Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen, head of the School of Economics, Policy and History at Kingston University in London (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. MacroVoices episode 20 was recorded on June 23rd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Professor Steve Keen is back by popular request as today's feature interview guest. I'll be talking to Professor Keen about Brexit, alternative currencies, negative interest rates, and the inevitability of another financial crisis.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. The big news of the week is clearly a result of the Brexit referendum in the U.K. We're recording this week's show at about 8:00 PM London time on Thursday evening, and the polls will remain open for another hour.
Brexit referendum and equities
Aaron Chan: Now, while the result of the referendum vote isn't known to us, tape action in the pound sterling, which has been hovering near 2016 highs this afternoon, suggests that markets are pricing in relatively high confidence that the result will be a decision to remain in the E.U. Erik, while we're on that topic, what's your take on the Brexit issue in general before we move on to specific asset classes and how likely it'll be affected in either outcome?
Erik Townsend: Well, clearly, this has been the risk event of the year in terms of its significance. Everybody has been scared to death as to what the financial market reaction could be to a leave vote. But I agree with you, markets are pricing in a stay outcome. I think that there might be a little bit of excessive confidence in that outcome because, frankly, the polls have been back and forth for the last few days. The undecided component is large enough that I don't think it's really close enough to call anything. However, some of the big banks have commissioned their own exit polls, even though there's no official exit poll. So I suspect that what we're seeing in terms of today's market action is a reflection of the big banks having better information than we do, and probably having good information that allows them to conclude that Leave is unlikely, and that staying in the European Union is the more likely outcome.
If we were to have that outlier event, though, if there was a Leave outcome, to this vote. That, again, starts an unknown process that nobody's ever been through that takes at least 2 years and involves the other countries in the E.U. voting as to whether or not the country that wants to leave is allowed to leave. It's very complex and it's never been done before. A stay result would likely result in a pop in asset markets, but I don't see it as much more than that.
Aaron Chan: So, we've seen a fair bit of volatility in the S&P over the last few weeks in the lead-up to the Brexit vote. Markets are still trading as we're recording this program on Thursday afternoon, with E-mini S&P futures trading just above 2,100 just before Thursday's close. Where do you see stocks headed from here in the case of either result?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that there is a pop in equity prices that likely comes from a stay result, which is most likely. And remember, we were trading as high as 2,120 before the fear of an exit vote started to come into the system. So probably back up towards that number over the next couple of days. Maybe even higher. Does it take us to new all-time highs? I don't know. It's possible. But I don't think that the question is so much what the short-term reaction is as much as it's will it last.
You know, there's really nothing that has been corrected or solved or whatever. There's a fear that was we didn't know what could happen if we had an exit vote, a leave vote. Assuming that that doesn't happen, I think that we probably get back to where we were. Does it take us to all-time highs? I don't know. If there is a leave vote, I think that is definitely not priced in, and what would happen is a very sharp move to the downside. Then, of course, politicians would try to contain it by saying, well, this doesn't mean we have to leave; it just means Parliament will take this referendum under advisement. And that would probably result in a bounce. And then, you know, the UK Independence Party would come out and say, no, this is the will of the people; we need to proceed with leaving. And I think it would induce a huge amount of volatility, mostly to the downside.
I don't think that's likely to happen at this.
Crude oil: inventories, time spreads, Nigeria
Aaron Chan: Pivoting to oil, WTI crude was trading on a $45 handle briefly as we were taping last week's show. Since then, it recovered back above $50 before running into some volatility when this week's inventory numbers came out. What do you make of the action in crude oil generally, and what would the effects of either Brexit outcome likely be?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's been fascinating this week. The big inventory number is Wednesday morning reported by the EIA, which is the official U.S. government agency. The American Petroleum Institute, API, reports on Tuesday afternoon, and that report is given a huge amount of credibility by traders as an indication of what's going to happen with the EIA data the next morning. Now, why they give it so much credibility, I don't know, because API is frankly wrong more often than they're right. In this case, it was definitely no exception to that rule. API reported a 5.2 million barrel drawdown in national crude oil inventories. Not that unbelievable for this time of year. Because we are in the middle of summer driving season. But then the next morning, EIA reported, actually, no, the number is really only 917,000 barrels, less than a million-barrel drawdown, and really pretty darn small for this time of year.
Even more interesting and disturbing is you normally expect to see drawdowns in gasoline and distillate inventories, the finished products that are manufactured from crude oil. They both saw builds this week, 627,000 barrels of gasoline added to inventory, 151,000 barrels of distillates added to inventory. That adds up to 778,000 barrels. Well, if you take that out of the total 917,000-barrel draw, the net drawdown is only 139,000 barrels of petroleum-related products, both crude oil and, you know, net of the build in finished product inventories. This is Right in the heart of summer driving season, and that's not what's supposed to happen this time of year. So as much as I had kind of given up on my bearish thesis, where I had earlier in the year thought that we were headed towards a storage crisis in the springtime, well, we can't get through fall maintenance season until we start to see some bigger drawdowns than this. And so far, they're not happening.
To give you a sense of the scale of this, in order to get to normal inventory levels by Labor Day, we would need to see 12 million barrels per week of inventory drawdown. drawdowns on national crude oil inventory. If you look at the 917,000-barrel drawdown, that's only about 7.5% of that 12 million barrel figure. If you take that 917 and net out the effects of the builds and finished products, then you're only at 1.1% of the required number. So, we're not seeing anything close to the drawdowns that we need. The question is what happens over the next 2 months. So, I'm going to be watching those inventory numbers very carefully. What is very interesting, though, and a sigh of relief in terms of the risk of a storage crisis, is Cushing, Oklahoma, which is the most important number, saw a drawdown of 1.28 million barrels. That takes us down to 87.5% of Cushing capacity. Remember, we got to 97.5% just a few weeks ago.
To my own astonishment, the market didn't panic at 97.5%, so it's certainly not going to panic here at 87.5%.
Another thing to consider in terms of the price rebound that we have seen since that $45 handle we had taping last week's show, that was very short-lived. We're back up to just above $50 as we're taping. But about 50 cents of that came from the contract roll. The July contract expired this week. August is the new front month. August has been trading at least 50 cents higher than July all along. So that $50.11 number, if you corrected it to what the July number would have been if that contract was still trading, would be about 50 cents lower.
Fascinating action this week in the time spreads. That's the difference in price from one month to the next. When we saw the API inventory number spike prices higher, normally what happens if the front month gets spiked higher, it moves up. The longer-dated contracts are normally less volatile, so you would expect compression in those time spreads. They went the other way. Then on Wednesday morning, when we saw the EIA number come out with a much smaller drawdown of only 917,000 barrels as opposed to API's 5.2 million, that caused the front-month price to go straight down. You'd normally expect that to widen the spreads because you'd expect the longer-dated contracts not to go down as quickly, but the opposite happened again. Well, how is that possible? My hypothesis is that what's going on is when they see a number like API saying, okay, we've got a very bullish result here, I think that the producers that we're hedging are starting to slow down their hedging activities, and that's what's resulting in the spreads widening in reaction, opposite of what you would normally expect.
Similarly, when EIA came out the next morning and said, no, it's the other direction, now what happens is the producers start to say, uh-oh, I missed the boat. I really do want to be hedging here, and they start selling the long-dated contracts more. That's the only explanation I can come up with for this sort of backwards price action in the time spreads.
As far as what could happen in terms of the referendum, there's really no reason for the U.K. leaving the European Union to have any direct effect on the price of crude oil. But pretty much everybody expects all asset markets to be affected by this in the sense that a leave vote would result in everything selling off, and probably there's at least a short-lived pop-up in the result of a remain vote. Would that take us back to that $51.90 target that we haven't hit yet, that a lot of technicians have targeted as a major retracement level?
Aaron Chan: Yes.
Erik Townsend: Is that a significant level that might mark a top in this market? I'm not sure. We'll probably find out tomorrow.
The other issue that's affecting crude oil this week, Nigerian government has announced, ta-da, we have a ceasefire with the Niger Delta Avengers. Shortly after that announcement, the Niger Delta Avengers announced, no, we don't. So it's not really clear. And then there was another report that said maybe they do. So is there really a ceasefire on the table that's agreed to in Nigeria, or is that wishful thinking? I think it remains to be seen. In any case, look for more volatility as a result of whatever news flow comes out of Nigeria.
Gold outlook after the Brexit vote
Aaron Chan: So you opined last week that gold would be the most likely benefactor of a leave vote, but the shiny yellow metal has been pretty soft this week, even as other asset classes were falling on Brexit risk-off fears. So what's on the horizon for gold in the face of either outcome?
Erik Townsend: Well, CPM Group had a research note out this week, which registered MacroVoices users will find a link to in your Research Roundup email. I mostly agree with it. What they're saying is they think gold moves lower from here regardless of the outcome. I would disagree slightly, saying I think that a leave vote at this point would surprise everybody and there would be at least a short-term up spike in the price of gold. But I definitely agree with them in the more likely case of a remain in the EU vote. In that case, I think that basically what CPM Group said is there's been a lot of buying of gold in anticipation of this. The risk is over and it's probably gonna sell back off to $1,200, maybe even lower.
Aaron Chan: Okay.
Erik Townsend: If that happens, I think it's a buy down there because although a U-turn in Fed policy maybe hasn't come quite clearly into view yet, I think it's coming eventually. I think we're seeing that the Fed is realizing that this rate normalization strategy they have is not going to work and that the economy is going to need more central bank easing and accommodation. So I think that if CPM Group is right and we see maybe a trade down as low as the 200-day moving average, which right now on the futures chart looks to be at about 1177, 1,700 or so. If we got back down to that kind of number, I think gold is definitely a buy.
Remember, though, in the unlikely event of a leave vote, where the U.K. leaves the European Union, or at least initiates that process, if that really and truly led to a major crisis in asset markets, as some people have predicted, remember what happened in 2008. At first, gold spiked up, then it sold off hard with everything else, and eventually did very well.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: So, if we really got into a major sell-off event across all asset classes, I think gold would be taken down with it in the short term, and maybe the buying opportunity would be further along. More likely scenario though, I think, is the remain vote. And in that case, I think CPM Group is right. Probably the party's over in the short term, and I would look for the buying opportunity that's created by that.
US Dollar Index and the Fed
Aaron Chan: And what about the US Dollar Index, both in terms of Brexit effects and also with regard to the monetary policy?
Erik Townsend: Well, my view on the dollar is evolving for sure. I think, first of all, we'd seen a fair amount of strength in the U.S. dollar over the last several weeks. It looked like, hey, the rally is back on and the dollar's headed higher from here. What I think we're seeing is that a lot of that dollar strength was coming from people fearing the possibility of a leave vote, and a lot of people were selling pound sterling and buying dollars. That appears to be over, and we're back down to, you know, 93 or so on the Dollar Index, a little higher than that, tested below 93 today, closed above it.
I think that maybe what we're seeing here is that the market really is discounting, hey, wait a minute, the whole argument that a number of guests on this program have made is that the Fed is still on this rate normalization strategy, even if we don't believe it's gonna work out. That's the story they're telling publicly. The mainstream is buying it, and that's the reason the dollar was set to move higher, Because, at least in my opinion, the reason the dollar's been so strong for the last couple of years is the ECB and the BOJ are in easing mode, while the Fed is, at least supposedly, in a tightening mode, in a rate normalization cycle.
If the market is losing faith in the Fed's ability to follow through with its rate hiking program, that could mean that the party is over for the dollar. The big number I'd be looking for is a move below 92 on the dollar index. That was the previous low from a little over a month ago. 6 weeks ago. or so ago. If we were to go below that, I would really start to get worried that the dollar rally is over, and that changes a lot of things.
10-year Treasury yield and Fed credibility
Aaron Chan: 2 weeks ago, you said 1.7% could be a credibility level for the US 10-year Treasury, below which you thought it would be hard for the Fed to justify continuing their rate hike schedule. We've since seen it fall almost as low as 1.5%, but as of Thursday afternoon, it's recovered back to 1.73%.
So, Erik, what is the 10-year yield telling you about what's on the horizon for monetary policy?
Erik Townsend: Well, when we saw the flow into Treasuries and therefore the yield moving down, I think it was down to 1.52% or so at one point, some people were saying, okay, this means the Fed has lost credibility, that this is a major sign of a policy reversal on the horizon. I think that was a false alarm. I think the reason that we saw Treasury yields dipped so low was just people were panicking out of pound sterling, buying US dollars and buying US 10-year Treasuries with the proceeds of those sales. So I think that that's what did it.
Now that the Brexit— certainly we don't know the outcome yet as we're taping this show, but markets are assuming that we're going to have a stay vote, a remain in the EU vote. Assuming that that happens, We're back above that credibility level. And I think it really means all eyes are on the Fed.
What they've been saying, what markets have been saying, what observers have been saying are all different things. You know, the story from the Fed is still, hey, we are on our rate normalization cycle. If they were to, at the July meeting, say, okay, we didn't hike rates in June because it was a week before the Brexit referendum and we didn't want to take that chance, but Brexit is behind us now. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that there has been a remain vote on the Brexit referendum.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: And so, we're gonna go ahead and hike now in the July meeting. I think that would shock everybody and would change everything. On the other hand, if they chicken out and it seems like they really are showing more signs of capitulation, then we go in the other direction.
So, what happens with the dollar, what happens with the 10-year Treasury yield, I think is very much a function of what the FOMC does next and whether or not Janet Yellen blinks. Are they gonna stay on their story or are they going to capitulate and throw in the towel on this rate hiking cycle?
Aaron Chan: Right. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Well, this week's featured guest is Professor Steve Keen, who heads up the School of Economics, Policy, and History for Kingston University in London. He's also one of the very few mainstream economists who saw the 2008 crisis coming and accurately predicted what would occur.
When Erik interviewed Professor Keen 6 weeks ago on MacroVoices episode 14, he mentioned in passing that he could do an entire interview on the subject of alternative currencies. So listener response was overwhelming. So by popular request, Professor Keen is back with us this week to discuss this subject, the Brexit referendum, negative interest rates, and more.
Erik's interview with Professor Keen is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Keen on the Brexit vote: why he expects Remain to win
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: I'm delighted to welcome back Professor Professor Steve Keen, who offered so kindly to come back and talk to us about alternative currencies. Before we go there, obviously the topic of the day is the Brexit referendum. We are recording this interview at about 5:00 PM London time. The polls don't close until 9:00 PM. It appears just from looking at the tape action, Steve, like markets are expecting that a remain outcome is most likely. Your boots on the ground there in London, what are you seeing? Where do you think things are headed? And what do you think comes next?
Steve Keen: Well, I think the market is Well, I think the expectation I have is that the Remain case will win as well, mainly because first of all, it's been so finely balanced when they do the overall polls. So all the way through, people have been saying in recent surveys, like 53% for Leave and 47% for Remain. So you could have seen a line ball going for Remain. Of course, a large number of voters were in the undecided category. And when you— when you— what they normally do is proportionally allocate them to either the The remain or leave case. That's where you get the 53-47 type numbers from. But the reality is there really is a don't know category, and they might be 20% of those who vote.
And of course, also, it's an optional vote. You don't have to vote.
So given all those situations, little things— not little things— little things like the weather in London could be enough to swing the vote. Because if it's a miserable day, which it is, and raining a lot, which it is, then the people who aren't committed might decide, I won't bother voting, I'll wait, sit back and see what happens.
So that's something that could actually favor the leave case.
In the other direction, and far more important, of course, the murder of Jo Cox last week by a lunatic, apparently a member of the Britain First group, and certainly influenced by them. That's the first politically motivated murder in England for 25 or 30 years. That is such a horrific event that people who would have been wavering and wondering which way do I go, I think when they get to the ballot might have that in their mind and go, I'll vote Remain. So my overall expectation is Remain is going to win as well.
Economic impact of Brexit and the Groucho Marx question
Erik Townsend: And what is your view in terms of what should happen? Obviously, as an economist, you have a much deeper view of the effects on Britain's economy, as well as the knock-on effects to the rest of the EU and the rest of the world. What's your view on this?
Steve Keen: Yeah. Well, in terms of what's the impact on the economy, I'm actually siding with Richard Werner on this front. Richard wrote a very well-argued blog post a couple of days ago saying that— of course, I agree with him on this front— the fundamental thing that determines the level of economic activity is the creation of money in your national economy, whether that's by credit-created money by the banks or government money created by fiat with central bank-created money backing the government deficit.
And it's really what happens with that number that's got the main impact whether the economy is going to rise or fall in size. And if, and of course, if Brexit occurs, and there's therefore, as a result, there's a significant and sustained devaluation in the pound, that is going to initially cause an increase, but then ultimately cause a potential decrease in Britain's extreme trade deficit. And if there's any attempt by the EU to whack on controls to actually use as a tariff policy to try to punish the British for leaving, and I wouldn't put that past Schäuble, pushing that sort of policy through the European Union, all those factors are actually going to help to some extent British industry, even though they might cause a downturn in the economy for a short while.
So it simply isn't possible to make the definitive argument that some people are making based on standard style linear extrapolated econometric estimates. So I don't think you can make a case one way or the other. And he affirms the idea is which is better for Britain, staying in or leaving.
What I've really focused on is what I called in my Forbes column the Groucho Marxist question I posed myself. I'm in a club. Do I want to belong to this club? And frankly, the euro is such a disaster of a club. The eurozone more so than the European Union itself, of course. But it has been such a disastrous club, so badly managed. If I'm given a chance to leave, I voted for out, so I actually voted for breakfast at Brexit today.
Unintended consequences and contagion in Europe
Erik Townsend: And do you expect any unintended consequences or unexpected effects other than the ones that we've heard about? Obviously, everyone expects if Brexit were to be approved, the most likely outcome of that would be sudden and extreme turbulence in financial markets. Is there anything beyond that that you see that perhaps hasn't been covered by other pundits?
Steve Keen: Well, I think sudden and extreme turbulence in finance markets is basically a daily activity these days, isn't it? It's not as if we've had nothing but stability for the previous 50 years and suddenly we're throwing ourselves into uncertainty. I think the last 10 years have shown to people, anybody except somebody who's been infected with the neoclassical economic virus accepts that capitalism is a pretty unstable system. This is just another form of instability there. I think there are plenty of potential unintended consequences.
For example, a lot of people are voting for Remain on the basis of the racist campaign that's been run for Leave by groups like UKIP, Britain First, and so on. They're saying they don't want to give in to the racists. That's a huge political factor. Of course, that's all caused by the refugee crisis, the timing of that being independent in many ways of Britain's own reconsideration of its membership.
You could be strengthening the hands of racists here in this country. On my perspective, it is. Well, the EU and the EU's policies and the mishandling of its own refugee waves, and the idea that you can blame what's happening in England on decisions made in Brussels about refugees, has been a strong basis for the political support for groups like UKIP and Britain First in Britain. If they suddenly can't use that as an excuse anymore, they may well lose support here. So again, you really can't pick which way these things may go. But the real impact that I think Brexit would have is emboldening groups in Europe to also consider exiting. And of course, I believe that certainly France and Italy should leave the euro. They're big enough to survive the very obvious shock that would cause them changing one currency system to another, but to get out of this straitjacket and go back to nationally managed currencies where they have some sense of sovereignty and some capacity to manage their own affairs in ways that the Maastricht Treaty doesn't allow them to do at the moment.
So that could actually mean that Britain's departure from the European Union could weaken racist forces here, but increase them on the mainland. So it's one of those things where you simply— you can't make a definitive case one way or the other about what's going to happen as a consequence of this. But my feeling was I believe that Brussels has become so dictatorial. So anti-democratic in their behavior that it's about time they were forced to negotiate from a position of weakness rather than a position of strength. And of course, with Greece, they steamrolled Greece by having the complete position of strength that they controlled the currency, they controlled the banking system, they controlled the central bank of Greece. Greece was completely emasculated in that argument, and the Germans and the French could ride roughshod over the rest.
Now, in this particular case, they wouldn't be able to ride roughshod over anymore, and I think it's about time they learned some humility. So that, that to me is the main benefit of the European— of a British exit should it occur. But as I said, I think we're going to wake up tomorrow and find we're still inside the European Union.
Why the euro fails: the Le Pen scenario
Erik Townsend: Now, you've described a contagion effect if a Brexit were to happen. Let's suppose that it doesn't happen. You wake up tomorrow and you do in fact find that you're still in the European Union. It seems to me like the problems that the EU faces are not going away. So do you think that Britain staying in is going to save the day for them, or does it just delay execution by a few months or years?
Steve Keen: It delays execution. And the euro is an utterly flawed concept, and the countries in the euro— of course, you got Germany benefiting out of it because they effectively have a captive trading bloc that can't devalue again. Against them. But most of the European Union is losing very badly out of the euro, partly because of the fact that they can't devalue against the Germans, but mainly because they also can't run compensating fiscal policy and stimulate their own economies as they would be able to do if they were sovereign nations. So that's leading— that's fed the growth of Marine Le Pen in France. It's fed the growth of Beppe's party, thankfully rather more acceptable for social socially acceptable party in Italy. It led to Podemos in Spain. It's led to the rise of Sinn Féin in Ireland again.
It's what lives behind the failed attempt at liberation in Greece under Tsipras. So all these pressures, it's going to get worse. And as they get worse, everything that's identified with the European Union gets tainted as well. So as well as having the economic policies, which have been catastrophic and conservative— if I want to use the word conservative versus progressive, it's conservative in the sense that it believes the world should look like a first-year economics textbook.
That force has been running in parallel with arguments about human rights, good rights for refugees, all the other elements of the European agenda for a decent society. And of course, the failure of the economic program has tainted all those other elements of the program. So we're getting a rise of racist parties, a rise of nationalism. All that stuff, I think, is a direct consequence of this catastrophic system the Europeans created.
So it has to fail at some point. And it'll fail when a group gets in power that quite enjoys breaking rules and enjoys doing things that aren't allowed by treaties. And enjoys machismo-type events. And that's why the right normally does this sort of stuff when they get into power. And so to me, the most likely scenario is Marine Le Pen getting in, trying to negotiate to some extent inside the euro, potentially facing the iron will of Schäuble that it won't be changed, and then announcing overnight that the euro is now the franc, all debts are canceled. And we're going to go forward and build our own national currency again. And if they do that and they eliminate all private debts by writing off the debts that are denominated in euro, which is quite feasible, the French economy could boom.
And that would then legitimize the rest of Marine Le Pen's program. Now, this is very similar to what happened some years ago with a funny little bloke in Germany, whom you're not supposed to mention. But frankly, if you continue deciding not to learn from history, then you're doomed to repeat it. And I think that's what the Germans have set themselves up for this time around.
Giving up on economics; entrepreneurs and private currencies
Erik Townsend: So your prediction is regardless of Brexit, eventually the euro fails. And that is a perfect segue to the topic that we want to discuss today. I was quite taken aback last time I interviewed you about 6 weeks ago. You know, if I consider your background, Steve, you are a very well-accomplished, formally accredited economist. You're not only a professor of economics but a department head at a well-respected London university.
All expectations in your field, the natural thing to expect would be you would be writing, publishing your work into the peer review process. And just as John Taylor's career was advanced with the Taylor Rule being adopted and believed in by central bankers, we'd expect you to be working on influencing public policy, you know, creating the Keen Rule. You told us in your last interview you've become so fed up that you're not even trying to influence influence public policy. You're working with entrepreneurs on alternate currencies.
How did you get to the point where you were ready to give up on the system? How— what's this journey been like for you personally?
Steve Keen: Well, it starts from giving up on economics itself, realizing there's no chance of persuading neoclassical economists to change their minds. It's the same as trying to persuade somebody, trying to persuade a pope that there isn't Good luck. They will just not listen even if you have the evidence. If you deposit the body of Jesus Christ at the Vatican, they still won't believe you. So there's that resistance to change. And that's not just something that economists are guilty of. It's a human trait, I think. I see us being a species that believes something. We're not really logical creatures. We're believing creatures. And we believe despite the evidence until such time as it becomes absolutely overwhelming. Now, in the case of sciences like astronomy or chemistry or physics and so on, because the evidence itself can be reproduced by anybody in a laboratory, you ultimately get to the stage where the evidence overwhelms and they are forced to change their beliefs and you get progress that way.
But economics is so far removed from actually being able to touch this thing they call the economy and observe how it behaves and moves. Make definitive tests, that myths can be maintained just not just for decades but for centuries. And that's been the state of economic theory. So I don't try to persuade economists. I try to persuade new recruits to economics not to accept the way of thinking that they'll get taught by their standard professors. And when it comes to policy, there is some movement.
I have seen some substantial movement since I've been in England, and I've got a lot of respect for the Bank of England intellectual flexibility on that front. And even just recently, the Economic and Social Research Council, which funds academic research over here, has realized that they need to provide a means by which the sort of non-orthodox work that I do gets funding from the government, because they've realized that the refereeing channels inside economics work against anything outside the orthodoxy. So they've opened up a £4.8 million, what they call Network Plus Fund, just recently. So there is progress. But I think that to get the policymakers to realize they've made a complete botch of it by following the wrong theory, and then to reverse their direction and follow a different theory, that might take 10 to 15 years. And in 10 to 15 years, a lot of people frankly are going to die because of this situation we're in.
Certainly, people in Greece and Spain are dying courtesy of these policies on a substantial scale already. It'll just get worse.
So in that situation, you need a credible threat. You need something which is going to focus their minds on the need to change. And one would be the evolution of private currencies created by entrepreneurs and backed, of course, not by state fiat, but by some other means to give people capacity to trust the currency for conversion, for sale purposes. We need something like that. And frankly, entrepreneurs learn faster than economists do. I've seen entrepreneurs go through this experience, be hit by the financial crisis, see their fortunes wiped out, think, what the hell hit me? Where did that come from?
See an economist saying it's an exogenous shock and say, you've got to be kidding. It's something inside the system. Learn about the system and then realize how it functions. Okay, not only is this what wiped me out, this is a potential commercial opportunity because there are many, many people who would like to make make business transactions right now who can't make the transactions simply because of shortage of credit-based money or government-based money, let's create a private-based money instead.
So in that sense, I've always had great respect for entrepreneurs. It's made me very different to a lot of critics of capitalism who normally deride everybody in the system. I have a lot of time for people who innovate. And that's here yet again, innovation at the level of the financial sector is now necessary And it's far more likely to come from commercial sector entrepreneurs than it is from the finance sector, and certainly from governments and economists.
Alternative currency models: Bartercard, IEX, nursing dollars, Brixton pound
Erik Townsend: Now, 100 years ago, the in thing was gold-backed currencies. That's what most of the world used. And ever since the 1970s, we've moved to fiat currency, where— and actually, the proponents of fiat currency would say its principal feature is that the government gets to just decide what the size of the money supply should be, or increase it or decrease it at the push of a button, without having to have any gold backing behind it. So when you talk about moving away from the current system to something new and better, what kind of currency system should we have? Should it be another fiat system that's run by someone other than the government, or should it be gold-backed, or should it be backed by some other kind of asset? What are we talking about in terms of the nature of the currency itself?
Steve Keen: Well, look, there's still— I still think the best system is one which is a combination of fiat and credit-based money, but where we're aware of the failings of both those systems. And the failing of the fundament— when you have a mixed system like we have right now, the government might not create enough money, might make the wrong decisions. They've been doing it ever since Wachler.
And the credit banks, money-creating banks, might create credit for the purposes of speculation rather than production. And even beyond that, you have an inherent tendency, as Minsky argued, for capitalism to generate too much debt and have a debt crisis. Even if the money's all been used for productive purposes. So there's all those sorts of limitations, but if you're aware of them, it is a system which is very flexible. If we can get the money to entrepreneurs and to firms for working capital as our first priority, then it works very, very well. And the elasticity of that money system is partly where capitalism's capacity to innovate occurred compared to the stodgy behavior of the Soviets, for example, back in the day. than the days when we had central planned economies as well. So that's still, I'd say, is a preferable system.
But if you have this type of intellectual paralysis now that features with both central banks and private banks, then you need an independent group to come forward. And private entrepreneurs can create money systems based on, for example, one of the systems I know called Bartercard, which is based in Australia, is people have to join, you have to be a tradesman. And as a tradesman, you can be paid to work for another person who's part of the whole system, therefore another tradesman, in what they call trade dollars, which are basically valued dollar for dollar, Australian currency dollars to these currency dollars. But they value it in terms of your labor at $10 per hour of labor.
So in that situation, tradesmen who would like to, for example, get their house plastered can go and say, I'll be an electrician, I'll work on your electrical project, get paid half in dollars and half in trade dollars. And then that's built up a credit that you can then send to this person and say, I want you to come do plastering in my house at 10 trade dollars an hour. And that has enabled quite a substantial amount of commerce to occur, particularly in the Australian state of Victoria where it began. So systems like that are backed effectively by the labor of the members.
Erik Townsend: The system that you've just described works for people who are tradesmen and are sharing skills, but the rest of the economy obviously can't participate in something that's that focused. So when you talk about entrepreneurs generally offering currency systems on a competitive basis, what would it look like? How would this work? What are the mechanics? Are these things backed by something? If so, how would they be redeemed? And so That's—
Steve Keen: it has to be backed by something that people trust to some degree, in the same sense we currently trust banks. Because of course, if you got a check deposited in your account by Barclays Bank, for example, you wouldn't tear it up. You'd think that that is now your— you just accept the bank's crediting of your account as a form of money. And that's because you trust that the bank has the backing to enable this to happen. Okay. And it's only when we lose trust in a bank that runs on banks actually occur.
Now, you therefore have to find something else that people trust. And that's why gold always comes forward as something people think they trust the value of gold. So a gold-backed currency is one particular way that this could be achieved. But that is not what people are putting forward in these various parallel currencies that I know about. So one, of course, the backing I've just explained is based on the labor of the members.
Another one that I know, which is called IEX, it's about to start, I think, on the 1st of July. It's been launched in about 30 or so countries around the world. And that is based on the wealth of high net worth individuals who have assets they want to sell. And what this system does is say, I'm going to get a valuation. By the way, I better say I'm consulting to this firm and being paid by them. So I have to state that upfront. But I'm doing it because I think I think we need something, and I think this is a potentially successful avenue.
But back to the explanation. To become a member, you have to have at least $1 million worth of assets. The assets get valued by an auditing firm. Of course, they're verified at current price levels. Then you get a certificate, which you can then use to buy assets owned by any other person in this whole network. So effectively, it's backed by the wealth, not the labor of the individuals as it is with the barter currency. Card, but it's backed by the wealth of the individuals in this system. Then that's to enable people to sell a yacht. There's not enough monetary demand for a yacht, but they can find IEX certificates for it. A hotel chain could use that as a way of— they could value the notional value of the rooms that currently aren't being used and produced, get an IEX certificate backing that, which would then enable them to make a sale to A retail chain, and the retail chain— again, it's a parallel form of exchange.
So this is another clever way to say, what can we use as a way of backing a currency that people will trust to enable an exchange to occur? So those are at least 2. Another one I know from— and I'm not being consulting for this group, I just mentioned its system.
I know an Israeli company which has developed a system of hierarchical private currency systems. For example, the first one they did was with nursing mothers, and the nursing mothers would notionally create nursing dollars, and then with those nursing dollars, one could pay another to take care of their kids at different times. And there was a central bank within that system, which is an overall administrator who kept track of all the accounts of the nursing mothers. Then there was another one for students, I think this is first-year university students, and that was then for buying textbooks and things of that nature. And again, there'd be study assistance tied up with that group. So each of these had a system of accounts stored at a central individual who was the administrator of the system. And then they had worked out a software package to enable transfers at the central bank level, effectively, from the nursing mothers across to the students and so on.
That's another effectively based on the trust within these smaller communities, which is then extended to links between the managing agents of those systems. And the central bank notionally in the system has the capacity to create additional credits to enable more transactions within their own pyramid, and they can be linked up to another pyramid. So that's another system. Again, it's like a hierarchy of trust. So there's many, many ways that people are inventing.
The simplest way is things like councils, like Brixton Council here in London, for example, has the Brixton dollar. Now, that is actually backed by money which is deposited, bought from the central bank, deposited in an account on a £1 for 1 Brixton dollar, or Brixton pound, I think it's called, basis. And then the Brixton pounds are accepted by businesses in the Brixton community. And partly to back that, you're able to pay your council rates in Brixton dollars or Brixton pounds as well as paying in English pounds. So something like that, those are some of the sort of notional systems that are around there, and these can provide commerce that wouldn't otherwise occur because of a lack of money.
Gold-backed and energy-backed currencies
Erik Townsend: You touched on gold-backed currencies, and there are in fact some private gold-backed currencies. There's one service where you can open an account denominated in gold but it provides a credit card that allows you to use it in other currencies and automatically converts. But when I think about gold-backed currency, certainly historically for thousands of years it's been the standard, but in modern times gold is really just shiny yellow metal that doesn't have a lot of practical application. On the other hand, energy is absolutely central to the economy. So something I think about a lot is, is it possible to somehow conceive an energy-backed, say a crude oil-backed currency. The obvious problem is, you know, unlike gold, which you can store fairly easily in a vault, you'd have to have a lot of really big tanks to physically back that currency. So is there some other way to do that, to achieve an energy-backed currency?
Steve Keen: It's feasible to issue certificates that are based on the energy stored in some particular country or or like going back on, say, Saudi Arabia oil and things of that nature. The fundamental thing that backs currencies is trust. The reason that gold worked is that people trusted that gold couldn't be fabricated, which of course we know can't be made, couldn't be destroyed either, could be lost, but that gave you a sense of solidity. And we would trust that anybody who said they were using gold as a certificate that the gold actually existed. So again, trust is always that foundation. Now, whether you can convert that across to energy, I'm just not sure.
I think we have to— one thing we're going to realize, I think, is the crucial role that energy actually plays in our economy, which is ignored by mainstream economic theory and not handled well by non-orthodox theory either, I might add.
We therefore ignore the role of energy in production, but you can't produce anything without it. Now, once we realize we're in a serious ecological crisis, and that therefore means that using energy now becomes something you need effectively public allowance for, you can't just burn coal anymore. There'll be controls on that and for good ecological reasons, whether whatever Austrians might think about those sorts of government controls, they'll become vital. Since we've overloaded the planet so much. In that situation, you might then be able to say, well, I'm now going to base the currency itself on the energy, or maybe even on the waste impact of that energy on the biosphere. So, I think it's feasible. But again, I can't say that I've thought about it in enough detail to know how to go about doing it.
Risks of private money: Rothschild versus Schäuble
Erik Townsend: Now, with respect to this idea in general of entrepreneurs introducing competitive currencies, I personally love the idea of less government control. But if I put my journalist hat on, I have to ask the opposing question, which would be, you know, Baron Rothschild very famously said, let me control the supply of a nation's currency, and I care not who makes its laws.
Is there a huge risk of— you know, we've watched stock exchanges abuse the power that they have by selling information to high-frequency traders that, frankly, they shouldn't be selling. But that's what entrepreneurs do. So, is there a risk here that by putting the creation of currency in the hands of entrepreneurs, We're potentially inviting fraud and a lot of other problems.
Steve Keen: We are. There's no doubt about that. So that's the reason why we've normally stuck with fiat currencies or with the banking sector, where the banking sector needs to be licensed to be able to actually have banks created in the first place. So then that's why I largely favor the mixed fiat and credit system if it's handled properly. But the trouble is it's not Baron Rothschild we need to worry about anymore. It's Baron Schäuble. Krugler that now controls the money supply. And rather than creating too much or doing fraud, they're creating too little and causing economic chaos. So we've got ourselves the wrong Baron Rothschild. And that really is a product of economic theory. This is why I'm such a battler on economics in general. Economic theory is so misleading about the nature of money and the nature of capitalism that it's led to people believing total myths about the stuff. And yet, to get a job running a central bank, you have to have a PhD in economics.
Well, that's where this paralysis is coming from.
So I don't see private currencies as a permanent solution. I see it as something we need for a while until central bankers are no longer trained in neoclassical economics and learn something realistic, and then understand how the system they operate actually works rather than believing myths like the money multiplier, for example, or believing in negative interest rates. And we can finally move forward with a sensibly managed monetary system. But that, that day could be 15 years away, maybe even more, on the record of what happens in Japan. So in the meantime, I'd like to have private entrepreneurs come in not as a permanent replacement but as a disruptor.
Negative interest rates and bank runs
Erik Townsend: Now, you mentioned negative interest rates. Unfortunately, that is not 15 years off. That's right now, amazingly to me. And, you know, we're seeing the, the German Bund now beyond 10 years on the yield curve Negative yields. What is all this going to mean? Because I'm concerned, frankly, as I listen to central bankers and neoclassical economists, they all seem to say, oh, no worries, the fact that we've completely turned the system upside down from what everybody thinks is normal is no big deal.
What's your view on negative interest rates and the potential knock-on effects that they could have?
Steve Keen: I think it probably wins my award for the stupidest economic policy dreamt up in the last 100 years. There'd probably be a few other larger candidates, but in terms of widely agreed by central banks, it shows how little they know about the system. Because they think that by putting negative rates on the reserve deposits that the private banks have at the central bank, that will then lead to private banks putting negative rates on the deposit rates they pay to their depositors, you and me at local banks. And that will then stimulate you and me to spend more money, which will cause the economy to Start increasing in size. Give me a break. That is so asinine and childish.
When you actually know what's going on, you think about it in double-entry bookkeeping terms, which is the way I think about money fundamentally now, is that if central banks are proposing negative rates on the huge excess reserves that banks currently have, that means that that particular asset is now a negative asset for private banks.
They know that if they tried to make a negative yield on the liabilities as well to balance it, their depositors would leave that bank and go to another one or take the money out in cash. So they're not going to give negative rates for depositors. What they'll do instead is increase the rate that they charge to their current borrowers. Anybody who's taken out a loan from a bank will find the bank is putting up the rates, making the rates you and I pay higher in response to the negative rates being imposed by central banks.
We've already seen this in Switzerland. I think Switzerland's now got what, -0.75% is the rate they're charging on excess reserves. And Swiss banks in general have put up the rates on mortgages to compensate. And that's all you need to think about this is just thinking double-entry bookkeeping terms. You can't do anything about your liability side, but you can— if one asset turns negative on you, you can make the other assets more positive by increasing the amount charged for that asset. So it just shows how little the central banks actually know about the the monetary system they're supposed to manage.
Erik Townsend: Do you think that there is a risk that the fractional reserve banking system obviously can only exist if people don't take their money out of the system? And, you know, negative interest rates create an economic incentive for hoarding cash and just putting it in a safe deposit box or under the mattress.
How far negative do rates have to go before there's a run on the banking system?
Steve Keen: Yeah, I don't think it's going to happen With depositors directly, but it certainly could happen with corporations making that decision. And of course, if you start— I mean, we don't have a fractional reserve banking system. We have a credit system where the banks are required to keep a certain amount of reserves in case there is a run on the banks. That's what really exists right now. But the amount of money they're required to keep, like in America's case, is 10% of household deposits only, which is about 2% of the money supply.
Now, if you then have the household sector deciding that they— if you have the corporations or the household sector deciding, I'm not going to get negative— if the negative rates actually got passed through to the depositors, then they could easily demand more cash than the banks currently have, which would force the banks to go to the central bank to ask for loans of money and so on.
It's a source of potential breakdown. And the difficult thing for banks is they actually need a decent margin and they need also a decent volume of new debt. Now, the volume of new debt has dried up completely. The margin's being squeezed at the same time. So there could well be banks that look like they can't survive and people then go and take their money out and we have a crisis that way. And the ironic thing is this is being done by people who are trying to make the financial system more stable.
QE, asset prices and where the next crisis comes from
Erik Townsend: Finally, before we close, I have one question that's really been on my mind for you because of your reputation for having called the 2008 event in advance and accurately describing what would happen and when it would happen. And I think back 7 years ago to the summer of 2009 after QE1 was announced, what I said— and boy, did I ever get the call wrong— I said, Look, they're not solving any problem here. The problem is too much debt. The government solution with QE is basically to create more debt. That exacerbates the problem. They are grasping for straws. This is an act of desperation that the market will see through, and this rally won't last.
Now, of course, I was proven completely wrong. If central banks print money out of thin air, that money has to go someplace. It went into asset markets, and the rally did last. It's lasted for the last 7 years.
Steve Keen: Right.
Erik Townsend: Now I finally see that even the mainstream, even Steve Liesman on CNBC, is questioning whether or not the Fed is losing credibility at this point and is about to lose control of asset markets. Have we gotten to that point? I mean, you've got the track record here for getting the timing right. Are we getting to the point where George Soros and Stan Druckenmiller and all these other heavyweights are going to be proven right and we're going to have another perhaps bigger than 2008 financial crisis, or can we go on for a few more years of printing money out of thin air and having it just work somehow? Which, it astonishes me that it's worked for the last 7 years.
Steve Keen: I can continue working, but what you get is asset price inflation. You don't get much output in the, in the domestic economy. And what's— if you think about the QE when it was done by the Federal Reserve, they committed themselves to buying $85 billion a month, which is effectively $1 trillion a year. Worth of bonds off the private sector mortgage-backed securities and stuff like that rather than just relying on Treasuries.
Now, that means that, of course, they're doing repo agreements all the time and you've got the open market operations, but it means that the central bank is saying that in the aggregate, we're going to be on the buy side at the tune of $1 trillion a year.
And of course, when they're doing that, they're buying assets off banks. When banks suddenly have Yeah. They have a mortgage-backed security, which is dodgy as it might be. They've now sold to the government. So the income stream for that mortgage-backed security is now going to the central bank, not going to the private bank.
And they've got— in its place, they have in the aggregate $1 trillion worth of cash, which is stored as reserve assets at the central bank. And so their attitude is, well, let's actually use this to buy some shares. And of course, when they buy the shares, the money comes right back in again because the people they buy the shares off deposit the money they get from the banks at the So they can't get rid of the reserves, but that helps both drive down interest rates and drive up asset prices.
And that is what's caused this inflation. If the central bank's willing to stay on the buy side to that scale for that length of time, they'll keep that upward pressure. So they can keep on doing it, keep asset prices high. But of course, if they decide to pull out, that's the only thing keeping asset prices high. So any attempt to unwind QE causes a crash in the market.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Steve Keen: And they're stuck. It's in that sense they've made a pact with Mephistopheles that they can't actually pull out of. So they could keep it going for some substantial time, but they can't stop financial crises happening in the real economy. And I see about 18 countries, I think, in total that have managed to avoid the crisis in 2008 by continuing to borrow. Of course, the most obvious one is China, but also Australia and Canada are well and truly up on that list. So has Norway to some extent, Sweden and Korea, and also Malaysia, to mention a few that have done that. Now, that means that they've all got high levels of credit. So in the case of Australia, for example, the increase in private debt every year is running at 15% of GDP, meaning credit is 15% of GDP. So total demand is like 1.15 times GDP. Credit is now starting to plunge in the Australian economy.
The rate of growth of debt slowing down dramatically. Same thing happening in Canada. That means those countries are going to have the type of financial crisis they avoided back in 2008.
Now, when you look at China being one of those countries, China alone, its slowdown in the rate of growth of its credit, which is running— its credit's running at 25% to 30% of GDP per annum. If that falls back to zero, so if debt growth stops, that's equivalent to 5% of global GDP disappearing.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Steve Keen: So we're looking at that sort of scale of shock coming to the economy from these countries that managed to evade the crisis. After it happens, of course, after those credit collapses occur, they'll be in the same situation as America and England and much of Europe of being debt zombies.
And in that situation, we've all turned Japanese, but we don't have the advantage the Japanese had of being able to export to the rest of the world. So I think a crisis is inevitable. It's not going to come from America or England. It's going to come from China and the other countries that have managed to evade the crisis last time around. But there's nothing that the central banks can do to stop that. The only way you can stop it is by encouraging people to continue borrowing at a rate of 15% of GDP per annum forever. And that was possible when debt levels were down at the 20% and 30% of GDP. It's not possible when they're at 2.1 and 2.2 times GDP as they are now. Okay. Now, in most of those vulnerable countries.
Inflation versus deflation as the catalyst
Erik Townsend: Now, a view that I've come around to is that central banks can almost indefinitely continue to prop up asset prices until something ties their hands so that they're not able to be accommodative. And it seems to me like the big thing is runaway inflation hitting the stage. At that point, they're forced to tighten in order to stop the inflation, and that crashes asset markets. So what I've been watching for is when do we see inflation come Would you agree with that view, and are there other catalysts?
Steve Keen: No, the real catalyst is deflation, because the real dynamic behind all this is the growth in private debt, which is credit. We're getting to the stage where it becomes excessive, so credit becomes negative. That whole process ends up causing a slower rate of growth and a higher level of unemployment, which reduces the capacity of workers to make wage demands, and that's actually the main source of inflation.
So that's why we're ending up in deflation right now. And then if you have financial crisis on top of it, then you can have firms deciding to cut their markups to try to sell more goods. And that was what really happened in a huge way during the Great Depression. That gives you deflation. Now, in that situation, the central banks are forced to do something about the real economy rather than the Wall Street economy, which is where all this money has gone so far. So it's more the threat of deflation.
But because it hasn't bitten as heavily as it did back in the Great Depression when it was running at 10% per annum— prices were falling by more than 10% per year for the first 2 really deep years of the Great Depression— because that hasn't happened, they've been fudging around with stupid policies like negative interest rates.
But inflation requires them to succeed at what they've been failing at for so long. And the only way you're going to get inflation is to increase workers' wages. Wages, which is the last thing conventional economists want to do, and increase the bargaining power of workers, again the last thing they want to do. So we're just not going to see inflation.
Where to follow Keen: Twitter, blog, new book
Erik Townsend: Well, unfortunately, as much as I would love to continue this conversation, we are out of time. Fantastic interview again. You've been extremely popular with our listeners. For people who want to continue to follow your work, I know you've got a book coming out, you're very active on Twitter. Give our listeners a sense of where they can follow your work.
Steve Keen: I guess the 3 places would be my— Twitter's probably the best way to follow me because I'm addicted to Twitter, so I continue using it all the time. Then my blog, which is— I publish on Forbes and then also cross-publish a part of that on my debtdeflation.com/blogs website. And I've got a new book coming out, which is called Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? And I'm hoping that'll be out by the end of the year from Polity Press. So that's probably the best way to get a concise statement of my views— 25,000 words rather than just one.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so we have @ProfSteveKeen on Twitter and DebtDeflation.com are probably the best places to start, and they can find links to the information about the book and other— the Forbes blog and so forth— from those sources. Thanks again so much for joining us on the program, Steve. Aaron Chan will be back with me as MacroVoices MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer break
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for future guests. suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: Erik clarifies the inflation question
Aaron Chan: I'm Aaron Chan, back with you. So Professor Keen always gives a great interview. So I'll take this opportunity to remind listeners that Erik interviewed him 6 weeks ago on MacroVoices episode 14, where the topic at hand was a comparison of prevailing schools of economics, and particularly Professor Keen's criticisms of neoclassical economics. That interview is still available free of charge on our homepage at MacroVoices.com. So let me get right into the questions, Erik. You and Professor Keen covered a lot of meaty topics, but I want to first touch on your last question about inflation potentially backing central banks into a corner and ultimately being forced to stem credit expansion, essentially pricking the massive asset bubble we have. Now, Professor Keen thinks deflation is the more likely scenario from falling economic activity due to slowing private credit growth, lower wages, and an eventual reduction in price Basically, the 1930s.
So, Erik, what's your reaction to that?
Erik Townsend: Well, for the most part, I think the reason it appears that we disagreed there is that I botched the question. I didn't phrase it correctly. I agree with Professor Keen that the current environment is very much conducive to deflation, not inflation. The question I intended to ask is, irrespective of the current environment, what are the things that could happen that would tie central bankers' hands to the point where they couldn't get away with propping up asset markets anymore. And when I said that I thought a return to runaway inflation was the thing that would tie their hands, I do very much believe that would do it. I don't think that's coming right away. I didn't mean to forecast that that was about to happen, and I think he took it that way. And I agree with him disagreeing with me because I don't think inflation is right around the corner. I do think that it would tie their hands.
So I probably should have asked that question a little bit differently.
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Postgame: where the next crisis comes from
Aaron Chan: So now, Professor Keen thinks that the next domino to fall could be one of the 18 countries he mentioned who managed to escape 2008 by going further into debt, be it Australia, Canada, or China. On the other hand, our guest last week, John Llewellyn, said that the next catalyst could be a Lehman-style event in the European banking system. So which one do you think is more likely?
Erik Townsend: Boy, that's a tough one. I would say all of the above. And the way that I look at this environment right now, this overall macro backdrop, I think that the system is very fragile, and it is waiting for a Lehman-sized catalyst to start an avalanche that could be really scary. Does that mean that I know where it's going to come from? No, I have no clue. Brexit was a good candidate. The most likely outcome is that Brexit is off the table, although we don't know that for certain as we're taping Thursday afternoon.
Assuming that Brexit is off the table, where's the next one come from? I don't know. I think those are all possibilities. I definitely agree with other aspects of what you said. What Professor Keen said in this interview, which is once the Brexit is off the table, that doesn't mean the E.U. is out of trouble. The E.U. still has massive problems between the banking crisis— look at what's going on with European banking stocks right now, look at the predicament that the ECB has gotten itself into, look at the refugee crisis, look at the just ridiculous negative interest rate situation that's going on with German bond yields right There's all kinds of things that could provide a tipping point or a catalyst, and I really have no idea which one it's going to be.
Postgame: fractional reserve versus credit system
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, when you mentioned that we have a fractional reserve system, Professor Keen took another view and said that we instead have a credit system where banks are required to hold 10% of household deposits for withdrawal. Now, that sounds like fractional reserve banking to me, but was there something I missed?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the distinction that he was trying to make is it's not just a fractional reserve banking system, which means people have their savings, they put it in the bank, and the bank does The Fed doesn't really have the money. They only have a fraction of it, which is what fractional reserve banking is. I think his point is, it's not just that. It's, we also have a credit system which is providing the bulk of the money that people are spending into the economy. So, it's not just the question of fractional reserve banking, but also the question of what happens to the overall credit system, which we are so dependent on. Right now, with all of these easy money policies, we're supporting the economy by allowing people to borrow and spend beyond their means. What if we can't do that anymore?
Postgame: alternative currencies and the Twitter analogy
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, let me pivot to the alternative currencies. I thought that conversation was fascinating, and Professor Keen mentioned currencies I hadn't even heard of before. And perhaps our listeners are aware or even using some of these currencies, and it would be great to hear more about them. So on to my question about them. From my understanding, for something to be money, it must serve numerous functions, and one of which is for it to be fungible, meaning the money in my account has to be the same in your account. I noted Professor Keen saying that it might take central bankers 10 to 15 years to transition to more applicable or practical theories, and entrepreneurs could do well and promote commerce by introducing new currencies, be it backed by gold, labor, boats, you name it.
However, it seems sort of paradoxical to me because on the one hand, we are advocating decentralization, but to alternatives that are inherently centralized. So do you see anything at odds here, and do you think a transition to alternative Do you think that these alternatives could promote commerce, as Professor Keen said?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's a question of purposes and timeframes. I don't see any of the currencies that he mentioned changing the world starting tomorrow or next week or really anytime soon, frankly. But if you look at his perspective, what he said is he sees the big picture of we have this fiat money system which is destined for eventually a failure, as all fiat money systems in the history of the world have eventually failed.
And what are the alternatives? What are we going to have in order to replace them? There's not a lot of good possibilities.
And I would draw an analogy to say something like Twitter. The guys that designed Twitter literally had no idea what the purpose of the thing was going to be. They were experimenting with this idea of microblogging and trying to find an application for it. I'm told that one of the thoughts they had was maybe people would use it to communicate with taxi drivers in San Francisco in order In order to find a taxi that was close to them.
Well, look at what Twitter has evolved into. Nobody ever guessed what it would become. I think— I don't want to speak for Professor Keen, but my perception is the reason he's spending his time on these things is he knows that the world needs to be exploring other alternatives to a continued central bank-administered fiat money system.
And I think that what he's saying is eventually that central bank-administered fiat money system going to fail, and the more work that we do to explore possibilities for alternatives, the better off we are. I don't see any of the things that he's talking about now suddenly taking over and becoming the new currency. I think that he's looking at them in terms of having more options on the table when we eventually get to the point of what Raoul Pal has called the reset, when the existing system of fractional reserve banking and central bank administered fiat money breaks down at some point in the future.
Research Roundup, next week's guest and sign-off
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that's all I got for questions.
Erik Townsend: Okay. And for our registered users who have registered at MacroVoices.com, what can they find in this week's Research Roundup email?
Aaron Chan: Well, we've once again got a stacked lineup for our subscribers. And this week's Research Roundup is headlined by Raoul Pal's latest presentation on Real Vision TV. This was an excellent presentation, and I highly recommend our listeners to check I've already watched it twice and have it bookmarked because Mr. Pal goes through his macro and business cycle framework. We've also got excellent articles from listener favorites like Axel Merk, Satyajit Das, and Art Berman. So stay tuned for that.
Erik Townsend: And I definitely want to echo your comment, Aaron That video with Raoul Pal was absolutely outstanding. And that is a free link. You don't have to be a Real Vision subscriber in order to watch that one. I recommend it very, very highly. And again, for anyone who has not registered yet, it is completely free. Just go to MacroVoices.com, register a free account with your email address, and you will receive our weekly Research Roundup email with the best that we can find in free research on the internet. Aaron who do we have for next week's show?
Aaron Chan: Well, next week we are bringing back another all-time favorite MacroVoices guest, Grant Williams, who's the publisher of Things That Make You Go Hmmm and co-founder of Real Vision TV. Mr. Williams is both a Brit and has a brilliant mind for macro, so I'm sure he'll have plenty to say about Brexit regardless of the outcome.
Well folks, that about wraps it up for this week's episode. We continue to receive a lot of positive feedback, and Erik and I look forward to continue bringing you premier content with the sharpest minds in finance. But we also need your help in order to bring you the biggest names like Kyle Bass or Stanley Druckenmiller. So if you're on Twitter, give us a retweet and mention it to your followers. You can also follow our main account @MacroVoices. You can follow Erik and me @ErikSTownsend and @_AaronChan_.
If you know others who would enjoy the Research Roundup and the content we bring you there, please forward it to them as well. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. See you next week.
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