Art Berman — Energy industry consultant (as introduced on the show)
Intro and welcome
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome to MacroVoices, episode 3, recorded February 25th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We have another great show lined up for you. Energy industry consultant Art Berman joins me as today's featured guest. We offered you a choice of a conventional interview or a special format more akin to listening in on a meeting between 2 finance professionals, and you, our listeners, chose the latter. I think you're really going to enjoy the result.
Market wrap: equity rally likely over
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, continued wild swings in equities. We saw an impressive rally in the S&P early in the week, and then yesterday, Wednesday, February 24th, we saw the benchmark index swan dive and briefly dip below 1,887 before a bounce in the banks led a nearly 50-point intraday recovery.
Meanwhile, we're still seeing a strong correlation with crude. Help us make sense of all of this.
Erik Townsend: Well, I thought that this move in the rally in equities, which I'm convinced is a combination of a short squeeze and a relief rally, I thought it was going to be over when it hit the 50-day moving average. And that's exactly where it stopped on Wednesday. Thursday, we traded below the 50-day moving average. We only just peeked our head above it. As news hit the oil market, which I think will be temporary. So I still think that even though we have moved above the 50-day moving average, the equity rally is probably just about over here. Obviously, it's impossible to call these things exactly, but I think this rally has pretty much run out of steam, and I'm waiting for it to reverse back to the downside.
Market wrap: crude oil, Russia and the production-freeze talk
Nathan Egger: All right, well, let's cover the crude oil next. Obviously, your discussion with this week's featured guest, Art Berman, is going to take us deep into the fundamentals of the oil market. But let's just get a quick market update now. You said last week that oil prices should turn lower, but that another rumor out of Russia could cause another price spike. Who's winning this week, the supply-demand fundamentals or the spin doctors?
Erik Townsend: The spin doctors are winning, especially as we're recording now. We've seen a $2 move in the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures in the last hour. And that's as of just coming into the pit close now on Thursday afternoon as we're taping this interview. It's amazing, Nathan. You know, as I've described before, we had supposedly a meeting that was to talk about a production cut. That led nowhere. Saudi Arabia laughed the other countries out of the room and said, we're not going to cut production. That's ridiculous. They said that they would agree to freeze production at January levels. That's record January levels. It's a meaningless statement, because to freeze production at a level which you are incapable of increasing beyond anyway, Doesn't mean anything.
So I thought this was dying out. Then what we got early Monday morning was an announcement from Russia that they think these discussions about a freeze could be wrapped up as early as March. Well, it's no surprise that those conversations could be wrapped up as early as March because there's nothing to converse about. There is no production cut that's imminently going to happen. I think that this process might eventually lead to that. in several months' time, but it's not happening now.
On Tuesday— and we have CERA this week. CERA is a big oil industry event in Houston, Texas. All of the bigwigs, everybody from the Saudi oil minister, all the big players in the oil industry are in Houston. So the Iranian minister gets up, and I'm so proud of the guy.
Art Berman: He—
Erik Townsend: to borrow momentarily from the Boston vernacular, where I'm from originally, What he said to his colleagues with respect to a production cut that Iran would participate in was essentially, what are you guys, retarded? He said, this is ridiculous, utterly ridiculous. Iran is in the process— sanctions have just been lifted. They want to aggressively ramp up to their former production highs. And I think they have indicated a little bit of willingness if they were allowed to get to their target first, they might be open to discussing a joint production cut at that point.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: But they have used the word ridiculous to describe this entire conversation.
Then on Wednesday, Saudi Saudi Arabia dismissed the chance of a production cut, saying no way, not going to happen. Looked like finally fundamentals gravity was going to set in and we were going to have correction to the downside, which I think is long overdue. Then conveniently, not during. business hours over in the Middle East or anything that would make sense when these people ought to be awake, but rather just an hour before the close of pit trading in New York, the Venezuelan oil minister announces that he's going to have a meeting in mid-March with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other oil producers. Instantly we got a $2 screaming rally out of that statement. I ask a few rhetorical questions. A meeting about what? To discuss what? It is brutally clear that nobody is ready to talk about a production cut. The production freeze is inane nonsense that doesn't mean anything.
So at this stage in the game, we've seen Russia successfully elevate the oil price by about $6 or $7 on average from its January 20th low to where it is today. And that $7 times a month times 10 million barrels per day is a lot of money for Russia. So my hat is off to the Russians for doing an astonishingly effective job at confusing this market with abject nonsense that has nothing to do with anything. And it's working. And so oil prices are still about $10 higher than I think they should be. They're going to stay there until the fundamentals kick back in. And we get out of this silly talk that we're having about production cuts.
Nathan Egger: Are you telling me that the Russians are good at propaganda?
Erik Townsend: They are rather accomplished at that.
Market wrap: gold and false-breakout risk
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, more on crude later. Moving on to gold. 2 weeks ago, you and Jim Rogers both expressed concern that we may have been seeing a false breakout and/or blow-off top in the gold market. You told us to watch to see whether the market could break out to yet another high above $1,260. How are things looking now?
Erik Townsend: Well, we've definitely seen some strength in gold in the last day or two. Still, though, at $1,235 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon, I want to see this breakout continue above the previous high. I think there's still a good chance that that will happen.
My skepticism, again, as I've said in the past, is that in the beginning of the 2008 crisis, gold was up, but then gold sold off hard with everything else. And if, as I believe, we're at the beginning of what could be a very deep and uncomfortable rout in equity markets, I think there's a good chance that once it really gets going, gold is going to get taken with it, even though it doesn't make sense on a fundamental level. That's what happened last time. And it's basically just a matter of when things really get tough, people start selling everything that isn't tied down so they can meet their margin calls, whether it logically makes sense or not.
Market wrap: Treasury yields
Nathan Egger: All right. And finally, in the fixed income space, I saw Treasury yields backed up a little in sympathy with the earlier week rally in the stock market that we discussed, rallied back to the 50-day moving average. If we're to expect the stock market to roll over from here, does that mean we should also expect even lower Treasury yields in the coming months?
Erik Townsend: I think it does mean precisely that, Nathan. I think that we're likely to see a continued safety trade, both domestically as the stock market rolls over, which, of course, I could be wrong about that. If the stock market goes straight up from here, then presumably Treasury yields are going to reflect that also. But I think the most likely scenario is the rally in the equity market is done or almost done. It's going to roll over soon, and when it does, I think that bond prices are headed higher and therefore bond yields headed lower. I wouldn't be at all surprised before this year is out if we retest that 2010 2012 low of 1.36% on the 10-year yield.
Format change: this week's show becomes part 1 of 2
Nathan Egger: Well, thank you, as always, for the market perspective, Erik. I've been waiting for weeks to hear your discussion with Art Berman, and I know from feedback in our discussion forums that quite a few listeners are excited about this new fly-on-the-wall format that we're experimenting with. But first, we need to explain to our listeners why we've decided to change the format slightly and make this week's show part 1 of 2.
Erik Townsend: Well, we originally conceived today's interview with Art in 2 parts, both of which would air today. Part 1 would be a deep dive into the fundamental factors that are driving the crude oil market. And Part 2 was to be an analysis of strategies for trading the coming bottom from several different perspectives. We planned to first cover the commodity futures trading opportunity, then look at this from a fixed income manager's standpoint, looking at the junk bond implications, and then come back at it from an equity manager's standpoint, looking at when does the oil price bottom versus when do the oil-related stocks bottom. And then finally, we were going to discuss this from a retail investment perspective. What would a retail investor do in order to play this market?
2 things went wrong. First, we ran out of time. Art is such a wealth of information that we wound up putting an entire hour into just talking about market fundamentals. The second issue is that Art is a petroleum guy at heart, not a trader, and his comment to me off the air was that he really feels like the fundamentals conversation that we had today is where he's comfortable. He'd rather leave it to oil traders like myself to talk about specific trading strategies. He doesn't really feel that he has anything to add to that particular conversation. All these factors forced us to make a last-minute decision to break this topic up into 2 shows.
So today's show is going to be the interview with Art entirely about what are the fundamentals driving the oil market, why do both Art and I see it going lower from here before this is over, where are we headed. Part 2 will be a completely separate conversation about designing trading strategies for the upcoming bottom in crude prices. And I'm just going to be honest with our listeners, these changes have all happened in the last few hours. We're still trying to sort out when we're going to air the part 2 episode, but we'll get it to you soon.
Nathan Egger: Well, hey, it's hard to complain about too much of a good thing. So part 1, Erik's discussion with Art Berman about oil market fundamentals, coming up right after this.
How the professional-level interview works
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is my all-time favorite oil and gas industry consultant, Art Berman. Art, thanks so much for joining us today.
Art Berman: Thanks for inviting me, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Instead of a traditional interview, our audience has asked for a different format that amounts to listening in on a professional money manager meeting with an energy industry consultant to discuss trading strategies for the coming bottom in oil prices. This introduces some challenges. Do we stop and explain everything that we discuss in gory detail to make sure that everyone can follow along? Or do we just speak on a professional level and cross our fingers and hope that we don't lose too many listeners?
We've given this a lot of thought and we have a solution that I think will work very well. In this interview, I'm going to be speaking to Art on a professional level. We'll try to define the terminology that we're using, but we're not going to stop and explain conceptual material. So, for example, we're not going to stop to explain the difference between contango and backwardation in commodity futures markets, because explaining all these things would take too long and it would disrupt the flow of the conversation. But coming up next, right after my discussion with Art, Nathan Egger will join me again. Nathan will have listened to the discussion with Art and he'll have a long list of questions and subjects that need explanation. Nathan and I will then go through things like what's the difference between contango and backwardation. That's one example, but it's just one of many.
So the idea here is that even a professional oil trader will hopefully find this conversation with Art to be interesting and worthwhile. Pro-commodity traders probably are safe skipping our post-game show with Nathan and me, where we'll be explaining some of the underlying concepts and terminology and so forth. Investors who are not familiar with these concepts are advised to first listen to this conversation with Art, then listen to the post-game show with Nathan, and then consider coming back and listening to the conversation with Art again. Your newfound knowledge from the segment with Nathan just might help you get a whole lot more out of the second listen than the first one.
So, Art, before we dive into the markets, I think it's important to make sure that we're both on the same page in terms of the backstory. So what I'd like to do is run very quickly through my high-level macro view of how we got here, why oil prices are already so low. What I would like you to do is to interrupt and tell me if you disagree, because it's perfectly fine to disagree. It's good if you disagree, but I need to know that you do.
Art Berman: Okay.
Erik Townsend: disagree and why you disagree, because it may affect how I interpret your advice. Does that make sense?
Art Berman: Sure, go ahead.
Erik's framing: oil backstory and five key issues
Erik Townsend: Okay, perfect. Basically, prior to 2014, I think we had a reasonably balanced oil market. Prices were definitely high in the $90 to $110 range. That was due to peak cheap oil, the fact that we are expecting very significant declines in the future and that oil is getting more expensive to produce.
What happened was this flood of easy money from central banks, primarily Fed monetary easing policy, led to an overinvestment. Austrian economists would say even a malinvestment in the shale patch that pushed prices down to about $90 or so.
Everybody assumed that at that level, OPEC, which really means Saudi Arabia, would cut production in order to balance the market. They did the exact opposite. They said we're not going to be the ones. To take the burden of this anymore. We're not going to cut until the non-OPEC producers cut first. Now a lot of people think that Saudi Arabia is trying to punish the US shale operators. I don't agree with that at all. I think what they want is the US shale operators to lose their funding. I think that what Saudi Arabia wants to do is punish the people that spent all that money on junk bonds in the shale patch and get them to not do that again. I also think that to an equal extent, Saudi Arabia is just as interested in regaining its former cartel status. They want to coerce Russia and other large producers to play ball with them, to either join OPEC or to participate in production cuts.
That leaves us with an environment where the market is oversupplied. By how much, we'll talk about. I'm not exactly sure. I'm hoping you can help refine my views on that.
That oversupply means that the oil has to be stored someplace. When we had a whole lot of empty storage, it didn't matter that much. But now, as we're starting to run out of storage, the potential risk of a storage crisis could easily force West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices down into the teens or even lower. So I don't think there is any bottom to how far prices can go if we get into a storage crisis. Prices can keep going lower until that oversupply is eliminated, period. What changes everything, what would completely, totally change the face of the oil market, would be if Saudi Arabia actually made a deal for a production cut with Russia and other non-OPEC producers. If they actually made that deal and they only cut by 5%, it would be more than enough to rebalance the market. So this is a man-made problem. It could be solved by a negotiation. But I don't think that we're there yet.
I don't think it's possible for that deal to come together, at least for a few more months.
The idea that US tight oil production could be shut in is something that I think about a lot, and I'd really like to talk more about it in this interview, because when we first started looking at this situation and prices were in the $80s, everybody was saying if the price gets below $35, they'll be forced to shut in because it's below the cash cost. Now the number's $20. When we get to $20, what's the number going to be? So I think there's a very interesting question of it. At what point do the shale operators basically have to fold their cards and give up?
So as I see things, it really gives us basically 5 issues to look at. How big is this global oversupply really is number one. Number 2, how long will it take for US production to naturally decline as a result of the decline in drilling rigs that are operating in order to rebalance the market? But that has to be tempered, number 3, by how long will it take for Iran to make up. Iran is increasing while US is decreasing. When do we get to the point where we're actually rebalancing the market if you have these 2 factors in play at the same time? Number 4, storage crisis. Is that really an imminent risk or is it just something that people talk about? Number 5, what would it take to bring about an OPEC, Russia, other producer production cut? To me, those are the 5 key issues.
I want to make sure, though, that we don't just do this on my views. How do you feel about the way I've framed the problem, Art? Am I missing anything? Do we need to add anything to the conversation?
Art's clarifications: OPEC, balanced market, shut-in price
Art Berman: Erik, I think you've got a really good framework for the conversation. There are just a couple of points that, before we move on, I want to not dispute but clarify. First of all, Erik, let's talk about OPEC for a second, because I agree with you that, first of all, I think that OPEC will cut. production in 2016.
We can discuss why I think that, but I believe they will. I don't think that it's imminent, but I think that they're going to have to. But let's talk about OPEC for just a minute. OPEC is not a bloc. Okay? The bloc in OPEC, you said Saudi Arabia, let's add Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE, that's half of OPEC production. And those guys are pretty much on the same page and, you know, all working in unison.
The other thing that I completely agree with is that the target of the OPEC doing nothing policy is to kill the capital providers or the capital enablers. The other point that I want to add in here is that OPEC is a microcosm of the Middle East macrocosm. And so we have Sunni versus Shia, the idea that Iran Iran and Iraq are going to in any way acquiesce to what Saudi Arabia and its Gulf state Sunni partners want is laughable.
So, I mean, these guys are involved in a proxy war in Syria and Russia is on the side of Iran and Iraq. And for anyone to think that OPEC is going to come into a room and they're going to walk out with their arms around each other and all agreeing, I think that needs to be looked at. But I'm with you. The role of Russia is a critical issue.
The other thing is the notion What's the definition of a balanced market before 2014? Well, prices were pretty stable, average Brent, you know, $111. But the reason that the price was there was because we had a lot of supply interruptions, mostly from Libya and Iran, leaving the world in a supply deficit. That changed in 2014 because mainly North American tight oil production caught up with with the deficits mainly from those 2 countries. That's the issue we've been trying to work our way through. And then the final point is, what is the shut-in price for tight oil in the United States?
And you're right, Erik, it's a bit of a moving target. And the reason it's a moving target is because oilfield service prices have come down proportional to oil prices. Now, they can't keep going down or else those companies go bankrupt. So I think we now know kind of what the cost floor is. And, and believe me when I say that everybody's losing big time at $30 oil, especially since the wellhead price that they're actually getting for the oil in the field, for instance, in, in the Bakken, they're getting $16.50. So WTI is not the number that people get paid. And so I'm, I'm comfortable if oil prices don't go any lower than $30, although I agree with you, Erik, and I think that they will. So with that, with those kind of, uh, Clarifications, let's move on.
Size of the oversupply and reliability of IEA/EIA data
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, let's start then with what clearly is the central issue here, which is the market is oversupplied. And I think it's pretty clear how we got here. The overinvestment in the US shale just led to more production than we needed. It was brought online a little bit too quickly. What I am having a hard time getting my head around is what the trend is, because I felt like, okay, maybe the spring Late spring of 2015 is where that oversupply peaked, and it's been getting better since then. The number's not as big anymore. IEA just came out last week and said the number has increased from 1.6 to 2.24 million barrels per day of oversupply. So IEA is saying that the problem is getting worse. Would you agree with that? Is it possible that their numbers are wrong? It doesn't add up to me. It doesn't.
feel like the problem's getting worse than it was a year ago?
Art Berman: Well, you bring up a good point, and that is how reliable are the numbers? What those numbers represent, whether it's EIA or IEA, or whoever we're talking about, those are estimates. Nobody knows what production is in the month we just finished, which was January. Nobody knows what that number is. In the United States and Canada, where where production reporting is about as reliable as, as it is anywhere in the world, more reliable in fact. We don't really know what production was any better than about 3 months back.
And even then, that's subject to a lot of revisions. So point number one is whatever comes out of EIA, IEA in the current month, it's a guess. It's based on a formula. It's wrong. Okay? It's the best thing we've got, but we know it's wrong.
Second point is that the number we're talking about, which is the relative oversupply or deficit, it's got 2 components. One is production and the other is demand or consumption. And this particular month, the reason that the the net number went up is because consumption went way down. So supply or production didn't change very much, hardly at all. But in the EIA view of the world, consumption took a tremendous drop, which frankly, I don't believe. I mean, I just don't believe that global consumption fell a million barrels a day in a month. That's, that's what they're saying. But, you know, I'm not in a position to to explain why they're wrong. And my view is wait another month. I mean, that's not a very satisfying explanation, but these things will get worked out in the short term.
But the basic point, Erik, is things are not getting better. At best, we're moving sideways. And so something has to give. And I think we agree that what really has to give is US production has to drop in a, in a much more meaningful way than 50,000 barrels per month, 50,000 barrels per day per month, which is kind of what it's been since the spring of last year.
And it needs to get to 100,000 or 150,000 barrels a day per month before OPEC is going to be in any position to start talking seriously about a cut.
Rig counts, DUCs and what really drives US production
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, it's interesting. I think there's a point that most people miss in this equation, which is when you think about how bad is it, most people think in terms of, well, how big is that oversupply? Is it 1.6 or is it 2.2 million barrels per day? How bad it is is not really a function of how big the oversupply is. It's a question of how much of a problem that's going to cause. And I would argue that how much available storage capacity remains is probably a bigger issue than what the size of the oversupply is on a daily basis, because it's a question of having someplace to put that extra oil.
Let's focus though on US production, as you said. I think that's the key. Traders tend to get obsessed with the Baker Hughes rig count, and it seems like everybody just freaks out on Fridays at 1 PM Eastern time when that number comes out. It just doesn't make sense to me, Art, because— and we should sort of explain here that the way a shale well gets drilled, you start by drilling a hole in the ground. You're not done yet. The next step is to fracture, hydraulic fracture that well and complete it, put the well casing in and so forth. There were at one point more than 3,000 drilled but not yet completed wells, what people in the industry call DUCs.
So I don't understand why the Baker Hughes rig count is even relevant if you've got 3,000 already drilled wells that are awaiting fracking completion. And it just seems like nobody tracks what's the fracking rig count. I don't care what the Baker Hughes rotary drilling count is. I want to know how many fracking rigs are operating because that's how many completed wells are actually going to come online and start producing oil.
Am I missing something? Is this just a question of the people following the wrong data or the right data is not available? Why is everybody obsessed with Baker Hughes when there's this huge inventory of uncompleted shale wells?
Art Berman: Right. The reason is because the Baker Hughes data is available. It's a predictable event, as you say, every Friday around noon or so. Traders have always focused on Baker Hughes rig count, and they probably always will. But as we understand, The advent of pad drilling, which is to say you drill from a single surface location many, many wells, you know, maybe as many as 10 before you actually have to physically rig down, move the rig, and rig up again. That's changed the arithmetic of rig count. And so to your very relevant question is, well, why don't we follow the number of wells waiting on completion or drilled and uncompleted? The simple answer is, is because we don't know what the I don't know what that number is.
It's a number that is knowable. It's not knowable by anyone other than state agencies who can keep track of that. Now, the North Dakota agency that follows that, the Department of Mineral Resources, comes out and tells you exactly how many wells are waiting on completion. If Texas did that as well, or the 2 other big plays, the Permian Basin and the Eagle Ford Shale, we would be able to do exactly what you're talking about, Erik. And that's what I would like to do, but it isn't happening.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Okay, so what I do and what I think is relevant, I don't frankly care how many rigs are operating. And I, I think that the EIA's focus on drilling productivity is one of the silliest statistics that's ever come out. I mean, a rig doesn't produce oil, a well produces oil.
So what I pay attention to are the number of producing wells that are added every month. And that's something that can be known from the state reporting agencies. Again, there's, there's some, you know, there's a lag to that data. And the reason that US production has not declined more than it has is that regardless of what the rig count is doing, and regardless of what people think, the number of producing wells has continued to increase. in all of the main plays that are responsible for the overproduction until about September, October of 2015.
Follow the money, follow the wells that are being completed. And, and so the, you know, the, the discussion that goes on is, oh, well, these operators are getting so much more efficient. You know, they're driving down the cost because of, you know, the rigs and et cetera, et cetera. That's the wrong way to think about it.
Each one of these wells costs between $6 and $8 million a copy. And all you need to do is look at the number of wells that are brought on production every month and multiply, let's say, by $7 million, and you know what the cost of this production is. And I promise you, it's not going down.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: You know, there is a lot of signal-to-noise interference in the, in the opinion and therefore in the marketplace of oil and gas. And the illusion that somehow these producers are figuring out how to produce oil for less and less money is simply untrue. It's just untrue. Are there efficiency gains? Well, yeah. I mean, you know, we're smart people and the people that run these companies are smart people, but The efficiency gains are— it's the wrong thing to focus on. It's a relatively small number.
US tight oil, Iran and storage at 80%
Erik Townsend: On that same point of signal-to-noise ratio in the marketplace, I'd like to come back. Just last week, I think, Genscape came out with some US production estimates, and they are projecting a decline from 9 million barrels per day to 7.8 million barrels per day, or about a 1.2 million barrel decline in US production over the next year. People are cheering in the streets, yay, this solves the problem. And I'm just sitting here like, wait a minute, isn't Iran in the headlines with a plan to increase by more than 1.5 million barrels in the next year? Isn't 1.5 a bigger number than 1.2? Wouldn't that increase the total overproduction by 0.3 million barrels if US were to decrease by 1.2 while Iran increases by 1.5. But it seems like everybody just focuses on the US number. Am I missing something here?
Art Berman: Well, no, you're not missing anything. But, but here's the, here's the framework, Erik, and that is that US production is not necessarily in direct competition with, say, Iranian production or Saudi Arabian production. And this is a function of the kind of oil that's being produced in these tight oil plays, which is simply— a lot of it is just not available for refining because US refineries and global refineries are not engineered to take this very light, sweet crude.
So the problem is, is that most of the oil that's produced in the United States from this tight oil ends up in storage because we don't have the refineries to process it. And even though we've now lifted the crude oil export ban, guess what? The rest of the world has about the same refinery specs that we do in the United States. And, you know, okay, so we've been 2 months without a ban on crude oil exports, and crude oil exports haven't done a thing.
You know, it's not like we've opened the floodgates and we're exporting a lot of oil. So basically all the oil, or most Most of the oil that gets produced in the United States, a heck of a lot of it finds its way into storage.
That's the focal point, I think, and I think you agree, Erik. That's the critical measure of understanding where price is going. As long as capacity at Cushing and the Gulf Coast, the PADD 3, as it's known, those are the two— I don't remember the percentage, but it's Something like 80% of US storage, and those combined numbers are at 85% of storage capacity. As long as storage capacity is 80% or greater, prices are going to be crushed. And until that number drops below 80%, they're going to stay crushed. I don't care what the global balance is. I don't care what OPEC does. I mean, I do care, don't get me wrong. I'm just trying— I meant, I'm being— I'm using hyperbole to make a point.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Art Berman: The issue is that WTI and the US market still pretty much controls the price of oil in the world, and the price of WTI isn't going anywhere until we start to deflate the bottleneck at Cushing and the associated Gulf Coast. And the only way to do that is to reduce US production.
Shut-in cost, shale debt and the Big Short analogy
Erik Townsend: I want to pick up on that specific scenario, because you and I both agree that what has to happen here Is oil prices have to fall to what people sometimes call the shut-in cost, the level at which it makes more sense for the shale operators to just close their wells in, lay off their staff, and wait.
Here's the problem I'm having with this. My understanding of what's really going on in the shale patch these days is these guys know perfectly well that their debt is unserviceable. They know they can't pay the money back. But they don't have to pay the money back. They don't have to pay the principal back. All they have to do is make the interest payments in order to avoid falling into what technically would be a default condition.
So if their mindset is entirely cash flow based, we're just going to make the interest payments. We're going to cross our fingers and pray that someday the price of oil recovers before we have to make a principal payment at some point when these things come due. We're just going to somehow squeak by. It's it's it's like the guy who's. Running out of, you know, about to go bankrupt, and he's got 12 credit cards that he's using to take a cash advance from one in order to pay the minimum payment on the next one.
If they're in that mentality, it seems to me that we could get below what logically should be a shut-in cost, and these guys that are in survival mode are just going to keep pumping oil to make revenue to try to not default on their bonds. At some point, they get to the point where they do default on their bonds, and there's just no point, and they shut everything down.
Art Berman: Right.
Erik Townsend: So, it seems to me like you could kind of get to an overshoot where the price goes well below what we think it should be, and eventually everybody capitulates and shuts in. But I could see that being delayed. Does that make sense?
Art Berman: Perfect sense, and you're absolutely right. So, the truth of the matter is, forget about all the nonsense that you read in The Telegraph or The Guardian or The Wall Street Journal. Street Journal about, or Bloomberg, about the, you know, the true breakeven price of all of these plays. The true breakeven price for the best operators, which is to say the people who have the core area positions in the 3 main tight oil plays, is $60 to $70 a barrel. Now, how do I know that? Because I do the work. I do the reserve forecasts. And the costs. And those are the 2 components you got to have right. Now, the costs are relatively easy to determine. They just mean plowing through a bunch of SEC filings. And the harder part, or the trickier part, is actually knowing the per-well average reserves for each one of these companies. And that means going through an analysis that, as a geologist and an engineer, my colleague and I can do.
Now, I don't know where the people who say that we're making money at $30 a barrel, where they get their reserve numbers. was from, but I promise you they're completely wrong.
The truth is that you're 100% right, Erik, that the true breakeven price for the tight oil plays, let's just say the floor for the company or 2 in each one of the plays that is in the best position, is somewhere around $50 or $55.
Erik Townsend: We know that they're already operating way below their costs. And that says to me that really shut-in cost, it's not a cost where somebody makes an intelligent decision that it makes more sense to shut in. It's a question of when do they default on their bonds and give up? And it seems like they're just going to keep on pumping until they get to that point.
Art Berman: No, that's exactly right. And so the credit card analogy is correct. And in fact, the preference if you will, let's say for the Permian Basin, has nothing to do with economics. It has to do with initial rate. Okay? The Permian wells come on at a higher rate than the Eagle Ford or the Bakken. Now, their reserves are much smaller and their decline rates are much higher, but if your objective is cash flow in the moment, you can make your biggest credit card withdrawal on the Permian. And so that's where you're going to go. And that's the reason for the preference.
The geology, believe me, the Permian Basin is a largely depleted basin. Okay. What's going on out there is a big secondary recover— oil recovery project using horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. I don't mean to say anything bad about the Permian. That's just, that's just reality.
And so the bond defaults are an issue, Erik, but you know, there's this, there's this other, uh, small matter. Yeah. Of supporting your stock price, which, you know, they haven't been doing very well on recently.
But these companies have no money. I mean, you know, they have assets in the ground whose value is being degraded every time the price goes down, and they have credit, and they have the value of their stock, which accounts for most of their asset value. And if they— if their production drops, then investors abandon their Their net asset value drops, and that should trigger you know loan covenant problems. You know the kind of thing that happened to Bear Stearns, where you know the bank actually makes a cash call on the loan. That's a real immediate kind of a problem. Now that hasn't happened yet because the banks have basically given them a pass, but that that's a very real concern. Stock prices are a concern.
Loan covenants are a concern, and bond. defaults are also a big concern, and they're all 3 coalescing right now.
Erik Townsend: And what that says to me is that we're really set up for a big bang moment. In other words, everybody just keeps pumping, and eventually it becomes clear that all of this shale-issued junk bond paper is nearly worthless. And all of a sudden, similar to the housing crisis, it really was obvious to a lot of people for years that this was an unsustainable situation. Finally, the mainstream wakes up and says, uh-oh, subprime, those mortgage-backed securities are worthless.
Art Berman: Oopsie. It is. It's exactly that. And, and, um, you know, you can, you can read the comments that people make on my Forbes blog, and, and there are people every time that say, oh, you know, Art Berman has been, you know, saying this is going to happen for the last 6 years and he's always wrong. Well, you know, if you go back to the subprime crisis, the people who ended up making billions of dollars on shorting the US market were in the same position. I'm not comparing myself to them. It's all I'm saying is that for those who actually understand the way the business works, and I am a working petroleum geologist, I'm not an analyst, I'm not a pundit, uh, it's pretty obvious to everybody who knows And has been for many years that this situation's going to crash in a big way. It's really just a question of when. So go out and see The Big Short if you haven't already, and then think about the shale plays in the United States.
It's a very similar scenario.
Cushing storage mechanics, Whiting drilling halt, refiners
Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and move on to storage, because I think we both agree that that is absolutely critical. Before we move on, I just want to take a minute for our listeners' benefit and explain why Cushing has such special importance.
Cushing, Oklahoma is the home of a very large tank farm. More importantly, it is the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. So what happens just before a futures contract expires if there's not enough buyers? What happens is the price goes down. Well, when the price goes down to the point where this month, let's say the March delivery is selling for more than $2 less than the April delivery contract, what happens is these storage guys jump in and they say, hey, I'll take that profit. I will buy the March oil, I'll immediately sell it into the April delivery, so I just have to find a place to store that oil for a month, and I'll pocket that $2 of profit. On an annualized basis, they're making a fortune, and that's really That's really what makes the whole oil market work, is when there's too much oil, it gets stored forward in Cushing, Oklahoma, because that's where the contract is settled.
If there is no available storage in Cushing, Oklahoma, those guys can't do business anymore, and that means that there is no limit to how low the price can go. If there's not enough buyers, that contract has 1 day left until it expires, the price could go to $5 unless somebody can step in and say, hey, I've got a plan. I'll buy that oil and I'll sell it next month and I'll make a little bit of profit on the difference. You can only do that if there's a place to store the oil. Right now we're already at, I think, 89% of the capacity of Cushing.
It's important to understand, though, that it's not just like you get to go all the way to 99 and you don't have a problem yet. They're already having blending operations being affected. And what that means is, let's Say you've got light sweet oil in one tank, heavy sour oil in another tank. You're going to blend the two together at some ratio in order to create something that matches the West Texas Intermediate delivery standards because you've got to deliver against that futures contract. You blend those two tanks and you pump the resulting oil into a third tank. Well, if you don't have a third tank to pump into, you can't blend those two different grades of oil together. Because there's no way to do that. And there's already companies that are turning down blending operations because they don't have the resources for it.
So it feels to me like we're getting pretty darn close to a real live storage crisis where we actually get to the point where futures contracts can't settle because the people that would normally step in and arbitrage that storage cost between two months and put it in. A tank. There's no tank for them to put it in. So I think what we really have to get down to is how much storage is available both inside Cushing that can be used for this purpose.
As Cushing starts to fill up, there's pipelines in and out of Cushing. So you can say, well, there's a pipeline from Cushing to Houston, so it's not really a problem. We'll just pump our oil from Cushing to Houston and store it there. Well, to do that, you've got to know what the availability is of storage in Houston. And also, once it's time to deliver that oil back into the market, you're going to have to get it back to Cushing. So do you have pipeline capacity in both directions? What does it cost in both directions? And so forth.
What do you think in terms of— you understand all of the details of the pipelines and everything much better than I do. Cushing can't run out of storage or we have a problem, Houston. What are the factors that will prevent Cushing from actually running out of oil, and how close are we to exhausting those other options?
Art Berman: Yeah, I don't think, I don't think we have a lot of options beyond increasing storage capacity, which happens, you know, once a year or so. They actually build more tanks. I don't see that as being helpful. There is a certain release valve that, you know, that a certain amount of that oil can get offloaded to other tank farms farther south. But, but there are 2 really important developments that have surfaced in the last 24 hours that I need to interject into our conversation. The first is that Whiting Petroleum, which is the 2nd largest producer in the Bakken shale play, announced yesterday that they're going to suspend all drilling and fracking operations. Okay? So here's a company that produces a couple of hundred thousand barrels a day. They're not shutting in, Erik, but they're not drilling anything more.
Continental, who is the biggest producer in that basin, and Hess have said they're pretty much going to do the same. Okay? So that's the beginning, I think. Hang on.
Erik Townsend: Before you move on from that point, Art, what you just said, they've announced that they're going to stop Drilling and fracking operations. I could interpret that one of two ways. I could think of really smart people in a room sitting around and thinking, "Hmm, it would be smarter for us to wait for more favorable market conditions." This is the best thing for our shareholders. I've got that image in my mind, but frankly, it's being crowded out by another image, which is a bunch of guys saying, "Oh crap! We're out of money. We can't afford to do any more operations. Let's make it look like." this was a conscious decision because we're screwed. Which is it? What's going on here?
Art Berman: It's clearly the latter, Erik. These guys made a terrible acquisition in December of 2014 as oil was cratering. They spent $5 billion or something to buy another producer in the Bakken. Terrible timing. No, they're clear. I mean, this is a company that I mean, they tried to sell themselves for a while in 2015 unsuccessfully.
So this is an act of desperation. And none of these— I mean, I don't want to imply anything about the character of these executives in these companies, but they really could care less about the shareholder because the shareholder doesn't appear to care. I mean, Devon went out and issued a whole bunch of new shares. You know, that brought in a couple of billion dollars, diluted their existing shareholders by 13%. Was there a shareholder uprising? No, there was no reaction at all. So as long as shareholders don't seem to care, then the companies will act with, with relative impunity. So you're right, the Whiting deal is these guys are out of money and they got no choice but to do what they're doing. And, and, and their stock price actually went up a couple of dollars that, you know, at least temporarily, the investors said, yeah, that's, that's a smart move.
So now the other issue, the other story that came out in this morning's Wall Street Journal, but it's even, I think, more critical, is headline is Big New Threat to Oil Prices: A Flood of Gasoline.
And what's happening here is that a bunch of Midwestern refineries have said we're going to cut back on buying crude oil. Because we don't think there's a market for the refined product in the United States. So there are, you know, there are the class of people that are speculating on barrels at Cushing that have no intention of taking possession of a physical barrel.
And then there are the buyers like the refineries that actually bid on contracts and do plan to take possession of the oil, which actually has the potential to reduce the volume at Cushing. And so what we read this morning is that, that, that amount of physical oil that's going to move out of Cushing is going to be lower going forward, which is a very bad thing for storage and capacity. And so then the flip side is, well, OK, we also heard a bit of news that a big producer in the Bakken is going to reduce the amount of oil that it's moving into Cushing.
Maybe the two counterbalance and reciprocate. I don't know. What it says more than anything else is that this market is a moving target, and we just don't know what shoe is going to drop tomorrow, and we got to watch it very carefully.
Floating storage and the $16.50 benchmark
Erik Townsend: A lot of people would say floating storage is the answer here. And for anyone who's unfamiliar with that, it just means chartering a very large crude carrier ship, using it as a floating gas tank. It's hard to tell in terms of, you know, how much capacity is available in Cushing. That's reported every week by the government. How many ships are available to charter and who already has them locked up with contracts? These are things that are private matters that are not publicly reported. So it's very hard. Do you Do you have any metrics or any index that you follow that tells you how much floating storage capacity might still exist other than, say, charter rates?
Art Berman: I don't. The reason I don't is because I think if it gets to that, we're talking about oil prices that are going to go down to their 1998 level of $16.50. I think we're going to get there. I don't know if $16.50 is the right number. Don't quote me on that.
But that gives you a— and $16.50, by the way, is in 2015 dollars. So, if anybody wants to know, well, what's the lowest price that oil has ever gotten to in our careers or lifetimes, that's what it was. So, that doesn't mean it couldn't go lower, and it doesn't mean that it'll get that low, but it gives you a benchmark.
Erik Townsend: And it's so important for people to understand that what's going on here is all about an oversupply that already exists. Things like what is the cost of production, what is the sustainable long-term cost—all of those things are not really relevant right now. They matter in the long run, but as far as how low the price can go in the short run, as long as the oversupply is there, there's no limit to how low it can go.
And it's especially exacerbated when we run out of storage.
And when you get to something like floating storage, I make the argument. You know, hey, I'm a pretty smart guy, but I don't have nearly enough assets under management to go and charter a crude oil ship. There's only a handful of players in the market that are big enough and talented enough and have the in-house skills to really do that tanker trade.
Little guys like me can't even think about it. So I would argue when we get to the point where floating storage is the only alternative, the people The people that are able to control that trade and lock up most of the ships, they're going to make a fortune, and the price of oil, I think, is unfortunately going to suffer very dramatically. I think we've covered storage.
I hope everybody understands why this is such a critical issue.
What ends the glut: OPEC, Russia, Iran, Libya, EIA outlook
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to what really ultimately ends this whole story, and that is a reversal of strategy from OPEC. And as you said, really, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are the big players there. What does it take? What do you think the factors are that will eventually lead up? What is Saudi Arabia waiting for that they're not getting yet? Why have they not seemed like they want to make a deal?
Art Berman: I think they're waiting for some combination of capital providers clearly pulling back. From investing in mostly US tight oil. I think have pulled back from, from the oil sands in Canada. That was arguably maybe, maybe a bigger long-term, long-range target for Saudi Arabia because it's a much bigger reserve and a much longer-lived reserve. But, you know, future investments in the oil sands are dead. At least for now. Now we keep seeing, you know, just when we think it's over, Pioneer and Diamondback were able to raise a couple of billion dollars in January.
And I already mentioned Devon raised a billion or so just a week or so ago. And so there are people that say, see, the money's still out there. It's still coming. I say, well, you know, there, there are always people whose timing is, is completely off. But so, so the answer to your question, Erik, is Saudi Arabia needs to see 2 related things. One is that the capital providers have completely pulled back from providing extra enabling capacity for the US shale drillers. Number 2, and very much related, the production has to drop significantly. When all— when those 2 things come together, I think then they will be motivated to talk about a cut. So what has to happen is waiting in the wings. And what's happening, what's going to happen sometime in the next— well, certainly in the first half of 2016— is there's going to be a wave of bankruptcies, defaults on bond payments, a collapse in the high-yield bond market that could spill over potentially into other markets.
And some real distress, which we've already seen signs of in the banking industry, which is exposed to oil and gas loans. And that is going to be a bloodbath, I believe.
I'm not an expert on many of the topics I just discussed, but I was on an energy panel last week up at the University of Texas at Austin, which included some very heavy hitters in in energy economics, hedge fund management, and E&P and banking finance. And those guys were unanimous in saying that a 30% bankruptcy of US E&P companies would be a relatively small number. It could be 50% in 2016.
Erik Townsend: It's amazing how much we think alike, Art, because I'm very much on the same page with you. The one thing I see a little bit differently, I see 2 things that has to happen here. One is shale-issued junk bonds have to take on the same reputation that subprime mortgages had in 2009. It's got to be nobody will touch it. I think that's what Saudi Arabia is working for.
The other thing is I think Saudi Arabia has a shortlist that I know Russia is on, and I'm not sure if there's other countries on it or not, but there's some minimum number of players that I think Saudi Arabia feels like we've got to get Russia playing ball with OPEC. Are other big producers like Mexico on that list? I'm not sure, but I'm convinced OPEC has a list and they're going to say, we're not cutting anything until 2 things happen. One, we've destroyed the source of funding for US shale. 2, we have our minimum list of who we think needs to be participating with us in any production cuts agreeing to do so. And for whatever reason, I think Saudi Arabia is not showing its cards about who's on that list.
Art Berman: Well, I think Russia is the prime candidate on the list. And of course, it doesn't help that Russia is currently on the opposite side of the Middle East and therefore OPEC dispute, that they're on the side of the Shia Iran and Iraq and Syria. And so, yeah, there's a real conflict there.
And we didn't really talk about Iran before. But let's do for a second here, because it's relevant to all the topics that were discussed. The fear, of course, is that Iran says that they're going to bring on millions of barrels of production. They're going to get back to pre-1970 levels. And I don't think anybody believes that. The reality is that Iran probably will deliver something like 300,000 barrels of crude oil on average in 2016. And if you add in the liquids, that could easily be 500,000 barrels a day.
And so you're absolutely right, that's a counterbalance to US production cuts or drops so far.
Now, the key to understanding how those two work is that if If you dig into the EIA's model, which says that US production is going to reach minimum sometime in, I think it's September of 2016, it'll go down a total of about 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day from its high in April. The Achilles heel in that model is their price deck.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Their price deck says that WTI PPI a linear fashion from $30 a barrel in January to $58 a barrel in December of 2018, and that ain't going to happen. What that tells me is that the— and the EIA model is as good as any that we have, at least as a point of departure. What it says is that the decline is going to be faster because The assumption of prices is completely incorrect. So the first thing, Iran is going to deliver a bunch of oil to the market. It isn't as much as some people fear.
Second, US production is going to decline a lot faster and a lot sooner than most people assume.
The wildcard that I worry about, Erik, is not Iran, it's Libya.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Syria has the potential, if they ever get their civil unrest situation under control, they have the potential to very quickly add 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day to the market. And that would be a disaster. Now, you hate to talk about these things in the way that I'm about to, but there's very little likelihood that Syria is going to end its It's painful unrest in 2016 because ISIS is right in the middle. So assuming that their rival factions can get together, and you'll see headlines every day that they're talking, and that's great, but they're not going to. But that's a wild card that we don't really even want to imagine happening. Iran is going to happen, and there's nothing we can do about it.
For right now, though, I go back to the fact that the US Still controls world oil price, not intentionally and not by conspiracy or fiat. And therefore, the most important controlling element on oil price has got to be storage in Cushing and to a secondary but important source in, in the Gulf Coast PADD 3. And if that overcapacity drops below 80, uh, and appears to be— 80%, that is— and appears to be If we have some momentum, we're going to see a $10 or $15 bump in WTI price, and that's where the profits are when that happens.
Whoever's astute enough to figure that out is going to do awfully well.
My own guess here is I worry about what happens if you overfill capacity, but the OPEC+ I think it's going to— I'm not an eternal optimist, but I think that all of these moving parts are going to move in such a way that US production is going to start declining in a serious way.
We've all cried wolf about that, but I think that really is going to happen. OPEC is going to cut 2 million barrels a day along with Russia, maybe at their June meeting. It doesn't serve OPEC to have oil prices go to $16.50 or $5 or zero. I mean, you know, that is their only source of revenue.
And, you know, they're not going to stubbornly just say, well, you know, it's the will of Allah. It may be the will of Allah, but it's also the will of those that, you know, are in charge of pricing for OPEC.
So I think that the ideal scenario is that we do start to see a big drop in US production, that, as you say, Erik, the energy junk bonds become untouchable, and we see an OPEC cut that more or less coincides with that sometime in the middle of the year.
Art's closing view and Erik's summary
Erik Townsend: You know, Art, I could go on for 3 more hours talking about the fundamentals here. And originally, we had conceived this interview to talk first about fundamentals and then move into a whole bunch of different trading strategies for different classes of investors. We've used up almost all of our time on fundamentals, and I didn't want to cut you off because this is just so fascinating. What we're going to do is save the discussion of how to trade this from several different investment perspectives— from the commodity perspective, from the fixed income perspective, from the equity perspective. I'm going to save that for another show. Because I think that we've done a really great job. Art and I have not rehearsed or practiced this. The fact that we agree so much on the fundamentals is really shocking.
Before we close, Art, is there anything else that we haven't discussed that you think might be relevant in terms of our listeners understanding the fundamentals of what's going on in this market right now?
Art Berman: Well, only to say that you're going to hear a lot of, you know, very pessimistic, gloomy forecasts Every day when you pick up the paper or turn on cable TV, and you know there's truth in that. But I think that when these prices, these prices are going to turn a lot sooner and a lot harder than most of the so-called experts imagine. If I knew when that was going to be, then you know we'd have a whole different conversation here. I don't, but I think that the you know that the forecast. Of low oil prices for 10 years or 5 years, I think they're way wrong.
And I think that they ignore the fact that there's a depletion issue in the world, that in a matter of a year or 2, we're going to be in a deficit because we're not investing. We have deferred oil investments in 2015, and it's going to be an even bigger number in 2016.
And even though it, you know, the— it's the darkest hours before the dawn, oil is not a, you know, it's not a cornucopia. There's a limited amount of it that's available as supply, and we're going to bump up against that limit. And it's going to be— it's going to be a hard awakening no matter what happens between now and then. So, you know, what we're going to see, I think, is amazing volatility in oil prices. Going forward regardless of how this topic we've been discussing resolves itself.
We're not going back to anything. Normal's over, and, and there isn't a new normal yet. So this requires, you know, great focus and great attention by people who really understand the oil business and the oil markets, and that, that's where I would leave it.
Erik Townsend: Okay, super. Such a So, to summarize, we both agree that absent the possibility of a surprise production cut from OPEC, which we both think is unlikely, you and I both agree that this market is at extreme risk of a precipitous and sharp drop to the downside. That would be the market clearing move that forces the shale operators to either shut in or stop or do something and forces a US production decline. From there, we both disagree with a lot of the long-term prognosticators who say this could last for 10 years or something.
What's going to happen is in the short run, we're going to have potentially a crash, and that's going to result in something happening. Some kind of OPEC deal or something comes to fruition, and we end up with a whole new regime that nobody is smart enough to really be able to identify and articulate yet, but it's going to look very different than what we're used to.
Art Berman: I agree.
Erik Townsend: I think we're on the same page. Listeners, we originally conceived today's interview as starting with this discussion of fundamentals and then moving into how to trade this upcoming bottom in oil prices from several different perspectives, from the commodity futures perspective, from a fixed income manager's perspective, from an equity manager's perspective and from a retail investor's perspective.
We're not going to do that today because we've used up all of our time with this excellent conversation. Art, thank you so much for joining us and for all of the wonderful information that you have shared with our listeners. We're going to cover the rest of that, though, on a separate show, and we'll have an announcement later on in this show as to when you can expect that. Art, thanks so much for joining me again on the program. Thank you, Jeff. We really appreciate your time.
Interview close, artberman.com and break
Art Berman: It's been a pleasure, Erik. Thank you.
Erik Townsend: As we close, I just want to make a point that in addition to everything we've discussed, there's actually quite a bit more in the fundamental analysis area in this oil market. Art has an amazing website at artberman.com. It's, in my opinion, the best oil analyst blog anywhere on the internet. We're working with Art to get a presentation with a whole bunch of graphs and charts. that support the conversation and go beyond the conversation that we've just had. When Nathan joins me after the break, we'll come back and tell you more about where to find that information, as well as when we're going to reschedule the rest of what was originally planned as how-to-trade perspective on all of the information that I've discussed with Art today. Nathan will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nate.
Postgame: reaction and Art's proprietary presentation
Nathan Egger: Well, what a fascinating conversation that was. I've known that this was coming for a long time, and it was well worth the wait. Art really is a wealth of information.
Erik Townsend: He is amazing. And believe it or not, what you heard in this interview was only scratching on the surface. We had a, a little chat after we got off the air, and Art has agreed to give me a copy of a proprietary presentation that he normally reserves for his paying consulting clients, goes much deeper with incredibly detailed graphs and charts into everything that we talked about today. There's more substance to it. I can't read you the URL for it right now because frankly, we're in a scramble today and we don't have it. But by the time that you hear this, if you go to MacroVoices.com, MacroVoices.com to our homepage, read the description of this interview with Art Berman. In that description, there will be a link to where you can find Art's presentation. And believe me, folks, you really want to take a minute to download this one.
Fantastic graphs and charts, and it goes into considerably more depth than what we've just discussed with Art today.
Peak oil versus peak cheap oil
Nathan Egger: Well, as much as I enjoyed that conversation, thanks to the magic of podcast recording, I had a few hours to really absorb it, and I have some questions for you I would love to have clarified. As we discussed doing so earlier, I thought we could run down some of the terminology that might not be clear to me, and it might not be clear to a lot of our listeners. So Art ended that conversation, starting from the end here, uh, saying that normal is over. This sounds pretty dire, and it sounds to me like Art is referring to peak oil, which Almost a taboo topic for many pundits these days. So let's again explain to listeners what peak oil means, and as well the difference between peak oil and peak cheap oil.
Erik Townsend: OK. All the way back in 1957, a Shell Oil geologist named Marion King Hubbert came up with what is now called peak oil. At the time, it was just known as a peak. And what he said is, Any collection of oil fields, whether it's one oil play or one company's plays or an entire country, has a certain profile where basically what's going to happen is as you put more investment into it, it's going to produce more and more oil. But eventually you get to the point where you've used up the highest reservoir pressures and so forth, and now it gets harder to extract the oil, and you start declining from that peak, and you're producing It's producing less and less oil. And the more money you put into it, there's a diminishing return.
So that was the concept of peak oil, conceived in 1957.
And Hubbert had 2 predictions. One was that around 1970 or so, US domestic production would peak. And he's talking about conventional oil production, because that's the only kind of oil production that we knew about back in those days. He was exactly right. That peak of US production around the early '70s led, of course, to the Arab oil embargo and the energy crisis. And, you know, if you were old enough to remember the gasoline lines of 1973, I still remember as a kid waiting for hours in line to buy gasoline at the local gas station. It was a really big deal.
So he got the call right. He said around 2000 or so would be the peak in global oil production. Again, he's talking about conventional oil production, where you just drill a hole in the ground and oil comes out. He was pretty close. Conventional oil production peaked in May of 2005. Depending on whose data you use, it may have actually exceeded that in 2011, but not by very much. So we did see a peak in conventional oil production.
The peak oil thesis, as it was originally conceived, was kind of like, oh boy, Boy, this is a real problem. When we hit the peak, there's no more oil to be discovered. We're in big trouble. I think that some of the people in the peak oil camp got a little bit carried away, just as some environmentalists get a little bit carried away with a belief that they feel strongly about. And it was a lot of gloom and doom stuff.
Peak cheap oil is a phrase that I use to contrast this and say, look, I don't predict that the world is running out of oil. There's always going to be plenty of oil. We'll find more and we'll find new innovative ways to produce it. But the point is, the cheap, easy stuff where you just drill a hole in the ground and oil comes gushing out, that's all been found and developed. There's no more of that.
And that's what I really think Art meant with that comment where he said the old normal is over and we don't know what the new normal is like. The old normal of being able to just get all the energy that we need by drilling a hole in the ground and oil comes out. That's long gone. We're into the age of peak cheap oil, which means that, yeah, there's going to be more oil, but it comes from expensive technologies like hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, which are the 2 big technologies that are the biggest enablers of the rapid growth that we've seen in oil production in recent years.
Someday, the shale, the tight oil plays will be used up and that won't be the play anymore. We'll have to come up with some new technology, and that technology will come too, but it'll come at ever-increasing cost. So the point is, we're never going back to the days of being able to sustain oil prices at $20 a barrel, say, as we used to be able to do. Now, I won't be surprised if they dip below $20 before this is over, as I discussed with Art, but that's a temporary situation that happens in a It's not something that can be sustained long-term. So peak cheap oil means we've reached the point where all the cheap and easy oil is gone. We're in a new era where it's going to become more and more expensive over time to produce oil. And therefore, over time, the cost of oil will increase, and the amount of excess energy capacity that we have to grow the economy will decrease.
What tight oil means
Nathan Egger: You just used a term there, tight oil, and I heard it in your conversation with Art Berman. Can you clarify for us what tight oil means?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Back in the old— well, first of all, people usually imagine, the average layperson imagines an oil well, and they kind of have this idea in their head that there is an underground river or lake full of oil, and we're going to drill a hole down to where we can tap into that lake of oil, that reservoir. It doesn't really work that way. Anyway, what's down there is mostly just rock.
The thing is, a lot of the rock— and it's very, very deep, thousands and thousands of feet below the surface of the earth— a lot of that rock is very porous.
So similar to a sponge, it can soak up a whole bunch of crude oil. And that crude oil, if you drill a hole deep enough into that rock, what happens is the oil just comes seeping out through the rock into the hole, and then of course the hole is the bottom of the well. It can be pumped up to the surface and used to refine that oil into finished products. So the way it used to work is you could only drill oil wells in porous rock, because if the rock was not porous, then the oil couldn't flow through the rock into the well, and there's no way to get the oil out. So in the old days, when they found oil, And there was oil there, but the rock was not porous enough for the oil to ooze out into the well. You couldn't develop that. It was not an economic or developable well at that point.
You had to abandon it.
What we've done in the last few years is to take a technology that's actually not new— hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have both been around for decades, they just weren't effective and economic when they were first invented. We got to the point where oil prices were high enough, over $100 a barrel, that it made sense to look for new ways to produce oil. So people said, wait, if we went back to those oil wells where the rock is not porous, what if we went back— there's no oil flowing out into the well because the rock is not porous— what if we were to put super duper high energy, high pressure Hydraulic fluid, water essentially, into the well, and then shock it with just super duper high pressure shock waves that would literally fracture the the the rock below the Earth's surface.
So now there's great big cracks in it, and of course those cracks provide the conduit through which the oil can flow from the rock into the oil well. And that's what we accomplish with horizontal. Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. These things together, why is it called a tight oil play? Tight oil means oil that's locked inside the rock. It is tightly contained inside the rock, and it doesn't come out on its own until you fracture it with this very expensive, high-tech process called multistage hydraulic fracturing.
Shut-in cost and wellhead versus WTI price
Nathan Egger: OK, with regards to these tight oil plays, you used another term, shut-in. You and Art both used that term. this quite a few times. Can you explain what shut-in means to us, or the shut-in cost?
Erik Townsend: Sure. I want to cover shut-in, shut-in cost, and also the difference between shut-in and laying down of drilling rigs, because these are very different concepts and a lot of people confuse them. What shutting in a well means is you've got a producing well. This thing is actually producing oil that can be used by a refinery.
But for whatever reason, we've decided that we don't want to continue producing oil.
In the context that Art used it, it was when the price reaches a level where the operator is losing so much money that they can't even pay their direct operating cost of getting their staff to come in and you know pay the electric bill and so forth. What they might do at that point is shut in their well, stop. Producing oil from a well that's up and running and functioning normally, turn the thing off, put it in storage, come back to it a year or 2 later when prices are better. That's what's meant by shutting in of an oil well.
What's amazing to me is all through 2015, we had all this conversation in the media about the declining Baker Hughes rig count. Now, the rig count measures how many drilling rigs are in operation. When the rig count was going down, all the Bloomberg and CNBC anchors were saying, well, they're shutting in oil wells, they're capping wells. Nobody was capping anything. Nobody shut in any wells. They stopped drilling new ones. That's a very, very different statement. But a lot of people got really confused about this. So far, there hasn't been any shutting in of oil wells, because once they're operating and producing, they're making money. They might be not making enough money, but they're making enough money to at least pay the cost of paying the electric bills, running the pumps, paying the staff, and so forth.
What Art was talking about is if the price gets so low that they can't even pay the electric bill anymore, that's what he calls the shut-in cost, the price at which the operator throws up their hands and says, At these oil prices, we're better off just closing in our well, leaving it shut down, and coming back in a year or 2 when the price is better.
Nathan Egger: OK, well, that does well to explain what my next question would have been regarding the Baker Hughes rig count. Now, Art said— well, clarified for all of us that the WTI crude oil price, or the CL contract that you're seeing in the futures market, is not the number— is not the price that people are getting paid.
Erik Townsend: No, the way to think about this is imagine you're buying meat at the grocery store. What price do you pay? Well, you're paying a retail price. There's also a wholesale price, which is what the grocery store paid to their distributor, their wholesaler. That's going to be less than the retail price. The wholesale price is the equivalent of the WTI futures price. Okay. What's trading in the futures market is the wholesale price. That is basically for delivery in Cushing, Oklahoma, where there's a big oil storage tank farm.
If you want to buy a futures contract and accept oil delivery in Cushing, Oklahoma, that's the price you pay.
The grocery store paid their distributor the wholesale price. The distributor didn't pay the farmer the wholesale price. The distributor had to, first of all, make a profit for himself. But he also had to pay transportation and storage costs. Presumably he went to the farmer and, you know, the farmer sold him a cow and there was a butcher that was involved someplace that had to cut it into finished products. All these guys have to make money along the way. What the farmer actually got for his cow is much less than what the supermarket is paying as a wholesale price for beef. Same thing is true in crude oil.
What the guy that owns the oil well gets is whatever somebody is willing to pay him at the wellhead. That middleman has to figure out how to transport the oil from the wellhead to Cushing, Oklahoma, how to store it there, pay storage costs, pay insurance costs, so on and so forth, and all this stuff costs money.
So the cost of what they're getting— Art was talking about a very remote area where there are no pipelines and there probably is not easy rail access. They might have to, you know, be moving oil by truck and then rail in order to get it to Cushing, Oklahoma. That all costs money. And so the guys that are in those remote areas are getting in the teens already for their oil. Begin— you know, imagine what happens when the WTI price goes below $20 if that happens.
EIA versus IEA and why US and Iran are different markets
Nathan Egger: Terrifying thought. A couple of acronyms, EIA and IEA. Who And what are these organizations, and why do they matter, despite the fact that they're essentially estimating— in Art's words, they're essentially wrong?
Erik Townsend: I agree with Art. I think they are wrong. Part of the reasons that they're wrong may have to do with their mandate for how they do things. But let's start with who they are. EIA is the Energy Information Agency of the United States Department of Energy. When oil Traders all get excited on a Wednesday morning at 10:30 a.m. Eastern time to see what the latest inventory and production reports are going to be. Those reports are coming from the EIA, from the U.S. government's Energy Information Agency, and that agency's job is to provide the official government information to the industry, to everybody who needs to have it for whatever purpose.
There's also the American Petroleum Petroleum Institute, which is a private entity that makes projections of consumption and storage data available. For some reason, I think it's just convention that markets always trust the government data the most. The government data is the official data. Frankly, I think in a lot of cases, the private data may be higher quality, but the market tends to accept that whatever the government data is, is fact.
And that's what we tend to go by. So EIA is the god of energy information in the United States.
But it's a United States government agency, so therefore, it only deals with the US. To understand the global oil market, you've got to understand the global picture. The IEA is the International Energy Agency. It is a quasi-official agency. It's an international organization, so it's not It's not really part of any government, but it is accepted as effectively the international equivalent of EIA. It is the international organization which is taken most seriously and whose predictions are taken most seriously, although Art and I seriously question why people even put any faith in some of the things that they say.
Nathan Egger: Wait, so if, as you just said, the oil market is indeed a global one, Why did Art say that the US is not in competition with, say, Iran?
Erik Townsend: Well, because they're addressing different markets. And it is very much a global market. And the US and Iran are very central to the overall supply-demand picture. But if you've got an oil well in North Dakota, your oil is probably headed towards Cushing, Oklahoma, and either to to the Midwest refiners or through a pipeline down to Houston where the Gulf Coast refiners are going to use it. If you're in Iran, you're probably better off selling to China, you know, other parts of Asia, than you are trying to export to the United States right now, just because the transportation costs and so forth. It makes more sense to do that.
So I don't think Art meant to say that US and Iran don't both play play an important part in the overall global supply-demand picture. His point was, in terms of where that oil is going, I think the Iranian oil is going to end up in a different market.
Baker Hughes rig count and well completion
Nathan Egger: All right. The rotary drilling rig count— I know we touched on the Baker Hughes rig count. Are these 2 different things that I'm conflating here?
Erik Townsend: No, it's the same thing. The full name of that index is the Baker Hughes Rotary Rotary drill rig count. And what it measures is how many rotary drilling rigs— that's great big machines that spin a drill bit to cut a hole in the ground, to dig a hole in the ground in order to make an oil well— how many of these things are out in the field and actually up and running and drilling holes that become oil wells.
That's the Baker Hughes Rotary Rig Count. It has It's been a mainstay of the industry for decades, and I think that's the reason people continue to put so much blind faith in it. Back in the old days, it made perfect sense, because what does it mean to create a new oil well? You drill a hole in the ground.
That's— the rotary rig count is needed to do that. Then you put a casing on it, put a valve at the top of it, install a pump, and you're done. The big The big job was drilling the hole. That was most of the work. So how many drilling rigs are in operation tells you how many new oil wells are coming into operation. And that's very useful for prognosticating what's going to happen in the next 6 to 12 months in terms of production levels.
That's in the old days.
The way that you make the newfangled kind of oil well that is really what this whole expansion of US capacity has been entirely about, is not a conventional oil well. It is a horizontally drilled well. Once you're drilling the hole with that rotary rig that goes into the Baker Hughes rig count, you're not done yet. You're less than halfway done. The much larger part of the job is the completion of the well, the hydraulic fracturing that has to be accomplished in order to complete the well.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Some of these wells are very, very sophisticated. They have heater wells in addition to the actual producing wells, where there are heating elements that literally warm up the rock and allow the oil to flow more effectively.
As you're doing all of these things, it's not the rotary rig count or the rotary drilling rig that is installing heater wells or fracturing or doing any of these things, but everybody used to thinking about that. So the reason that both Art and I agree that the Baker Hughes rig count is not really all that relevant is people act like it still has the meaning that it used to, which is, well, we— this drill is operating, therefore it's making a new oil well.
Now, it's not making a new oil well in a lot of cases. What happened in the last couple of years is those rigs were drilling holes that created what we call a DUC. Drilled but uncompleted oil well. It hasn't been fracked yet. It means half of the work is left to be done. If you're going to just have an inventory sitting around of all of these wells that are drilled but are not producing oil, it really, to me, undermines the meaningfulness and the relevance of that rotary drill count.
What would be much more useful is a count of how many fracking rigs are in operation, because that would tell us after After they're fracked, we know the well is likely to go into production. As Art described, you can get some of the data from some of the places and just look at how many wells actually go into production, but different states vary in terms of what data they require the operator to provide to the government. So you're looking at kind of an apples-to-oranges comparison from one state to the next of what data you're looking at.
PADD versus pad drilling
Nathan Egger: Okay. I think that's why the cost is so elevated for these tight oil plays. You've got a multistage process. You've got different guys who operate the different rigs, different experts you've got to bring on. It all sounds very expensive. Another acronym was PADD 3 which was entirely new to me. Can you explain that for me?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Back around World War II, the US government recognized something, which is that That the amount of petroleum that we have in storage, our ability to deliver petroleum, this is a national defense issue. It is something that the government needs to take an interest in, because if there was a shortage of oil, it could cripple the country's ability to produce weapons and defend us from the Nazis and so forth. So, back around World War II era, they created this idea called Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, or PADD.
At the time, it was primarily motivated by managing the country around its national defense resources pertaining to oil.
These days, it really just means the US government divides the country into 5 regions, and for historical reasons, they're called PADDs. So PADD 2 is where Cushing, Oklahoma is. In the Mid-States area. PADD 3 is the Gulf Coast, Houston, Texas. The various different parts of the country are all divided into separate Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, hence the acronym PADD.
Nathan Egger: And this is different than pad drilling?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, that's a completely different idea. So PADD, P-A-D-D, was Petroleum Administration for Defense District. Completely different idea is the way you used to drill oil oil wells is you would go someplace where you thought you could have an oil well, and you'd set your drilling rig up there, and you'd drill one well with it. And then you'd have to break down your drilling rig and take it someplace else, and you've got your oil well.
What they realized as we went from vertical wells, the old technology, to horizontal wells, you could set up like a— imagine a concrete pad. You've got a spot where you set up your drilling rig, but it's going to drill one horizontal well to the north Another one to the south, another one to the east, another one to the west. Maybe it's going to go down deeper and then drill another one to the north that's deeper down, another one to the west, east, south.
You could have a spider web of potentially quite a few horizontal wells all drilled from one rig that got set up once in one spot, and it drilled all those wells. The time and energy that it takes The cost to break down these drilling rigs, move them from one location to the next, set them up and get ready to do the next drilling operation is enormous. So if you can economize by having a single drilling rig in one spot go and drill 5 or 6 different wells before it has to be broken down and moved to another spot, there's a tremendous efficiency of scale there. And that's called pad drilling.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Just having a drill in one place drill several oil wells in different directions.
Nathan Egger: OK. So this really does clarify for me that the EIA focus on drilling productivity, or the market's focus on the Baker Hughes rig count, is really quite silly. We've got wells producing the oil. It's not rigs.
Erik Townsend: Exactly. And even more importantly, suppose that the rig count goes up by 1 next week. That tells us there's one more rotary drilling rig that's in production. Somebody has deployed it someplace. Did they deploy it? Maybe it was one of the older rigs that doesn't have the ability to do pad drilling. Did they deploy that rig just to drill one oil well, or did they deploy that rig to drill 10 oil wells from a pad?
Huge difference in terms of how many oil wells are coming into production, but it's still one rotary, you know, one. And the one on the Baker Hughes rig count. It doesn't make sense for people to focus as much as they do on this silly Baker Hughes rig count. Yeah, it's got some relevance, but not nearly as much as people think.
Light sweet crude and US refinery configuration
Nathan Egger: All right. So we've drilled, we've fracked, we've got our oil. Why is most of this tight oil, at least in the US, ending up in storage? Why can't it be refined into gasoline or some other finished product?
Erik Townsend: Well, because there's not enough demand for it. And a related question, Is, wait a minute, if we're producing all of this oil in the United States, why are we importing any Middle Eastern oil if we've got too much US oil that's just going into storage?
The answer to that question is the US oil is light sweet, which is actually the highest quality grade that there is. It's better than heavy sour. We have very light, very sweet oil in the US shale patch. And we're getting this super high-quality oil. It sounds like a good thing. Just one problem: for the last several decades, all of the U.S. refining capacity has been designed around refining what? Middle Eastern oil, which is not the high-grade stuff. It's a lower grade. They actually have more expensive, more complicated processes for handling the heavy sour oil.
That's what we're set up for. So believe it or not, what we get in the US is really good light sweet, which is easiest to refine with a cheap refinery. We don't have cheap refineries. We have expensive high-tech American refineries that were designed to process Middle Eastern oil.
What we end up doing is buying heavy sour oil from the Middle East, blending it with the light sweet that's produced in the United States, and that blend then approximates something that the refinery is set up to deal with. In many ways, it would make sense to say, well, if we're producing all of this light sweet and that's the good stuff, why wouldn't we just set the refineries up to process the light sweet? We wouldn't have to buy any of the heavy oil from the Arabs anymore. Wouldn't that be better?
The thing is, it takes decades to build out the entire refining industry. It's not like you just flip a switch. You know, people kind of imagine a little toggle switch on a control panel that says, you know, push up for light sweet and push down for heavy sour.
It doesn't work that way. If you want to change your refinery, you literally have construction crews working for years reconfiguring all the valves and pipes and so forth that are in the equipment that is involved in the refining process in order to tune it for a different kind of oil. So it's not a decision that can be made lightly, and it's It's not one that can be implemented quickly.
Nathan Egger: So given the duration that these projects— the amount of time that these projects would require to either create new refineries or modify the current refineries, and the rapid decline rates that are associated with the tight oil plays in the United States, is there any chance at all that we're going to see increased refining capacity for this light sweet crude product that we have coming on market in the United States?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think we are seeing that already. refineries are tuning their equipment to be more capable of dealing with that. But again, it's a long process that happens over time. And I think if I were the refinery at this point in the story with what's happening, I think everybody sees that we've got a big shakeout in shale happening.
Would you really want to reconfigure your refinery so it can only process US oil and can't process the imported stuff? Unless you've got something to mix it with in this environment where Saudi Arabia is working so hard to push these shale guys out of business? Or would you kind of keep your options open? I think they're keeping their options open.
Permian economics
Nathan Egger: So that given, why is the return on investment quicker in the Permian Basin, as Art suggested?
Erik Townsend: The reason is that as you deal with different geology, it requires a different amount of investment. It's a huge investment to get the same amount of oil. Back in the old days, all you did was drill a hole in the ground and oil comes gushing out. You don't even need a pump for it. Those days are gone. We can't do that anymore.
We moved to more sophisticated oil wells, but it was still basic, simple technology. Now, in order to get any oil out of it, you've got to use hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.
It costs more to do that. In a given shale play, in some areas, areas, you just drill your horizontals— laterals, they're called— and, you know, you can start to frack them and you can start producing oil. In other places, you need longer laterals. You might need something like a heater well, which actually warms up the rock that surrounds the oil well and allows the oil to flow more quickly. All these things cost money. So depending on the geology of the rock formation, each different Every different play is going to have different economics in terms of how much money you have to spend on investment in order to get the same resulting oil flow from the producing well.
Shale junk bonds: JNK, HYG and SJB
Nathan Egger: OK. And the associated junk bonds with these shale oil plays, Art described them as worthless. Is this true? And if it is true, then why isn't shorting a JNK or HYG, these ETFs for high-yield debt, Why is this not the modern-day equivalent to printing money?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's— first of all, the junk bonds that are issued by shale drillers, there are some shale drillers that probably have a lot better economics than others. So I wouldn't quite say they're all worthless. I think that similar to subprime mortgage bonds back in 2008, 2009, They're going to become a very unfavored asset class.
And that also will mean, as it meant in 2009, there will be a bunch of perfectly good shale-issued bonds that are not going to default that will be negatively affected. And that will be a buying opportunity. But for the most part, I think that the bonds issued by shale drillers are in big trouble.
Why does that not translate to JNK and HYG being just the short of the century. Those 2 big ETFs are for junk bonds in general, not energy-related junk bonds. Now, a fairly significant percentage of the junk bonds that they own are issued by shale drillers. So a lot of them are that. If you really want to make the pure play that you're talking about, you have to short the individual issues of shale driller-issued bonds individually in the bond market. That really is something that only larger institutional traders have the sophistication to do.
If you want to play this from a retail standpoint or even a smaller hedge fund, JNK and HYG are the obvious targets. The other one is SJB, Sierra Juliet Bravo That's one that you buy as a long, and it's basically an inverse ETF on those same bonds. I'm not aware, though, of any product in the ETF space which is unique to energy-related bonds. Those are just junk bonds in general.
Refiners cutting crude purchases
Nathan Egger: That'd probably be a popular one if it did exist, but we're going to cover a lot more about the trading strategies associated with these junk We'll talk about the Trump bonds and all of that in part 2 of this discussion. Art discussed a couple of headlines that we saw this week about refiners not wanting to buy more crude or not wanting to buy as much crude that they would turn into gasoline. And despite recently hearing that there's a surprise uptick in the amount of miles that Americans are driving, the refiners still don't want to buy as much crude. What gives?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that what's going on in part is The other thing is that there's a storage problem everywhere. There have been in recent weeks crude oil inventories building up, finished product inventories building up, everything is building up. The system is backing up. If you're talking about storing crude oil, you can store it pretty much indefinitely. It was sitting underground for thousands of years before it came out. It's not going to go bad. It has an indefinite shelf life. If you Refine that crude oil into gasoline, it has a shelf life of several months after. I don't know the exact number, but less than a year after it's been refined, you can't really sell it as gasoline anymore because it starts to break down and it doesn't have the chemical properties that are needed to use it as a fuel and so forth.
So I think that what you're seeing is refiners are starting to favor if they're going to potentially run into bottleneck situations. With a lot of stuff sitting around in inventory. They want to have the crude oil in inventory rather than finished product in inventory. And I think you're also seeing storage issues. We didn't used to have a situation where the finished product, the gasoline, could not be produced because the tanks for storing it were already full and there was no place to put it. We're starting to run into those problems now, and I think that's causing the refiners to take a step back and slow down a little bit.
Futures curve: contango, backwardation and roll premia
Nathan Egger: All right, well, before we close this wrap-up segment, there were a couple of other terms that I think would be unclear to many. Front spread, contango, salsa dance, alpha-bravo, roll forward. What was going on there?
Erik Townsend: I don't know about the salsa dance. I'll try to address the rest of it. I think that a lot of our listeners are probably familiar with the concept of the yield curve in fixed income markets. In other words, if you want to borrow money for one year versus borrow money for five years versus borrow money for ten years, the rate of interest that you're going to pay is going to be different based on how long the term of the loan is.
Another way to think about that is the commodity that is being purchased there is money itself. The interest that you're paying to borrow money is the price of that money. What is What determines the price? Well, it depends on the delivery date. When is the money going to be paid back? Generally speaking, the longer the delivery date is, the longer the duration of the loan, the higher the interest rate tends to be, but there are some economic conditions when the reverse is true. Well, what we're talking about when we talk about the yield curve is the cost of money over time at various different maturities, different repayment periods.
What does it cost to borrow money? Take that same concept and extend it to commodities.
If I want to buy crude oil, well, wait a minute. Crude oil when? I have to answer that question. Crude oil to be delivered next month, that has a price, what we call the front month price, $33.08 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon. Looks like this crazy spike that happened is a result result of the Venezuelan energy minister's statement, is starting to retrace at least partially. So that's the price for now. But what if I want to know what the price is in order to have oil delivered in, say, the end of 2018, December— or let's say December of 2019? That price is $45.20 as we speak. So the price is different depending on when the oil is going to be delivered.
Contango and backwardation are just relative terms. If the price is going up over time, so next month costs more than this month, that's called contango. If next month costs less than this month, that's called backwardation. The reason that we said that the likely bottom in oil prices will come with record contango is what is going to cause oil prices to trade all the way down into the teens. I'm not promising that's going to happen, don't quote me on that, but I think it's very possible.
How could that possibly come about when everybody knows perfectly well that the long-term sustainable cost of production is more like $50, not $20? Well, the answer is because that oil is piling up and it has an expiration date. If we're talking about, as an example, the April delivery contract for West Texas Intermediate crude, it has an expiration date of March 21st. After March 21st, everybody's got to close their contracts or take delivery, one or the other. If you don't have a tank to store it in, you're going to sell it, and you're going to sell it at any price because you don't have a place to put it.
So it's when you run out of storage that what would happen is the front-month price would probably be deeply, deeply discounted to the next month, because everybody's crossing their fingers and hoping that by that next monthly deadline that some storage space will open up. But until then, this contract that's about to expire in the next few days, what are we going to do? We're going to let it trade lower and lower until eventually somebody who has the wherewithal to take the oil away from Cushing, Oklahoma buys that contract.
So Art and I both see this the same way, that when we hit If we do hit a bottom, it will likely be a panic bottom, and it will likely come— when we talked about front spread contango, what we mean is the difference between the front month and the next month. We are predicting that the very low price, let's say it's $17 a barrel, sounds like, wow, buy all you can get at $17. Wait a minute, if you're buying the April contract at $17, but in order to roll it forward into the May contract, which you have to do, that or liquidate it, then you're going to end up with paying whatever that contango difference is. So let's say that April was trading at $17, May was trading at $22, $5 higher.
Really, it feels like you're buying it for $17, but as soon as you roll it forward, your effective cost is $22. That's that problem of being bitten by that front-month contango being so steep, it dramatically increases your cost above the level at which you originally bought it.
Another catchphrase that you'll hear is roll-forward premia. That means as you roll the contract from one month to the next, the price is going up, and therefore your acquisition cost is going up.
Part 2 plans and ratings request
Nathan Egger: Okay, this makes a lot of sense, and, and, and we could go on, but, but I feel like we're, we're treading into part 2 territory here. So I'm going to let that be it for my questions right now. Listeners, I know that was a lot, and we've gone a bit long here, but I hope this follow-up has been helpful and sets us up for part 2, when we're going to discuss trading strategies related to all this part 1 discussion that we've had today. I know that a lot has been clarified in my own mind. And as soon as I'm done taping this segment, I'm going to go back and listen to Erik's discussion with Art again with this information fresh in my mind, and I encourage you guys to consider doing the same if you have the time. But I'm afraid after all of that, we've run out of time for this week.
Erik, is there anything else before we wrap it up?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're going to do our best. Obviously scheduling is an issue. We've already got a guest booked for next week, so we're probably not going to do book part 2 next week. As soon as we can, we'll bring you part 2 of this show. Undecided at this point, and we would welcome your feedback, listeners. Should we do part 2 by trying to rush out and recruit another guest, because Art says part 2 is really not up his alley? Or should Nathan and I just do this? Because frankly, this trading strategy is what I've spent the last 6 months of my life focusing on. I think we're leaning a little bit towards just doing it in-house, which means there would be no special guest for that show. It's kind of a break from our general format, but I think it may be the best way to deliver the content. The other option is we could try to find a trader.
I'd love to find someone with different views than mine who doesn't think that the outcome that Art and I see is going to happen, just as contrasting views.
Nathan and I are hard at work. We're going to put together a part 2 of this that gets into the trading strategies. We're going to bring that to you in Meanwhile, we still need everybody's help, so please subscribe, rate, and review us on iTunes. It only takes a few seconds to open iTunes, right-click on MacroVoices, choose View in iTunes Store, and then when the store window pops up, click on Ratings and Reviews. And then where it says Click to Rate, just click on 5 stars. Actually, you can click— 5 stars. Click on whatever you feel is appropriate. We hope to inspire you to click on 5 stars if you're feeling good about the direction that we're taking this program so far. And better yet, write a review.
These little things make a huge difference in our ratings. I know it sounds like that's just for us folks, but it's really for you too. The more that we increase our ratings, that translates directly into Nathan being able to bring you even bigger, better guest names. A lot of you guys want to hear Kyle Bass. Nathan is working hard to get Kyle Bass. He's not responding because we're nobody on their radar screen right now. It is your help in terms of ratings and reviews that is going to help us get the notoriety that we need to bring you the guests that we most want to bring you.
Nathan Egger: So we really appreciate your help, everybody. You've been great so far. Don't forget to follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices. We're still out of time for now. So until next week, take care, everyone.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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