Satyajit Das — None stated; introduced as Satyajit Das, author of Traders, Guns and Money (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 13 was recorded May 5th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Satyajit Das is on deck as today's special guest. I'll be talking with Das about the US dollar rally, monetary policy around the world, China, precious metals, and much more. All of that's coming up when Das joins us after today's market wrap.
Market wrap: S&P 500 topping pattern and short setup
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Good to be back with you, Erik. To my relatively untrained eye, the equity markets are finally starting to look like they want lower. What are you seeing?
Erik Townsend: Well, there's definitely signs of that. Visually, it looks like a topping pattern on the S&P. I would also note Raoul Pal, who's one of our favorite macro commentators interviewed recently on this program, tweeted this week that he has been waiting all He's been waiting for a year for the opportunity to short the S&P, and he sees it upon us now. I haven't spoken to Raoul, so I don't know anything more about his view than that. I have felt very strongly that this rally was not supported by fundamentals. I was unable, though, to explain what the heck happened and what drove it, and I'm still unable to explain that.
As I look at the chart right now, we're hovering just over the 50-day moving average. I'm looking at the E-mini futures chart, so the moving average may be a little bit different in the cash market. I just look at this and say, hmm, Looks to me like maybe it's coming up on time for another short here, but I think I'd like to see the 50-day moving average get taken out decisively. Kind of tough to justify shorting right on top of what could be a rebound point.
I can't describe, I can't explain why this happened anyway. I do also worry as we're coming into the month of May, we're out of earnings quiet period. That means that corporate buybacks could be starting up in earnest again. That could create buying pressure. So I want to short this market, but I'm a little bit skittish having been wrong one once before this year, and I'm still watching it to see what develops.
Crude oil: storage thesis, Fort McMurray fires, Hormuz, Saudi motives
Nathan Egger: And plenty of crude oil volatility on considerable volume since we last spoke. Erik, how is your view of the goo shaping up from here?
Erik Townsend: The view of the goo. Okay. First of all, seasonality is super important this time of year. Normally what happens is during refinery maintenance season, we see builds on inventory because the refineries are not using it. Then once that's over and we're starting to get geared up towards summer driving season, we're consuming more oil.
May is a month historically, if we look at the data for the last 5 years, there's only been 1 year in the last 5 where there was a net build on inventory for the month of May overall. That was 2012 with a 5.1 million barrel build on inventory.
Well, if you look at that in isolation, boy, it's not looking good for my fundamental view, which is that we're headed towards a storage crisis. Because from a seasonality standpoint, we're now facing a headwind from the standpoint that it's May, which Which is traditionally a drawdown month, where before we had a tailwind, which was coming from the fact that it was refinery maintenance season.
But hang on a second. If you follow Samir Madani's work, there's 28 million barrels of oil anchored off of Houston, waiting to get into the ship channel. That's 5 times more than the biggest monthly draw. Now, of course, not all of that oil goes into storage when it hits the dock. A lot of it will get consumed. But if you believe, as I do, and as Samir's analysis reveals, that a lot of that oil is going to get counted as inventory, I think we could see a massive surprise in the month of May where it's traditionally— and I think a lot of analysts might be expecting a drawdown on inventories to begin in May. I think this is where the market has the opportunity to be surprised and say, oh, wait a minute, there's more.
As I've opined in the past, if Saudi Arabia wants to make a move to try to push the market lower, certainly it would be sensible for them to do that in conjunction with another bearish catalyst in order to get the maximum effect. That's not this week's inventory because, you know, we've seen the last several weeks that the market has shrugged off massive inventory builds and managed to move higher anyway. This week, the action was a little bit different, just as Samir predicted.
He was saying there was going to be either a draw on inventory nationally or a very small build. We got what initially looked from API like a small build, a little bit bigger from the EIA on Wednesday morning.
2.8 million barrels is certainly not a trivial build on inventory. But it's nothing close to 10.5 million barrels that we had a few weeks ago. So to my surprise, what I thought is with a relatively small build, a negligible Cushing, Oklahoma build, which I think is the most important number, I thought maybe we were going to see a repeat of the last few weeks where there's bearish catalysts that should shock the market lower. That happens for an hour or so and then the market just moves higher.
Well, it looked like fundamentals were maybe actually starting to work again this week because after the inventory data came out, the market did end up closing not just on the lows of the day. Last few minutes of pit trading, there was a big move higher, perhaps somebody trying to bang the close and manipulate that closing number. But there was a lot of weakness over the course of the day.
Overnight from Wednesday into Thursday, of course, the news of the Canadian wildfires in Fort McMurray, as well as escalating tensions in Libya, came out. That's creating upside pressure on oil prices. So far, at least as far as the Fort McMurray situation is concerned, There are no critical oil production assets at risk. The fires are about 30 kilometers away from where the oil production is.
The problem is the town of Fort McMurray is basically where all of the oil workers live, and there have just been horrible, terrible damage there. 1,800 homes and other buildings in Fort McMurray, which of course is a town in Alberta where the Canadian tar sands business is kind of headquartered. All the oil workers, even though the producing assets are still there, Many of their homes have been burned to the ground. 90,000 residents have been evacuated from Fort McMurray.
And we do, unfortunately, have at least one MacroVoices regular listener, boots on the ground there.
Our listener Dean and his family were evacuated and may have lost their homes. So this is a really, really serious situation for the industry. I got an email from Dean telling me that, you know, the big question is it looks like there's not going to be any fire risk to the oil-producing assets, but there's no place for the oil workers to sleep. Because so many homes were destroyed. So it's going to be very interesting to see what happens there.
Meanwhile, we also had news on Thursday that an Iranian military commander had threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, which of course is a global oil delivery choke point because all the oil coming out of the Middle East has to pass through the Straits of Hormuz. Last data that we had this afternoon on Thursday was just that threat. Just looking at the tape action Thursday afternoon, that must have died down because oil prices have come back down. As far as where we're headed Where do you think we're headed from here?
I think that the fundamental view that I've expressed, I really feel strongly about. As far as calling tops and bottoms, it's difficult work to start with, and I don't consider myself to be the world's greatest technical analyst. If I look at this market, it appears to me that we've got one more wave higher. Maybe we're going to test that $50 Brent number. I do see strong signs of hedging occurring in this market because the time spreads in the front end of the curve especially are collapsing with this strength in the market. So that tells me that we're seeing front-end strength But hedging on the back end as we get closer to that $50 number.
Nathan Egger: Erik, we've heard you and Art Berman discuss more recently a need to revisit some of your fundamental analysis. Can you give us any update on that front?
Erik Townsend: Well, I've spoken to Art, and I think both of us really feel that in terms of the supply-demand analysis, we got it right. This market has just gone crazy with sentiment as far as we're concerned. The thing that I really think is Interesting though, and as I've really thought through all of my assumptions, I have assumed, as most people have, it was very, very clear that Saudi Arabia wanted oil prices to go lower, at least through the beginning of February.
If you look at what happened with this production freeze nonsense, at first Saudi Arabia was pretty aggressive in denying that rumor, saying, no way, we don't know about any meeting, it's not happening. Then at some point, they kind of changed their tune and were willing to attend meetings and so forth. And I just think about if their goal was And if their goal was, as Art and I believed, to cut off the source of funding, cause massive collateral damage in the US junk bond market in order to prevent the shale drillers from getting funding next time around, if that's their goal, why did they let this go as far as it did?
They could have shut down this production freeze rumor long before the Doha meeting. Saudi Arabia could have just denounced it and said, this is nonsense, it's not happening. Right. Continue to want to suppress the price, why are they letting it go on so long? And why, since the Doha meeting, has Saudi Arabia not been more forthcoming or more aggressive about jawboning the market, more threats about increasing production, so on and so forth? So it almost feels like they're allowing the price to come up so that the US producers can hedge before maybe the supply-demand fundamentals kick in and there's another move lower.
That would totally unseat my theory about what Saudi Arabia's motivations have been. So, that's the only thing I can find that doesn't really add up for me is why Saudi Arabia has allowed this rally to happen when, in my eyes, it would've been pretty easy for them to stop it in its tracks. Aside from that, I think the fundamental analysis is spot on.
Gold breaks from the 50-day average
Nathan Egger: Perfect. And I should mention that our thoughts are certainly with Dean, his family, and all those affected by this fire in Alberta right now. Erik, last week you opined that the gold rally doesn't really get serious until gold clearly rejects its 50-day moving average and we see a move away from this hugging the line that we've been seeing in the gold market for the last couple of weeks, in fact. So you got your wish the very next day after last week's show when we saw a notable move higher. So does this mean that the gold bull market is finally on?
Erik Townsend: Well, possibly. From a technical standpoint, we were hugging that 50-day moving average line on the futures chart. Definitely last Friday, big break away from that, just flirting with $1,300, rejecting $1,300. I think that's natural round number resistance. As we're speaking Thursday afternoon, we're looking at $1,279.
If I look at this chart, yeah, it is breaking away. Like I said, needed to happen next. The next test will be, can it get through $1,300 and decisively above $1,300? All of these things really are looking pretty bullish for gold, and it really makes me think, okay, What's my problem? How come I haven't bought it yet? And I think the reason is this US dollar rally question. I don't really have a firm answer to, is the US dollar rally paused or have we seen the tops? And I think that as that question becomes clearer, or the answer to that becomes clearer, and particularly if we get clarity if there is another rate hike from the Fed, June rate hike, okay, I think that's bad news for gold.
On the other hand, if the Fed chickens out of a rate hike in June, I think that maybe could be the catalyst to really help it move further. I'm a little bit nervous about this market still. I want to see it stay off of its moving average for a good solid week. Coming up on that, it is correcting back to the downside, but well above the moving average. Let's see if it holds up. And I am playing this one conservatively. I haven't bought it yet. And I just wonder if there's another move down before the gold cyclical bear market is over.
I want to stress, though, for anyone listening, these are short-term views. I am I'm absolutely extremely bullish long-term on gold. I think it's going well above $2,000 in the next 10 years. The question is, is it ready yet? And for traders who are trading with leverage and have to be careful about what positions they put on, I don't really feel that we have a trend that is established decisively enough to really give me confidence in this market.
US dollar, DXY 92.50 and secret central-bank meetings
Nathan Egger: Okay. And I just want to stay on the US dollar for a moment, because you've asked several of our guests over the past couple of months whether they think this is a pause in the dollar rally or if the top is in. We've gotten a wide variety of answers and explanations for why it's going to go this way or that. But can you expound a little bit on your views on the US dollar right now?
Erik Townsend: Well, the reason that I'm asking all of our guests that same question, and I'm definitely planning to ask Das that question today, is that I don't know, and I feel it's the most important question to answer. If you look at what a lot of technical analysts have said, they say 92.50 on the dollar index is a really important number. A breakdown below that level would maybe indicate That there's a lot worse to come. I think it got all the way down to 91.89, but it stayed below 92.50 for like an hour. It didn't really count as far as I'm concerned.
I don't think we've got room to do another test lower that breaks below the prior low without really wondering what's going on. And the reason I'm asking all the guests the same question is I'm trying to assimilate a view of my own from all the smart people that we talked to. And frankly, what I come to at this point, my conclusion is—
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: There are unelected government officials, that is monetary policy-setting officials, in secret meetings around the world that are setting policy. Now, I don't know if this Jim Rickards theory that there was a February 26th Shanghai Accord meeting, he's calling it essentially the equivalent of the Plaza Accord, there was a secret meeting in Shanghai, you know, that's a great theory. Sounds like it kind of explains what's going on. I can't prove that. I haven't seen any compelling evidence to suggest that. Are these ideas true? I think that guys like Raoul Pal, Really articulate what to me is a very, very persuasive bull argument for the US dollar rally to continue.
My feeling is if it's not going to continue, it's probably because of some kind of government intervention somewhere. Is that Jim Rickards' theory of a Shanghai Accord, or is it something else? Why did Janet Yellen meet with President Obama with not a lot of description of what was going on a few weeks ago? I don't know. But something's going on here, and I think that we're probably going to find out in the next few weeks which way this is going to go, because we're flirting with a technical support level that if it breaks, most technicians I'm reading are saying, okay, something's really changing here.
Nathan Egger: So, if I understand you correctly here, what you're suggesting is maybe we should put a little less faith in technical levels than we normally would, knowing that this market is going to be moved primarily by the people in power who can move
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I mean, there's an argument for that. The reason that technical analysis works to some extent does have to do with psychology of traders. So if you think that the traders don't know the secret information and it's really being kept secret, there's good reason to conclude that technical analysis won't work on that.
The thing is, somebody always knows what's going on. People are trading inside information. Somebody knows what's happening, has better information than we do. And those are very well-heeled people that are putting a lot of trades on. So I tend to believe in technical analysis.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: technical analysis is being able to see through a situation like this, even though theoretically it shouldn't work if that secret information was truly secret.
Sovereign bond crisis: Bunds and JGBs
Nathan Egger: Gotcha. And we haven't covered the fixed income space in a while. Do you have any thoughts on global bond markets this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, we have had questions from listeners and discussions I've seen elsewhere on the internet. A lot of people are interested in this idea of shorting the US sovereign bond market, the US Treasury market, because they feel that, okay, there's a 30-year, 35-year, as Jim Rogers pointed out, bear market here in interest rates, bull market in bond prices. And from a secular perspective, we're about due for a reversal. I really think that's a bad idea. When I first learned about the US debt situation and how bad it was, I thought maybe there's a play shorting US Treasury debt.
What I've realized is it's going to happen in other parts of the world first. The US is still It's the cleanest dirty shirt in a very, very dirty laundry pile. So, what I'm starting to think about, not for any immediate trades, it's just when the sovereign bond crisis comes, and I'm convinced that it's coming, and I'm convinced that it does not start in the United States. And I don't know if it's tomorrow, next week, or 3 years from now.
So, how do you play that when you get to the point where the world maybe really is on the verge of a sovereign debt crisis?
I look at the German Bund deeply into negative yield territory all the way out beyond 10-year maturity. There are signs in that market. That's the Golf Bravo Lima futures contract, GBL. Signs of what looks kind of like a topping pattern, maybe the formation beginning of a right shoulder here. Maybe it's moving higher still. I'm kind of watching that market and I'm watching Japanese government bonds. I think between German bonds being the safest asset in Europe and therefore the one that's deepest into negative yield territory, or Japanese government bonds because the Japanese situation is growing dire, those are the places where the sovereign bond crash would happen long before a US Treasury crash.
I'm not saying it's upon us. I'm not saying it's imminent. What I am saying is I'm starting to think hard about where to play the sovereign bond crisis someday when it comes.
Why contrasting guests: Duncan, Das and Keen
Nathan Egger: Erik, before we move on to your feature interview with Satyajit Das, I'd like to share a little perspective with our listeners about what I've been trying to accomplish in our recent guest booking strategy. Because I've intentionally chose 2 recognized experts in the world of macroeconomics, Richard Duncan last week and Satyajit Das this week, specifically because we knew that they would likely have sharply contrasting views on many of the same subjects. So our listeners who are paying attention at home will notice that the series of questions that Erik is going to ask Das this week will be quite similar to those he posed for Mr. Duncan last week. So the whole idea is that we're trying to bring you contrasting views from different experts so that you can shape your own opinion.
Erik Townsend: And I really want to make this point emphatically, folks. The worst mistake you could make is to think of this as a contest or a debate where you're trying to decide which guest got it right and which guest got it wrong. Much to the contrary, what makes a good investor is the ability to be open-minded and listen to the views of several different experts, including those that you tend to disagree And then to assimilate your own worldview based on integrating the arguments that you found most compelling from each different expert. So, it's not about whether Mr. Duncan or Mr. Das has it right. It's about helping you get it right by presenting you with contrasting views on the same subjects from a number of recognized experts. We're starting with Richard Duncan and Satyajit Das, and we're going to add another economist next week in order to round out a trifecta of different viewpoints for you to consider about the current
Nathan Egger: It's good advice, Erik, and I think it's advice that really
Erik Townsend: pertains to all aspects of life, not just in the investing world.
Nathan Egger: But we don't cover all aspects of life. We're talking about investing here. So without further ado, let's go right to Erik's interview with Satyajit Das coming up as MacroVoices continues here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Interview with Satyajit Das: currency wars and the US dollar
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Satyajit Das, and that's not really his name because nobody, including me, can pronounce his first name. So we're just going to go by Das. I was absolutely delighted to get Das on the show because his first book, Traders, Guns and Money, bestselling book, was one of my all-time favorite finance reads. Das, thanks so much for joining me on the program. And just so people can hear it, let's hear just one time, what's your full name, sir? Satyajit Das.
Satyajit Das: Satyajit Das.
Erik Townsend: We're going to stick with Das because that's beyond my pay grade, sir. Let's dive right in. I think the most interesting thing in the world of global macro right now is this US dollar rally. Some people say we're just looking at a pause here. Others say the top is in. Still others are theorizing that perhaps there's some secret central banker meeting, this Shanghai Accord theory, that might involve an intentional policy to arrest the rise of the dollar. How do you see this issue, Das? Where is it going from here? Are we looking at a pause? Is the top in, or are we going to see more dollar strength?
Satyajit Das: I think you have to back up a little bit to look at the dollar in a wider context. And the context is the currency wars, which, according to central bankers, as you know, is not happening. And I think what you need to think about is how we used to think of currencies.
Which is in terms of certain fundamental factors like interest rate differentials, inflation rates, particularly relative inflation rates, growth rates in countries, their current account, their need for capital, you know, all of those sorts of things. The best way I can describe that is you take that— those textbooks and you make a bonfire because it's basically irrelevant now.
Because essentially what is now going on and has been going on since 2009 is a game about manipulating several indices, but one of them is obviously currencies. So to talk about what the dollar is going to do and what the dollar is not going to do is kind of asking the wrong question. The answer will depend on what the central banks want to do.
And I think to come back to your question of the dollar, let's look at what people did after 2009. What they actually did in the United States at least was use a variety of techniques, low interest rates, the QE programs to devalue the dollar. And that obviously gave some impetus to the US economy.
But the problem with that is in a world of limited growth, if you grow, other people get less of that growth if you're growing quicker. So what we saw And particularly over the last two or three years, we've seen the Europeans, the Japanese, and the Chinese start to try to devalue their currency.
So what we're now seeing is this battle going backwards and forwards, and I think what you're going to see is enormous volatility. And what you're going to see is the dollar rise, and then everybody's going to no no no no no! It's risen too much. It's risen too much. And then they're going to back right off, and then. And then everybody's going to go, no, no, no, no, no, no, it's fallen too much. Other currencies are going up too much. And you're just going to see this entire volatility going on. So I think the question is what that volatility means in the longer run. I think the US dollar will be stronger because essentially the United States is the cleanest shirt in a very dirty laundry basket of economies.
Emerging-market dollar debt and the risk of defaults
Erik Townsend: OK. If that is the situation with the US dollar, you expect volatility and then eventually it moving higher. Does that mean that there is a risk of an emerging market debt crisis as a result of dollar appreciation, or do you disagree with that view?
Satyajit Das: Well, I think the emerging markets are kind of interesting. And I go back to essentially the hypothesis that James O'Neill or Jim O'Neill Actually, I can't call him that now. He's now Lord, so I have to call him Lord O'Neill. When he was at Goldman Sachs, when he published the BRICS research, and essentially what he was positing was stronger rates of growth in emerging markets. Now, that's all fine. And to some extent, in fact, a large extent, his views of the growth have been correct.
But I think post-2007, 2008, you need to ask a question of what happened to these emerging countries. And effectively, there's a series of problems that emerging markets actually face. But I think central to that problem is their model of growth changed post-2008, 2009, and in part reflecting the quantitative easing policies in the developed markets. They used a lot more credit. So there's been a huge buildup of debt, and there's roughly $9 trillion of dollar debt outside of the United States. Of which probably about three trillion is in emerging markets.
Now, what you're pointing to is if rates go up, if the dollar goes up, what happens to this debt? And this is a conundrum that everybody has been focusing on since about 2013, when Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke started to talk about the taper causing enormous volatility. Now, my view is. You have to ask the question, is this dollar debt covered firstly by productive assets and secondly by dollar revenues?
And I think overall the conclusion that you reach if you look carefully is that the projects that a lot of this money went into aren't actually that productive. A lot of that went into building overcapacity. A lot of that went into real estate speculation. And what went into real projects was a lot of that was in commodities, which obviously throws off US dollar revenues, which is nice. But the problem is that if you have most of your money in unproductive projects, or alternatively you have it in matters which are linked to commodity prices, it's the combination of low commodity prices which is going to force down your revenues. And there's high levels of US dollar debt. Debt, which is going to cause you some problems. And my view is that you are going to see problems in emerging markets. They will vary.
And I think you're going to see rising defaults in emerging markets. People forget that foreigners have lent about $1 trillion to China, for instance. And these are mainly Chinese companies, and many of them are state-owned. So I think the emerging markets look suspect to me from that financial point of view. But also, the other thing I would say is everybody assumes that all this debt was covered by US dollar revenues.
I've spent the better part of about 30 years working around emerging markets. And the reality is they borrow in US dollars for a variety of reasons. And they haven't changed a lot in that 30 years. One is lower interest rates. And the second is the fact of abundant dollar liquidity.
And so I think you're going to find when the tide goes out, that many of these companies don't have the revenues and they certainly don't have the productive projects on the other side. And that contraction of liquidity from the withdrawal of dollars and also from higher dollar rates and the stronger dollar will come back to haunt them.
And there is a second part of the mythology which is kind of interesting. And that second part of the mythology is that everybody learned from '97, '98 with the Asian monetary crisis. And essentially that, that process will not repeat. I think to some extent they're correct. Many of these countries moved off fixed exchange rate. They built up reserves. But the problem is that when they did all of those things, and also the third thing they did was they redenominated a lot of their debt in domestic currencies. But the problem is they're still capital importers. So many of the actual investors in, say, Indonesian rupiah bonds or South African rand bonds or in Malaysian ringgit bonds or Brazilian real bonds are actually foreigners.
And they did it as part of the carry trade because essentially these securities gave higher returns. So if there is a problem in capital flows and if there is a problem in terms of emerging market currency weaknesses, they're going to start to sell this. And that's going to cause some problems. So, yes, you're quite correct. The stronger dollar outlook will cause some problems in emerging markets.
And the old famous saying about emerging markets that when things go pear-shaped, they go to submerging markets will, I think, play out over the next few years.
Cyclical downturn or structural shift: the Fed's exit trap
Erik Townsend: Well, based on your answer, it sounds like comparative monetary policy, how the US monetary policy compares with other nations, is going to play a very important role in this. So let's move on to that now, because we We still have the ECB and the Bank of Japan clearly in easing mode. They're still in money printing mode. What the Fed would like us to believe is, hey, they have reached so-called liftoff. They feel that the US economy is able to resume organic growth on its own, and we are embarking now in a rate normalization cycle that will basically take us back to historically normal interest rates. I know that I'm extremely skeptical of that view myself. But where do you see this? Is this true or is a policy U-turn imminent towards either negative interest rates or more quantitative easing from the Federal Reserve?
Satyajit Das: Well, again, I think you need to put the policy in context. And the context is that when the Lehman incident and the great slowdown of 2008, 2009 took place, I think you have to look at that and ask yourself a question. Is this a cyclical downturn? Or is this something different? In other words, a structural shift, a discontinuity.
I think the central bankers essentially thought that it was just a normal cyclical downturn, which means run a few deficits on the fiscal side, cut interest rates, and things will recover. And to be very fair to them, over the last 30 years, that sort of rinse and repeat formula has worked quite well. Well, the problem this time around, I don't think was that it wasn't what they thought it was. I think it's a structural discontinuity. And as you know, people who are much more eminent than me, like George Soros, have been arguing that fairly vociferously for the last 7 or 8 years.
And once you get that divergence between a structural shift and a cyclical downturn, then your policy settings need to be thought through. And I think cutting interest rates was fine in the sense that it bought you a bit of time, but you needed to do a whole lot of things. And the 2 major things I think were crucial was to address debt and the global imbalances issue between, say, a whole bunch of people who saved and exported their savings and a whole bunch of people who didn't save and just imported those savings.
Now, we didn't do either. We didn't address the debt and we didn't address the global imbalances. And part of the debt was also future debt in the sense of entitlement programs, which are being addressed but in a very piecemeal way. So if you look at that overall context of having bought some time with low interest rates and then basically hoping that there is a cyclical recovery and growth and inflation take care of the debt problem, that has proved to be be completely, totally wrong.
And now what you've got is a real problem of firstly different economies in different places, which is going to your point of the fact that different central banks have policies. But the more important thing is the total debt levels have actually now increased. And to look at that in context, let's say if you normalize U.S. interest rates, you'd get back to 3%.
Now, to put that into context, for the US federal government alone, with $19 trillion of debt, that means that you would add roughly $570 billion in additional interest costs. Now, that is actually larger than the fiscal deficit that's being currently run by the US government. And that deficit is, in historical terms, still substantial.
So you're now trapped in a situation where if you push up interest rates, you basically have additional interest burden, which actually makes the management of the entire debt complex terribly difficult. Now, to put that into another context, in say a place like Japan, at the moment, firstly, for every dollar the Japanese government spends, Less than half of that, so less than 50 cents of that, is covered by tax revenues. But of that 50 cents, a quarter of that is going to servicing Japanese government bonds in terms of interest.
Now, that's under conditions of zero interest rates. So you have a problem of trying to normalize interest rates when you get into this conundrum of high debt, low growth, and disinflation. Now, then the next issue for the Fed is that, okay, do we separate out our international obligations such that we have and our domestic obligation, which are very clear and documented?
And if you look at the domestic story, it's patchy. But overall, you could make a case for normalization and mainly to avoid speculative bubbles in many markets, which we know from evidence exists. But on the other side, if I push up interest rates, And what we saw in 2013 is when the 10-year Treasury bond in the United States went up 1%, interest rates pretty much around the world went up by 1%, except actually in Japan— I beg your pardon— in Japan, where they actually had a quantitative easing program that was being launched at that time.
So what you're going to do is now export instability. And the interesting thing about the Fed is that it has this waxing and waning process. Every once in a while they talk about international stability and then they don't. And for instance, everybody's taken a lot of sort of notice of the fact that the Federal Reserve's latest statements don't have international stability as a problem. So they're assuming that rates are going to go up. But I think it's a more complicated program than that. And I think the issue is that the recovery that we have, the financial market stability and the higher asset prices we have are actually a function of these low rates. So I don't think anybody really knows what will happen when you, when you remove this.
And don't forget, the problem will very quickly go to the core of the financial system, which is the banks, because if you have asset prices falling, they form the major part of the collateral which supports lending in the banking system, which is what we saw in 2008, 2009. And if that collapses, then we have a real problem. So I personally think the Fed and indeed central banks around the world now have a major problem that they can't exit from this actual position that they've actually found themselves in.
And I think the best way to describe it is there was a woman called Ashley Lorenza, who apparently was a high-class prostitute and wrote a memoir. And in it— I have fairly eclectic reading tastes, so I did read this. And essentially, at one point, she says, that the definition of an addiction is something which you can give up next Tuesday.
And I think the central banks are now in that position of they're going to actually keep saying that they're going to normalize policies, but they're going to find the constraints on them such that they're actually not going to be able to do it. And if you want a good historical precedent for that is I think if you ask the Japanese central bankers in 1994, '96, whether they thought these policies that they were putting in place were going to be there some 20, 21 years later, they would have laughed and said these are just emergency measures.
And the problem is those emergency measures have now become permanent. And it would not surprise me at all to see that process play out in developed economies other than Japan.
More debt, negative rates, cash bans and central bankers
Erik Townsend: I think you've really hit the key of this is the problem we started with was too much debt. And the solution that's been engineered since 2009 is more debt. And what's being discussed— we already have negative interest rates in many places in the world. There's discussion of that in the United States. There's a lot of discussion of banning cash because it's essentially necessary in order to get substantive negative interest rates. You have to ban cash, otherwise people would just hoard cash. So, it seems like everything the government is doing is really encouraging more borrowing and more spending, which I think you and I agree is really the causal problem. So, it seems like not only are we only treating the symptoms and not the real causal problem, but we're making it worse. Am I right about that? And if so, where does this whole quantitative easing story, you know, helicopter money, the various things that have been discussed, where does this take us and what are the unintended consequences of it?
of this?
Satyajit Das: Well, I think I agree with you that this is very, very definitely the problem. But I think to get people to acknowledge the problem is going to be extremely difficult. And let me explain why I think that's a huge problem.
The first issue is you have to again look at the, I suppose, the understructure of this. And the understructure is we need growth. And if you actually look at the history of the world in the last 20 or 30 years, we— and this goes back to the 1970s and the period of stagflation when growth started to peter out and people start to experiment with how we actually restart the growth engines because people are basically addicted to higher living standards. And if you look at history, the improvement in living standards is actually only the last probably 150 years.
Before that, you didn't actually see much in the way of improvement in living standards. And part of that's technological. Part of that's economic.
But I think the crucial thing here is once you get hooked onto this, then the problem is you've got to keep going. And when the normal engines of growth, which are things like population growth, things like innovation, productivity improvements, those things started to slow down. Down, we started to use debt as an accelerant.
And there's no mystery about what debt does. It just brings forward consumption and investment, which in itself is not a bad thing. But the problem is if you can't pay back that debt— in other words, what you've invested in doesn't provide the income or the appreciation capital value of the asset to pay that back— you've got a serious problem.
And I don't think there's any acknowledgment of that because I have not seen any central banker, any policymakers who actually accept that. And one of the things that'll amuse you is, as you know, I recently published a book called The Age of Stagnation in North America, but it's called A Banquet of Consequences elsewhere. The US publisher thought A Banquet of Consequences sounded like a cookbook. So they changed the title. But it was interesting to see the reviews of that book, which have been, to be very candid, uniformly negative.
And essentially everybody's view is that I make too much of debt. That's fine. That's not a problem because it'll take care of itself. Now, unfortunately, I don't agree with that because no matter what you do, it creates a burden going forward. And to now come back to not dealing with the debt and let's see how they are dealing with the debt and let's look at what you just mentioned, which is, I think, the crucial policy going forward, which is negative interest rates.
Now, we can dance on the head of this pin in whichever way you like, but What negative interest rates are is actually a form of taxation or a form of confiscation of money. Because if I put my money in the bank of $100 and at the end of the year I get $98 or $95 back, what it's doing, it's being used to actually wipe out part of the debt.
And what that does is essentially create the most perverse incentives in the world. Because under those circumstances, a logical person would not put money in a bank. Why would you do that? So you take it out. And this is where your allusion to banning cash becomes important.
And this is not actually hypothetical. In Japan in the 1990s, and then towards the middle of the 1990s, I observed that the sales of bank— sorry, not bank, but house safes went up. And essentially, that was the only industry that was growing in a substantive way in Japan. And the reason was very simple. People were just taking their money out of the bank and stuffing it into these safes. And we're now seeing that process play out. But this is kind of quite bizarre if you look at it in terms of a modern economy which is driven by credit, if people start to do that.
And I'll show you how absurd the policies are. On the one side, the policymakers are trying to make sure that banks have balance sheets which are funded by deposits and the tenor of the deposits, the maturity of the deposits matches the assets. In other words, the asset liability mismatches are minimized.
But at the same time, they're putting in policies elsewhere which are actually counterproductive in the sense that people will take out their money from the bank, creating instability of the funding of these banks.
And I think the most important thing about this is to understand that this is actually a form of financial repression, which actually becomes political repression. And the most interesting way to think about this is what Andrew Haldane, which is the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, actually explained this. He was the most candid of all the central bankers about negative interest rates. And he said, look, interest rates at zero or substantively zero And we're reaching the end of our policy toolkit.
And he was quite open and said there's a crisis coming. We all know that. And if that crisis occurs, we're going to have to cut interest rates. And he said— and I actually have been saying this for a long time— that in a crisis, you need to have around about 3 to 4% interest rate cuts up your sleeve.
Now, here you can't cut by 3 to 4% because you're already at zero. So he said we're going to have to go into negative interest rates in a very, very deep way. And if we do that, then the problem is the policy will be defeated by people taking money out of the banks. So we have to ban cash.
He was actually explicit. And I would go one step further. You not only have to ban cash, you have to put capital controls in place because people will take their money out of countries if you do this.
So you get these sorts of repressive processes being put in place. And I think one of the key things here to grasp, I think, is the fact that we have a bunch of central bankers who, in my view, have never worked an honest day in their lives. They have a career path, which means they just get PhDs at universities, mill around with other PhDs, then get a job at a central bank and mill around with other central bankers who've never really worked in the real world. They don't understand very much about that world. And, and if you want evidence of that, I think Mr. Dudley, who was at the New York Fed, decided to have a town hall meeting in Brooklyn and explain to people in Brooklyn how everybody was better off. And I think he was pretty lucky to escape alive out of that meeting. And so these people have no cognizance of how the real world works.
And more importantly, they're unelected officials and they can do whatever they like or they think they like. And they don't understand the political and social implications of this. And I think that's really, really dangerous. And you're seeing some spinoff from that in places like the United States. You can see the rise of some of the populist politicians like Bernie Sanders and and Donald Trump. Now, I'm not saying their policies are right or wrong, but they certainly are a reaction to the types of steps that are being contemplated. So I think this is actually a very dangerous point, not only from an economic point of view, but from a social and political point of view. But, you know, I think it's important to actually give the listeners an idea of what they should do. So I've worked out for them if they have, say, money in the bank and they want to take it out, I'll give them an idea of how to save up.
Because if they're going to carry $10 million in large banknotes, and I assume the largest banknote is $100, $10 million is going to weigh 100 kilos. So I think you should basically go to the gym and muscle up. And the other thing is, if you're going to buy a home safe, I was trying to work out how much money you could put in a 1 cubic meter safe. And in the United States, that happens to be a substantial sum of money, which is about $86 million. So, I think your listeners can sort of scale up or down according to their net worth as to what they're going to need.
China: debt, bad loans and turning Japanese
Erik Townsend: Well, and I couldn't agree with you more. And of course, we don't have to worry about any pushback from the people on the loss of liberty associated with banning cash, because all you have to do is tell them it's because of terrorism. Let's move on to China. I think China is obviously a huge story in the macroeconomy. In the global macro environment, there's every opinion from the worst is over to the worst has yet to begin.
Where do you see the whole story on China? Where are we in the cycle? Can the current leadership survive? And what will the knock-on effects be? Because obviously there's a lot of money that flows out of China into Vancouver real estate and various other places. Where is this story headed?
Satyajit Das: How do you see it playing Well, I think there's several things that you need to think about. I'm always reminded of China because Charles de Gaulle, General Charles de Gaulle, who was the president of France for many, many years, once gave a view of China. He said China is a very large country with a lot of Chinese people in it.
And I suspect that Western understanding of China has always sort of struggled to get beyond that level. So I think the size dazzles everyone. Everybody. And to be honest, in recent times, China's become such an important catalyst in terms of growth, company profits, and also in terms of recycling of savings, it plays a disproportionate sort of role in people's consciousness. But you got to keep that in perspective.
The US economy is still about double the size of China. And China's It's large, but not as large, say, even as the Eurozone economies combined. But it is substantial. And they face enormous challenges. And those challenges, I think you can sort of say, range from slowing growth, the debt problems, which everybody talks about. But they also have problems of industrial structure, which is a very inefficient state-owned enterprise sector. They overinvest relative to consumption. There's massive overcapacity. There are asset bubbles in property. The social problems of demographics, and also their environment is very degraded. And politically, it's, it's got a huge series of challenges. So it's a very complex story.
But the real issue for me is the one that everybody's worried about, which is the debt problem. Now, to put that into perspective, let's look at what China's debt has done. In 2000, China's debt was around $2 trillion. In 2007, it was about $7 trillion. The last definitive figures are around about the end of 2014.
It had gone to $28 trillion. So I repeat, in 14 years, their debt has gone from $2 trillion to $28 trillion. Now, in fairness, during the same period, the country has grown. But even if you look at it as a percentage of GDP, it's doubled. Now, that's That's just extraordinary, extraordinary expansion credit. And to be honest, I struggle to find another country in the world which has experienced that.
Then the question is, okay, is that good or bad? And the answer to that question is it depends on what you did with the money. And I think that's where the real problem comes. We know that a lot of that money was used in investment. And that investment may or may not return what is needed to pay back that debt. I think that lies at the heart of the problem. And a lot of that was done purely to prop up demand.
And the reason it was done was in 2007, 2008, what happened as the global economy turned down is the Chinese economy also turned down. And there was just in Guangzhou Province alone about 20 million people who became unemployed in a very short period of time. And whatever else dominates Chinese thinking, social stability and political hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party are paramount.
So they had to do something. And so this whole debt building up is part of the process of restarting demand. Now, that's all fine. Have they spent wisely? My suspicion is some of the things have been pretty wise. Some of them have been pretty dumb. You know, you can build fast trains, but if no Chinese can afford to be on those fast trains, they would have been far better off just looking at their existing infrastructure and trying to improve their existing normal train services. They've built superhighways, yet I know of Thousands and thousands of small villages in China, which don't have anything other than a dirt road leading up to them, which has huge economic consequences. So I don't think they spend well.
But we are where we are, and to some extent, the question particularly important for Western observers is how this problem will be dealt with. And obviously, it becomes this sort of dichotomy between people who assume. That the world is going to end and it's all going to collapse. And the other sort of everything will be all right group who basically are saying, well, no, no, no, it's all under control.
I think I would actually sit somewhere more towards the middle of that spectrum. And this is because you have to understand how China has dealt with these problems in the past.
This is going to be my 3rd debt crisis in China in terms of banking system crises. And this happens periodically. And every time it happens, it's exactly the same. There is actually no change. It is essentially the government-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises and local governments who then misspend the money. And then the banks have to essentially manage manage what is non-performing loans.
And this is how they're going to do it, because this is what they've done in the past. What will happen is the state has 4 asset management companies which are very, very large, and they will buy these bad loans from the banks. And what they will do is finance that purchase by issuing government bonds, which are guaranteed by central government, and they will sell them back to the banks from whence the non-performing loans came.
How do I know this? Because this is what happened last time.
Now, the interesting thing about that process is that the idea is that over time these loans will be dealt with. And I think going forward, this is the problem that China has. The last time this happened, which was in the late '90s, early 2000s, The bad loans were 20% of GDP, and that amounted to about $200 billion at the time.
So what they did was the process that I've just described, and what bailed them out was very strong growth of 6, 7, 8%. So what was 20% of GDP in 10 years' time became 5% of GDP and could be restructured or written off as the case might be. The problem this time is they're not going to get that level of growth, and the size of the problem is larger, and the economy is coming off a much larger base, and they will not have the uplift from external demand that they probably enjoyed during this period.
So I think it's going to be more difficult to deal with. But because the Chinese state essentially owns both the borrowers and the lenders. And they have substantial resources, they will be able to muddle their way through it.
And I think the longer-term impact of this is slightly different. What you're going to see in China is a Potemkin village economy, which looks fine on the outside, but essentially it's hollow inside, filled with underperforming assets, which are like zombie companies which are kept alive. In fact, what I have argued for a very long period of time is that what is actually happening is China is turning Japanese. Because if you look at what happened in Japan post the bursting of the bubble economy, and particularly the appreciation of the yen in '85, is the process we're going to see play out in China.
And what that means is that China may not collapse, but China's focus is going to become more inward. And also, it's not going to provide the growth to the rest of the world and the markets for products and the trading opportunities that people are looking for. And I think that is the bigger story. But that's not going to happen quickly. That's going to play out over long periods of time.
And just as an aside, I find it hugely amusing amusing to hear people talking about Chinese reforms. I've been dealing with China for about 30 years. And during that period, I've learned several things. One is China is not a country. It's a family business. And the family is the Chinese Communist Party.
And they run it as a family business. And the only thing that matters is the familia, essentially to keep them in power. And they have absolutely no interest in reform. And their adherence to what I would call market principles is very superficial. They like the market as long as the market gives them what they want. They don't like it, as we saw last year and the year before, when the stock market started to come down. They didn't find the market to be terribly helpful. So they're not going to reform.
And there's a very funny story about that, the assumption about the control over the economy that the Chinese Politburo has is kind of overstated as well. And one of the things about that is a story when Henry— which Henry Kissinger reports about Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. So Richard Nixon is sitting across from Mao Zedong, and he starts to flatter Mao Zedong by telling him what a great man he is.
And how it's remarkable that he's been able to bring this huge landmass and a billion people under control. And Mao Zedong starts to laugh when he hears the translation of this question. And he looks at Richard Nixon and responds in Mandarin, I control Beijing, just about. And that's essentially the problem. That's essentially the problem that you have. So China, I don't actually see the collapse scenario, but I do see a period of stagnation emerging which has significant implications. And there's one last implication that's worth mentioning.
That overcapacity in China in terms of steel, various raw metals and so forth does impact the rest of the world. As you've now seen, there's a lot of low-priced steel being let onto the world market as that overcapacity is released. And that has huge implications for the rest of the world. Which interestingly enough, people like Donald Trump are tapping into, Bernie Sanders is tapping into, with interesting anti-China rhetoric, some of which, to be very fair, has some factual basis.
Gold: currency, confidence and faith
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to a subject that we've had a lot of interest in, which is precious metals. Something I find very interesting is we've had quite a few guests on this program who agree with you. They are long-term dollar bulls. But they're about evenly divided. Half feel that that means you should be gold bearish because you're dollar bullish. And then others say, no, no, no, it's a different equation because of this environment. It's time to be gold bullish regardless of what the dollar does.
Where do you fall in this? Or perhaps you have a completely different view?
Satyajit Das: Well, I have never really understood gold. But what I do think of gold as now is in 3 dimensions. The first dimension is I think of gold as a currency. Currency. And essentially, it's a vote of confidence or a lack of vote of confidence in things like, for instance, the US dollar, the euro, or the yen.
So essentially, if people think these currencies are going to weaken, they just buy gold because they can convert it back at some stage. The second element of that, which is related to that, is it's a vote in fiat money systems. And essentially, the— I suppose the integrity and the management expertise of central banks. So essentially, gold tends to function as if we don't like these policies as a default position. And the third is really nominal interest rates.
If you push nominal interest rates to negative territory, gold becomes attractive. It's simple as that. And to some extent, there is a mythological element to gold as well. And there is There is some truth in that in the sense that if you look at it historically during times of turbulence or volatility, gold sometimes does very, very well.
And that means that essentially people now add gold to their portfolio or precious metals to their portfolio as kind of a hedge against that. But to be very fair, I think most people would not have their entire portfolio in gold. So they're looking at a period of instability. So they say, well, we'll add some gold to the portfolio. And I think if you actually look at the history of gold, it's not a great long-term store of value.
My friend Dylan Grice from when he used to be at Société Générale did a famous paper when, being Scottish, he went back to his ancestors about 500 years ago. And he said if they'd taken all their money and put it into gold, what would have happened? Dylan found out after his calculations that they would have lost around 95% of their value.
So I don't think it's a good long-term store of value necessarily.
But over certain periods of history, it's done very, very well. And particularly in recent history against things like fiat currencies, the argument goes it does well. So I think it has a role. But to some extent, gold is really not financial. It's religious. So there are people who believe in it and people who don't. So it's a matter of faith. in that sort of sense. And I never ask people about their religious beliefs because it only leads to conflict.
Outlook: Lazarus, stagnation or the wheels come off
Erik Townsend: Now, as we're starting to run out of time here, my final question to Das would be, what is all this going to mean? What is the medium to long-term outlook look like? Got fantastic news for you. Das has written an excellent paper really going into a lot of detail. Registered users at MacroVoices.com should have already received that from us via email by the time that you hear this episode. I don't want you to miss it, though. It's a really good one. So, Das, could you please give them just maybe the 3 to 4 minute executive summary of what that paper is about?
Satyajit Das: Sure. I think we now face a whole bunch of areas of instability, which could be equity markets, debt markets, particularly things like energy and corporate and emerging. And we obviously have slow growth and deflation, the risk of a Chinese hard landing. The currency volatility, the liquidity conditions which are tightening in some areas, and the problem of policy errors and policy exhaustion, as well as social and political breakdowns, are always there. And I see the world working out in one of three scenarios.
One is what I call the Lazarus economy, which is that I'm completely wrong and everything sort of goes back to normal, and essentially the economy grows and inflates its way out of these problems, and we manage to resolve all of these. I give that about a. Half a percent chance, because you should never say never.
And that might be some external catalyst like cold fusion or something like that, or something miraculous happening. I think the most likely scenario, which is I'd give about a 70% chance, is stagnation, which is we turn Japanese. So essentially what happens is we actually become a low-growth, low-inflation or deflationary economy where the central bank pettifoggery keeps us going, but we don't improve very much and we just drag the problem out.
The last risk, obviously the 30% chance, is the wheels come off.
And the major concern I now have is essentially we have so much buildup of risk, and particularly in certain asset prices, and it's all dependent on this Hail Mary pass to essentially the central bankers. Who we want to believe are right, yet we know in our heart of hearts, they don't know what they're doing. And basically, there's no real solution to this other than hard choices, which would involve a massive drop of living standards, which nobody's willing to tolerate.
And the problem is, everybody sort of knows this and senses this. But there's going to be a moment, an inflection point, when people just lose faith in all of this. And at that point in time, everybody's going to hit the exits. And once you do that, it becomes uncontrollable. And this time around, you have to keep in mind that whatever happens, it's going to be very different to what actually happened in 2007, 2008.
The reason is, in 2007, 2008, the problems were smaller. The problems have become bigger. For instance, debt in the world has grown by $57 trillion, which is around about 17 percentage points of GDP. And many of the problems have become much, much more intractable. The second element is the policy measures available in terms of government balance sheets and interest rates and QE options are now much more constrained. And even things like negative interest rates, as we saw in the earlier part of this year, have created massive backlashes. Emerging markets, which were a source of growth and demand in 2008 are now a source of weakness.
And as I said, the belief in policymakers is now actually much less because we've discovered the emperor does have no clothes. And the last element in this, which I think people need to keep in the back of their mind, is the geopolitical situation is much worse than it was in 2008. So if the wheels do come off, they're going to come off in a rather spectacular way.
So I think those are the 3 scenarios. And I think the best one can say is that you should actually think through that in terms of your personal financial choices and investment decisions. I think it was Michael Tyson who once said that everybody has a plan. The problem, he went on to add, is everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth. So I think it'll be a difficult process for people to negotiate. But the one thing I do strongly believe believe is that volatility, and particularly episodes of very large melt-ups and meltdowns, are going to be with us for a very, very long period of time. And that's going to make any investing decision much more complicated than perhaps in the recent past.
Erik Townsend: I really feel privileged to have you on the program, Das. It is normal and customary at this point to invite our guests to promote whatever they're You're not selling anything. You're basically retired and you make the time to do an interview like this, not because you have some commercial interest, but because it's a passionate subject. And it's people like you that we really feel passionate about getting on the program. I know you've got nothing to sell, but for people who would like to follow your work and learn more about you, are there any places online that they can read more of your writings?
Satyajit Das: Well, I'm sort of winding up, but I still write a column called Das Kapital. With a name like Das, what else would you call it? In The Independent in the U.K. UK. I still write occasionally for MarketWatch, and those are the 2 major sources. And I have a couple of books out, so people might, if they want to basically get depressive literature— I actually think if they should read that, they should get a bottle of vodka or their preferred tipple next to them and perhaps get away— take away all sharp objects and essentially any ligatures around the room just in case it has the wrong
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, we really appreciate your joining us today. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Postgame: Traders, Guns and Money and how derivatives get complicated
Nathan Egger: That was a great interview with Das, Erik. I could listen to that guy talk all day, even if he was reading nursery rhymes. I just love his voice. But something that I picked up on immediately was when you described Traders, Guns and Money, his book from the mid-2000s, mid to late 2000s, as one of your all-time best finance reads. And those are pretty strong words of praise coming from you. So, I was actually looking forward to the point at the end where we let our guests promote and where Das would promote his books. But in the end, he didn't care at all about promoting anything because apparently he's retiring. It must be nice. But I still want to know, what's the story on this book? Or, you know, why did it resonate with you?
Erik Townsend: Well, it came at a particularly ripe time in my education. I was going through the process of reinventing myself from retired software entrepreneur to full-time investor and trying to learn to really be a professional investor on a full-time basis. So, I'm reading all of the wrong things. I was looking mostly at textbooks from finance degree programs, MBA programs, and so forth. And I don't know why I was naive enough to think that they would teach people in those programs anything useful about the markets, which so far as I can tell, they don't. So, I'm reading about efficient market hypothesis and modern portfolio theory and rational expectations theory. And all of this nonsense, frankly. And I see this book as I'm walking through the Borders bookstore in San Francisco, and it's just such a catchy title. I pick it up just out of curiosity.
One of the best things that ever happened to me, because one of the stories I remember Das telling in the book is he describes the history of the derivatives industry in terms that really made sense to me.
He says, look, in the early '70s, we got listed options, puts and calls on stocks. And that meant that the big banks had to make a market in these things. And the people that ran the market-making desks had no idea how to price them. Well, if you are a super high-paid Wall Street executive and you manage a trading desk or a market-making desk, you don't admit to your boss that you don't know how to price something. You figure it out. So what happened is they didn't know how to figure it out. This was before the Black-Scholes option pricing model had been published. So really smart guys figured out how on their own before Black-Scholes to price options efficiently. The market-making desks didn't. That created a Tremendous, just huge inefficiency that some people exploited and made a huge amount of money. Because basically, the people that were responsible in the finance industry had to either admit that they didn't know how to price it or try to save face and act like they did.
And they did the later. Eventually, Black-Scholes gets published, and that means that this inefficiency is gone because now the market makers know how to price options.
Well, the greediest and sleaziest people in the room watched this whole story go down. And in Das's description, they said, wait a minute, we got the memo. All you have to do is make something so complicated that nobody can understand it. And the finance professionals who ought to understand it are forced to pretend because they would lose face in front of their management otherwise. And you get a bunch of people that are acting in very foolish, inefficient ways because you've set them up essentially to look bad in front of their management otherwise.
So, I imagined from reading this story, I don't think this was actually in Das's book, but I just imagined this room full of 100 PhDs that had just been hired. And this Wall Street guy with a Brooklyn accent comes in and he says, all right, you PhD guys, here's the story.
You guys are gonna invent some new financial derivatives. You're gonna come back and present them to management. If we understand one word of what you're saying, then you're fired and you're never gonna work in the industry again, but it's got to be full of math because we might get a guy from one of these freaking firms that wants to talk math and understand this, and you got to keep them busy for at least a few hours so we can buy a hooker for his boss and get the deal done. Okay, you guys got it? Good. And hence the financial derivatives industry is born, and it is about creating things that are too complex for anybody to understand so that you can sell them things that they don't understand the risk they're taking.
So I've got this perspective from Das this book, just months later, I had moved to New York and I had joined a high net worth investor club in New York City. Most of the guys are way more experienced than me, Wall Street veterans, and they're all trying to get their heads around what a collateralized debt obligation is. And there's also something called a CDO squared, which is an obligation of other obligations. So, it's— you've got starting with a CDO, it's multiple tranches of bonds, and then you've got multiple tranches of CDOs within a CDO squared. I'm just looking So, I'm looking at this way over my head at that time. I had no idea what these guys are talking about. But I'm looking at veterans, 40 years in the industry, made lots of money in their careers. They can't figure it out. Das told me how this goes down. I don't need to understand this myself. What I need to do is look for who's the guy who knows how to short this thing, whatever it is.
And so, in the movie, The Big Short, they portray it as if the only guy who figured this out was Michael Burry, the hedge fund manager from
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: There were actually about a dozen different hedge fund managers that figured this out and were trading credit default swaps on the bonds in these subprime mortgage CDOs.
I managed to get into one of those funds as a result, really, of the insight I got from Das's book. I'm like, I get it. This is exactly what they're doing is what Das said. They're making it too complicated. They sold a whole bunch of people a bunch of risk that they didn't understand, and it's blowing up. And that was what prompted me to invest in a fund that actually made a very healthy profit.
That guy actually was, I think his best year was 2007 at over 200% return. I was not in the fund for that whole time, so I didn't make that much, but other people did. And Das goes on to just debunk all kinds of stuff that was big in the industry at the time, whether it's portable alpha or any of these other buzzwords. He's saying it's all nonsense. They make this stuff up in order to confuse people.
Portable alpha and the pay-to-play conference
Nathan Egger: Wait a minute, Erik, portable alpha? What is that? That sounds, I've never heard that before.
Erik Townsend: Oh, that was a mid-2000s buzzword. So let's say you're a pension fund, manager and you really like some investment you're looking at, might be a stock, it might be something else, but whatever it is, it has a really high beta to the S&P 500. In other words, if you buy this thing, you're going to even further increase your correlation to the S&P 500. And you'd like to be a little bit decorrelated from a risk management standpoint. So what do you do?
Nathan Egger: I mean, I think you either reduce your S&P exposure or you find a short S&P hedge to reduce your net S&P exposure.
Erik Townsend: Nathan, Nathan, Nathan, you're not listening. What you just said simply, easily, directly addresses the problem and solves it. It does not generate millions of dollars for middlemen. It does not confuse anybody. You're not getting the memo here. You call it portable alpha.
First of all, I actually went to a portable alpha conference once in San Francisco. So you get a whole bunch of pension fund managers from all over the country in in a room, and the first thing you do is get a super confident Wall Street guy come and tell them how great this is, that portable alpha is going to change everything. Then you get a math guy that's got 3 PhDs talking about fractals and quadratic equations. And the favorite one is Greek letters. Anything involving Greek letters gets everybody confused. So, the gamma to the beta of the inverse differential of the something. And I'm just watching exactly as Das explained. I'm looking around the room and I'm seeing these guys first, their jaw drops, they're confused, they don't understand what's What's going on? Then they kind of do this, oh, wait a minute, I better not look like I don't know that I understand this. I'll act cool.
And they get them to the point where everybody's trying to act cool and nobody understands it. And then they start explaining, well, I've got this magic financial engineering that's so amazing. What you can do is you can take an investment that's a high-beta investment and you can effectively port that alpha, take the alpha you want, whatever the investment generates above and beyond the S&P 500, and you can decouple it from the investment and move it onto another portfolio without affecting your beta. Isn't that amazing? Amazing. Now, how do they accomplish that? They do exactly what you said, which is trivial, and a retail trader like yourself can learn it kind of in your first year, but that doesn't generate lots of fees. So they go through all this stuff.
Then this woman that they had hired to emcee the event gets up and there's a lot of confused faces. She finally says, okay, think of it this way, guys. You've got some big investment you want to make, but think of what it is, is it's got this little bit of alpha and this great big piece of beta, and that beta is the S&P. So, what you do is you short the S&P, very similar to your description, Nathan. She says you short the S&P, that effectively allows you to separate the alpha and minimize your beta impact on your portfolio when you buy this investment.
Then she goes on and she says, and as you do that, the alpha is now a smaller overall thing because you've hedged most of the overall overall notional size of this investment out with the short S&P hedge. Therefore, it becomes even more important to be aware of things like what your fee structure is, because fees are now a larger percentage of things. She gives a succinct, clear explanation that was almost as clear as yours was. And all of a sudden, there's a lot of heads nodding and everybody gets it.
Now, I used to do a lot of public speaking in the software business, and I know what it feels like to be a public speaker. And I know you don't— it's often a thankless job. So, I approach her afterwards and say, I just want to introduce myself. I thought you did a fantastic job of clarifying that. She gets offended and turns around and walks away. And I'm thinking, what the heck just happened here? And she sees me later and says, what firm are you with? Who are you again? And I said, I'm not with any firm. I'm a private investor. I'm just, you know, trying to learn this. She says, oh my goodness, your comment to me was sincere. You don't know what's going on. I said, no, I don't know what's going on. She says, I'm very proud of my public speaking. It's something I feel very strongly about, but I'm in the process of being fired today.
The comment that I made where I I said you want to focus on your fees. This is a pay-to-play conference, which means that the people who paid for this are the salesmen that are here to sell these services. I just told their customers that it is smart to understand what you're paying for this stuff. And it looks like I'm going to be fired. And there are people talking about walking me out the door even before the day is over. So, when your comment came, I thought you were being sarcastic. I'm sorry. I took it seriously. No, no, no. took offense.
And I'm like, are you serious? So we ended up— it's kind of a funny story. We ended up having breakfast the next day before both of our flights. And when I moved to New York, I ended up dating her for a little while.
Nathan Egger: Happy ending.
Erik Townsend: Woohoo!
Buffett on sales over investing
Nathan Egger: This kind of reminds me of and reinforces Warren Buffett's comments from last weekend's Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, where he was saying that the majority of money that has been made on Wall Street has been made through sales acumen and not investing Well, I don't usually agree with Warren Buffett on many things, but on that one, I couldn't possibly agree more.
Erik Townsend: If there's anything I've learned as I've gone from private investor to getting involved with this business, it is all about BS. It's about marketing. And I think that Traders, Guns and Money, although it's— and Das has another book out which I've not read yet, unfortunately. Traders, Guns and Money was a classic in my mind because it really really just explained what this is all about. It's people that are selling bullshit, frankly.
Next week: Steve Keen; sign-off
Nathan Egger: Well, next week, Erik, as you mentioned, you're going to be talking with an economist. He's also an author. His name is Steve Keen. For those who aren't familiar, Mr. Keen considers himself to be a post-Keynesian and has been an outspoken critic of neoclassical economics. So, he should have plenty more to say on the topics we've been focused on for the last 2 Please subscribe, rate, and review on iTunes and follow us on Twitter if you're active on Twitter. Our handle is @MacroVoices. You can also find Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend.
Also remember that if you'd like to continue today's discussion or the discussion we're really having over these 3 weeks, you can do so by joining us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums, or just go to MacroVoices.com and click on the Listener Discussion Forum tab. Thank you all for listening. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.
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