Alex Gurevich — author of the book The Next Perfect Trade (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.
Episode set-up and Aaron Chan's opener
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 32 was recorded on September 22nd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've got a great guest lined up for this week's feature interview. Alex Gurevich, author of the book The Next Perfect Trade, is also one of the most prolific and regular guests on Real Vision Television. Alex and I will be going around the world of macro, covering this week's FOMC decision, the US dollar rally, Treasury yields, gold, China, Japan, European and exit contagion, and much, much more.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Last week, the S&P 500 had been beaten down a bit from its all-time high a few weeks back, and we wondered if maybe the big correction so many industry luminaries are predicting had finally begun. But once again, a little accommodation from the Fed goes a long way to cure all stock market ills, or so it would seem this week. The FOMC did not hike rates yesterday, consistent with most analysts' predictions, and that seems to have begun a rally in stocks, gold, and Oil and just about everything else except the dollar itself. So, Erik, what's your take on the FOMC decision and the equity market outlook?
Market wrap: FOMC, equities and the election
Erik Townsend: Well, it's interesting. I think that for the most part, the no rate hike should have been priced in. The expectations among analysts were pretty darn low. I think it was clear that there was not going to be a rate hike. Frankly, it's clear to me that I don't think that any more rate hikes are coming in this cycle. I think we've gotten to the point where the Fed has realized that they don't really have room to hike. The macro data is looking worse and worse.
And I think they're afraid to admit it because, you know, to say they're in a rate hiking cycle, they only had one hike and there's no second hike in the cycle, is kind of a loss of face and could inspire a loss of confidence.
As far as where things go from here, you know, it's really hard to call. I am so tempted emotionally. I have to admit I want to be short this market because I have so much respect for some of these industry luminaries that are just saying the valuations here are way overextended. We're due for something really big to the downside.
The thing is, what I— the reason I've chickened out of that, and, you know, if we hit 2190 again, it'll be really tempting to go short. But the reason so far that I have chickened out of a short trade on the S&P 500 is just that I really think the election outcome is going to have a tremendous effect.
And that means not just after the election, as soon as it becomes clear from polls who's most likely to win. Right now it's close enough that it's hard to say. You know, if Hillary Clinton is elected, I think it's pretty much assured that it's business as usual. The government is for sale to Wall Street for a price, and they can expect to be able to get more accommodation from the Fed and so on and so forth. If Trump is elected, it's such a wild card, because on the one hand, he's been really outspoken in saying that the Fed is just propping up markets so Obama will look good for the rest of his term.
Well, if he gets elected, it certainly doesn't behoove him to do something that causes the market to crash. His Republican supporters would not like that. On the other hand, it would be kind of disingenuous for him to not put some kind of pressure on the Fed to stop doing what he's criticized them for doing.
So how would that play out? It's such a huge wildcard. I don't think anybody knows. And, you know, I'm not a political pundit or expert on evaluating campaign, you know, election outcome risks. And the other thing is there are so many wildcards in this because we know that WikiLeaks has a bunch of dirt on Hillary Clinton that they're going to wait until October to release when they think it has the most effect. Well, how much dirt do they really have? Are they bluffing? We don't know yet. Similarly, Donald Trump seems like he could really pull a rabbit out of a hat if he doesn't stick his foot in his mouth and pull off a landslide win.
Guess what? Donald Trump's pretty good at sticking his foot in his mouth. So I think that the election has so much of a wildcard effect in either direction. If I were going to trade this, it would probably be to buy out-of-the-money puts on the S&P. And that's a lottery ticket trade. You've got to be ready to lose 100% on that trade.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: And just figure if you get lucky and called it right, maybe there's a big percentage win. But you've got to have a small enough size in order to not get clobbered if it goes the other way.
Market wrap: crude inventories and Cushing
Aaron Chan: Right. And let's turn to oil for a second here. 2 weeks ago, we had a massive 14.5 million barrel drawdown in nationwide crude oil inventories. Then last week, there was a much smaller draw. And we've been waiting for a big rebound in the form of a big inventory build now that Tropical Storm Eileen is behind us. How'd the numbers come out this week?
Erik Townsend: I got to tell you, Aaron, I am absolutely dumbfounded this week. Another huge drawdown, 6.2 million barrels. Now, it's tempting to look for this pipeline disruption on the East Coast and the leak and everything and say, well, maybe that caused it. Well, I could rationalize that in the other direction.
You know, if you couldn't use the pipeline, you had to stop refining, then you're going to stop using crude oil. And maybe in that case, you get a bigger build. But we got a big drawdown against analyst expectations. Of a 3-point-something million barrel build, we got a 6.2 million barrel drawdown. I don't get it. I can't explain it. I can't figure it out. Cushing, Oklahoma, 526,000 barrel build on inventory.
That one makes a little bit more sense. Might be associated with the pipeline stuff. I'm not sure. Gasoline, 3.2 million barrel massive, massive drawdown on gasoline inventories. Now there was a 2.2 million barrel build on distillate inventories, but still that nets out. Out to more than 1 million barrels of net drawdown on finished products. Not what I was expecting with summer driving season behind us. So prices unsurprisingly are up on the news. I should point out that our friends at hashtag OOTT have been predicting that next week will bring the really big build on crude oil inventories. We'll have to see whether or not that happens. But until it does, prices are up. And also The time spreads, which I watch very carefully, are narrowing, suggesting that fears about an inventory crisis around fall maintenance season are abating. So, it appears for now that, you know, looks like the call that Art Berman and I made that there would be a bunch of large builds on inventory hasn't happened yet.
I don't think that the jury is out yet, but we'll see what next week brings.
Market wrap: gold consolidation range
Aaron Chan: All right, Erik. And I don't even know if I should say it at this point, but we're still locked in a consolidation range in gold between $1,308 and $1,310. Now, when we taped last week's show, we were flirting with the bottom of the range. So I guess this week it must be time to retest the top of the range again?
Erik Townsend: Seems that way. It feels like a real just roller coaster week to week. $1,341 as we speak, right, just almost to the close on Thursday afternoon. $1,347.80 was the high trade on the day. Clearly, this is being fueled by reaction to the FOMC announcement yesterday. Dollar index taking a Tumble on no rate hike as a result, gold seeing to the upside. Frankly, though, I don't see this as a big bullish indication. That confirmation of no rate hike, I would have expected maybe even a bigger pop. $1,347, that's $10 less than we saw, what was it, 2 weeks ago when we had a test of a higher number. And, you know, now we've confirmed no rate hike and, you know, we didn't even get to that. So, I still am leaning slightly towards a downside resolution to this trading range, but definitely this one has confounded me.
I really don't know where it's going.
Market wrap: 10-year yield and the dollar index
Aaron Chan: Got it. Last week you said you'd been waiting for months to buy 10-year Treasury futures if the yield touched 1.70%, but you chickened out when it finally did last week because you feared it might have further to go. Now we're back down to a 1.62% yield as we're taping the show on Thursday afternoon. Erik, are you regretting your decision to pass on buying that dip?
Erik Townsend: Well, hindsight's always 20/20. You know, I suppose I should regret it because it would have been a profitable trade so far, but I am not a day trader. I tend to put on longer trades. And I think, as Raoul Pal said last week, there's room for this to go to 2%. Who knows? I do think we eventually get to 1% yields. Did I miss my opportunity to buy the dip? Maybe, probably, I don't know. But I don't really have enough conviction to say that I regret it deeply. I'll ask Alex in today's interview what he thinks.
But I think there's plenty of room for more volatility, especially with uncertainty that we already talked about around the election and everything. I'm not too excited to dump into a speculative trade when there's plenty of room to see a pretty big move in the other direction before it eventually resolves, as I think it will, to lower yields.
Aaron Chan: Okay. And finally, even in the wake of the FOMC decision not to hike rates, the dollar index has managed to hold on to a 95 handle. So, Erik, any new thoughts on the dollar this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, yeah, it's, it's interesting. I'm surprised with how quickly Equities responded to the upside and dollar to the downside. We were just over 96, just barely into a 96 handle. We touched 95 even very briefly today, back up to 95.34 as we're speaking now, just before the close on Thursday. So I think we're still in that consolidation range. The thing that I'm waiting for— it seems like most people's reaction to yesterday's news was, oh, that means the rate hike is going to come in December instead of now.
I think what could send the dollar temporarily lower, maybe retesting the bottom of this range around 91 or so, would be if the Fed admits that we're not going to hike in December either. It's, it's time to just admit that the hiking cycle is over. So what would cause them to do that? Maybe a preemptive move if they think they're eventually going to have to have a cut next. They probably don't want to announce that all at once. So we'll see what happens.
Aaron Chan: All right. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Alex Gurevich has been an extremely popular guest on Real Vision Television, and we're excited to have him on this week's program as a first-time guest. Erik's interview with Mr. Gurevich is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Gurevich on the FOMC reaction
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Alex Gurevich, author of The Next Perfect Trade and the founder of HonTe Investments. Alex, thanks so much for joining us on the program. I like to start these macro interviews usually with the US dollar, but this week, boy, FOMC— I'm really surprised. I thought that I think that it was pretty much baked in. Everybody knew there was not going to be a rate hike. But boy, we've really seen a pretty big run-up in everything, really— stocks, gold, everything rallying, except of course the dollar index. Were you surprised by this? And I wonder particularly if you would agree with me, because I'm starting to feel like the Fed has really trapped themselves here. I don't think they can hike rates, but I don't think they can admit that they can't and save face at the same time. So how do you see this whole monetary policy situation in this week's announcement?
Alex Gurevich: Well, Erik, thank you for having me here. This is, of course, a complex and long question, but I'll try to see some sense in this. It is hard to predict generally how market would react to any given policy meeting, but I am not surprised by the rally that occurred because the market was a little bit trapped, as you say, but in this case it was trapped in bearishness in bonds.
But the reality was that The two things that if Fed was to hike, it would probably create some risk-off shock, catastrophic flattening of yield curve and rally in the long end of the yield curve anyway, and maybe temporarily rally in the dollar index and temporarily sell-off in stocks.
But that might have not lasted. On the flip side, I think there was a lot of technical pressure, for example, on the yield curve. And on the bond markets coming from, we just came from ECB and BOJ, and we have established over the last year a very strong pattern of ECB and BOJ disappointing.
And after their meetings, typically the rates yields rise. They rose, and there was a recent pretty significant yield rise in Japan, and I think that pulled U.S. yields up. And then when there was this relief. That nothing is happening with the Fed. I think there was a snapback. And yes, I agree, hike was highly unlikely. The market was pricing around 20% in terms of Fed funds futures.
And I personally thought the likelihood was more like 3% because I could not imagine Fed hiking when the probability is so low.
In fact, they have not done it since 1994. There has— have not been any surprise hikes for 22 years on the markets, which is a long time. It could have been the first day today, but I just— I mean, whatever, yesterday, but it was unlikely. And however, I think a couple of dealers who put— primary dealers who put out their research and a couple of other thinkers managed to scare people a little bit and kept everybody on their toes by putting out opinions that Fed might hike after all.
So I think that there was certain psychological pressure which was beyond actual market pricing that got relieved once this meeting rolled off.
Long dollar as a dominant trade
Erik Townsend: I want to move on to the US dollar, one of my favorite topics, because of course everything is priced in US dollars. I just had Raoul Pal on the show last week. And, you know, Raoul and I both expected the US dollar rally to continue. But boy, it's taken longer. This pause, if that's what it is, consolidation, has taken longer than we expected. And now I sort of think, boy, I think the Fed is close to having to admit that the rate hiking cycle, if a single hike counts as a cycle, is over. And if that's the case, you know, maybe that's a bear factor for the dollar. So where do you see the US dollar? Do you think that we're just in a pause and the rally is going to continue, or do you think the tops are in?
Alex Gurevich: Well, this is, of course, as you point out correctly, a very crucial point and very crucial conversation. I think of these things, I think, slightly different than most macro thinkers. For those who have read or will read my book, I think of things in terms of concurrent necessity. So I do not think of dollar as a single asset performance.
I think of dollar— to me, long dollar is a dominant trade. The reason I'm long dollar, because dollar is a concurrent necessity with respect to rate hikes, and I will explain it in a moment. So majority of people, if you go back even a year, majority of people who were saying that the dollar rally is over were predicating their view on the fact that the hiking cycle is over, which may or may not be correct.
And I can actually go a little bit further to discussing the hiking cycle, but right now I just want to outline my overall logic. However, the yield curve was pricing a hiking cycle, and in fact it's still pricing it. The yield curve in the U.S. is upward sloping, and more so than in other developed world countries.
So you cannot price one asset based on non-market projections of another asset. So if you want to understand correct pricing for the dollar currently, you have to yield current yield curve. Now, if your view is that yield curve will rally, that is, hikes will be all taken out and maybe the next move is an ease, then the correct trade is to be long bonds.
If you think that is not the case, then correct trade is to be long dollar.
But the beauty of the long dollar trade, as it has proven over the last few years, that it actually can succeed without hiking cycle by the Fed. Because the other central banks— and when I'm talking about long dollar, I'm talking about long dollar developed markets, because long dollar versus emerging markets, it's a very different kind of trades and has to do more with risk and growth in the world. While Developed relative exchanges of developed market currencies. It's a policy game, and the policy is very easy in Japan, in Switzerland, and and of course in Eurozone. Switzerland obviously the easiest with a carry on dollar Swiss currently is at two percent even before any more hikes because if you factor in the cross currency basis swap, it is two percent, which is actually huge if you look at the. Volatilities, ever since the pegging of Swiss franc, the volatility on dollar Swiss was pretty contained. So 2% is really meaningful.
And if you look at 10-year forwards, what I always like to tell people, look at 10-year forwards on euro. That is pricing current US yield curve. 10-year forward on euro is currently around 1.35, which is pretty high relative to what I think is the equilibrium value of 1.20.
So So in this policy divergence situation is still supportive for dollar.
So we don't necessarily need to have much more hiking for dollar doing well, at least on total return basis. However, if we do hike more, I think at any point when hiking comes in, especially if it comes in faster than currently projected by the market, I think we can reasonably expect dollar to rally.
So we have a Dollar will rally definitely if we do have hiking cycle. Dollar may or may not rally when we don't have hiking cycle. So we have long dollar as a dominant trade. And correspondingly, long US bonds, long-dated bonds is another dominant trade because it will perform well if we don't have any hikes because you'll just keep earning carry. If you do have hikes, the yield curve will flatten and dollar will rally and it will support the long end.
So that is my broad picture. So I'm not thinking of dollars just— I'm not trying to project exact hiking cycle right now. I think the dollar is a dominant trade, but it actually does not mean the dollar will make money. I just think it's the right trade to have on in the long run.
Historical Fed hiking cycles end in an ease
Erik Townsend: I want to get back to your long view on Treasury bonds, but before we go there, you said you had more to say on the hiking cycle, and I'm particularly interested in that.
Alex Gurevich: Yes. So one interesting observation about the hiking cycle over the fairly long period of time now, that once we have a hiking cycle interrupted, virtually every time the next move is an ease. So we can look at several decades of data, and I've actually looked pretty carefully at this data and marked out all the surprise eases, all the hiking cycles, all the periods between easing and hiking. And I think other people have done those studies even in more detail.
Yeah. What is interesting is that it's very rare for the Fed to have a hiking cycle, pause, and then next move is a hike. Typically, you pause and next move is an ease. Moreover, an ease comes much faster than people expect after the last hike, typically within nine months.
So historically, right now, we're kind of due for an ease rather than for a hike. People don't have to. Happen exactly on historical patterns.
But my intuition behind that is because of the lagging effect of Fed policy, whenever you see Fed hiked enough to be able to pause, they really already have done enough to roll the cycle over. It is just lagging. And those rollovers typically happen much faster than people expect.
So based on historical pattern and what I point out in my book, that historical pattern is a good way to gauge gauge things which are just more likely to happen. Things don't have to repeat, but if something has happened every time over the last 30 years, it's likely to happen again. So historical pattern tells me that the hiking cycle is more likely over than not, and the next move is more likely to be an ease of a kind. However, that does not contradict the possibility that next move is a hike, because besides historical pattern, there are other factors like clearly the Fed wants to hike.
So I think we should be prepared for either, but do not blind ourselves to the possibility that the curve might already roll over and next move can be an ease.
Cheap Treasuries and the long-bond trade
Erik Townsend: Thank you. Let's move on to that long bond trade because, you know, I have predicted for some time that we would eventually see 1% yields on the 10-year, and a lot of other people have thought the same thing. I've also been telling myself for more than a month now that if we saw a dip in bond prices and a rise back up to 1.7%, 1.70 on the 10-year yield, that I would buy it because I've regretted not being in that trade. You know, I chickened out last week, and the reason was just because so many big names have come out recently. Jeff Gundlach declaring that the 35-year bond rally is over, that the bottom is in for yields, that it's all uphill from here. Ray Dalio saying the credit cycle is over.
Goldman Sachs had a note out last week, and I got intimidated. I chickened out, and I'm starting to regret it. What do you think? It sounds like you still are committed to the long trade in Treasury
Alex Gurevich: Yes, I'm committed. And in fact, I was increasing it, especially the best point I got was on the night after BOJ when there was a dip. So I was definitely increasing my position into FOMC meeting, but I was only increasing it to the size which I would consider core.
I was running below core since the July rally when I took some profits. And the reason is So basically, I disregard what anyone says. To me, that just carries no information, what the big names are saying, because whatever they are saying, there is like positives and negatives to that. Okay, so some huge bond manager says that they're now short, well great, and that means that they'll have to buy at some point.
None of them have the logic of concurrent necessity, so none of them have done as well on the bonds as I have. Because they do not have the tools of concurrent necessity that I do. Their logic could be totally fine in the short run, and no, anybody who went short in July, and which even Gundlach was talking about, is he had the right timing, I think. So he's a good trader. I'm not going to argue with that. If somebody got short in July and covered now, or maybe they're still running short, who knows, I'm not going to say it's not a good trade.
But over the long run, I think the logic is still working.
The logic that I've outlined to you is still working. One of the things I pointed out yesterday is that if the Fed is even going to continue hiking cycle but hike once a year as it's currently doing, 10-year notes are still cheap. That is, if you hold and fund 10-year notes and, and the Fed will make one hike a year for the next 10 years, you still make money or break even on 10-year notes. That's how cheap I think Treasury market is.
I think Treasury bonds are enormously, egregiously cheap because they are very cheap relative to any of their counterparts in developed markets based on historical basis, and they're very cheap to swaps. And I think this is a separate subject, but I think we need to distinguish between talking about U.S. interest rates and U.S. Treasury bonds.
Because U.S. interest rates is defined by the swap market, but interest rates is defined by U.S. Treasury bonds, and Treasury bonds, which could be either explained technically or by explaining that Treasury bonds have started to price credit risk. And we can go into this in more detail too.
Erik Townsend: Before we get away from the long bond trade, I wanted to ask you a question because I've often thought about, you know, I really believe that we are headed still to lower yields, but I also have to kind of think, boy, you know, We're 35 years into this bull market in bonds. You know, it can't go that much further. Do you think there's a pairs trade or a hedge, maybe say short German bunds or something that's already negative yielding, that would make that trade safer? Or do you think it's, it's best just as a naked long?
Alex Gurevich: So in general, I do not hedge just for the sake of hedging. I only do— when I do what could be sort of pairs trades, I only do those if I I like each leg as an individual trade. And then if they're negatively correlated, all the better. In the case of bonds, I don't really think they're going anywhere. And I think any trade there would be purely tactical. And I typically don't engage in tactical trading.
I think in terms of, is it the end of the 35-year bull market? I don't know. At some point, the end of all— the end of everything comes. I see no sign of it and no particular indication of it. And there is a lot of things which typically happen at the end of secular trends which does not happen. Like, there is no euphoria, no bullishness, no parabolic rally. Everything is more or less on the same trade channel it has been for the last 35 years. So to me, there is no sign of imminent doom. Yet there are, of course, things you can think about and risks you can think about.
And in some sense, pairing Pairing with long dollar could be a good trade, and that's a good hedge against very hawkish policy. But it's not a hedge— pairing long bonds with long dollar does not hedge against more like a fiat weakness and steepening. Like, if there is some kind of like a global fiat weakness and people just start losing faith in paper money and yield curves are steepening a lot, Right. So that's more of like a risk of actually easy policy, in which case dollar may be weak or not stronger than other currencies, and yield— the end of the yield curve could flop out.
This is a real risk. I think a very good hedge against it is gold, because I think this is a scenario in which gold should perform well. If there is any kind of weakness of fiat currency and concern over central banks losing control over paper money, then I would think gold would rally a lot.
Gold, Nikkei and a long-everything portfolio
Erik Townsend: I agree with you completely. Let's go ahead and stay on the gold topic since you brought it up. A trade that Raoul Pal and I talked about last week, which I find particularly fascinating, is that pairs trade which is long gold and long dollar index at the same time, which, as you say, aren't usually negatively correlated. Raoul and I both see a good argument for both and love that trade. I spent a lot of time pondering what could go wrong that could cause both gold and the dollar index to both sell off at the same time over a sustained period, and I just can't come up with a scenario. Have you thought about this trade, and what do you think? Am I missing anything?
Alex Gurevich: Well, first of all, things sometimes move for technical correlations, break down for technical reasoning and reasoning of market positioning. What I really like about gold trade is that given location, I think upside is bigger than downside. If you just like don't even know what's going on in the world, gold is, say, $1,300. Yes, it can go to $600, $700, but it also can go to $3,000 or $4,000 over the next decade, and I think this risk-reward is good. And gold is clearly— has been clearly negatively correlated with the rest of my portfolio, the rest of it being— so my portfolio— so you're talking about portfolio just long dollar and long gold. My portfolio is long bonds, long stocks, long dollar, and long gold.
So I'm long everything, to the chagrin of many people who want to be short stocks, I know.
Erik Townsend: Why don't we pick up on that? There's obviously a growing chorus of very famous people, whether it be Carl Icahn or Stan Druckenmiller or George Soros, all basically calling for gloom and doom, the stock market's going to crash, but the tape just keeps marching higher. What do you think about all of this bearishness? Is it, uh, is there anything to it, or is it just setting us up for a lot of short-covering rally, a short squeeze, when it's proven wrong?
Alex Gurevich: Well, I don't really, I don't claim to really fully understand the technical positioning of the stock market, who is short and who is long. I'm not, I do not think that U.S. stock market necessarily is the best place to be.
My favorite stock market right now is Japan, and I've been long Nikkei. And this trade on a relative basis has been performing tremendously over the last few months if you look at relative to the performance of dollar-yen. So we had a 20% strengthening— or maybe this year it was not from the very top, but maybe like 15% strengthening of yen.
And meanwhile, it was accompanied, if you start from February, with very strong actually positive performance of Nikkei, which makes Nikkei unbelievably robust. Imagine what will happen If BOJ actually gets traction and yen will weaken, I think the upside of Nikkei is tremendous.
And it is interesting that I, I hear all about what people are saying about overall stock markets being overvalued and falling earnings and all this, but my strategic principles keep staying positive for the stock market. So my sort of necessity still dictates to be long rather than short, or at least neutral.
So I'm actually not in my personal portfolio. I don't have a lot of weight on U.S. stock market. I have some, but my in my liquid trading portfolio, I'm only long Nikkei. But I'm still biased that way because the parameters that I see are still positive for stock market.
But I but having said that, I do not look even at P/E valuations. That's not my Part of my strategy.
Dollar-yen outlook
Erik Townsend: While we're on Japan, let's also cover the dollar-yen cross. What's your outlook there?
Alex Gurevich: I think dollar-yen cross— first of all, dollar-yen was one of the best historical trades being longed from 2010 to 2015. It was one of my most successful trades. I have run this trade for several years. I've taken majority of profits on it. And then it started to go— on the residual, it started to go against me. And as it got now to these levels, I'm building again a long dollar-yen trade. I actually think that dollar-yen is a decent long here.
The carry, once again, as I will mention, is very good. We seem to have found some line in the sand somewhere around 100. So the basing is beginning. Can it break down and go a few more percent down? Yes. Can it go to 70? I don't think so. I don't think dollar-yen is again going to 70. Now, you ask a lot of macro thinkers Including Gundlach, who— and he said, like, well, eventually it'll go to 200.
So people actually— a lot of people, when they see the really long horizon on dollar-yen, they see it much higher. And so do I, because I think this continues— because when people think, like, about— on a given meeting, they think, like, oh, BOJ didn't do enough, they didn't shock us enough.
But actually, they are very easy. They keep expanding their monetary base. And And I'm a big believer that if you keep printing something, eventually it'll get cheaper. If you keep making more and more of something, eventually it has to get cheaper. So I think eventually yen, one way or another, will get cheaper.
But there is a lot of technicals and a lot of technical positioning and flow stuff that will happen in between. So in the long run, I think dollar-yen is a very good long here.
China private debt, RMB and no signposts
Erik Townsend: While we're in Asia, let's move over to China in terms of both outlook for economic growth, the general economic situation, situation in China equity market. And of course, the RMB devaluation is a big question. Some macro thinkers are saying it's just getting started. Other people think it's overextended already. So China in general, what's, what's your take?
Alex Gurevich: So China, again, this is a very interesting part of the world right now. Obviously, I don't need to say that. It's a huge economy and a lot of interesting things are going there. There is a lot of uncertainty about China outlook. That is, as you There are total doomsayers about China that are total bulls.
The only kind of people that I don't understand are people who are totally sanguine on China. Like, I don't see the sanguinity. And this is why.
When there is uncertainty about government data, uncertainty about statistics, uncertainty about situation, I try to stick to facts which are certain. Like something which you can see for sure. What I can see for sure is the amount of private debt in China which is approaching $30 trillion. Which is the largest private debt of any country ever, including the United States. It's probably the largest, one of the largest relative to GDP private debts. It is also the largest pace of growth of debt, both on the absolute and the relative terms. So we have 4 records for China: absolute total size, relative total size, absolute growth, and relative growth for private debt.
There has been no historical precedent of such a growth in debt not ending in some kind of catastrophic unwind.
Furthermore, people can say that China is different. Well, let's look at the history of China. China has several thousand years of history of imperial rise and very bad collapse. So every time China was— began to sort of imperial power in the world, as if it has found a way to self-destruct.
And I could give you more historic several historical examples, but there are China history scholars who should probably do better than I would. But so we have two historical patterns going in our favor in the favor of serious risks to China: the historical pattern of debt unwind and historical pattern of China specifically to self-destruct.
What we have to remember that those cycles are very long, especially in China. So timing such a cycle is extremely difficult. When people talk about It has to happen next year or next 2 years. And some people have been calling for it since like '08, '09 for this China unwind. And now they're almost 10 years in the hole. That is actually not a long period. When I talk about those imperial China cycles, those like century-long cycles, those are dynasties we are talking about, not just single even reigns.
So how soon, how long China can last on how— like, I believe that the probability is very high of at some point catastrophic unwind. But I cannot put any time on it.
Now when it comes to specific trades, so I have to go from this cautious view to specific trades. I do think RMB is a really good trade and it has proven to be a really good trade. Why is it proving to be such a good trade is because, well, if you just simply long dollar RMB, if you're not buying out-of-the-money options as some people do, if you're not staking your money on specific timing or specific magnitude RMB has been in steady devaluation trend relative to its trading counterpart, relative to the basket.
It may look like it's not going down very fast against the dollar, but it's because dollar has been fairly weak over the last year. So if you compare performance of dollar index with performance of dollar-RMB, dollar-RMB is performing much better. Yes, you have to beat some carry, and carry varies. Sometimes it's— the forwards have been very volatile.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Alex Gurevich: And if you got— if you grabbed the highest forwards, which were at the beginning of this year, and locked yourself into 4% of negative carry for a year, you had a lot of carry to beat, and you probably wouldn't make any money up to this point.
But then again, you could have been long dollar-yen, and you could have lost 15%. So to put things in perspective, it is very important not just to think whether a trade makes or loses money, or how it may— or how it performs relative to other trades expressing the same view. That's why I mentioned Nikkei. Yeah. Being a great trade. That's why dollar RMB has proved to be a really good trade. I think the trend is there. I think deval can go much further, can go much further. I think the typical way to deal with that cycle unwind is devaluation. So, and the capital flows pressure is still outward. So I think the odds are skewed in that favor. I think what's going to happen is that if you're wrong, If you're wrong and RMB will get stuck at the current levels, you'll lose whatever carry you lose. You'll lose 2 or 3%. If you're right, they might devalue a little faster than forward projected, and you can make 3 or 4%.
So a trade which looks almost symmetric, but you also have that whole upside of a windfall of catastrophic devaluation. So if you are in just simple vanilla forwards trade, you probably can lose a little or make a little, or you can make a lot. I see a very low probability of losing a lot.
That's what, what, that's what makes this trade, in my opinion, of a very good characteristic.
Erik Townsend: I couldn't possibly agree more with you on 2 points that you made. Number one, that the credit growth in China is just unprecedented and that it has to eventually lead to a catastrophic unwind. But also, number two, that there's no reason to think that that unwind is imminent starting tomorrow, is a mistake that so many people have My follow-on question is, okay, if we both agree it's not imminent, what are the signposts that you're looking for? What would tell you that that catastrophic unwind is beginning or is imminently about to begin?
Alex Gurevich: You know, to be honest, I think we will not see any signposts. If you can see them, that they're not there. I think it will catch everybody by surprise. It will be something that we cannot predict, cannot foresee. Things will play out in a way we cannot expect. Anything that we can expect will be controlled.
Because China has a very organized central government which tries to control everything. So anything that could be observable, they will take care of and they will control.
So it has to happen in a way that nobody can predict. If you remember, like the global financial crisis, how did it start? It started with sudden seizure of financial assets in August 2007. Retrospectively, you could see that as a clear signpost of what happened afterwards, but nobody could predict that what happened in August 2007. Nobody would predict that LIBOR would go up instead of down in an easing environment, that the spreads between LIBOR and funds would blow out the way they have since early '70s.
All the stuff that happened was hard to predict.
Now, for example, look at dollar-yen. Earlier I said that I was on a trade for 5 years. What would have been— dollar-yen seemed to be stuck like at 80 and even 70, up higher 70s and even down to 75. Nothing seemed to have been able to move it. What was the catalyst was the fall of DPJ, and nobody could have predicted. Nobody could have predicted, or at least I couldn't have predicted the sudden dramatic change of political scene in Japan, which happened in 2012. By the time that happens, you have to really have your sleeves rolled up and just run with the trend. And it's better if you already had the trade on.
For me, like, I had the trade on already and I increased it as it started running in my favor. But if I was not ready for it at all, you could have missed the whole move.
So the same thing, I think, with China. It is going to be— the mechanism is going to be something that we don't see see something unpredictable if it were to happen, and there will be no clear signs that we will see that in advance.
Brexit, European politics and the euro
Erik Townsend: Okay, fantastic. Let's go around the world now to Europe. We've had so many different views on this program. Grant Williams told us that he thought Brexit would be remembered eventually as the first step in what would eventually be the complete demise of the European Union. We've had other guests tell us that Brexit was just a flash in the pan, it's a— it's over with, it didn't really matter because the U.K. was never in the euro to start with. So what do you think? Is European exit contagion a serious risk? And based on that answer, what do you think it means in terms of euro/USD?
Alex Gurevich: I think European exit— Brexit is a serious risk. I was probably in the minority of people. I kind of had the unpopular opinion that Brexit was the right thing to do. I was— I thought that for U.K. U.K., it was the right thing to leave the European Union because I'm probably more pessimistic on European Union than other market players.
I'm not— I was not actually a huge pessimist in the European economy or even in European stock market, but I think the migrant problem and political problems in Europe just made me more pessimistic on the situation there. I think politics— this is a whole separate subject— but developed world politics are becoming to be much more of a risk than they It used to be that you pretty much can ignore elections in countries and referendums and all this stuff. That was all just noise.
I mean, the most important referendum was for Sweden whether to join Euro, I think maybe like 10 or 12 years ago, and who cares, right? But nowadays we're actually having like real referendums. Like Scotland is having a real referendum. Like then all of a sudden Brexit is happening and European politics is getting dicey, especially with migrant problem.
Right. Problem. And I think there are some serious problems happening there because we have declining population in core of Europe and meanwhile strong inflow, very different culture. And it's very different from regular US immigration. I don't have to tell you that. This is a major migration. So major migrations are typically highly destabilizing for the countries which are receiving the inflows of So I'm not like one to call absolute doom and gloom on this, but I think there are very serious risks and there are some maybe other countries not wanting to be there.
Now, how will it— how will potential splintering of Europe affect euro? It's actually hard to tell because it's kind of paradoxical. Imagine that every country leaves Europe and euro will be just Deutsche Mark. Then actually it has to get stronger because Deutsche Mark actually would be stronger if we would just use Germany as a currency benchmark.
benchmark, it will be stronger against dollar than it is now. Because for Germany, euro is actually too weak. Germany has a huge surplus, trade surplus, current account surplus. So it's very hard to play out the politics in my head, but the destabilization, I think, still probably net negative.
But to me, I don't even have to see necessity for destabilization to be short euro. Okay. Euro on this concurrent necessity basis, because if U.S. were to proceed with the same yield curve as it currently priced, and Euro is to proceed with the yield curve that is currently priced, then Euro is about to head to seriously negative real interest rates. If you just look at the central bank's projections, ECB is projecting 1.5-2% inflation in the next 2-3 years, and they're still projecting zero to negative interest rates. So we're going to be heading to negative 2% inflation— sorry, negative 2% real interest rates in Europe, while in U.S., again according to curve projections, we're going to be pulling to much more benign negative real interest rates and possibly at some point to zero interest rates if Fed were to proceed hiking. However, if they are not, I'm still making money on the bonds.
Don't forget that. So I think as a combination, short euro is still Still a high-expectation trade, but not necessarily short European stock markets because that's a harder thing to predict.
Clinton or Trump: Treasuries and swap spreads
Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's come back to the United States and particularly the election. Something I've been thinking a lot about lately is, boy, the leading candidates are just so opposite in their policies. Donald Trump has been so outspoken in criticizing the Fed, and it seems clear that he would likely put pressure on the Fed to stop trying to support asset markets with quantitative easing. Hillary would probably have a very very different policy view. What do you see in general, whether it be on that issue or other issues, in terms of the effects on global financial markets of either a Clinton or a Trump presidency?
Alex Gurevich: Well, I don't know if I can say something particularly intelligent about the effects of Clinton presidency. I think everybody, pretty much everybody, thinks of Clinton presidency as business as usual on the general scheme. Like, you kind of just go back to your to your macro textbook. Because that's what I typically do. Typically, I ignore political and geopolitical risk. I ignore elections in any country. I just look at my principles, my strategic principles, and choose trades according to them. And elections come and go, and things typically still work out according to the basic logical principles of the world. And I think working with Clinton is basically just going back to the drawboard.
For example, remember when Obama became president, we had a huge sell-off actually for the next few months. And then a huge rally began. So how would you even say, was it bad for the markets or good for the markets? Obama presidency, how would you interpret it? I think it's very— such things are very hard to interpret. For example, you could have Clinton presidency could cause relief rally in stock markets or some kind of disappointment sell-off that nothing has changed.
You can have relief rally in the bond markets However, Trump presidency, as you said, is a very interesting thing. I actually don't quite understand his rhetoric on the Fed and what he's going to do with it on that. It doesn't seem very consistent to me.
And by the way, I just want to point out, I'm not being partisan, and I don't think no candidates that I've seen ever made any sense on economics. So in terms of the logical, logical consistency. Of what people are saying or actually macroeconomic meaningfulness of what they're saying. I've never seen any candidate for presidential candidate during my time of living in this country make any sense whatsoever. So theoretically, everything they said could be just replaced by blah, blah, blah, blah, whatever sounds good for the electorate.
So that's first premises.
However, when they say something really outlying, we have to pay attention. And that's what makes it interesting with Trump, that he says things that actually make— you cannot just ignore the complete nonsense noise. He wants to increase infrastructure spending, which potentially could be heavy for the long end because it increases debt.
He's also mentioned at some point the fact that he would be even open to work out on US Treasuries and not paying 100% on them in case we're overburdened with debt, while in practice it seems very unlikely that it would create some sort of fear factor. I think it's very hard to tell what specific presidency will do in the long run, but I think you cannot disregard the fear factor associated with this election.
And honestly, what I've noticed is that as Trump odds surged over the last few weeks, we had this push down on US Treasury bonds.
And what is specifically interesting to look at is, again, not just at the absolute levels, but at the swap spreads. The civilian Inverted swap spreads—the fact that longer-dated treasuries are trading at LIBOR plus 50, and even medium-term like six-seven-year treasuries may trade at something like LIBOR plus 10, LIBOR plus 15—that's really unprecedented.
It can be explained technically by the lack of balance sheet created by Dodd-Frank and other regulations, and that is part of it. But that could be discussed in more detail how much that is an effect and where the asset managers. Could neutralize this effect by putting more assets, more bonds into their portfolio. It seems just people don't have the tools to neutralize this effect of reduced balance sheets. So that's probably technical, but I'm beginning to worry that market is pricing real credit risk in US Treasuries.
And once you start pricing real credit risk in bonds, it's very hard to call for the exact downside. That will not, I think, derail the long-term bull trend because if we do have a major sell-off in long bonds due to credit fears, most likely what it does, it creates just artificial tightening of economic conditions and actually rates end up lower in the long run.
And assuming that US will not default actually, which I think it won't, you probably in the long run still make money on bonds, but there are some serious volatility. volatility risks associated with that. And what I think might happen— may happen is— so my one prediction is that if Clinton wins, the swap spread situation might start rectifying and swap spreads might start moving to the right. That is, Treasury yields will stop being so high relative to swap rate yields.
The Next Perfect Trade and HonTe Investments
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, I would love to continue this conversation, Alex, on a number of topics for another hour, but unfortunately we are out Before we close, your book, The Next Perfect Trade, could you tell our listeners what that's about and where they can find it?
Alex Gurevich: So The Next Perfect Trade can be found on Amazon, and it's, it's my book on selecting trades. Basically, it's my strategic principle of selecting what I call superior trades, that is trades that work in the broadest range of economic scenarios. What I like to say is that I don't focus on forces that drive markets rather than forces that drive successful trades.
So that's what the book is about.
Erik Townsend: Now, I, I know you also run HonTe Investments, which is a commodity trading advisor. As a fellow CTA and CPO, I'm very familiar with the obligations that you're under, so I know that you're not at liberty to discuss the services that your commodity trading advisor offers except to accredited investors, but we do have a large accredited So could you please tell our accredited audience where they could find out more information about your CTA offerings?
Alex Gurevich: Yeah, you can look us up on our website, www.honteinv.com, which is short for HonTe Investments. And you can also follow me on Twitter as my first initial and last name, @agurevich23. That's my handle, and this Twitter profile will give you a link to my book and to my fund.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Well, we cannot thank you enough for a really great interview, Alex. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer break
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: will the Fed signal the end of hiking?
Aaron Chan: Well, fascinating interview, Erik, and it was definitely interesting Alex's varying opinions. I want to start by touching on Alex's views on the hiking cycle. Now, you mentioned, and I completely agree, that the Fed has boxed itself into a corner essentially, and raising rates just isn't in the cards no matter what they're saying. So are we at a point where we need to roll over from the rate hiking cycle or expectation, or are you waiting for something specific to signal this rollover?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's a very interesting question to contemplate because you're trying to read the minds of essentially politicians, which is what I consider central bankers to be for the most part. And it's always a very difficult proposition. But the way I think about this is let's assume that the next policy change is actually going to be a cut at some point, not a hike. And let's assume that they know that, that they've figured out that they're not going to get away with any more hikes.
Does that mean that they are going to be preemptive and proactive and say, hmm, we can't shock the market after we've been telling them that a hike is coming and just cut out of, out of the blue. So what we need to do is get a message out, whether they want to leak that through The Wall Street Journal, through, you know, John Hilsenrath writing an article or something saying the next policy decision could be in either direction.
Are they going to give some hint that the hiking cycle is over, or are they going to go back to language about being data dependent and stop saying that they're in a hiking cycle? Or are they just going to wait until conditions warrant cut and hope that the market figures it out without proactively setting expectations that the next move could be in either direction.
From what I've seen out of Janet, I think they're more likely to try to give some indication that it could go either way so that people are not completely shocked if the next move is a cut. Would they do that in, in the next press conference? Would they do it through The Wall Street Journal, through a Hilsenrath article? I don't know. It's total guesswork. So I think we've just got to, you know, keep our ears glued to the wire and see what comes next.
Postgame: billionaire bears and short-squeeze risk
Aaron Chan: Right. And on the topic of the billionaire bears that have come out with negative prognostications for bonds and the stock market, you know, it was actually really refreshing to hear Alex pay essentially no regard to what he calls the noise coming from these experts and instead focus on his own strategy. But as these billionaires have trotted out their bearish calls, and now that we've had a couple of guests broach this topic and broach this question, Erik, where is your present thinking on these proclamations?
Erik Townsend: You know, it's interesting. I have a lot of respect for Alex's philosophy about not listening to anybody, trusting his own judgment, and, you know, not being influenced by other people's views. So doing your own homework and deciding what you think yourself about fundamentals rather than listening to people that are talking their own books, I really respect that.
The place I have to disagree, and this is something that I've really learned in the last few years, is even so, the market internals are really important. And when there are people that have as much money as these billionaire bears all talking up this story, that means they are levered way up to the short side. And that means if they're proven wrong, there is going to be a short-covering rally or short squeeze extraordinaire. So I do take that seriously. And I think without a doubt, if I was not concerned about about the uncertainty that the election brings into this, I think I'd be going short here because emotionally, for sure, I want to be on the same side of the trade as Stan Druckenmiller and George Soros and Carl Icahn and all of these guys that have just phenomenal track records.
They're often early, but they're almost always proven right in the end when they have this much conviction. The thing is, with, with this much short interest in the market. If those guys get proven wrong and all have to cover their hedges and cover their speculative shorts, there could be a real big short squeeze. And I think that, you know, it usually takes a pretty good catalyst to bring on a short squeeze like that. What could be more ripe than an election surprise to bring on that short squeeze? If all of a sudden Trump really screws himself and it becomes clear that Hillary is a shoo-in, I think that could easily trigger that short squeeze, and I don't want to get caught on the wrong side of it. So as I said earlier, if I was going to play this equity market, it would be out-of-the-money puts on the S&P in a small size.
Postgame: China unwind, inevitable is not imminent
Aaron Chan: So on China, Erik, it was a fascinating discussion you had with Alex, and we all know the individual investors from the likes of Mark Hart and Kyle Bass who've been predicting the eventual $30 trillion credit unwind and what that'll do to their RMB. However, do you agree with Alex that this Sometimes one is going to come from left field. I mean, it seems to me that similar to what Raoul was saying about the business cycle, more and more debt fertilizes the soil for something bad happening. So even though we don't know what to wait for, even where to look, would you say that the likelihood is increasing?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm in very strong agreement with Alex on part of what he said, but I differ respectfully on other parts of it. If there's anything that I've learned about this investing game, on one hand, it's absolutely true that what caused 2008 to happen was There's too much debt. And when you see something that is unsustainable and cannot go on forever, it means it will not go on forever. So, I couldn't possibly agree more with his statement that this eventual cataclysmic unwind of the massive, massive credit expansion that's happened in China, it is inevitable, absolutely 100% guaranteed.
But right behind that, the next most important lesson that I've learned is the worst mistake you can make is to think that because it's inevitable, that that means that it's imminent. It's not imminent. And I think Alex said that as well.
Go back to 2009. If you looked at what happened, what took down the whole mortgage market, there was too much debt that was undercollateralized, and it all came collapsing down at once. You could have very persuasively made the argument then, hey, mortgage-backed securities were just the first salvo, and that means that Treasuries are coming next, and it's time to go short short the 30-year long bond because for sure we know that long-term this United States debt situation is unsustainable. Well, on the one hand, I think that the logic there is actually correct in that it's not sustainable, and sometime in our lifetimes the, the U.S. Treasury debt is going to have a horrific collapse. But guess what? If you had made that decision back in 2009 and gone short long-dated Treasuries, you would have been absolutely annihilated since then. So the fact that you know for sure that it's coming someday does not mean it's time to put the trade on today.
That much of what Alex said I agree with emphatically, violently, couldn't possibly agree more.
The part where he said the Chinese government can control all of this, I think you have to qualify that. The Chinese government can control a certain category of risks and will control it, and for that And so, for that reason, this coming totally out of left field is much more likely. But there's a whole category of risks that are foreseeable, say, pertaining to a war breaking out between China and another country that puts the entire country's national security at risk. You could see that coming, and that would be an example of something the Chinese government wouldn't have the ability to simply control. So, I think that there are categories of risk that fall into what he said. There are other categories that don't.
But I agree very strongly with him. This credit expansion The inflation in China is crazy by any measure. It's going to come undone someday. And the question that I asked him, and I think his answer was correct, you know, how do you know when it's almost here? You don't. You see it when it starts to break apart. And hopefully you've done your homework and you've thought carefully about how you want to trade it. So when you wake up one day and say, oh my God, it's happening and it's now, you know what to do.
Postgame: European disintegration and the euro
Aaron Chan: Right. Well, jumping from one collapse to another, European disintegration is something that I've been thinking about a lot recently, and 2017 seems poised to be a spicy political year, given the French and German elections, just to name a few. Now, as I play out the disintegration in my mind, and if we're left with Germany, but also a whole bunch of euro-denominated debt that'll probably need to be written down in one form or another. So given the strong credit that is the German sovereign and the amount of outstanding euro debt, debt. Do you agree with Alex that the German-backed euro, or effectively the mark, will be stronger or weaker?
Erik Townsend: Well, Alex was describing one very specific scenario as to how a disintegration of the European Union might come about, where Germany effectively is the last man standing. And that would perhaps, as Alex suggested, surprise everybody, because if the euro essentially becomes the Deutsche mark, there's an argument that it The thing is, that was just one scenario. Consider this: what if Germany were the first country, even before the U.K. finalizes its decision, to leave the euro because Angela Merkel commits political suicide, which she seems to be doing a pretty good job of at the moment, and there is some radical regime change in Germany and a change of political sentiment, and suddenly the Germans are the first ones to bail?
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: on the euro. That would, you know, completely change the scenario that Alex described. So, I don't think that it's fair to say Alex predicted that outcome. He gave that outcome as an example of something that could happen that would result in a completely different strong euro rather than weak euro outcome.
In general, my view is I think that Brexit was probably just the beginning. But just as we talked about for the Chinese credit unwind. It doesn't mean anything is imminent. We could easily go 10 more years before the next, you know, big thing happens in Europe, or the whole shebang could be over by the end of 2018. I don't know. These things tend to happen very slowly and then accelerate very rapidly and happen all at once when they hit a certain tipping point. It seems like so far post-Brexit, the— we haven't hit any tipping points. There may be more things coming, but they're not coming
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, what is imminent is us running out of time for the show, unfortunately. So, anything else before we wrap?
Closing: ZeroHedge thanks and Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: Well, I want to thank Tyler Durden again at ZeroHedge They covered Raoul's interview last week, and that resulted in a whole bunch of traffic. It's helping us to grow the show. And folks, remember, the more that we can popularize MacroVoices, get more name recognition, the more that helps Aaron to recruit the very best guests to come on the program. And as you've seen in recent weeks, we're starting to really up the ante and get some fantastic guests on the program. So please help us out. Help us promote the show. Tell your friends, tell your colleagues, and most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com.
When you do so, you get our free Research Roundup email. Never includes spam or marketing. It's basically a compendium of links to supporting information for our feature interviews, as well as the best free research that we could find on the internet every single week. If you don't want it, it takes one click on the safe unsubscribe link in order to turn it back off. Again, registering helps us to increase our number of listeners and recruit the very best guests that we can. For those of you getting the Research Roundup, Aaron what can they expect in this week's email?
Aaron Chan: So in addition to the great documents provided by Alex from HonTe Investments this week, I'd like to start by highlighting Nassim Taleb's Medium post entitled, quote, The Intellectual Yet Idiot. Now, given the rise of populism, it's encouraging to read that not all elites are penning articles about the ignorant masses, but are demonstrating some self-awareness about a trend that really has no signs of abating. Now, for what I call the tyranny of the experts, this phenomenon will come under greater pressure as the Fed-tainted economic pie continues to shrink and the populace awakens to their economic fleecing. Now, additionally, we've got a response to Ken Rogoff's War on Cash from Peter Vikmeyer of Sprott Money, and a long-form report and gold projection from the research team at Goldmoney.
Finally, we've got 2 great submissions from our subscribers. Joshua Hall of Truevine Investments returns with his outlook for silver prices, and Aidan Gharib of Pavilion Capital Markets has a research note on the gold-dollar pairs trade. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
Announcer closing and disclaimer
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.MacroVoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly newsletter. Weekly Research Roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.
You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment.
MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.
MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.
Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.