Julian Brigden — Julian Brigden, Macro Intelligence 2 Partners (introduced as 'Macro Intelligence 2 founder' by Erik at w85 and 'Macro Intelligence co-founder' by Nathan at w2008) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 16 was recorded on May 26th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Macro Intelligence 2 founder Julian Brigden will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts to support this interview, and we'll be talking about the US dollar cycle, what it means to both developed and emerging markets, inflation, precious metals, and much more.

Equities: S&P rebound and the June Fed meeting

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's get started with equities, Erik. 2 weeks ago, you said you were watching the S&P and waiting for a daily close below the 50-day moving average before you'd consider putting on a short trade. And we got that close on Friday, 2 weeks ago. But then last week, you were a little hesitant, saying that you didn't like the tape action. And you said you were going to wait and see what happened with the head and shoulders pattern that has been developing. which was actually trading below the neckline intraday when we were recording last week's show. Did you end up going short?

Erik Townsend: No, and I'm glad I didn't. Obviously, this week's upside tape action has just blown my mind. When we did not see an acceleration of downside momentum on that intraday break below the neckline and eventually closed above it, I knew we were set up for at least some kind of a bounce. I wasn't expecting quite this much. And frankly, what really kind of blows my mind is that The expectations, market expectations of a Fed rate hike at the June meeting have collapsed. Now, in the past, what we've seen is coming into these meetings where there was a threat of a hike, the market would throw a little tantrum. It would be down 100 S&P points effectively to scare the Fed out of hiking. The market's not trying to scare the Fed. I think that it's— it is a live meeting. As Mr. Dudley said last week, it's entirely possible that they could hike rates at the June meeting. It seems like the market has decided that's not a risk.

And I'm looking at 2,000 We're trading at 2,090 right now, which has been a technical level that's been thrown around by some technicians as maybe where we're going to find resistance. I don't know what to make of this, though. Clearly, the head and shoulders pattern has been invalidated now as we've moved well above what would have been the right shoulder. So, we're in uncharted territory. And I think that the Fed meeting in 2 and a half weeks' time is going to be very telling. Until then, I don't know what to make of the equity market.

Crude oil near $50, Cushing inventories and spreads

Nathan Egger: And of course, the crude oil market comes next, Erik. The financial press finally got their $50 crude headlines. Where do you see us going from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I was actually surprised. As bearish as I've been, I thought we were going to see a breakout above $50 with a lot of irrational exuberance and marching band music and retail investors piling in saying, okay, it's over. And I thought we might get to $51 or $52. And then I thought probably that would be the cycle high.

I did expect that we would break above $50. I thought it would last for more than half an hour, which is about what it's been so far. And then we saw a very aggressive sell-off. We closed on Thursday below the $49.50 level, which a lot of technicians have said is where that long-term channel resistance line is. So we're still, you know, in that trading range.

It's not an upside breakout. I would still expect probably a little bit more action above $50. If that was it, just the half an hour that we spent above $50 this morning, then I think that's a very bearish sign. Next week's inventory, of course, will be very important. And it's hard to tell. You know, the oil that comes from Canada in the pipeline, it takes it a month to get from Canada to the United States where it eventually hits those tanks. So with the disruptions and all of the up and down, first the Canada wildfire situation was critical, then it was resolved supposedly, then it turned out not to be resolved and there was another evacuation. It's been a lot of up and down. So what is that going to mean to Cushing inventory numbers next week remains to be seen. The 4.2 million barrel drawdown that was kind of the catalyst for the move higher this week. Was, I don't think, any real big deal.

It should be expected given seasonality. First of all, it's time of year that we should be having drawdowns on national inventory. Canada fires, Venezuela, and so forth. The fact that we only saw a 650,000-barrel drawdown in Cushing inventory in the face of the Canadian fires is really amazing to me. And to put it in context, you know, we were at 96.42%, I think, of operating capacity. We're all the way down to 95.51%. of operating capacity at Cushing, Oklahoma, as of this week's report. The thing that people didn't seem to really focus on in this report is there was a 2 million barrel gasoline build.

So, they're producing gasoline for summer driving season, which is upon us. The demand hasn't quite been there. And that is, to me, a bearish signal that the market didn't really discount as much as it should have. If the Canada situation gets resolved and normal flows into Cushing continue, we could still be setting up for that storage crisis. I don't think it would happen now, but, you know, We should be seeing big drawdowns in inventory this time of year. We won't get through fall maintenance season if we start at these inventory levels. So we've got to see drawdowns in inventory between now and the fall. Well, it's summer driving season and that should solve everything, right? Because we'll be consuming more oil. Look at this unexpected build in gasoline inventories. It seems like the demand is not coming as much as people thought. So I do think that the market rebalance should take care of itself in the second half.

But boy, we need to see Cushing Cushing in particular. And it's interesting to me, at 96% of operating capacity, the opportunity to pipeline some of that oil out of Cushing down to Houston, you'd think that would be happening. But what the traders tell me is the price levels just aren't there in order to arbitrage that trade. By the time you pay for the oil in Cushing and then pay for the delivery expense of sending it through the pipeline, nobody in Houston is willing to pay extra for it. So, You know, we still got this situation in Cushing, and I think we could see that in the expiration of this July contract, which would be in the middle of June. Right now, the difference between the first and second month is only about 39 cents as we're speaking. It was about 75 cents in the first to second spread a month ago. So, what happens when we get toward the expiry of this contract?

All the people that are piling in, the speculative longs that are saying, okay, you know, this is it.

Nathan Egger: That's it.

Erik Townsend: We're headed higher from here. Those people are buying front-month contracts, and as that contract expires, they have to sell them. They can't sell them to other speculators. Normally, who you sell them to is the guy with the storage tank who makes a little bit of money storing it for a month. If those storage tanks are full, I think you could see a dramatic widening of that spread as we approach the expiration of the July contract. In general, though, this cycle, I think it's getting tired, but it may not be over yet.

I think probably $51, $52 are some irrational exuberance before maybe next week's inventory could be the catalyst to begin a move to the downside. There are continuing signs of hedging going on in the oil market, as evidenced in those time spreads compressing. What that says to me is the front month is strong as it is pushing the curve up. The back months are being sold by producers hedging their forward production.

Gold: 50-day break, 200-day target

Nathan Egger: And you said last week that while you're long-term bullish precious metals, you feared that the party might be over for gold At least in the short term. And this week we saw gold lose $25 in a single day. That was on Tuesday. And as we're taping on Thursday, it looks like the selling is continuing. What do you see next?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, $1,219 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon before the futures close. And in general, something I've noticed about the gold market is the 50-day moving average tends to be more important in gold than it is in some other markets. It was the close below the 50-day moving average that we had earlier this week that really accelerated the downside selling. The next logical target to look at would be the 200-day moving average, which right now is right around $1,168 or so, at least on the futures chart. And I would say, if I had to, you know, what I like to do is kind of project just what the trajectory is. How long is it gonna be before we would get there? Looks to me like the test of the 200-day would come right around the time of the FOMC meeting on the 15th of June. So, I'm guessing that we're gonna see continued weakness in gold.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: If there is a rate hike, I think that would be the catalyst to send gold below the 200-day moving average.

If there's no rate hike at that meeting, I think that's where you might see the upside reversal, and that might be a buying point.

US dollar index after the Fed minutes

Nathan Egger: We've also been keeping a close eye on the dollar index here at MacroVoices for the last couple of weeks. And I'm sure our featured guest today, Julian Brigden, is going to have a lot to say about it. But is there anything that you would like to add, Erik, from your perspective?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, what has surprised me, what I said last week is, boy, we've seen really good tape action. The case for the dollar index really looks bullish. But boy, you know, a lot of that was this Fed minutes thing. And I thought we would see a pullback and we didn't really see the pullback. We have in the last couple of days seen a little bit of weakness, but, you know, nothing that's big enough to worry about. Where I thought we would see a pullback and a retracement of some of that strength that happened in response to the FOMC minutes. We're still holding right about at the same level as, as after that big move up. So, I think that it's— the tape is saying to me that this dollar rally is pretty strong. We do have a little bit of a pullback here.

I think that no hike at the Fed meeting might be a catalyst for a little bit of a move lower. But I think the lows are probably in. And if we did see a Fed rate hike, I think we're headed higher from here.

Guest preview, chart PDF and registration

Nathan Egger: Thank you, as always, for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest, as I mentioned, is Macro Intelligence co-founder Julian Brigden. Brigden. This guy is brilliant. I think you guys are really going to enjoy this one.

Erik Townsend: You know, Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts that he's going to be referring to in the interview. So, for those of you who are not listening at the gym or someplace where you can't look at a PDF file, I recommend that you pause now and open Julian's PDF file full of charts. He'll be referring to them in the interview. Registered users at MacroVoices.com should have already received this presentation via our Research Roundup email, which was sent to you when the podcast was published.

Nathan Egger: We've had a problem actually over the last couple of weeks where people are emailing me asking me to register them. Look, folks, this is a part-time job for me. And as much as I'd like to help you out, I can't do your registration for you. This is something you're going to have to do on your own. So, if you haven't registered yourself yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button on the top right side of the homepage, then click the Register Your Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page that you will see. It's always free. And we promise We promise never to spam you, and we're not going to sell your email address to anyone else.

Erik Townsend: We did discover a flaw in the registration process, which we fixed, and the problem was people were going ahead and registering at MacroVoices.com, as Nathan just described. That automatically signs you up to receive the next Research Roundup email, but what a lot of people wanted was the current Research Roundup email so that they could look at this week's content, which had already been sent out.

To solve this problem, we've added a new Research Library tab to the MacroVoices.com homepage. This new area of the site is eventually going to allow registered and logged-in users to go back and peruse all of the past content that we've ever distributed through our Research Roundup, including the latest content that supports this week's podcast.

So, if you were not already registered and you want Julian Brigden's presentation, here's what you need to do. First of all, go to MacroVoices.com, register a free account, per the instructions Nathan just gave you. Once you've done that and you're logged in, on the black menu bar at the top of the page, choose the Research Library function from the title bar, then choose the Documents dropdown. From there, click on Guest Publications, and then look for the Macro Intelligence 2 Partners presentation, which is about halfway down in that list of documents. We just set this up over the last couple of weeks, and frankly, the navigation could be better. We don't have pictures of the guests and that stuff yet.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: We'll get to that at some point, but for now, we do have a solution. So, that's how to get Julian's presentation right now if you're not registered yet.

Nathan Egger: Thank you for the clarification, Erik. And thanks for your patience, folks, for those of you who are already registered. But explaining this in detail on the show is going to save me from answering dozens of emails from listeners asking me to register for them. Erik's interview with Julian Brigden coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Broad trade-weighted dollar versus the DXY

Erik Townsend: Joining me next from Macro Intelligence 2 Partners is Julian Brigden, one of my favorite Real Vision appearances. I really love the graphs and charts that you have produced, Julian, and thank you so much for sending them to our audience ahead of time. Before we get into your first chart, though, about the US dollar, something I've noticed— I interview almost everyone in this program about the US dollar rally. And most people on Wall Street, when they talk about the US dollar, are talking about the DXY, the dollar index. But I noticed that most of the smartest guys in the room, yourself included, all prefer the broad real trade-weighted dollar index instead of the DXY. So, let's start with what's wrong with the DXY and why do you prefer the trade-weighted dollar index?

Julian Brigden: I don't think there's anything wrong per se with the DXY. It just has a, you know, a huge euro component to it, which makes, to be honest, from a trading perspective, it's sort of a waste of time. You might as well trade the euro.

But really, from an analysis perspective, I think we have to move beyond that. When we're looking at trying to look at macro effects of the dollar, you have to think well beyond the DXY, because the DXY is essentially the developed markets. So, it's got euro, sterling, CAD, Aussie, etc., etc. When we're trying to see the macro impact of dollar moves, I much prefer to look at the broad dollar, because it contains a huge element of EM in that. And that's important because these are the guys in the EM space are the guys who generally tend to fund themselves in dollars. You don't find many European or UK companies funding themselves in dollars, because they have large domestic deep capital markets. So when you want to look at the impact of the dollar, we prefer to— from a macro perspective, I said, we prefer to use that that broad dollar.

Three dollar cycles: the pause is not the top

Erik Townsend: And as I look at the chart that you've provided, you've got— looks like about a 40-year history of the Trade-Weighted Dollar Index showing the massive buildup in the '80s before the Plaza Accord, and then again another peak around 2002 or so. And that cycle bottomed in the last couple of years, and it looks like we're headed higher. And of course, the question on everybody's mind is, is this rally in the dollar That has clearly paused. Is it over or is it just pausing? And is the pause over? Are we headed higher? What's the direction from here? And what does this history tell you about what we can expect next?

Julian Brigden: So I find, you know, if you've got the chart in front of you, you can see this broad swing in the dollar. But if you don't, essentially what you're looking at is 3 cycles for the dollar. And you have these extended multi-year declines in the dollar. During those periods, whether it was— and it's hidden slightly by the gold standard, you know, we had all the Bretton Woods game. But essentially, the dollar was falling in value hard even before this chart began in '72. And that was because we were essentially devaluing the dollar or debasing the dollar by printing money to pay for the Vietnam War.

But as the dollar falls in value, you tend to build up bubbles in things that are very dollar sensitive. So emerging markets, commodities, that type of thing. And then as the dollar rallies, what you find, and you can see it on the chart, is roughly at around 21-plus percent, between 21 and sort of 24, 25, you tend to get a problem. And it's simply because the reserve currency has moved so far that you start to undermine the excesses created in the falling dollar periods. As I said, those typically tend to be in EM or in the commodity space.

So the first one that we saw was in the early '80s where we get the Latin American debt crisis. We'd built up massive bubbles in the Latin American commodity space fed by petrodollars out of the Middle East as their oil prices had boomed post the end of controlled commodity and oil prices in the '70s.

And as the dollar rises, Led by Volcker's extremely tight monetary policy, basically 21% change off the lows in the dollar. We get Latin American debt crisis, and that has consequences for the United States. We saw you know big losses in U.S. banks, people like Chemical Bank and Citibank, who were very present down in Latin America. They take hits, and the Fed steps off the gas, and we get this corrective pause.

The same happened in the late '90s. So this time we're coming off the highs of the dollar in the Plaza Accord. In 1985, the dollar falls steadily, steadily, steadily. The first thing that we do as the dollar is falling, we're building excesses actually in Japan because the yen's rising every single day as the dollar is falling. The money floods in naturally into Japan seeking to double dip both in terms of the currency appreciation and the equity market appreciation that's going on there. And then we get the Nikkei bubble burst eventually. The money comes flooding out of that and it goes into the next hot topic, which is Asia. And so we build excesses there. And then We put a low in the dollar when Sakakibara comes in in 1995 and says, look, yen strength is just too excessive. The dollar starts to rally 24% and change off the lows. We get the beginning of the Asian crisis.

It actually kicks in around 21%. It's the first time we get problems with Thailand in early 1987— 1997, sorry. And the US pauses. The Fed pauses because you've got problems. And the dollar dips.

But here's the point. In both of those cycles, it was a corrective pause. It was not a top. And when we look at the current scenario, we've been using this chart. And you can see here— or you can't see here— but basically, we're 25% off the lows of 2011 now. So, all of last year, we were saying we're going to get an emerging market crisis, and we were playing for an emerging market crisis.

And we did very well out of that. And now essentially we're in that pause phase.

But here's the point. History dictates that this is not the top. And I think there's some other things that we can talk about, gents, in terms of what's driven this structural move in the dollar, which do make it somewhat different and much more difficult to prevent that continued dollar strength. So this is a pause. We've been playing for the pause. We tend to think the pause is probably over in terms of the move down. We're down to the lows on the dollar.

We may not be ready quite yet to break out to the highs. That's going to take Fed rate hikes. But we think that's coming in the second half of the year. And we can explain that as you would like.

Dollar, oil and the second-half inflation upturn

Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, this entire move in the dollar, if you expect the dollar to be headed higher after this pause, most people would say, okay, that is inherently a deflationary event. If the dollar is stronger, then things that are priced in dollars would go down in price. And so, this is inherently deflationary. But I think you have a different view.

Julian Brigden: Yeah. So one of the things that we've been intrigued about is the way that central banks have— well, firstly, you know, you'll see in the chart pack if you've got it, you'll see that a dollar pause is itself truly reflationary. I mean, basically, if you look at— we've got a chart in here of G7 inflation against the dollar.

And you can see that the highs of the dollar are the lows of G7 inflation and the lows in the dollars are the highs of G7 inflation. It literally, within a sort of broadly structural disinflationary world that we live in. I don't like to use the word deflationary because deflation implies falling aggregate demand and falling inflation. So in this sort of disinflationary environment, the cycle is set by the dollar.

So what I find quite intriguing is that we've seen this hugely disinflationary pulse by a rapid rise in the dollar since, particularly since the summer of 2014, which has crushed oil prices. But the key thing for us is that, you know, back in the spring, in February, we started to suggest to clients that they actually start to buy oil.

And when you look at inflation, the issue is obviously we've had this massive disinflationary pulse. We've seen a bunch of central banks across the world, not so much the Fed, but certainly they've delayed hiking because of the disinflationary pulse. But certainly in the ECB, we've seen a bunch of central banks ease into this disinflationary pulse.

You know, that policy is now passed. We're already starting to see the base effects drop out from the oil price. And if you look at one of the final charts we put in there, we look at CPI in the United States. And you can see that essentially the big key components of CPI— owners' equivalent rent, services, and medical costs— are all sitting well comfortably above 3%.

What we've had is this huge drop in energy prices, which from a CPI perspective at the lows when the dollar peaked basically in January, February, were running at around 20% negative year over year in energy costs. So, that pushed down overall CPI.

But the point is that this is a one-off deflationary shock or disinflationary shock. Oil prices are by their very nature transitory. So, and we've seen this in the past, you've seen scenarios where particularly in the mid-'80s, '80s, where you saw huge drops in oil prices, similar sort of magnitude that we saw now, big drops in interest rates as central banks moved to ease into that thing. But a year later, those base effects drop out. I mean, literally, you go back to where you were with your underlying inflation, which in the US is above 3%.

And then unfortunately, you have to build into, to take into effect what happens then to the oil price. And we've actually You essentially doubled the oil price now, and so we have to then add in that inflationary pulse. So, as we move into the second half of the year, we truly believe that you get this cyclical upturn in inflation within a structurally disinflationary world, but a cyclical upturn in inflation, which causes huge problems for the central banks and potentially the bond markets because central banks have distorted bond markets and rates to such a large extent.

So, in the second half of of the year, what we expect to happen is the Fed to be forced to hike rates potentially significantly more than certainly the market's pricing, not necessarily the Fed is pricing, but the market is certainly pricing. And that we believe will reignite the next leg of the dollar up move that will be destructive again. So this is a cycle. This is a sequence of events and it's a sequencing game, but it will be, we truly toxic for emerging markets and I think do some significant damage.

So it's this misjudgment by central banks that we think is the big problem, that they've misjudged oil as a disinflationary event or as a deflationary event when it really is a transitory disinflationary event. And even in the US, where we have a huge shale industry, which has been responsible for a lot of the growth outperformance we've seen over the last few years, even in the US is ultimately stimulative lower oil prices.

Asia and China: money supply and the EM crisis risk

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to go back to your comment about emerging markets and what could happen there, because a lot of people have expressed great, dire concern about the risk that exists of another Asian financial crisis, as we had in the late '90s, if the dollar were to continue to appreciate. I think you have a slightly different view than the mainstream on that. So, could you elaborate on what you see happening there? Where are the risks, and how do reserves play into that?

Julian Brigden: So, if you look at if you look at Asia, one of the things that you can see is certainly from a currency perspective, one of the few regions that's seen little to no adjustment or the least adjustment, should we put it that way, in this dollar move has been Asia. You know, part of that is because you know as the savings pool is built up in Asia, the money has sort of stayed at home. It's been they've been very stable, safe places for domestic investors to keep their money. I mean, far better than you. Yes, in nominal terms, we've seen, you know, huge increase in US equity markets. We've seen big increases in European equity markets as these central banks have QE'd.

But because the currencies in Asia have stayed strong, there's been less incentive for this money to leave. The problem is, is, is that since last year, we have been building this disinflationary cycle in Asia because they have had— they've kept these very strong currencies. And we obviously have borrowing exposure. In US dollars, either directly or indirectly.

So, for example, if you look at somewhere like Singapore, if you track money supply growth in Singapore year over year, it is an utter mirror image of the fluctuations of the dollar because they run a true peg. And as they run a true peg, what happens when, you know, in 2006, when the dollar— '07, when the dollar was on the low, Singapore money supply growth was running at 25% almost year over year, which is why she has one of the most overvalued property markets. And overvalued asset markets in the world. And as the dollar started to appreciate, that money supply growth slipped dramatically.

And in the autumn of 2014, it was approaching zero, which is why she had to allow her currency to take some of the strain.

The same metrics essentially apply in China. So much more closed capital account, obviously. But essentially, while the dollar is stable or falling in value, which we saw into 2011, China, outside the absurdities of the GFC, and you can see this in the slide, basically control money supply growth somewhere between sort of 15 to 20% per annum. All is well.

The dollar starts to appreciate in 2011. Money supply growth slips a little bit. She manages to rejig it. But then in 2014, when the dollar really takes off, China is forced to intervene. Reserves fall. Remember, she takes dollars, they come straight through the front door, they get converted into renminbi, and her money supply growth slips towards 10%, which is when you started to get problems in the housing market, problems in the real economy, and problems in the equity market. Simply isn't enough cash to keep all those balls in the air.

So she had to let the currency go. And the point is, I think, is that we're in this, the eye of the storm at the moment, for better, for want of a better term.

And while the dollar is pausing, it is a pause to use a sort of trite phrase, a pause that refreshes because the fact that the dollar isn't appreciating takes the pressure off places like Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and most importantly, China. It allows them to not have to continue to intervene to maintain currency values and not draw down their own domestic money supply growth. But if we're right, and as this inflation story picks up in the second half of the year, and the Fed is then forced to hike rates and the dollar reaccelerates, and you can see Towards the end of the chart pack, we show the dollar how the typical correction in the dollar, if you look at that '81-'82 phase or that '97-'98 phase, is sort of 4% versus EM on a TWI basis and about 8% to 9% versus DM on a TWI basis. And we've essentially seen those moves.

So you'll also see at the end of the thing at the pack, the last slide that I put in there is the rate of change of this real broad trade-weighted dollar index. And you can see that Once we get over 12% to 13%, the wheels fall off the world. And that's that green line we put up there. You get an emerging market crisis. But the point is, is there's only 2 occasions where the dollar has lost all forward momentum and gone negative year over year. And that is Plaza, which was central bank intervention, and we're not about to see that. And that was post the GFC, where the Fed came in with QE1. And absent QE4, which we all know is still a long, long way away, That isn't going to happen either. And in every other occasion, we see a dip, a bleed-off of momentum, and then a secondary reacceleration.

So I think in that secondary reacceleration, which, as I said, I think we've possibly seen the lows on the dollar yet now already. We may not be ready to break out to new highs until the Fed is forced to acknowledge the rising inflation story. But once that happens and the dollar reaccelerates, we go very, very, very quickly. Back to the chaotic crisis we saw in EM, and particularly focused around Asia that we saw before. And I think the Chinese will have to let the renminbi at that point continue to gradually depreciate. I'm not so much in the sort of huge one-off 20% type thing, but I do believe they will let this renminbi march steadily, dollar-renminbi march steadily higher.

Chinese capital flight and property abroad

Erik Townsend: There has been an extraordinary appreciation in property values, particularly high-end luxury real estate in Hong Kong, Vancouver, San Francisco, and several other cities, which most people have attributed to money leaking out of China, essentially saying that it has entirely to do with the wealthiest Chinese wanting to get their money out of the country. How would this whole picture that you're painting reflect on And what property owners might expect in those markets?

Julian Brigden: Interesting tangential question. Look, I mean, I think that's entirely true. I mean, we have seen, you know, huge outflows. And I think we continue to see sort of steady outflows. They're trying to clamp down on this. They have to clamp down on this. But I think— and as I said, we're in this sort of eye in the storm where we've seen— I mean, if you actually started to see Chinese reserve growth actually improve a wee bit, and we've got some charts that sort of show that literally, you know, is part of this pause that refreshes in terms of the dollar pausing. That's literally what happens. But as soon as the dollar starts to reaccelerate again, I think you will see that pressure to the extent that it can from those Asians to continue to file out, fly out.

And I think it's not only going to see it just from the Chinese.

I think you're going to see it from numerous wealthy Asians who, as I said, have been Essentially, up until the latter half of last year, were cocooned by their strong domestic currencies. And certainly, I know by talking to Asian clients of mine, you know, starting last year was the first year in five or six that they'd actually started to allocate cash to overseas investments. So I think, you know, we will definitely see renewed interest by by Asian investors to the extent that they can. Can, to the extent the Chinese can, I think this is a trend that's not going away. Does it mean that Vancouver real estate isn't a bubble?

No, it doesn't. Because I think you can see it everywhere that there's huge excesses in the system. But I think there's always going to be a solid bid there. And you're going to have to see something, I think, really quite dramatic to call these markets to collapse. Cool off, cool down a wee bit, because just domestics can't buy this stuff. I mean, look at London. You know, look at the center of London. It isn't domestics who are buying this stuff. They're selling and moving out to the suburbs because the price arb is so huge. But there's still a constant bid underneath the market.

Silver and precious metals in a strong dollar

Erik Townsend: Now, you've articulated a bullish story for the US dollar, which most people would initially think of as bearish for precious metals. But you've also described an inflation case, which most people would think of as bullish for precious metals. I know you've got a slide here which makes a bull argument for silver. So, explain first why you see the current environment in the face of— you're expecting stronger, you know, strength in the dollar, but also strength in precious metals, and why silver over gold?

Julian Brigden: So, one of the trades that we recommended at the end of last year in December was to buy silver. It was purely a sort of chart-based call. So, you can see here, we've, we've got a Quite heavily scripted sort of silver chart, and there's a reason for that. First off, these the key thing to note is these are essentially anti-dollar trades because you can see here we've marked 2002 dollar high, 2011 dollar low. Those were literally the lows and highs of the silver price. So don't ever con yourself that these are any more. Than anti-dollar trades.

The reason why we scripted this silver chart so heavily, it is because we follow this pattern in charts which we use for all sorts of things. You know, for example, Triple D, the 3D printing people, or Apple stock at the moment, or whatever. And this is what we call a classic bubble. And we did a ton of work over the last few years looking and trying to identify a classic bubble. And essentially, it has nothing to do with valuation. It is all about greed and fear.

And it breaks down into sort of 4 parts: stealth, discovery, mania, bust. And it has some key components. You have to get a bear trap, you have to get a parabolic move, you have to get a bull trap, a failed neckline.

And silver fit all of those metrics. And believe it or not, we wrote a piece back in 2011 when silver was breaking through sort of $36, $37. And we said, our target on this is $13.50, this very long-term trend line that comes off the lows of the early 2000s. And so we got down to sort of $13.50, $13.75 at the end of last year. We recommended buying it because we were expecting this dollar pause because we'd done simply so much damage to the underlying global economy that the Fed would have to back off.

So as things stand at the moment, we've been long some silver. We took a little bit of profit recently or recommended taking a little bit of profit recently as the dollar started to show signs of basing. We're hoping we can get up to sort of $18.50, $18.60, $18.80, where there's a trend line. And I do think in an extreme scenario, we could possibly move up to $20.00. But I will stress this, that we like precious metals. But let's say we get that inflation dollar strength story in the second half of the year.

I'm really not expecting precious metals to massively outperform. I think they are going to be what they say on the can, and that is a store of value. So in an environment where my big fear is as the dollar rises, we get what I call a risk-off dollar rally. So you're getting the dollar rising as global equities are under pressure from this rising inflation and potentially bonds are under pressure too.

I think it's possible that precious metals hold their own. I'm not sure if I can really believe that we get a massive rally. I just do not believe we're getting back to much above even in the best-case scenario 25 on something like silver. So, we like it. We like it. We've liked it off these very tempting lows. We're getting closer to some resistance.

But, you know, I do like it as a potential store of value.

Emerging market equities and bonds: MSCI EM target

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to emerging market equities. Obviously, the weak dollar and rising commodity prices has been good news for emerging market stocks. One of the biggest trades of the last few years has been short emerging market equities, whether it be through the EEM or the MSCI Emerging Markets Index or whatever. A lot of people have said, though, that that trade is over. Certainly if you draw a trend line through the 2002 low and the— I guess it's the 2008 or '09 low, you know, from the financial crisis, we already hit that trend line. A lot of people say the bottom is in and it's uphill from here for emerging market stocks. I think you have a different view. Why is that?

Julian Brigden: Yeah, I mean, you know, for those of you who've got the slides in front of you, you will see that we've got a chart of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index here. And as with silver, I mean, this is a classic bubble. It is actually a classic bubble that should have burst in 2011, 2010, and should have collapsed. But QE came along and supplied the world with sufficient dollars to keep the game going via outflows from the US current account— sorry, capital account.

And when we look at precious metals, as I said, sorry, when we look at EM and emerging market equities, we cover most of our position back in January as we hit this trend line, and we've seen a countertrend rally.

But I can't be a bull on emerging market equities if I suspect that we have a secondary reaccelerative move coming in the dollar. And if I don't believe a top is coming in the dollar, and I think the only way that you can be a bull, and I think a lot of people are bulls, is this assumption that the highs are in on the dollar.

But I fundamentally don't believe the highs are in on the dollar for numerous reasons. I mean, we haven't even seen a single— well, we've seen one rate hike. So this has not been a dollar rally that's been driven by interest rate differentials. This is driven by much more structural underlying problems, which we can discuss in a second.

But when those interest rate differentials start to rise, as you know, as the inflation picture starts to accelerate, I think the dollar reaccelerates. And at that point, I'm— when we break that trend line in in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which, as you correctly point out, comes off those sort of 2001, 2002 lows, then I think we are going to see a major liquidation.

And the other sector that I'm watching very, very closely, which I think held up remarkably well in the second half of the year in the face of that weakness in emerging market equities, has been emerging market bonds. But if I'm right that we've got inflation and dollar strength coming through, It's in— it's— that's where I think we are going to start to see some real wealth destruction, destruction potentially, is not so much in the equity space, but in the bond space. And when that happens, I think, and you start to see outflows out of things like EMB, then you're going to see major pressure on those equities again. And our ultimate target for the MSCI Emerging Markets Index is about 400, which would in EM terms is about 15%.

Plaza Accord redux?

Erik Townsend: Now, one of the common narratives that you'll hear is that for exactly the reason that you just described, having to do with emerging market debt as opposed to emerging market equities, that the central bankers of the world cannot allow the dollar to appreciate as natural forces might want it to. And some kind of intervention along the lines of a Plaza Accord would be necessary because they're smart enough to know that if they let the dollar appreciate, it's going to cause an emerging market debt crisis.

Julian Brigden: Right.

Erik Townsend: What do you think about that? Is that realistic thinking?

Julian Brigden: I mean, look, here's the thing. I mean, there was obviously a lot of talk at the beginning of the year about some sort of pact. And I worked for policy consultancy policy groups for a number of years in my career, Medley Advisors being sort of one of them. And I'm always suspicious about this sort of coordinated intervention stuff, because when you actually chat to these guys on a one-on-one basis, the level of sort of international cooperation is not as great as you imagine.

And don't get me wrong, I think there was a sort of handshake that we got at the beginning of the year, which was facilitated by conditions. So, you know, given that we were starting to see equity weakness in the US as a consequence of the sort of deterioration we were seeing elsewhere in the world, given that we were starting to see pressure from the Chinese on the currency, I think everyone was in a position to stand back and allow the dollar to pause and allow the renminbi's depreciation to stabilize.

But that's where this inflation story comes through, because there comes a— you know, and we've just seen it from the G7. There just isn't that degree of cooperation. I mean, they can't even agree between the Japanese and the Germans and the US to allow the Japanese to try and push dollar-yen off the lows. I mean, they've done a decent job chatting it off the lows. But, you know, there's no way heading into a US election that the US can condone this, particularly since they know that they'd be handing a battering ram to Donald Trump. The Germans just aren't in favor of it, period, end of story, because they don't want to see the euro strengthen. So, I think that the practicalities of actually something much more concrete than a handshake, which in itself is, I said, afforded by this dollar pause, is it can only come about from something that I think is much, much more destructive.

So, in other words, I think I'm not I'm not putting the concept of some sort of Plaza Accord completely off the table, but I think you have to see a hell of a lot of pain to create that. It doesn't just happen now. And as I said, if domestic conditions in the United States start to materially change as the inflation picture, as the disinflation from the oil shock drops out, and then we have to factor in the 100% increase in oil prices that we've seen since January, I don't know.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Julian Brigden: I don't think the Fed can just stand back and just let, you know, and ignore it, because otherwise they're going to lose control of the bond market. And I think that's a far greater fear.

The central bank put: bonds versus equities

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to, I want to come back to that bond market point, but maybe in the context of another narrative that you hear a lot, even from some Fed governors recently, which is that there's just way too much complacency in developed equity markets, because people believe in what used to be called the Greenspan put or the Bernanke put, or I suppose now it's the Yellen put.

And what people have said is, look, at some point, the ability of central banks to bail out the stock market, even if they wanted to, breaks down. How does it break down? I would think what you were alluding to with the bond market is probably the answer. What does that look like? And what does it mean in terms of— I think there is tremendous complacency that, you know, nothing can really go wrong. 20% down, we know we're going to get more QE and a bailout. It's all going to be fine.

Where does that breakdown?

Julian Brigden: So as I said, I mean, if when I look at bonds and equities, there are some indicators which I sort of look at which just show just this extreme. And essentially, in the sort of halcyon world of academia that now passes itself off for central banking, it may be justifiable to have risk assets nailed to the ceiling.

And risk-free bond yields nailed to the floor. But as an investor, and clearly not of the same intellectual weight as these central bankers that we have now, I look at that and I just go, hmm, one of these things is wrong, and arguably possibly even both. Either we do have a recovery and reflation, in which case we've got the equity markets right, bond market is wrong, And we get a scenario like we got last spring starting in Europe. And particularly, I think the sensitivities in Europe, as I said, given how much they've overreacted to the fall in oil prices, and we get a massive correction in the European bond markets because, you know, if the DAX sitting at 12,000, I don't want to own Bobl 5-year Bobls at minus 37 basis points. It's just simple. We get this huge correction that in itself, as we saw last spring, will tend to undermine the equity market.

The other alternative is that the bond market is right. My natural inclination as a sort of bond-biased individual is to always believe the bond market's right. And there is no recovery. There is really no sustainable reflation. And in which case, the equity market's just a Ponzi scheme. Now, in that situation, in that latter situation, I think you can get a correction in the equity market, but absent inflation, You will, I think correctly to what most people's assumptions, get a central bank put at some point.

Now, does it work? We'll see. I mean, I'm very worried by the apparent lack of effectiveness of ECB and BOJ QE. And I do believe that the efficacy of QE depends very heavily on us believing it works. Right? Rather than it actually working, we have to believe it's working. We have to take money out of the bond market and put it into the risk asset market. And if you like Japan, and this is a problem in Japan, the Japanese have never believed it's worked. They've never taken money out of their own bond market. So, in that latter scenario, let's say the bond market's right, there is no reflation, then yes, I think the central bank put can come in. Where does it come in? We can all argue the toss. Is it, you know, 1,600? Is it 1,800? Is it 1,900? 1,900? Sorry, 1,600 or whatever on the S&P doesn't really matter.

But in the first scenario, where the equity market is actually right that we have growth, that we have reflation, and in the second half of the year we get that inflationary pickup, which all our models are starting to show in Europe, in the U.S. in particular, then I. I think the ability of central banks to act is actually really restrained. And I actually think that's the worst and the most dangerous outcome. So, we get this cyclical burst of inflation created by swings in the oil prices, which is what it generally does.

And a major disconnect between bond and equity prices created by this overreaction, this panicked reaction of central bankers. And in that case, as the bond market is under pressure, and the equity market starts to strain, the ability of those central bankers to come out and act will be heavily, heavily tied.

And in that environment, I think you're looking at a much, much, much more toxic, dangerous environment, you know, an environment eventually that leads to, you know, a major equity correction. Pushes us right back into deflation again, but with central banks' ability highly questioned, and the efficacy of QE even potentially questioned, which I think would be tragic.

Fed or the bond market: three trenches and the ECB

Erik Townsend: Now, one of the slides that you have in your chartbook just says very simply, either the Fed hikes in the second half of this year, or the bond market does it for them. I assume by does it for them, you mean the reemergence of inflation expectations is going to force

Julian Brigden: Correct. So, you know, as I said, they can, they can, you know, they'll try as much as they can to be behind the curve. And its logic dictates this is the right thing. I mean, there is an asymmetry to the risks here. But we've already started to see a pretty solid pickup in some of the breakeven indicators.

And if you look at the bond market, we kind of like to think of it as a sort of, you know, sort of First World War analogy, 3 sets of trenches.

So, your first trench with the onslaught of inflation is breakevens. Breakevens should naturally take the strain as the inflation wave starts to hit. And we've seen, as I said, solid pickup in US breakevens. We think that's got a lot, lot further to go. Then depending on how the central bank reacts, we come to the second trench. And the second trench is essentially the shape of the curve. So if the Fed is ahead of the game, game and hiking aggressively into that inflation pickup, then it's very possible that we get a flattening curve.

If they hang behind, which I think is their natural inclination, I think it's entirely possible if they prevaricate, you know, we don't get a hike in June, they maybe don't go in July, then we get into the, oh God, can they go in front of the election as that inflation pick accelerates, I think you see the curve potentially steepen.

And then the third and final line of defense will be those ED strips, you know, sort of Z 2016s against Z 2017, that kind of thing. So I think, you know, so far we're only in the embryonic stage. The only pressure that we're really seeing in, in the bond market is really in the breakevens. The curves have really done very little, certainly not protesting anything. But I think I think the Fed, they've picked up in the US, but I'm actually expecting in the next couple of months to see a marked acceleration of European inflation as those base effects that we've seen in the US already start to drop out.

We think that inflation picks up markedly in Europe into the second half of the year. With the ECB still pumping like crazy, I think we could start to see some pressure in that bond market. And let's be honest, I mean, ECB's reaction function to oil prices has been deplorable.

You've only got to go back to the summer of 2008, where we had, you know, Trichet saying— I have a slide which I show my clients— you know, he had a quote where he said, if we do not act decisively, inflation may explode. I think at the time oil prices were like $142. So, we were literally, you know, within a few bucks of the absolute high of oil prices. And of course, Of course, by treating it as a purely inflationary-deflationary event rather than a demand stimulative or demand destructive event, they overreacted. They hiked rates. And in January of this year, we had the mirror image of that where Draghi says, we will not surrender to low inflation. Well, they won't have to.

They will not have to. Inflation is going to rise markedly in Europe. Inflation, consumer inflation expectations are already rising. Raising and tend to lead the turn in the actual inflation. Wage growth is really robust in Europe. In fact, if you look at that versus CPI, we're at 2.8% now year over year compensation growth in Europe.

This is the sort of level where back in 2011, the ECB actually hiked. Now, we've changed colors totally in the ECB from sort of too So, from sort of Nordic toughies to sort of southern Mediterranean wussies when it comes to the inflation story. But the reality is that this situation, I think, emerges hard in the second half of the year, ties these guys' hands down markedly.

Erik Townsend: Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but from everything you're saying, I hear what sounds almost like a perfect storm analogy that you see inflation expectations rising that will force central banks to allow the dollar to appreciate, allowing the dollar to appreciate. At a time when inflation expectations are rising potentially takes away the ability of central banks to provide that Bernanke put or Greenspan put capability. And that potentially ignites a major risk-off situation. Am I, am I putting the lining the dominoes up correctly here?

Julian Brigden: Yeah. I mean, here's, here's the thing. I think I keep saying, you know, people say to me, you know, oh, but this is what central banks want. Right. And I keep saying, well, they've got to be careful what they wish for, because in a normal world, this wouldn't be a problem, right?

In a normal world where we hadn't distorted bond markets, this wouldn't be a problem. But the problem occurs because we have distorted bond markets and because we have created historical-wide divergences between bond markets and risk assets. So, yes, this may be what they want. But my concern is, as I said, is in the reset process where we push bond yields markedly higher, how much damage does that potentially do to these, to these, to these risk assets? And I think, you know, it may not be catastrophic, you know, because ultimately we do want reflation. It may not be catastrophic, but I fear That, you know, it may make last spring's bond meltdown and ensuing equity correction look like a walk in the park.

Macro Intelligence 2 Partners and Real Vision

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, we have not gotten to all of the excellent slides in your chartbook that you provided our listeners, but we are running out of time. I want to stress for our listeners, many of our listeners are also Real Vision television subscribers. I know you are one of the most prolific and popular personalities on Real Vision, so there's quite a bit more of your research available on Real Vision for people who are subscribers. Before we close, what can you tell us about Macro Intelligence 2 Partners, or MI2? I'm pretty sure that's the British Secret Service agency that James Bond worked for.

Julian Brigden: But I think— It's funny you pick up on that, actually. It was— he's actually MI6. But there was actually an MI2, and it is sort of a play on words. We set the company up 5 years ago this summer at the behest of a couple of hedge funds. Clients of mine who were reading my sort of my muses, musings that I was sort of making on from from my prior employer. And so we were looking around for a sort of name. And you know, look, as I said, I'm a Brit, and you know, I do love everything James Bond.

So I sort of came up with a logo that looks frighteningly similar to the sort of Universal Exports logo. And MI2 was just a play because there was actually a there were two of us who starting it off, and there was an MI2. And an MI3 and an MI4 and an MI5 and MI6. But MI2 was in charge of geographical intelligence up until just after the First World War. So, that's kind of— that was the play.

We've now grown the company over the last 5 years to sort of 8 individuals, 4 professionals. And we've got guys in London, we've got guys in New York, and I'm lucky enough to live out here in the mountains in Colorado. But essentially, we produce— the underlying aim of the business is not to pontificate about economics. I really— I'm not an economist.

And our role is to try and help clients make money. So, we develop these structural themes, some of the stuff that you're seeing today, where we talk about the bigger picture themes to help get people's heads around the issues that they should be watching. Those are a key part of the product. Then we have this piece that we called MI2 Trader, which is produced by one of my colleagues who's got 25 years as a hedge fund PM.

And essentially, his role is to look at the instruments we can express these views in, and more importantly, to say now, this is breaking now.

So, for example, last spring, we'd been bearish on US fixed income. We expected a slowdown in the US at the start of the year. We weren't looking at it from a weather perspective. We were looking at it from the shale perspective. We'd ridden the rise in the US bond market, and we were waiting for that turn where the market went, okay, this is over, and then the bond market started to sell off. But Erik, who's the trader, said— called me up one day and said, look, mate, I'm afraid it's not the Treasury market that goes. It's the Bund market, and it's going now. So, that's where we put the piece out, managed to catch the Bund sell-off.

And then finally, we have a Japan product, which is just produced by another colleague. It's fantastic. People love it. It's a very different product from the main product. It's basically a summary of the news with some commentary and analysis by a guy who's traded Japanese markets for 35 years and is beyond a fluent Japanese speaker. He frequently ends up putting out pieces where he's correcting some misinterpretation by Bloomberg and Reuters.

But yeah, that's, that's kind of what We are an institutional client base, ranging from family offices through to big money managers.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so your primary products are all institutional, which is a large part of our listener base. We also have a retail component. Is Real Vision the best place for them to follow you? Because for the folks that can't afford institutionally priced research, you do some fantastic stuff. Where can they find it?

Julian Brigden: Yeah, I think Real Vision— Raoul and I have— we've known each other since I used to cover him when he was at GLG. The hedge fund, and I was at Medley. And so, yeah, that's probably the best place to do it, because I certainly will be a relative— at least sort of 3 to 4 times a year, I'll be on Real Vision.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. And of course, for our institutional listeners, MI2Partners.com is your website. Julian, thanks so much for joining us today. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at Macro

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Real Vision offer and format feedback

Nathan Egger: Erik, we mentioned Julian Brigden's excellent Excellent work on Real Vision Television a couple of times today. And I just want to remind our audience that they can receive a free 1-week trial of Real Vision Television by visiting realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices. There's absolutely no financial incentive for us in promoting Real Vision, but we really do believe in their work. And we like to get you guys discounts wherever and whenever we can.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, and you know, I want to mention something else, Nathan, which is a question in my mind. We, we really love the Real Vision guys. They are doing a video format, and one of the things that differentiates us, aside from being free, is you can take us to the gym and listen to us on the treadmill because we're audio. So, I don't really know the best way to handle an interview like this. Julian had such fantastic charts, I just wanted to talk to them and talk about the detail of the chart. We welcome your feedback. Should we be doing that, or should we be trying to keep it focused on talk so you don't need to look at anything, giving you more flexibility to listen from wherever you are. We tried to kind of balance it today, but we would welcome your feedback on that point.

Postgame: inflation and the Fed

Nathan Egger: So, Erik, what did you think of Mr. Brigden's view that inflation is returning and that it might handcuff the Fed in terms of their options going forward?

Erik Townsend: It's absolutely fascinating to me that he brought that up. This is something I've been talking about literally for 5 years, and I don't have a prediction for when inflation comes back. But the point that I've been making is that you know a lot of people say, "Boy, quantitative easing, just printing money, trying to paper over all of our problems. This has to end badly someday."

And usually they don't fill in the blank and say, "Well, how would that happen? How would it end badly?" My answer to that is the Fed can get away with this money printing in order to paper over our problems until inflation rears its ugly head.

Once we have inflation, the Fed is forced to tighten policy in order to arrest inflation. And that means they can't bail out the stock market. So, I don't think that we really get to the endgame where we find out what the unintended adverse consequences of all of this money printing is until inflation starts to rear its ugly head. What Mr. Brigden is saying is that's coming by the end of this year. And if that's true, I don't really have an opinion on the timing of it. When and if it happens, Houston, we have a problem. Okay.

Postgame: dollar versus Saudi policy in oil

Nathan Egger: And do you tend to agree with his view that it was, in fact, the US dollar rally that caused the oil price collapse?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's a, it's a very interesting one, because I'm sure that the US dollar rally has had a lot to do with exacerbating the downside. I personally am very strongly of the conviction that the oil situation was a man-made event caused by Saudi Arabia intentionally. They could have supported prices by cutting production, as everyone expected them to do. Going into that Thanksgiving of 2014 OPEC meeting. They did the opposite. I am convinced that that was the catalyst that caused the massive downside move in oil prices.

Now, would it really have gone all the way to $26, or would it only have gone down to $50 if not for the US dollar rally? I think it definitely was an exacerbating factor, but I really think the catalyst that brought it on was Saudi Arabian policy. And the catalyst that has not happened What hasn't happened yet that will really bring on a strong recovery in oil prices is a reversal of that Saudi policy. I think eventually Saudi Arabia intends to coerce Russia and other producing nations to join forces with them in a cartel. When that happens and they cut production, everything changes overnight.

Oil outlook, next week's guest and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: Until then, I think right now we're in an overbought condition, and I would expect a move back at least into the high 30s before this thing

Nathan Egger: Listeners should know that in addition to all the excellent feedback that we've asked you for and you've been providing, the very best way that you can support MacroVoices is by subscribing, rating, and reviewing us on iTunes. You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and you can get regular market updates from Erik throughout the week by following his personal handle @ErikSTownsend, E-R-I-K-S Townsend. If you're not already subscribed, If you're not a Twitter person, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.

Next week, we'll be back with fan favorite Art Berman. He's going to be bringing us up to speed on the oil market fundamentals just as we're reaching this key $50 level. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions. based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

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