Rick Rule — Sprott Global Resources founder (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Show preview: oil special, Rick Rule, Art Berman bonus

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 11 was recorded on April 21st, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've got a really big show lined up for you guys today, and please trust me, this is an episode you're not going to want to miss. We've got Sprott Global Resources founder Rick Rule coming up as today's feature interview. But we're going to take that interview in a completely different direction than anything you've ever heard on any other podcast. I'll save the details as a surprise. As regular listeners know, we planned this week's episode as part 2 in our special on the new bull market in gold. But news from the oil markets was so big this week that we almost postponed Mr. Rule in order to do another oil special. So how are we going to resolve this conundrum? By doing both. So put your seatbelts on, folks. This is going to be a longer than usual and very content-rich show. We've got expanded depth coverage in our oil commentary in the beginning of the show.

Then we've got a full-length interview that you've been looking forward to with Sprott Global's Rick Rule, but we'll also be bringing you a bonus interview with petroleum geologist Art Berman, who's coming back to give us an update on oil fundamentals since his feature interview here on MacroVoices back in February. Please forgive us for leaving out a few subjects we normally cover each week. It was everything we could do to squeeze all the content that we had into today's program.

Equity market: 'I don't get it'

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Welcome back, everyone. As Erik said, we've got a longer than usual show. We've got a lot to cover. So, let's jump right in and discuss the equity market briefly.

Erik Townsend: You know, Nathan, if there's one thing that we can do at MacroVoices to differentiate ourselves from the rest of the industry, it's not to respond to a situation where we don't have a good answer by making shit up, which is what most people do. So, I'm going to summarize my in-depth analysis of the entire equity market for you in 4 words. I don't get it.

The equity market is moving higher at breakneck speed. All indications that I can see from a technical basis looking at the chart are that we are headed for new all-time highs. I think it's very, very strong bullish technical picture on the chart, and it just does not add up for me. I wonder about whether there's some big fundamental driver that might be behind that. But you know what? It doesn't matter. I don't get what's going on. If it doesn't make sense, I don't have an opinion on it. Let's move on. We got a busy show.

Doha freeze, Sue Saudi bill and Saudi Treasury threat

Nathan Egger: Don't be too proud of yourself for saving time with that answer, because normally I only have to ask you, at least at the outset of the show, one oil question. What did the market do this week? But after this week's action, I have at least 6 questions, maybe more, depending on what you have to say. And you told me off the air that your views are slowly starting to change. So we really need to go deep on oil this week. Let's start with a review of all the crazy events that have happened in the market this week.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so first of all, the setup coming into— let's go back to last week's show. We knew what we were coming up to was there has been what seems to me like a lot of hysteria about this production freeze nonsense. We're talking about 5 countries that couldn't possibly increase their production if they wanted to agreeing not to do something. You know, it made no sense. It was political theater. I thought what was going to happen was the only big news that would happen between last week's show and this week's show was we'd have that Doha meeting and the market would move down after one of two things happened. Either there was no deal or there was a deal, and the deal was shortly thereafter debunked as meaningless, which is what was going to happen. I had to take notes for today's show, Nate. I've got like 12 bullets of other major news events that are affecting this story.

End of last week, this Sue Saudi bill came up. Now, there are people in the United States who believe that Afghanistan and Iraq didn't do it. Saudi Arabia is responsible for 9/11, and the families of 9/11 victims ought to be able to sue Saudi Arabia in the United States for their, their I'm not even going to comment on whether I think that makes sense or not. It's not my field. Suffice it to say, there are people who hold that view, and there are congressmen who are trying to push this idea of a Sue Saudi bill, making it possible for 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia.

Something I have predicted for years, Nathan, is that at some point, the major holders of US debt would play the card of saying, look it, we're sick of the United States pushing the rest of the world around and telling us what we have to do, whether it's your stupid FATCA tax law or your other stupid policies.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Other policies of trying to dictate things to the rest of the world. Stop telling us what to do or we are going to crash your Treasury market by selling all of the US Treasuries that we hold. We don't need to be able to compete with you, United States, you invincible military force. We can take you out economically if you keep messing with us. I have opined for years now that I thought that was coming, that one of these 3 countries, China, Japan, or Saudi Arabia, which have massive Treasury holdings, would eventually Eventually play that card of threatening the United States by intentionally damaging the Treasury market.

And it would be big damage. It would cost them a lot, 'cause to do the damage, they'd have to sell it sloppy, as the expression goes in the industry, intentionally dump all those Treasuries. They would lose a lot of money in the process, but they would do immense, immense damage to the United States.

I thought someday, 10 years from now, China would threaten that once we got closer, you know, an escalated Cold War. For it to come from Saudi Arabia now really surprised me. I could do an entire show on this subject. I've been thinking about it for years. It's one of my 11 bullets, and it's only your first of 6 questions.

Prince Salman's threats and the Doha meeting

Erik Townsend: Let's move on. Prince Salman made some very important threats. I think this was either Friday or Saturday. It was before the Doha meeting. Prince Salman said, look, we're going into this Doha thing. We're going to listen. But I want to be clear. We can increase production by 1 million barrels tomorrow if we want to. If I want to turn up production, don't put it past me to increase our production by 1 million barrels per day starting tomorrow morning. I can turn the valve. And I'll tell you something else. In 6 to 9 months, I could add another million barrels of production.

So, we'll consider a freeze if Iran participates. If Iran doesn't participate, hey, we might turn the dials up, guys. Watch out.

I think that Prince Salman is definitely bluffing on part of that, but not all of it. I think he is dead serious in saying, we are ready to do everything within our power. Saudi Arabia is ready to turn the screws and really, really try to make this situation worse in order to improve their negotiating position.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: So I say this guy could be for real in terms of his intentions. He has the ability, he says, to increase production by 1 million barrels starting tomorrow morning. Baloney. I don't believe it. I think they're pedaling as fast as they can already. But they can take action to increase production. In fact, they don't have to. All they have to do is announce that they have increased production. That can be validated and verified 6 months later, but that's 6 months later. If they want to have the propaganda effect of, we've just increased our production by 2 million barrels, all they have to do is announce it.

People will believe it.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: So, finally, we get through all this stuff, and we get to the Doha meeting. No great surprise. What happens is Saudi Arabia shows up and says, there's no way that we're going to participate in this unless Iran cooperates, and Iran's not going to cooperate.

Now, Saudi Arabia had been misquoted widely last week. People were saying, oh, Saudi Arabia said that they're going to be ready to freeze production, even if Iran doesn't. And they never said that. What they said is that they would come to the meeting, and they would make their decision independent of what No matter what Iran does, they're not going to make any decision before the meeting based on Iran. That didn't say that they were going to agree to anything. They said they were not going to go into the meeting with a foregone conclusion just because Iran was refusing to participate. The idea that anybody thought that they were really going to get a deal out of that or a meaningful deal blows my mind. It didn't happen. We get the meeting, we're waiting for the market to open on Sunday because it was early Sunday morning US time that we got the news that there's no deal in Doha.

We're waiting for the 6 PM open.

Kuwait strike, gap-downs, Houston Ship Channel and the rally

Nathan Egger: Then what happens?

Erik Townsend: Massive strike in Kuwait. Now, wait a minute. This is super huge because when there's news of a strike, you don't know how big it's going to get. If it were to take Kuwait offline, if it was something that just erupted into massive confrontation and Kuwait stopped producing oil, that's 1.7 million barrels per day. That totally rebalances the market. That solves the whole problem Art and I have been talking about overnight. Kuwait could have changed everything. So now I'm thinking, boy, I'm predicting a huge gap-down open.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: on Sunday's session. But now there is something that fundamentally could change everything on the table. I'm pretty sure it's going to just blow over, which it did, but you don't know that. We still get the $2 gap-down open. $2 gap-down open on Sunday. Massive profit for the shorts. Lasted all of a few hours.

And you know, at that open, when I watched the market, it felt like Thanksgiving of '14 when we saw that OPEC meeting and it just straight down from there. All of the crude oil traders on Twitter were talking about, yeah, here we are, We are at 37.70. I predict 36 by morning and 34 by tomorrow afternoon. Everybody was calling for major moves into the low 30s. The major banks were coming out with calls, moves into the low 30s.

What happens 12 hours later? Actually, it was closer to 24 hours later. The market is right back to where it started, trading above the level when the Doha meeting fell apart. Okay, you can explain that by saying maybe what happened is people really came to terms with what the Kuwait strike could mean. They realized Kuwait's a really big deal, or it could be. So maybe we shouldn't be jumping for joy, or not jumping for joy, but expecting that prices have to go down. Jumping for joy if you're short, as a result of no Doha meeting.

So the Kuwait strike is on the table. They get the massive gap-down open. It retraces in less than 24 hours. Well, now the Kuwait strike ends and it's completely over. Happens while the market is closed. Market opens to another small gap-down. Looks like again, we're headed down finally.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: The other fundamental factor's off the table. Kuwait's not a factor. We got no Doha. It's got to be pure down from here. Just has to be. Oh, wait a minute.

We've got again a retrace, a full retrace in less than 24 hours.

On what catalyst? EIA data was a build, even if not a spectacular build. It was 2.1 million barrels of additional inventory cataloged this week that we didn't have last week. The Houston Ship Channel has been closed.

Nathan Egger: Oh, wow.

Erik Townsend: Quite a bit. If you haven't seen the news, Houston is just flooded. The whole city is in trouble. A whole bunch of ships, 33 at the beginning of the week, I don't have an update as of today as we're taping, are sitting outside of Houston waiting to come and deliver their oil. That's all oil that should have been in this week's inventory report that didn't get there because the ships are stuck at sea. That oil potentially will be coming back at some point. Then after that, There's nothing, nothing, nothing but bearish news.

What happens? The market breaks out to the upside to $44.50. Is there any news to explain it? The only news that came out that seemed to be a proximal trigger is Russia says there's going to be no meeting in May. There was people saying, you know, they were going to resurrect the production freeze, have another meeting in May. Russia says, no, that's baloney. We don't know anything about any meeting. Russia and Saudi Arabia both make public threats. to immediately begin production increases.

Couldn't imagine a more bearish statement than that. That took us from $44 up to $44.50. Nate, something is going on here. Something is up. And I just have to admit, it appears to me that there is some bullish fundamental factor in play that I have not been in touch with, and I still can't figure out what it is.

Everybody that I'm following, all the traders on Twitter, everybody is confused. What the heck is pushing this market higher? But it is clear that the upside The upside momentum is massive. The action and reaction to Wednesday's inventory report, it's been just straight up. And in theory, it should have been a modestly bearish report, but still a bearish report. And, you know, we moved up a couple dollars from there. So this market is just going higher. Something is in play that I don't understand.

Inventory builds ignored; ship tracking and Samir Madani

Nathan Egger: What I find most fascinating is that on one hand, the predictions that led you and Art Berman to conclude that the market was headed much lower did in fact come true to a large extent. You predicted some big builds on inventory. And for a while there, we were getting them. And I remember one week came in literally 3 times expectations at 10.5 million barrels of inventory built in a single week. And there was another big build in the high single digits. So, the predictions you and Art made about inventory came true, but they came true at a time when the market just shrugged them off and it moved higher anyway. Perhaps that was because of the hysteria around the production freeze and the Doha meeting, perhaps. But one way or another, US refinery maintenance season is now winding down. For the last few weeks, we've seen consistent drawdowns on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, even though the national number has been a build.

They were very small drawdowns, but they were drawdowns just the same. And that's bucking the trend. So even though you guys got the inventory supply-demand story right, The market didn't listen because of the production freeze. And now that the production freeze and Kuwait strike appear to be dead issues, we're not seeing the big draws anymore. It's almost as if the big downside catalyst you guys predicted came true. It was that pair of really big inventory builds that by reasonable logic should have pushed the market much lower. But the spin doctors can and did win out over fundamentals and common sense in the short run. So where does that leave us? Do you still have the same strong bearish conviction on crude oil? At least in the very short term?

Erik Townsend: Well, my conclusion until now has been that the rally from, let's say, February 11th has been primarily driven by expectations around this production freeze thing. Certainly, if you look at the tape action, all of the moves up were in reaction to an oil minister from one country or another making a statement. I am forced at this point, because this has moved so far beyond where I thought it could, to really look carefully at this and say, wait a minute, what could I be missing? Is there some hidden fundamental factor that could be be responsible for driving this entire thing.

Certainly, some dollar weakness would play into that. I agree that the builds that you mentioned, the inventory builds, came and were ineffective. I was expecting more builds than that. I was expecting— the 10 million barrel inventory build didn't surprise me at all, but I thought it was going to be the first of a string of 5 of those. And we did get 2 really big ones. Not enough, and they came at the wrong time to be effective in moving the market lower. From an inventory standpoint, though, The ship channel really speaks to me. I think that, you know, how is it that Art and I both really thought that this bunch of builds was coming and it didn't come when we thought it was going to come? Well, because the ships can't get into port. Kind of makes sense. What do you do about that?

I'll be the first— I wish I could afford it. There is really expensive research available in the oil industry that very accurately tracks all of the ships and where the cargoes are and who's got how much oil and so forth.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: That's, you know, really heavy-duty, expensive research that people with a lot more assets under management than me can afford to buy.

You gotta love the internet, Nathan, and this is something you turned me on to, is Twitter. There's this dude on Twitter. His name is Samir Madani. He is a Kuwaiti-born guy. He lives in Stockholm, Sweden. When I approached Samir and asked his permission to talk about his work on the show today, he said, yeah, you can tell people, you know, I don't do this for any kind of business. It was just a bizarre—

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Confluence of personal interests that turned into a hobby of this guy doing research on where all the crude oil ships are and what the delays are into port. And he does predictions of how that's going to affect inventory reports and so on and so forth.

Now, I certainly have to comment, what am I talking about using some random guy on the internet's research when he's not even a professional? And I think a lot of people would judge that. Certainly, I take it cautiously with a grain of salt, but I look at this guy's work. The one thing that I can tell with certainty from looking at it He knows more about this than I do. So is he as smart as the guys at Platts that I could buy this research for $1 million a year from? Probably not. I don't have the $1 million a year to spend on it. So I follow this guy's work, and he does a fantastic job, I think. He says that he thinks that he predicted before this week that it was going to be a soft build. He thought that this week, because of ship traffic, that the inventory report would be soft. And he thinks it's going to be soft again next week, although he'll probably have an update again.

Anybody who wants to follow that, Twitter, Samir Madani, Samir underscore, and the rest of it will come up automatically.

If you're my age and you don't use Twitter because this social networking crap is for kids and you don't have Nathan beating you over the head every day with a baseball bat saying, I'm telling you this is worthwhile, guys, it's worthwhile. I resisted pretty hard. There's a lot of interesting stuff out there on Twitter.

Cushing as the forcing function for a crash

Erik Townsend: The really big Cushing builds that we expected to have come If the ship backup clears, all the ships are easily able to get into port, the weather is sunny in Houston, all the ships have unloaded, and we still haven't had the big inventory builds that Art and I predicted, well, then we were wrong. And that's just it. I think that there is still room that we will be proven right and that it will be massive builds and that the market shocks much lower. I still think that that's possible, but it ain't gonna happen until we have a catalyst.

And that catalyst has to be a really big threat that a storage crisis is coming. That means a build on Cushing inventory. Build on national inventory doesn't count because what the industry is doing very effectively right now is they're making room in Cushing. They're pipelining oil out of Cushing. The national inventory goes up, but the Cushing inventory goes down. Why? Because the guys in Cushing ain't stupid. They know that they're the critical choke point. They're pumping as much oil to other storage facilities as they can.

This invites a thought experiment. If Art and I predicted that the market was gonna balance itself within 6 months on natural factors because of declining US production, but we saw a crash coming first because of this crunch on inventory, well, it was 6 months that it had to happen in before the market was gonna rebalance itself.

This production freeze idea came up on the morning of January 20th. How long did it take until it had been fully debunked as nonsense by the experts and all the smart people in the room knew that it was irrelevant and had nothing to do with anything?

Nathan Egger: 2 days.

Erik Townsend: About 3 hours. Yet, for 3 more months, it's had a profound effect on prices, or at least it appears to. That or something else is having a profound effect on prices and I'm missing it. So, if they make another 3-month rhetoric story about who knows what they call it next, and they burn another 3 months, then the market could have balanced itself. Have they won? Could it be that the spin doctors could keep prices elevated and the scenario that Art and I anticipated never happens because of the actions of the Fed?

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: of political theater by oil ministers? Well, there's a forcing function here, and that's Cushing inventory.

If we get to the point where Cushing is running out of inventory, I don't care who's saying what, the price is going to crash. But here's the thing, we weren't really counting on that happening. I was never convinced we were going to have a Cushing storage crisis. I thought we'd get close enough to one to scare everybody.

Nobody's getting scared here, and I don't understand it.

But what's going on is, until we see massive Cushing builds, which I think might still be coming, the market is not going to respond. That bear factor is not going to be there. If they come, it could happen dramatically, instantly, overnight. It could be a dramatic crash. The inventory reports will be very, very important to watch. But it's also possible, you know, if we get through the next couple months and we still haven't seen it, then we really have to look at a different scenario playing out than we originally thought.

Nathan Egger: Yeah. Okay. So, is that your current thinking, that what's going on here is hysteria about the Doha production freeze meeting carried us through inventory vulnerability season, also known as refinery maintenance season? And if so, does that mean that this will come down to whether or not the big builds resume after the weather-related issues in Houston are resolved?

Hunting the hidden driver: Shanghai Accord theory

Erik Townsend: I think that question, Nathan, comes down to whether or not the factor that's been driving this rally since February 11th Really is what I think it's been, which is a lot of hype and hysteria about the Doha production freeze meeting. We know that that's now nonsense, so that's not going to be affecting things, but the market has risen all the way up to $44 here.

I'm increasingly focusing on a hunch that I have, and I can't see what the factor is, but I just look at this and I say, this hasn't gone the way I thought. The market has gone farther than I thought it could.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: What could be the fundamental factor that I'm not seeing? Is there something that's not public knowledge yet? I can't explain Wednesday's tape after the Doha meeting is dead, the Kuwait strike is over, and then Russia says that this supposed meeting where we're gonna, you know, maybe we are gonna revive the production freeze, yeah, that's BS. It's not really happening, guys. These are all profoundly bearish factors. What does the market do? Goes up $2 in response. Something's going on here that is not making sense to me. I haven't figured it out yet.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: yet. And it makes me wonder what hidden driver could be behind the scenes here.

Nathan Egger: Okay, then clearly the central question has to be what the hidden fundamental driver could be that we've all been missing for the past 3 months. Put another way, if this rally wasn't really about the production freeze propaganda, what could have been the driver?

Erik Townsend: Art Berman and I both, you know, have been exchanging emails and we can't see it in terms of any public knowledge stuff. I hate to get into conspiracy theories and that kind of stuff. And when I first read about this Shanghai Accord theory on ZeroHedge I just thought, oh, here we go, another conspiracy theory about supposed, you know, evil government officials that are doing who knows what kind of thing.

I'm sure many of our listeners are familiar with the Plaza Accord back in 1984, which was the famous meeting where a number of nations agreed to work together to intentionally devalue the US dollar against other currencies. So, there are people who are speculating that perhaps there has been a so-called Shanghai Accord, a secret meeting between government officials that would somehow mean that there's a secret story that only the most powerful people in the world know that they're going to dramatically weaken the dollar. Weaker dollar, stronger oil. If somebody really and truly knew that a Plaza Accord kind of thing had happened on the QT, and that was really true, It would explain a lot. It would explain the equity story. It would explain a lot of things. Now, I don't like, you know, correlation does not mean causation, and I don't like conspiracy theories. On this particular one, I have to at least follow this and take it seriously because, you know, there's a lot of suspicious things happening.

There's this really weird meeting announced between President Obama and Janet Yellen last week. It was just a few days before the meeting. I suspect it was probably some obligation they had, statutory obligation to make it public notice.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: that President Obama has asked Janet Yellen to come to the White House for a Monday afternoon chat. The President of the United States doesn't invite Janet Yellen into the Oval Office to chat about the weather. Something was up.

Then Saudi Arabia is threatening to literally crash the US Treasury market if the Congress doesn't back down on this sue Saudi stuff. President Obama meets with King Salman. Promptly after that meeting, publicly vows that he will veto The suit sought— it's very unusual for the president to publicly vow to veto something like that when the, you know, the guys that want it to be vetoed are foreigners and the guys that don't want it to be vetoed, who will be— whose feelings are going to be hurt by that, are Americans whose families were lost in 9/11. A politician taking that move publicly, promising to veto, he wants to make damn sure that this thing doesn't go through. Both equities and crude oil have been going gangbusters despite no apparent fundamental driver that I can explain.

I had, I thought, a very good explanation.

Short squeeze made perfect sense. Well, guess what? The shorts have been squeezed out. If you look at the Commitments of Traders reports, it's not a short squeeze anymore. The markets are not acting like I think they should. I don't like to take conspiracy theories seriously. I don't have any belief that this thing has happened, this Shanghai Accord. But I sure do wonder what could be going on to explain these weird meetings between Janet Yellen and the president.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: and King Salman and all these things, it feels to me like maybe there's an invisible hand of government doing something and I don't know what. And maybe that somehow explains why the oil market is just so far out of whack with what I thought it was going to be doing right now.

Erik's position: covering shorts and re-entry conditions

Nathan Egger: So where does that leave you in terms of your view on this trade, specifically on the trade? In the past weeks, you've been extremely bearish and you said you thought the market had to get Doha out of its system. Well, Doha came and went. The freeze was debunked as nonsense, as you predicted, but the market went straight up anyway. So are you still short WTI futures here? Are you still convinced that the bottom is not yet in and that the market has yet to find a true final low?

Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, let me be really clear that you have to, as an investor, be humble enough to recognize no matter how strong your conviction is, when the market is telling you, is proving to you That what you thought is wrong, you have to accept it. Until the Doha meeting, where I was with this is, I think it's crazy that people are putting so much apparent faith in this Doha idea, but I knew it was going to be disproven. I thought that had to be what moved the market much lower.

I was proven right on Doha, and the market went straight up anyway. What I've done, you know, I had to get out of the way of this. I immediately covered on that because it proved to me that whatever's going on, is not what I thought was going on.

The only reason I could justify all of this strength was— actually, it was not just Doha. After Doha happened, I was out of the market waiting to see where it was going to go. I thought that it made sense to re-enter the short if and when the strike in Kuwait was resolved. The strike was resolved. I put a short on, a smaller short position there.

We saw another retrace. I got out of that one at my entry price. I wasn't going to take a loss on that one.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: And sure enough, the market moved considerably higher from there. In order for me to still be proven right on the original trading thesis, that was low 20s on WTI before this is over, we gotta have the inventory builds and they gotta be inventory builds in Cushing. If the industry can succeed at pumping enough oil out of Cushing, so you maybe have a storage crisis in Houston, but we never get to a storage crisis in Cushing, then that's going to eliminate my scenario of a crash.

The reason that I thought a crash was likely to happen is I thought we were headed towards an imminent storage crisis. Now, that could still be true. If Samir Madani is right, we could be in the middle of a temporary delay. Now, you would think, well, wait a minute, oil traders are smart. If this is about ships being backed up into Houston, surely when they see those inventory reports, they would think about it that— No, don't give them that much credit, guys. The headline comes out, the number is not a big build, the market goes up. People don't really do the cause and effect and think about the ships that are stuck at sea. Some people do, but most of the people I don't.

I'm going to be the first to admit that I have changed my view to where I still think that all of our analysis was right unless there's some fundamental factor that is hidden or I'm not seeing. But I'm becoming much more open to the possibility that that hidden factor is there because things are happening in this market that just don't add up for me. I will definitely reconsider entering the short trade again if we get And then we get the really big inventory builds that we've been predicting. That definitely should be the big downside shock. And I mean, I don't mean big inventory builds like it's not 2 million, it's 3 million. I mean, it's 10 million, it's 12 million, it's 15 million barrels a week for a period of several weeks. That's what crashes the market to the teens if it happens. My confidence that that's going to happen was strong when we did that interview with Art.

I still think there's a good chance of that. I am not banking on it definitely happening.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: Certainly, if it does happen, I will take that short trade a little differently. I won't be as aggressive about holding out for a price target. I'll be taking money off the table and taking profits, you know, a little bit earlier because I just don't know that the case is as strong as it is. But that could change. It really depends on what we see in the inventory numbers. My prior view was that we don't need to run out of storage in Cushing. All we have to do is come close and everybody will panic.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Nobody's panicking. They're panicking in the other direction. They're panicking with exuberance and they're ignoring these risk factors. I don't know if that sentiment is going to change, but right now, with current sentiment, the only way the market's going to crash is if we actually get the Cushing storage crisis. It really happens, not just is imminent to maybe happen. So I think it takes a little bit more to crash the market than it used to, and I think that the likelihood of happening— of that happening, my confidence is not as strong as it was, but I still think the fundamental analysis was spot on. There's either something something completely hidden that we're not seeing, or what we anticipated should play out eventually.

Nathan Egger: All right.

Post-mortem on a losing trade

Nathan Egger: Well, Erik, as you know, as our listeners know, our charter at MacroVoices is to bring our listeners into the inside world of what a hedge fund manager actually does day to day, what he thinks about and so forth. I hope you won't mind this question, but you've expressed really, really strong bearish conviction on crude oil ever since we launched this podcast almost 3 months And the market has done nothing but move against you for that entire time. And I know that for compliance reasons, you can't make any representations about the fund you manage on the air. But with all due respect, I can only guess that you're probably not having your best month ever.

So are you willing to talk on the air about the personal aspects of this? You're a really smart guy. You've articulated a really convincing bear argument on crude oil. But the bottom line is that by your own analysis, the big Cushing inventory builds you predicted have to start real soon, or we're getting close to when you and Art predicted the market would rebalance itself. You gave it about 6 months, give or take. So, what does a fund manager do in a situation like that? Your arguments have all made a hell of a lot of sense, at least to me, and our regular listeners, many of them will probably agree. But you expected to be proven right by now, and it's yet to happen. So, so now what?

Erik Townsend: Well, yes, I'm certainly happy to talk about it. That's why we do this show. And I'm also happy to acknowledge my mistakes, and I've made them I think the original analysis that Art and I made was spot on. I'm proud of it. I think it's— I think that view that we expressed in that show in February was extremely well articulated. And I think we were right. And we were careful to say there were plenty of things that could upset it. We had this view about inventory. We said very clearly that if some exogenous event occurred, if there were a war or something that took 1.5 million barrels of supply offline, that would change everything.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: So, I think we did identify what the realistic risks that were counter to our expectation were, and I think it was a good set of calls. The biggest mistake that I think I made, though, is when the market didn't do what I expected, my reaction was to just arrogantly judge these morons that are dumb enough to take this production freeze thing seriously. Well, am I doing myself Am I doing myself any favor by spending my time and energy pontificating here on MacroVoices and in my private life about how stupid other traders are? Or would I be better served really looking hard for, is there something that some of them are seeing that I'm not seeing? Because it is retarded for everybody to have been as bullish as they were over this stupid production freeze thing. Could it have been that I thought that was what was driving the market, but really the people doing the buying were buying for a different reason?

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: You know, I have to say I made a huge mistake because I wasn't paying close enough attention. Well, now I am paying close enough attention. Frankly, when I go back and do the postmortem and really look carefully at it, I still can't see how that could be it. Because if I look at every leg up, technical traders will understand that the most important legs, if you're trying to analyze the cause of a market move, is when there are technical resistance levels that in theory should hold and the market breaks breaks through those resistance levels. What was the news event that was the catalyst that took it through what should have been technical resistance? Well, every time it broke through a technical resistance level, it was on yet another oil minister talking up this production freeze thing. So I really do think, although I did make a mistake in not being a little more humble about thinking about it, I've humbled myself.

I've spent a lot of time in this week really, really carefully looking at this, and I still can't find Any evidence that anything other than production freeze stuff was driving this.

The fact that it still kept going up after the production freeze didn't happen made sense because of the Kuwait strike. It really did make sense. But then the Kuwait strike was over. Not only did it go up, but after the Wednesday inventory report from DOE, it went skyrocketing up.

And that should have been— I mean, not a hugely bearish number of 2.1 million barrel inventory build, but still a significant one. It should have been at least a little bit bearish. The market breathed a huge sigh of relief, went much higher. Everybody seems to think the fundamentals call for higher prices, and I just don't get it.

There's also another factor that will come into play here, which is we're very rapidly reaching $50 Brent. $50 Brent, a lot of analysts think, is a magic number where a lot of people will start hedging again. So there'll be selling pressure from the producers hedging their forward production. They'll be selling farther out on the curve, hopefully depressing some of those longer-dated contracts.

Second biggest mistake that I made: I assumed that the imminent threat of a storage crisis— not, not actual storage crisis, but just fear that one was near— was going to be enough to crash the market. And the reason I assumed that is because I really do think all indications when I said that were that that's how sentiment was. People were ready to react to something like that.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: The sentiment changed. We went bull silly to the point where we got to nothing short of an actual out-of-space crisis is going to bring this on because the market is so ready to just accept bearish news and ignore it and shrug it off.

At the end of the day, wrong is wrong. The worst mistake that an asset manager can ever make is to tell yourself that I got it right, but the market got it wrong. Or the dummies who made money being long were wrong because they're not as smart as me and I'm smarter than them and I just lost money anyway. Anyway, baloney. If your goal is to make money, wrong is wrong. You lose money, you were wrong. That's the story. That said, what sucks most for me, frankly, is I feel like I did get the analysis right, and it's a factor I've not seen that's doing this.

And yeah, you're right, it does affect you personally. It happens that we launched a MacroVoices podcast, so the first time ever I'm being extremely public about my views and my— one of my strongest, highest conviction trades of the last few years. And I do think the analysis was very sound. And guess what? It doesn't matter whether I was smart or not smart or right or not right. I'm wrong in the sense that the trade didn't play out. And you just have to take that at what it is and not kid yourself about it.

As far as to what do you do now? How do you respond to this? First step for me is going to be to collaborate with Art Berman. I want to touch base with Art. I see changes in the fundamentals. The Cushing draws don't surprise me that much because I think we're still seeing national builds People are just pumping oil out of Cushing. in order to forestall this. How long can they forestall it? How long can they keep pumping that out? Art knows more than that about me. So I would definitely look to my consultant to advance my own knowledge when it comes to the fundamentals.

Overall, if I had to grade myself on this trade, it might surprise some of our listeners, I would grade myself as an A+ all the way up to the point where I was first stopped out of this trade when we hit $36. Up to that point, frankly, yeah, I was losing money as the market was going up. Guess what? That's just part of the game. The market goes in cycles. It was well within an established trading range. When it broke out of $36, I predicted on this program that if that happened, it would take on a mind of its own because it would trigger a short squeeze.

I got out at $36. That was the right thing to do. I stepped out of the way, but I still had very strong views. And what I did So what I did is I went ahead and get— I waited for the market to get to the next level at 40.5, and I shorted there. And it broke that, I covered my short, I waited till 42, and I got the next level. I was gaining ground each time, but I was trying to get back into a short trade. It was already out of range. You know, the fact that we'd broken north of 36 said to me something is not working the way I think it should. I wrote that off as a short squeeze, and I looked at the Commitments of Traders data, and I said, as soon as we see the short interest coming down and we go back to net long speculative interest, it's time to get short again. And I went back into the trade short a little bit early.

And, you know, that has not been profitable. So this whole thing is not happy. But at the same time, I don't really regret most of the decisions I made. I think the original analysis was exactly right. I still think it can be proven out, especially if the ship channel thesis plays out. But it's definitely time to look at other possibilities.

New idea: a term-structure steepener

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: How do you go from here? You really have to step back. When something has not worked, you have to take a step back, forget about trying to get back into the same trade that you had so much emotional attachment to, and just look at where you are.

Where we are is I see a whole new opportunity here, and it's not a directional trade, it's a term structure trade. I look at what's going on in this market, and I say, wait a minute, the effect of this big rally is it's flattened the term structure, so we're looking at all the contracts basically, you know, the difference in price between between each month is not that much anymore. That really invites an opportunity. It's a trade that our professionals, I'm sure, are familiar with called a steepener. You're basically betting that the contango is going to come back into the market.

Well, this is all about asymmetric return. Do I think that the contango is coming back into the market? Well, I know if Art and I are proven right, there's going to be massive contango, because if that front month crashes in an inventory crisis, it will happen on record contango.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: There you go. That steepener trade profits wildly. It is massively profitable if the crash happens.

What happens if the crash doesn't happen and prices just drift higher from here? As far as I can see, and this is— I've only been looking at this trade for a day now. I'm not ready to put it on. I have to do some more analysis. I don't see it as realistic that this market, on fundamental factors, moves into backwardation, which is what would cause that trade to lose money.

I think that it could just be flat and not make very much money because nothing happened, or it could profit tremendously if the crash happened. But I don't see a whole lot of downside.

One big downside risk, if you look at that steepener, that means you're going to be short a near month and you're going to be long a further out month. If a war broke out, it could spike that near month up. So you would have to hedge that with a 3rd derivative leg, probably with a call on an out-of-the-money call. on whatever the front side of that spread is that you're trading as a steepener. I'm starting to do analysis of that kind of trade because I think that trade makes a lot more sense than an outright directional trade based on what I see in the market.

That's pretty much where I'm at right now. And I'd say this last few days, you know, when this stuff happens, it's not like, oh, I do this for a living, so therefore I know the answers. It's, I do this for a living, so I sit down and try to figure out the answers, and it takes time. And we're just digging into this, but boy, it has been an amazing week.

Nathan Egger: I have a very different job here at MacroVoices, and I think our regular listeners already know what drives my thinking as the show's producers. And if Erik's next step is to consult with his favorite petroleum geologist on the inventory fundamentals, you guys already know I'm going to want to get in on that phone call.

So, that's exactly what we have lined up for you. And at the end of today's show, we're going to do a special second interview segment with Art Berman. And this is real behind-the-scenes stuff, folks. We're not going to plan an interview or do a presentation. Erik is going to have a heart-to-heart with Art about how the market has evolved differently than expected and where it's headed from here. Now, we normally cover gold with Erik at this point before our feature guest interview, but we just don't have time today. But we've got plenty of gold coming up next. I think you guys are really going to like today's feature interview with Sprott Global Resources founder Rick Rule, because Erik's going to take that interview with Rick in a completely different direction than you're probably expecting. That interview is coming up next as MacroVoices MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Rick Rule's three-minute precious metals summary

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Rick Rule, founder of Sprott Global Resources International. We're going to do this interview in a little bit of a different direction. So Rick, what I'd like you to do— I know this is not your first rodeo, you do these podcast interviews all the I'd like you to take your standard-issue Rick Rule 45-minute precious metals interview intended for a retail audience. You got that in your head?

Rick Rule: Absolutely.

Erik Townsend: Okay, we're not going to do that because this is not a retail podcast, but we do have that audience component. Could you give me, please, the 3-minute condensed executive summary for the benefit of our retail audience? What's your take on precious metals? Because we do want to deliver that content.

Rick Rule: Well, that one's pretty simple. There's a lot of discussion about precious metals and what causes precious metals to move. I think the most important factor is that precious metals trade contra to the US dollar, and particularly the US dollar as expressed by the US 10-year Treasury. My own belief is that the US 10-year Treasury, after a 35-year bull market, is much closer to the top than the bottom. And if you agree with my thesis that gold trades contra to the Treasury, That means that gold and precious metals are much closer to the bottom than the top. 2 things here.

5 or 6 years ago, if you owned gold, you paid an implied rent which was the equivalent to the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury, a 5 handle. Today, you pay something like 1.7. So, the rent you pay on gold is less, at the same time that the relative attractiveness of the competing asset class, the U.S. 10-year Treasury, is much higher.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Rick Rule: is much, much, much less attractive.

That means, I think, that with the 35-year bond market closer to the top than the bottom, the precious metals market, I think, is much closer to the bottom than the top.

Capital formation: why private placements

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Thank you so much, Rick. And I know that you've done a lot of other retail podcasts. People who want more depth from a retail perspective can find it on the internet. You're a very famous guy. Google Rick Rule. We're not going to go there. This is MacroVoices. This is not a retail podcast. We're going to take this in a completely different direction. So, let's kick it into gear now and talk about what the capital formation process is that actually brings these companies into existence. Something I've noticed, particularly for gold investors, people will do so much research and learn so much about gold and mining and so forth. Do they ever do any research on gold companies? Where do these mining companies come from? How does the capital formation process occur? When you buy them in a public offering, who are you actually buying them from?

Rick Rule: Right.

Erik Townsend: Have you ever heard of something called overhang in a stock?

Do you know what the risk is associated with that? I bet you don't. We're going to go in a completely different direction, focused on the opportunities that exist for accredited investors. That's our finance professionals, high net worth individuals, essentially more than $1 million of investable assets. Retail guys, don't tune out on me. You're going to learn more about the industry and how businesses come into play than you're going to find out anyplace else. So this really is going to be of interest to everyone, but particularly for our accredited audience.

I want to start this, Rick, just with how you and I didn't meet the first time. I had sold a software company. I'm a software entrepreneur. I'm a technical guy. I tried to be retired for a few years, flunked retirement, lived on a yacht for a couple of years. Don't ever do that. That's a dumb idea. And I started getting interested in precious metals. I'm going to conferences, and there's one guy who seemed to really know a lot. He says, you're an accredited— you're a retired entrepreneur. You're an accredited investor. Yeah. Have you talked to Rick Rule? And I said, who the hell is Rick Rule? And the answer was the guy that's giving the keynote at the conference. You got to talk to him about private placements. And I thought to myself, wait a minute, as a software entrepreneur, I know what a private placement is.

It's when somebody invests in a startup company buying stock. And from my perspective, the equation is entirely about who's got the killer app, finding the, you know, the incredible new idea for the hot software company, something as low-tech as drilling a hole in the ground and pulling rock out of it.

Why in the world, I thought, would any idiot consider a private placement in a gold mining company? Well, the answer is because I didn't know anything about it and should have come and talked to you.

So, let's imagine that I did meet you in the early 2000s. I said, Rick, what's this private placements in natural resources? Let's expand it, by the way, not just to talk about gold, natural resources in general. And before we get into the specific investment opportunity, Give us some perspective on what does natural resources involve? Is it just mining? Is it— does it include just precious metals? Is it also oil and energy? And what are the differences between these things in terms of their capital requirements and how they each operate in terms of early-stage capital formation before they become public companies?

Natural resources, contrarian cycles and trade-show stories

Rick Rule: Broad question. So for our purpose, let's differentiate between precious metals and other natural resource asset classes. The precious metals component are unique in the sense that they're financial assets as opposed to merely commodities. Gold, silver, and to a lesser extent platinum and palladium have functioned for decades and decades and decades—in fact, thousands of years—as both a medium of exchange and simultaneously a store of value.

Most fiat currency around the world is a promise to pay, and precious metals constitute payment. So they're unique asset classes. And I believe that precious metals are already in a bull market. I believe that industrial materials—that's energy and base metals, non-ferrous metals—probably are either at a bottom or approaching a bottom. But I suspect that you're going to be 18 months before you see a demonstrated recovery. So first of all, let's talk about a bifurcation in natural resource. Markets between precious metals and industrial materials.

In terms of your question as to what you could have expected when you first met me, I think the important thing to know about natural resource-based businesses is that they are simultaneously extremely cyclical and also very volatile, both of which can be good if you're a contrarian. But if you don't have a contrarian orientation We like to say in resource-based businesses, you are either a contrarian or you will be a victim.

What is attractive about resource-based businesses is that they're broadly predictable, meaning that an industry that sells its product for less than the cost of production in a bear market, in liquidation, has set the stage for its own recovery. And if you have the courage to buy the sector when the sector is in fact in liquidation, you are setting up for a very predictable recovery. Volatility similarly can be attractive if you're psychologically equipped to benefit from it rather than being victimized by it. If you have some sense of value, what volatility does is it means the asset that you have a sense in— a sense about the value of goes on sale periodically. Sometimes extremely deep sales. But if your own orientation is not value-oriented and isn't disciplined, and if you aren't by nature a contrarian, the resource-based businesses are a great place to stay out of.

Now let's dial back to the point in time in the early part of the— the early part of the last decade that you talked about. The resource-based businesses had been, by one measure, in a 5-year bear market. In another measure by a 20-year bear market that began really in the early '80s after the bull market of the 1970s. So expectations for natural resource investments were extremely low. Markets move because you exceed expectation, and the expectations were so low that you couldn't help but exceed them.

Private placements in small companies in the resource sector meant that you were taking an out-of-favor bet in an out-of-favor sector. You know, a sort of a spectacular combination for contrarian investors. And the performance that one enjoyed by having the courage to participate when nobody else wanted to participate was spectacular.

We syndicated a private placement partnership— that is, an aggregation of capital— that took part in numerous private placements. It was called Exploration Capital Partners 2000. And if my memory serves me correctly, that partnership generated a 22-to-1 return for investors over 7 years. My best effort, by the way, to date. It had to do precisely with, as Buffett would say, being brave when others are afraid and afraid when others are brave.

And let me tell you one more story to illustrate things. Talking about conferences. In the early part of the decade, the last decade, when resources were unpopular, it was fairly difficult to get an audience, although the rewards that the audience enjoyed were spectacular. Later on in 2006, at similar conferences, after the thesis had been proved, I was in fact so popular That at one conference— by the way, popular when I had very little remaining utility because the sector was so popular— I had one occasion where I was a keynote speaker in San Francisco. I had consumed a bit too much coffee before I went on the podium, and by the end of my speech, the need to release the coffee was extraordinary. And rather than taking questions, I sort of exited from the stage to the men's room, and I was followed into the men's room by 30 or 40 people, uh, normally polite people, who were so overcome by the greed engendered in a bull market that they formed semicircles behind me firing questions while I went around my business.

It's interesting that the demand for information and contrarian topics is the least when the information is most valuable and is, of course, most intense when the information is the most dangerous.

Erik Townsend: That's a great story. And you definitely have a reputation as being quite a character. I remember another story, I think from another trade show. You had given your talk, probably a keynote, because you're kind of big man on campus at a lot of these natural resource events. And you took your suit off, put your blue jeans on, and went to check out the trade show. And there's one particularly confident fellow who just knew he would be successful. Tell us why.

Rick Rule: Well, that was highly amusing. And as you suggest, I had been a speaker and I had then gone into civilian clothes wandering around the exhibitors. And there was a particularly aggressive salesman, you know, the type, white shoe, you know, yellow tie, good-looking, very voluble. And he had great lateral moves like a linebacker. I couldn't get around him.

And I started listening and he was just going on and on about all the work they were going to do, all the money they were going to spend, all the exploration they were going to do. And I, you know, sort of decided to humor myself, and I said, you know, this is all very aggressive and very impressive. All of this is going to take a lot of money.

Can you talk to me about money? And I remember his opening line, well, the money doesn't matter. I was thinking, well, that's interesting. My money matters. But I played along. I said, how's that? This should happen to everybody once in their life. The young gentleman replied, well, there's a very well-known— Hott, I think was his name— West Coast broker. broker by the name of Rick Rule, uh, myself, who was going to give this guy all the money he needed. And the—

Erik Townsend: Oh, he has an unlimited, uh, blank check from Rick Rule?

Rick Rule: Yeah, basically. And he said the opportunity here is that my stock is selling at 50 cents now, but Rick feels that there's a reputational disadvantage to 50-cent stocks. And when the stock gets to $2, he'll finance me. And that was a bit more I could take. I got my wallet out, got my driver's license out, and said, listen, I know this Rick Rule fella pretty well, and the probability of you getting any money at any price, much less $2, is way south of slim.

It teaches you, I think, in all speculative realms, that a market where good salesmen can paint dreams on pieces of paper And trade them for specie is a very, very dangerous place.

Private placements and warrants versus ETFs; debt structures

Erik Townsend: So, Rick, I think that most of our audience is already sold on the idea that long-term gold is definitely a buy, whether or not the bottom's in or yet. Maybe different people have a different view, but, you know, it's headed higher. A lot of people just think, look at this as ETFs. Could be GLD, could be the Sprott ETFs, which are excellent products as well. But why would an accredited investor who doesn't have to invest in retail products choose to do anything else? And the way I would look at this is, it's so easy to buy an ETF, whether it's one of your Sprott ETFs or one of the other ones. Why in the world would I get involved in something like a private placement or any of the other work that you guys offer?

Rick Rule: The cyclicality and volatility of gold and gold equities markets, and the lack of an equitable distribution of information, is why private placement and PIPE investing can be preferable for sophisticated investors to an ETF product. Smaller companies in a volatile sector like gold outperform on the upside. And the important part of a private placement is that the private placement, if properly constructed, in addition to giving you shares, gives you warrants. Warrants being the right but not the obligation to buy more shares at a fixed price.

If the capital that you have contributed to a company is the sort of catalytic infusion which changes the company's ability to profit from the increase in gold price, by providing that catalytic capital, if you have the warrant, you get an extra dose of the benefit relative to everybody else.

Now, the truth is, in small company investing, in venture capital investing, in private placement investing, the whole process is highly risky. The expectation If you invest in 10 private placements, is that you're going to lose money on 3 or 4 or 5. You're going to break even on a couple, and almost all of your gain is going to come in 1 or 2. By magnifying the gain with the warrants, which are the chief attractiveness of private placements, what can happen is that a 10-bagger— that is, a tenfold increase in one stock— can be magnified by the warrants to become a 15 or a 17-bagger.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Rick Rule: 17-fold increase.

And a 17-fold increase in one company in a 10-company portfolio can generate returns that hide the sin in the rest of the portfolio and still leave a very attractive margin left over for the investor.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so to summarize what we're talking about here, private equity means getting into companies before they go public. And unfortunately, Rick and I don't make the rules, but we do have to follow These are investments that are not available to retail investors. Institutional investors, high net worth individuals, people who meet the definition of an accredited investor are allowed to do this.

You're saying that the principal benefit, as you perceive it, is you can structure that deal. It's not buy a share for X amount of money. It's buy a share for X amount of money that comes for free with an opportunity to buy another share for an agreed amount of money. It's like you bought a call option and a share, but you only paid for the share. Is that essentially the, the summary of what you're saying?

Rick Rule: That's absolutely correct. And by the way, it isn't just pre-public. You often have the opportunity to do that after companies are public, and sometimes at a discount, occasionally at a substantial discount to the existing public market price of the company.

Erik Townsend: I definitely want to come back to PIPEs because the PIPE mechanism most people don't understand at all, even professionals. I've invested in a PIPE fund before. I want to come back to that, but let's finish out with when you say a private placement, most people would assume you're talking about, you said a share and a warrant, so we're talking about stock and a warrant. I know at least in my industry in software, a lot of angel investors prefer to work from convertible debt. They would much rather have that company owe them debt that they can actually sue against and then convert it to equity once they've seen the company actually succeed.

Rick Rule: Right.

Erik Townsend: Is that same kind of model applicable to natural resource investing? Does that come into play?

Rick Rule: Absolutely. You need to structure an instrument, be it equity, convertible debt, or straight debt, that suits both the investor and the company that is looking to raise money. I've been active for 20 or 25 years in privately placed debt and privately placed convertible debt. The beauty of that is depending on how well you know the collateral, you are participating in a reward transfer but not a risk transfer.

If you are a debt investor, anytime you're an investor in early-stage companies, you subject yourself to the upside story from the promoter, from the insiders. When you're a debt investor, you have to say to the company, this is interesting, Interesting, but not relevant. You get the upside, I don't. I want to get paid back with an agreeable internal rate of return.

But the important thing to note about that is that while your upside is somewhat limited, if you structure the investment correctly, you can take away most of your downside.

One illustration of that has been the recent Sprott performance, where in our debt portfolio, privately structured debt we've generated a 5-year compound internal rate of return of almost 20% annualized, where the underlying equities as measured by the Toronto Stock Exchange Junior Resource Index is almost— is off by almost 90% in the same period. So the delta between the median market performance, which is off 90% over 5 years, and the lending experience experience at Sprott, which is a 20% compound internal rate of return, is very striking.

Rule's own portfolio and alignment of interests

Erik Townsend: Okay. So, in terms of Rick Rule wants for your own money to— you say you think gold has turned around. You think gold's in a bull market. You've got a lot of your own assets. To what extent do you invest in the public market versus private markets? Is this something that you do on a 50/50 basis? Is it something that you think people who are able to should focus on private markets? How would you address that?

Rick Rule: Well, Erik, I've been very fortunate. I've taken a lot of risks in my life. I've saved fairly religiously. I have a reasonably high net worth. So I'm actually speculating to make money now, not to sustain my family. The consequence of that is that my own portfolio has come to resemble a barbell.

On one side, I have very, very, very low risk. Investments with a lot of stability but fairly low and predictable internal rates of return. And on the other hand, I have very, very, very risky investments. In terms of my own resource portfolio, my portfolio now is skewed much more aggressively to the high-risk, high-reward private placement markets and away from the general securities market.

Markets. At Sprott, where we manage money for all nature of investors, of course the majority of the money that we manage is skewed towards less speculative debt and equity markets and natural resources. But you asked the question with regards to me personally, and with regards to me personally, New Capital in particular is overwhelmingly oriented towards higher Higher reward private placement debt and equity.

Erik Townsend: And if I understand your business, essentially what you're doing is you're taking your personal skill and knowledge and saying, I'm going to figure out what I, Rick Rule, want to invest in personally. But I don't have billions of dollars personally that, that's needed to— if I meet a guy who's a really brilliant rock head and he's going to just nail it with this next mine, I can't finance that whole thing. Your company basically sells investments that allow people to invest alongside you. Is it true that you personally are investing in all of these deals, or are there some that you're maybe selling to people that aren't quite as smart as you, that don't pick the good ones?

Rick Rule: Well, certainly in every aggregated investment, that is partnerships that we put together that we manage over the 5 or 10-year period of time, or non-public single asset private placements where we would buy an interest in an oil field or an interest in a pipeline. I personally subscribe for 10% of the interest in every one of those private placements.

In addition to that, Sprott probably originates $200-$250 million a year in private debt and equity transactions. Where permissible, I participate in those. Securities laws and I would say a moral obligation mean means with regards to private placement where we're acting as agent in the private placement. If the private placement is oversubscribed by clients, then Sprott and Sprott personnel are prohibited from competing with clients in the placement.

So I think you need to differentiate Sprott-managed products where we are raising money from investors to invest alongside of us in a process that might take 5 or 10 years. I always own 10% of the partnerships or the investment vehicles that we syndicate. Where we are operating as originators and agents raising either debt or equity for companies on a one-off basis, we always guarantee the offering, meaning that we always guarantee as a company and individually to subscribe for all of the unsubscribed interest in the private placement. But there are circumstances where the demand for the issue from clients is large enough that we aren't allowed to participate in the offering. Clients come first.

Erik Townsend: Okay. But from an investor's perspective, I feel pretty comfortable with that. My immediate skepticism of any kind of private offering is there's no free market price discovery. I have to trust your expertise and your honesty to tell me whether or not the valuation that we're negotiating is fair and reasonable. And I don't have that knowledge and expertise. I want you in the deal. I want you to be at risk of losing more than I am, or else I'm not going to pursue it. And, you know, that answer satisfies me that you're trying to be in the deal unless there's no room.

Rick Rule: Absolutely. The other thing, as I think I mentioned at the outset, is with regards to our own proprietary offerings, the compensation is always on the European plan, meaning that we get paid on the back end. We get paid to succeed. Many sponsors get performance fees on performance that accrues.

We only get performance fees on performance that occurs, meaning after the investor has received his or her money back with the agreed-upon priority rate of return, we get some of the surplus, if any. A much fairer structure for investors.

Erik Townsend: And I would definitely encourage our listeners who may not have experience with these kind of investments, you absolutely have to look very carefully for conflicts of interest. And, you know, you are doing 2 things. You are selling investments to help investors to be successful. You're also helping these resource companies to raise assets. There is the potential for conflict of interest. And, you know, it's very important for an investor to very carefully evaluate that.

To my thinking, the single most important measure of conflict of interest is not how persuasive you can tell me this great argument about why it's safe. It's whether or not you're putting your own money on the line. And that's what says it to me. So, I think you've got a pretty good story there. I want to come back, though, to, you know, we're talking about these early-stage companies that have not gone public yet.

PIPE transactions and a caution about PIPE funds

Erik Townsend: So, This whole benefit of the— boy, you're saying you can buy these early-stage companies. They're not public yet. So for the price of the share, you get the share and the warrant that lets you get the next share at a discount. You're getting a free call option. There's this huge discount that you're buying. But of course, most investors assume the rules are once a company goes public, you can't do that anymore because public companies are only traded on stock exchanges. That's simply not true. There's something called a PIPE transaction.

Explain what it is, how it works.

Rick Rule: A PIPE is an acronym for Private Investment in Public Equity, meaning that you are doing a new private offering in a company that's already public. The attraction to the company of that is that private offerings are often much cheaper for them to complete than public offerings. The attraction to the investor is that you participate at a pre-negotiated price. Often you can buy a large position in a private offering where that— a position of that size wouldn't be available easily in the public market. But more importantly, of course, you have the ability, if you negotiate well, to acquire the warrant that we talked about earlier in the discussion.

It's worth noting Noting that one thing that we joke about in the private equity business in terms of pre-public is that IPO itself is often an acronym for it's probably overpriced. And the advantage of a PIPE offering over participation in a private company is, first of all, the certainty that the stock you buy is going to trade, that it will come public, because it's already public.

But in a market like the market that we're in today in resource-based businesses, where the appropriate index for small-cap resource issuers is off by 90%, what you are often doing is buying assets that you're familiar with at a dime on the dollar— the type of investment that doesn't happen in the pre-public market.

When you have an echo market, that is a market that is starting to come back after having suffered severe price deterioration, the PIPE market is vastly, vastly preferable to the pre-public market because you are buying assets that have been benefited with capital raised in prior public offerings at extraordinary discounts.

Erik Townsend: And it truly— I think most CEOs of small companies, it's often companies that maybe went public a little bit too early. They need more money. They just cannot do a secondary public offering. They don't even realize that this is available. I just feel a responsibility, Rick, to say something if we're covering this topic. Obviously, I respect you as an honorable, high-integrity kind of guy, or I never would have invited you on this program.

If we look at the world of hedge funds, that focus specifically on the PIPE strategy, and I would go so far as to say specifically on exploiting the financial naivety of relatively inexperienced CEOs. I would just caution our listeners that PIPE deals, especially if you are on the company that needs to be funded side, you need to look very carefully at the reputation and integrity of the people that you're dealing with. Some of the The guys that run PIPE funds are there to very aggressively exploit and use and abuse their customers. They often make a deal and then short your stock in order to really rip you off. So if you are going to consider a PIPE deal as an investor, it's a fantastic deal for the investor. It can be a fantastic deal for the company if you don't get taken. Rick's a good guy. Not everybody is. I just felt that we needed to say that.

And I'm guessing I'm guessing you would agree with that.

Rick Rule: Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, frankly, on both sides, for the investor, you need to make sure that the jockey, the person that's allocating your capital, is a very sober investor who understands the ins and outs of extractive industries. I think it was Mark Twain once, who once defined a miner as a liar standing next to a hole in the ground. And while that's probably too broad a statement, the truth is anytime Anytime that you're in a business where you can monetize other people's dreams, where you can paint dreams on a piece of paper and trade them for specie, you do attract a reasonable number of bad actors.

How investors engage: mindset and the uranium example

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I think the PIPE space is particularly attractive to them. So let's look at this from the standpoint— suppose that I'm an accredited investor, whether I'm a high net worth individual, a family office, or whatever. This story sounds really interesting. My status as an accredited investor The trade-off, of course, if I'm buying this investment that only I can buy, that means that I can't sell it to anybody other than another accredited investor. So, from a liquidity standpoint, I'm probably in it for a reasonably long haul. Sounds good, but I'm a rich guy. I enjoy my yachting and my golf course. I don't want to go and travel all around Zimbabwe and Mongolia looking at gold mines. It sounds like a lot of due diligence is in these things. So how does a private investor or a small institution like a family office typically interface with your industry? Is it something where they get confident with you and allocate a certain amount of capital and you just manage it?

Or do you present deals to them on an individual basis and they make individual investments in private placements? How— if I were someone who had a lot of experience trading in public markets, I am accredited, I am eligible to do this, how would it look to me? What would it— what would the structure be?

Rick Rule: Private placement investing is a bit risky and it requires a certain mindset. So I would advise investors who are thinking about the sector to be prepared to spend some time and be prepared to educate themselves enough so that they're prepared to make non-emotional decisions. To handle volatility and to handle cyclicality.

Certainly it isn't in the interest of most generalist investors to invest the time and treasure to be able to do all of the due diligence competently themselves. It is in their interest to understand enough about the sector so that when we describe the processes that we employ on their behalf, they become comfortable the themselves with the process. But you know, a lot of this has to do with common sense.

If I describe an investment to you, and let's say that the headline is uranium, and I say to you, on a global basis, we sell uranium for $34 a pound, but it costs us $60 a pound to make it, including the cost of capital. Therefore, over 5 or 6 years, there's 2 possible outcomes.

The price of uranium goes up or the lights go out. There's 2 different types of investors. There's one who sees the attractiveness of a business that's in liquidation. There's another who, when they hear the word uranium, thinks Hiroshima and Nagasaki and doesn't understand that the fact that the industry is in liquidation guarantees the fact that the price of uranium is going to go up. Right. Up.

It's the investor who takes the time to shape his or her paradigm that will do well in industries that require a contrarian orientation, a value orientation. For investors who are more narrative-oriented than fact-oriented, for investors who are more interested in social trends than arithmetic, they should avoid the natural resources sector So the time and treasure that's required is really time and treasure that an investor spends on their own psyche and their own process.

We don't expect investors to duplicate the investment that we make, about $3.5 million a year currently, in information acquisition. We don't expect them to hire their own geologists and their own engineers. What we do expect them to do is condition themselves mentally to the process. processes that will allow us to act successfully for them in contrarian, volatile, cyclical industries.

Learning resources and Sprott retail products

Erik Townsend: Okay, Rick, let's suppose that some of our listeners who are accredited high-net-worth individuals, family offices, what have you, are compelled by this and want to move forward. The first advice I would give them is don't. If you are looking at making your first private equity investment, investments and you've never done it before, my strongest advice is learn about it first. And yes, there is a huge benefit in terms of being able to invest in private equity, which non-accredited investors can't do. That benefit is derived by people who do their homework and learn how this stuff works. And I just feel a sense of responsibility. I'm trying to think of a book or something, Rick. I would love to see people pursue these things. I think the idea, especially of PIPE deals where you can literally take a company that is trading on a stock exchange and has a listed price and buy shares at a discount to the quoted price.

It seems like that shouldn't be legal, but it is. And it's a great deal for the investor. Sometimes it's a good deal for the company. Boy, I don't want to see our listeners doing that unless we can find a book for them to read or some source of more information than just a 45-minute podcast. Where do we send them?

Rick Rule: Well, 4 sources. Ground yourself in investing first. The Intelligent Investor by Ben Graham is a great place to start. I'll give you some more book reviews later after you start there. The second place with regards to specific information about natural resources is our website, www.sprottglobal.com. There are about 200 hours of educational material on that site, including something called the Mining Investment College that we did in conjunction with the Colorado School of Mines for accredited investors.

The third thing would be to subscribe to Sprott's Thoughts, a blog that comes out that has the best minds at Sprott and the best minds that we can acquire elsewhere. I guarantee your listeners will get their money's worth because it's absolutely free. But finally, we enjoy educating and talking to people. Investors should feel free to contact me directly one of two ways: rrule@sprottglobal.com by email, or if the investor lives in the United States or Canada, by calling me directly toll-free at 800-477-7853. Because the best advice is bespoke advice, and what strategy is appropriate to an investor is a subject that deals with the investor

Erik Townsend: Couldn't possibly agree more. And, you know, my advice— we have a lot of people that have asked us among our listeners to do a gold show. We have a lot of accredited investors asking for that. My advice to accredited investors is, if you think that gold has turned the corner, which a lot of people do— I'm not quite sure yet myself, but I think it's close. If we're not— if we haven't seen the bottom, we're awfully close to it.

My advice is, learn as much as you can do. This is not something to go invest in. This is something to go learn a lot more about. And I think that's a great point. The opportunities in the private equity space are extremely compelling, as are the risks, and it definitely requires education. Before we close, Rick, is there anything— I guess I do want to give you a chance. We do have still a retail audience. I hate to leave our poor retail guys who are not allowed to invest in this stuff. Sprott has plenty of offerings for them. If you want ETFs, what's available? What's in the Sprott universe for the retail audience?

Rick Rule: Yeah, we have a vast number of retail offerings. In the first instance, if you think that gold is going to go up and you want to buy the gold itself, buying the Sprott-certificated product, the PHYS, is vastly superior, we believe, to the competitive ETFs for 2 reasons. The Sprott product isn't structured as an ETF, so we don't buy and sell gold, which means that all of our assets is physical metal. We never take depository receipts, which the ETF has to do.

The second reason, of course, that's structured as a trust, if you make money on the underlying investment in the United States, you're taxed at the capital gains rate rather than the ordinary income tax rate, which can make a substantial difference. With regard to the equities, our own equity ETF we think is superior to the industry-leading ETF because our ETF is factors-based where theirs is market cap weighted. They buy just based on size. We buy based on factors, things like profit margin, things like EBITDA to enterprise value, and in product— in particular, revenue growth. We're looking for companies that are increasing their production rather than decreasing their production, people that offer leverage to the gold price now and will continue to offer leverage to the gold price 5 years from now. The symbol there is SGDM for the major gold companies and SGDJ for the small-cap gold companies.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. So you've got a broad offering for retail and for our accredited investors. They can call you directly or email you at rrule@sprottglobal.com.

Rick Rule: I really, really thank you for the high quality of questions that you've given me and the opportunity to address your audience today.

Erik Townsend: Rick, as we close, I can't thank you enough.

Rick Rule: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: Rick, thank you enough for a fantastic interview. I really think it's probably been of interest to our listeners. It sounds like you do have a broad range of products for our retail audience at Sprott, but more importantly, if our accredited investors are interested in the gold space, in gold equities, I definitely think that looking at your opportunities in the private equity space is tremendously compelling. But boy, it's not something to go invest in tomorrow. It's something to go learn a whole lot more about. Give Rick a call. Call or start wherever you like. I think it's something that definitely warrants your consideration.

Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Accredited investor definition and proposed reform

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Welcome back. Most of this interview was specifically designed for our accredited investor audience, as that's our primary focus here at MacroVoices. But we need to clearly define that term. I know it's a regulatory thing, but please, Erik, explain what it means and where did that term even come from?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, this is one of the few cases where I can really give the U.S. government a lot of credit for doing something really smart and right halfway, and then they totally screwed it up. You get a problem, which is that the investment world is full of con men and scumbags and sleazeballs, and the SEC needs to protect retail investors, naive retail investors, from being taken by these guys. And so they have all kinds of rules to protect you. Those rules can get in the way of your— of a sophisticated investor doing business with someone they want to. So what the rule is, what the law says is that if you are not a sophisticated, what's called an accredited investor, then you're not allowed to invest in hedge funds, private equity, private placements, all of these investment categories that really require some due diligence, where somebody could be just plain old ripping you off.

The SEC, for your own protection, and I think it's a good rule, does not allow people who have very little knowledge to invest in such things. But they do say, for an accredited investor, someone who knows what they're doing, they should have the right to do whatever they want and the government should be out of the way. Nice libertarian value. I feel great about this story so far. I feel proud of the government for having it.

Then it comes to implement that. How do you decide who's smart and who's not? The answer, according to the government, is how much money they have. So, this is a true fact. Let's suppose Suppose that you are a nail technician from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and like, you talk like this, and you don't know anything about, like, finance, and you just won the Tri-State Mega Bucks. Well, you're an accredited investor. You're sophisticated. You're allowed to invest in hedge funds and private placements and so forth, because you're a sophisticated investor based on your assets, according to the SEC.

Now, let's consider another investor. The person is a senior, let's say the head of the economics department at Columbia University, holds 2 PhDs in economics and another MBA, and is also a Nobel laureate in economics. That guy is prohibited by law from investing in a hedge fund or private placement or any other kind of accredited investment, because he is presumed, if he has less than a million dollars, to be not sophisticated enough to understand the risks that might be inherent to this. The basic premise of this rule Keep people out of trouble if they need to be kept out of trouble. Stay out of the way of people that don't need that help. I could not possibly agree with that more. Deciding who is smart enough to understand risks based on how much money they have, that's just crazy. It doesn't make any sense.

Nathan Egger: If that doesn't make any sense, then what should it be? How would, how would you change things?

Erik Townsend: Oh, if I was in charge, and if anybody from SEC is listening, believe me, I would— nothing would honor me more. Than to be contracted by the SEC to design a curriculum called the Accredited Investor Class, which you have to pass the test. I would imagine a test approximately on the same scale of complexity and difficulty as, say, the FINRA Series 65, which is the Investment Advisor Representative Test, which I've taken. I think something about that complicated, but not that subject matter. Subject matter entirely on how not to How to get screwed, how to watch out for yourself, and so forth. And I think every single human being, regardless of their asset level, should have an equal right to take that test. And those who pass it ought to have the right to tell the SEC to stay the hell out of what their investment decisions are. I would love nothing more than to be involved with that.

I have a certain passion, having been frankly screwed over by Wall Street when I was a naive high net worth investor, having sold my software company. I would love to help people learn how to be good accredited investors. And that's a big reason that we produce this show. But right now, the way the rules work, the definition of how smart you are is your bank statement.

What 'overhang' means

Nathan Egger: Now, in the introduction, you mentioned that most of our listeners might not know what overhang refers to in regards to a stock. I certainly don't. So, I think you're probably on the right track. So, you guys never technically defined that. Could you help us out?

Erik Townsend: Yes, a lot of things, the internals of the stock market that most most investors don't understand. And I learned about this when I sold my software company. Overhang refers to how many guys like the founders of the company have a whole bunch of new wealth that they're not used to having and can't wait to spend it and just got a bunch of restricted stock. So in other words, it was a private company, either the company went public, the company got acquired, one way or another, there are people who have a whole bunch of this company's stock.

It is basically a windfall to them. They were never rich before, and now they are. The thing they want to do is sell that stock, but they can't, because usually most of these deals, if it's a public offering, the founders are not allowed to sell their stock for a certain period after the public offering. If it's an acquisition where a public company acquired your company, you as the founder of the acquired company got a whole bunch of stock stock in the acquiring company in exchange for selling them your company, that stock is restricted. You're not allowed to sell it.

When that restriction runs out, you're gonna sell it. You would be stupid not to, because if nothing else, you just want to diversify. You've got 100% of your assets in whoever this company that just acquired your business is. You want to diversify into other things.

A very, very important thing that you can find out from public data on any stock is, you know, what acquisitions have these guys How many shares did they pay to who, and what are the dates on those? There are dates on any stock where certain guys have zillions of shares, you know, hundreds of thousands of shares or millions of shares that they're not allowed to sell, and there's a certain date on which they're allowed to start selling it. That's a day that there's going to be selling pressure in that stock. What an incredible opportunity to analyze what's going to happen to stocks just based on guys getting rich, obviously wanting to diversify out of whatever they were just acquired into. Almost nobody looks at that. I learned about it from the investment bankers that handled the acquisition of my software company.

Erik on PIPE funds: risks to entrepreneurs and investors

Nathan Egger: And at another point, you suddenly seemed to feel a need to protect our listeners from some evil force when Rick brought up the PIPE investment mechanism. You went out of your way to acknowledge that Rick is an honorable guy and you wouldn't have invited him on the program otherwise. But dude, sounds like your opinion of others in the PIPE financing business isn't quite as high as Rick's is. How about elaborating for our listeners on what that was all about?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, I didn't know Rick was going to bring up PIPE transactions. It caught me a little bit by surprise. I am embarrassed to say that I have been an investor in a PIPE fund before because I didn't understand that much about them. Most of what I can tell you, I think you're asking about investor risk, but I want to start with entrepreneur risks, because frankly, I think a lot of our MacroVoices listeners are entrepreneurs who are preparing to eventually sell their companies or to go public or so forth.

The PIPEs guys are basically in the business, and I don't mean Rick in the natural resources space. There's a lot of reasons that what he said makes sense. I'm talking about, let's say you're a doctor, you started a medical devices company because you invented some cool pacemaker thing. You went public earlier than you should have because you met another sleazy investment banker who just wanted to make fees taking you public when it didn't make sense.

Right. Now you can't raise any money because it's very, very hard for a public company to raise any kind of debt money in private markets. You gotta go do a secondary public offering and you can't do it because it costs too much and you're screwed. You are stuck. Your company has got maybe great prospects, but you cannot get any more financing. Basically, the way you got here, with all due respect, is you're being taken by finance guys who know that entrepreneurs like you, the doctor who invented the pacemaker, They see you coming. They know how to play you. They make you feel really good about your company and how great it is. They exploit the fact that you don't understand the warrants. They basically make what would be too good of a deal for you. It's a really fantastic deal for you. And oh, by the way, there's these warrant things that you don't really understand too that come into it.

Now, so far on the face of it, even with the warrants, maybe you can live with it.

Maybe you're smart and you do understand the warrants. What you don't know is how sleazy the guys in that business are, what their reputation is. What they do, if they can get away with it, they negotiate with the guy who's running the company, with the CEO, and say, look, we can basically, you know, you're going to have to give us a small discount below what your stock is trading at in the public market, and that's our profit. You can't blame us for wanting that profit. It's a small one. It's a very small discount below the public price. You'll also give us this warrant, and don't worry, it's just technical stuff that us finance understand. Don't worry about that. And, you know, it's going to be a great deal. Well, it's a way to get financing. You're the doctor. You don't understand all this high finance stuff. You just want your company to be successful. Okay, I'll take that deal.

What you didn't realize is you just signed a contract where they're going to set your valuation of your deal based on the average price of the stock during some period in the future, starting next Tuesday and for 3 weeks after that. You were not astute enough to think about how sleazy these guys are. You didn't know that as soon as Tuesday comes, they are going to aggressively short your stock and intentionally crash it. This is the guy you just signed up to help you. He's helping you finance your company. What is the first action he takes? He crashes your stock and he doesn't tell you he's doing that. You panic. You call him up and you say, oh my God, well, we made this deal. It was based on this call option. That you described, we're going to go by the stock price during this period, but the stock price during this period is suddenly not what anybody expected.

We have to call the deal off. No, it's not not what anybody expected. It's exactly what he designed, because the whole thing is a scam designed to take advantage of inexperienced CEOs who don't understand finance. It's a rip-off. It is the only investment ever in my life— I made money on that.

I made more than a 30% return being invested in a PIPE fund I had heard originally that there were some ethical questions about PIPE funds I thought it was just the idea that you're buying stock for less than a guy who's could you know a regular retail guy has to pay the the quoted price on the stock exchange. You're getting a discount below that because you're an accredited investor. That seems kind of unfair to the retail guy. I thought that was the extent of the ethical argument. I had no idea how incredibly sleazy. These guys can be. I want to be clear though, I haven't mentioned the fund I was invested in. I don't know that the fund I invested in did all this stuff. When I learned that PIPE funds in general do these things, even despite having made a 30% return, I got out of that investment because I just didn't feel good about what may be happening to entrepreneurs like myself.

And I don't walk away from a 30% a year return investment over ethical objections unless my ethical objections are pretty strong. I don't know that the fund I was in was engaging in this stuff, but I've learned that these PIPE funds, they exist to rip off naive CEOs. Now, what Rick was talking about was a different use. He's talking about an entirely valid use of that PIPE mechanism. He's not talking about being one of these guys I'm talking about. So don't think it's a criticism of Rick.

In terms of investor risks, let's suppose that your ethical concern is not as strong. You think 30% return What fund was that, Erik? I want to invest in that one. Here's what you need to think about. Inherently, as Rick described, the reason a PIPE deal makes sense is because of the warrants you get out of it. That's where the upside is for the investor.

If you're investing in a hedge fund that holds illiquid warrants, those are not Level 1 assets. They're not traded in a market. The value of the warrants is determined by the hedge fund's own staff. They have a valuation committee. Inside the hedge fund, no conflict of interest there, where they decide what they think the assets they're holding are really worth, even though they're not liquid and it's not possible to sell them to anyone on any market. So basically, you can very easily manipulate your returns. You can show on your tear sheet that you're making 5 or 10% a month. In reality, all you're doing is overstating the value of these warrants. And all you need to do that is just a good Excel model that's complicated enough that nobody Nobody can figure it out.

These things generally always have liquidity gates, and that means there's a situation where as soon as a lot of investors want to get out of that fund, they want to get out at the same time. Well, gee, we can sell the stock we've got, but we can't sell the warrants because the warrants are not liquid investments. So even though, trust us, your investment really is worth that million dollars that it says on your statement, we can't give it back to you right now. And by the way, you signed some fine print in your investment.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: your subscription, agreeing to something called a liquidity gate, which says all we have to do is make an announcement that nobody's allowed to have their money back. And as long as we make that announcement equally and we don't allow any investor to have their money back, it's legal and you don't have to like it.

So, there's a lot that can go wrong. I'm not saying there's anything wrong at all with the private investment in public equity mechanism in the sense that a guy like Rick could use it in a responsible way.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Anyway, there are sleazy people in the world that really do sleazy things around that investment mechanism. And I just caution that people be very careful with it.

Nathan Egger: So, I hope that helps to clarify the complicated world filled with pitfalls. But folks, in the interest of time, we're going to forego the usual back and forth reflections between Erik and I on today's interview in order to make time for something much more important, or at least we consider it to be more important. And that's Erik's call to Art Berman in in which Erik and Art will reconsider their predictions from February based on the recent developments in the crude oil market. As promised, that's coming up next as MacroVoices continues right after this.

Art Berman: why the Cushing builds failed

Announcer: Now back to your host, hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Petroleum geologist Art Berman joins me for a special interview segment next on MacroVoices. Art was kind enough to share a fantastic Fantastic new presentation that he's developed, full of up-to-date graphs and charts about the oil market. That has already been emailed to all registered MacroVoices.com users, so it should already be in your inbox by the time you're listening to this interview.

Art, back in February, you and I both predicted a number of things. We predicted that the market would eventually balance itself after U.S. production declines, but that'll take at least 6 months or so. We thought that there was a very, very high risk of an outright crash in WTI crude oil in the interim, and the reason is we feared a storage crisis developing in Cushing, Oklahoma. That is, of course, the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, and it is a place that is filling up quickly. Initially, we were very much proven right. Huge inventory builds— 10.5 million barrels added in one week 3 times the highest analyst expectations, really, really looked like our view was playing out. Shockingly, on that day that we had the 10.5 million barrel build, the market still closed higher. How could that possibly be? I think everybody was just completely absorbed in this production freeze rhetoric, which we think is nonsense.

But the point is, the prices moved higher. Now what we're starting to see is a small trend of drawdown. In that Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, which is so critical, and we were looking for big builds. What's going on here, Art?

Art Berman: Erik, I think there's a lot going on. To try to simplify it, though, the essence of it is, is the following: based on fundamentals alone, there is very little reason for the price rally that we've seen since late January. I can, you know, I can find a couple of odds and ends here and there, particularly in the last few weeks, that suggest that there is something going on with inventories in the United States that might turn into something interesting. But as yet, I'd have to say it's too fragmentary, and it certainly doesn't explain the whole thing.

So what I think is happening is the market is pretty smart about figuring out when there's a problem down the road. And we had— IEA came to Houston for the Cambridge Energy Research Associates meeting, made a big deal about how we really need to look out for dwindling supply, all this underinvestment. We've underinvested for 2 years, that's going to come back and bite us. And I think that, that probably, you know, set off a certain amount of thinking and speculation. And I think the main thing that's happening here— yeah, the Doha meeting is certainly a piece of it— but I think that there's now this kind of medium-term concern that there's just not going to be enough supply.

And that's, I think, That's what's kind of been driving things. That's what has caused a lot of big things that we would have thought would have made a difference in prices, normal kinds of things. They didn't have that impact. The Doha meeting turned out to be nothing, as I think we both thought it would. Should have had a couple-of-dollar effect on oil prices, did for a few hours. By the end of the day, Brent was flat and WTI was You know, just down 40 or 50 cents. So that's what I think is going on.

However, what I see is that I look a lot at something called comparative inventories. Now, comparative inventories is simply looking at the current stock level, the current storage level, and comparing it with a moving average of a certain number of weeks over the last 5 years. I think this is a The most powerful tool to try to understand certainly WTI, if not global prices. And what I see is that Cushing comparative inventory has been falling since the first week in January, and falling pretty impressively. Now, we don't see that for overall U.S. crude. We don't see that for Gulf Coast or PADD 3. We only see it at Cushing.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: But I can go back and I look at the price rally that happened in March through June of 2015, see a real strong Cushing drop in comparative inventory. Even the weird price rally in late August that lasted until early November, same thing. What I'm seeing right now is stronger than either of those.

So, what I'm saying is that we got this kind of medium-term to long-term concern about supply, and things are freeing up at Cushing. I agree completely with, you know, your, your statement earlier. It doesn't mean we're using more oil, we're just moving it somewhere else. But I think that's, that's the simplest answer that I can provide.

Pipelining out of Cushing and the Houston Ship Channel thesis

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that that's a very important point, though, that we're not using more oil, we're moving it somewhere else. This is like a calculus problem, you know, where there's the 2 cones and which one's going to run out of water Because if you can just hold over by moving oil someplace else for 6 months, you and I have both predicted the market's going to balance itself in that 6 months on natural factors anyway. So the question is, can they be creative enough to take what was looking like an imminent Cushing storage crisis— and I emphasize the word crisis— can they be creative about pipelining that oil out of Cushing into PADD 3 other places, and buy enough time to wait for the U.S. production decline to kick in, as everyone is expecting. If that happens, it's entirely possible that we missed the bottom. It's in. And I'll be very disappointed because this was a very high conviction trade for me, probably the highest conviction trade in several years.

But you can never be 100% right. And it looks to me like what's starting to happen here is Because I still think all the factors that were there are there, but maybe we can buy enough time to avert the storage crisis.

I also think the key to this is the way the market sentiment was operating when we did that interview in February. I didn't think we needed a storage crisis in order to crash the market. I think we needed to persuade people that there was a realistic chance that one could occur, and I thought that that fear would capture the market. What we're seeing now is a big change in sentiment. It's going to take hard evidence that something's wrong or this excitement rally is going to continue on momentum. And the way I'm starting to look at it, I think a lot about the weather in the last few weeks, in the closure of the Houston Ship Channel in particular.

There's sort of one last explanation here. And I think especially if you look at what happened on Wednesday of this week, the tape action was very clear. It was about inventory.

Art Berman: Right.

Erik Townsend: We were starting to see correction to the downside. We bounced up off of that, that reaction low to the Doha no meeting. But it looked like maybe it was going to roll over and it was kind of following what on a technical level looked like maybe that was the last top. Then we got the inventory report, DOE. It was a build on inventory, 2.1 million barrels. It wasn't a huge build. That seemed to be the sigh of relief that just sent the market skyrocketing all the way to $44.50.

Art Berman: Wow.

Erik Townsend: So, I think about that and I think, boy, there's at least some people who think that what's happened is the last 2 weeks of arrivals of cargoes into Houston have been delayed. Houston Ship Channel has been certainly closed for most of the last 2 weeks, I think. I'm not sure whether it's reopened. Last I had checked a couple days ago, there were 35 ships waiting to get into port. That inventory doesn't get counted until those ships get into port. So, there's maybe one theory left, and I want to be careful not to be grasping at straws here, which is if we're having artificially depressed inventory reports as a result of slowdowns in ship arrivals into Houston, then when the weather clears and that backlog of all those ships waiting in the Gulf of Mexico deliver their cargoes to Houston, you could see a massive, huge build all in one week. And that could be a big turnaround.

You know way more about this end of things than I do.

So I follow an analyst named Samir Madani who publishes a free oil tanker analysis on Twitter. Samir predicted that this week's build would be light or a draw, and it was, and he expects possibly another draw or light build next week because of the situation with the Houston Ship Channel. My interpretation of Samir's analysis overall is that delayed arrival of tanker ships into Houston could very well explain why we've yet to see the big inventory builds that we both expected. What's your take, Art? Would you concur with that view, or is that grasping at straws for the bears here?

Art Berman: No, I, I don't think that's grasping at straws at all. We've had a lot of— a big bottleneck trying to get into the Houston Ship Channel for, you know, for, for weeks and weeks. And as most people who pay attention to the As those of you who have been following national news understand, Houston just got taken out for the better part of this week by big floods, massive rain, which, by the way, is not over yet.

And so that's just compounding what has been a big problem of, you know, oil from who knows where, Iraq and all kinds of places, trying to get into the United States. So it's been a long-term problem. It's been a long-term problem. I say long-term meaning all year, all of 2016, and it just got a lot worse. And the question is, you know, how quickly does that resolve itself? And I think at this point the weather crisis, the flooding here in Houston is, I would say, largely over.

And at least there's not abandoned cars sitting out on the street trying to get into work.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: But, you know, it's still an issue. So, we have to watch it. But, no, I think those guys are right on. I think that's a big deal. And like you said, the fact that we had a storage build and, you know, prices went up anyway, that tells me this market wants to raise price for any excuse whatsoever.

It's— there's momentum in that direction for who knows I don't know for what reason, and it's going to take something that, you know, that really brings everyone to their senses to cause it to move in the other direction.

Risks to the bearish case; 150-day cycles; steepener

Erik Townsend: You know, Art, as I look at this trade, it seems to me that one of two things has to be true. Either we got it right, those big inventory builds are still coming, they've been delayed because of the Houston Ship Channel situation, and that means that we're going to be proven right, there's going to be a really big move down. And we're going to see probably still lower oil prices. Bottom's not in yet. That's been the scenario that we're talking about. But I think we need to consider the other possibility, which is that there is some unforeseen fundamental driver that you and I have somehow missed, that somehow this rally really wasn't all about the production freeze and the political theater associated with it, and really it was something else. Now, I've looked pretty hard and I can't find it. But as we've done a pretty good job with our analysis, we should consider the possibility that we might have missed something.

So I've looked at this very closely. I know you've been doing a lot of analysis in the last few days. I wonder if there's something nonpublic. You know, we've had funky meetings lately— Obama and Yellen, Obama and King Salman. Could there be something going on politically? Is the invisible hand of government somehow doing something that's not public that's affecting the market?

I worry about these things, but frankly, I think our analysis is pretty darn solid. As I evaluate the current landscape, I don't think an outright short is the effective way to trade this anymore. As I look at what's happened to the term structure, I think a term structure steepener is a much, much better way to play this. At this point, I think it offers a much better asymmetric return profile. I explained the reasons for that earlier in this program. Before we did the interview with Rick Rule. Now, that means that my risk concern is completely changed. I used to think 10 hours a day, what have I not thought of? Where's the upside price risk in crude oil? If we look at a term structure steepener in lieu of an outright short, we don't care about upside price risk because that's not a risk anymore. We care about backwardation risk because that's where you lose on that trade.

Clearly, if we ran out of inventory, that would do it. Well, that's not going to happen.

Art Berman: Right.

Erik Townsend: If there was a war, that would do it. I know how to hedge that though by putting a third leg on that in terms of using a call to hedge it. But what other backwardation risks might I not be thinking of? So I wonder if you have any thoughts specifically on what I might have missed in terms of backwardation risks using a steepener rather than an outright short.

Art Berman: Right. Well, first of all, I think let's, let's put a little context around around being right and wrong on fundamentals. I suppose it's possible to miss something, as you say. I'm not perfect. You're not perfect. But I don't think I've missed anything significant. So, what I'm going to say right now is that looking at the price cycles of the last year, year and a half, What I see is that, for whatever reason these cycles form, they have a period, a term, of about 150 days.

Okay? So, in the case of the 2 big cycles in 2015, we had WTI— WTI went up to $60 and then down to high $30s.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: And then towards the end of the 3rd quarter, it went up again, not quite as high, and crashed way down to almost $26. Those were both about 150-day events.

We're 68 days into the current event, and so that says we're, you know, assuming that it works out the same— there's no saying that it will— we're halfway into it. Okay, so what I would predict is that That this cycle is going to peak, maybe it already has, and it's going to go down. And it's going to go down a lot, and then we'll have another cycle after that. So, I think it's— what I'm saying, Erik, is that I think it's too early to say that we were fundamentally wrong, and I promise that you're going to see lower prices than right now. But as to your question, you know, what could make us wrong?

Short of a war, I, you know, I really— I guess the only thing that could happen is, you know, some sort of other supply interruption. That's the only thing I can imagine. Should the Islamic State somehow move into the oil fields in southern Iraq, that would do it. Should there be some kind of a terrorist action in Saudi Arabia with the pipeline, Or a refinery, that would do it.

Those are the kinds of— I mean, those are, you know, you can put any kind of probability on those you like, and maybe we can say it's low probability in either case, but those are exactly the kind of things that, you know, those are exogenous events that no one can predict. But we should have those in our, you know, in our Our range of possibilities, because it's not as if they're— you know, these guys aren't thinking about doing that. So, but, you know, business as usual kinds of things, no, I don't see it. I, I don't, you know, and even, even so, with the amount of oil we have in storage in the world, and we got more than 3.1 billion barrels in OECD inventories right now, and, you know, you can And you can qualify that all you want and say, okay, well, you know, compared to 5-year averages, you know, that's a mere, you know, 500 or 600 million barrels or something.

But, you know, we've got a lot of days to cover, whether you're talking about OECD or just U.S. And it's gonna, you know, it's gonna take a— it would take an event of fairly unprecedented magnitude Unprecedented magnitude, barring a war.

War, you know, that'll do something like that.

But then you have to think, well, you know, where does US oil come from? And the public thinks that most of our imported oil comes from the Middle East, and that's just not the case. You know, half of our oil imports come from Canada, or almost half. Saudi Arabia counts for, you know, maybe 17% of our oil imports. Iraq is a big one. Iraq is 5%. Iraq is almost as much as Mexico and Venezuela.

Point is, is that the United States has got a pretty diversified source for its imported oil. And, you know, that's not to say that, you know, that a million-barrel, million-barrel-a-day event— well, we had a million-and-a-half-barrel event last week in Kuwait, and it definitely had an impact on price, but it, it didn't affect actual supply. So I'm hard-pressed to answer your question because I think it, it falls into, you know, a gray swan kind of category.

Under ordinary weird world situations, hard for me to see it.

Erik Townsend: Art, this is fantastic content. I don't know about you, I could go on for 2 more hours. But we actually already had our feature interview today. I'm sure we're going to be running overtime. I need to wrap it up. But one thing we did miss on your last interview, I really want to hit because we did get some inquiries, people asking us in emails. Please give us the sign-off, not only on your newsletter, which is certainly something I recommend for everyone, retail professional or otherwise. Your blog is fantastic. But what business are you actually in? We have a lot of pro finance, high net worth family offices and so Explain what services you guys offer to investors.

Art Berman: I collaborate with a first-rate reservoir petroleum engineer. We do all kinds of reserve forecasts, property valuations, production forecasts, anything to do with, you know, how does, how does a reserve or how does production affect value. you, we do it. We do a lot of consulting for money managers, hedge fund managers, portfolio managers. So if it has to do with valuation, that, that, that's what we do. And of course, I'm a petroleum geologist, so I do all sorts of things like make maps and drill wells. So I'm always happy to talk about those too.

Erik Townsend: Well, you're always an absolute pleasure to work So thanks so much again for joining us on the program. We're going to have to wrap it there, and Nathan and I will be back in just a moment as MacroVoices continues here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Well, that was great hearing from Art again. I can't help but feel like, Erik, you guys could have gone on for another 2 hours. This show is going to be 2 hours as it is. So what do you think about getting Art back on the show sometime soon for a full-length interview?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, absolutely. We have Art on our list, I think, already to come back. We were waiting, frankly, until this crude oil story had played out. I don't know when it's going to play out, but we should definitely get him back. We'll look at the scheduling, but we will schedule Art for sure for a full-length interview. I wanted to squeeze him in here, but obviously we've already gone way late, folks.

Sign-off: Richard Duncan next week

Nathan Egger: So this is as We have indeed gone very late, so we're going to cut it off for this week at least. Please remember to join us next week when Richard Duncan is going to be with us. And if you subscribe to us on MacroVoices on iTunes, you're just going to get these directly sent to you. You can always find it on the website, www.MacroVoices.com. We've changed things up a little bit. We've removed a button that was unclear to some people. We put in a player. It should be very obvious where everything is listed on the front page there. Thank you, Patrick.

And if you have a spare moment, rating us and reviewing us on iTunes is massive for us. So please, if you haven't done so already, help us out. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices. And while you're at it, please follow Erik directly. He's getting more and more into the Twittersphere every week. I'm excited about it.

Erik Townsend: I'm a cool dude in a Twitter mood.

Nathan Egger: Yes.

Erik Townsend: I'm going millennial. I'm taking the youth pill.

Nathan Egger: I don't know. So that handle is @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K-S Townsend. Drop by our listener forums, as I said, MacroVoices.com/forums, where you can suggest future show topics, future show guests, and pose questions for Erik. Feel free to ask us questions, and we're going to answer these on the show, on the air, from time to time. So for Erik Townsend, this has been Nathan Egger, wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Erik Townsend: Thank you.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

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