Ben Hunt — Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 18 was recorded a day early this week to accommodate travel schedules on Wednesday, June 8th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author Dr. Ben Hunt Will be joining me as this week's featured guest. Dr. Hunt and I will be discussing the U.S. dollar, the upcoming Brexit referendum, U.S. monetary policy, negative interest rates, and much more. And MacroVoices' own volunteer research team captain, Aaron Chan, will be joining us again at the end of today's program.

Market wrap: equities, bad-is-the-new-good and the Fed

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's talk equities, Erik. By midweek, the S&P had already traded above 2,120, nearing those all-time highs. And all of this in the face of economic data that has been just awful, including last Friday's nonfarm payroll report coming in at only— it was 38,000 new jobs created. Erik, what's going on here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's exactly about the awful data, and it's— we're going back to this bad is the new good doctrine. And it's crazy that this is happening because just this week, you know, last week we talked about Andy Xie joining the chorus of bears along with George Soros and Carl Icahn and Stan Druckenmiller and all these, you know, rock of finance who are just saying, this is crazy. Asset markets are way overvalued. Rosenberg came in this week. He has a new 106-slide PowerPoint presentation, which I thought was excellent. We've got a link to that in this week's Research Roundup, which has already been emailed to our registered listeners here at MacroVoices.com. And for that matter, Goldman Sachs was out Tuesday evening with a bearish note predicting a significant drawdown in equities. So how are all these things possible? In that we have the market almost flirting with all-time highs in the face of the smartest guys in the room all saying that the economy is headed for the toilet?

And the answer is because we're back to this bad is the new good doctrine, which really has existed since 2009, where it is expectations of Fed easing that are driving things more than actual economic data. And of course, the effect of the nonfarm payroll report on Friday was to virtually guarantee that there will be no hike at next week's FOMC meeting.

So if we're not going to get a hike in June, a lot of people seem to think a hike in July is impossible because there's no press conference. Now, the Fed has been pretty clear that the July meeting is a live meeting and there could be a hike then. But there hasn't ever been one, at least in recent times, before when there was no press conference. And so a lot of people think that that is not possible. I said last week that no hike could ignite a rally towards all-time highs. And that's exactly what's happening. But it's happening early because people are basically assuming it's a foregone conclusion after this nonfarm payroll report. And Janet Yellen's emphasis on being data dependent, that, well, gee, the data really does not justify a rate hike at this point.

So it remains to be seen whether or not this rate hike is going to be a buy the rumor, sell the news event where we see a top in equities, which would be, say, a double top testing those all-time highs. And maybe that's where the top is in and it's downhill from there and all these smart guys are proven right. Or maybe we see an actual breakout above those prior highs. If that happened, it would definitely be self-reinforcing because pretty much any technician will tell you that a breakout to new all-time highs is always a bullish buy signal. Now, a disciplined technician would also tell you that you have to wait for that breakout to be qualified as a legitimate breakout. In other words, it needs to stay above those all-time highs for more than just a few days, and it also needs to significantly move well above the prior highs.

In this environment where there's so much irrational exuberance and very strong bullish investor sentiment in the system, I think as soon as we see a couple of points above the previous high, a lot of people are going to be buying hand over fist in what I think is really more hysteria than sensible risk-taking.

But, you know, I think the biggest mistake that you don't want to make here is say, oh, it's impossible in the face of this economic data for the market to move higher. It's not impossible if the majority of market participants think that a U-turn in policy is coming.

In other words, not only is there no hike at the June meeting, But there's no more hikes. We're not gonna have any more hikes. The attempted hiking cycle is over after only one hike. If that's what happens, or if expectations in the market are that that is what happens, that the rate normalization narrative that we've been living under is over, then we're back to the same kind of craziness that's happened since 2009, where people start expecting the next round of quantitative easing and so forth. So now that's not what Janet Yellen is saying. She's saying that we are in a normalization process and that if it doesn't happen at this meeting, Well, then maybe it'll happen at the next meeting. I think a lot of people are starting to assume that maybe the rate normalization attempt is over. And the reason a lot of them are saying that is that if we don't have a hike at the June meeting next week, which seems almost certain that we will not, well, then it's been too many meetings between rate hikes.

And if you look at prior precedents, normally a rate hiking cycle, you don't go that many meetings without having a hike. So that sort of implies that it's over. I think that's misplaced logic, frankly, but a lot of people think that. And what we're seeing right now is a lot of exuberance. Let's suppose this thing does break above the previous all-time high and starts to gain momentum and moves even more to the upside.

You know, at some point, what does this mean? You know, is it bad is the new good forever? So if we had another Great Depression, that would send the S&P to 5,000? Obviously, this can't go on forever. So the question to ask yourself is, what breaks this bad is the new good doctrine?

And I think it's one of two things. Number one, when inflation hits the stage again. The Fed can get away with accommodating asset markets and boosting asset markets to create wealth effect. We had an article in, I think, last week's Research Roundup from Jesse Felder describing why he feels that the Fed is entirely Dow-dependent rather than data-dependent.

The thing is, they're getting away with that because of the current deflationary backdrop. When inflation hits the stage again, whenever that happens, all of a sudden the Fed's hands are tied. They're forced to hike rates. rates in order to combat inflation, they can't support asset markets, and then you potentially get a really abrupt sell-off, if not a bigger crash than 2008.

Now, a lot of people have said to me, Erik, you're crazy to even bring up inflation. Look at what's going on. Very, very clearly, the macro backdrop here is deflationary, not inflationary. Well, they're right about that, but if you look at your history, every epic inflation in history has been preceded by a whiff of very strong deflation. And usually what happens, the Weimar Hyperinflation is a good example. There's a deflationary backdrop that allows central bankers to become overconfident and think they can get away with printing unlimited amounts of money, which of course Rudolf von Havenstein did back in Germany in, in the Weimar hyperinflation. That works for a while until it doesn't work and you get runaway inflation, and then you've got a really crazy situation. I didn't think that there was any sign of inflation on the horizon. I was very surprised when Julian Brigden a couple of weeks ago said Hey, you know, I think by the end of the year we could be looking at inflation and inflation expectations starting to take off.

I'll be surprised to see that, actually, but boy, I'll be watching carefully for it, because when you start to see inflation take off, that's where I really get concerned.

The other way that this bad is the new good doctrine could come to an end would be if we start to see the Fed moving back to an accommodative stance, maybe another round of quantitative easing, and there is a public outcry. And I think in the current political cycle, it's very possible that this could happen, where the people say, look, if we're going to do more money printing, it should support Main Street, not Wall Street. This business of propping up asset markets is immoral because it helps only a very small part of the population. If there's going to be more money printing, it should go into infrastructure or some other kind of spending which is much broader based. That could be what short-circuits the Wall Street expectation of the Yellen put, that the Fed is going to be there to bail out Right.

Until one of those things happens, though, I think if we are indeed going to watch the Fed abandon its attempted rate hiking cycle, or rate normalization cycle, as they call it, that could lead to another big round of irrational exuberance and more upside in asset markets. I don't think it makes any sense in terms of the economic backdrop. And I'm noticing that some of the smarter guys, you know, Rosenberg is not saying that he thinks the stock market is going to crash. He just thinks that the broader economy is in big trouble. And I think I think Andy Xie said the same thing about the global economy. So maybe what we're looking at is a period, at least, where we were kind of like the Austrian concept of a crack-up boom, where asset prices continue to rise as the economy falls apart. I don't know, but I think the fundamental backdrop looks awful.

Asset prices are still moving higher and may continue to move higher if there is an expectation of more accommodation from the Fed.

Crude oil, Cushing storage and spreads

Nathan Egger: I often wonder who exactly it is that's waking up every morning and deciding they need to buy more equities. But we saw crude oil We saw crude oil last week, Erik, meet considerable resistance around $50. And we've seen a lot more strength in crude oil. We got back above that $50 level, and we've been able to trade there for a bit. Saw WTI trading above $51 on Wednesday. What's your outlook for the crude?

Erik Townsend: Well, we had a couple of things happen this week. As you said, we couldn't get above $50. There's a psychological barrier there. But I think most technicians have said the more important technical level is not $50, which is a psychological number, but more like Like $51.90, just below $52. And that shows up in the longer-term charts, in the weekly charts, as a major retracement level.

And as we speak, just after the close on Wednesday, we're almost there. We're 30 cents away from it at $51.53 as we're speaking late on Wednesday. I think we're probably going to get to that $51.90 number. That also coincides with what looks like it could be the final reaction high on an ascending wedge pattern in both the CL and the Brent crude oil charts. So it does look like we're maybe on a high here, but with all of this Fed exuberance, I'm not sure I dare to short it just because everybody's buying everything hand over fist. A couple things happened this week.

Tuesday, EIA's short-term energy outlook reported a much larger drop in production in May than we had seen previously. Remember Art Berman last week on the show saying, you know, we were seeing these 50,000 barrel per day drops in a given month, and it maybe got as much as 100, but it's not enough. We need 150 before it's really going to make a difference in terms of allowing higher oil prices. Well, guess what? We've got that north of 150 now. Also, relative inventories, both in absolute and in relative terms, inventories are falling. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on that because Art Berman does have an excellent new blog post out on that exact subject. We've got a link to that post in your Research Roundup email this week.

EIA inventory came out Wednesday morning. Drawdown in national inventories of 3.2 million barrels, about in line with expectations and entirely consistent with what would be regular and normal at this time of year. We are in drawdown season. It's summer driving season. Cushing, Oklahoma, drawing down 1.4 million barrels. 1.363 actually was the number.

That's a little bit bigger than analyst expectations. Doesn't really surprise me, though, because of the Canada wildfires, which are affecting supply of Alberta oil into Cushing. That is a major stick save, though, for the storage crisis. We got as far as 96.42% of operating capacity in Cushing, down to about 92.5% as of today. 92.5% is still a huge number, but in terms of how much spare capacity is available, we've gone from 3% to 7%. So we've got, you know, twice as much buffer as we had before. The surprise, though, was gasoline and distillates. Distillates, of course, is a collective term for diesel fuel and jet fuel and all the other stuff that's made from crude oil, types of fuels other than gasoline. A build in inventories of 1 million barrels of gasoline, 1.7 million barrels in distillates. Well, hang on. That 3.2 million barrel crude oil drawdown is about right for this time of year. But if you consider that there was a buildup of 2.7 million barrels of finished products, they're processing the crude oil, they're refining it into refined products that apparently are not selling.

So it almost mitigates or cancels out most of that 3.2 million barrel drawdown. The $51.90 retrace target that I mentioned is definitely in the crosshairs. I'm noticing a lot of technicians, whether they're talking about that number or they're talking about the ascending wedge pattern or they're talking about just prior levels that existed, for different reasons, different technicians are talking about tops here. So I do think that we may be at a cycle high at $51.90, which I expect that we'll test before the week is out.

Nathan Egger: Okay. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: I'm also watching carefully the front-month spread. That's the difference between the July and the August contract. Because as I've described in previous shows, the place where you potentially get downside risk in terms of storage capacity being a problem is if the speculative longs— and remember, even if the longs want to stay long, they're still forced to sell that expiring July contract. Who are they going to sell it to? They can't sell it to other speculators because other speculators have to be into the next contract, the one that It does not require you to take physical delivery if you trade beyond the 21st of June, which is when this contract expires. So if they're forced to sell that and there's nobody to sell it to, you could see that spread dramatically widen out. Now, back when we were at 85% of capacity, we were seeing $2 contango spreads near expiration. We're not seeing anything close to that.

It moved from $0.45 a week and a half ago to $0.61 as we're speaking now on Wednesday. So we are seeing a widening of the spread, which is not unusual. If there is tight storage, as we have, but it's nothing out of bounds. It's nothing to suggest a panic. So it does not look to me like there's any storage crisis that's going to happen. I think the market, even though we're above 90% capacity, is saying, "Hey, the trend is reversed. We're seeing drawdowns. We're also seeing a lot of supply destruction around the world." I think the market is breathing a big sigh of relief.

I have noticed also. You can see also that there's been temporary compression in those spreads, spreads across the board, not just the front month. Each time the market moved above 50, there was a temporary compression of spreads that lasted for several hours and then came back out. What that says to me is each time the market moved above 50, there was another wave of producer hedging. And again, producer hedging means that oil producers are selling the long-dated contracts as speculators are buying the near-dated contracts. That flattens out the curve.

If you think, as I do, that that is not sustainable long-term, that either the front month moves down or the back months move up, one or the other, then that curve steepener trade that I've talked about in previous shows ought to be profitable.

Gold and the FOMC test

Nathan Egger: And the gold chart was looking awfully bearish last week. We saw the yellow metal struggling to stay above $1,200, but the upward price spike in reaction to the weak jobs report on Friday was dramatic. It was instantaneous. What are you seeing in the gold market?

Erik Townsend: Well, it was not only dramatic and instantaneous, it took us right back to a critical level, which was around 1,250 or so, and the 50-day moving average. To see a data report like that jerk the market back to a key technical level such as a moving average is really not a big deal as long as it stays below that moving average. And for a couple of days, it looks like it was going to stay below the 50-day moving average. I thought that might be kind of a False up move and it might roll back over as the, the news from the payroll kind of faded out of traders' minds. Today on Wednesday though, we saw a very aggressive breakout up above the 50-day moving average, testing $1,267 at one point on Wednesday. So that's $12 above where the moving average was. What this all says to me is we're seeing some pretty darn good strength here. I had said last week, I think, that what we might see happen with Gold is if we got to the FOMC meeting and there was no rate hike, that might mark a bottom.

I think that could be what is in play here, but it wasn't the FOMC meeting, it was the payroll report, which basically guaranteed the outcome of the FOMC meeting. And that clearly, at least on Wednesday, is showing a lot of strength. So I think maybe we are seeing the beginning of another move higher. The next big test, of course, will be can we get above $1,300, above the most recent high, and start to move higher from there.

It's still a matter of watching, and I think that next week's FOMC press conference is going to be absolutely critical, because if Janet Yellen reinforces the message of, hey guys, we are in a rate hiking cycle, we've decided to pause here, we're not going to do it this month because of data, we're going to wait for next month and see if the data looks good, but don't be surprised if a rate hike comes next month, boys and girls. If Janet Yellen were to express that sentiment, I think gold would be turning right back down just as quickly as it went up.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: But more consistent with her recent statements, if she kind of said, yeah, well, maybe we don't have to do any more hiking, and we're not going to perhaps do any more hikes this year, and maybe that's it. If she continued to send a dovish message, as she has, that could very easily shock both equity and precious metal prices much higher.

So I think that the tell is probably going to be what happens at next week's FOMC meeting, which of course is Wednesday afternoon, the 15th of So, we're seeing buying in gold in response to weak economic data and statement from the Fed.

US dollar index weakness

Nathan Egger: How's this been affecting the US dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, obviously, the big move was way down in reaction, again, to the jobs report. Everybody knew that that was going to take the rate hike off the table. And of course, if the rate hike is not there, that was— it was the expectation of the possibility of a rate hike, or at least the fact that we're still in a hiking cycle, that was providing strength to the dollar. When I saw that massive downside spike, I said, I sort of thought to myself, okay, markets tend to overshoot and overreact to data points. Maybe this is a buying opportunity here. Maybe it is going to be uphill from here and this is a buying opportunity, but I'll watch it for a couple days before I buy anything.

Sure enough, what's happened in the last couple days is we're seeing continued weakening. We've dropped almost another full large handle on the dollar index since that jobs report. And what it says to me is the market is starting to say, hey, wait a minute.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: If the Fed is not really going to follow through with this rate hiking program, maybe that wasn't the low that we saw back at '92 or so on the dollar index. Maybe this was a false move to the upside and actually there's a much lower. So I see continued selling this week following Friday's data. It's not just the crazy reaction on Friday, but it's continuing. That says to me that there are growing market market expectations that the hiking cycle, the rate normalization cycle, is over and about to be abandoned by the Fed. I think they'll probably be proven wrong by that, but it won't be till Janet Yellen's press conference that we get a better indication of what's going on.

Treasury yields

Nathan Egger: So, equities up, gold up, dollar's getting crushed. Why are we seeing bond yields getting crushed with Wednesday's 10-year reopening printing a 1.7 yield? What's going on here in fixed income?

Erik Townsend: Well, of course, what's going on is the, the same thing. The jobs report is pretty much assuring that there's going to be no hike of short-term interest rates. And so as a result of that, long-term interest rates are starting to drift down as well. 1.7 is kind of a key level in a lot of technical charts, and I think that a lot of people are perceiving it as sort of a credibility level. In other words, we were seeing increasing 10-year yields So, if we continue to see higher yields, that's an indication that market participants are expecting improvement in the broader economy. But if we start falling below 1.7%, how does the Fed justify a hiking cycle if we're seeing really what is a pretty strong oncoming recession signal coming from longer-dated Treasury securities? And how does the Fed continue to justify staying on its rate normalization cycle in the face of that?

So, what happens here?

Nathan Egger: Lower?

Erik Townsend: We'll see. I think, again, it's going to depend very much on Janet Yellen's comments next week. If she reinforces the message of, hey folks, don't forget, we are committed to a rate normalization cycle, it's just a question of taking pause until the data supports it, then I think you'll see things turn around. If the Fed backs away and says, oh, maybe we're done with this rate normalization cycle after only one hike, then I think it's a whole new ballgame. And I think you could see lower bond yields. I think that you could You'll definitely see asset markets in general going crazy.

Nathan Egger: Thank you for the market update. This week's featured guest is Dr. Ben Hunt of Salient Partners. Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Ben Hunt: Dollar outlook and China's devaluation pressure

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Dr. Ben Hunt, Chief Risk Officer at Salient Partners, and of course, author of the very popular Epsilon Theory blog. Ben, thanks so much for joining me on the program. I want to start with the US dollar because, as you know, everything else hinges on that. We've had some guests on the program tell us the tops are in and it's all downhill from here on the dollar. Others have said the pause is over and it's all uphill from here. What's your perspective?

Ben Hunt: Well, it's great to be here, and you're right that this is the topic that we need to be discussing first and foremost. So, so, so here's my view. My view is that the dollar is not a, um, let's call it an independent entity or security like a, a stock would be. It doesn't have its own independent cash flows or anything the like.

What the dollar is— what, and by the dollar, what we mean is the exchange rate of the dollar versus our trading partners— the dollar is a reflection of monetary policy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: Not just to the Fed, but a reflection of the strategic interaction, the game that's being played between the Fed, People's Bank of China, the ECB, and the yen. So I'm not perplexed, because I understand that that's what we do in this world. We try to predict if something's going up or down. But what I'll tell you is that when you're dealing with something like the dollar today, that is driven

Erik Townsend: That's right.

Ben Hunt: That's driven by game-playing, that's driven by strategic interactions.

It's very different from trying to predict whether something that has fundamental causes will go up or down. That is, whether the dollar goes up from here or down from here depends entirely not just on the decisions that the Fed makes, but on the interplay, the interaction between the decisions that the Fed makes and particularly the Chinese So I'll tell you, if I'm a betting man, I say that the dollar goes up from here because I think it's an existential issue, political issue in China, that they have to keep devaluing their currency. It's massively overvalued today for reasons we can discuss, but I think that the political dynamic is going to be driven by this existential issue in China. to devalue their currency, to continue to promote industrial production and exports.

Erik Townsend: Okay, why don't we go ahead and pick up on the China overvalued argument?

Ben Hunt: Yeah, sure, sure. That— I mean, this is the, uh, you know, I, I try in my, my blog and the notes that I write to try to apply the lenses of, of game theory, which we just kind of touched in passing, but also of history. And, you know, the last time we had such overwhelming debt in the world was in the 1930s. And I think people are kind of familiar with that dynamic.

But, you know, what I think is most interesting about China, the historical comparison I would make with China, is that I think they're very similar to Germany before World War I. You know, what do I mean by that? What I mean is that As Germany was in, say, 1910, 1912, they are the up-and-coming challenger in the global economy.

They are also a country that is, let's call it, more authoritarian than their neighbors, the European neighbors in the case of Germany, and of course, their Pacific neighbors in the case of China.

And they're also responding to their new position as the challenger for the largest economy in the world in a very similar way. And what I mean by that is they're printing a lot of money. It's something that one does as a government or a country in this sort of position, because what you're trying to do is you're trying to Well, let me back up a second. You've built this position of being a challenger in a tremendous economy by trading with the world.

And what you need to do now is what— or what you think you need to do now is you need to develop internally. And that's what China's trying to do too, just like Germany tried to do before World War I. They're trying to build out their own domestic— they didn't call it consumption in 1910, But they, they, because they're trying to build out their own domestic, particularly financial system. It's the same in China.

So what do you do when that happens? When you have shocks that are occurring in the world, as you did in, you know, in the early 20th century? Well, you print a lot of money.

You print a lot of money because you don't want to be tied, you don't want to be vulnerable to what's going on in the, in the, in than the rest of the world. And the way this played out with China was that in the Great Recession, 2008, they flooded their country domestically with credit. It's a very sensible thing to do, right? You can, in a sense, inoculate yourself from the enormous recessionary, deflationary pressures that are washing up, in that case, on China's shores. From the financial crisis in the US and Europe by just printing a lot of money. That's what they did. So, to give you a sense of this, in the US today, when we talk about M2, the broad-based monetary supply, it's about, I don't know, 75%, 80% of US GDP.

In China today, it's about 250%, 260%.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Ben Hunt: Of their GDP. It's a tremendous difference, and almost all of that difference has occurred since 2008, where they've just printed lots of money. Now, that's fine. Like I say, it's a very sensible thing to do to try to protect yourself as a big growing economy.

You want to— you don't want to get knocked back by whatever's happening in other countries. But here's the downside. The downside is That because you've printed so much money, your currency should be worth less, right? I mean, if you now have to exchange that currency that you've printed 10 times of over the past few years, it means it's going to be worth less when you're exchanging it for dollars.

But that's a problem. It was a problem for Germany when they were on the gold standard, and it's a problem for China today when they're effectively on the US dollar. Dollar standard, because they haven't been able to devalue their currency. All right? So why is that a problem? It's a problem because then it makes their goods and— not so much services, but the things they make, the industrial output that they have, it makes it more expensive to sell abroad.

And for the next decade or so, as much as they're trying to develop that internal market, China is still going to be an export-led economy. Exports to the United States for sure, but also to Japan, to the emerging markets of Russia, India, Brazil, and particularly to Europe. And when their currency is overvalued, they can't sell as much stuff, and so their industrial production goes down.

Why do I call that an existential threat? Because ever since Donald Deng Xiaoping really reformulated the legitimacy of the Chinese state from Mao and the Gang of Four, and that legitimacy was based on the idea of, you know what, we can all get rich together. We can develop the economy. It's glorious to be rich, and that's going to be the driving force of the Chinese state.

So, So in this world that Deng Xiaoping created 35 years ago, they, meaning Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party, have to have real people making real stuff in real factories that they can really sell. They don't care if they sell it domestically or internationally, but for, let's say, the next decade, most of it's going to have to be sold internationally.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Ben Hunt: So they have to export. Their exports are declining, declining precipitously. And that's the existential risk that China has, and that's what I think will continue to press them to devalue their currency so they can keep selling stuff to the rest of the world.

Brexit, the euro and Humpty Dumpty moments

Erik Townsend: Let's go back to Europe, but perhaps to the part that is not sure if it wants to be in Europe, which of course is the upcoming Brexit referendum on June 23rd. Most of the interviews I've heard on this topic are with British economists who seem to have a lot of political capital invested personally. I wonder if you can give us the level-headed— for both outcomes, what are the economic consequences to the rest of the global economy on either result of this referendum?

Ben Hunt: Minimal. Minimal. So, so, and here's, here's why I say that. There are, in my thinking, I think I think there are 2 what I'll call Humpty Dumpty moments, right? Meaning that events that are so damaging to the status quo of monetary policy and this edifice that, you know, the central banks and the status quo politicians have built up over the years.

There are 2 of those Humpty Dumpty moments that I can identify. One is what we just talked about. If China floats their currency and it devalues, If the euro devalues by 20%, which I think it would, that's an atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, and Asian and European banks are in an unbelievable world of hurt if that happens. We can talk about that.

The other Humpty Dumpty moment is something that strikes at the heart of the euro.

You'll notice both of these Humpty Dumpty moments have to do with currencies. And that is the world we're in. And that's why I think you smartly started off our discussion talking about the dollar. It really is currencies today through which all of these political and monetary forces present themselves.

So the thing, though, that would break up the euro, it's not Brexit, right? So obviously, you know, the U.K. is not part of the euro system, so their exit doesn't threaten the euro system.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: And that's why I say it's not an issue that really is that big of an impact fundamentally on markets, because it doesn't impact the euro system. It impacts the E.U., the European Union, but it doesn't impact the euro system. What would impact the euro system?

A President Le Pen, right?

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: An election in Germany in 2017 Where, you know, a Le Pen equivalent, right, comes to the fore in German politics. That is what strikes at the heart of the euro system. And those are the Humpty Dumpty moments that I think you have to look at for Europe. So, look, is Brexit important? Of course Brexit is important. It's particularly important for the U.K. I'd vote to leave in a heartbeat if I were over there and I were voting.

You know, that's just me. I think that the politics of identity and sovereignty are clearly making a resurgence in the world. I think this is a— the Brexit vote is a symptom of that. And if I were a betting man, I'd say that they leave. But I don't think that it has that great of an economic impact. I think, you know, Look, I think you can have a risk-off moment in markets if they vote to leave, because the dollar will go up when they leave.

The pound will go down when they leave. That's a risk-off scenario. But for me, that's a moment to jump in and buy, as opposed to those other Humpty Dumpty moments I spoke of, you know, a Chinese devaluation, a French election, of the National Front candidate. Those are events where I want to sell on the risk-off and then keep selling.

Inverted price signal: equities as monetary-policy proxy

Erik Townsend: Let's come back to the United States. Equities, as we're speaking on Wednesday morning, are flirting with all-time highs. And of course, it appears that the catalyst for that is bad news, that we had this dreadful payrolls report. So I particularly have been looking forward to asking you this question because you view economics through the lens of game theory. And what I see here is just nobody's talking about the fact that we've completely inverted the price signal. You know, the S&P 500 used to be a leading— or still is a leading economic indicator. But what we see now is bad is the new good.

You know, it seems to me if the sun were to rise in the west tomorrow, that would be big news. That would make the news, right?

Ben Hunt: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: But we've completely inverted the price signal and nobody's talking about What does this mean and what are the knock-on effects of it?

Ben Hunt: Well, the knock-on effects is that we continue to gravitate higher. Look, you're right that the S&P used to be a leading indicator of what was going on in the actual economy. Why? Because stocks were in fact fractional ownership shares of real companies where the earnings, GAAP or otherwise, the The cash flows, that was all then reflected in stock prices. But, you know, as you're alluding to, and again, as you started off the start of this conversation, you know, that hasn't been the case for— well, it's remarkable how the correlation, how now the S&P is actually a following indicator, again, of monetary policy as reflected in the dollar.

That's been the case really for the past 30 years. Well, 5 years. I mean, obviously, these events started in March of '09 with the first imposition of QE by the Fed. And as you know, I've got some charts on this that I like to show in some of my blog posts and the like.

But if you look at the 9 years before March of '09, so from 2000 to March of '09, what we would call a quality factor, and you can, you know, Deutsche Bank and some other guys do indices of these different factors, right? And the quality factor, which is exactly what you would think it means, right? These are companies, these are large-cap companies that have a high return on equity, high return on invested capital, have positive accruals from accounting perspective.

If you had just invested in those companies and you insured And shorted the companies that, that had the worst on this score, i.e., you're market neutral, right? So you're, you're purely market neutral. You just want to be long quality and short crap, right? That index for the 9 years, March of 2000 to March of 2009, was up 70-something percent. What was S&P? It was down 50%. Since March of '09, So the S&P 500 has tripled.

That quality index, flat. It's up about 9% over the intervening, you know, 7 years now.

That's what happens when the banks, the central banks, insert themselves into markets. And today it's, you know, every, every month, every year I wake up and say, well, we can't possibly become more correlated more linked to, more driven by monetary policy. And every month and every year, yes, we are. So you're exactly right that, that in a sense, the sun is now rising in the west and setting in the east. And in the sense that you were correct in is that the stocks, equity prices are no longer a leading indicator of what's happening in the real economy. They're no longer a reflection of what happens in the real economy at all.

They are purely a lagging indicator, a reflection of monetary policy. And that's the prison we're in right now.

Fed policy, negative rates and the war on cash

Erik Townsend: And with respect to monetary policy, I mean, this is just one payroll report, and obviously the implication is that we're not going to get a rate hike in June. But, you know, supposedly Janet Yellen's story is that we're still in a rate normalization process, even if the hike doesn't happen this month, maybe it'll happen next month. But the time between hikes has already exceeded any past precedent in terms of how long they wait between hikes when there is a true rate hiking cycle in play. So do you see this as we're on the verge of a policy U-turn that's headed back towards negative rates and more QE, or is this just a brief pause as Janet says it is?

Ben Hunt: So, look, this gets back to that first question you were asking about how do you predict the dollar, where the dollar's going to go up or down. And I wish we were back in those happy days when I could look at U.S. industrial production, I could look at U.S. jobs, I could look at U.S.-only indicators and tell you which way is the dollar going, because I could then do the same thing about interest rates as well. And that's how we all grew up. We all grew up in markets that, okay, if you just focus on the U.S., you can figure out what U.S. policy's gonna be.

But that's not the world we're in anymore, whether you're talking about the dollar, which is, again, that reflection of monetary policy, or you're talking about monetary policy itself.

So, in that March speech that Janet Yellen gave, where she essentially turned the barge entirely around and said, oh, you know, we were talking in December about 4 rate hikes, And Stanley Fischer was talking about doing 4 rate hikes. And maybe we won't hike at all here in 2016. That was the big dovish moment, right, in March.

In that speech, she mentioned China and the dollar more frequently than she had mentioned China and the dollar in every other speech she's given put together. And that's what's changed. I think that the Fed The Fed has slowly, belatedly come to realize that it's not just what's happening in the U.S.

I'm sorry, but— and look, I wish it were. I wish it were just what was happening in the U.S., but it's not. It is that strategic interaction between the U.S. and particularly China, also Europe, also Japan. So, when you look at the rest of the world and you see how just— it's just obliteration out there. There in terms of inflation, in terms of growth.

I mean, for God's sake, the German 10-year Bund is, what, at 2 basis points today? I mean, it's— we are truly in a world where, even though I think the Fed really does want to normalize, they want to— look, they're just people, right? And they're like people like you and me. I would love to go back to normal times where fundamentals mattered and where the Fed could just stay the heck out of the way.

But we're not.

And so long as the rest of the world is in negative rates and getting more negative, so long as the rest of the world is declining from an economic growth perspective, so long as inflation expectations are declining, so long as— and this is the most important thing to me— global trade is shrinking, there's no way the Fed can raise rates.

Or if they do, it'll be like December and you have major freakout moments and they have to reverse themselves. That is unfortunately the world we're in today.

Erik Townsend: And whether or not we actually get to negative rates in the United States, as you said, we've already got them around the world. I just saw this week Toyota issued a corporate bond at 1/10 of 1 basis point.

Ben Hunt: Hey, let's— let me be clear. Negative rates are here in the U.S. And here's what I mean by that. In money market funds, money market funds, and this is driven both by global rates, but also by new regulations that have been passed here in the United States governing money market funds. So, I'm aware of 2 large money market fund complexes that As of April 2017, will be no longer offering positive rate of interest on their money market funds.

The fact is, is that for money market funds, because there's a cost of maintaining these funds, they've been giving essentially refunds, a rebate, on their safest money market funds. Market accounts, which are the ones that are only in short-term government paper. You can get a few more basis points if you're prepared to go into munis, if you're prepared to go into commercial paper, like the Toyota— the short-term paper, not the long-term bond that you're referring to.

But because of these regulations, most money market complexes are going to be Eliminating those funds that can actually pay, you know, 20, 30 basis points in favor of only offering the most conservative, you know, US government, other sovereign government short-term paper. That is obviously at zero or close to zero, and they are no longer going to be offering the rebate.

So, starting Starting in April of 2017, you've got a money market fund, you're going to open up that statement, and there's a big— let me assure you, there's a big difference between zero or a few basis points of positive interest and seeing that you are now paying for the privilege of keeping your money in a money market fund.

So, that's coming soon to a money market fund in the U.S.

Erik Townsend: I'd like to look at this a little deeper in terms of game theory, because what astonishes me is nobody is talking about the risk of a run on the bank coming from, you know, as soon as we get substantially negative returns, there's an incentive to just hoard cash, put it in a safe deposit box.

Ben Hunt: For sure.

Erik Townsend: And the whole fractional reserve banking system can't tolerate a massive run on the bank and everybody hoarding cash. So, short of outright banning cash, how can this

Ben Hunt: Well, you say banning cash. I mean, that's not— that is how it works. So, let me be clear what I mean. So, an acquaintance of mine, he's for one of the big Swiss banks, he runs their retail branches. You know, the bank starts with— the name of it, you know, starts with a U and ends with an S.

And he was talking about the branches and the vaults and the safe deposit boxes. Well, they've totally run out of safe deposit box space in Switzerland, because, obviously, people are using their safe deposit boxes to take money at Swiss francs and just put them in the safe deposit box.

They have a special holder for the notes. They're out, of course, of those holders, but the real problem is That the holder, the currency holder, doesn't really fit. You know, in Europe, many European countries, the size of the— the greater the denomination, the larger physically the note is. So the largest denomination Swiss franc note does not fit well inside the currency holder they have for the safe deposit boxes. So what they're doing now is they roll them up, roll the highest denomination bills up, put a rubber band around it, and he said, you know, it's like, We're drug dealers, right? I mean, this is how we're storing our money now, exactly to your point.

So, so, so what, what's the reaction to this? Well, I mean, it'll come soon, I'm sure, in Switzerland, but, but in, in the EU, which of course is the, you know, much larger issue here around negative rates, yeah, they're going to get rid of the, of the €500 note.

They're going to get rid of it. Uh, I would, I would be I'm not surprised in the least if the US gets rid of the $100 bill. And the rationale for this is going to be, well, well, these are the notes that are used for money laundering. You don't want to be supporting terrorists, do you? Because, you know, if you've got $100 bills, you're clearly, you know, you're with the bad guys here. You're supporting terrorism. That's why we need to get rid of these notes.

And it's just, you know, it's just a crock, right? They want to get rid of the higher denomination notes because it makes it that much more difficult to take cash out and to store the cash. And it forces you to keep your money in the system, forcing you to accept the negative interest rates. And listen, that's, like I say, it's already here in the rest of the world, and it's coming soon to a money market fund near you.

Erik Townsend: Just the notion. The notion that central banks need to eliminate high-denomination banknotes in order to make sure that a lot of money doesn't fit into the available vaults is really—

Ben Hunt: Crazy, right?

Gold as insurance against central bank error

Erik Townsend: An amazing thing. That obviously leads us to the topic of precious metals, because if you start to lose faith in the system, that's usually the most obvious place to go. Gold has— was really— the gold chart was looking awful until we got this news. It bounced immediately to the 50-day moving average and is now today as we're talking broken well above that. Do you think that the, the bottom is in now for gold and it's all higher from here, or do you think as we get back to at least a narrative about rate normalization that we're still going to see some weakness in the yellow metal?

Ben Hunt: Look, I, I think that what gold is is an insurance policy. It's an insurance policy against central bank error. And my view is that particularly when interest rates are zero or negative, particularly when the price of gold is where it is today, it's a— and what it could be with a significant central bank error.

I think it's a phenomenally cheap insurance policy. But it's like any other insurance policy, right? It's, it's even if you're not paying for it, right, there's an opportunity cost. You're, you, you are buying gold as a As opposed to putting your capital somewhere else, somewhere that might have actual cash flow dynamics and actual production. So, you know, when I think of how to protect myself, you know, and I think about my investments, what I'm looking for is something close to me, something that's out of the casino of public markets that— because nothing is going to be perfectly insulated. Isolated from the monetary policy casino that we have going on.

But you can get more— as much distance as you can put between you and that, the better.

And typically, that means private activities, private businesses. And it means insurance policies like gold. So, look, again, I think it's a phenomenally inexpensive insurance policy, but that's the way to think of it. It's not, it's not a currency. It's not a store of value. It's an insurance policy. And, and I think it's a cheap one at that.

Commodities, the dollar and Chinese devaluation risk

Erik Townsend: Moving on to the rest of the commodity complex, we're getting some mixed signals. A lot of people have been saying, okay, look at how impressively oil is bouncing. So clearly the commodity bear market is over. Well, if the commodity bear market is over, Dr. Copper didn't get the memo, at least not in the last few days. Where do you see commodities in general going from here?

Ben Hunt: Well, so, so look, so, so the firm I work for, Salient, we're, you know, got a big Houston base. We've got a— sure, we've got $5 billion in, you know, MLP investments. So this is something we spend a lot of time thinking about.

And I will tell you that, again, it gets back to that very first question you asked. You tell me where the dollars go And I'll tell you what the commodities are doing. Oil is a little bit different, but only a little bit different than, as you said, copper, because oil has this other narrative, the narrative of supply and demand, that also impacts its price action.

You know, as the dollar appreciates, through February of this year, copper, industrial metals went down. With the weakening of the dollar from, call it, mid-February, February 22nd, I think it was, to that jobs report, or, you know, actually the dollar started to strengthen again a little bit more When, you know, we got that renewed thinking that, oh, well, maybe they'll hike rates in June.

You know, you got the dollar then strengthening again, and so most commodities went down again. Oil's been flattish, right? Maybe nominally higher, because again, that supply and demand narrative has switched around 180 degrees.

But as far as what happens with commodities going forward, look, if we're able to preserve this status quo environment where Yellen and the Fed jawbone about wanting to raise rates, but really don't, where we're able to keep the political genie in the bottle, bad genie in the bottle, by not having a trade war sparked from the US, not having A euro-destroying election in France or Germany in 2017.

Yeah, the dollar gets— maybe gets a little weaker because U.S. data is getting a little weaker. The dollar gets weaker, that is all good. It's all good for risk assets. It's all good for commodities. It's all good for China. The dollar gets weaker, even if it's because we've got some weaker U.S. data, that's good for risk assets.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Ben Hunt: My concern is actually that the U.S. data gets better. My concern is that actually, from a political perspective, the Fed does hike. My concern is that as the dollar goes up, commodities go down, and China is forced to devalue. And that, my friend, like I say, that's the atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, not just for commodities but all risk assets.

Erik Townsend: And that's self-reinforcing for the dollar because of And of course, if China devalues, the dollar goes right on up.

Ben Hunt: That's exactly right. It's a— it is a non-equilibrium situation, as we'd say in economics.

Japan, Kyle Bass and the China banking thesis

Erik Townsend: And we covered China already. What do you make of this whole Japan situation? Of course, Kyle Bass has been very outspoken in saying he thinks it's all about to come crashing down. How do you see the BOJ?

Ben Hunt: Yeah, I know Kyle, and, you know, you know, talked to him I'm thinking about his China thesis now as well. By the way, I disagree with Kyle on his China thesis. I think that China domestically is likely to come out of this just fine. You know, you end up in China with zombie banks with a devaluation, but very similar to the Japanese banks of the 1990s, and that's not good, but China has the ability, much more than Japan did then or does today to grow their way out of that zombiness in their banking system.

So, on Japan specifically, look, I agree with everyone who points to this demographic time bomb in Japan, but the thing about demographic time bombs is that the timeframe you're talking about is decades. And there's, there's, there's not really, I think, an investable catalyst around, uh, around demographics. That, that's always been my issue with investment themes or an investment thesis based on demographics. You know, what's the catalyst, right? What's the event that says, aha, this is an untenable situation or something has to be done or et cetera, et cetera.

You don't get it in markets around demographics. And also, you rarely get it in politics. You rarely get that kind of political catalyst around a purely demographic issue, like a change in the composition of the electorate or the change in the aging of the population or the like.

So I understand the arguments that about the death of Japan, literally the death of Japan. Sorry, I shouldn't laugh, but that it is a literal statement when people are making this argument. I just don't know how to invest on that, right? Because the, like I say, these demographic arguments, it's just very hard to find a catalyst.

US election and shrinking global trade

Erik Townsend: Speaking of politics, the front-running presidential candidates have very different views. Mr. Trump seems to want to start a cultural war with Mexico. Mrs. Clinton has some, I think, fairly aggressive ideas that maybe lead to more American hegemony. The markets tend to hate uncertainty, and we really have no idea where we're headed. How do you see the economic consequences of the potential different presidential election outcomes?

Ben Hunt: Well, look, the— for me, the most important consequences of this election, and this gets back to the What I was describing as the observation about the world that I find most troubling is that global trade, that global trade pie is now shrinking. That hasn't happened in a long time. And what I mean is that since Q3 of 2014, not coincidentally, when you started to get competition in monetary policies, when Europe, Draghi, Went to double down on QE in June of 2014, and Janet Yellen, that was her moment of saying, we're now on a tightening course.

It's not an accident that that's when the dollar started to go straight up. It's not an accident that that's when global trade started to shrink. And my big concern is that no matter who's elected here in the U.S. in November, that tightening, that shrinking, is going to accelerate. I think it accelerates more with a Trump in office, right? I mean, as he says, who's afraid of a little trade war? Well, I am.

I am. You know, it's— the unfortunate thing is that it's such a powerful electoral issue when a majority of voters in the United States States think that free trade is a bad thing, right?

I don't know what you do with that, except if you're on either party's standard bearer, you run with it, and you campaign on that basis, and then you actually do something about it. And that, to me, is— that is a catalyst, because when you have a declining trade pie, what happens is that the financial institutions that are levered to global trade— and that's mostly Asian banks, and that's certainly mostly European banks— they, they are revealed as being as insolvent as they actually are. And that's a bad thing.

Epsilon Theory and why game theory plus history

Erik Townsend: Finally, about 3 years ago now, you wrote a piece called The Epsilon Theory Manifesto, which—

Ben Hunt: Oh yeah, my start. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Got a lot of attention, and it's actually morphed now into the Epsilon Theory blog at the Salient Partners website. Tell us about it. What's it about? What information is available there? We're going to send a link to that to our registered users through our Research Roundup email.

Ben Hunt: Oh, well, thanks very much for that. Look, I was a hedge fund manager here in Connecticut for a lot of years, and We did well, and I was just looking at that like, I want to go back to my roots, which are really more writing and being an academic, but I wanted to stay in the business.

Salient is an asset manager, I'd say, based in Houston, San Francisco. They'd been investors in my hedge fund. I joined them 2 years ago as their Chief Risk Officer, and it gave me that perch, that ability to continue to write about risk and reward in markets today. So as you say, I'd started about really 3 years ago, almost to the day.

And it was really just writing to myself and, you know, a few colleagues and clients, about 200. And I tell you, it's just, it's just trying to speak honestly, to call things by their proper names, from

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Ben Hunt: Someone who's actually managed money and is in the business of this, but not to present it with the pablum that you get from the sell side and the, you know, people trying to pitch their own fund. I'm not pitching a fund.

It really is my observations about this golden age, now silver age, of the central banker and, you know, how dangerous And how difficult it is to be an investment survivor in it. So we've got about, oh, about 100,000 email subscribers now. So it's been very gratifying that it does seem to have struck a chord.

So absolutely, if anybody's interested in looking at it, there are a lot of pieces. It's all free, of course, on the website. You can find it at Salient Partners or at Epsilon Theory.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Ben Hunt: And, you know, it really is trying to look at the world through those lenses of game theory and history, because I think that's the necessary lens to see the world today, because we haven't been in this sort of policy-driven market since the 1930s. So our traditional measuring sticks and mileposts, they just don't— I just don't think they work as well.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I certainly think that of the free content that's available on the internet, Epsilon Theory definitely has a reputation for being some of the highest quality content that is out there. So, Ben, I cannot thank you—

Ben Hunt: Thank you a lot. You're very welcome, and the compliment is well deserved.

Erik Townsend: I can't thank you enough for joining us on the program. Thanks so much. Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Nathan Egger back with you. Normally, as co-host, I get to listen to our feature interview before we tape the final segment of the show so that I can ask Erik questions about what was discussed with our featured guest. But due to my tight travel schedule this week, I was unable to do so.

Thankfully, however, as we announced last week, Aaron Chan has joined forces with us as captain of the MacroVoices research team. So now I get to delegate. Aaron, what did you think of Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt? And what questions did it bring to mind? The floor is all yours.

Postgame: what game theory is and why investors care

Aaron Chan: Well, Nathan, thanks. You missed a good one, but I'm happy to take the steering wheel for a little bit. So, Erik, I thought that was a fascinating interview, and you guys really stamped your passports in terms of geographic coverage. So right off the bat, and this may be for our listeners who may not be as familiar with Dr. Hunt's work, what is game theory, and why are game theoretical concepts something investors need to think about when considering the macro environment?

Erik Townsend: Well, people may remember the movie A Beautiful Mind, which was actually about the guy who did

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And he did a lot of pioneering work on game theory. But essentially, if you look at how competing parties that are trying to outsmart each other, whether it's in a poker game, or in markets, or what have you, what are the ways that they do that? A lot of the concepts around that are very vague, or tend to be very vague in the way that they were thought of before the development of game theory, which is basically applying mathematical discipline to building mathematical models to describe how different actors that are expected to act on their own behalf may try to manipulate situations and events in order to have the outcome that they want.

So it is the mathematical study of these interactions, and what Dr. Hunt does is apply that mathematical study to analyzing markets and trying to figure out how different players are going to affect each other and what the reflexive relationships are between them. between the actions of different entities.

End of the central-banker golden age and inflation as trigger

Aaron Chan: That makes sense. Now, near the end of the interview, Dr. Hunt noted that his writing represents observations about the gold or silver age of the central banker. Now, in a recent interview, and along a similar vein to the market-neutral strategy he described where you are long quality and short garbage, he spoke about a surprisingly effective Fed-based strategy. And so the strategy It involved buying an MLP, which is a master limited partnership index, on Fed days versus buying on any other day. And the Fed strategy actually outperformed the other strategy by nearly 70%.

So with Draghi recently coming out insinuating that QE might not be working, and Japan's continued lack of success with negative interest rates, might we be transitioning to a bronze or even a stone age of central bankers?

Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think that we are yet. Yet, my expectation, you know, what people do when they're desperate, let's take the example of young adults that get themselves overextended on credit cards, and they know that the situation is not going to resolve itself. They're going to eventually end up in bankruptcy. Human nature is people tend to just keep reaching, trying to hope and pray and somehow cross their fingers and hope somehow if they can just get one more credit card and take cash advances on it in order to pay the minimum payments on the other credit cards, they won't get foreclosed on or something.

And it never works out. But people tend to not give up until something comes crashing down in the night. So I do think that we are headed towards a major transformation where the whole world wakes up and says, this whole business of central bankers trying to control the economy by essentially price-fixing the cost of money was a really dumb idea and it didn't work. But I don't think we get to that point until Until the house of cards that they've built on printed money comes crashing down. When does it come crashing down? When they can't do it anymore. And I think inflation is likely to be the trigger for that.

So when inflation hits the stage, according to Julian Brigden, could happen this year. I think that's probably— I would have guessed it would take longer than that, but we'll see. That's the point where I think you see the transformation to a realization of, oh, all that we did with all of this central banks trying to centrally plan the economy was to make the next crash dramatically Worse than the last crash. It doesn't come until their hand is forced, though. I think what you're describing is maybe somebody would wake up and recognize that what they're doing is stupid. I don't see them doing that. I think it's not until their hand is forced. Hmm.

1930s parallels, the gold standard and Weimar

Aaron Chan: Well, Dr. Hunt also made numerous references to the Depressionary 1930s and drew interesting parallels to our present-day scenario. For me, the Great Boom and Panic of the 1930s wasn't taught in any of my business or finance classes in undergrad. So I was curious, when Dr. Hunt talks about the world swimming in debt and draws similarities between early 20th century Germany and present-day China, what other similarities do you see, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm going to focus actually on the dissimilarity, which is, I think, the most important one. There are huge similarities between the 1930s Great Depression era and what we've had since 2008. The difference is that on a gold standard, you didn't have the ability for the Fed to just print money. So we don't now have the discipline of a gold standard. If you look at what's happened since 2008, it really is the same thing as the '30s. And what the proponents of money printing, quantitative easing, and central bank management of the economy would say is, look how beautifully it's working. We have not had the repeat of the Great Depression, and that's because we got off of the gold standard, which was a bad idea according to them, not to me.

And that means that now central banks have the tools that they need to be able to print money in order to deal with these problems, and everything is just hunky-dory.

So far, those people are being proven right in the short term. My contention is, in the long term, there's no free lunch. This house of cards that's been built on printed money is going to come crashing down, and when it comes crashing down, it's going to be considerably worse than 2008.

But the thing is, that doesn't have to happen until inflation hits the stage. Until then, the Fed can get away with papering over our problems, and not just the Fed, but other central bankers can get away with papering over all of our problems and mistakes with freshly printed money.

They're getting away with that because of the deflationary backdrop. If you look at your history, go back to the Weimar hyperinflation. It started with a deflationary backdrop, allowing Rudi von Havenstein to do what he did. Right. To print way too much money. He got carried away, he got complacent, and eventually you had the Weimar hyperinflation. I don't think we'd have a US dollar hyperinflation, but we could see easily sustained periods of 20% inflation per year for 10 years or something in order to inflate away the mess that's been made, and we could have an inflationary depression. None of that has to start until inflation hits the stage, and until then, I think we'll have the continuing false perception that all of this is working. And it's not until inflation hits the stage that it starts to fall apart.

Deutsche Bank, Creditanstalt and private debt

Aaron Chan: So let's stay with the 1930s for a second. Separately, I've heard Dr. Hunt talk about the parallels between Deutsche Bank and Creditanstalt, which was a German bank that went bankrupt in 1931 due to an overexposure to merchant loans and plummeting global trade, which Dr. Hunt brought up in the So interestingly, Deutsche Bank is actually an heir to Creditanstalt. And given that Deutsche Bank's CDS spreads are now well above 500 basis points, should investors be paying attention to Deutsche Bank, or maybe some second-order entities that may spread contagion into an already precarious situation in the European Union?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that investors should be watching. You know, the problem that we have here, as Steve Keen said so eloquently when we interviewed David Hume, is too much private debt. We have too much debt on every level, public and private. What we need to all be watching for is when does that actually start to cause a problem? When does it start to fall apart? Widening credit default swap spreads on Deutsche Bank are a perfect early sign. It's certainly not the only one.

Now, as far as the analog to the 1930s, again, the difference is because we're not on a gold standard and central banks can do things, like print money out of thin air in order to buy toxic debt from financial institutions at artificially high prices in order to bail those institutions out for the sake of protecting the overall system. Those tools were not available under the discipline of a gold standard. A lot of people would say that was a good thing. The current thinking in central banking is that it was a bad thing and it's good that they have these tools available. The question is, will people like me be proven right eventually that these tools were just exacerbating the problem and making the next crash worse than the last one? Or will they be proven right that, yeah, you really can have something for nothing, print money out of thin air and have no adverse long-term consequence?

You know which way I'm thinking, but obviously that is a question that is yet to be resolved.

Negative money market yields and reach for yield

Aaron Chan: Yeah. And it could be, as Dr. Hunt said, with demographics in Japan, it could be a long time and the timeframe just doesn't make sense for investors. So, Erik, last question. Dr. Hunt talked about money market funds no longer offering positive interest rates, and that really sounds pretty concerning.

We all know investors are clawing for yield, and we also know this low-yield environment has resulted in certain municipal credits like Puerto Rico raising more funds than is warranted. So taking into account the pension crises in New Jersey and Illinois, which Andrew Levine, a fellow listener, wrote about a couple weeks ago, do you think money market funds going negative Do you think the negative will push investors to ignore the putrid fundamentals and to bid up bad muni credit?

Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. And I think that what we'll continue to see is this reach for yield, both on a retail and an institutional level, where people, you know, people used to be satisfied with a so-called 5% risk-free yield. When there was no more risk-free yield at 5%, they had to meet their 5%.

So they took whatever they could get in order to get the 5%. Now it's very hard even in junk bonds, which a lot of institutions are not able to hold in order to get those yields. And yes, the reach for yield will continue and eventually it will exacerbate the magnitude of the crash.

Research Roundup

Nathan Egger: And Aaron, you also just took over curating our free Research Roundup email, which has already been sent to registered users at MacroVoices.com. Would you please mind giving us a quick rundown of what's in this week's roundup before we close?

Aaron Chan: For sure. We've got a 7-course meal lined up for our registered users. And frankly, there's a lot of solid content, but we don't have the time to cover it all. But this week we're bringing you a 106-page macro deck from David Rosenberg, which offers sweeping coverage of the monetary mess we're in. We've also got a great video interview between Dr. Benn Steil, the Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Keith McCullough of Hedgeye, where they discuss internal Fed politics. Finally, Danielle DiMartino Booth's article on Venezuela's socialist tire provided some much-needed historical context to what's happening there.

Again, I look forward to your feedback and want to remind our subscribers that they can submit their own content for inclusion in the Research Roundup newsletter by emailing us at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter.

Sign-off and next week's guest

Nathan Egger: Thanks again for all your help, Aaron. You've made my life a heck of a lot easier this week while I'm traveling. We'd like to thank all you listeners again for tuning in, and we encourage you to subscribe to MacroVoices While you're there, rating and reviewing us helps us expand our audience in a massive way. If you have colleagues, friends, or families who find value in the work that we do at MacroVoices, please let them know about us. We're on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Erik has a personal handle @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. You can also find Aaron on Twitter That's @_Aaroanchan_.

Erik Townsend: @Aaroanchan_.

Nathan Egger: If you don't do Twitter, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. We'll be back with you again next week when economist John Llewellyn of Llewellyn Consulting will be joining us to discuss in greater depth the upcoming Brexit referendum. For Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. See you next time.

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