Jeff Snider — Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners (Alhambra Investments at w70) (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Episode preview and chartbook instructions
Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. This is Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan. MacroVoices episode 27 was recorded on August 18th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Investments will be joining me as today's special guest. We'll be covering corporate earnings and why Jeff feels that equity valuations are rich to fair value. What Jeff sees is a chronic and acute dollar shortage, TED spread volatility, Eurodollar money supply, and why Jeff believes that all of this points to the need for a global systemic reset of the financial system. Jeff sent us a really fantastic book of charts that he'll be referring to in the interview. Normally, we try to produce MacroVoices so that you could listen to it at the gym or in the car or what have you. But for this week, I highly recommend that you download the excellent book of charts and graphs that Jeff sent us, because he's going to refer directly to them in the interview.
Registered users at MacroVoices.com already received the download link, and your Research Roundup email. For anyone who is not registered yet, you can register a free account at MacroVoices.com, and once you're logged in, click on the Research Library function on the black menu bar at the top of the screen, and you'll find the download there.
We also are going to talk about Bitcoin and why we've yet to do a show on that topic after today's feature interview.
Market wrap: equities melt-up and the famous bears
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P, with E-mini S&P futures trading north of 2,190 at one point earlier this week and ultimately closing on Thursday afternoon at about 2,184. So, Erik, has anything changed in your view for equities?
Erik Townsend: Not too much change from what we discussed last week. You know, we're still seeing this melt-up. I don't think that the economic fundamentals at all support these valuations. I do think maybe what's starting to happen here is people who have been very short for a long time are starting to give up. And I think we could see basically short-covering pressure pushing equity prices even higher. Certainly, the Fed minutes coming out a bit more dovish, quashing expectations of a rate hike have definitely added to volatility in the last couple of days. Dollar index has, of course, been very soft in the last couple days, and that, I think, has helped to push the prices of equities and everything else a little bit higher. One thing I do think very interesting, though— you'll remember my comment last week— was that although there is this chorus of bearish voices with very, very famous people between Carl Icahn and George Soros and Stan Druckenmiller, I observed that those are the old-school rock stars.
Those are the guys that are famous for their work in the industry back in the good old days before we had central bank liquidity driving markets. Well, this week I saw an analysis on ZeroHedge of David Tepper's 13F.
Now, Tepper is definitely a new normal kind of guy. He was the very first and most outspoken person to say back in 2009, hey, QE is unconditionally good for stock prices. You print money out of thin air, it's got to go someplace, it's going to go into asset markets. So, this is a guy who's definitely got the handle on this new normal world of central bank liquidity that we've run into. And even he is scaling back his bullish bets, according to the 13F analysis. George Soros, according to ZeroHedge analysis, has doubled his bearish put exposure to S&P 500 puts. Carl Icahn reiterated that he sees a day of reckoning coming and emphasized that he's more hedged than he's ever been before. So, you know, all of these voices are still selling a very Very, very bearish signal. My only comment is, you know, I've been saying the same thing for years, and what's happened is the market continues to march higher against the fundamentals.
And Jeff Snider is going to have a lot to say about this, about equity valuations and so forth, in today's feature interview.
Market wrap: oil inventories and OPEC
Aaron Chan: Right. And last week you remarked that OPEC propaganda would likely continue to boost oil prices, and that even though you thought they were already higher than fundamentals dictated, it would probably take a bearish inventory report to reverse a trend. And we certainly saw the exuberance continue with WTI trading north of $49 this afternoon. What did we get from inventory numbers from yesterday's DOE report, and what's next for oil prices?
Erik Townsend: Well, you're exactly right, Aaron, that what's going on here is the rally is basically being driven by OPEC propaganda. What it would take to turn it around would be a decisively bearish inventory report, and we didn't get that this week. The inventory numbers came in at a 2.5 million barrel nationwide draw on inventory.
So, you know, we're still at a time of year when draws are expected, but we've had a couple of builds on inventory for the last couple of weeks. So, 2.5 million barrel draw. And Cushing, Oklahoma, which is ever critical because it's where the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract is settled, again, a draw on inventory, making 724,000 barrels of extra space, bringing Cushing down to 86% of its working capacity.
And I'll point out, you know, there are several sources of these working capacity numbers for Cushing, and different people calculate them in different ways. The number that's now 86% at one point got to 97% back in the spring. Whereas if you look at something like RBN Energy's analysis, they say the real number never got north of 91% because they calculate it differently. So, it's a little bit of a subjective matter of opinion there. But at least one measure says we're down to 86% of capacity. Gasoline, 2.7 million barrel drawdown on inventory after several weeks of unexpected builds on inventory. We've got a much more characteristic drawdown. Distillates, on the other hand, 1.9 million build, that would be a little bit bearish. But in the context of the other numbers, the inventory information is definitely not a really bearish message.
Now, what I think the market has missed, quite frankly, is we also saw the biggest increase in US production in 15 months. We're also seeing increasing rig counts, and Saudi Arabia just announced an all-time record high level of production at 10.9 million barrels per day. So, I do see some significant bearish indications in these numbers, but the inventory numbers themselves were not markedly bearish. And I think that's what's allowed the exuberance to continue. I don't think it's supported by real fundamentals, but we didn't see big builds on inventory. That was a sigh of relief. And I think that's allowed this rally to really accelerate in the last couple of days. A little bit of a correction there. We did see north of $49 this afternoon, but there was also a contract roll there.
Aaron Chan: So the—
Erik Townsend: The September contract has not traded that high. It is still about 65 cents lower than that. It was the October contract, which is about to become the new front month, that actually traded above $49. So, you know, I think that the market is overvalued, but I think, again, what it's going to take to turn this around is a clear bearish inventory signal. For some reason, the increasing production, increasing rig count, and Saudi record production wasn't enough to do it.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: And I think that we may have to wait this out until nothing of consequence happens at this OPEC meeting in September before we see a meaningful reversal, unless we get a very significant increase, build on inventory. I think those inventory builds are coming, but seasonally, it's still a little bit early for that. In the next month or so, I would expect to see them to start picking up. So, I do still expect a low to come. I don't think the $39 that we saw is the ultimate low. I think sometime in September or early October, we're likely to see see a lower number there. Whether it gets back down to the $26 range where we saw the low this spring, I don't know. It's all going to depend on what the numbers tell us in terms of inventory.
And again, I think that Saudi Arabia, the discussion about how they're going to take steps supposedly to balance the market— look, if Saudi Arabia wanted to balance the market, it takes 10 minutes. It's a phone call to Russia to say we're ready to make a deal where we mutually cut production by 5%.
That would cause at least a 30% increase in prices because the market would be rebalanced even though Saudi Arabia would be accepting less volume of production. They'd be getting paid 30 or 40 or 50% more for it. Their overall revenue would increase. At some point, Saudi Arabia is going to be ready to do that. They don't need to wait for a meeting to make it happen. When they're talking about taking action to balance markets at the meeting, it's propaganda. And I don't really think that this OPEC meeting has any consequence or significance, but it certainly does in terms of price. It has no consequence in terms of true fundamentals, but the propaganda is working and it could propel prices even higher.
Market wrap: gold, 10-year yields and the dollar index
Aaron Chan: Right. So, shifting over to gold, since late June, we've been watching a technical consolidation range in gold between $1,308 and $1,377, and it feels like Groundhog Day, Erik. And it looks like we're still stuck in this range. Do you have any new views on gold for this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's mostly same old, same old. We're looking at the same picture. We're still stuck in that range. What I would observe, though, is that we've seen a lot of weakness in the dollar index this week, which was there before the Fed minutes, was accelerated after the Fed minutes. We're back down to just barely above 94 right now, 94.09, as I look at the dollar index on Thursday afternoon. That is a post-Brexit low, but even with that weakness in the dollar, we still haven't gotten back up to the top of that trading range. So, even though we're We're at $1,357 on the gold futures chart as I look at it Thursday afternoon. That is, you know, on the top half of the range, but it's not at the very top of the range. And we're definitely looking at a low in the dollar index for 3 months. So, I still think that we're seeing overall kind of a weak picture here for gold.
I think it still has further to roll over and fall off to the downside. But that hasn't happened yet. And certainly, you know, there was Ukraine talking about fears of all-on invasion from Russia.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: If the geopolitical situation heats up, that certainly would be a bullish catalyst for gold. So, until we get out of that $1,308 to $1,377 consolidation range, I don't have a firm opinion, but I'm kind of just very slightly leaning towards the bearish side, that maybe there is still lower numbers to be seen in the gold market before this is over.
Aaron Chan: Got it. So, 10-year Treasury yields traded back up to the highs of the 150s, trading around 153 Thursday afternoon. Any change on your outlook for yields?
Erik Townsend: Well, again, no, not really. I think we're still in this post-Brexit bounce. If we were to move above 170, that would tell me, hmm, maybe my view is wrong. But I think that we're in a consolidation period, and eventually I expect it to resolve lower in yield, higher in price. And I am still expecting sub-1% Treasury yields eventually before this whole thing is over. Whether it happens this year or not, I don't know.
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, as you mentioned earlier, the dollar index is still treading water to maybe looking weaker, having traded on a low 94 handle briefly this week. So what's your take on the DXY?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, it's been this afternoon particularly weak and was accelerated. There had been some weakness. The Fed minutes clearly accelerated that. I don't know really where we're headed. I still have the view big picture-wise that probably this consolidation range, you know, from whatever the bottom was, 91 to 97. On a fundamental level, I still see the argument for a resolution to the upside above 97. But boy, you know, I thought we were going to consolidate between 95 and 97, and we're down to almost 94 now, 94.10 as I speak. So, I don't know where it's headed. We're watching it closely. And of course, central bank policy and what the Fed says next is going to be telling.
Something I find interesting, though, is the way the market reacts to Fed minutes as if they were new news. The minutes are a reflection of what happened in a meeting several weeks ago. And we had earlier this week a Fed commentator saying, hey, don't discount the possibility of a rate hike at the next meeting. I think they were trying to set expectations that maybe things have changed since that last meeting and not wanting people to interpret the Fed minutes as being too dovish. But the Fed minutes come out after that statement and people act as if it's new news that happened after that, when in reality it's just a release of news from weeks ago. So, you know, I wonder what the next message is going to be out of the Fed, but I'm actually surprised that the dollar index has fallen as much as it has in the last couple of days.
Aaron Chan: Right. So, it's like no news is good news. So, thanks for the update, Erik. This week's special guest is Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners. And as Erik mentioned at the top of the show, we strongly encourage you to download the chartbook that accompanies this interview. Registered users at MacroVoices already received the download link in your Research Roundup email.
For anyone who didn't receive it yet, you can register a free account at MacroVoices.com. And once you're logged in, you can find the download under the Research Library tab on the black menu bar at the top of the screen. Erik's interview with Mr. Snider is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Corporate earnings, profits and cash flow
Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners. And Jeff sent us an absolutely fantastic book of charts that he's going to be referring to. We told you earlier in the program where you can download the chart book. Jeff, I can't thank you enough for sending us so much information. You've gone well beyond the call of duty in terms of what we expect from most of our guests. I want to dive right in because it's going to be a challenge to get through all of this. So, the first few charts that you sent us focused on corporate earnings, and your research suggests that equity prices are considerably rich right now to the value imputed by earnings. Please give us the big picture here. What are these charts telling us, and what's the story on corporate earnings?
Jeff Snider: Sure, Erik. And first of all, let me thank you for having me on, and I appreciate the opportunity to deliver as much information as I possibly can. As far as the stock market goes, and earnings in particular, what we see is a dramatic deviation from what was supposed to happen.
We were supposed to have a full-blown recovery based on, you know, You know, the idea that QE would create a successful and sustainable economy. And in the middle of 2014, that the trend in earnings deviated sharply. We saw an actual contraction in earnings to the point where what was supposed to be about $145 in 2015 trailing 12-month earnings turned out to only be about $87.
So, it was a massive deviation between what was supposed to happen and what did happen. And that's, you know, that's always the danger with forward earnings. There's the risk that they don't actually show up.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, your charts are showing pretty clearly that earnings keep getting revised lower time after time after time, and that would seem to suggest that the earnings recession that we're in is dragging on much longer than almost all analysts had initially expected. So what's going on? Why is it dragging on so long, and how long do you expect it to last? And when will it eventually— and how will it end?
Jeff Snider: Well, how long it lasts is, you know, obviously very difficult to discern ahead of the time. But I think the big problem is the fact that the economy itself is not getting better, is certainly not at the pace that would generate a return to earnings growth. So, that's part of the problem is the fact that I think a lot of analysts and a lot of economists certainly have underestimated the degree and the depth of the problems that are existing, and they are dragging on further than anyone anticipated. And so, we have this process where They keep expecting earnings to recover rather relatively quickly, rapidly, but they don't. Quarter after quarter, they get marked down significantly.
So the fact of the earnings recession is there in 2015, but 2016 has yet to become the recovery. In fact, we're still seeing earnings that are about the same as they were toward the end of last year.
Erik Townsend: You're also including a couple of charts in addition to the earnings projections, which are showing corporate profits and cash flow. How do they fit into
Jeff Snider: Well, it's always good to look outside of, you know, I think we have a tendency to focus maybe too narrowly on the stock market, S&P 500 large-cap companies. And so, it's always good to look outside to maybe some broader pieces of information. And the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which is the agency that produces GDP, produces the other side of GDP, which is gross domestic income. And within that side is corporate cash flow and corporate profits. Across the entire corporate sector and the entire business sector.
What we find in this segment of data largely corroborates what we see in the S&P 500 earnings, that cash flow and profits are declining, and they have been off pace for quite a significant amount of time, which again ties back into the idea that the recovery has been inordinately shallow and unusually so.
So, there is much— there's a lot of evidence that shows And that really underscores how the corporate sector has been struggling for many years, not just the last few years. And that puts into context why, why the earnings environment might be so rough and so off in 2016, because it's not something that's new. It's just a relatively weak environment getting much weaker.
Is QE liquidity? Bank reserves versus money
Erik Townsend: Now, before we move on from equity prices, I'd like to get your feedback on something, because several past guests on this program have shared the view that I've held, which is that the principal driver of of this whole equity rally since 2009 has been central bank-provided liquidity. So, the thesis is basically that if you conjure trillions of dollars out of thin air, that money has to go someplace, and a lot of it ends up in asset markets. Frankly, though, we're way past overdue in terms of having a contradictory viewpoint.
I know that you have one, so please don't be shy. Tear my view apart. What's wrong with that view, and how do you see it?
Jeff Snider: Well, let me start with, uh, partially by agreeing with you. I think there are effects from what the Federal Reserve has done, particularly in quantitative easing. The Fed does buy bonds from the marketplace, primarily dealers, and it does have portfolio effects, which pushes investors into things, riskier things like stocks. So, there is some effect from what the Federal Reserve does. However, I would disagree in calling that liquidity, because what the Fed does through quantitative easing is create bank reserves.
And bank reserves, in my view, aren't the same thing as dollars. It's not the same thing as money printing. And so I think there's a great mainstream misconception about what the Fed actually does. Because of that, I think there's a tendency to discount liquidity risk overall, which is something that we'll get into a little bit later on.
In fact, I think what happens in stocks is more a myth than actual reality. Investors in stocks are buying into the idea that the Fed does create liquidity And so that's one reason why you see valuations stretched, because it's the idea that because the Fed does create liquidity, that risk is very low. And so investors are buying shares at ridiculous valuations based on the premise that the Fed can create a recovery through liquidity. And what 2014 showed and 2015 was that wasn't true. The earnings that were supposed to justify the valuations based on the idea that QE work never happened, and they still haven't happened.
And so the longer the earnings recession lingers, the greater the risk there is that stock investors will eventually realize that they have been following the wrong story all along, that what the Federal Reserve does do is not money printing, it's not creating dollars, it's creating only one form of bank liability, and that I would argue isn't even a very important form of bank liability. Bank balance sheet construction on a liability has far more important factors that are more relevant to the global economy and the marketplace.
Eurodollar contraction, TIC data and the interest rate fallacy
Erik Townsend: Speaking of following the right story, a theme that we've really focused on in this program is the US dollar rally and where the dollar is headed. The next section of the chartbook that you sent us addresses what you're calling a chronic and acute dollar shortage. And you've got some great charts that show everything from Treasury international capital flows to the 2s-10s yield curve flattening to inflation breakevens to repo fail rates.
Give us the, the big story here. How do all these things come together, and what are they telling you that leads you to conclude that we have a chronic and acute dollar crisis?
Jeff Snider: Well, first, you know, you look at the TIC data, for example, and a lot of people are confused about what that actually represents. It's essentially buying and selling of US Treasuries and US dollar-denominated assets by foreign actors. But in a, in a more general sense, what it shows is the offshore Eurodollar system, which is the global reserve, the actual global reserve currency.
And before 2007, it was a rising, almost flourishing system. And after 2007, it has been the opposite. It's been a decay, a constriction, a contraction in global money supply that isn't a straight-line contraction, that's uneven and Produces quite a crisis here and there, but overall there's a bright demarcation that sits with August 2007 where the global eurodollar system is no longer able to be, to be a stable platform of monetary growth and therefore economic growth.
Erik Townsend: On page 9 of the chartbook, you've got a chart that shows a frightening decline recently in official holdings of US Treasury debt. What does that tell you about what central banks are doing and how they play a role in this
Jeff Snider: Well, what it tells me is that, again, with the TIC data and the idea that the global eurodollar system is contracting, it shows that in the last couple years especially, that contraction has become so severe that central banks have been forced to try to deal with it as best they can. And we know this, you know, a lot of people know about how China has been selling their Treasuries, and that plays into part of what we're talking about here. Right. Which is that central banks are trying to fill a funding gap in dollars that they just can't fill.
And a lot of central bank programs are temporary in nature, and they're just done and designed for immediate relieving of pressure. And what that chart shows is that central banks aren't able to actually fix the problem. They're constantly intervening and constantly trying to deal with what is a chronic issue.
And so the chart tells me that the chronic issue has become more and more severe to the point where you see enormous interventions in dollar markets.
Erik Townsend: On pages 10 and 11, you allude to an interest rate fallacy. What's the fallacy? What's the story there?
Jeff Snider: Well, Milton Friedman, back in the late 1990s, talked about the interest rate fallacy. He was speaking specifically about Japan. And what he said was, and he was absolutely correct, Was that low interest rates do not tell us that the economy is being stimulated. Low interest rates actually show a tightness of money supply in the real economy.
And you know, he made mention of the fact that that's what we saw in the United States in the 1930s was low interest rates throughout that decade. And conversely, in the 1970s during the Great Inflation, interest rates were high. And so when we think about low interest rates, we need to think about the them in terms of more than just short run.
Long-term low interest rates are again a signal of tight money, which is what we've just been talking about with the eurodollar system.
Repo fails, eurodollar futures, LIBOR and the TED spread
Erik Townsend: Now you go on in pages 12 through 17 to focus quite a bit— 5 slides— just on repo imbalances and repo issues. Where do repos fit into this story and why are they relevant?
Jeff Snider: I think it goes back to what we said about the central banks and chart Page 9. Page 9. It's the fact that the chronic dollar problem has become more acute, especially over the last couple of years. What we call the rising dollar is really an increase in pressure and tightness in the eurodollar contraction.
So, in the repo market, that's exactly what we find. You find an increasing— a whole variety of ways in which there is disorder and— I don't want to say chaos, but problems in normal and flexible funding. So, you see everything from dealers hoarding of US Treasury collateral, which will then create problems in overall funding where it breaks out into repo fails, rising repo fails. You know, back in March, we had the largest 2 weeks of repo fails since the panic in 2008. And these are all tied together with the fact that the dollar pressure is rising to the point where it's becoming a very acute problem.
That's the reason why we've got currency problems all over the world. It's the reason why we had the market crash in August and then another liquidation again in January and February. It's because these funding issues are becoming more and more serious. They're not being alleviated by anything that any central bank is doing, which includes the Fed, which ignores that it has any problem to begin with and denies that it has any problem.
Erik Townsend: Starting on page 18, you shift gears back to eurodollars and you focus on eurodollar futures. What's the story there, and what does it tell you about interest rate expectations?
Jeff Snider: Well, yeah, eurodollar futures are kind of the cross-section or intersection between the economy and monetary policy and forward views on monetary policy. And over the last year, eurodollar futures have signaled an immense amount of bearishness about future— the future trajectory of short-term interest rates. And so, what you find is a contradictory narrative to what the Fed is trying to say. LIBOR is supposed to be a reflection of monetary policy at the very least.
And so, if the Fed is going to be raising rates, we would expect to find eurodollar futures to decline in value, which means rising interest rate expectations in the future.
But what we've seen is, again, an incredible amount of the opposite, where eurodollar futures are being bid up, which is a very bearish expression about what the market is expecting the future path of interest rates to be. It's nothing like what the Federal Reserve is saying. And so it's, again, it's a reflection of the Eurodollar system not buying into both the quantitative easing being liquidity and also the effect of that on the economy, which is quite negative, getting back to Milton Friedman's interest rate policy. It's again a reflection of tight money in the real economy in the area, the Eurodollar area, where it actually matters.
Erik Townsend: You've also got some charts that address a rising trend in LIBOR as well as the TED spread, which TED, of course, is the difference between Treasury yields and eurodollars. That is viewed by a lot of people as kind of a gauge of how much banks trust each other. But you've pointed out not only the rising trend in the TED spread, but also a very marked uptick in terms of volatility in the TED spread. So, what, what are both of those things telling you? Why is the TED suddenly so volatile?
Jeff Snider: I think the volatility is, again, a reflection of the fact that the acuteness of the funding environment has become that much more problematic. And so, while you see the same volatility in GCF repo rates, for example, if you go back to page 16, it's the same thing. The fact is that the funding markets, whether it be repo, whether it be unsecured LIBOR, whether it be any other format, including derivatives, I would add cross- currency basis swaps, interest rate swaps, any number of wholesale financial factors have become much more volatile because of the uncertainty that goes with a tighter monetary environment, but also the, uh, the idea that the Federal Reserve and indeed central banks around the world might be losing control of the system as it goes in the wrong direction.
And going back to the stock market, the idea was prevalent that that this kind of thing wasn't supposed to happen. It wasn't supposed to be possible under especially conditions where the Federal Reserve increased their balance sheet by some $4 trillion. These kinds of things were not supposed to be possible, yet here we are. We see it as a global problem.
You know, if you go to page 21, for example, you see that the relationship between 12-month and 1-month LIBOR and the Chinese yuan exchange rate, which is, you know, CNY is a very good reflection of eurodollar tightness.
And so the idea in the TED spread, and again, I think there's some misconception about what that tells us too, is that it's not just credit risk in interbank markets, but also liquidity risk. And that was, I think, the lesson, the primary lesson that it, in eurodollar system in 2007 and 2008, wasn't so much that there was fear over credit between interbank participants, So much as there was fear over illiquidity turning out like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.
So again, I think in the TED spread in particular, what we're seeing is rising liquidity risk as dollar tightness continues to create further problems that nobody seems to have any answer for.
Why QE could not work
Erik Townsend: One of the assertions you make, I think it's on slide 23, which is one of your title slides, is the reasons why QE did not work and cannot ever work Please elaborate on that. Why do you conclude that QE has not and cannot work?
Jeff Snider: If you think about the Eurodollar system as the global money supply, what that does is it gives us a basis of comparison. And if you, uh, first of all, you have to understand that the Eurodollar system is largely hidden and opaque, and we have no idea the exact nature of it. We have no ability to actually measure the full extent of it. So, a lot of what we're left with is inference. However, there are some ways we can at least put together a picture, a solid picture of certain parts of it.
And that includes things like federal funds, repurchase agreements, repos, commercial paper. And just the contraction in those 3 categories in 2007 was far more than the Fed ever did in balance sheet expansion. Worse than that, however, is as those things contracted in 2007 and 2008, They never came back, and so what you do is you compare what the Fed might have done through balance sheet expansion to the contraction in just what we can see of the eurodollar system, and the difference is still where the Fed hasn't done nearly enough, assuming that bank reserves are a substitute to all of those eurodollar factors, which they aren't.
So there, the Federal Reserve every time it did an additional round of QE. Instead of trying to get the system back to where it was, it was only falling further and further and further behind each time. Monetary contraction is therefore much bigger than what the Fed could do. Again, assuming that it could do with bank reserves what was necessary.
So the fact of the matter is, just on a quantitative basis alone, the Fed just could not keep up with the pace of contraction, and that's why we see all the things, things like. TIPS and things like repo market, eurodollar futures, and it all adds up to Milton Friedman's interest rate fallacy.
Erik Townsend: I want to talk specifically about Chart 24. You're showing a really excellent visual history here of yield curves, and the yield curves that we're seeing now are not the ones that were promised to us when quantitative easing was first introduced. So, what is this telling you? Give us the whole picture of of what slide 24 is about?
Jeff Snider: Well, you know, even Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen would agree that the way to rising interest rates is for actual economic recovery. That's where you see steeper yield curve, so you see nominal rates at more normal levels and not, not, uh, completely depressed levels. And so what that shows is the fact that there is something wrong overall in the economy over the long run. And it's not just the economy, it's the monetary system in general.
And what we find is the fact that the yield curve is shrinking, nominal rates are falling rather than rising.
And so what that does, especially with the US Treasury curve, is it shows exactly what we're talking about in terms of the Eurodollar system overall. It is an expression in very simple terms of the fact that there has to be monetary contraction. There has to be. There's only way to explain how the yield curve can go from where it was in 2006 and before to where it is in 2016, which is barely a curve. And then by the way, this is not just the United States either. It's not just in dollars. We see these distorted scribbled curves all over the world, whether it be Europe and negative rates, Japan, the same thing.
It's a global problem. It's a global monetary problem. The fact that the economy doesn't grow because it's cut off and strangled by monetary decay that is just ongoing and so far unsolved.
And it's a process that is by far more than any central bank can deal with in terms of just raw balance sheet expansion through quantitative easing or whatever other format. And so what the yield curves tell us is that these myths that continue to be believed about what central banks can and cannot do are in fact wrong. They are Myth.
There is no liquidity in central banking. There is only monetary decay in the eurodollar system, and that's all that really matters. And so, getting back to where we're talking about with stock market, the stock market is overvalued based on a belief in a myth that is increasingly being proved as a myth by credit and dollar markets. So it's a it's a big risk to take, especially when these the acuteness.
And the dollar shortage is as recently becoming more and more of a problem.
Erik Townsend: Slides 25 and 26, you're talking about financial business liabilities, and then you're overlaying monetary authority behind it. It's a very impressive graph. Tell us about these slides. What do they mean? What's going on here?
Jeff Snider: Again, it shows the fact that even if we assume the best about what the Federal Reserve did, that quantitative easing and bank reserves are actual substitute liquidity, It still, on a quantitative basis alone, wasn't enough to offset the decline in just these areas. And again, these— what I'm showing here are just federal funds, repo, and commercial paper. And these are only the segments of the Eurodollar system that can actually be measured. So, there's much more that is not seen beyond the chart. So, we really don't have any good idea of how much of monetary contraction occurred in 2007.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeff Snider: Really, beyond 2007, again, because it's ongoing.
So, the Fed, even though it sounds impressive, you know, a $4.5 trillion balance sheet, by account of just these areas of the wholesale system alone, it wasn't enough to offset the decline just in 2007, let alone the ongoing decline in these areas and further.
A permanent break: shrinking derivative books
Erik Townsend: Slide 27, you're showing what looks almost like an output gap type of chart, basically, we're just not tracking the numbers that we're supposed to be. What's this slide about?
Jeff Snider: If we plot the baseline growth in, again, the wholesale eurodollar system of commercial paper repos, federal funds, these kinds of things, that is what was required in order for the economy, through credit and debt growth, to continue growing as if the Great Recession would be a recession. What you see, in fact, is not only did the Fed not offset the contraction in 2007-2008, they haven't come even close to bridging the divide to what growth in those monetary areas should be or should have been had the system actually been rebuilt as it was prior to the crisis.
I think that's primarily the problem here is that we need to realize that what happened in 2007 was not a cyclical temporary deviation. It was in fact A permanent structural problem, which is why we have, you know, again, monetary contraction, which is why the economy has been so lackluster globally since the Great Recession, why there is essentially a lack of recovery, because the financial system as it was, the Eurodollar system as it was before August 2007, has never been restored, and it never will be restored. And I think that's the main picture. here, the main interpretation here, is that this is a permanent disruption in monetary supply throughout the world.
Erik Townsend: And why do you think that that permanent disruption occurred? Is it a matter of we just hit a debt limit, there was too much debt, and, you know, you can't fix it with QE? Or why was it permanent? What happened in 2007?
Jeff Snider: Well, first of all, it was based on faulty premises, which we all know. I mean, the subprime mortgages, all the assumptions about that And it was based on essentially a need for exponential growth. And so when we hit the limits in 2007, where all of those faulty assumptions were exposed as faulty, it could no longer grow exponentially. And because of that, banks, which are the central axis of all this, their balance sheet capacity and construction, they realized that without exponential growth, there's far too much risk and very little reward. For actually doing these money-dealing activities.
And so it's just a matter of banks deciding in long-term type decisions over time that they were no longer willing to do the same kinds of things they were doing before. If you get— if you look at page 28, for example, credit default swaps are a perfect illustration of this point.
You know, prior to 2007, the growth in credit default swaps was enormous. I mean, it was unquantifiable, it was so rapid. Afterwards, however, you can't get any bank to write a default swap policy. In fact, what you see on that chart is leftover credit default swaps from before 2008 that are just being run down in every derivative book.
And the reason is, again, because banks— there's too much risk and not enough reward in doing these types of money-dealing activities. And so, that is the basis for money contraction.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Jeff Snider: is the fact that banks are exiting the FICC businesses because there's just, there's just no reason for them to do it.
Erik Townsend: And let's go ahead and cover slides 29 and 30 as well.
Jeff Snider: Slide 29 is just the companion to credit default swaps, which are interest rate swaps. Same thing there. The realization to get out of that, that market was a little bit later, more related to the 2011 crisis. Crisis in 2007, but the effect is the same. Over time, you see gross derivative books in each of these banks shrinking, not growing.
And same thing with slide 30, which puts together all of the derivative books, which are contracting, and noticeably so. Again, it gets back to the point where banks are shrinking in their money-dealing activities, or what we call money-dealing in the Eurodollar system.
And they're doing so in a manner that is highly disruptive. Again, it gets back to the interest rate fallacy. Here we have these, these various elements of the Eurodollar system, and each and every one, what you find is exactly what you would expect under Milton Friedman's terms. It's contracting money supply and contracting in a way that is economically harmful and increasing financial and market risk.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Where this ends: a systemic reset and central bank denial
Erik Townsend: Okay. I wanted to start by giving you a chance to get through your entire book of slides because it's so fascinating. And I think, frankly, it's probably the most compelling presentation that I've seen to really make the case that the system has not been fixed. We have not structurally fixed anything since 2008. What we've done is paper over our problems and address symptoms on a short-term basis. But something broke, something broke badly, and it hasn't been fixed yet. And I think you do an incredibly compelling job in this chartbook of making that case. But that obviously begs the $64 trillion question, which is what's next in terms of forward-looking? It seems like a lot of things are very seriously broken. You've, you've made that case extremely well.
I don't think that current policy is really focused on on solving anything. I think that we've mostly been stuck in addressing symptoms. Where do you see this heading from here? You know, we have a very large growing chorus of very, very famous and successful people, from George Soros to Stan Druckenmiller to Carl Icahn, all really, really starting to get nervous about equity valuations and what could be next. Are we setting up for a 2008-size or bigger crash, or are we looking at a melt- up, which frankly is a scenario that I've given a lot of thought to because, you know, you, you just look at how things have gone. If the, the short interest here gives up, the short squeeze could take us another couple hundred S&P points higher. Where are we headed and how is this crazy situation that the world economy has gotten into ultimately going to resolve itself?
Jeff Snider: I think we're headed in the long run, you know, it's difficult to say, you know, obviously short on what's gonna happen tomorrow or even next month. But I think longer term, what we're heading toward is the systemic reset. And that conjures all sorts of scary images, and they don't necessarily have to be so. But a systemic reset is simply the realization that what is happening in the current structure of the system now just isn't working, and furthermore, it cannot work.
And if you look at, again, you're absolutely correct, Erik, that the central bank policy, the main policy levers throughout the world, since 2007 has been, how do we rebuild the status quo? How do we bridge the divide of what do we think is essentially a cyclical problem? What is— what we find now in 2016 is that those were faulty premises to begin with. It was never a cyclical problem. So status quo type policies aren't going to work. And in fact, they're actually harmful because they prevent the rest of the system from identifying actual useful strategies for that systemic reset.
So, what does a systemic reset mean? And it's— that's even difficult to tell, too, because it's more than just the financial element. There's social unrest to consider. There's political unrest to consider, not just the election here in the US, but you think about things like Brexit, the political situation in Brazil, China, Japan.
It's a global problem of of where the economy just doesn't work anymore. And so at some point it's going to be forced to deal with that fact, whether that means a financial event and actual monetary reform, or whether it's gonna be dealt with the worst kinds of systemic resets, which are things like the 1930s, where prolonged economic decay led to complete social disarray and disorder.
So we have to hope that there is more of the, more benign types of resets, which could be anything from just redesigning the eurodollar system into something more stable, to maybe the worst type of scenario.
Erik Townsend: If you were in a position to advise central bankers, if Janet Yellen came to you for advice, would you even be able to tell them what to do next? And if so, what would it be?
Jeff Snider: I don't think I would, because, you know, the eurodollar system is not a mystery to these people. They decided 50 years ago that it wasn't money, and so there's been decades of denying the fact that these things are actually monetary in nature, and therefore the Federal Reserve is absolutely certain that what it does is monetary.
The real truth of the matter is the fact there is no money in monetary policy anymore, even though during the 1990s people like Alan Greenspan would would often allude to the fact that they didn't know what money.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeff Snider: Financial innovation along these lines of the wholesale Eurodollar system were completely upsetting the economic order and the order of monetary policy. Yet the Fed decided that it didn't need to study these things. It didn't need to appreciate these things.
We know that very well. And, you know, they discontinued M3 in 2006, which was kind of the last admission that the Fed wasn't ever going to consider the Eurodollar system as part of the monetary regime. And so there, I don't think there is under the current central bank format an answer because the central banks are dedicated to a monetary system that hasn't existed in 50 years. And they have proven time and again that they're not going to change their ways. They're not going to grow in how they manage the economy. They're not going to change in how they intellectually believe in how these things work. They're going to keep doing the same things over and over Again, and they have proven that much. I mean, how many, how many QE programs has there been around the world? And none of them work, yet then it's not— that's what they still talk about.
Erik Townsend: Well, and they're still talking and talking, and I guess between euro exit contagion, China, Japan, it just feels like a whole lot of things in the world are, you know, about to break. If you were to talk to the conspiracy crowd, they would tell you, you know, the governments never let a good crisis go to waste. When the shit hits the fan, they're gonna try to use this for who knows what. You know, do you think that there's a possibility that we get to a point where a major crisis breaks out and it becomes we have to have a global currency or a global central bank or a global government? Do you think it's that magnitude of crisis that we're talking about that could be potentially around the corner?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and again, that's definitely a possibility in terms of a systemic reset. And I would agree that that will probably be their solution to it. It's the idea that we need more control, more centralized control, a single currency, a global currency. Of course, it's completely unworkable, but that won't be the message. The only solution to that, or the only pushback against that, will be whether or not anybody believes them anymore. Because that's one of the things that you look at in these marketplaces, especially the repo market, the Eurodollar market, LIBOR, TIPS, all these other things, What they what they can be classified as is growing mistrust of central bankers and central bank programs.
I think there's also a populist revolt against this type of elite answer. The idea that they keep saying the recovery is coming, or the recovery itself is actually pretty good when everybody knows it's not the case. So I think there is a growing revulsion to that type of solution.
Whether or not it's enough will remain to be seen. But there has to be some kind of answer at some point because the current Eurodollar system, the current global monetary system, is unworkable. It cannot go on forever as it is. It's an unstable system that will reset somehow.
Politics, populist revolt and Bretton Woods
Erik Townsend: And it would occur to me that, you know, you're saying there has to be some kind of global reset. What you need in order to achieve a global reset of anything is really strong and open collaboration and cooperation between nations. But honestly, Jeff, if I look at the political situation without taking any sides in this election, you know, if Hillary Clinton is the next president, she's not ready to be friends with Russia. If Donald Trump is the next president, he's not ready to be friends with China and Mexico. It doesn't seem like we're in an environment where the next leader of the United States is going to have the personality type for a lot of collaboration and cooperation.
And at the same time, you know, we could be on the verge of the European Union potentially facing some pretty serious turmoil. Do you think that the political backdrop plays a role in this story, and how do you see it?
Jeff Snider: Oh, I would absolutely agree based on current conditions. However, I would, I would add though, we don't know how these people would act if they're forced act more responsibly. Put it that way. If we have another crisis, that may sharpen resolve to get along, as you put it. And so, you know, that might be a possible optimistic scenario where something bad really does happen and forces people of the world to get together and actually put together constructive solutions. You think about something like the Bretton Woods Conference back in 1944. Something similar, though, actually worked for might be possible under those kinds of conditions. And, you know, that's basic human nature.
Humanity doesn't revolve or reform until there is a crisis, until people are forced to. You know, that's one of the saddest and most frustrating parts of 2008, was that was a perfect example to do actual reform then, but because economists and central bankers are so set in their ways so set in their view of monetary system, they decided that they were just gonna treat it as any other recession rather than the structural break that it was.
So, we lost an opportunity where people around the world were probably willing to cooperate and work together to put together an actually stable monetary system. And instead, we've been wasting, what is it now, almost a decade on things that just cannot work. It's not that they won't work, they just cannot work.
So, that might be the optimistic answer, is if this does end up being something more of a serious crisis, whether that means a 2008 rerun or not, I don't know, there's at least the potential for people to set aside their petty differences and actually work together for something workable, or face an even worse future.
Erik Townsend: Well, and I think that a point that you made earlier really resonates for me, which is not only have we wasted the time since 2008 in terms of monetary policy and actually doing something to address the core problem as opposed to treating symptoms. But during that time, we've gone from an environment where people were mostly supportive of governments and ready to allow governments to fix things if governments would have done so, to— I think we're getting very close to a point where, you know, the world is just boiling over with discontent with elites. And unfortunately, Unfortunately, when people get to the point where they're just fed up and they've had enough of the global elites and the power structure, they don't respond en masse by saying, we need to completely redesign the Eurodollar system. They respond by throwing Molotov cocktails at central banks. And unfortunately, I think we're in an environment where people are probably not going to be tolerant of giving governments a whole lot more time to get their act together.
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think I agree with you. That's the kind of the downside of a systemic reset that gets out of control. So, the hope would be that somebody somewhere gives in to common sense and actual intellectual growth and stops it before it gets that far.
Because you are right, that's, that's the history of the world, especially with prolonged economic crisis. Eventually, the population gets fed up to the point where there's no amount of reason will talk them back from ledge. And so we have to work and we have to hope that we can arrest that process before it gets that far. And again, you know, as you said, the wasted years since 2008 have increased that risk, not decreased it. The fact that we see it all over the world, there's massive discontent and reasonably so. And that's part of the problem too, is the fact that the elites, the central bankers, the economists around the world keep telling us there's nothing wrong. And it's just, it's plain obvious that that's not the case.
Even their own markets don't believe them.
Erik Townsend: Do you think that they believe that? Do you think that, uh, when Janet Yellen tells us that the economy is approaching liftoff and everything is fine and the policy has worked, do you think that they're just blowing smoke because they're scared, or do you think they're buying their own BS?
Jeff Snider: I think they believe it because they want to believe it, but they also know that It's tenuous. I do believe that there is far more doubt probably expressed internally than they would ever allow publicly, and I think that comes out at certain points. But yeah, I don't think that they're as convinced as they might sound in public. We know that because they would have raised rates more than once already. So there is definitely an idea within the professional official circles that something is wrong. Whether or not they know exactly what might— what that might be is a different story, but they are not— they are not completely shut off from the world as it actually is.
Close of interview: where to follow Alhambra
Erik Townsend: Well, unfortunately, Jeff, I would love to go on for another hour about this. It's a fantastic conversation, but unfortunately we are running out of time. I cannot thank you enough for sending us such an excellent book of charts. I strongly recommend to our listeners that they download them and look at it, and And I sure hope that central bankers are listening to this program, because, frankly, they need to.
Many of our listeners already know you. You're a very prolific writer. Your work is very frequently featured on ZeroHedge But for people that are just joining the fan club, please tell them, what does Alhambra Partners do? What business are you in? Where can people follow more of your work?
Jeff Snider: Well, we're a registered investment advisor based in Florida with offices throughout the country. My work is posted at our website, alhambra.com. AlhambraPartners.com. It's also syndicated at quite a few places around the web, including Newsmax and David Stockman's Contra Corner. I have a regular weekly column at RealClearMarkets and many other places around the web that you can find relatively easily.
Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, this interview has been a real pleasure. I cannot thank you enough. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: reaction to Snider and why no Bitcoin show
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, that was a great interview, and I really appreciate Mr. Snider's take. What did you think about that?
Erik Townsend: I think that it was a fantastic interview, and, you know, I, I don't really like the conspiracy theory guys that say the sky is falling and then they can't back it up with hard evidence or persuasive, informed arguments. Jeffrey Snider is in a whole different league. You know, he has a very bearish view He thinks that the global monetary system eventually has to fail and be reset. I agree with him, by the way, but he articulates a very compelling and persuasive argument, and he backs his statements up with hard data and graphs and charts. So, I really appreciate his style, and I want to thank Jeff again for an excellent interview.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, likewise. And on a different note, we've received several suggestions that we should do a feature interview about Bitcoin. Well, the cryptocurrency that has become quite popular in recent years. So, Erik, can you please explain why we haven't done this topic yet?
Erik Townsend: Well, to be brutally honest, the short answer is because I personally think that Bitcoin is way overhyped, and I don't think that it is likely to ever gain the prominence as a currency that most of the fan club is expecting. Now, before going on, we should probably explain what Bitcoin is for anyone who doesn't doesn't already know about it. It is a very, very impressive technology. As a technology guy, and for anyone who's new to the program or doesn't know my background, my first career was as a software technologist. I ran a software company. That's what I know about. Bitcoin, from a techie standpoint, is way cool stuff. I love it.
What it does is it acts effectively like digital cash, not a digital It's not a check that has to clear through a bank, but truly digital cash. So, it allows anonymous, secure online payments. There is no central overseer. There's no central database of all the Bitcoin accounts. There's no place that could be hacked, no central point of control. And that is the principal technology innovation behind it. There's no way, therefore, to dispute transactions similar to a cash transaction. Once you give somebody your cash, it's a done deal. It can't be rolled back.
There's no way to—
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: There's no way to dispute the charge on your credit card statement and have some authority that overrides this whole thing, unroll it for you. Once it's done, it's done. That also means that there is no way for governments to control or trace transactions in Bitcoin, and that is one of its biggest features according to its proponents.
I love this stuff. And again, folks, don't get me wrong. Bitcoin is way cool. But what does Bitcoin actually achieve? It takes power away from governments and gives financial privacy and autonomy back to the people. Folks, I love it. I'm all for it. I like these values and principles as much as you do. But the fact of the matter is that most people on the planet support their government's supposed need to fight terrorism and And fight tax cheats and to have a whole lot of control over people's finances. So, I think that as soon as Bitcoin gains any more traction than it already has, it's very likely to be outlawed or severely restricted. And in fact, that's already happening. In the EU, there are already calls for a central Bitcoin owner registry where in order to have Bitcoins, your identity and how many Bitcoins you have and so forth would have to be cataloged in a central database.
And of course, that fundamentally undermines the whole point of what Bitcoin is designed to do. So, governments are already onto this. They will blame it on terrorism. They'll tell us that if you have Bitcoins, it's going to help terrorists to finance their operations. They'll tell you it's necessary to prevent tax fraud. In reality, the government wants to control our finances.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: And the value that a lot of libertarians have, which is that people have the right to financial privacy and it's none of the government's business to be able to see what's in your bank account. Unfortunately, most people don't agree with that view, and the government is not going to allow Bitcoin to take off in any way.
So, as a technologist, I think it's absolutely fascinating. I think it would be irresponsible, though, for us to promote Bitcoin as the way of the future, as a lot of people have been doing. Right. Doing in podcast interviews. I just don't think that's realistic. I wish it was. And it, to me, it hearkens to a few years ago, a lot of people were saying, okay, it's unavoidable. We have to go back to a gold standard. Well, sure, a gold standard would enforce monetary responsibility. It would take the most powerful people in the world, central bankers, and it would take a lot of their power away from them because under Under the discipline of a gold standard, you wouldn't have the ability to conjure money out of thin air with no backing behind it, and central bankers wouldn't have so much power. Well, guess what? The people in power want to keep their power. So, short of a revolution or something, I just don't see how governments would ever allow Bitcoin to seriously take off.
And, you know, Bitcoins also can and have been stolen, even though it's a really cool system. Think of it like an account and a password. You know, if somebody steals your password, they They can steal your account. And it is possible. There was already one of the exchanges for converting Bitcoins between Bitcoin and dollars basically had a bail-in. They were hacked. Somebody stole a whole bunch of Bitcoins from their database, and that resulted in them having to impose a 36% so-called shared loss. In other words, a bail-in where everybody who was on the exchange or had Bitcoins on the exchange lost 36% of their value because that's how much got stolen by somebody. So, you know, the technology is not totally refined yet. I think the technology can be refined so that those kinds of problems can be overcome. But I really, frankly, I think people are missing the point. Now, the underlying technology that makes Bitcoin possible, which is called blockchain, I think it's one of the most important technological innovations ever.
It is way cool. But I think the story is blockchain, not Bitcoin. I think Bitcoin is a flash in the pan, and not because it's not a good idea, not because I personally wouldn't love to see a secure online cash system that is impervious to government tampering. The thing is, the governments make the laws, and they don't like that idea. And in this environment where they can basically get away with telling the people that anything Anything is supposedly in the name of fighting terrorism, and they'll get public support for it.
So, I don't think governments are going to have any difficulty at all preventing Bitcoin from ever gaining traction as a currency. And that's the reason that we've never done a show, and I'm not particularly inclined to do a show on Bitcoin as, you know, the way of the future as a new currency. For people who disagree with that view, hey, there's plenty of podcast interviews that have been done with Bitcoin experts who do think Bitcoin is going to replace cash and replace money and so forth. If you want to hear that viewpoint, there are plenty of places to find it on the internet.
Postgame: blockchain as the real story
Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, I completely agree with you. It sounds like Bitcoin is just the medium, whereas the fundamental technology is the blockchain. And it's also evidenced by the fact that a lot of commercial banks are trying to figure out how to use blockchain. But before we move on, what exactly is blockchain for those people who don't know, and why do think it's more important than Bitcoin itself?
Erik Townsend: Oh, I think it's profoundly important, and I think that we have yet to even figure out how important it is. And just as a little bit of history for people who may not be aware, in 1980, when the personal computer was introduced, it was widely ridiculed by almost everyone in the computer industry. And we called them toy computers, which was originally a reference— most people don't know— to the Intel 4004 chip, which the first personal computers were based on. It was originally designed for electronic toys. That's where the phrase toy computer came from. But it came to take on more of a pejorative meaning of these silly little computers. And if you look, you know, it was introduced around 1980. 2 years earlier, in 1978, Digital Equipment had introduced the world's first true page fault virtual memory operating system on a minicomputer, which was just Way cool stuff. And I'm getting a little bit technical, so I won't bother to elaborate on what that meant.
But we had really, really cool things happening in the computer industry. And these PCs, you know, an application program could overwrite the operating system with a corrupt address pointer. It was a joke in the eyes of almost any programmer or software developer back in 1980. We just made fun of those things. Well, the reality is we completely, totally missed the Because the profound paradigm change, the game changer, is that a fully programmable electronic computer was suddenly affordable enough that everybody could have one on their desk. And of course, the first version of it was extremely primitive. The first version of anything is extremely primitive. But we all know how quickly technology advances. And sure enough, MS-DOS, which was a joke, only lasted a few years. And eventually, Actually, ironically, it was the same guy who did that virtual memory operating system for Digital Equipment who architected Windows NT, which was the first real operating system for Microsoft, and which everything since then has kind of grown out of.
So, this is that kind of game changer. And the reason it's a game changer is as follows. Until now, there have only been really 2 chapters in terms of where information gets stored in the history of information technology. In the beginning, it was on Hollerith cards. Those are the little cardboard rectangle-shaped cards where they actually would use a punch key system where it would physically knock little holes out of them that light would shine through. And the way that data processing occurred was not with programmable computers, but with card sorters. They actually took big decks of these cardboard cards and sorted them in order to get information.
The next big advance from that was the idea of a centralized database system, where all of the data is stored on a disk drive someplace on some computer. In the beginning, it had to be a great big mainframe computer that would allow lots and lots of users to log into it.
In the '80s and '90s, we advanced to distributed systems, client-server computing, and eventually the internet, where you can have people on a lot of different computers all over the network.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: network accessing a central database, which is centrally located on some computer someplace. Now, the most modern versions of these central databases are actually replicated, so it's not physically in one place. There'll be multiple data centers in, in different places, so if there's an earthquake or something, it automatically fails over and uses the backup. But still, from a design standpoint, logically speaking, it's one big central data database that has all the data for some system of record. So, for example, if you do your banking with Citibank, Citibank has a database in a data center someplace, replicated in another data center, and that's where everybody's information is. And if you're really smart and you can figure out how to hack that database, you can steal money from the bank, because that's where your account balance and your transaction history ledger are all stored.
So, this idea of central database, has basically persisted in the computer industry ever since the days of punch cards.
Now, blockchain invents the notion of essentially a secure distributed database where there is no central database. There is no central point of control. So, the reason that Bitcoin is so cool is, you know, you think, oh boy, this Bitcoin system, what if somebody hacked that central database that has everybody's Bitcoin balances in it and stole my stuff? Well, it's impossible because there is no central point of failure. There is no central location for the data. It's distributed across a network and they use this really cool system that's based on timestamps to make sure that it is secure and cannot be hacked. It is incredibly cool. So, if you think about every application of storing information in an information system of some kind. Primary systems of record, they're called in banks, which is, you know, the system that has your checking account or your brokerage account or whatever.
These things could all be re-architected to rely on a completely different architecture. So, you might have, for example, the notion of shipping something. You're shipping a pallet of product to somebody somewhere else in the world. Well, it comes attached to it with an electronic invoice, which is stored in a distributed fashion using blockchain. Somebody can just pay that invoice like COD. It doesn't have to go back to a central server. It doesn't have to clear the bank. The idea of whether or not the product has been paid for and whether or not the obligations under the invoice and contract have been satisfied could be securely stored in a distributed fashion so everybody can access it. It, without exposing it to a whole bunch of security risk. It is a fundamental, game-changing paradigm shift for how information is stored.
The way that it's been used for Bitcoin is to make it possible for me to have a Bitcoin and give it to you, or you to give it back to me in this secure transaction mechanism, and nobody can hack the central database in order to change the history of what happened, because That central database doesn't exist. That's just one tiny application. And it's like back in the day, in 1980, people would ask the salesman at the Radio Shack store, well, this personal computer, you know, what would I use it for? Why would I want to have a computer in my house? And the usual answer was, well, I mean, you could balance your checkbook with it. You could edit a text document with it. We didn't have email yet.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: Then. But, you know, you could use it to write your English homework and print it out on a printer so that you don't have to type it on a typewriter. That was about all they could think of as applications for PCs in the earliest days.
Look what's happened since. So far, blockchain has been used most notably by Bitcoin, but there's a lot of people around the world that are investing in think tanks and trying to figure out what other applications are there for this secure distributed database technology? And I think in finance in particular, there are just myriad applications. It will take years for smart people to dream up all of the cool ways that you could use this. And I think that that's really where the story is.
Looking for a blockchain expert
Aaron Chan: Right. So, Erik, perhaps we should be shopping for a blockchain expert rather than a Bitcoin expert per se for a future
Erik Townsend: Oh, I would definitely welcome suggestions of that. The reason we haven't done that show is because we don't know who that person is or where to find them. Honestly, to do an interview with one of the Bitcoin guys, and there's quite a few Bitcoin experts out there, Real Vision Television has done a couple of excellent interviews on Bitcoin with some well-established experts. You can find that content. It's already been done. What we should do as a courtesy to our listeners is look for one of those Real Vision Bitcoin interviews and see if we can put it on our Sunday Real Vision TV rebroadcast.
But the interview I'd love to do is not with somebody about Bitcoin. It's about somebody who's in a think tank someplace trying to figure out all of the different cool applications of blockchain technology. And it's really distributed secure database, whether it's the blockchain design or the next generation Obviously, in the beginning, MS-DOS seemed to be the center of the computer world. A few years later, it had been replaced with something much better. I would guess that blockchain is the cool thing for now, and somebody at some point invents an even better idea or a better implementation of some of the same concepts. So, the idea of secure distributed databases with no central data repository, how that might change the world of commerce, finance, investing, Testing, et cetera. That is a way cool topic. I don't know where to find the expert for that interview.
Aaron Chan: Right. I think it's a good idea. Maybe we can see if there's anything we can find on Real Vision TV. So, Erik, unfortunately, we're out of time for this week.
Spreading the word and this week's Research Roundup
Aaron Chan: Is there anything else you want to cover before we close?
Erik Townsend: Well, I probably sound like a broken record, but regular listeners know my spiel here. You look at an interview like we did with Jeff today, this is on a different level, folks, than you find on your retail focused financial podcasts. We really deserve the recognition that we're doing something special and different here, and I don't say that to just toot our own horns. It's because we need that recognition in order to be able to recruit the guests that you really want. There's still a long list of people that don't reply to our emails because they never heard of it. Things that you can do to help us: certainly tell all your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices. You know, we used to get covered on ZeroHedge a bit when we did our first few shows, Aaron, and they haven't picked us up recently. I hope ZeroHedge will pick up on something. I mean, they do a lot of coverage of Jeff's work.
I think this was a fantastic interview. I think Jeff's presentation is incredibly compelling here. So, you know, we can't be the ones to sell them on that. If you're a regular ZeroHedge reader I hope you'll send an email to Tyler and suggest that maybe they should pick up coverage of this. In general, help us spread the word, folks. Follow us on Twitter, post links on finance and investing, you know, bulletin boards that you might participate in. Anything that you folks can do to help us expand the show, get a larger following, get more name recognition for MacroVoices, that all directly helps us to bring you the guests that you want on future episodes of the program.
And of course, when you register at MacroVoices.com, that helps us because it increases our count of registered users, which we use as a selling point to try to recruit our feature interview guests. And as a benefit of registering, you get our free Research Roundup weekly email, which provides both the supporting information, such as the presentation for Jeff's interview today, as well as whatever cool research that we could find in a particular week on the internet. Aaron, why don't we tell people what they can expect in this week's Research Roundup before we
Aaron Chan: Right. So, in addition to Jeff's excellent and detailed chart book, from our listeners, we're back with great posts from Michael Medici on oil, stocks, and addressing biases, and Michael Seiding with an introspective post on how to find your purpose. In all the research from around the web, we've got an excellent article from Jesse Felder on how to hedge tail risk, Dr. Marc Faber's recent appearance on CNBC in which he prognosticates that the S&P is set to fall 50%, Dr. Ben Hunt's latest Epsilon Theory blog wherein he proposes a new A new metaphor for the world as a narrative machine, gold articles from Frank Holmes of US Global Investors and Eric Bush of Gavekal Capital, and much more.
Sign-off and disclaimer
Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for this week's edition. We appreciate all the support and feedback our listeners have provided and continue to welcome your opinions and suggestions on how we can make this program even better. Articles from our subscribers continue to be well received, and we encourage our listeners to submit their own writing for inclusion in each week's Research Roundup.
If you're interested in submitting If your own articles, you're please visit us interested, at MacroVoices.com. shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com, or if you're Twitter inclined, tag your article with the #MVRR hashtag. Again, the best way you can help us is by retweeting, following, and sharing MacroVoices with your family and colleagues. Also, don't forget to follow us on our main account @MacroVoices. And you can also follow Erik and myself @ErikSTownsend and @_AaronChen_ respectively. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Aaron. Chat with you next week.
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