Raoul Pal — Global macro investor, writer, and Real Vision Television co-founder (as introduced on the show)

Show open and Erik's preview of the Raoul Pal interview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 9 was recorded on April 7th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Global macro investor, writer, and Real Vision Television co-founder Raoul Pal will be joining me as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Raoul about the US dollar rally, why he thinks it's set to rally much farther, why he's bullish on long bonds, what he thinks about negative-yielding European sovereign debt, and a long list of other macro topics. I think you're really going to enjoy this week's interview.

Market wrap: S&P 500 head-and-shoulders

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's dive into the markets. Erik, you've been an equity bear for weeks here, and we've just seen the S&P close Thursday at around 2,040. Dovish comments from the Fed enabled us to make a new year-to-date high early this week, but now we're seeing a pretty compelling head and shoulders formation being completed here on Thursday. Is the market finally ready to cooperate with the bears?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, there was a break of a neckline. It's really just a mini S&P formation that's occurred over just the last couple of weeks. I think that what is still the big question mark here, the reason the rally has stalled— clearly it is not advancing even higher, but it really has not impressively turned down either. And I think the equity market is waiting to see what happens with the oil market.

And I think that the oil I think the oil market will get to that next. Needs another catalyst before— it may need another week before it's ready to move down. I think equities are probably going to drift around here in this range until the oil market turns down first. And I think that's going to be the catalyst to turn the equity market back over.

Crude oil: production freeze, inventories and the path to the 20s

Nathan Egger: Well, let's cover the crude oil. Saudi Arabia seems to now be backpedaling on the output freeze, suggesting that no freeze is possible without Iran's cooperation, specifically Iran. And Iran has the pedal to the metal and has said they have no intention of taking their foot off the pedal anytime soon. So could this be the catalyst that finally has the market trending lower?

Erik Townsend: No, I don't think so. You know, this, this whole production freeze thing has been so just beaten to death. It was first introduced on the morning of January 20th. It was fully and thoroughly debunked by credible experts by the afternoon of January 20th, and it still has been a major influencing factor in the market.

The oil ministers from OPEC have done an incredible job of political theater, getting people to think that this is meaningful. And it still isn't. I think that Saudi Arabia has been pretty shrewd here. You know, what happened is they didn't want to do anything. Venezuela was really pressuring them very hard to say, oh, come on, come on, come on, you got to at least come to the table. And Saudi Arabia says, hmm, okay, well, what if, you know, they clearly want— we're not going to agree to a production cut, but they want us to agree to some token kind of something, and they're really pushing hard for it. What could we— I know, we'll agree to something that kind of backs Iran into a corner. Hey, we're willing to freeze production as long as everybody will do it. Well, of course, it's absurd to ask Iran to freeze production.

They just had sanctions lifted. They've been in a very depressed condition. They're just trying to return to their normal production. So I don't think any of that is going to play. But the thing is, this week, what we got was, you know, the market had been just really dramatically selling off, as I've expected that it would. We hit the 50-day moving average. I knew that by itself ought to be good for at least a little bit of a bounce. But then what we got was a very unexpected bounce.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: drawdown in inventories. The amount of oil in those tanks actually came down for once, which is the opposite of the trend that we've been seeing. That shocked prices, probably almost $2, $2.50 higher. We were trading in the $35 handle a couple days ago.

As I'm speaking to you now, we're back up above $37. So this thing was headed lower, then we get this inventory report. And I suppose you could interpret that inventory report to mean that Art Berman got the analysis wrong, I got the analysis wrong, IEA got the analysis wrong, and the market's not really oversupplied. And, you know, we're, we're not going to have any more builds in inventory.

The more likely explanation, I think, is the fact that there's been a whole lot of fog around the Houston Ship Channel has delayed the arrival of some ships that were supposed to arrive last week. If I'm right about this, and it's just a hunch, it's not a prediction at this point, I think we've got a setup next week for maybe a massive build in inventory. And it's not because of any change in fundamentals. It's just because a couple of ships that were late getting in might arrive this week instead of last week, and they'll show up in next week's inventory number. So I don't put any fundamental importance on the fact that we had what I think was a fluke of a 5 million barrel inventory drawdown.

Nathan Egger: All right, Erik. So with all these factors together, where does that leave us?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it where it leaves us is in a little bit of limbo, Nathan. I would be surprised if the sell-off in crude oil, which is very much what I do expect to continue, is going to get much lower than the 50-day moving average until we see a catalyst, and that catalyst will be an inventory number. We got the inventory number in the other direction this week. I think it's a fluke. I do think it potentially sets us up for a big number in the other direction next week. That, I think, if it happens, would be the catalyst to take the market. Market to the next level lower. There's pretty good technical support levels at 34 and 32 and again at 30. But I think we're ultimately headed into the 20s. It's just going to be a question of time. And it's those inventory reports that are going to do it. And I think really the Cushing inventory more so than the headline national number is going to be it.

There was an interesting thing that happened in this report, Nathan, which is when the API data came out on Tuesday afternoon, that's the private data. We were expecting a 650,000-barrel build from the private API data on Tuesday afternoon. When we got the EIA data on Wednesday morning, it was a much, much smaller build. So I think that's helped the price to move higher.

What I'm going to be watching most closely on next week's both Tuesday and Wednesday— that's API first and then EIA inventory numbers— is the Cushing, Oklahoma number. If that number continues to build significantly, I think it's going to be the catalyst to push prices considerably lower.

Gold at its 50-day moving average

Nathan Egger: Erik, last week gold was experiencing close encounters with its 50-day moving average, and you opined that the big question would be whether it bounced higher off the 50-day or if it would break down below the 50-day. How's it looking this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, what the market's doing is what I call hugging the moving average. In other words, for the last week, it's been bouncing up and down in a narrow trading range, but it's basically right along its 50-day moving average. And what's going on is the bulls and the bears are fighting it out. The bulls are buying the 50-day moving average. They think it's going to bounce higher. The bears are selling it thinking it's going to move lower. So far, the bulls are winning, but this is exactly the kind of pattern that you would expect.

As gold flirts with its moving average here, we need to see one of two things happen. Either it clearly breaks away from the moving average. In other words, there's plenty of space above the moving average, below the trading range on a given daily basis for at least a couple of days, or it breaks down below it. And it hasn't done either one of those. So we are above the moving average, lingering, hovering just above it. Will it break higher? Or will it break down below it? That still is the $64 million question.

Nathan Egger: Thanks for bringing us up to speed, Erik. We've got a killer interview with GMI's Raoul Pal coming up right after this.

Introducing Raoul Pal: GMI and Real Vision

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Raoul Pal joins me as our featured guest. Raoul began his career on the sell side, where he co-managed hedge fund equity and equity derivatives business for Goldman Sachs in Europe. Raoul then moved to the buy side, where he co-managed Raoul managed a global macro hedge fund for GLG Partners in London. He retired from running other people's money back in 2004 at the grand old age of 36. Raoul now lives in the Cayman Islands, where he writes the Global Macro Investor newsletter. Raoul is also, of course, Grant Williams' partner in Real Vision Television. Raoul, I've been particularly keen to get you on the program for one specific reason, and that is that you have been incredibly right recently in your macro calls, to the point that when you interviewed Hugh Hendry for Real Vision Television recently, Hendry actually opened the interview by, by cracking a few jokes and picking on you for how right you've been. So I've got to congratulate you.

Hugh Hendry is known for a lot of things to a lot of people, but publicly expressing humility and acknowledging someone else's brilliance is not something you get out of Hugh very easily. So my hat is off to you.

Raoul Pal: Thank you. But one thing we have to all understand in this business is Being right is something that's fleeting. Sometimes we can look heroes for a period of time, but usually it doesn't last that long. We all just try our best.

Dollar rally: causes and outlook

Erik Townsend: Well, you've been hitting it. You've been batting 1,000 so far, for the least in recent history. I want to dive right into what I think is arguably the hottest topic in macro today. And that, of course, is the US dollar rally and the hot debate over whether it is done and ready to falter or if it is just catching its breath and ready to take off, as Goldman Sachs Thanks. Thanks. It is here.

Something I've noticed, though, about this subject, people will get into a debate about whether it's going to end or it's not going to end or it's about to end or whatever. And then they realize they are coming from completely different understandings of what caused the rally in the first place. So, I don't think it's constructive to talk about whether it continues or not until we're on the same page about what caused it. So, let's set the Wayback Machine to the end of 2013. Why did the US Dollar Index rally so aggressively in 2014? What was driving it? Why did it slow down in 2015? And what's going to happen next?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, it's a multi-phase thing. I think it's a really good question because what started off and what generally starts off these kind of giant macro trends is policy divergence. So, we had the Japanese came out of the blue with the massive outsized quantitative easing and the kind of stated aim of weakening the yen. So, what you have is suddenly the Fed who were looking to tried to tighten rates at that point. They didn't obviously do it for a long period of time, but they wanted to slightly tighten rates. Meanwhile, the Japanese were doing the absolute opposite in the biggest possible size.

So what happened is dollar-yen took off, or the yen collapsed, and that started the global macro imbalance because the move of the yen versus all of its trading partners was far too big for the world to deal with. And that was the start of the dollar rally, because then that kind of sucked in the euro. The Europeans had to do something about their own currency. But the US at the same time was trying to strengthen or tighten rates.

So that whole divergence set the thing off. That was the spark that lit the kindling. The kindling was the policy divergence. Then what happened was it started sucking in at the margin a lot of the big carry trade positions, which is $9.8 trillion according to the BIS. And that's a short dollar position that the world has. So what you've got is you've got a massive amount of fuel to this fire.

The policy divergence set it off, and then the thing started. And then it's very difficult to stop once currencies start trending.

So you talk about, yes, it paused last year. Well, it depends what you're looking at. The major currencies that started the move against the dollar, the euro and the yen, did pause, but nothing else did. I mean, I look at a basket of 27 currencies equally weighted against the dollar to give us the best idea.

And almost all of them continue trending lower against the dollar for the entire of last year. The emerging markets obviously got massively smashed in the back of this. But the whole situation is going to go— continues to go on and roll between region to region. One minute, it's the Aussie dollar, next minute, it's the euro, next minute, it's the Swiss franc, then it's the pound. So, it's a big rolling situation.

Okay. Now, going forwards, where do I think we are? Okay, I have to acknowledge I've been one of the big dollar bulls. I've been a dollar bull for a long, long time now. At this point, if I look back at the 2 preceding dollar bull markets, the early '80s and the late '90s, the early '80s bull market, the dollar rose about 100%.

In the late '90s, it rose about 50%. At this time, it's up about 30%. It's a very small dollar bull market compared to the others. We also know that the short position in the dollar based around the carry trade, not the speculative position, but the real positioning, is the biggest the world has ever seen.

What I look at the world is in terms of probabilities. The probability of this carry trade unwind happening is high. What it does is create a situation of a negative gamma in these currencies. And you tend to get an acceleration through that. Now, what's interesting is that carry trade is hardly unwound at all. In fact, arguably not at all. It stopped increasing, which is the only thing we've seen so far. So that makes me think potentially there's another leg to come.

I then lay on technical analysis onto that to look at where we are. And technically, the dollar's not doing anything wrong. Dollar-yen possibly, but that moved the most, so it's having a bigger correction. The euro is just trading sideways. The DXY is trading sideways. And many of the other currencies are actually still starting to weaken again against the dollar. So we've got a situation where it's possible that it tops out. It's possible that the G20 agreed something tacitly to try and stop using currencies. I don't really believe that's the case, but many people do. But let's give them the benefit of the doubt. Maybe they tried to say, OK, let's just try and hold off using currencies.

But if I look at the positioning, the positioning now is people start to get short the dollar, particularly against the yen and even starting against the euro.

So if I think of the short-term speculative positioning, that's potentially on the wrong side of this. Potentially the Fed, if the economic data continues to come out reasonably okay, they may be forced to look to tighten again. We've still got a situation where the Europeans and the Japanese still want to loosen monetary policy, but maybe not using negative interest rates. So the policy divergence is still in place. The technical position looks corrective as opposed to a reversal. And then we know we've got this huge amount of kerosene, which is the global carry trade. So that's all there. So if I use the balance of probabilities, I'd say the probability is this is corrective.

If we look at the previous 2 dollar bull markets, we never had a correction bigger than 10%. We've had about 7% this time around. So we could go a little bit further in this correction. But it looks unlikely. Both of them around the same level, about 35% into the rally, had a big correction. So this is pretty much in line with the previous other 2 dollar bull markets.

So I'm— my base case has and still remains that this will be one of the larger dollar bull markets that we've seen.

I clearly understand there is a risk that there is a reversal, but I don't believe that there's a Plaza Accord-style agreement in Shanghai. There's just not enough evidence to suggest that that's the case. So that's where I stand on the whole situation right now.

Treasury yields to 0.5%, the greater-fool question and gold as hedge

Erik Townsend: You made a comment recently, I believe it was on CNBC, where you said you thought that the 10-year Treasury bond could actually go all the way to 50 basis points. And the CNBC commentator just didn't even know what to make of that. They thought you had misspoken. Was that a dollar strength argument, or is there more to that story? What is it that causes you to see this very, very bullish case for long-dated Treasury paper?

Raoul Pal: Yeah. So that is based on 3 things. Firstly, global rate differentials. So everywhere else has interest rates at 10 years negative, both in Germany and in Japan right now. So for the US rates to come down 50 basis points doesn't look unreasonable. It doesn't look unreasonable in terms of the curve flattening, which has been doing aggressively for quite some period of time now. That kind of makes sense to me. If the Fed were to tighten, the curve would flatten anyway. Because they'd start pricing in a recession because growth is too slow in the US.

I also spend a lot of time looking at the business cycle. I use the ISM as my best predictor of the business cycle. Now, the business cycle topped out several years ago now and has been softening ever since. The ISM crossed 50 and then crossed— got down to around 48, giving us about at the time between 65% and 70% chance of a recession.

So if that were the case, then clearly 10-year bond yields have to fall a lot further. You know, if we look at the Atlanta Fed GDP now, it's currently about 0.6%. So the US economy is weak. So therefore, we should see Treasury bonds rallying. Inflation— there is no inflation apart from the year-on-year rate of change of the oil price. Other than that, if we look at core inflation, core inflation lags the ISM by a full 24 months. So we should see core inflation coming lower anyway over the next year or so.

So what we've got is a situation where we've got weak growth in the US, we've got a business cycle that has rolled over, and we've got inflation that should be rolling over in any event. And then we've got the global rate differentials driving it. The dollar itself obviously creates a much slower global economic growth situation. We've seen global trade at its second lowest level since 1958, and that's due to the US dollar. So that's causing tremendous pain around the world. And obviously, the fallout of the global commodity markets has created a huge slowdown anyway in the global economy.

So the only thing conflicting to that that makes me scratch my head is obviously the bounce in the ISM that we've seen. It's very common in the final part of the down cycle leading into recession to get a small bounce. It's rare that it bounces back over 50, which the ISM did at the beginning of this month. So that makes me pay attention and say maybe I'm wrong. Maybe this is a replay of 1998 where the in the middle of the dollar bull market, after the emerging market crisis, the US continued to grow.

Now, the difference between now and then is— and the ISM bounced from below 50, and everything was fine in the US. The difference then was the US was growing at 4.5%, and this time, it's growing at about 0.6%.

I think the probability of this being a new mid-cycle upswing in the US is not the highest probability. It is reasonably high because it's doing something we've not often seen before. But I have a feeling that the ISM will weaken along with economic data around the world going forward. If the dollar starts to rally, then that almost bakes it into the cake. So that's how I'm seeing this. And therefore, I'm expecting bond yields to come down to half a percent. And technically, it looks that way, too.

Erik Townsend: You've described the long Treasury trade as the layup trade of the year, is just the no-brainer. And it's fascinating to me because I think you make a very, very compelling argument, and I agree with you, that there are good reasons to think that bond prices are headed higher, yields are headed lower. But coming from you, Raoul, you've been as outspoken as I've been about the national debt and unsustainability of liabilities and so on and so forth.

Isn't this really, if you think about it, the ultimate Greater Fool trade? Because you're making a loan. To arguably an insolvent borrower that, you know, mathematically cannot repay that money in real terms. It can pay it in inflated terms, but it can't pay it back in real terms. So you're counting on being able to sell that loan to somebody else who thinks it's worth more than what you've got into it because of what you expect to happen between now and then. Aren't you setting yourself up there? And if you are, is there a hedge? Is there a way to hedge that? Or do you just not see it as the Treasury market doesn't turn around that quickly.

Raoul Pal: Okay, so macro, the key to macro is living in the future and understanding where the outcomes are. And you need to know whereabouts in that future trajectory you need to live to understand what the investment opportunity is. If we look 10 years down the line, then what you're talking about is a very real situation.

But if we look currently going forward into the future, you know, a year, let's say, well, what does the world look like then? Well, we're talking about slow global growth situation, where's the greater fool? The greater fool is the person who's lending to Japan and paying to lend.

In a global world where we have relative attractiveness of assets, US Treasuries at even half a percent are incredibly attractive versus paying an even more bankrupt government. That is the situation we're in. The US, yes, there is a huge situation, a huge problem with debt, it's the most indebted than the world has ever known as a percent of world GDP. And that's talking about total debt in the US.

But what it is, it has reserve currency status. We have a situation where everybody owes dollars. If the dollar bull market continues, then everybody is going to fund the US, because that's where they need to put the currency back.

A lot of dollar-denominated debt abroad gets written off. That shortage of dollars, people invest in dollar-based assets. For the US to finance themselves going forward, it's not difficult. When we go further into the future, of course, it's much more difficult. But the problem is here for us living in this investment world is these situations are so far off what is normal or even have been experienced before that none of us really have the toolkit to understand how this plays out, how long it takes.

Japan has been the great the widowmaker trade for so long now. In fact, my entire career since the very early '90s, Japan has lost people money by shorting bonds. There's something about the solvency of sovereign states that we don't understand, and that is complex to me. I think in the end, I think our understanding will be correct. Somewhere down the line, you have to destroy the debt either by massive currency depreciations, inflation or a debt jubilee.

But the various things, it's clear that none of us really understand, and we have to be honest about it, is why governments can continue to fund themselves so long and at negative rates. I mean, nobody would have thought that. Nobody thought it was possible. But yet it's now becoming part of normality. So it's a really complex world. And you talk about how do you hedge that?

Erik Townsend: Well, I was, I was thinking, you know, you just mentioned, I think maybe where the hedge is, which is the situation in Europe is so much uglier than the U.S. The trade that comes to my mind is long US 10-year, short German 10-year Bund, because, you know, first you got to the point where Bill Gross said this is crazy, and then it got even more crazy with the refugee crisis with deeply negative 10-year yields. It's crazy.

Raoul Pal: Yeah, but you're using the same base assumptions that is getting everybody on the wrong foot, which is you're making the assumption that they can't go more negative. Well, maybe we come back in 3 years' time and Bunds are trading negative 2.5%. I don't know. We don't know. So we're using a wrong framework to analyze what's going on. I'm not saying it's right that they should be negative, but we don't know how far negative they can go.

So I think we have to throw that out as a suggestion.

What I do know, there's a much easier hedge for all of this. If we get into the world where negative interest rates are endemic across most of the major world. Well, what you end up with is gold, which— and I'm not a gold bug, but as an asset, gold becomes very interesting because it'll have a relative positive cost of carry.

And it becomes a hedge to the currency risk that's involved with this whole situation of negative rates. That becomes interesting. Interestingly enough, and I know most people would disagree, and I'm just thinking this through in my head, is real estate becomes interesting again. Because it does have a positive yield, and so that becomes much more interesting in a world where there's negative interest rates.

It's very difficult to explain to my father, for example, who's retired and sits on cash, what negative interest rates mean—that he gets poorer every year without doing anything. People are going to be forced to have to do something about it, particularly the baby boomers, because they cannot sit without cash. Now, do this right in the stock market and watch the stock market fall 50%; that would be stupid. You know, there's there's various things that may be more interesting. Gold, I think, is one of them, and real estate potentially. and other, even though real estate is relatively expensive around the world.

Erik Townsend: Now, how do you reconcile— and first of all, I agree with you. I think in the long term, the bull case for gold is extremely strong. But you're also making a very strong argument for the dollar rally continuing, which is obviously, you know, these things are at odds. Do you think the gold argument is just so strong that it overrules the currency argument against it, or how do you balance those?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, so this is— I'm now getting into dodgy ground. Ground, because I follow economic history, and we've only got history of dollar bull markets going back to the early '80s, because the dollar obviously before that was pegged to gold. It's difficult to make the assumption that the dollar can rally and gold can rally for an extended period, because we've never seen it before. Now, I'm in that dodgy ground of I'm making a prediction based on a lack of historical evidence, but I would suggest that in this situation, because we've never had this negative interest rate situation before, That we could see a situation where the dollar is going to be bid up because of what's going on for the dollar shortage around the carry trade, and gold becomes the currency you have to own because owning any other currency earns you a negative yield.

So, gold could go up more than the dollar. So, is there a situation that I can see where you get both? Yeah, it's looking like now could be the time, or coming up in the next 6 months, if things play out as I expect. Yes.

European banks and CoCo bonds

Erik Townsend: Okay. I want to go back to Europe before we move on. You have done some writing recently about the European banking system, and particularly the rapidity at which it has been declining recently. What's going on there? What do you think it means? What is a CoCo bond Why do they keep you awake in the middle of the night? What's this whole Europe story about?

Raoul Pal: The Europe story is multi-layered. I mean, you know, I lived in Spain for 12 years. I've lived intimately with the banking crisis that went on there. Nothing has changed in Europe. And we all use price action to look back and say, look, everything's changed. So when things rally, we say everything's changed. When they get worse, we suddenly realize they haven't changed.

And the situation in Europe is they haven't changed. These banks have enormous leverage still. They can't clean their balance sheets. The ECB has been supporting them on life support by taking all the rubbish off the balance sheets to lend them more money, which doesn't go into the system because the banks can't. They're all raising reserve ratios to make sure that they remain solvent, but it's a struggle.

And so you've got a situation where some of the bigger banks, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, they carry so much leverage on their balance sheets that it's becoming problematic, and the share prices won't get out of their own way.

And then we have the magic situation, which is a true financial market genius, where somebody decides, okay, the problem happens with these banks is they can't raise capital in a falling market. It's very difficult to issue new shares to raise their reserve ratios. So what we'll do is we'll issue these bonds that are a funky way of actually putting people into stock later, i.e., a way of issuing capital if the capital adequacy ratio falls. Okay, that sounds all great on paper. What it actually means is these bonds are so complicated, they go into the hands of arbitrageurs and special situations funds who know exactly how to trade them. And that means When the share price falls, it means the banks are less likely to be able to meet their capital ratios, and therefore, they start selling stock to hedge themselves knowing that stock is going to be put to them.

It creates a death spiral. We had these in the '90s in Europe a lot. They were called reverse convertibles, which were yield enhancement trades. In fact, in South Korea right now, there's a ton of these as well. They're very toxic because they create this negative gamma to the downside. As everybody at some point is a forced seller to hedge themselves. And that creates the death spiral going forwards as you need more stock to be issued for the CoCo bond to keep up the adequacy ratios, etc., etc.

So it's been a big, big mess. And so that's really what's going on in Europe right now. The banking system is just not off its feet, and I don't think it will be for a long time to come. I think we've got some bankruptcies to come.

Cash bans, financial repression and negative rates

Erik Townsend: There's a lot There's a lot of talk around the world about banning cash, and almost all of the rhetoric that we hear in the system from the politicians is that the motivation for this is entirely about terrorism and keeping us safe from bad guys and so forth. You and I know that the ban on cash is about one thing and one thing only. What is it really about? And explain that connection, because not everybody sees it.

Raoul Pal: The ban on cash is about control over your assets. The reason they want that is because it's a way of allowing taxations, wealth taxes, negative interest rates to have a true effect on you. Basically, it's financial repression. Switzerland was a great example because they started this process first with negative interest rates.

What happened, very interestingly, one of the big Swiss cantonal pension funds went to their bank and said, right, you've got negative interest rates, so we want to withdraw the cash that we have on deposit and stick it in your vault. And the Swiss bank said, thank you, but you can't. You don't own the cash. What you own is a fungible group of securities, including wire transfers. We can wire transfer this anywhere, but you can't take the cash out. That was the first alarm bell where I thought, okay, I see the picture now. The picture is basically, imagine if you cannot take out your cash from the banking system.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Raoul Pal: So therefore, tomorrow, they can have negative interest rates of 0.5%. You think, okay, that's fine. I don't mind paying for the put option of cash, as opposed to receiving money for the put option of cash. But then let's say the next day, they come and say, we need to raise more money, so we're going to move it to -10%, and you can't take your money out.

So this is where the problem lies, is they have an ability to trap your money, and then take it away from you in various means. They could just say, we've got a wealth tax, all deposits are going to be taxed. There's nothing you can do about it now. So this becomes a very problematic situation. And it's all about control of your assets. It's much the same— you talked about global terrorism— it's much the same.

And I live in the Cayman Islands with FATCA and all of this reporting of foreign income and etc. back to the US and home countries. And it's nothing about terrorism. Funding terrorism is a small issue here. What it really is all about is figuring out how you can tax the money that's abroad, and whether it's legitimately abroad or not legitimately abroad. But it's all about the same thing as increasing tax revenue. Why? And that goes back to the earlier thing: is the government the most indebted the world has ever seen?

At almost every single country, we've got the same problem. That's why they're all trying to do the same thing, which is get hold of your money and somehow pay off their own debt. And that's the risk to this whole thing, is the savers get screwed in this whole situation. They always do.

Erik Townsend: You know, it makes me think a lot. I don't think that systemically negative interest rates out to longer maturities has ever existed in history, as far as I know. So we don't have any precedent for any of this. And it just gets me thinking about what some of the unexpected or unobvious consequences of negative rates are going to be. The, you know, the most obvious One is that it creates a strong incentive for everyone to look to move their wealth out of the financial system, look for hard assets or something. What other implications do you see? You know, one of the things that I think about a lot, we think about short selling as a tactical move. You can buy and hold for the long term, but you don't short and hold for the long term. Well, wait a minute. If you've got negative yielding assets, why wouldn't you short Treasury bonds? for the long term.

You know, you're getting paid to hold it negative, and you know someday the rates are going back up and you're going to make the capital appreciation. So, I think it potentially invites all kinds of behavior that would have been completely counterintuitive previously because we have new motivations. What do you think this could do in terms of changing behaviors in unexpected ways?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, I talk a lot about something called the law of unintended consequences. And when we are off the map, which we are with this, We just don't know the outcomes. The thing that worries me is what does this mean for the pensions industry? Because there is no way you can retire on a fixed income basis. The entire global pension system was set up for annuity-based retirement. That cannot happen now.

It's impossible to meet anybody's retirement planning in this. That's one thing. How does the insurance and life assurance industry work now? It can't. It physically can't work with negative long-term rates, and everyone hopes it goes away. I don't think it does. So I'm more concerned about the death of the pensions industry, what that kind of means, what that means for growth going forwards as the boomers start really finding that they've got trouble.

Now, the difficulty is we talk about, you know, do you find other assets to invest in? Well, it's difficult to know what assets to invest in right now. Yeah, gold is relatively cheap. There's some things that are relatively cheap. Cheap, but there's not many. Even farmland versus the price of agricultural commodities is expensive. There's very few places to go either. This is what worries me is where does that capital go?

Yes, other trading situations, looking at how you should trade bonds, but then you're talking about that situation if everybody shorts bonds and yields get even more negative. If you think positive carries by shorting bonds, then what you're creating is a busting of the global pension system as well. So this whole thing is very, very complex, and it's clear that central banks haven't thought this through.

They don't really know what they're doing. They're still using the same old tricks to try and solve a problem, and they don't even know what problem they're trying to solve. You know, we don't really know what caused all of this in the end, but it was partly demographics, it was partly government policy back from the early '80s, it was partly due to central banks policy. We've got a whole number of things that brought this, and nobody even knows what battle they're fighting anymore. So, it's terrifying in that respect.

The next recession and the 'big uglies'

Erik Townsend: One of the things that you've said is that with this macro backdrop, with all the things going on in the system, there's so much stress, so much tension, that if we get another recession, probably we're going to be looking at what you call one of the big uglies coming out.

What are the big uglies? Explain the metaphor and And what are the scenarios that you think could come to occur if we see the economic pressure of a recession?

Raoul Pal: Yeah. So, when you look back over history, you can pretty much mark every recession with a big event that happened, whether it was the housing market and the banking system in 2008, whether it was the tech bust in 2001, whether it was, you know, the emerging market crisis running into that beforehand, you know, going back or the early '80s, whether it was the LatAm crisis. There's usually the big stress within the system. The weakest link goes. The problem is right now we've got too many weak links, so we don't know which one's going to go. Is it the Chinese economy that's a mess? Is it the Japanese overindebted economy that's a mess? Is it the European overindebted, rigid economy that's a mess and the banking system that's a mess? Is it the commodity-based businesses imploding and creating a big problem in the banking industry? That's possible, too. Is it the emerging markets and the carry trade blowing up? That's possible too.

Is it the UK and its enormous debts at household level and the financial sector level? It's possible too. We've got too many of these big situations there that I don't like, because if you tip one over, you tip them all over.

If you tip over Spain, you tip over Italy. If you tip over Japan, you'll tip over China. If you tip over China, you'll tip over Europe. Europe. So this is why I'm really concerned about these big uglies. Is it possible to get through a recession without one of these dominoes falling over? Yes. Is the probability high of getting through it without it happening? No. So we have to be realistic about economic history, what events usually happen, and what events they could be.

Now, everybody makes a mistake of trying to forecast which one it's going to be.

We don't know. We have to— we've got too many moving parts to keep our eye on, and it could be another thing that blew up. I remember very clearly that the situation in 2007 really started with Iceland. So, we saw Iceland and its mess, and we didn't really realize that that was the start. That was the ripple that creates the wave that creates the tsunami. I don't know what that's going to be. It can be anything.

Helicopter QE and infrastructure spending

Erik Townsend: But in a weak economic situation is when the probability explodes of one of those things A lot of investors think that we're going to have more quantitative easing at some point in the future. And I certainly agree with that. I think a lot of investors make a mistake in assuming it's going to look like the last few rounds of QE. And I think something you and I agree on is it's very likely, especially in an election year, that the next round of quantitative easing will be influenced by it. You know, it'll be helicopter QE for the people, QE for Main Street, not for Wall Street. Very, very clear to me that there will be a strong sentiment that the next QE should be for the benefit of Main Street, not for Wall Street.

What is that going to mean, though? Is it going to mean infrastructure spending instead of supporting banks? Is it going to mean true social transfer payments as helicopter money? Where do you think it's headed? Do you think it will play out in the 2016 election cycle or not until after that?

What do you see on the horizon in terms of how we get back to quantitative easing someday? Do you think we will get back to it? And what will it look like?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, look, I think we do. I mean, unless we get a pickup in global growth, which is possible, as I explained at the beginning of the interview, that there is a possibility of that. So I'm not ruling it out. But if we don't, if we follow the highest probability event, which is leading into a global recession, because global recessions come after certain periods of time and we're into that period of time now and everything's playing out looking like that is the case. Rates.

So if that's the case, then the chances of more quantitative easing ahead of negative interest rates has to be high. You're right, I think if you start giving away money to the rich again, which is basically what quantitative easing did, you know, you see it everywhere.

I deal with a lot of family offices, and they basically could borrow non-recourse money for virtually nothing and invest in virtually anything they wanted to. That is not going to wash anymore. We're seeing the change in populism across the world The political situation is changing dramatically. We don't really know what that means because we've not seen this for a long time either.

For the central banks to continue down the same path of what they've done, which clearly didn't work, would be stupid in the extreme.

Are the governments going to try and bully the central banks into financing infrastructure spends that creates jobs? Yeah, that's an easy, easy thing to do. It's actually probably a good thing. For the countries. Does it actually create a sustainable situation? No. Japan's tried this for decades. It doesn't work.

Would it create some jobs? For a while. Does it create long-lasting economic growth? No chance. We know this because we see every Olympic Games I've ever seen and probably every football World Cup, soccer World Cup, these have usually huge, particularly Olympic Games, have huge infrastructure spends. And then what happens afterwards? Almost without question, every single country goes into recession.

So all you're going to do is you're just robbing growth from the future and you'll get the payback afterwards. So I don't think it's going to help. It doesn't change anything. It doesn't change the structure of the debt situation globally or the demographics that's causing this mess in the first place.

Endgame: failed economic frameworks and a debt jubilee

Erik Townsend: Where do you think this eventually goes in terms of the endgame? Because one of the things I ponder a lot, you know, people talk about loss of confidence in central banks and how that's going to change everything. And I feel sometimes like I just don't get it because the evidence has been overwhelmingly clear since 2009, if not well before that.

I was saying in 2009, this quantitative easing thing is never going to work because the market will see through it. The market will recognize that it is an act of desperation on the Fed's part and it's not going to work. I couldn't possibly have been more wrong about that. The reality of the situation is the Fed's got the printing press. If they print money, that money's got to go someplace. This is all going to end very, very badly someday. I think you and I agree on that. But most of us are musing, trying to figure out what that might look like, because we know that there's no free lunch. The piper has to be paid someday. But we really haven't seen, you know, people predicted runaway inflation. There hasn't been any runaway inflation. Where does this go? How does it eventually blow up?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, I think this is the key point that I think we're all having to learn is we don't know what, what this all means. We don't actually understand. We're using the wrong framework of understanding. So when we're using the wrong framework of understanding, we keep drawing the wrong conclusions. Now, I can't suggest that I know how to even analyze this. In terms of understanding how Japan can fund itself with negative interest rates. It just doesn't compute to me. But clearly, the framework of our understanding of the monetary system, human behavior is wrong.

And I think this is part of the flaws of economic analysis. We've been brought up in 2 schools of economic analysis, both of which have proven to not work, which is Keynesianism and monetarism. What we've now done is combine the 2 together and hope that'll work. Which is making things even worse.

So what we have to do is kind of—I think there's a big structural behavioral, structural shift that has to go on in the economics profession and the financial markets, which is understanding behavioral economics. Once we understand behavioral economics, we'll understand why these things are sustainable, and only until then will we understand about tipping points, what it means, what changes this at the margin. We don't know. We don't know how far this can go and what changes it.

We don't even know. We talk about markets now, we don't even know what markets are any longer because there's so few participants in the markets. In a place like Japan now, virtually the only participant really is the central bank buying equities, buying bonds, everything else. I don't even know what it means, but I do know that somewhere down the line, we're all getting screwed.

Anybody who's a saver is going to lose money in this somewhere, somehow, whether it's through grinding negative interest rates, Whether it's via currency depreciation, whether it's via equity market falls. If you force it all into assets and then those assets deflate, you're in big trouble. There's a number of issues. I think in the end, once they realize that you can't just keep doing this and you're not going to generate growth, you're going to have to have a debt jubilee. That's the way the world has always dealt with these issues. That's everybody sitting around the table and writing off as much debt as possible. Now, again, people talk about, well, the central banks could finance that kind of thing, and there's ways of doing it. But somewhere down the line, somebody, as you suggest, is going to have to pay the bill. And again, it's going to come from the saver. So, it's a very complicated situation.

What does it mean for the group of savers in the Western world are the retirees? So, you're going to destroy all the retirees. It's very difficult. It's really complex. I really don't know how it's going to play out. Okay. But I think the debt jubilee of some way, shape, or form is some answer.

Do the governments then have to backstop the global pension system? Probably. The global banking system, half has to be privatized or nationalized, sorry. I don't really know. It's too complex for us to figure out. And that's one of the reasons why central banks continue down the routes that they continue down, and governments continue down that route, because the problem is too big to solve.

And we just don't even know how to do it, because we don't even have the framework of understanding. Until the economics profession moves on and realizes that model-based economics is not how the world works, and the behavioral economics, and even things like Austrian economics, which are much more behavioral in nature, once we start better understanding this, we can actually understand the problem and look at tackling it and how to deal with the outcomes, but it's beyond our current comprehension of how to do this.

Custody risk, complexity and blockchain

Erik Townsend: Well, and it really speaks to your earlier point, too, which is that we're in completely uncharted territory here, because my understanding is any Any example that you can look to in history of debt jubilees all goes back to times when there was no concept of securitization or large banks and so forth. You had a bunch of parties that owed each other money, and they were one-to-one relationships. In this modern banking system, where everything is securitized, it's very difficult to even know who owns your mortgage, ultimately, and the web of interconnectedness between institutions And what happens if the value of this goes down and somebody's forced to sell that? All of the scenarios that could unfold in terms of unintended adverse consequences, completely impossible, I think, to even gauge. And it scares me to death, Raoul.

And I watched a really excellent piece on Real Vision Television recently called The Reset 2, where you were talking about the CoCo bonds And you described this experiment. of literally waking up in the middle of the night in the Cayman Islands and you've had this epiphany. You say, wait a minute, the way this thing works, now that I think about it, it sort of turns into an equity when it gets to a certain— that's going to cause this to happen, that's going to cause— and that means that when this— Raoul, you're one of the smartest guys around. You ran the equity derivatives business in Europe for Goldman Sachs. You know more about this stuff than almost everybody, and you're waking up in the middle of the night late figuring out, oh my gosh, I just realized this does this.

Well, how many things are left that even you haven't figured out that are going to change everything?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, look, there were a lot. One of the ones I had— one of the things I'm lucky enough and unlucky enough to have uncovered was I spent some time with a group we were trying to put together at the time, the world's safest bank. And for a number of reasons, we couldn't do it.

Actually, it's to do with the Federal Reserve not allowing us to do it. But, um, what it was What I ended up doing was getting in a room with all of the people involved in the global custody business. I can't really disclose who was there, but there were central banks, there were all sorts of people. It was a private meeting, and my job was for 2 days to argue why, if one of the sovereign nations, big sovereign nations went bust, the entire custody system had gone, and that we didn't own any assets.

That was the thing, that was the worst thing I ever discovered in financial markets is that I had the New York Fed confirming to me at one point that US Treasury bonds were reused 35 times in the system, and that then getting confirmed by, you know, various central clearing entities that you actually in the end don't own anything. You own a percentage share of a fungible pool of securities, and therefore if there are 35 different claims on that security, You'll get a 35th of it, even though we're led to believe there's a segregated world where your money is segregated at the cesspool that is the global clearing system and custody system. There's no segregation at all for a number of very complicated reasons. But basically, you start uncovering these things, the weak links in our financial system that we've created through complexity.

And the complexity is the big issue here. The complexity is creating so much of these problems.

So from my understanding, complexity has to disappear from the system. And I see it from the blockchain and Bitcoin. I think that is a true need, and it's a rapid need. We need to start having a better way of recording who owns what and giving allowances for people to use your assets or not use your assets. And that is the one way of picking apart the system in a much much, much better way. So the sooner we get to putting securities and all important kind of financial information onto the blockchain, whichever blockchain it is, the better, because we cannot continue this.

Because if one of these big uglies goes, my fear at the whole of this, you know, we see sovereign nations go under, all of that kind of stuff, but if you find that none of the assets that you thought you owned, you Then that's the end of everything. That's the complete loss of faith in the global financial system.

All this complexity has to come back down to simplicity again. That, I think, is a process that's going to take 20 years. The financial— size of the financial industry and financial marketplace has to shrink over time, because it needs to come back to a much simpler system that is much more accountable and understandable by all participants involved.

How pensions turned labor into capital

Erik Townsend: Amen to that. You know, one of the things I've said for years is we need to remember the reason that capital markets are allowed to exist in the first place is not for finance guys like us to make money. It is to enable the efficient formation of capital to grow American business. And if all this stuff that's going on doesn't support that, then we shouldn't have it. It doesn't make sense.

Raoul Pal: But we've made another fundamental mistake that most people don't understand. Is what we did is the world used to operate with it with labor and capital, so capital supplied the money. So they were the savers, usually the wealthy or corporations that had money or banks. They would supply the capital to businesses to expand in the capitalist system, and labor would be the productive part of the asset that would create a return on the capital. So there was this nice symbiotic relationship.

Then what we did is we invented the pension system and forced basically everybody into the financial market. If you were a car worker, no, not a car worker, a factory worker in the 1940s, '30s, or going back 100 years or so, your savings, or a farm worker, whatever you were, the average guy, your savings were your savings.

What we did is we changed it. And we said, okay, they're not your savings now. We are going to put them in the financial system and force you to invest in equities. So guess what? When equities fall 50% in 2008, and all these people are in their early 60s, late 50s, because they're boomers, they're like, but that wasn't the agreement that you would lose our retirement savings. But you're forced to do it. You're pretty much forced to invest in risky assets. by regulatory changes. So you've made labor become capital. So labor is supplying the capital to the system, which is why the financial system became so big, because they sucked in the average Joe's money into it.

It's not right. They should never have done that. You know, people who can afford to risk money, risk money. That's what you got paid a reward for. People who can't afford to risk money, which is the average guy, they should never have been sucked into the financial system in the first place.

Why Pal built Real Vision; who GMI is for

Erik Townsend: And that whole process has to be unpicked Raoul, before we close here, I want to shift gears and ask a question on a completely different topic, and that has to do just with personal motivations, where you're at in life. You're obviously a brilliant guy. You retired at the age of 36. You live on a tropical island. The very best scuba diving in the Caribbean is literally in your backyard on Bloody Bay Wall.

Raoul Pal: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: You're a very smart guy, and you're very capable of doing a lot of things that you could make a lot more money doing, such as, say, launching a hedge fund. You and Grant decided to do what is probably the least lucrative opportunity available to you. So, there must be some passion in it. What led you to put so much time and energy into Real Vision Television when obviously, you guys could have made more money doing something else?

Raoul Pal: Twofold. Firstly is, I think you can get across from the interview that I'm pretty passionate about what's been going on in the world. I understand quite a lot more because I've been at the center of the financial system. I write The Global Macro Investor, which is my economic and investment strategy research publication that's read by all the world's big hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices.

I get to the middle of the system, and what I know is that those towards the center of the system know a lot more than those on the periphery.

In a situation like this, when we've done bad things like like force the average guy into the financial system of which they don't understand. And then something like 2008 comes along and people say to me, well, why didn't we know? Why did the media not tell us? Why did the banks not tell us what was going on?

And that didn't sit well with me, and it didn't sit well with Grant. And we talked about this and thought, you know what, we have a moral duty to do something about this. People need to know because we're in an extraordinary world, as you and I have just been talking about. We're in a world that has so many potential bad outcomes. There's so many big risks out there that people need to be aware of what is going on.

That's why we started Real Vision. We thought not only— it's not only the hedge fund elite that should know, but even the financial advisors, the RIAs, and all of those guys, they should know. They should understand what it means for their clients. Yes, maybe Real Vision is a little bit complex for the average man on the street, but there's many people, we've got thousands of doctors, dentists, lawyers, all these guys who actively engage with their own retirement savings and investments, they need to know. They can't be told the narrative that the media tells them. They cannot be treated in a dumb way. These are smart people. They've worked their lives for their savings, and they need to understand what they're doing with them. So, that's why we did it.

And the other flip side is the assumption that you can't make money out of it is probably wrong as well, because the whole media industry is up for disruption. And we've got some huge plans with Real Vision rolling out various channels and various other products. So, we'll actually make money out of doing a good thing. And that's how the world could work. You can do good things and make money too.

Erik Townsend: I clearly misspoke then. There's no doubt in my mind that you guys will be successful and will make money. My point was It's simply that I think you are quite capable of making a lot of money in a shorter timeframe with less effort.

This project, I can feel it, Raoul. This is a passion-driven project, just as MacroVoices is. And I think that's the reason that we've kind of hit it off, is that we're both doing this because we're passionate. I was successful in the software industry. I retired in my 30s, a multimillionaire. I don't have to do any of this stuff. I don't do it to make more money. I do it because I want to be engaged in what is going on in the world, because it is so fascinating. And these are such incredibly, incredibly challenging times. It blows my mind. During the Cold War, everybody was scared to death. Now everybody's completely complacent. And I think that a lot of risks in the world are worse than they were then. But it's an amazing passion. And I really— my hat is off to both you and Grant for the fantastic work that you do.

Before we close, though, I do want to come back to GMI. Everybody knows what Real Vision is. Not a lot of people outside of the institutional world know about GMI. Can you talk a little bit more about who it's for? Is it open? Can people sign up for it? Where can they get information and so forth?

Raoul Pal: Yeah. I mean, GMI is what I've been doing since I left the hedge fund game. I decided to start writing because, like you, I love the financial markets. It's in my blood. And one of the things— I love writing as well, and the creative process and the thinking process. It helps me clear my thoughts.

Thoughts. And writing from not sitting in London or New York or wherever, but doing it from Spain for 10 years and now the Cayman Islands, gives me a clarity of thought. So, Global Macro Investor is that, and it's my thoughts on everything in all asset classes around the world, what I think is interesting, the key things to focus on.

And it's not just a negative bear fest about the problems in the world. There's tons of opportunities and different things to look at. So, I've been doing that and keeping a track record. For GMI subscribers for the last 12 years. Luckily, it's been probably one of the most successful research publications and portfolios, it's actually a model portfolio there, that reflects on my own personal investments that's been there, and I have a track record to prove it. The point being, sadly, that the idea is it's a very closed user group, so I only have a restricted number of users. Readers, and they tend to be the ultra-high net worth family offices, hedge funds, pension funds, and those guys who can pay the fees for the research.

It's a very opposite— Grant has a product, which is Things That Make You Go Hmmm... which is $300, and mine is many times that.

It's not really aimed at the man on the street, but actually, with anybody who's subscribed to Real Vision this month, they get a copy of my research. research in it. So, I think they're going to get my April monthly. So, people— anybody who's a subscriber of Real Vision should be able to have a copy of it and look at it. And they can draw their own conclusions whether it adds any value or not.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, we should definitely be clear so we don't waste anyone's time that GMI, from a price point standpoint, is beyond the retail investor's reach. But certainly, for our institutional audience, it's a possibility.

Raoul Pal: Yeah, absolutely right.

Erik Townsend: Raoul, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. You are welcome on this show anytime you like. And if there's anything that we can

Raoul Pal: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: If there's anything that we can do to help you and Grant with the fantastic work that you're doing at Real Vision Television, by all means, let us know. I want to remind our listeners that we are offering a discount, or I don't know, I think it's a free trial of Real Vision Television if you go to realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices.

You can get a free trial, and it's what, $1 a day if you want to sign up, 365 $25 a year for Real Vision, which is an on-demand, basically like MacroVoices, but it's video and it's live, and you guys have a better network than we do, so you're getting some of the guests that we want to get in the future.

Raoul Pal: Absolutely. Yeah. I think what you guys are doing is fabulous. It's very much in line with what we're doing, and widening that discourse over a number of different platforms is a great thing.

Erik Townsend: Raoul, thanks again so much for joining me on the program. Nathan Egger joins me as MacroVoices continues.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: dollar index outlook and Erik's short trades

Nathan Egger: Erik, I'm very interested in the idea of the Fed I'm interested in this dollar story, as are many who follow global macro. And Raoul took time to chat with us at a really opportune moment as we see the dollar at a really key technical level right now. We've talked a lot on the program about a couple of different short trades, one in crude oil, with the other being short the S&P.

If the dollar index does break down below the mid-93s or so, how does this affect your view on both of these short trades?

Erik Townsend: You know, I have been in Raoul's camp that I think the dollar rally is set to continue. My view's a little bit— it was interesting to hear Raoul talk about how clearly he sees the cause for the dollar rally, and he did describe it as policy. I see it as a more very narrow, specific policy event, which is you had the U.S. printing money, quantitative easing, that's weakening the dollar, while other countries are not. And then you suddenly shift from that to the U.S. not printing While Europe and Japan are printing money. All of a sudden, the other guys are weakening their currencies. It's just natural that as long as that continues, that it's going to be positive for the dollar. So, I've been in the dollar bull camp with Raoul.

I think Axel Merk made the opposite argument very persuasively a few weeks ago here on the program. I've still sort of sided with Raoul. I'd say a breakdown below 93.50. Especially, you know, below 92 even, that really says to me, okay, the technicals just didn't play out the way we thought they would. It still looks to me like this could be just a healthy pullback, and I'm watching it very closely for signs to move higher, because of course if the dollar is moving higher, then commodities priced in dollars, including gold and oil, should both be expected to move lower on that basis.

Postgame: debt jubilee, regime change and oil at $20

Nathan Egger: Okay, and we also heard Raoul suggest suggest that a so-called debt jubilee is far more likely than most will currently want to admit. And we can look to the history books to see how these situations have played out in the past. But if you had to venture to guess how exactly this sort of debt forgiveness could play out this time around, how do you see it? In other words, which parties in the global financial system are the most likely to be forced to forgive some of their outstanding debt?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's a completely, totally, categorically uncharted territory. And the reason I say that is just because the modern financial system is so securitized. The concept of debt means something very different than what it used to. In any context where you might find an example of a debt jubilee occurring, you're going back a long time in history to where a debt was something where a borrower borrowed from one party and then paid that one party back someday, and it didn't change hands.

It's such a complex system now that I don't think it's possible to accurately predict exactly how it will play out. But I think you can count on a few things, which is that the people that are in charge are going to protect themselves first. There will be a public outcry that the debt is unfair, that the system is rigged, rigged, that people who are in over their heads in debt were forced into these circumstances by actions of people that were reckless and irresponsible. It's not their fault and so forth, and they shouldn't have to pay the debt back. That will be countered by, of course, the political influence that all the bankers have. And I think that it potentially creates a great divide.

The current political system, the mainstream, the old-school political system, The establishment is very much designed around things needing to stay the way that they are. So, ultimately, when it comes down to who's going to be forced to forgive debt, nobody is going to do it voluntarily. It's going to be everybody kicking and screaming and who's got the most power. I would expect it to come in phases. At first, the establishment wins.

And, you know, tough luck if you don't want to pay your bills.

Eventually, you start to see politicians looking at the threat of actual revolution where people are really freaking out, and it all changes. What does this look like? You know, as far as I know, I'm not an expert on this. I haven't done much research on it. Debt jubilees have occurred in conjunction with regime changes, changes of government, so forth in the past. You know, somebody lost a war. A bunch of debts end up getting forgiven because the war is over or something. I don't think we have that circumstance here. So I don't know how it would play out. I think it is a very, very ugly picture. But as Raoul said, we are living in completely uncharted territory here.

Nathan Egger: Well, we might not have the conditions yet, but something that we've talked about many times on the program is a ramping up of defense spending and fiscal stimulus in the form of defense spending around the world. And you're seeing these proxy wars start to play out. So, there is a chance that you might start to see some massive regime changes happening in the world, is there not?

Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. I think that there is very likely to be dramatic regime change. I think the oil situation by itself, if this goes where I think it can go, which is all the way down to $20 a barrel, I don't know how long it stays there. If we were to see prolonged oil prices more than 6 months at $20 a barrel. I don't think it's possible, first of all. But if that were to happen, it would cause several governments to fail. No doubt about it. It would dramatically change the political landscape. So there's a lot of really big things in motion here right now. And I don't think it's possible to predict where it's going to go. When you ask a question like debt forgiveness, I think that everybody's going to try to make it be the other guy. And whoever Whoever has the least political clout is going to lose.

Nathan Egger: I was looking at—

Erik Townsend: Least political clout is going to win, and, uh, or is going to— most political clout wins, least loses.

Postgame: student debt as national debt

Nathan Egger: As it usually is. I was looking at some numbers today, and by 2030, the student debt in the United States is estimated to be $16, $17 trillion at that time. So that's approaching the national debt level. So when you think about the presidential candidacy, of a guy like Bernie Sanders, all of a sudden, you start looking to these students. These are the ones that are going to have no jobs, no place to go, and all the time in the world to protest and rally and scream about how they've been unfairly tricked into taking on $200,000 worth of college debt, which didn't get them the job that they were promised was going to get them. It'd be very interesting to see how the presidential election in the United States is going to influence a potential debt jubilee or debt forgiveness.

Erik Townsend: Well, and without a doubt, all of that student debt, or not all of it, but a lot of that student debt, the part that will default, what it really is, is national debt. We pretend that these people are going to pay these debts back so we don't have to admit the truth, which is ultimately the federal government is going to get stiffed. And that means that really it's just that much more federal debt, unfunded the debt deficit by another name.

Postgame: Erik on the relationship with Real Vision

Nathan Egger: Eventually, we're not going to have another balance sheet to transfer all of this debt to, and we're going to have to deal with it. Erik, can you please re-explain to our listeners what our relationship is exactly with Real Vision and why we bring it up so frequently on the show?

Erik Townsend: Well, I just love these guys. They're really the only ones that, like us, they're not motivated to be doing a podcast because they're trying to sell precious metals or because they're trying to pimp some conspiracy theory or because they've got a broker-dealer that they're trying to pimp that service or something. They're doing this because they're really, really passionate about the fact that macroeconomics and the way we think about the way the economy drives the world is so profoundly important. And really the only media that we have in finance is the cable networks. And, you know, they're fine for what they're good for, but they don't get to deep, meaningful, thoughtful analysis like they're doing.

So I just think that they do cool stuff. And what we have agreed with Raoul off the air, we had done a few of these encore presentations just on a short-term basis. I think we'll keep doing those every couple of weeks to provide a little bit of teaser content to let people know what's available there. We don't make anything on it. We don't get any commissions from subscriptions there. We just want to help them out because I really think they're on the cusp of a transition.

They've made their first transition, which is when they launched. It was 2 guys with whoever they had in their own personal Rolodexes that they could beg for an interview, try to get this thing going. Now, they've got enough traction and enough momentum that I'm hearing a lot about them. There are people that I sent emails to a year ago saying, hey, check out Real Vision, that ignored it. Now they're telling me, hey, have you heard about Real Vision? So, the slowpokes, the laggards in society are finally catching on to this trend.

I think they've got another major transition, which is eventually they get to the point where all of the guests realize this is the only chance to really have a thoughtful— what, you know, if I'm Kyle Bass, what is my thesis really about? Right. Out, CNBC is never going to convey it because they just don't spend the time to go in depth with that stuff. So we haven't gotten to the point yet where the real titans of finance are thinking, boy, my outlet, the place where I can really have my thoughts heard, it's Real Vision as opposed to the cable networks. I'm going to call those guys up. Carl Icahn's asking for an opportunity to be interviewed on on Real Vision because of the significance that it carries in the industry. They're a long way from that, but I predict they're going to get there eventually.

All right.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Nathan Egger: Well, you guys, Erik went really deep in his conversation with Raoul today, and we ended up with a little more interview than we are used to. And I'm certainly not complaining, but in the interest of keeping this episode at a reasonable length, I think we're going to call it a show here. Again, we want to thank Raoul for an interview packed with fascinating And please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes, and your ratings and reviews are helping us out a ton. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and even Erik is now starting to get active on Twitter. You can follow him @ErikSTownsend. You can also connect with us directly in our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. For Erik Townsend, this is Patrick Ceresna. This is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented by AIG. For informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

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