Bill Fleckenstein — Bill Fleckenstein, former short-fund manager (closed his short fund in March 2009, now setting up a fund again); daily column and subscription service at FleckensteinCapital.com (as introduced on the show)
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Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 8 was recorded March 31st, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Bill Fleckenstein joins me as today's special guest. I'll be talking to Bill about monetary policy, the market outlook, short selling, and much more.
Yellen's dovish speech and the S&P
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, Equities got a nice bump this week after surprisingly dovish words from Fed Chair Yellen in a speech that she gave on Tuesday to the New York Economic Club. But it looks like we're stalling out here short of new highs in the S&P. What do you make of the Yellen speech and the effect that it is having on risk markets?
Erik Townsend: Well, Janet Yellen's change of tune took a lot of people by surprise, myself included. And the reason I say that is, you know, in the past what we've seen is, okay, let's say the stock market's down 15% and people are getting really worried. And Jim Bullard or somebody is going to save the market with a speech and the Fed comes out all dovish. We've seen this in reaction to market events. If you look at what's going on right now, basically the chart looks like we're well above the 200-day moving average on the S&P, working certainly on a cycle high and rapidly approaching new all-time highs. Why would this be an environment where this Fed would suddenly change face? What they've been trying to do is emphasize before, you know, April's a live meeting. We could hike rates in April. We could if we wanted to. We could. We're trying to emphasize that to everybody. Now they're going the other way. And it really caught me by surprise.
I was not expecting that change of tune from Janet Yellen.
The question now is, is it going to actually mean that there is a new trend in play, or is this one of those cases where a Fed statement maybe spooked the market to where it hits a high and now it's going to roll over? I'm leaning towards that. But boy, the last couple of days of market action after Janet spoke, you know, we pushed above the support level. I think there's another technical support level in the S&P around 2,075 or so. Once we get above that, there's really not a lot of obvious resistance levels until you get to new all-time highs. So we're definitely flirting with something here. On a technical analysis standpoint, all I can say is, wow, it's gone farther than I thought. On a fundamental basis, I still think that there's a lot of downside left in this market. Nothing has been solved. The economy is slowing down. We still have all these problems.
And And I don't think that the problems in the oil market are over either.
Crude oil: Cushing builds, refinery maintenance and the buyback lull
Nathan Egger: Speaking of the oil market, we also saw crude react to Yellen's speech initially to the upside before resuming its recent downtrend. Where do you think we're headed here next?
Erik Townsend: Well, I thought it was very interesting. You know, what Art Berman and I have predicted is that there will be a series of big builds on inventory and that the builds, particularly on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, because that's the settlement point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, that was going to be so important.
Well, what we got this week was a fairly weak inventory report. In other words, analysts were expecting there to be a build in inventory of about 3, 3.5 million barrels. We got 2.5 million barrels. 2.2, I think, was the number.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: That doesn't really change my outlook, but I would expect that it would create some upside weakness in price.
We saw a little bit, based on the private API data that came out on Tuesday afternoon, we saw a little bit of anticipation.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And so, you know, there was some anticipatory buying moving the price higher into that. But after the data came out on Wednesday morning at 10:30, the market's done nothing but go down since then.
So what that says to me is even in a week, you know, if you look 2 weeks ago, we had a 10.5 million barrel build. The market wanted to move higher because the short squeeze wasn't over yet, and it shrugged off what should have been very bearish news. Now we're seeing the market shrugging off what should be bullish news, which is the inventory is not building yet as quickly as Art and I expected. That it will.
Once we see a catalyst, and I think the catalyst will be a build in Cushing inventory. Now, even though this week we saw a build in national inventory, it was actually a small drawdown in Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. So there's a little bit more space in those tanks in Cushing, Oklahoma. Those are the most critical ones because it's where the futures contract is settled.
If we see, as I expect in the next few weeks, large builds in inventory that are also builds on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, inventory. I think that that will be the catalyst to allow the oil market to move substantially lower from here, at least $10 lower. And as that happens, I think equities will be taken down with it.
Nathan Egger: And is refinery maintenance season continuing to have an effect on this market?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, we're in the— right in the throes of refinery maintenance season right now in the United States. And so that means we're consuming less crude oil. Another few weeks here, the United States refinery maintenance season will be over, but Europe's refineries are going into maintenance. And remember, crude oil is a global market. So if you're doing maintenance on European refineries, even though it's the other side of the ocean, it still affects the price of the oil globally. So we do have several more weeks that the industry's ability to consume crude oil will be curtailed slightly by the fact that maintenance is going on and what the industry calls turnarounds when they are reversing the configuration. Of the refinery to produce summertime grades of finished product instead of wintertime grades. So that's going to be with us for the next several weeks.
The other thing that, at least as it affects the equity market, that will be with us for the next several weeks is really for the entire month of April, there's no corporate buybacks because we're in the earnings quiet period. It'll be very interesting to me, first of all, to see whether or not we get the sell-off in equities that I'm expecting during April. But then the question is, when we get into May and And the quiet period is over, and it is now possible for corporations to go back to their ways of borrowing in the bond market and then using that money to buy back their own shares. Is that big share repurchase trend going to continue, or is it finally winding down? I think that's going to be a big tell in terms of the direction of the stock market from here.
Gold's muted reaction and the 50-day average
Nathan Egger: Erik, one would have expected gold to respond very positively to Yellen's comments this week, but thus far, the reaction, at least to my eyes, has been surprisingly muted. Listeners will know that you've been skeptical of gold's rally in 2016, but here is a seemingly dovish-turning Fed. Enough to make you change your tune?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm still waiting, frankly, to figure out what happened here. And obviously, it's very clear what happened in the sense of what was said. But I haven't figured out what's the motivation. Why did Janet Yellen go from emphasizing, going out of her way to really try to steer the markets in the direction of, hey, April's a live meeting, We could hike rates again, could be happening, to now this very dovish commentary. I don't understand what the catalyst was that caused Janet to change her tune. And until I figure out what her motive is, I don't really know that I can interpret the meaning of her actions.
In terms of the market reaction to it, though, what I said last week was that gold is rapidly approaching its 50-day moving average, right around $1,200. Would it be able to bounce off of that? Well, it bounced off fairly impressively on Tuesday, but that was in reaction.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: to incredibly, incredibly unexpectedly dovish comments. And it was a fairly big move, but more than half of that is retraced now.
And we're looking at $1,232, just where we've been for the last month or so. I think that the 50-day moving average is still, particularly in the gold market, 50-day moving average is really important. We are in a process here. Are we going to get through this support at the 50-day, and is the market gonna move lower? Or is it gonna bounce off it and sustain a move higher?
It's only been a couple of days since Janet's comments, if anything was going to turn the market around to the upside, change my outlook of a bearish view on gold, it would be what has happened. So it should be turning up. But as you said, muted reaction. That says to me that the gold market is not ready yet.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, thank you, Erik. Your insights are always appreciated. And we'll be back with this week's feature interview with Bill Fleckenstein right after this.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Why Fleckenstein is back to shorting
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Bill Fleckenstein. And Bill, you're a fairly notorious guy, but for those listeners who don't know who you are already, you ran a short fund and you shut it down in March of 2009, essentially because you knew what was going to happen. You knew the Fed was going to print money and that money had to go someplace, and a lot of it was going to end up in asset markets.
You're back We're back now, setting your fund back up. And the most immediate question that comes to my mind, Bill, is what's different now? Because obviously you can make a, I'm sure, a very persuasive bearish case on the stock market. I've had at least 5 or 6 rounds of this since 2009 where I just thought, boy, we haven't solved any problems. We've papered over our problems with printed money to address symptoms without solving any problem. This all has to come falling apart. The party's over. And it seems like it's never over. So what's different about this time?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think the problem is that Well, what's different about the last— well, we could call it maybe 18 months— is since QE3 ended, the stock market really hasn't gone up. It hasn't gone down very well, but there have been some bursts of kind of violent downside action, and they've gotten progressively worse. I actually thought that when the market took out the August lows this winter, I thought we'd see a, you know, a rapid collapse. That did not happen. I was lucky enough that when I saw that it wasn't happening, you know, I covered most of the shorts that I have. Even though I haven't restarted my short-only fund, I still run my— I still manage my own money and, and there's some friends and family, and I had a lot of shorts and I took them in. So I was pretty fortunate about that.
So one of the reasons why I why I discussed, uh, opening a new short fund was because some of the things that I think are important to making money on the short side were falling into place. Number one, the Fed was not printing money and the market appeared to have stalled.
You know, I thought there was plenty of bad news that might hit, and bad news was mattering. Right now we're back in a period where bad news doesn't really matter, but I think this is kind of transitory. And another leg will start to the downside. I can't tell you when.
It could be tomorrow, could be in a month, could be anytime. But there's plenty of unfinished business without— I mean, we do have the fumes of QE because the Fed is rolling over its balance sheet. Then you do have the other central bankers doing what they're doing. So it's not like there's no QE going on, but it's not happening here in America. The more important stage of this will be when And the market breaks and the Fed does what it's gonna do next, and we see if the market wants to believe them.
In the wake of the last 2 burst bubbles, the stock bubble and then the real estate bubble, we had a period where the Fed did a lot of easing. And of course, after '08, we had government support programs, and those really weren't perceived to be effective for a while.
You know, but then when, when people started to have confidence again in the Fed, Markets took off. And, and of course, since, oh, the lows in '09, the market has hardly spent any time going down, absent the few breaks we've had in the last couple of years— or sorry, in the last 18 months.
What's changed is the Fed's not doing QE. Now, you're going to have to be on guard for a return of QE when the market breaks. Whatever the heck they're going to do, I don't know, but they'll do something again. So, you know, it's, it's not—
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: as though the market breaks and you can sit back and be short for a year and a half. I mean, the most important thing about short selling, in my opinion, are the tactics that you employ.
You have to do the research. It's important, but all by itself it won't make any money. In fact, it'll probably cost you money.
Trading around an activist Fed; the next air pocket
Erik Townsend: Could you just map out for us what you see on the horizon, Bill? I think that everybody sort of sees the, the same big picture here, which is that the Fed's taken away the punchbowl, markets are set to roll over, but everybody knows that if things get really bad, we're going to see QE4 and more accommodation, and things are going to reverse again. So when you can't really gauge the market based on economic fundamentals because Fed policy is driving everything, how do you trade around that? Is it based entirely on analyzing the Fed?
Bill Fleckenstein: Fed policy— sorry, activist Fed policy intervention has been the case on a progressively larger scale now for for almost 20 years. I mean, Greenspan was completely incompetent, but he makes these people that have come after him, they make him look like Albert Einstein. So it's not new news that we have to factor in what the Fed is doing. It's a major part of how I try to manage risk when I'm running a short portfolio. But you can talk much and say, well, I'm gonna own my stocks and I know the Fed's got my back. Yeah, well, you say that now, but you have a, you know, 15, 20% break in the market and shorts And, you know, those same guys that are saying that'll be shaking in their boots and they'll be selling stocks.
And then it'll take a while for the Fed to ride to the rescue. But as a short seller, you'd have to get out of the way anticipating their next move. And then in the wake of the next move that they make, we'll have to see what happens. Because at the end of the day, these policies don't work. Anyone with an ounce of brains can see that these— that the—
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: Response to failed policies is just doing more of the same failed policy. And that's gone on for some time.
At some point, the bond markets are going to revolt against this because I think at some point people are not going to want to own these low-yielding to negative-yielding pieces of government paper when government deficits are liable to explode. I mean, this is a recipe for disaster. But for the moment, And it's perceived to be completely intelligent policy, even though it's the opposite.
Erik Townsend: Bill, where do you think if we look at monetary policy, the story that we're being told by the Fed is entirely about how we are on a rate normalization cycle. They're not sure how long it will take, but we're headed back towards historically normal interest rates. A lot of skeptics, myself included, have said, hey, it's a matter of time And not a question of if, but when the Fed reverses course towards either QE4 or negative interest rates or some other kind of accommodation. First of all, would you agree with that characterization? And second of all, where do you think we are in this story? Are we close to the point where we are going to see that U-turn, or are we going to follow this for a while more with the Fed trying to save face?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think to any objective observer, It's pretty clear that the Fed's back way off from that storyline. You can see it in the FX market. I mean, the whole— here's what's happened since 2011. The Fed, between the Fed's QE and Draghi's and now Japan's, they managed to push the stock market to the moon in America. The stock market wrote the news. People said, okay guys, market's up, economy's gonna be better. We had this whole storyline of self-sustaining recovery and multiple rate hikes, and there was— the dollar was up and everyone else was going to have to follow our policies, but they're way behind. So the dollar is going to be strong, the other currency is going to be weak, and you had to invest in America and emerging markets were no good. All that was BS. It was all fantasy precipitated by stock prices going up, having people write the news differently and believe different things.
And now guess what? Here we are A year later, about a year ago, is about the zenith of this thinking, and the dollar rolled over pretty hard, at least against the dollar index, not against every small currency on the planet. But, and it's pretty clear that there's no self-sustaining recovery and there's not going to be a lot of rate hikes.
Now, ardent believers in the school of thought that says the Fed knows what it's doing won't agree with that statement, but anybody who's
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Bill Fleckenstein: Who knows anything about history and objective will see that that's true. So when are people going to— when is the Fed going to be forced to do something else? They're not going to do anything else until the stock market gets smoked.
Now, is that down 10, 12, 15, 20? I don't know. I think that the next time the market goes down, we take out those February lows, August lows. This time I think we will hit an air pocket. I thought that would happen last time. I was wrong. I think, but I still think next time it's going to happen. I think the market is an air pocket waiting to happen. There's all these false beliefs based on the premise that all this stuff works, and it's nonsense. And things aren't going to get better materially because these policies don't work. And at some point, people are going to be forced to realize that. When they're forced to, they start to— that dawns on them, the stock market will get hit hard, fast.
At some point, the Fed will panic. When the Fed panics, then we can look at those policies and see what they are and try to come up with some sort of conclusion as to what does it mean. And, you know, if one of these days the bond markets of the world finally decide that they're not going to put up with this central planning that comes out of these, you know, these academics that run the central banks, then, then things are really going to get tough and we're going to have to settle up a lot of these long-running problems that keep getting worse because we've refused to address So, basically, the—
Will the next Fed rescue work? Bonds, CPI and the dollar
Erik Townsend: if we sort of lay out the picture here that we can expect the market to fail at some point, I think you and I are both looking for that to happen sooner rather than later. But then there will be a stick save. There will be some kind of Fed accommodation that at least temporarily rescues things. I'm assuming that you would agree with me that we're getting to the point where they're running out of bullets and it's not going to work, or at least we're closer To the point where eventually it's not going to work?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, you can't prejudge that. I mean, I don't know. It's not going to work in the sense that it's not going to make the economy— create an economy like we used to have before the Fed started doing all of its intervention and holding rates for too low for too long. But it might work in the sense that it could take the stock market up a bunch in a short space of time. So if you're talking about You're talking about it from an economic standpoint, no, it won't work. You're talking about it from the perspective of a short seller, and you fold your arms and say, I don't care what they do, it's not going to work, and I'm going to stay short, you're liable to get your head ripped off.
So what they're going to do, we don't know. We know they'll do something. There'll be an attempt to ride to the rescue. It won't be successful from an economic standpoint. It will probably be successful from, at least from a short-term standpoint.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Bill Fleckenstein: As far as financial markets go. I remember in '09 when I decided to close down my short funds because I knew they were going to print money. And guys I knew, there were other short sellers, you know, sort of poked fun at me saying, well, this is not going to work. It doesn't work. It didn't work last time. And consumers tapped.
And well, you know what? Fortunately, I stuck to my guns. I got out of the way and I didn't get run over.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: So you have to be very careful when you say it's not going to work, you know what I mean?
Erik Townsend: Oh, I definitely know what you mean. I have made this mistake so many times. In March of 2009, when you were making the right call and shutting down your short fund, I was saying this isn't going to work because the market's going to see through it. This is an act of desperation on the Fed's part. They've gotten to the point where all conventional monetary policy is not working.
We are at the desperation point where they're just reaching for straws. The market will see through that, and it's not going to work. And boy, I couldn't possibly have been more wrong. You print money in dollars, those dollars have to go someplace. And as you've said, they may not solve any systemic problems for society, but you sure can prop up asset markets with printed money if you want to do that.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, you can, as long as people have confidence in what you're doing. Now we're going to get to one of these rounds, whether it's QE4, 5, 6, or 7, I don't know, it'll backfire quickly. And you'll know that because the bond market won't cooperate. And when they lose the bond market, the game is over.
Erik Townsend: So your thesis is basically when you see the bond market reacting in reverse— in other words, normally what we expect in quantitative easing, the government's printing money to buy bonds, you're expecting the price of bonds to go up. Because the government's buying them. When you see the price of bonds going down in that environment because regular investors are scared to death that they're never going to get paid back, that's the moment when confidence has been lost.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, yeah. Well, it's not they're scared to death they won't get paid back, they just know that they're not going to get— you know, they finally decide that they're not going to own this paper because it's a losing proposition, because they know these policies are good. At some point it's going to lead to more inflation. I mean, inflation is higher than people are willing to admit to because the CPI is— the CPI doesn't measure inflation. It measures some sort of after-it's-been-manipulated statistic about how much prices go up if you want to believe in hedonic adjustment, substitution, and all of that sort of crap.
You know, I wrote a book on the Fed and then I had a chapter in it on how the CPI had been manipulated. And so if you rely on CPI inflation or any of the silly measures the Fed uses, you're never going to get any anyway. But it's out there. I mean, ask any— the reason there's no middle class in this country anymore is because the economy has been ruined by the Fed and the politicians. And there's still inflation even though they talk about deflation. So people can't get good jobs in the aggregate, and the price of living keeps going up for the most part. I mean, yeah, we've been in a period of some commodity decline, price declines in the last year, but now once they stabilize, then you start that clock all over again.
So at some point, the Fed will lose the confidence of the bond market, and then it's game over. But I don't know when that will be. And when that happens, then your tactics will You have to be different, and then you can play, you can operate in a totally different fashion than you must when you have to worry about them riding to the rescue.
Erik Townsend: One of the biggest stories in the global macro world in the last couple of years has been the US dollar rally. Basically, ever since the end of QE3, the US dollar has been rallying against other currencies. We had Axel Merk on the program a couple of weeks ago saying that he thinks it's done He thinks the dollar rally is over. Goldman Sachs was out with a note the other day saying they think it's about to take off dramatically further to the upside.
Where do you see this dollar debate headed? Where do you think it's going from here?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think I just covered that. I mean, I think it was a fantasy. It's over. You know, peaked out last year and maybe retested the high recently, but Goldman Sachs is full of crap.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so you, you do see the dollar rally is done at this point?
Bill Fleckenstein: Yes.
Short-selling method: 10% research, 90% tactics
Erik Townsend: Okay. And so with respect to a short-selling book and building a short strategy, how do you approach this? You know, I, I, if I were to look at a book about short selling, it would probably be about security analysis and looking at balance sheets and which companies are having the most trouble. It seems to me that this macro cycle of what Fed policy is going to be is much, much bigger than the balance sheet, you know, particulars of any company. So how do you approach a short fund, a short strategy in this environment?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I mean, you basically can't be short. I mean, that's been— let me say it this way: research counts for maybe 10%, although you have to do good research, you have to be right about that. The tactics and how you manage your risk and how you initiate shorts and press them and take them off and cut your losses and all that. All those sorts of things count for about 90%.
And the analysis of what the central banks are up to and how people perceive that and all of that is an integral component of managing the risk. So as I said earlier, it's not about research, it's about your tactics.
So I have a set of rules that I use that say, okay, is it safe to be short or not? And, and how careful do I have to be? And they revolve around Is the market making some highs? Are individual stocks going up or down on bad news? What's the perception of the Fed? What's the Fed doing? All those sorts of things.
Erik Townsend: And are your shorts always against stocks that you've analyzed for a particular weakness, or do you sometimes short sectors on a macro play?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, always individual companies for specific reasons.
Erik Townsend: And that's— I think that's a fairly consistent rule that I've heard from other people, is that, you know, you can, you can be an index trader on the long side But on the short side, you really can't just trade an index. You've got to do the research and the homework.
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I don't think you can do that. I mean, even on the long side, if you're just going to buy an index, what's your edge? You're saying, okay, well, I don't have an edge, but I know the crowd's bullish and they're all going up. Okay. And you could do that on the short side, I guess.
If your tactics were good, it would work. But most of the time, I think I think you need to feel like you've got some sort of an edge or what you're thinking that other people aren't thinking or how you see this. And so that's why I prefer individual securities. I mean, otherwise it's just a guess. Now, sometimes if you know you're making a guess, it's easier to pick some basket of stuff that you're not going to have your— you're not going to be mentally invested in, right? You do a whole bunch of research on a particular company, it's easy to get get sort of dug in over that, where if you pick something that you know you don't have any edge, it's easier to get away from the trade. So from that standpoint, sometimes picking a basket would be useful if you follow my logic.
Erik Townsend: Okay, but you say that at least in your style, you generally short individual securities only?
Bill Fleckenstein: Correct.
Reading the rally: why he is not short now
Erik Townsend: Okay, if you look at the market right now, I watched this rally start from a few weeks ago, and, you know, I thought it was going to end at the 50-day moving average, and it And then I thought it was going to end at the 100-day moving average, and it didn't. And then we took out the 200-day moving average. We're at the point now, I think we've got one more technical level around 2,070, 2,075. After that, it's really new highs before on a technical level, you know, you could say that this rally is done. So on a pure technical analysis standpoint, I'm thinking, boy, it's time to cover my shorts on the S&P. On a fundamental level, I just have really strong conviction it's short. What do you think has driven this rally that we've seen so far for so long? When so many people seem to have the same hesitations and skepticisms about the health of the rally?
Bill Fleckenstein: I don't know. Could it be a function of how the compute— the algos and computers read the environment at the margin, and versus too many guys who got too short, maybe, or something? I don't really know. I don't spend a lot of time thinking about that. I mean, it is what it is. And if If you knew who was buying and why they were buying, I don't even— I mean, I'm not sure it would do you any good. So, and I don't think any of these technical levels matter.
When I realized I was wrong about the market vapor locking in the downside, I cut myself way, way, way back, got out of the way. And I said to my— I said, okay, this rally is either going to be shorter than people expect and they'll get pulled that way, or it'll last longer. Well, it's fallen into the latter category. So it'll last longer, be more complex, you know, fail at some number that nobody could pick. I don't know. I, I don't spend a lot of time thinking about that because I can't know. Well, I can wait and see. If wherever it fails, I'll start to pay attention and I'll start to see what companies are going down on what kind of news. I'll start to get an idea of what's up, and I'll know what the companies that I think have problems and whether I think it's going to get rugged to be involved. And then I'll, I'll get active again because that, that could be Maybe 3 days from now.
I just don't know, but I don't need to know. As long as I'm not gonna— if it's not working for an extended period of time, I'm not gonna stand there and be in the way.
It's just part of what I've learned. And the way you could have made money shorting stocks in— I don't really know about the '70s, I wasn't in the business yet, but in the '80s or early '90s, it's totally different the way it works now. And you just have to be— you just have to, you know, bow to the reality of that situation.
Erik Townsend: And when you say it's totally different, what's totally different? Because monetary policy is driving markets more than individual—
Bill Fleckenstein: Central banks get in the way all the time, and they just, you know, you can't wait for some company, you know, that's terminal, that can't get funding. You know, all of a sudden the Fed comes with a QE or emergency rate hike, and guys cover shorts, they spike up, and the next thing you know, the company does a deal. I mean, the activist central banker, the Greenspan began has totally changed the way you have to manage your tactics of running a short book. You can't just sit there and fold your arms and be short them and say, ah, now I got them, because there's just too much noise involved given the, the violent rallies that these guys precipitate.
Erik Townsend: Well, and certainly the algorithmic trading and everything else that has changed the market has been amazing.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, but the algorithmic trading could operate on the downside too. You know, I mean, so we have only seen it really operate on the upside. At some point, it'll operate on the downside, and that'll be a— that'll be a horror show, most likely. But so far, that hasn't happened.
Erik Townsend: So as you look at this market today, do you see this as it's time to be building a short book, or are you still in hurry-up-and-wait mode, waiting to see what the Fed does?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I see no reason to be short. Why? I mean, it's like we just talked about it. I mean, the market keeps hitting recovery highs. And bad news doesn't make stocks go down. They ignore it and they go up. So I don't see any reason to get short until something starts to change.
I mean, I have companies that I know, companies I would be willing to get short if I thought it would, you know, if I think the environment's changing. And I think it will change. I think, you know, I don't think April is going to be great for stocks because I think we'll start to see earnings. But, you know, maybe People give it a pass. They'll say, okay, now it's getting better. We thought it was bad. I don't know.
Psychology is a big component in this central bank, activist central bank era. So we'll just have to wait and see. I don't feel like I'm gonna miss something if I'm not on it.
'Cause remember, you've only got a trade in front of you on the downside, 'cause the Fed's gonna ride to the rescue. It's not like the bubble burst and And things are going to get violent quickly, which is what happened after the last 2 bubbles burst. This one's different, the way government bonds are involved and stuff like that.
I mean, if they lost the bond market, that'd be different. You could be maxed out short for the rest of your life until they collapsed, right? But we're just not there.
Precious metals: the bear market is over
Erik Townsend: Do you get involved in the— I know you follow macro a lot, and a lot of macro traders pay attention to things like gold. Do you integrate precious metals into your trading a lot, or do you really focus on the equities primarily?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I'm heavily involved in precious metals. That's another reason why I don't feel so compelled to do anything on the short side. Metals are starting to work again. You're able to make good money in these miners and in the metals themselves. And there's way— I felt like at the beginning of this year, there's way more upside in the miners than there was downside in stocks. So, that was fairly easy.
I was the director, I was the lead director of Pan American Silver for about, uh, I was a director for about 15 years. I was the lead director for about 10 or 12. So I've actually been in the industry from that standpoint.
Erik Townsend: And what's your outlook at this point? I, I think a lot of us have felt like the long-term precious metals has got to be a bullish story, but, you know, cyclically we've been in a bear market for the last few years. Does it feel like it's over?
Bill Fleckenstein: I mean, Yeah, the bear market, I think, ended. In the metal and the stocks, it's quite a bit different. So, I think it's over. I think it's— and so I think we're in a new bull market, and I see all these tech— look, the problem with gold is everyone who can spell gold has an opinion about where the price is supposed to be. Most of it's based on slapping a ruler against a chart and drawing a trend line or making up some story about what's gonna happen. So, everyone's got an opinion about it.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Bill Fleckenstein: Most people don't know much about it from a fundamental standpoint. You know, people that are bullish are looking for a correction; those that are bearish are looking for much lower. And the small minority of people think that it's going to be resolved on the upside, and it's a bull market. A lot of these technicians keep looking at the data through the lens of the last three years when we're in a bear market. And if we're not, and if we're not in a bear market, which is my opinion, then the data that they're looking. looking at that's got themselves all twisted sideways isn't gonna matter.
Advice for new short sellers
Erik Townsend: So let's move back to short selling. A lot of our listeners are active traders who are very familiar with the concept of what a short sale is. They know how to put a short position in on their account. But experienced short sellers like yourself, Bill, know that there's a lot more to it than just understanding the mechanics of a short trade. There are aspects of of short selling that are different from trading from a long side.
I think a lot of our listeners are maybe looking at whether it's immediately on the horizon or a couple years down the road, I'm not sure, but we're going to be going through a soft patch, I think, in the economy where a lot of people who are traders but not experienced short sellers are going to be involved in more short positions. What would your advice be to new short sellers or experienced traders that don't have a lot of shorting experience? as market conditions tend to drag them more into short trades?
Bill Fleckenstein: That's a pretty complicated question. I don't know that I have a soundbite worth of information to give you. I mean, you have to have rules about what you think is going to happen. You have to know what would make you cover. You know, the hardest thing about short selling is the tactics. You, you know, you have to have conviction to be short, but you have to be flexible enough to say, hey, this is not working, I got to cut it back. You've got to be willing to put it back out. If you're wrong, you've got to be willing to get chopped up and chewed up some. You can't just fold your arms. Something starts to go against you, you've got to start nibbling and taking it in.
And there was a book recently written by Richard Teitelbaum called The Most Dangerous Trade, and in it he profiled some short sellers— myself, Marc Cohodes, David Einhorn, and some others. But some of the guys in the book aren't really short sellers, they're just marquee names.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: Help sell books, but some of the others are. And you can read that book and see what doesn't work. Marc Cohodes does great research, and he, he was not in the same camp that I am about tactics.
And I could never do it the way he does. He relied, you know, all on the research and tended to go after fraud. I think you have to be much more tactical about it. So, I mean, I think the thing you have to realize is that it takes a great deal of trading, it takes a lot of risk management, and just get Getting the research right is like 1/10 of the problem.
So I think being aware of how difficult it is and how much hands-on and day-to-day management it takes, and again, knowing when to prep and when to cut back, I mean, that's the critical stuff. And if you don't really— if all this sounds foreign to you, you have to be really, really careful and keep those positions small.
How Fleckenstein got into short selling
Erik Townsend: And what was it about short selling that attracted you to it, Bill? You've got a very strong— so it's just something that you have experience with and got good at, or?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I mean, yeah, I had experience with in the '80s. I was short Japan after that bubble, and I'd been short stocks in the late '80s and early '90s, you know, frauds and different things like that. But then when I saw the path that Greenspan was on, I knew it was going to lead to disaster. So I left the long firm that I worked— I was a partner partner at and set up a short fund in 1995. I was 5 years too early because the party lasted longer than I would have guessed.
But it came to a bad end, and then they did it again, and then I wrote a book, and, you know, and then they did it again. So it was— these policies were no good, and they were going to end in disaster. But I never dreamed that they'd get, you know, that they'd keep doing the same thing over and over, but that's exactly what's happened.
Erik Townsend: It's absolutely amazing to me that It's amazing that we can go through so many rounds of the same policies, and it's not like it's a mystery. There's lots of smart people that comment on monetary policy and describe all of the reasons why there are so many faults in our government's policies, but we just keep doing the same things over again. It never ceases to amaze me.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, I know what you mean.
Outlook: precious metals as the easier trade; sign-off
Erik Townsend: Bill, as we close, I'd like to just get a perspective from you as to where you see things headed. It sounds like you don't think that it's time to be short yet, but you're definitely getting ready for that to come. So, do you think this is something that's going to play out soon, long?
Bill Fleckenstein: How—
Erik Townsend: what do you see on the horizon?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think it's going to happen pretty soon, but I don't need to know that because I can wait and see it start to develop, and then I can act. So, I don't, I don't need to know the future. I just need to start to see it develop, recognize it, and be smart enough to get short at the right time, the right stuff, and manage my risks, and it'll work out. But I think there's more money that's going to be Made in precious metals is going to be made even shorter. So I think that's potentially a much easier place to go for the average person.
Erik Townsend: For the average person, then, you think a long trade in precious metals is both easier, safer, better, smarter than trying to learn short selling of stocks that you're experienced with?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, yeah, but that doesn't mean it will be actually easy. That means it's easier. We're talking about degrees of difficulty here.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Bill, I can't thank you enough for coming and joining us on the program. It's been a fantastic interview. I know that you write a daily column every day at FleckensteinCapital.com. You also have a subscription service that people can subscribe to to get your perspective. That is at FleckensteinCapital.com. Anything else you'd like to add before we close?
Bill Fleckenstein: Not really. I think you asked all the important questions.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Thanks so much for joining us. Nathan Egger and I will be back right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Postgame: ELE indicators
Erik Townsend: Welcome back, everyone.
Nathan Egger: Erik, I wrote down a few questions for you as I was listening to your interview with Bill Fleckenstein. At one point, At one point, you were talking about the bond market and how it will eventually revolt against reckless monetary policy. And you were asking about a specific relationship between bond prices and monetary stimulus.
And when you said the word scared to death, Bill seemed to react to that phrase rather than the price relationship. And that left me a little bit confused. So, could you clarify for us what exactly was the relationship that you were talking about?
Erik Townsend: Well, Nate, where I was headed with that question is to feel Bill out as to whether or not he uses the same type of indicators that I do to sense oncoming problems in the Treasury market. And this goes back to sort of, you know, to explain this, I have to back up to a little bit of explanation.
I call these ELE indicators, and the analogy is to an old movie. I forget the name of it, but basically the asteroid was coming to destroy the Earth and everybody was going to get blown up, and they called it an extinction-level event, or ELE. And I sort of think about, well, if I think that the US Treasury market has structural problems, it is successful because there's no alternative. Someday there will be an alternative to the US Treasury market, and I think that we're going to face really big structural problems. Well, if I think that problem is going to occur in my lifetime, but I have no idea when, what do you do? What you do is you try to develop indicators to tell you when these things are going to happen.
The most important ratio that I look at is the dollar index to the 10-year Treasury yield. In other words, the whole theory of how currencies relate to interest rates is, as any given country is offering a higher or a lower Treasury yield— in other words, as the government is paying a different amount of interest— if they're paying more interest, well, that's rewarding investors better for investing in that country.
Country, the currency should appreciate as the country's Treasury yield is appreciating. Conversely, if a country is reducing its Treasury yield, there's less and less reward for international investors to invest there. They should take their money and go elsewhere, and that will cause the currency to weaken.
So there's always a relationship between the Dollar Index and the 10-year Treasury. What would happen If that were to break down and go into reverse, and particularly if the dollar index were going down at the same time that the Treasury yield were going up? Well, what that would tell you is you're being rewarded with a higher rate of interest to invest in the United States, but international capital isn't taking the deal. It's not worth it. They don't want the extra interest. Something's wrong. They don't trust it. So if the dollar index starts going the opposite direction, from the 10-year Treasury yield. That to me is saying this is the ELE indicator Something is so profoundly wrong with the system that interest rates and their historical relationship to exchange rates are breaking down. So that's an example of an ELE indicator
The next one that I think about is when we're in periods of quantitative easing, what we've seen in the past is that That the government is basically printing money, conjuring money out of thin air, in order effectively to monetize debt. They're buying government bonds. Well, that should cause the price of government bonds to go up and the yield to go down.
And what we've seen historically in quantitative easing periods is that they have succeeded in their stated goal of reducing short-term interest rates. Government buys a bunch of Treasury bonds. The result is that that supply is taken off the market. That results in higher interest rates. International investors are being rewarded and so forth. When this breaks down and goes into reverse, that's going to tell me something's really bad.
Well, what happens when you're printing money and you're buying bonds with them? That ought to be increasing the price of bonds, decreasing the yield, but the price of bonds goes down anyway, even though the government is buying them with freshly minted money. Well, what that would tell you is that there is the beginning of a loss of confidence. Even though the government is printing money and supporting the bond market, the market thinks it's not going to work. The market thinks it's going to fail and it's going to blow up. And even though there are attractive rates, people would rather just take their money and run. So to me, this is a very interesting ELE indicator and it's a tentative one because I don't have enough data to know if it's really reliable.
If you started seeing Let's suppose that we get into another round of quantitative easing, and all of this bond buying is going on, but we're still seeing Treasury rates back up anyway in the face of that bond buying. My hypothesis, and it's tentative, is that's a really important signal. What that's telling you is that a confidence crisis is beginning because people are not doing what they logically ought to be incented to do because they no longer trust the system.
So, to me, it's fascinating to come up with as many of these ELE indicators as I can and constantly follow them. And what I was hoping to get to with Bill is, it sounded at first to me like he was thinking the same way I am, which is, use what you know about quantitative easing and what you believe it has to imply on the 10-year Treasury yield trend and potentially infer an indicator from that. Didn't seem like Bill was thinking about it that way, so I decided to just move on to the next topic.
Postgame: short selling versus long trading
Nathan Egger: There was another point where you asked Bill to describe the differences inherent to short versus long trading. And I noticed you said specifically that these differences existed, but my sense was that Bill disagreed with you. What differences were you talking about when you brought up that question?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, I was really surprised by his answer on that one. It sounded to me like Bill was saying, from his perspective, you know, same difference, short, long. I don't I don't think of it that way. Now, in fairness, Bill is an accomplished short fund manager. I do a lot of short trading, but I'm not a short fund guy as a matter of background. But I think of it as a completely different environment because markets tend to behave differently on the upside and the downside.
There's a very well-known adage that markets move— they take the escalator up and the express elevator down. In other words, it's a slow, steady slog for stock prices to slowly climb up in a bull market.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Then you have a 1987-like event where all of a sudden you lose 25% in a day.
The point is, I think it's much harder than Bill alluded to just see things coming. You know, he said in a couple of places there, you know, well, I'm not short now because I'll see it coming.
In my experience, it's harder in the short world to see it coming than the long world, because when things start to happen, they happen very quickly and you have to react much more quickly. So I would contend that you have to be more nimble in short trading than in long trading.
I would also say that there are several forms of carry involved in short trading that just don't come into play. If you buy a stock and your motive for buying the stock is capital appreciation, you're not a dividend investor, and the stock happens to have a dividend anyway, okay, that's a free bonus. You probably didn't think too much about it. But if you're shorting a stock that pays a dividend, you as the short seller have to pay that dividend.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If you're shorting a bond that pays interest, you as the short seller, you have to ante up the interest. So if you're doing something like shorting junk bonds, they're called high yield for a reason. That yield, the interest payment is pretty significant. If you're going to carry that position for a year and you're going to be paying what might be an 8 or a 9% high yield return, you're paying that as a carry fee. So I would say, and at least in my opinion, Short selling differs from long trading in the sense that there's usually more time pressure.
You have to get the timing right. You can't just short and hold the way that you can buy and hold. Another reason that that's true is, in addition to the interest and dividend, there's also a broker's cost of carry.
And we should probably take a step back. How is it possible to short something in the first place anyway? How can you possibly sell something that you don't own? Well, the answer is you have to borrow it first.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If you want to short 100 shares of IBM stock. You borrow those 100 shares of IBM stock. That loan is repayable in shares. So what you have to repay someday is the 100 shares back. You sell those shares. Someday you buy them back. Hopefully you made a profit, and then you can repay the loan. Well, your broker is going to charge you for that loan. How much they charge you and how it's structured probably varies from one brokerage house to the next, but it ain't free. So if you're going to just, you know, you've got a bunch of cash in your account, you think, well, gee, I think I might want to be in such and such a stock for the long haul, just buy that stock and sit on it.
You can't really short for the long haul because you have a long-term view of something. You need to get the timing right. You need to understand that there are costs involved. In futures trading, that cost can go either direction.
In other words, if you are long or short— let's take crude oil as an example. If I go and buy crude oil futures tomorrow, So I'm long crude oil futures. There's going to be a very significant carry cost when I roll that May contract forward into the June contract. There's contango. That means a change in price from one delivery contract to the next. That's going to hurt me if I'm long. It's going to help me if I'm short. So there is a dramatic effect in the roll carry in futures trading that dramatically affects your overall performance as to whether you're getting paid a premium to be in that trade every month as you roll it, or you're paying a premium for the privilege of being in that trade. And that dramatically affects your overall result.
I'm just thinking, there's so many issues that make, to my mind, make short selling just a completely different world. You have to borrow before you can short. It seems logically like a simple enough thing. Oh, I see, the broker borrows stock and he lets me sell it and then I buy it back later. Well, the broker had to find that stock in order to borrow it. Let's suppose that the broker borrowed that stock from somebody else's margin account, and that somebody else finally figures out— let's take an example, a real-life example.
I want to short high-yield junk bonds, so I short the HYG ETF, and I'm paying the interest dividend cost. It's high yield, and I'm on the short side, so I got to pay that yield. I got to pay the interest.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: In order to be in this trade, hoping that I'm going to make more on the price going down. So now this price starts to go down and I'm finally making more and I'm making back that money that I've been paying my broker for the interest and the cost to borrow, the margin interest, all these things.
I get to the point where I'm finally making money. Well, now the other guys that are long HYG, they figure out what I already knew, which is this is not a smart thing to be long. They sell it out of their margin accounts.
Well, guess what happened? The shares that I was short were borrowed from some guy's margin account. Some guy just sold those shares in his margin account, so they're not there in his margin account. That's called a withdraw of borrow. In other words, the broker had borrowed the stock, but the stock had been borrowed from somebody's account, and somebody ended up not having it in their account anymore. So you can't borrow it.
You can actually, as a short seller, be right at the cusp of where your position is about to start paying off, and all of a sudden what happens is the guys that are long start selling out, the borrow is no longer available, your broker closes out your position just before what would have been a really big profit move.
So you have to be constantly aware of the fact that when you're short, you can be liquidated, force liquidated out of your position, not because you did something wrong, but just because the shares are no longer available to borrow.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: The other thing that brokers like to do is play games with the rates that they're charging you. Anything that is popular to short is going to be what they call HTB, hard to borrow, and that means they're going to charge a premium interest rate for letting you borrow it.
So there are completely different costs, transaction costs, carry costs, and probably the biggest one that I can think of in terms of differences, the mechanics of a short squeeze and how it works. It's so important for short sellers to understand that.
There's a point, if you're short, that the other guys that are short are going to give up. You want to give up on your short before the other guys do, because if the other guys give up, they're forced to buy. That carries the price higher. You might know that ultimately the end result is going to be the price ends up much lower. And this is very much what I think has happened just in the last few weeks in the oil market. But the thing is, the guys that are short are all liquidating, and that forces them to buy and it pushes the price up.
You need to know what a short squeeze is. You need to understand it. And as you see one starting— our regular listeners know that on this program we talked in great detail about if we get past $36, north of $36 on the oil price, I predicted that it would become a self-reinforcing event, that it would be carried higher as a result of that.
That. So that happened.
You can't possibly be successful trading an environment like this unless you understand how a short squeeze works. And in this case, what you have to watch is the Commitment of Traders reports are the indication to tell you how many of those other shorts have already exited their positions, how many are still in their shorts, how many longs have been added. And that all can help you to gauge when it's time to— if you were stopped out, as I was stopped out of the crude oil I wanted to get back into that. I knew there was momentum. I knew that when I was stopped out just over $36, that it was going to move higher. I knew it was in my interest to wait it out until it got to a higher price, but I wanted to get back into that short trade when it was time. How could I know if it was time if I didn't understand a short squeeze?
It's mechanics that don't exist on the long side of the market.
So I would have to respectfully disagree with Bill. To my thinking, Short selling and long trading are completely different, and you really need to understand the mechanics in order to be successful at it.
Postgame: shorting sector ETFs versus single stocks
Nathan Egger: Thanks for clearing that up, because this short squeeze terminology has been a real buzz lately at CNBC, Bloomberg, all over the blogs. People talking about a short squeeze both in the S&P, the crude oil market. You've been seeing this, so thank you for helping us to understand that. You also asked Bill about shorting sectors versus individual securities, and his response made it sound almost like there's no other option than to short individual stocks. What were you driving at with that question?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, Bill's answer surprised me on that one as well. What I was driving at is there is a viewpoint, and I was curious as to whether Bill shared it or not, among some short sellers, which is you cannot short an index. You know, you cannot short a basket of things. You have to do the— it's okay to do that in the long case if you're You want to buy defense stocks, you want to buy energy stocks, you buy an ETF like XLE. But boy, don't try that on the short side, is wisdom that some people think makes sense. Doesn't make any sense to me.
A lot, almost all of the short selling that I've done in my career has been ETFs or sectors. And perfect example of this, let's suppose that you believe that the economy is turning and there's what people call a sector rotation. You expect that for whatever reason, there's going to be a rotation out of consumer cyclical stocks into consumer staples, because maybe the economy is weakening. Well, in that case, what I would consider is using the sector ETFs, and those SPDR ETFs are fantastic for this, for going long the— if your expectation is that consumer staples are going to improve, you're going to be long staples and short consumer discretionary.
I've done a lot of long-short trading, pairs trading, and outright short trading against indices and ETFs. And it seems to me like there's no reason that that should work any differently than an individual issue.
Nathan Egger: So it sounds like there's actually plenty to disagree on. And that's not a bad thing. That's a good thing. That's, that's what makes markets and markets make us lots of money.
Listener feedback and a proposed high-net-worth series
Nathan Egger: So Erik, before we close today's show, can we just give our listeners a quick update on the MacroVoices project, on the feedback that we've received and where we're headed from here?
Erik Townsend: Sure. You know, fantastic feedback. I cannot thank everybody enough. Please continue to help us. Tell all of your friends and acquaintances about MacroVoices. Everything that we can do to grow our audience will help us to get you even better guests on the program.
It's really surprising to me, some of the feedback that we got in the forums, a lot of people asking for more content from me and less from our guests. And that's very flattering, good for my ego. I'm going to respectfully disagree with the people who said that. I know that a show that's just me talking for an hour is way too boring. So we're definitely going to continue to keep things interesting by bringing you a new guest every week. Frankly, I would rather go the other direction. I'd rather bring you more guests, have 2 or 3 guests on a show for shorter segments, if we can eventually get to that. This idea of additional content that's me only, I don't want to not have new guests every week.
We will consider, though, if there's demand for it, doing additional content in addition to the weekly show. And there's an idea I've been kicking around. I want to just sort of float it and see if we get any reaction.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: This is something I actually designed about 2.5, 3 years ago and proposed to another podcast program who actually committed to doing it but never followed through. And the idea was to kind of create a— not so much a weekly news program, but a targeted class, if you will, for what does it mean to be an accredited investor?
Because my experience when I sold my software company, made a few million bucks, I, you know, suddenly realized, okay, the next thing to do in life is to go learn all about markets and investing, because clearly now my wealth is in liquid form as opposed to owning a company that I had founded. So I had to learn all about this, and I thought, I've been around the block, I ran a company, I'm CEO, I know how to spot a con man in business. I know how not to get taken for a sucker by the con men. When you get to Wall Street, Nathan, the con men have have Ivy League MBAs, and they're really, really good at it, and you're dealing with a whole different league of sleaze.
And I frankly got screwed over pretty badly.
The world's most prestigious private bank lost about half of my net worth in the course of a few years, and it has been a lot of work to, to work that back. I guess it's something that I have a personal investment in because I I feel that I've been hurt by the industry badly, and I'd love to help other entrepreneurs who are coming into wealth not get screwed by private bankers and some of the other sleazy characters in the industry.
So we thought about this high net worth series that we might do, say, a show about angel investing in startup companies, which is only something that accredited investors are allowed to do. Another show about investing in private equity Again, something that only accredited investors can do. Another show about hedge funds and how they work and the ups and downs, why they're a good idea, why they're not a good idea. Some of the estate planning considerations that come into play in the high net worth arena that I was not aware of. So I thought about doing this kind of course about how to be a rich guy, for lack of a better term, that would give people an introduction to the ugly side of private banking and And some of the sleaziness out there.
So I've thought about doing that idea. It would certainly fall in that category of not having a guest, more content from me. That would be Nathan and me doing a series of shows together where Nathan is interviewing me about these subjects.
The hesitation I have is I just don't know if there's really a market for that. We do ask you when you sign up on the website whether or not you're an accredited investor, because we're trying to figure out whether or not this audience has enough accredited investors for us to do accredited investor-centric content. It's kind of the direction that we're leaning in, but we need to know whether or not that's of appeal to you guys. So I've been a little bit more long-winded than I wanted to be, because I think we need to wrap the show up at this point. But please send us, whether it's email or in our listener forums, send us your comments. Let us know your thoughts. We'd love to hear from you as to what you'd like in future shows as we move forward. Thanks, guys.
Outro and disclaimer
Nathan Egger: So that's where we're at with the MacroVoices project. But where we're at with this show, I'm afraid, is the bitter end. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. And if you have an extra moment, the ratings and reviews help us out a ton, get us traction on iTunes, move us up the charts. More visibility means greater exposure, better guests.
You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and you can connect with us directly in our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. For Erik Townsend, this has been Nathan Egger. We're wishing you all a great weekend, and we'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. To have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
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