Paul Krake — author of Hong Kong-based View from the Peak newsletter (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone.
Episode preview and early-recording note
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 40 was recorded on November 17th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Paul Krake, well-known author of Hong Kong-based View from the Peak newsletter and market advisory service, will be joining me as this week's special interview guest. We'll be discussing the global bond market sell-off in detail, along with Chinese debt dynamics, inflation expectations, the commodity supercycle, Japan, and a whole lot more.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Let's start by letting our listeners know that we recorded this week's show early Thursday morning before markets opened, as opposed to our usual taping time at Thursday's close. So, please keep in mind that our commentary won't take Thursday's market action into account. S&P futures rallied after Donald Trump's election initially, but appear to be leveling off in the 2170s on the S&P.
Equities after the Trump win
Aaron Chan: So, what's next for stocks?
Erik Townsend: You know, I don't think that anybody really knows. And one of the rules that I like to use is when you have a bunch of people all very confidently saying, oh, well, the explanation for this is such and such and so forth. And they're the same people that failed to predict what's happening right now.
I kind of question the narrative of what they think is now happening. And if you look at the history here, I don't remember anybody saying, if Donald Trump wins, we're going to see a massive spike in inflation expectations and a huge global bond market sell-off.
Everybody was worried about an equity sell-off. So it seems to me that there are almost no pundits that managed to correctly predict what would happen in the event of a Trump victory. And so now they're all saying, oh, well, it's trade policy that is causing inflation expectations to spike. And I think whoever said that first was the first person to come up with a credible explanation of anything, and everybody's latching onto it. And frankly, you know, it might be right, but I'm not sure it really explains everything in terms of what we're seeing in markets.
So I don't really know where this thing is headed. I continue to I feel like equity valuations in general are very extended and highly valued here. Interestingly, Carl Icahn turned around today. He had gone long on election night, and I don't remember whether he said he actually closed that position, but he's starting from his comments today to turn— and I say today, I mean Wednesday just passed because we are recording early this week— He's changed his view a little bit and no longer sounds like he's quite as bullish as he was. So I don't know where we're, where we're headed here.
US Dollar Index at 13-year high
Aaron Chan: Before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index, which traded as high as 100.60 this week, a 13-year high. So far, your dollar bullish scenario is playing out, Erik. So any updates on the dollar outlook?
Erik Townsend: I think that the dollar rally has resumed in earnest, and I think that we're headed much higher from here. But just to be fair, you know, this, this so-called breakout to a new cycle high was only 9 small handles. The previous number was 100.51. Now it's Right. Right now it's 100.60, so 9 small handles higher. That's not really a decisive breakout, and it's retracing a little bit. So I'd like to see it get above 100.60 and stay there for a few days to really persuade me that we're breaking out above the previous cycle high, but it looks to me like that's what's coming.
In general, this is all about the world digesting the Trump win, and I think everybody thinks that it's going to be dollar bullish. The big question is a lot of people in Europe are freaking out over the Trump victory. If Trump's victory leads to further European exit contagion, that could very easily accelerate the U.S. dollar rally. So, you know, I think that there's a lot of dynamics here. There's a lot of moving parts. We don't really know for sure exactly what's going to happen, but I think the trend is definitely going to be higher for the dollar.
Crude oil: inventory build and OPEC rhetoric
Aaron Chan: Erik, you've said that crude oil should test $42.50, if not lower, but you were cautious to call the direction from there. Now, we saw WTI trade as low as $42.20 since last week's show. So congratulations on that call. But it's back to a $46 handle on Thursday morning. So what's next for crude here?
Erik Townsend: Well, inventory this week was a massive build, 5.3 million barrels of national crude oil inventory increase. 691,000 barrels of that was in Cushing, Oklahoma. So not a super huge build in Cushing, but big builds across the board. Gasoline and distillates also big builds—750,000 barrels of gasoline, another 310,000 barrels of distillates.
So everything is building across the board. So wait a minute—we were at 42.20. Why the heck are we so much higher now? Seems to be entirely about this same old game that we've seen before, where we get some bearish inventory numbers and OPEC. And then the oil ministers respond by putting out some kind of rhetoric or press release. And there was a headline that supposedly OPEC is about to come to yet another, you know, deal that's not really going to happen. And there are people walking away from this meeting. There are, I think, now 3 countries that have said they're not even going to bother to attend. But they're still spinning the rhetoric, and it is working in terms of hypnotizing markets. I think you said 46 handle. It's almost 47 as we're speaking, 46.96. So, we're getting close and probably moving higher.
Gold sell-off and the hedged gold/dollar trade
Aaron Chan: So, pivoting to the yellow metal, gold has collapsed to the low 1,200s with 1,211 the low print so far. But this is all happening when inflation expectations are spiking. So, Erik, help me with the logic here. I would think spiking inflation expectations would actually be bullish for gold.
Erik Townsend: You know, I'm going to ask Paul Krake this same question for sure, but what Stan Druckenmiller said It kind of makes sense to me. And you're right that normally you'd think is, you know, spiking inflation expectations. A lot of people see gold as an inflation hedge, and gold ought to do well if inflation expectations are spiking.
What Druckenmiller said about gold is that the Trump victory is causing a lot of people to reallocate capital out of safe haven assets, out of Treasuries, into equities, and into US dollars. And so his view is that And the Trump victory is going to be extremely bullish for the U.S. Dollar and therefore bearish for gold, at least in the short term. Now, when I say at least in the short term, those are my words. Druckenmiller didn't say that.
I think that the other thing to consider is the rate hike expectations for the end of the year, for a December rate hike, are way above 90% now. The market thinks that we're going to get a rate hike. I think that's probably right, and I wouldn't be surprised if the low in gold coincides with that rate hike happening or imminently about to happen or just happened, you know, within a few days on either side of the rate hike, assuming we get one in December. I would predict that that's a good possibility as to when we might see a low in gold. So, I think that this gold sell-off is not structural. I think that if we are going to have Spiking inflation expectations, or I shouldn't say spiking, but rising inflation expectations on a consistent basis, that will eventually be bullish for gold.
But right now the focus is on the dollar bullish story. And of course, this is very much the reason that we've talked so much about that hedged trade, long gold and long the dollar index at the same time, because although you're kind of getting clobbered here if you're long gold, You're making a killing on the dollar index, which has been performing extremely well.
Global bond sell-off and 10-year yields
Aaron Chan: Speaking of Treasuries, the 10-year yield is going through the roof as bond markets around the world sell off. So what's going on with fixed income here?
Erik Townsend: Well, Aaron, I'll make a profound declaration. This is a big deal. Okay. What does it mean? Frankly, I don't know. And I don't think anybody else does. We're either seeing the beginning of maybe a secular change. Maybe it really is true that Jeff Gundlach got it exactly right and the bond bull market of 35-plus years is over and reversing rather abruptly now, or it could be that people are just sort of thinking that's what this Trump victory means, and because everybody else is doing it, they're doing it too, and it's all going to retrace before we know it.
I think it's too early to say yet, but boy, 50 basis points in a week, and I say 50 basis points in a week, it's back down to less than that now, but we were above 2.25% on the 10-year. Technicians I'm reading are saying the next target is around 2.5%. It'll probably get there. Looking to me more and more like the view that Raoul Pal and I have talked about, that we'd eventually get to sub-1% 10-year Treasury yields, might be wrong after all, because right now those yields sure are moving rapidly to the upside.
Aaron Chan: Thanks for the market update, Erik. Paul Krake is the founder of View from the Peak, a popular Hong Kong-based market letter and advisory firm. Erik's interview with Mr. Krake is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Interview: why bonds sold off - fiscal spending and the Republican sweep
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Paul Krake, very well-known author of View from the Peak in Hong Kong. And Paul, I think that it's so It's so timely that we get to talk to you this week because the rest of the world, I think, is being driven very much by the result of the U.S. election. We did have Pippa and Harald Malmgren on last week immediately after. But boy, did anybody anywhere predict that not the stock market, but the bond market would sell off dramatically, 50 basis points in a week on the 10-year yield? So holy cow, is this entirely about the election? Is it surprise factor? Is it inflation expectations? What's happening here?
Paul Krake: Erik, thanks very much for having me on. I think, look, I think that the bond market move was, was bound to happen regardless of who won the— of who won the election. Now, the speed of that move, I think, has been exacerbated by the Republican— by the Republican sweep. But at the end of the day, there was a narrative that was getting developed through the course of the last 3 months or so that whoever came to office, that a priority was going to be an increase in fiscal spending, predominantly on the infrastructure side of things.
So if you actually look at it, the bond market was actually starting to move well before the extraordinary victory by Mr. Trump. You know, we bottomed in US 10s in the summer at what I think about 1.38, I think we were. And we've been moving steadily higher since then because we had a campaign that was littered with promises of fiscal spending.
So what we've seen now and why the pace of this has accelerated is because that what We have a Republican sweep that means that anything that the Republicans want to be done can be done legislatively. And the debate really is not Democrat versus Republican. It's small government Republicans versus the populist movement of Trump. And that's where the true battles are going to lie.
We did a call today with a guy called Jim Capretta, who was a former very senior Bush administration budget guy. And we outlined this in— he outlined this in a lot of detail that there is a real ideological battle going on within the Republican Party on how this stimulus should look and how much should actually occur. I mean, if you take Trump at his word, and that has to be the base case for everything from fiscal spending to trade, the US budget deficit is about to balloon Big time. I mean, we could, we could be heading from the current 2.5% of GDP to well north of 5%.
And the Paul Ryans of the world and the Mitch McConnells of the world are not going to take that lying down. You know, if you read the Paul Ryan manifesto, A Better Way, it is a classic small government, balanced budget agenda. And that is the polar opposite of what we're seeing out of Mr. Trump.
Ripping up the investment playbook
Erik Townsend: Now, let's stay on the significance of this. Obviously, we're used to looking at elections in terms of Republican or Democrat. Democrat outcome. But it seems to me this election is more about the anti-establishment, throw the bums out, change everything. And I certainly understand why a lot of people resonate with that, but I'm not sure how much Donald Trump can really do to be effective at prosecuting an agenda that delivers on his campaign promises. So how significant is this election outcome, which is basically down with the establishment? It seems like everything is changing very dramatically.
Paul Krake: So, Erik, let's break that up into a couple of sections, right? So if we talk about ripping up the investment playbook, that's certainly what we've done since Tuesday night of last week. Because for the previous— really since the end of the financial crisis, we've lived in a world where the overriding investment thesis revolved around structurally low interest rates around the globe.
And that went from all the QE programs right through to the era of negative interest rates where we are today. And suddenly, what the Trump administration or the rise of the Trump administration has done has effectively ended the negative interest rate era or the negative bond yield era, I should say. So everything we thought we knew about our investment process several years forward, i.e., structurally low interest rates has gone out the window. Now, what we're seeing now is a violent rotation out of these long bond proxies, long carry, which is effectively a short volatility world, into a potentially higher growth, higher rates, potential stagflation, lower regulation, greater forward growth world. And the reality is that the investments that we own don't represent that.
So what you're seeing is a violent rotation into banks, into cyclicals, out of EM, out of bond proxies and the like. And the reality, the reality is that we're about to see just balance sheet and pension destruction because we're transitioning from one form, you know, one investment thesis to another. And the world's currently not positioned for that.
Now, if I was to put my— Erik, my fancy hat on and talk about the whole concept of risk parity and how risk parity is going to get hurt. Well, all risk parity is, is your retirement fund and mine, right? It's because you're long bonds and long stocks and that gets hurt in an environment where rates— where rates are going up. And the issue I have with all of this is because you are going to see personal balance sheet destruction, portfolio portfolio valuation destruction is that you can see this thing really spiral out of control. And that's the potential for VaR-related selling in the near term. But the losses on portfolios around the globe are going to be absolutely, absolutely enormous. There's implications on the deficit.
You know, we, as we talked about at the start, I mean, you know, there is an ideological conflict in the Republican Party between the Reagan, basically the the Reaganites and the populists that is going to dominate thinking in Washington for the next 4 years. And this is putting all the social policies to one side, which, again, we'll leave those musings to Facebook. But when you've got a guy like Steve Bannon, who— I spent an hour on Breitbart News on the weekend, And what's on there is terrifying if you're a normal person.
It's scary stuff.
So everything we look at, not only about the budget, but about trade, about the implicit global security guarantee that the US has— which is basically the US has had in place since 1945, which has effectively kept the developed economies around the globe out of, you know, out of conflict, with a few exceptions, that goes away. It changes the environment for Asia. It changes the environment for Europe.
You know, this is— to say the election of Mr. Trump was a historic moment is to, is to understate the significance of what happened.
Inflation expectations, stimulus lag and 2017 stagflation risk
Erik Townsend: Inflation expectations have obviously spiked dramatically, and a lot of commentators have sort of simplified this to say, oh, well, Trump's trade policies are going to involve tariffs and that increases prices and that's inflationary. It feels to me like there's more than just that going on. How do you see the spike in inflation expectations? Is it just about Trump's trade policy or is there more to it?
Paul Krake: Well, no. So going back to why bond yields went up and bond yields have been rising now for several months now, you know, so have inflationary expectations because there is a a very valid notion that we're going to get some base effect inflation in the first half of the year, the first half of 2017, just on the back of high commodity prices. And that's purely mathematical, but that is coming. Now, when you throw in a, you know, a $7 to $8 trillion tax cut over, you know, over, over a 10-year period, when you have situations such as, you know, Another, say, $1 trillion of fiscal spending. You have the tax amnesty on offshore earnings, which will allow US corporates to bring back maybe as much as $2.5 trillion from overseas at, say, a 10% tax rate. There's a lot of fuel being thrown on the fire.
Now, I am very skeptical about this. And I see a lot of market turmoil and actually a bear market in equity and credit in 2017. Because any stimulus that occurs in the first quarter or second quarter of next year is not going to have an impact on growth for at least 12 months.
We found that through when the US did its stimulus post the financial crisis, that you really didn't have a sustainable pickup in growth until well into 2010. There is a lag. Look, the only people who get rich in the early days of a fiscal stimulus are architects as things get as things get planned.
So what you could easily see in 2017 is classic stagflation, where you actually have slow growth because there's no impact of the stimulus. I'll make an argument because of the poor social policies that potentially could get implemented that there's a hit to consumer confidence in the US. So I could easily see a scenario where the US in the first half of next year is growing at 1%. And we have, you know, inflation that is through the top end of the Fed's, Fed's 2% target. But with interest rates heading towards cycle highs, that's a disastrous outcome for equity and credit markets globally.
Dollar strength and emerging-market fallout
Erik Townsend: But another big aspect of this story, of course, is the US dollar. The strength in the US dollar has continued. We're now trading above a 100 handle on the US Dollar Index. So how much farther do you think the US dollar has to go to the upside? I assume that your view is dollar bullish.
How much farther can it go before it has adverse consequences on emerging markets?
Paul Krake: Well, we're seeing that now. Now we see it's having adverse consequences. But you've got to throw it all in that— in the sort of the— into a bucket, sort of, because there are a lot of crosscurrents here. Trade policy, protectionist trade policy, the ripping up of NAFTA, the death of TPP. You know, these things that are anti-trade are actually— you know, it's bad for emerging markets and good for the dollar. And again, we have to take President Trump's, President-elect Trump's policy prescriptions at his word. There's a lot of people who are trying to apologize, and who are apologists, I should say, for the Trump campaign, saying, well, it's not gonna be as bad as what he said. Our base case has to be what he said, right? And what he said is very anti-trade, which is a terrible environment for Asia. Look, the dollar's going up for a myriad of reasons.
Most importantly, rates are going higher.
The Fed is not going to be on the same trajectory that it has been through the course of 2016, i.e., they're going to hike on multiple occasions next year. Do they hike on 4 occasions, 3 or 4 occasions? Certainly, that's conceivable in my thinking. And the dollar is going to be a high-yielding currency versus versus other majors. So the scary thing for markets as a whole is, again, going back to, do you have the situation that interest rates rise in a disorderly fashion?
If that's the case, then in concert with that, the dollar is going to rise in a disorderly fashion as well.
Now, just on the emerging markets side of things, You know, there's little doubt that the vast majority of emerging market economies, probably with the exception of somewhere like Turkey, have dramatically improved their external sovereign and corporate debt positions than they were at any— in the prelude to any other crisis in the last 30 years.
Indonesia is in much better shape on the external side of things. If you look at any ratio you want, but things like short-term debt to FX reserves across an array of emerging markets, they're just in better shape. Right. You know, the economic stewards in the emerging— in emerging market economies have just got better at running their economies in general. But it's not going to stop outflows of sovereign— in sovereign bond markets, in emerging market corporate credit. There is going to be a significant mark-to-market hit. Does it create an emerging market crisis? Probably not. But is this going to be worse than the taper tantrum that we saw in May and June of 2013? Absolutely it is.
Erik Townsend: We've obviously seen emerging markets sovereign debt already starting to sell off. Is that about the dollar? Is that about Trump trade policy? Is there more to the picture? And how much farther do you think it has to go?
Paul Krake: Yeah, look, it's all, it's all of the above. You know, and again, this, this stuff was starting to weaken a little bit, you know, as I said, over the last couple of months because the process started, started a little earlier. You know, it still, it still has further to go despite the fact, though, One advantage to emerging markets is that, you know, as we've known for the last 5 years, investors have been structurally underweight EM. And it was really only in February of this year with the impeachment of Mrs. Rousseff in Brazil that you saw a bottom in EM and flows start— and the underweight stance that global allocators had, they started taking that back in, taking that back in February. But look, you are going to see money leave EM.
You know, there are markets that are crowded and Brazil's an obvious one where people were piling into, into the short end of the Brazilian yield curve. And you saw Brazilian 2-year notes go from 16, 16-odd percent in, in February to a low. I think they traded as low as 11. And obviously yields are backing up now because, you know, that was a very crowded trade. And, you know, as you know, in the early stages of any form of adjustment, the crowded trades get hit, get hit first.
And that's why Brazil's had such a torrid time over the last week. And to be honest, that's only going to keep going because Brazilian equities are, you know, Brazilian equities are expensive and the like. So there's going to be aggressive selling there. I think India is another place that potentially could see further selling just purely on a valuation basis.
Look, EM's got further to go and EM's about to get very cheap in a world where the dollar gets very strong.
Gold: Krake's skeptical view
Erik Townsend: I actually read a headline this week that said gold is selling off because of inflation expectations. increasing. That's a little backwards from the normal interpretation. What's going on with gold?
Paul Krake: What's going on with gold? Erik, I did promise you I wouldn't rant on about gold, so I won't. But I— can you just answer a question for me? Is gold an inflation hedge or a deflation hedge? Because gold bugs will tell you it's both. And again, I, I think that gold in the last few years has lost all its predictive ability. Yes, it is a store of value in the case of severe crisis. But look, at the end of the day, tell me how many middle-class Indian weddings are going to happen in the next 12 months, and I'll tell you where the price of gold goes.
Because at the end of the day, gold is— gold is for practical— primarily for practical purposes these days. It's, it's, you know, Indian jewelry demand is one of the key drivers. You know, if you look at, you know, sort of ETF flows into gold, etc., they've come down a long, long way over the course of the last Last few years. I'm probably the wrong guy to ask about gold because I think, you know, mocking gold bugs is sport to me.
But, you know, on the whole, I, I don't think that gold is, is, is anywhere near as relevant as, as it once was.
China: debt dynamics, the yuan and Kyle Bass
Erik Townsend: Let's move on then to a topic that I know you've done a lot of work on, which is the dynamics of this Chinese debt situation. The credit expansion in China since 2008 has been monumental, and I'd like to look at this both in terms of the big picture But also vis-à-vis the recent election event in the United States.
Why don't we start? Because I don't think it's possible to understand the Chinese debt situation without understanding the cultural issues in China that drive the government's behavior. So give us the big picture here.
Paul Krake: Big picture. Start and end every conversation about China with this: number one goal of the Communist Party is preservation of the Communist Party. Only thing that matters, right? So within within that, prevention of social unrest is the number one priority of the party, and the and you've seen that in the form of you know the anti-corruption campaign as part of this. You know the way that they have handled you know the property market over the years, the bursting of the equity market bubble and the like. It's all it's all predicated on trying to increase the the wealth of the middle class. And if Xi Jinping has one power base within China, it it is the middle class. And, you know, they handle— they have many, many policy missteps along the way. And as I said, the way they handled the bursting of the equity bubble last year is a classic example of this. But look, what do we know about Chinese debt dynamics?
Look, the trajectory is certainly heading in a very dangerous, dangerous direction. That said, the only reason a debt problem becomes a credit crisis is if you have forced selling of assets.
One of my concerns about Xi Jinping is that the perception of him being a market reformer, I think, is very, very flawed. I think that he is far from that. As such, he will not allow the market mechanism to play a predominant role, particularly where it comes to the banking sector. Now, what I'm saying in a very, very roundabout way is that you're not going to see sharp increases in defaults in China because the government's not going to allow them to allow that to happen.
Because the Chinese cannot risk en masse unemployment because the last thing the last thing China needs is a million unemployed steelworkers with access to the internet, right? So what what you will see over time is a very organic approach to working out the debt problem. They legitimately believe that they can grow they. They grow their way out of it, and if they, for example, achieve their goal by 2020 of doubling GDP in the preceding decade, which they should do if growth can average 6.5%, then they go a long way to alleviating the debt problem. Now, recent you know what we see with the economy is they go in fits and starts in terms of credit. And if you actually look at the economy in the last four years, what they've done is. He's done a fiscal stimulus just after Chinese New Year, around January and February in Q1.
You've had strong growth basically Q2, Q3. Growth starts to slow at the end of Q3, slow in Q4, slow in Q1, another fiscal stimulus. Now, this is all very credit-driven every time they do that. Look, what you have is you have an economy that is on a glide path lower. It is transitioning towards a more self-sustaining, service-oriented economy, but it does go in these little mini cycles that tend to get fueled by credit. What eventually happens for me is that the return on investment, so the ROI on the economy is continuing to go down and down and down, and that is because of the debt dynamics.
Now, eventually, I don't think China has a debt problem. I think it ends up with a growth problem. But as we stand today, I think China has the means, it has the savings, it has effectively an undergeared federal balance sheet that can plug the holes where needed. So let's say the federal balance sheet is— they have federal debt to GDP of around 20%. So they have about $2 trillion of federal debt. Let's say that the banking, the bad debt problem is $3 trillion.
China, over the course of a several-year period, could issue $3 trillion worth of bonds. They'd be eagerly sought after internationally if they were to open up the capital account further. Then what you've done is put $3 trillion into the banking system, recapitalized all the banks, and federal debt to GDP has gone from 20% to 50%.
So I actually don't think that the aggregate debt levels in China are that bad. I think they're very much related to property, which has to do with a rapid expansion in property, with property rights and housing ownership in the last 20 years. I'm not as bearish on China as many are, but I am concerned that the rates of return are going to continue to fall if they continue to use credit as a vehicle of stimulus.
Erik Townsend: Kyle Bass has been very outspoken in suggesting that to achieve what you just said of not allowing a massive wave of defaults, that China would probably have to recap its banking system and in so doing would be forced to dramatically devalue the yuan. What's your reaction to that view?
Paul Krake: Don't agree. I don't agree. I mean, the bears on China— and the irony is that the further you get away from China, the more bearish people get. And a lot of the most bearish people on China have actually never been there. So I do find that— I think that's a very interesting take on the psychology of how people look at China. Look, I mean, people have been calling for the demise of China from a debt standpoint for 10 years, and it hasn't happened.
Now, the Chinese in August of last year go to a more flexible pricing methodology for the currency, which was purely done to get into the SDR, for the IMF to put China into the Special Drawing Rights basket. And that was a great symbol of economic power according to the Chinese. But the Chinese then started to let their currency slide.
Now, if you had told me at the start, at this time last year, that by Q4 of 2016, that the dollar-RMB would have been at 6.84, and the trade-weighted basket would be down some, what, 12% on the year, I would have told you that Malaysia would have been at the IMF and dollar-Brazil would have been at 4.5.
But the Chinese achieved the impossible. They've orchestrated a very slow, steady depreciation of their currency. that didn't have a dramatic impact on the rest of the emerging world or commodity producers as a whole. It's extraordinary that they've done this.
And what they've proven, effectively, if you point enough guns at enough heads, you can stop capital flight. So if you actually look at all the money that's left the country, it's effectively equal to all the corporate outflows in regards to M&A, et cetera, that's gone on over the course of the last year. So they've shut down underground banks. They've basically stopped the leakages out of the economy. And they've done a masterful job at weakening the currency in a very orderly fashion. No emerging market economy on earth has ever been able to do this.
And to be honest, the only reason they can do this is because it's, at the end of the day, it's still a totalitarian regime that can change the rules whenever they want and change those rules by force. But what they've done, I think, is just extraordinary.
And to be honest, I don't see the need for a dramatic depreciation of the currency. Look, the only way that a debt explosion becomes an issue is if you have domestic inflation. And the overcapacity issues in China basically ensure that you don't have domestic inflation. Right, and that's look, and that's not just a China problem; it's a global problem. I mean, you know, we QE was QE globally was meant to create en masse inflation, but it never it never happened, and it never happened because you know governments and central banks regulated their banking systems out of the business of expanding their balance sheets. So you could never really have a an inflationary a credit fueled inflationary bubble like you would have had in previous cycles. And what's happened in China is that a lot of the Liquidity has ended up in, in forming mini asset bubbles around the country.
Property, and property is the latest little— I'll call it a mini bubble that's, that's occurring across the country. And that's all due to a function of excess liquidity.
Trump, Asian security and de-dollarization
Erik Townsend: Obviously, Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric was very aggressive towards China. So how does the election of Donald Trump change or shape your views about China's future?
Paul Krake: It doesn't change my views about China's future per se. Look, I think that— look, Donald Trump has done already irreparable damage to the relationship that the United States has with Asia by basically telling the Japanese and the Koreans that they should go and get nuclear weapons and look after themselves. You effectively pulled the rug out of the implicit security guarantee that, as I said before, that's been in place since 1945. And what you're seeing now, and be it the Malaysians, be it more profoundly by Mr. Duterte in the Philippines, there is a movement away from a reliance on the US and a move towards— back towards China.
China's policies in the region are clear. There is territorial expansion. They are looking with One Belt, One Road to expand economic dominance. And all that the US has done, particularly by scuttling TPP, is pushing the region towards China.
The Japanese and Koreans are very concerned about this. The Chinese position in the region has improved dramatically. And this is not a good thing. This is not a good thing for our allies in the region. You're going to see massive increases in defense spending in Australia, in Korea, in Japan. And it's all on the back of the fact that the US is losing its influence in the region. And there's a policy the State Department has under the Obama administration. There was a, there was a policy called the pivot, which was pivoting away from effectively conflicts in the Middle East and, and involvement in Europe and focusing more on, on Asia, which was where the US saw its the need, the greatest need for its military influence, but to temper a rapidly expanding China. That pivot now is well and truly under threat, and US influence in the region is also under severe threat.
Erik Townsend: You described that reference, the Asian region. A lot of people have suggested that US economic hegemony really globally is on the decline. And of course, Russia has intentionally tried to encourage the rest of the emerging world to drop the US dollar as a reserve currency. Do you think that that trend has got further to go? And or is it just in Asia that you see this phenomenon?
Paul Krake: No, it's, it's, it's global. I give you a couple examples on this, Erik. I think that the, the US in the last few years has really overplayed its hand legally in some issues. And I'll give you the best example, which was the— I think it was 3 years ago now, maybe 4, which was where BNP was fined $8 billion by the Department of Justice for breaching sanctions with the South Sudanese.
Now, Europe doesn't have— didn't have Sudan under sanctions. But because they did an oil trade and settled that trade in dollars, a New York federal court judge turned around and said, if it's US dollars, it's our jurisdiction. You're in breach of our sanctions. Pay us $8 billion. And it was around that time where everyone, be it the— be it sort of more shady characters like the Saudis, the Chinese, the Venezuelans, the Russians, et cetera, et cetera, Hang on a second. If I settle an oil trade that doesn't involve the US in US dollars, suddenly my banks can get shut down in the US, or my accounts could be frozen.
No way I want to do that.
And that was the beginning of Russia developing its own— trying to develop its own SWIFT system. This is the Chinese looking to try to settle stuff in renminbi. It sort of was part of the beginning of the hastening of the internationalization of the renminbi. And all of this revolves around basically a legal grab by the US, which scared a lot of people. So I think that not only the internationalization of the renminbi, but the settlement of commodities that have historically been settled in dollars, settling them into other currencies, Be them oil exchanges, oil exchanges in China or whatever, that is going to grow and grow and grow.
But the problem with that is that we still live in a world that is laden with US dollar debt. And if you start settling transactions in currencies apart from dollars, suddenly you have economies that have debt in dollars but reserves in other currencies. And last time I looked, you can't settle a US dollar bond with renminbi.
So what's the result? Well, that leads to, over time, a structural appreciation of the dollar, because to pay back debt, you've got to sell your renminbi to buy dollars, or sell your rubles to buy dollars. So again, the move towards the dollar as the global— away from the dollar as the global trade currency is actually a severe dollar strengthener over time.
The commodity supercycle is over; energy goes free
Erik Townsend: Speaking of commodities, aside from settlement prices, let's talk about the commodity supercycle. I know you've done quite a bit of work there. There?
Paul Krake: Well, it's over. It's well and truly over. And it's— look, it's over for— it's over for a variety of reasons. It's over because, you know, China is transitioning away from fixed asset investment to more focusing on, on a service-driven economy. It's over because of massive supply expansion that you saw at precisely the wrong time of the cycle for everything from iron ore to coal to to copper. Everything, everything was part of that.
But look, I think there's some real, some real, you know, technology, technological issues as well.
And I think that if I was to say what is the, what is the biggest theme for the global economy over the course of the next 50 years, I would say that the inputs of doing business, i.e., energy, is going to effectively be free going forward. Right. And that changes, that changes so many— that just changes the way we do business, the cost of how the cost of doing business. It's incredibly deflationary if everything— if energy is effectively free because it comes from the wind and the sun. And I think that the way that we drive, i.e., electric cars, the way that we build our homes with solar panels as the staple going forward, it changes so, so many things. But it also means that we're going to use less of certain, certain things.
We're going to use less oil. We're going to use less coal. You know, the demand for copper is going to change because, you know, solar panels don't use as much copper as traditional sources of electricity generation. We are transitioning the things that we use. And just as, you know, commodities such as lead don't get used anywhere near as much as they did in the past, you're going to find other commodities that will become obsolete because of just extraordinary technological changes.
Japan: bullish turn, yen, Nikkei and the constitution
Erik Townsend: I know that although you're probably a little bit more bullish on China than some people, you're probably more bearish than others on Japan. What's your view there?
Paul Krake: Well, again, I was really bearish on Japan until last week. Look, again, I've never been a debt blowup guy in Japan. I think that, you know, the domestic savings pools cover enough. I'm a— look, I'm a big believer that just because a central bank owns a lot of JGBs, it's still Japan Inc. that owns those JGBs. And if the government wants to turn around and say to the Bank of Japan to turn them into perpetual bonds or to just write the debt off, these sort of things can all be done.
So I don't believe in the Japanese blowup. I mean, I am a big believer that the Japanese economy ceases to be relevant because of demographics and a shrinking population, all due to demographics. But this time, put it this way, this time 2 weeks ago, I was advocating policy mistakes in Japan. I was advocating that they were running out of policy options, that the whole yield curve targeting thing was completely flawed, and that they would never be able to— and all they were doing by targeting the yield curve was destroying bank profitability. And crushing their insurance industry and the like.
But Donald Trump steepened the yield curve globally. And dollar-yen— sorry, and dollar-yen's gone sharply higher because the dollar's gone up around the world because of the potential for Trump policies to become legislation.
So from a financial asset standpoint, Japan's incredibly attractive now because it has a bunch, a bunch of, a bunch of tailwinds that have nothing to do with domestic Japanese policy. But it will be enough to drive Nikkei dramatically higher in the next 12 months, to drive the yen significantly weaker over that time and steepen the Japanese yield curve, which helps the banking system, banking system and the like.
Look, the structural problems in terms of demographics aren't going away. You know, what Japan needs is immigration. And unfortunately, that's not going to happen. One thing I think that has changed in the last week is the outlook for the rewriting of the Japanese constitution. Abe, Prime Minister Abe, at the end of the day, is a foreign policy guy first. He's a markets/financial guy second. He wants his legacy to be that he's protected Japanese grandchildren from the rise of China militarily. Now, with the removal of the implicit security guarantee, suddenly the backstop of Japan, i.e., that the US would be there in case they ever got into military strife, suddenly they can't rely on that anymore.
Whilst the pacifist constitution is incredibly popular in Japan, or should I say, the prospect of rewriting it is very unpopular, That was always the case with the implicit guarantee that the US would always be there to back them up. If they're not, then suddenly Mr. Abe can seriously make the argument that says, we are on our own. We can see what the Japanese are doing in the Senkaku Islands and the like. They are expanding.
They are a legitimate threat. North Korea is a legitimate threat. We need to be able to be preemptive and have an offensive military military force. And I think you could see this— again, Japanese politics works in a very glacial way, but over the next couple of years, you could easily see a real movement towards reforming the pacifist constitution.
Practical macro and near-term positioning
Erik Townsend: Finally, I'd like to touch on something that I really appreciated from your recent Real Vision interview with Raoul Pal, which is your firm's focus on the concept of practical macro, that it's so easy in the world of macro to talk about, you know, these things that are intellectually fascinating, but not Actionable. So I want to turn this around and say, what questions have I forgotten to ask you? Or what, for the part of our audience who runs money for a living, what are the practical things that you're seeing in the market that actually lead to trading ideas?
Paul Krake: Well, let me put it this way, Erik. I mean, my partner often tells me, we run a product called the Expert Series where we get guys from the American Enterprise Institute or the Peterson Institute or the Brookings Institution to come in and talk about a topic of their choice. So we had a call on the fiscal situation today. We've had calls on the Saudi Aramco IPO. We've done stuff on productivity.
And my partner always says to me, Paul, we cannot be a high-priced version of The Economist. We don't want to be this coffee table magazine that people really enjoy reading, but can't make any money out of. And last time I looked, we were in the business— that's why we do this. We do this because we want to invest.
And the whole concept of Practical Macro is basically taking thematic work and at the end of it saying, OK, here's this thesis we've just outlined. By the way, you can make money by buying this equity, buying this credit, looking at these options. Here are the ways you implement the idea. And look, when I started the firm 5 years ago, that was the whole premise. There's a lot of great economic research out there. There's some wonderful thematic work. But a lot of it's— again, it's not practical. You've got to be able to put an idea on at the end of the day. Now, obviously, you need to develop a framework, an intellectual framework to before you develop these ideas. But a report without a trade idea at the end of it is, as I said, nothing more than a high-priced version of The Economist.
So what we really try to do is to find things that we can implement. One of the things that we're very focused on is actually asking the question, what is your timeframe? Because again, my view on on dollar-yen on a 1-week, 1-month, 1-year view, they may all be very, very different, and all for very valid reasons. So when we talk about the practical side of things, we have to ask the question first, what's your timeframe? So if I look at between, say, now and the end of the year, there's very little on the horizon that I can see that stops this violent rotation out of fixed income, out of bond proxies, into banks, into banks and cyclicals. Look, I mean, I think cyclical stocks globally are very, very expensive, but it doesn't mean they're not going to continue to go up. You know, we are seeing a fairly violent rotation out of large-cap tech. I mean, Google, Amazon, Facebook, etc., you know, they're companies that change the world every day.
And if you want a simple investment thesis, buy stocks that change the world every day. But these things are going to go down for the next 6 or 8 weeks. Because everybody owns them. And this is, you know, again, the practical side of things is not just about positioning, but it's certainly from a structural positioning standpoint, it becomes very, very relevant.
And in the near term, the practical stuff revolves around, you know, things like, you know, despite the fact that these companies are wonderful companies, they are over-owned and people are rotating into something different. So again, it's just all about the practical side of things is all about It's about having a well-thought-out thesis, but being able to implement something to make money out of it.
What View from the Peak offers
Erik Townsend: For our listeners who would like to follow your work, before we close, let's tell them about View from the Peak and what your firm offers.
Paul Krake: View from the Peak is, as I said, a practical macro or practical thematic research firm. We publish most days now, actually. I publish my flagship report, which is my weekly thought That comes out once a week. We publish with— so with the flagship report, what we have is a bunch of model portfolios, which is effectively an amalgamation of all our ideas. So we run a macro portfolio, which is all our ideas, asset class agnostic, currency agnostic.
We run 2 equity portfolios, which is an Asia long-short equity and an Asia 20, what we call 20 for 20, those 20 stocks that you need to own for the next 20 years around the region.
So we publish portfolio updates on that. We publish a Sunday night blotter, which is basically my thoughts for the upcoming week. And then we publish the transcripts of our expert series, which are cool video conferences that we hold once or twice a week on, as I said, on a myriad of topics.
So we're a subscription-based service. As I like to think, that— like to think that the true value in the services, you know, being able to talk to myself or Cindy and other members of the team, that's what we— that's what we do well. The written— the written word is, you know, probably, you know, probably 25% of what we're thinking, and the rest of it comes out through, you know, having a discussion just like this.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Well, I can't thank you enough for an excellent interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as Macro MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: Treasury sell-off, narratives and US stability
Aaron Chan: Great interview, Erik. You know, one of the big stories since the election, which you and Paul discussed thoroughly in the interview, was the bond market and Treasury sell-off that ensued. I think we've been sold this narrative that Trump, plus a Republican sweep of Congress, is inherently inflationary. But with the Chinese and Saudis clearly selling Treasuries, presumably for the purposes of addressing dollar shortages and FX interventions. I mean, what part of this reflects the retreat of US hegemony in general?
Erik Townsend: I think that's an excellent question, Aaron First of all, I agree with you when you say that we've been sold this narrative. I think that the first person to come up with a credible narrative, it caught on. And it's— everybody's sort of into this. It's all about Trump policy is going to be inflationary. I'm not persuaded that that narrative is correct. I think that time will tell. But you bring up an excellent point, which is I think that Americans tend to miss half of the story here just because of their orientation.
What you see a lot of awareness of right now among Americans is, boy, the divisiveness in the United States. There's a bunch of people that are just all excited because their boy Donald Trump won. And there's a bunch of other people that are literally throwing Molotov cocktails in the streets and trying to organize efforts to overturn the election results because they're so upset about it, because they feel that Donald Trump is the wrong person. So this divisiveness, I think everybody in the United States gets that. There's another category of divisiveness that I think is just as big of a story, if not bigger, which is that the way the rest of the world is looking at this is, holy cow, the United States, as much as they were offended that Putin was the one to say it, really is starting to look like a banana republic. Neither one of these candidates were fit for office.
And, you know, Americans are having riots in the streets if their candidate didn't win. It's causing the rest of the world to get really nervous about the stability of the United States.
And we're seeing this rush away from U.S. Treasuries as a safe haven asset. I don't think that's entirely about a loss of U.S. hegemony, but I think that that is a contributing factor to it. And we're we're seeing a lot of loss of faith and a lot of discussion around the world about some countries abandoning the U.S. dollar as a trade settlement currency. Other countries are Are abandoning their military and political alliances with the United States. There is a divisiveness that is about whether or not the U.S. is still the top dog on the street. And I don't think Americans are really perceiving it because they're so caught up in the internals of Trump versus Clinton. I think the rest of the world is looking at it in terms of what the heck happened to the USA in terms of the leadership and stability that it used to portray to the rest of the world.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Postgame: Asia trade deals and trading protection for influence
Aaron Chan: Erik, speaking of the disequilibrium that this US election has created, I read an article in the Financial Times about how Australia might be snubbing the United States and TPP in favor of an Asia-Pacific free trade deal, which China hopes to advance at this week's trade summit in Peru. Now, China's territorial aims in the South China Sea are well known, but it appears they're also highly interested in making trade deals. So, do you see the same remilitarization thesis in the region as Paul
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I would spin it a slightly different way. I think our views are very compatible. The way I would describe this is historically the United States has been in the business of exchanging or trading military protection for political influence. Basically, the deal is we're going to provide you with military protection because your country needs it and you can't afford to provide it for yourself.
And that's going to allow us to tell you what to do. And we expect you to play ball with us, or we're going to take away the protection that you desperately need.
What Donald Trump is saying is, look, these countries are getting a free ride. If they want military protection to be provided by the United States, they ought to pay for it. And frankly, I think what Mr. Trump is missing is the United States got a lot of political influence in terms of how it could control the actions of other countries by trading that so-called free military protection for political influence. If you put a price tag on that military protection, you lose the political influence and you lose the control that the United States has enjoyed. So I think that this international game of political influence and vying for power is a little bit more complicated than Donald Trump understands. And I think that his view about, you know, sending people a bill for their military protection is maybe a little bit misinformed.
Closing thoughts and Research Roundup
Aaron Chan: Thanks for that, Erik. That's all the time we have for this week. Erik, any closing thoughts?
Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, I want to let our listeners know that there will be a show next week. Of course, next Thursday is Thanksgiving Day, but we're going to air a prerecorded show, which will be episode 2 of my Accredited Investor Academy. That will appeal particularly to high-net-worth individual investors, but may interest the rest of the audience as well. And then we'll be back on December 1st with a regular format show and another feature interview guest.
And beyond that, as always, we need your help, folks, promoting the show and getting the word out.
So please retweet the announcements. A retweet is better than a like on Twitter. And tell your friends about it, forward the Research Roundup to your colleagues, and most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Helps us to increase our statistics, which allows Aaron to recruit better guests for the program. And it gets you the free Research Roundup email, which is a compendium of links to the very best free stuff that we could find on the internet each week.
What's in this week's Research Roundup, Aaron?
Aaron Chan: We've got a great lineup this week, including some reactions to Trump's victory from Ray Dalio, Howard Marks, Bill Gross, and Jeff Gundlach. In particular, we've got the 60-page slide deck from Jeff Gundlach's latest investor webinar. So, be sure to check that out. Finally, you may have heard about the recent demonetization fiasco in India, where the government botched an attempt to ban the circulation of 500 and 1,000 rupee notes from circulation, ultimately creating more confusion and chaos for Indian citizens. To get an on-the-ground perspective on what was happening, be sure to read the latest article from The Indian Express. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So, that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @macrovoices for the latest updates. updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik at Erik S. Townsend and myself at _AaronChan_.
For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
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