Rory Johnston

Erik: Joining me now is Commodity context founder Rory Johnston. Rory boy,  we live in interesting times. We've got the situation in Venezuela, and I think a  bigger picture to talk about, which is overall President Trump has. Described an  agenda, which is, Hey, we've really gotta get oil prices down. It's very near and  

dear to his heart because it's one of the most important things for him to do in  order to secure the potential of not losing the house in the midterm elections. 

How would you score the the president in terms of using the best tools available  to him to bring prices down?  

Rory: It's a great way to kick it off and thanks for having me back on the  podcast. Eric 2026 is off to quite the start. So this question about Donald Trump  and using the various very real levers of the presidency in order to reduce the  price of oil, I would say that the president's actually been really bad at this to  date. 

I think if the president did nothing. The oil price would be considerably lower  today than it is right now. I think it's important to walk through why that is,  because I think that's actually a fairly, this is a claim that gets me a decent  amount of hate online. That people are like, no, of course listen to what Donald  Trump says. 

He clearly wants lower oil prices and look, he just conquered Venezuela in  order to get lower oil prices. Whatcha talking about? But what we've seen is  that. One of the things we've talked about, routinely, I think that we talked about  this last time I was on the podcast, that the global oil market has headed in  2025, particularly the latter half of 2025, into fairly pronounced oversupply, at  least on paper, that supply considerably outran demand by upwards of 3 million  barrels a day, which is for those that watch the oil market, a very large glut in  the oil market. 

But while prices have been broadly under pressure, they are by no means under  the degree of pressure you'd expect if that kind of surplus was bearing down on  stocks. And while there have been a couple different things that have prevented,  I think the. Full transmission of that glut into prices and term structure. 

So far, I think un undoubtedly the most important variable there has been  president Trump's considerable increase in both the volume and enforcement of  various sanctions throughout the oil market. Both, on Venezuela, on Iran, and  on Russia, and across all three of these countries you've seen considerable  buildups.

There's essentially really two ways you can judge. Efficacy of these sanctions,  and that's by observing both the price that these producers are getting, or  essentially what price their crude is clearing the market, and also looking at oil  and water, essentially. How much are their logistics getting backed up? And oil  and water has surged through the latter half of last year and in the last quarter of  last year. So Q4 of 25, you are building oil and water at a pace of around three  quarters of a million barrels a day across the three of those sanctioned  producers. That's a lot of oil and that alone takes almost a third of that of that  supply glut right off the market. 

And I think even though PE people will say look. Their barrels are obviously  being produced, which is true. But they're not. This is the difference between  production and supply. They're being produced, they're ending up on tankers,  but they're not actually available to supply any piece of the market. 

So you're getting that kind of double whammy of it not happening and also  rising on the side. So this is preventing or blunting that supply from hitting the  market, and that I think is the most direct way. The president has actually  affected the oil market to date is essentially by taking off a bunch of supply that  otherwise would've been there. 

So to that point, I think that if you're grading him on his ability to keep oil  prices low, I would say he has been to date. A bearish factor on oil prices sorry,  a bullish factor on oil prices. And prices would be much, much lower if he, or, if  Kamala Harris had won the presidency 'cause and presumably she would not  have been quite so harsh on various angles of this sanctioned kind of buildup. 

Erik: Now one of the counter arguments that you would hear to what you just  said is, Rory, haven't you been paying attention to the news? President Trump  just announced that Venezuela is about to hand over 32, maybe as much as 50  million barrels of oil right away, which has got to help the market. Rory does  

Venezuela have 50 million barrels of oil to hand over to Donald Trump. 

Rory: Yes and no. And I think it really depends on how we define what we're  looking at. And Eric, I think you and I actually interacted earlier this week or I  guess late last week on this question of like how much oil is actually floating  around out there on Venezuela. 'cause we were talking earlier about a lot of  Venezuela oil backing up on water. 

That's, I think, a piece of what the president has talked about, seizing his, what  I've called his kind of like pirate booty of his conquest of Venezuela. Is this 30  to 50 million barrels now. One of the things, and I think when you look at what 

he said it's very clear that at least in the president's mind, part of what he will be  grading himself on. 

And I think what we should also be grading him on, is whether or not you have,  whether or not Venezuela's oil production actually begins to recover. He's  basically said that Venezuelan oil production, the industry is essentially rotted  away for lack of foreign capital and because of domestic mismanagement,  which is all true. 

So presumably he wants that production to rebound fairly quickly, which again  goes to his claim of wanting lower oil prices. So one of the issues with  Venezuela and the blockade that he imposed is that you essentially backed up a  lot of pressure on those systems and without tankers to get rid of the crude. 

And with domestic storage tanks overflowing, you saw more and more pressure  for PDVSA, the national oil company to shut in production, which is going the  opposite way of what the president wants. So I think what Trump is saying or  claiming here is that, while before they even figure out what's happening with  all the sanctions and the blockade and everything else, we're just gonna quickly  take off that, 30 to 50 million barrels to relieve some pressure on the system  Now. 

You can cobble together, very charitably, a way to do this, but it's unlikely we're  gonna see that full volume of crude delivered to the Gulf. But I think regardless,  markets are now, I think, acting in a way where that is beginning. To show up  and in prices you've seen, for instance, while global Brent crude markets I, I  think are rising rallying pretty aggressively. 

And the backwardation at the front of the Brent Curve has turned decisively  bullish. Again, WTI is lingering on a weaker back foot, not quite able to get that  same bid. You've seen, especially heavy pressure on things like Western  Canadian select or heavy crude oil benchmarks in the US Gulf Coast, where  essentially from November levels you've rise you've widened from a differential  of about $4 a barrel under WTI for WCS at Houston to roughly around 8, 7 50  $8 a barrel in WTI at Houston. 

So that is, I think, is your evidence that there is some pressure coming there, but  this now we can get to the whole question of what does this mean for the future  of Venezuela? And is this a problem for Canada and these, incrementally, I  think the future of Venezuela is probably better without Nicolas Maduro at the  helm than with him at the helm.

But I think it's obviously much more complicated than just all of a sudden  Venezuela and oil production's just gonna start mooning going forward.  

Erik: It seems clear, Rory, from both President Trump's comments and as well  as Chris Wright's comments that, the agenda is very clear here. It's going to be  the government of the United States does everything possible to encourage US  oil companies, if not subsidize US oil companies to make massive investments  to rapidly bring that production in Venezuela back online. 

And the thing that seems. I guess surprising to me is most of the other things the  president has done seem to be temporarily focused on the midterm elections  now, at least according to our mutual friend, Dr. Alhajji. He did a podcast or I  guess a Twitter space is about this. He thinks that the most aggressive, no matter  how much money you throw at it. 

It would take at least three years to get just 1 million barrels per day of  Venezuelan production back online. And I don't think anybody disputes that  Venezuela has the, more reserves than anybody else. So over a long period of  time and a huge amount of investment, there's lots and lots of oil there. 

But Dr. Alhajji says. At best it's three years to get just 1 million barrels a day of  additional production. What's your take on that? Does it take that long? Does it  take less than that? Longer than that? What do you think?  

Rory: No, I think that's about right. I think one of the big questions is where are  you measuring the growth point from? 

Because I think one of the things that's happened with Venezuelan supply and  production in the market is that it's changed a lot over the last couple months.  So for instance, whether, Trump could claim a much larger victory, a much  larger growth pace if you're measuring off the low point of shut in production  due to the blockade, right? 

Trump can just remove the blockade and some of that will just bounce back  naturally. Now. If we're talking about, say, how can we get incremental growth  from say, October levels from before the blockade was really imposed, that I  think is gonna be a much harder sell. And I think that's where you're gonna get,  three, five plus years before you can really get a million barrels a day of  production. 

And again, this is talking, this is with 50 plus billion barrels of investment. This  is with everyone beginning work very quickly or immediately none of which is 

currently happening. But I do think that you can probably get. A piece of that,  say two, 300,000 barrels a day, probably quicker than that. 

Maybe, a year, maybe 18 months. That would be more mostly focused on  Chevron's operations and essentially squeezing out what else you can get from  the current system. But I think. After that immediate low hanging fruit is  exhausted, that's when you move to this question of, okay, now we need to  repair pipelines. 

We need to fully begin to refurbish fields. We need full workovers, we need, all  the other things. We need more diluent coming in the market. We need  upgraders back up and running. This is when you start to get this really heavy.  Mountain of pent up investment demand that has yet to be kinda satiated. 

And the further you go down, the harder and harder it gets because eventually  you run into things like the Venezuelan power market, like the power grid is  deeply. Unreliable and, prone to blackouts, that's not a good way to run  upgraders and refineries and various other components of the industry. 

So when you get to that stage, that is obviously you need to fix like the entire  country's power grid. So these are obviously extremely difficult, expensive  things to do, and that I think is where you're gonna start to run into more  pushback or reticence among the people and the companies that would be  required to do that investment. 

I think you saw that this past Friday when Trump and Wright, Etc, all had the,  collection of oil industry executives gather for this press conference about what  the future of Venezuela was. And you saw a fairly broad spread. You saw  everyone there. You saw everyone from upstream companies, service  companies, refiners, trading companies, Etc. 

And I think each of those. Had a very different view of how optimistic they  were coming down the line. For instance, Chevron, which most listeners would  know has been in Venezuela, never left Venezuela, was able to work at a deal  with the Chavez and then, and the Mado government, and was able to cut  sanctions, waiver deals with, the Biden administration. 

And now again, the Trump administration, they think that, I think reasonably so  they can get, it's all upside for them because they've held on. Against all odds to  their Venezuelan assets. That I think will be some upside for them. But other  companies like Exxon is the one that coming outta that meeting had all of the 

headlines about it was saying it was, the quote was that Venezuela in its current  state is uninvestible. 

And talking about, the long, slow work of rebuilding institutions and rebuilding  the rule of law and rebuilding a culture that respects contracts and kind of  continuity of government. These are obviously. Much more difficult things and  things that the President can't just snap his fingers and say voila. 

Other companies, I think, I'm sure, trading companies are gonna be all over this.  You had Trafigura and Vitol at the meetings were very enthusiastic about,  essentially acting as the White House's broker of Venezuelan, repossessed and  resold Venezuelan oil. They're very enthusiastic with that. 

Unsurprisingly, I think overall, refining companies seemed happy to have more  heavy crude availability. But in terms of companies that were jumping over  themselves to get in and really make those hard investments, no, that happens  much slower. And then we get to this question of, okay would you have  subsidies? 

The one thing that they said in the. The meetings was, Trump committed to  some quote unquote security guarantee, but obviously the next day the State  Department advised all Americans to leave Venezuela because of the security  situation. There's a carton that a horse and a cart situation here, and I don't think  the president knows which one comes first. 

Erik: Let's go back in the short term to this 30 to 50 million barrels of oil that's  supposedly about to be handed over. First of all I think there's a psychological  effect that we're used to talking about oil supply in barrels per day of  production. This is not per day. This is a one time thing. 

So if we did hypothetically get 30 million barrels all at once, okay, that's 1  million barrels a day for just one month, and that's it. And so in terms of  context, it's not very much oil, but even if we said. Okay. 30 million barrels still.  That's, something to throw at the market, at least short term. 

Maybe that'll bump the price down a little bit and overcome some of the upside  that we've seen in the last couple of weeks. But hang on, where is this oil, first  of all? Does it exist? And if it exists, where does it exist? Because from the  Twitter exchange that I had with you and Dr. Anas. It sounds Anas was saying  there's really only about 11 million barrels is the most that they have.

And then somebody else, I don't re remember if it was you or someone else said  wait a minute. No, they've got more. It's in floating storage, but it's not in  Venezuela, it's in Asia. And I'm thinking to myself, oh yeah, so the Chinese are  gonna say, oh, that's Venezuelan oil. Send it back. How does this work?  

Rory: You know if you're looking at the barrels, actually physically off the  coast of Venezuela, you're probably looking at somewhere between 10 and 15  million barrels, depending on whose estimate you're using. But it's not  obviously the full 30 to 50, you've probably got another 10 or so at various  stages of transit throughout the world and floating around, waiting to be  delivered into China. 

I think that's probably what is being referred to by the president here, mixed  with some additional. Volumes that have built up on land in Venezuela as part  of this attempt to not shut in production. So they've been filling onshore  production and or onshore storage in production areas. So I think that's probably  what we're talking about, but just again, to reiterate. 

So far this, this volume of oil, it's been taken off the market by Trump in the  first place. So this would essentially be a debt almost that's being repaid. So it's  only a million barrels a day for a month. But that theoretical, I think you it in  another way. You could say that, let's say Venezuela starts producing and  flowing again, that could theoretically double Venezuela supply to the market  for one month. 

I think it's another way of framing the same thing, which again, to this point that  right now we're feeling a lot of these weird idiosyncratic, seemingly one-off  supply disruptions, whether or not it's Venezuela. We're gonna talk, I'm sure  about what's happening in Kazak flows. The CPC terminal or , Russia or Iran. 

These are all theoretically supplies that have been lost to the market that will.  The assumption is not that they're going to be permanently offline, so eventually  they're not just going to come back online. But in the case of Venezuela's  floating storage or built up oil and water, you could theoretically double the  pace at which that supplies for a certain number of months. 

Erik: Okay, so really what we're talking about is Trump took a bunch of oil off  the market with his blockade. That oil got trapped in Venezuela, and what he is  really saying now is about that oil that I trapped through my military operations  and prevented you from exporting that you've got. Piled up however much there  

is there, and let's inflate it, then exaggerate the amount by a President Trump  factor.

Whatever that number is we'll take it and you'll give it to us. And that's what's  going on there. But it's probably not a full 50 million barrels. Now. Meanwhile,  in other news president Trump seems to be encouraging Iranian protestors to.  Continue protesting and it seems like he's almost trying to spark a bigger  conflict or even civil war in Iran. 

I think most people are assuming that is a precursor to some kind of military  intervention from the US and Iran. Do. Would you agree with that? Do you  think that's what's coming next and in what timeframe?  

Rory: I think it definitely seems like that's what the market is currently  assuming, and I think at this stage, given what we've seen both from. 

The Prime President Trump regarding Iran as recently as last summer where  they dropped 14 bunker busters on various nuclear Iranian nuclear facilities.  And then we obviously saw a fairly unprecedented capture of Nicolas Maduro  and Venezuela. I think at this stage, he views those two interventions is wildly  successful as kind of proof of American power, which I think so far. 

Has only, and I think will continue to embolden him until one of these  interventions goes badly. So I would say at this stage it seems reasonably likely  that the president is going to do something here. And I, and while it's still, I  mean if we're just flashing back. To this past June when you had the 12 Day  Israel Iran War that's when obviously prices got really spiky again, I think for a  good reason. 

You had act, you had missiles flying around the region. But again, I think at this  stage when we, whenever we get to talking about Iran. You're talking about? I  think when we're talking about the price impact, and I think a lot of what we've  seen over the past, call it three, four days of trading in oil as we've rallied  roughly $5 a barrel higher. 

A lot of that has been a Ron risk, particularly running into a fairly overstretched  short. Positioning market positioning situation in the oil market. And just for  those, again, for those that don't know that, we're always talking about massive  amounts of oil traveling through the strait of hormoz. 

So even though it remains this like really. Minuscule tail risk. I think even a  one, two, 3% move in the probability of something happening in or around the  strait is worth a lot to the oil market, particularly in what we'd call this sense of  like precautionary demand. So you have these companies traders, Etc, that are  bidding up the front, particularly the Brent Curve, worried about.

The loss of these barrels. I think particularly coming at a moment that we're also  seeing, still tightness in Venezuelan supplies tightness in Russian supplies,  tightness in Kazak, supplies outta the ccpc terminal. All these things are keeping  the market tighter. And now you have this worry about the situation in the,  again, and all of this. 

It's, if it's starting to sound a lot like 2015, I think you're paying attention. It's  the same idea that. We have this overarching consensus view of. A surplus. It's  about to hit the market at any moment. It's this freight train running at you. And  then each single month you have some kind of shock that comes in it, whether  it's whether it's a CBC terminal outage, whether it's the Venezuela blockade,  whether it's before that the sanctions by Trump against Rosneft and Luke Oil,  Russia's two largest oil exporting companies. 

These things are still having these ripple effects to the market are keeping. All  that prompt supply tied up in knots in ways that it's really not able to fully bear  down on prices. So again, back to this point of is Donald Trump bullish or  bearish? I would say, again, he's bullish for prices because absent these knots,  we would've a lot more barrels trying to actually clear the market. 

But as of yet, they're all still, wrapped up in varying degrees of logistical legal  sanctions. Red tape.  

Erik: Now Rory, you are based in Canada. You're a Canadian citizen. I want to  ask you an awkward question, which is look it used to be that if someone said  the United States sometimes engages in regime change operations for the sake. 

Of taking oil from from countries by removing the government that's in charge  and replacing it with a different one. That was just crazy conspiracy talk. It  seems like the president's not really hiding the fact that his agenda is very much  to resources and certainly the folks in Greenland are very, acutely aware of this  right now, that he's not afraid to say, look, we think that we should have this.  We think it's in the world's best interest. We think we've decided that it's in the  Greenland people's best interest. Not necessarily checking with them to see  what they think, but just deciding for them it's in their best interest. 

It's best for everybody, and it's really important because it's really about the  development of the Arctic, including. Oil exploration in the Arctic. What  President Trump is saying is, we need Greenland because in, in it, please, what  President Trump is saying is the United States needs Greenland because if they  don't get it, if the United States doesn't get it.

Then Russia and China will, and it's gonna change the balance of power in a  way that's unhealthy for the world. And hey, I'm just doing the, president Trump  feels that he's just doing the right thing for the whole planet by telling the  people of Greenland that this is in your best interest, even if you don't think so. 

How do you guys in Canada feel about this, considering that you also have the  other big landmass that goes up into the polar region? If you were talking about  Arctic exploration acquiring Canada and President. Trump's words as the 51st  state would seem to achieve that goal just as well as getting Greenland would. 

It used to be crazy to think that there would ever be any overt pressure or forced  action for the United States to want to annex any part of Canada anyway, for  heaven's sakes. We're we excellent allies? Always have been. What are  Canadians thinking these days about all of that?  

Rory: It's certainly not lost on, on. 

Canadians, I think what's happening? I think. In a way it's Canada is both as  large heavy oil resources like Venezuela does, and it has a obviously large  mining and arctic kind of territorial expanse, much like Greenland does. So  there's obviously a lot of parallels here. 

I think the way I think about it is a couple different ways. I think on the first.  Simplest, geopolitical lens. Yeah. I think if we're, if you view kind of North  America as your risk board Venezuela kind of secures your entrance to North  America from the south and Greenland, from Europe. 

Canada's obviously an important piece of that entire continental control. So  yeah, that's obviously an obvious point of concern I think. In terms of assuming  that the level, I would say that we still feel relatively safer that our, no matter  what opinion you have of Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, I don't think  anyone believes that he's, the head of a narco terrorist syndicate. 

So I think that, you would at least need to create some other pretext there. But I  think what we have seen is this discussion increasing. The next thing that's  gonna be bearing on US Canada relations is going to be the renegotiation of U S-M-C-A or a Canadian call north of the border Uzma. 

We put the sea at the front, of course. Which is, I think, again, your sign of how  unified that that trade deal was. I think that each of the countries had their, has  their own name for the same deal. But that's the, that renegotiation is what's  going to be coming next. And I think one of the interesting things that's 

happened over the past year it wasn't, it was just a year ago that we were talking  about how, Trump was thinking about imposing tariffs on Canadian crude oil  experts in the United States. 

And despite. Pushback from essentially every corner of the industry. They  actually did impose tariffs on Canadian crude access for a day or two until the  U-S-M-C-A exemptions kicked in. But I think that, there's this feeling of, did  Trump feel like reality put him in a bind? 

I think there was a similar feeling of when he tried to go really hard against  China and then there was this, that rare earth's kind of export ban blow up that  kind of felt like he got, kinda got his hands tied by these physical mark  constraints. I think one of the things that's interesting heading into these  renegotiations is. 

I will, I can tell you many different ways in which Venezuela does not replace  Canada in terms of the US' crude slate in terms of energy security, Etc, Etc. I  think what you've seen is amongst the coalition of actors underpinning President  Trump, call it the broad MAGA movement, you've seen a very heavy anti  Canada kind of political tone take hold, and particularly after Trump. 

Captured Nicolas Maduro, last weekend, two weekends ago now. Ever since  that happened, you basically, there were comments around how, oh, now we  don't need Canada because we have another country with very large heavy oil  resources. But just on that, just I have to do my Canadian duty to 60 seconds  and say that's, you can. 

You're gonna see additional competition in the US Gulf Coast, but those  Venezuelan barrels, Venezuela produces less than a quarter of what Canada  exports regularly to the United States. It can't get into the Midwest because all  the pipelines point south, Etc, Etc Etc. But I think that what you have seen in  the Trump administration is that reality doesn't always. 

Bind as we've seen even with talking about Trump and and what he wants  international or US oil companies to do in Venezuela. It doesn't really matter  what they say. It matters more like his perceived vibe is. And I think right now  there's a perception among his coalition that having Venezuela as potentially the  51st state, so Canada would get bumped to, the threat of 52nd State. 

That I think becomes a, they believe that to be a point of leverage. So even if it  isn't physically a point of leverage, I don't think that matters. I think that the 

Trump administration's gonna come into these renegotiations with a feeling of  an advantage in Venezuela they didn't have last time around. 

Erik: Now one of the ideas that's been floated by Chris Wright, I think, or  maybe it came from President Trump, I'm not sure, was using any oil from  Venezuela to refill the strategic petroleum reserve. That actually seems like a  strategically good idea to me because the oil that the US is most dependent on,  in addition to the oil is produced in the United States, is blend stock. 

The heavy blend stock that's needed into mix with that very light. Bachan shale  oil in order to to be able to refine it in our refineries. What do you think about  the idea of using Venezuelan oil to refill the strategic petroleum reserve? Is  there enough supply from Venezuela to actually do that? 

'cause of course, the SPR is much bigger than the 30 to 50 million barrels that  they're talking about. Is that a realistic thing? And if so, is it a good idea?  

Rory: I think, to your point, I think that as an example, like this 30 to 50 million  barrels, I think, if we're talking about what the most strategic thing the United  States could do with it. 

Yeah. I think given that we've consistently talked about how one of the  limitations to limiting or to refilling the SPR is the lack of congressional  appropriations to do the lack of money to actually buy the oil. Suddenly. If  Trump claims that, Venezuela has turned over 30 to 50 million barrels, that is,  roughly market prices, two and a half billion barrels, sorry, two and a half  billion dollars on the upside. 

That's the 50 worth of oil, which is actually double the amount they even  initially tried to get from Congress in the last, kinda a big, beautiful bill before it  got hacked down to I think only a hundred something million. But yeah, I think  it's actually it's not a bad idea. 

The trouble is that, to my knowledge, and I've chatted with a few people that  know more about the SPR than I do. But I think to my knowledge, the merry  crude or your kind of heavy Venezuelan crude exports don't really match the  spec well of what's in the SPR, which is typically more of a medium sour barrel,  

more like your. 

Mars or Poseidon Barrel your ASCI kind of blends if those that are more  familiar with the US Gulf. But I think what could be interesting is there is  precedent before that the, oil that has been. Let's say put into the possession of 

the United States Federal government in the past that could be, for instance,  through royalty in kind programs where, the government actually got physical  barrels in exchange for production royalties rather than a cut of profits. 

In the, in prior moments that has been essentially exchanged a barrel for a barrel  or a barrel for a fraction of barrel or whatever for grades that are more  conducive to the US SPR, I think that is an interesting possibility here because  obviously the administration has not been very successful at getting those  congressional appropriations to refill the SPR. 

They've had other budget priorities whenever that's been going on. And I think  this, given that the, Trump administration has so front and center frame this  around oil and strategic energy security and everything else. I think that  obviously makes sense from a narrative kind of cohesiveness point. But again, I  think they would need to do some kind of. 

Roundabout maneuver in order to do that and end up with crude, that's actually  useful to the SPR.  

Erik: So let's try to bring this conversation around to things that our audience  can actually trade. We've got a pretty I don't know, it's the first time in how  many months that we've not only. 

Come off of that $55 very strong support level, but we're above 60, at least as  we're speaking on Tuesday afternoon as we're recording this, when's the last  time we were above 60 on WTI? It looks to me like we just barely touched it  briefly sometime in Dec early December. Before that, it goes off off one of my  charts I'm looking at, I'd have to look back to what sometime in October was the  last time before that.  

Rory: Yeah I'm looking at Brent the last time. We're at 65 40 on Brent right  now, which the last time we were there was in late October.  

Erik: Is this, has this rally got legs? Is this the beginning of something big? Or  is this one of those geopolitical rallies that you wanna fade? Because as soon as  the geopolitics come down, you know we're gonna retrace the whole thing back  down to 55. 

Rory: So my bias here is that it's the latter. It's this geopolitical again, this is  Iran, this is CPC. And again, we, I keep mentioning the CPC pipeline. So just  again, 60 seconds of what I'm talking about there. The CPC or the Caspian 

Pipeline Consortium Pipeline, which is essentially the way. 80% of  Kazakhstan's oil gets to market. 

This was, it's a pipeline that comes outta Russian territory that has historically  been safer than some of the other Russian ports. But in Nov in late November  Ukraine bombed the loading points the single point moorings that the facility  

uses to ship on. And essentially that's had this massive blowback effect and  taken upwards of a third of kaza production off the market in January so far. 

So there's also this there's a bunch of these compounding supply losses that are  keeping the market much tighter than it would otherwise be. So I'd say all else  equal the assumption is that those will not remain forever going forward. That,  

that, right now. LA based on later number that I'm seeing, you're looking at  Kazakhstan's production down to roughly a million barrels a day through the  first half of January, down from 1.75 million barrels a day in November. 

So that's, we're talking huge chunky losses. Presumably then Kazakhstan's  gonna wanna get that back up. So as long as Ukraine doesn't continue to bomb  the CBC terminal or tankers as they did today, that were heading to the CBC  terminal that should normalize. But I think the challenge with saying that is that. 

We've been saying that for a little while now, that these one-off things keep  happening repeatedly, and I think to a degree it's useful to just think of just a, a  theoretical regime to talk about how we're, how, what we're seeing right now,  which is we have a fundamentally weak oil market, which in my mind has  emboldened and facilitated particularly President Trump to take ever more  volatile, destabilizing policy actions in the market 

Yes, eventually this should all roll over and then we get the glut and the prices  grind lower and we go fully into Contango on the curve. But so far, these, he's,  Trump seems quite committed to continuing to pressure these various countries  

and I think as we've seen him emboldened by his, at least ostensible, thus far,  success in Venezuela. 

How far is he gonna go? In supporting the Iranian protestors, how far is he  going to go in, pushing harder on Russia. And I think all of this in the context  of, I don't know if you saw Eric earlier today but Donald Trump came out and  said that he really wished he could see oil go back down to $53 a barrel again. 

That's a very specific target in the president's mind, which I'll note is $3 a barrel  higher than his target used to be? So maybe that we can, maybe he is  acknowledging his own his own bullish slant on the market over time. 

Erik: Rory, could it be that? What's going on here is President Trump is trying  to do a calculated, risk management move where he says, okay, what he really  needs in terms of oil prices is that $53 number that he's talking about before the  midterm elections. 

And therefore, let's go fast and furious, bill. China shop, Donald Trump style,  do all of the geopolitical upsetting that he might be inclined to do early. Get it  over with in January, and then give the market time to calm down as we get,  into summer driving season. And the other pressures that tend to take us back  up in oil prices have it all over with so that we're in the blow off phase and  we're retracing, as you said. 

Could it be that he's just trying to get all of his, geopolitical upsetting, done and  over with.  

Rory: It's not a bad idea. If that was actually, what if there was a, a National  Security Council meeting or a National Economic Council meeting and like  someone said this should be the strategy. 

I think it's not a bad strategy because again, I think that this is the period of the  year where prices are going to be weakest when balances were weakest. That  provided you additional fundamental support for doing various supply side  destabilizing moves. I think even if you wanted to go one step further, even  more galaxy brained here, I think there's a factor that, Trump obviously says he  wants low prices speaking to that consumer sentiment around cost of living and  pump price pain, Etc, Etc. 

But I think what you've seen. If you're, if you wanna be purely rational about it.  I, I've come to really like this theory of essentially this like parabola of political  price pressure. That when you get. Over. So there's really compelling research  that was done by Brookings that showed negative media mentions that  essentially as you get above $3 and 50 cents a gallon for us pump prices,  negative mentions in media, which I think both reflect and further drive  consumer sentiment around these pump prices builds up rapidly after you hit  above three 50. 

But that doesn't, it basically flat lines under three 50. Like you don't get this  commensurate. It's not like people get happier for $3 or two 50 gas. So that I  think is interesting because it, you, your downside payoff is less it's almost like  a prospect curve that the, consumers overweight their losses and they don't  really give you the benefit of their upside.

If it's better than that. On the flip side, you have us producers that, if they go  from $90 a barrel to $60 a barrel on crude, maybe they go from making  gangbuster profits to only scraping by. That's obviously unpopular, but it's much  more painful to go from 60 to say. 40 or 30 where you go from, not it, it is from  breaking even to like outright bankruptcy or worrying about layoffs and  winding up your company, that becomes much more painful. 

So I think if you got much below 50 for any durable period, even below 60 for a  durable period as we saw, I think the pushback from. Trump's base in the oil  sector, which I think has felt reasonably and understandably burned, but I think  still naturally gravitates towards. Coalition for, let's say the upcoming midterms. 

So I think there could be an attempt to balance those competing factions and  don't get too offside on either one of those kind of rising parabola of pump price  pain or or barrel pain on the producer side. But I think at the end of the day, the  one thing I'll say is that I think all of this we can. 

Trump does so many things and says so many things that I think it's easy to  overfit a theory onto him. But I do worry that this, I think the other side is that I  think it's just reasonable to think that he is just winging it, that he wants pro, he  wants prices to be lower and you know he says that, but he does a bunch of stuff  that increases the price with sanctions and everything else without fully  recognizing why. 

And he'll just post about how, if you were a patriot, you would bid the price of  oil lower or something like that. So I think I, I do worry about overfitting and  giving him too much credit for having a consistent strategy here. 'cause I just  don't know if that's the case. 

Erik: I wanna get a little bit more technical here because this is where I think  the best trading opportunities are in this market. Last time I had you on, I don't  remember how long ago it was or maybe it was two interviews ago. You and I  had both noticed something that we thought was quite unusual in the shape of  

the forward curve, the term structure of WTI, crude oil, which is all, it's they  call it a curve for a reason. 

It's usually curved. And what we noticed, both of us was, eh, it's funny. It's like  there's really, pronounced backwardation right to one specific contract. And I  think it was actually right now around January of 26, and then all of a sudden  there's like a, a very sudden bend in the curve and it's all contango after that.

And we were both kind of scratching our heads saying, why that specific month,  why not the usual curvature that you would see there? It's happened again,  Rory. If you look at the WTI curve right now it's exactly as you and I predicted  at that time. You and I have said, wait a minute, that contango that you see after  January of 26, that's gonna flip into backwardation, at least at the front of the  curve. 

That's exactly what's happened, but now it's March of 27. Just about one year  out. 'cause we're just flipping from the February to the March contract and the  contract role that's coming in the next week. All of a sudden, that's the inflection  point. Why are these funny shaped curves happening at odd months where all of  a sudden that there's that abrupt shift from backwardation to contango? 

And specifically what you and I thought at that time was okay, it means the  trade is. To buy the spread that started at that time in January 26th. By January  26th through January 27, that calendar spread and expect it to flip from  contango into backwardation is the it would be the the H seven. 

H eight the March of 27 to March of 28 one year calendar spread, which is all in  contango. I, is that a ripe trade to expect that over the next year to switch into  backwardation? And if so how does that compare with trading the front, the flat  price on the front month?  

Rory: So I think one thing that's interesting that you've seen, and you've seen  this almost. 

Almost every month since April, since last, since last April when Trump  announced his Liberation Day tariffs. And this is, I think when this whole, at  that point you got the add-on of opec adding all that, crude back to the market.  This is when the global glut thesis really took hold very rapidly. 

And what you've seen really interestingly, pretty much every single month  since, is that for the first half of the month. The front of the curve weakens you  basically flirt with flipping into prompt contango, and then something happens  in the middle of the month, whether or not it's Ukrainian attacks on the CPC or  it's Trump sanctions against Russian oil majors or anything else. 

This, it's just the moment that you basically get the shock higher, and then  basically at the end of the month you always end back and fairly pronounced.  Backwardation only for that to begin sliding again the next month. And  essentially it's this recycled, it's this yo-yo up and down.

Flat prices had I think a bit more of a range, like a trend to it. But if you just, if  you're just looking at prompt time spreads or or even let's say the front couple  time spreads along the crude curve that has been a cyclical thing every single  month that it goes. Lower and then higher and lower and then higher. 

And I think I've joked with some, friends, analysts that are they're watching  someone in the White House is watching for when this curve is about to flip  into contango. And that's when they're like, aha, that's when we'll announce the  next section against against Roz n Luko or whatever. 

And I think that's something that's been thoroughly consistent. Now what's  interesting about this cycle is that. Got started much earlier in the month, about  a week earlier than it has in prior months, and this is when Iran got started up.  So I think if we were to follow this back to it, if this was to repeat itself, I would  expect this, us to remain heavy and hot on the, at the front of the curve up until  the end of the month. 

Then begin to essentially fall back down again as the market says, okay, is this  the month when we finally begin to see that surplus arrive on shore? And again,  until it, it's going to happen eventually. It's just a question of how many more  months we kick it down the road because each one of these crises, for most of  them at least it's not a complete change in narrative. 

It's just a, essentially you're either delaying that barrel from going to the market.  Which means you get a double whammy down the line or you're just,  preventing it from hitting right now. And I think that's what we're looking to see  is that these barrels will eventually hit. We just don't know when. 

So I think the market's gonna keep waiting every single month to say, is this  contango month? Is this contango month? And then as soon as something  happens, in this case, Iran and prior cases, it was something else. It was  Venezuela. That I think is the cycle that we're gonna keep following here. 

Erik: Rory, I want to come back briefly to this whole regime change question  that we discussed earlier in this interview, just because of some news that's  happened while we were speaking and now of course, the idea that the US  would ever engage in regime change operations for the sake of getting the oil is  obviously preposterous, ridiculous, crazy conspiracy talk that could never  happen. 

However just after the market closes on Tuesday as we were speaking, Chris  Wright announces, quote, the US would happily partner with Iran on oil if the 

regime ends. Now this is not a regime change operation of course, but just,  hypothetically, if the regime did end, the US would happily partner with Iran on  oil. 

Any comments on that? And as a Canadian any concerns?  

Rory: Yeah, I think I, I'm even, I haven't even seen the comment come across  the line yet, but it sounds very similar to what we've heard from other what  we've heard from Wright and others about Venezuela. 

I think there is this definite interests, and I think we haven't even really talked  about what these subsidies or, they also talked about potentially putting like  equity investments into US oil companies. Like we're going down this weird.  Kind of state capitalist, fusion line that I think is like very unfamiliar to more  modern markets but is like very almost cliche to like imperial markets. 

And I think that's what this is starting to feel like is, regime change with the  kind of the catch of and will get, traffic and vitol or whomever to market your  crude for whatever regime replaces you, But I think The thing that we have  seen, and I think this is something that has been relatively consistent despite  Trump's kind of bravado on foreign policy, is they have not like the, we're still a  far ways away from, say, your Bush era neoconservative democracy, promotion,  regime change kind of sentiment that. 

Very briefly was the thought in Venezuela with getting rid of Nicolas Maduro.  Obviously, Marco Rubio Secretary, secretary of State, has been a very long  running Venezuela regime, change hawk, and I think representing a fairly core  constituency of that kind of South Florida vote. Whether it's Venezuelan,  diaspora or Cuban diaspora populations, but again, what we've seen very  quickly there is that, very quickly Trump decided, actually no, we're, we don't,  it would be harder to deal with, say, a new Democratic opposition taking power  in Venezuela. 'cause that's destabilizing and that's messy and that's hard. So  mine as well, just, even in Venezuela, it's, we're just dealing with Delcy  Rodriguez, who is the Maduro's vice president and oil minister, notably here. 

That I think is, it's easier. That's let's just deal with the people we know. And I  think there's this question of like, why would that be any different in Iran? So I  think right now it's taking this this sound of democracy promotion and  supporting the protesters. But what we've seen historically from Trump is like a  fairly, rote willingness to.

Collaborate with whomever ends up being holding the keys to power at the end  of this, in which, in, in this case is, would that just be the IRGC or whomever  else? It's not necessarily that the protestors going to automatically get the keys  to the government, and I don't know if Trump is interested in the messy long  term post conflict reconstruction work that would be involved with something  like that. 

In Iran or Venezuela, which is, I think right now we're in this moment where  this stuff could turn into just a game of musical chairs and, the next strong man  goes into power and that strong man's a little bit more favorable to Trump and a  very, very familiar kind of, coup to desperate that's more favorable to  Washington vibe that we've seen from the United States over prior decades. 

I think that's not, at least what we're hearing from the White House right now.  So it'll be interesting to see where this goes, but I don't think that he has the  appetite for the kind of follow through that would be required there. And I, who  else is gonna be controlling Iranian oil after the Ayatollah Falls? 

Again, I don't think it's any of the protestors at this point.  

Erik: Rory, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. But before we  close, I wanna ask you to tell us a little bit about commodity context, your  company, what you do there. I know that you just wrote an excellent piece,  really giving your readers a, a, a. 

A perspective on this whole situation in a little bit more depth than we had time  to cover here on what's going on with Venezuela. Could we have your  permission to share that with our listeners in the research roundup email? And if  so, we will share it with them and please tell us what you do and how people  can find out more about your services. 

Rory: Absolutely. I, appreciate you sharing the research and for anyone that's  interested, commodity context is a research outlet where I provide all of my  thoughts on oil markets evolving as this market continues to roll forward. Got  three main different types of research on commodity context, which is a oil  context weekly, which is published every week around Friday at 4:00 PM  Eastern after Markets close. 

That kind of brings a roundup of essentially what nonsense has happened the  week and how oil markets have begun to process it. I've got three different  monthly data heavy reports, which are called data decks which are on global oil  balances, opec production compliance, everything else as well as a more 

detailed look around flows around North America, as well as on top of this, I  also offer an advisory service to higher touch clients and a data service for those  clients as well that look, they wanna provide a kind of a deeper data driven  backend that drives my own research head over to commoditycontext.com. We'd love to have you and and let's keep following this market together,  

Erik: and you can find a link to Rory's report on the situation in Venezuela in  this week's research roundup email. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as Macro  Voices continues right here at macrovoices.com.