David Hay — Evergreen Gavekal (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend. Hello, everyone.

Erik Townsend: Happy New Year, everybody. MacroVoices episode 44 was recorded on January 5th, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. David Hay from Evergreen Gavekal will be joining me as this week's featured interview guest. Dave and I will discuss the equity market outlook under President Donald Trump, interest rates backing up the US dollar rally, Energy Master Limited Partnerships, and much more.

Year-ahead format; stocks, the Trump rally and central banks

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Erik, since this is our first show of the new year, I'd like to take a different approach this week. Normally, our market wrap focuses on what happened in the last week and what you see ahead in the next few weeks for stocks, crude oil, bond yields, precious metals, dollar index. But since it's been a few weeks since our last regular format show, and we're starting a new year, let's zoom out to a longer time horizon and talk about what happened in markets last year and what you see on the horizon for this year. Why don't we start with stocks?

Erik Townsend: Okay, sure. Let's go all the way back to a very long time horizon. The view that I've had for many, many years now is that overly accommodative monetary policy from central banks only sets us up for the next successive crisis to be bigger than the last one. So my view has been that easy money policy in the '90s led to the late '90s boom period and then the dot-com bust. It was the overly accommodative monetary policy in reaction to the dot-com bust that set the stage, again, with easy money policy that led us into the housing crisis. And now, of course, with quantitative easing, we've had just huge accommodation since, and my prediction is that eventually sets us up for a worse outcome. And I think that you have to, at this point, kind of acknowledge, you know, hey, that's an interesting view, but it's been like 8 years now. And if you go all the way back to when the 2008 event, as it's called, really started, it was the second quarter of 2007.

2007. So, we're back, you know, 10 years ago to when the last crisis happened. If I'm saying there's going to be another one, you know, maybe I'm wrong and it's time to give up. Hugh Hendry certainly is the guest that we've had on the program who's taken that view, that, you know, he thought the same thing, but, you know, the big bad event never happened.

I would say my view is that, you know, it's definitely gone on longer than I thought possible. But the thing is that I don't think that the endgame really starts until you get an inflation problem, because in a deflationary backdrop, central banks can keep on printing money and propping up asset markets and doing, you know, whatever they want. They can get away with it. It's when you have inflation to contend with, which we haven't seen yet, although it seems like now it's starting, that's when we start to be in trouble.

So when I listen to some of the views that have come out since we did our last regular show in the last few weeks, Ray Dalio coming out, you know, one of the most famous investors of our time, really, the most successful hedge fund manager in the history of the world, saying that he thinks that we are headed into a new period of economic prosperity to be led by Donald Trump. You know, just super bullish message. Stan Druckenmiller turning very bullish. Carl Icahn, of course, being very outspoken, although he may have a little bit of conflict of interest in his relationship with Mr. Trump, but saying that he thinks that the Trump presidency is super bullish. So, I listened to all of these incredibly famous people with these very bullish views. And it's kind of awe-inspiring to me because I just can't believe it. You know, I think if you go back to Raoul Pal's argument that the business cycle is incredibly long in the tooth here, we're overdue for a recession.

If you look at the presidential election cycle, after a change of party, a new 8-year cycle, it's almost 100% within the first year you get a big A lot of people are saying that Trump is the new Ronald Reagan and that that's super bullish. Well, hey, wait a minute. The first 2 years of Ronald Reagan's presidency was defined by a massive recession. So, I don't see this really, really bullish view. I think, if anything, this Trump rally is probably overdone, and I'm not at all inclined to take a long view here. I'm on the sidelines still because I don't see this bull case, but at the same time, I don't really want to be short on the other side of the trade from guys like Ray Dalio and Stan Druckenmiller. Those are some pretty serious names.

So, I'm waiting to see what happens, but I'm still very skeptical about the stock market. Yes, Donald Trump, if he's able to do all of the things that he wants to do, that should be bullish for stocks, no doubt about it. But the things that he wants to do are going to require fighting an incredible headwind of political opposition. You know, half the country hates this guy and is trying to do everything they can possibly think of to prevent him from achieving the things that he wants to do. And it remains to be seen whether or not even the Republican Party is going to give him the support that he needs.

So, the big test, I think, is what's going to happen when the government needs to print money to deal with its debt problem. Because, you know, where's the real risk here? The risk is not in the stock market. The risk is in the bond market. We have so much debt that has accumulated. since 2009 that we can't go back to historically normal yields because if we did, the government would be unable to pay its bills, to service its debt. So they've got to keep interest rates low. Well, how do you keep interest rates low? Quantitative easing has been the technique for that. What happens when you try to use quantitative easing to hold interest rates artificially low when you have an inflationary backdrop rather than a deflationary backdrop?

My contention is that's when things really blow up. Now, we don't have right runaway inflation yet. We don't have anything close to it. But I think that may be what we're headed towards. The only way that my long-term view, though, will be proven right, if it's going to be proven right, is if we get to that situation where we just can't service the debt and you start to get a runaway inflation problem. And I think we could be headed for several years of massively high inflation, not hyperinflation, but very high inflation. There's a significant difference definitionally there.

Stop and think about this, Aaron Can you really just conjure money out of thin air and use it to prop up asset markets with no adverse consequences? Well, for crying out loud, if that's actually true, we should abolish taxes and print enough money for everybody in the country to get a new Mercedes. Well, nobody's proposing that. So, apparently, there are adverse consequences. Everybody agrees, but they think they can get away with the amount of debt that's already been created and the amount of money that's already been printed and not suffer any adverse consequences and not have to pay the piper. I I still don't see it, but it's not until we get to an inflation problem that we're going to find out.

So, as far as I'm concerned, I think we've seen this big reflation. I think that the Donald Trump is good for the market is probably already priced in, and I don't have a very bullish view, but I don't dare to be short because I don't want to, you know, be on the other side of the trade from Ray Dalio and Stan Druckenmiller.

Crude oil outlook and spread trade

Aaron Chan: Okay, let's cover crude oil next. What are your reflections on 2016, and what do you see coming in 2017?

Erik Townsend: Well, 2016 almost certainly marked the low, the bottom, after the great Saudi-induced sell-off that started Thanksgiving of 2014. If I look now at the supply and demand fundamentals, I think that this rally is overdone. OPEC is thought by many people to not even want prices to go higher than $60 because they're afraid that higher than $60 is where the Bakken shale boom, you know, takes off again. They don't want to enable the full resumption of the shale boom in the United States. So, we're already pretty close to what a lot of people think OPEC's real target number is.

And the shale revolution has really already started to resume, at least in the Permian Basin. It hasn't in the Bakken yet. But, you know, the shale drillers, the rig count's going through the roof. They are going to be making a lot more oil in the United States. The OPEC/non-OPEC deal, the compliance is already being questioned. I have predicted, as you know, they're probably not going to comply with this, that this was mostly hype. So I think that the big rally we've seen in oil prices has been driven by propaganda and sentiment. And I think if you look just at supply and demand factors as they exist now in the market, I think they all point to lower prices coming in the next several months. So does that mean I'm short? No, I'm not. And the reason is I do see a scenario that could cause prices to spike much higher in the next few months. And the scenario that I'm talking about is my prediction is that very shortly after taking office, Donald Trump is going to somehow get tough with ISIS.

I think it very much satisfies his political objectives to take a tough stance with ISIS. So, how does he do that? How does it play out? Well, of course, you can't read Donald Trump's mind. I don't think anybody can do that. So, who knows what form it will take, but I think it's quite possible that he could lay out some kind of ultimatum, basically saying, okay, ISIS, cut it out. No more terrorism, because if Any kind of aggression towards the United States continues, you know, it's, it's, you better cut it out or else. If he leaves some kind of open-ended ultimatum like that, I predict that the half of the country that's all freaked out and doesn't like Donald Trump is going to go into utter hysterics. They're going to start thinking, okay, Trump is about to launch nuclear weapons on Syria and the world's coming to an end and we're all about to, you know, die in World War III. I think that if that were to happen, it would be hysteria. And hype.

I don't think that Donald Trump is really going to do anything that starts World War III. I think he's smarter than that. But I do think that there's a lot of people who are very, very, very paranoid about Donald Trump and military action. So if there's any kind of threat about anything, which I think is very likely, I could easily see a geopolitical risk perception, not reality, but a perception that's just through the roof. And that could cause oil prices to spike markedly higher on fears that there's Yeah. What I'm worried about is that there's about to be some massive war in the Middle East started by Donald Trump. I don't think it'll really happen, but I do think that it could spike oil prices in the first or second quarter substantially higher. That would be the shorting opportunity if that happened. Right now, I'm not taking any directional trades. What I am looking at is the shape of the term structure.

We're seeing backwardation starting to develop as close as June, July, August of 2017. The storage tanks are all going to be emptying in the first half of the year. In the second half of the year, we won't have a storage problem, and there will be no premium for storage of oil. I don't think that's going to happen. So, I think the opportunity in the oil market right now is a spread trade on the term structure, basically expecting that backwardation to come back out of the market. And, you know, there's been some great opportunities. I already bought a bunch of spreads from shorting the June contract and long the December contract at minus $20. Minus 10 cents. So, you know, a backwardation of 10 cents across those months. I predict by the time June gets here, we'll be back to contango, at least in the front end of the curve. So I think that that's probably where I see the trading opportunity.

As far as a directional call, I don't dare make one at this point because of what could happen, as I said, with the geopolitical risk perception created if Trump threatens ISIS. Okay.

Aaron Chan: All right.

Bonds, global debt and inflation

Aaron Chan: And you said earlier that the big systemic risk is in the bond market and not the stock market. So, can you elaborate on that? And where are bond yields headed in 2017?

Erik Townsend: Well, global debt levels are utterly unprecedented now. I just saw a report from the Institute of International Finance that we're now at $217 trillion in total debt worldwide. That's 325% of global GDP. Of course, people familiar with Reinhart And if you've read Ken Rogoff's research, know that at least when you talk about sovereign debt, more than 100% of GDP is where you start getting into a really serious problem where it always ends badly. Now, we're talking about total debt, not just sovereign debt, but still, 325% is too much. And you've got a huge amount of negative yielding debt all around the world. And it creates a very, very serious trap because we're basically stuck with super low interest rates right now. If interest rates If interest rates were to go back to anything close to historical norms, it would bankrupt Western governments almost instantly because the average maturity of Treasury debt is much shorter than the good old days. It's only a few years and it has to be rolled over.

So, if you start seeing rates backing up, all of a sudden, the government cannot service its debt. Well, if they can't service its debt and they have to keep rates down, what do they do? Well, quantitative easing is the obvious answer. That's worked before. And I predict that because it's worked before, They've used it before. They'll use it again. The thing is, quantitative easing worked when we had a deflationary backdrop. I contend that it cannot work in an inflationary backdrop, which is what we appear to now be moving into. So, if there's no choice but to either tolerate very high inflation for many years, what are we gonna do? I don't think we're gonna have a choice. Now, I'm not talking about hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is a complete collapse of a currency system. It's not the same thing as high inflation, which is That's what I'm predicting. But I think we're gonna get to the point where there's no choice but to inflate away the real value of this debt.

And the way that that's going to happen is that we're not going to be able to raise interest rates as much as would be necessary to combat inflation. And we're gonna get a period of several years of very high inflation. That does not necessarily mean that we're going to have a stock market crash, because at least in the first several years of inflation, it's generally good for the stock market. The place The place where you're going to have trouble is in the bond market.

And the other thing to consider is that we are seeing more and more nations looking to diversify. They're not abandoning the US dollar, but they're starting to look at SDRs and other currencies. If we see more selling pressure, if China has to dump Treasuries in order to deal with its problems, and other countries start moving away from Treasuries, that means that there's even more pressure on rates and more— Risk. impetus for the US government to have to do something. And it might be forced to monetize deficit spending or monetize bond purchases or do something. If that starts to happen, precious metals will be the big benefactors. That's the reason that I have a very bullish long-term view on precious metals, although in the short term, I don't think that that's going to be the case.

Gold and Plaza Accord 2.0

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, all the way back in October, you predicted that the Fed would hike interest rates in December, which they did, and that the rate hike might mark a bottom for gold prices. So, so far, it looks like you were spot on with that prediction. Gold bottomed at $1,124 just a day or so after the rate hike announcement, and it's already back above $1,180 today as we're speaking. So congratulations on that call. Now, are you still of the opinion that was the bottom and it's all uphill from here for the yellow metal?

Erik Townsend: No, I'm not. It does appear that that call is working out. I think I got lucky as opposed to right on that one. And the reason I say that is with the expectation of more rate hikes coming in 2017 and so forth, I think that there's still a potential for more downside in gold. Now, yes, in the last couple of days particularly, gold's been very strong, but that's because the dollar rally is stumbling here in reaction to unprecedented action by China to intervene in its currency markets in the last couple of days. I think that's going to blow over. I think that the US dollar rally is going to resume in earnest, and when it does, that could result in further downside pressure for gold.

So, I'm not convinced that the bottom is in yet. So, where does the bottom come for gold? I think the bottom comes for gold when the market figures out that Plaza Accord version 2.0 is inevitable. In other words, at some point, central bankers are going to see that the dollar rally is causing too many problems around the world. Particularly, there's so much dollar-denominated debt that emerging markets owe that you're going to get to a lot of default risk growing and so forth, and central bankers will do something to To arrest— there's so many bullish factors for the dollar. At some point, they're going to have to cap it. When that starts to come into view, when the dollar rally is causing serious problems around the world, and the market starts to anticipate that there will be some policy action to prevent the dollar rally from continuing, that's where gold bottoms, I think. And that's where I would get very bullish from there.

Because once the dollar rally is arrested, which I think it will have to be at some point, you know, again, I think we're headed someday for massive inflation.

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And that will be very, very bullish for precious metals. I just don't know how far off that is, and it could still be years away.

Dollar index and China intervention

Aaron Chan: Well, since we're on the topic, the US Dollar Index broke out to a new cycle high earlier this week, trading intraday as high as 103.81. But today, we're back to a 101 handle. So, what happened there, and what's next for the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, what happened there is China, and it was a result— basically, I think China is trying to squeeze the shorts out of the short short yuan trade, and they have intervened in the last couple of days. And of course, if they're doing that, it has an effect on the dollar index. So the reason that the dollar has stumbled here, 101.46 as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon, is because of this China intervention. I think that's probably a one-time thing, and I don't know exactly what's going to happen, but I think this is a buying opportunity. I'm probably going to look at buying, adding to my long position on the dollar index, and I wouldn't be surprised if In the next couple of weeks, we've moved considerably higher.

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for the market update, Erik. David Hay is Chief Investment Officer for Evergreen Gavekal. Erik's interview with Mr. Hay is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Interview: Trumponomics and the Reagan analogy (David Hay)

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Evergreen Gavekal's David Hay. David is, of course, the Chief Investment Officer for Evergreen. And also writes Evergreen's newsletter called the Evergreen Virtual Advisor, which, by the way, is probably one of the best free newsletters out there on the internet. Thanks so much for joining me, David.

David Hay: Privilege.

Erik Townsend: It's great to have you here. You're the first guest of the new year.

David Hay: Oh, a double privilege.

Erik Townsend: I want to start with something that's just blown my mind. The number of people over the holidays, just before Christmas, I think Ray Dalio came out saying we're headed for a new era of economic prosperity under President Trump, and Trump is going to lead everything. Stan Druckenmiller turning super bullish.

David Hay: Druckenmiller. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And, you know, I love the message, but I just don't see it. Trump has a few good ideas, but he's got like half the country that hates his guts and wants to get rid of him. And there's all kinds of Democrats that are pledging to do everything possible to block anything that he tries to do. And even before you consider his ability to be successful, I mean, we're way overdue. Raoul Pal has made some excellent arguments about the business cycle being very long in the tooth. The presidential election cycle If you just look historically, you know, it seems like we're way overdue for a recession. And I'm hearing a lot of people invoking analogies to Ronald Reagan, saying Trump is the next Reagan. I'm thinking, okay, well, you're entitled to that opinion, but, but hang on, the first 2 years of Reagan's presidency were a massive recession.

So if that's the analogy, you know, why are you bullish right now? So what do you think about all of this bullishness?

David Hay: You did anticipate one of the things I was going to say, which is if you really did kind of a best-case analysis of Trumponomics, it's Reaganomics 2.0. I mean, I really think that's the best case. And I don't think it is, but let's just assume that. And as you already pointed out, you beat me to the punch on this, this one, which people forget, is that in the first 2 years of Reagan's term, he had a very severe recession, a deep bear market, And he got shot, and you know that's that's a pretty rough first couple of years in office.

And I actually think that you could see a similar scenario with Mr. Trump, hopefully not getting shot. Though, as you point out, there's an awful lot of people that dislike him intensely. So I am hoping he's got great security.

And I also want to point out that there's a number of his policies that we agree with that we've been actually writing about for years in our newsletter. You know, particularly the tax reform. And then the regulatory rollback, those have been 2 of the things that we have been screaming about for a long time, and even infrastructure, which back in 2010, 2011, we thought a domestic Marshall Plan type of thing was really appropriate. You know, you had a legion of unemployed construction workers. Very different story today, and that's a whole other topic as far as perhaps the overhyped infrastructure, you know, because it just takes forever to get these deals done, and, you know, they really happen at the local level.

Erik Townsend: Right.

David Hay: And there's only so much Trump can do. And I do think there was a pretty good little story about Truman, when Harry Truman was passing the baton to Ike, Dwight Eisenhower, who of course had been, you know, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in World War II. And there were high hopes that Eisenhower was going to be able to work miracles. And as Truman pointed out, you know, I feel sorry for Ike because he's going to get in the office in the White House, the Oval Office, and say, do this, do that, and nothing's going to happen. Right. And I think that, you know, certainly happened to Eisenhower, though he did do a pretty good job with the interstate freeway system. So that was one of the best infrastructure programs of all time. But, of course, the era today, you know, the NIMBY thing is so much different, not in my backyard.

I think that there's going to be disappointment there. I think your key point that you were making, that expectations have raced way ahead of reality, are very true. And you hate to argue with people like Ray Dalio, or Stan Druckenmiller, as you point out. You know, Icahn maybe is a little conflicted given the way he's in the administration, sort of. But I just think in general, you know, part of what— you got to give them credit. They said this stuff early on and they were right. I mean, they called it pretty, pretty well for the last couple of months. The question is going forward. And when we look at the way investors are positioned right now, particularly speculative investors, those that tend to have the worst track record, record. They are very bullish the US dollar. They're very bullish small-cap stocks, for example.

They're very bearish bonds. They're very bearish gold. So, at this point, we're more intrigued looking the other way, so looking at those asset classes that are extremely out of favor.

Contrarian trades: long Treasuries and solar yieldcos

Erik Townsend: Well, let's talk about who wins and who loses under the Trump presidency and then put that in perspective of, you know, how far has the market gone, maybe too far, and, you know, is there a contrarian trade there?

David Hay: What actually looks appealing to you as a result Well, I think as a trade, and I'm not sure it's the, you know, something you're gonna fall in love with long-term, it may be more of one to rent rather than own, but let's talk about bonds, and particularly long Treasuries, which have been nuked since the election. And we're seeing almost record-breaking negative sentiment on those in the various measures that we look at, including from our friends at Ned Davis. Right. And I think that's a trade that's worth taking.

So I do think there is a trade there. Now, you could be right that we— or I think you were quoting Ray Dalio saying that the— no, it was Jeff Gundlach that you were mentioning saying that the long-term bull market is over. And he could be right, but he's also kind of hedging himself a bit, and he's actually made some semi-bullish noises lately.

So even, you know, whenever you have a major turn in a trend, you still have countertrend moves, and I wouldn't be surprised to see this to be a fairly significant countertrend move. Perhaps a move from 2.60 on the 10-year back closer to 2, which would be a pretty nice total return.

We did just see in Ned Davis that whenever bond sentiment is as negative as it is right now on the long-term Treasury, you get a 19% annualized return. So it is possible to generate double-digit returns even with a 3% long Treasury. So that would be one area. But also, of course, when Treasuries catch a cold, a lot of the rest of the income market gets pneumonia. Right. So we have been buying some of the equity income names that were really hit hard after the election, and particularly in the solar yieldco area, which are like solar MLPs.

They're bouncing a bit now right after the first of the year, but they're still down pretty substantially with yields in the 5.5 to 8% range and very stable cash flows from long-term contracts. That's one of— it's really the only way we've been able to figure out how to play the solar theme, because frankly, almost everything else in that area area has been an unmitigated disaster.

Repatriation, interest deductibility and buybacks

Erik Townsend: One of the things that seems very clear is that Donald Trump is serious about this business of pressuring companies to bring their business back to the United States. And I think that is both bringing jobs back to the United States, but also maybe reversing some of these inversions that relocated companies' headquarters offshore.

There's been a lot of speculation about the repatriation trade. You know, it could be strong for the US dollar. What are the other effects of this? And particularly, I I think corporate buybacks probably also get affected by some of the tax implications. So give us the picture on what this aspect of Trump policy is going to mean in terms of markets.

David Hay: Well, certainly the interpretation at this point, it's very bullish for equities. And where that could be misplaced has to do with kind of the granularity of the proposal. The market tends to look at things pretty simplistically at times. So it sees repatriation coming. And we do think it will. It looks like there's bipartisan support for repatriation.

But part of what I think the market is missing is that it's also part of this overall solution, or tax reform would be a better way to say it, just a sweeping tax reform that would potentially, and it looks likely to, disallow the interest deduction on corporate debt. Now, there is— it's unclear whether it would be for both existing or just new debt, but either way, I think the implications are significant, and particularly for buybacks. So let's assume repatriation happens, so this money starts to come back to the United States.

I think you're right; it probably pushes the dollar up even further. But then what do they do with that money? And particularly if that money, if they're looking at a situation where debt is no longer tax deductible, I think at that point, and especially if you look at corporate leverage, which as you're probably aware was in pretty good shape back four or five years ago, but these companies have leveraged up grotesquely, frankly. I mean, we are basically back to where we were pre-crisis in terms of debt. Levels. The debt service is fine because interest rates are so low, although rising as we've talked about.

So we think that given— in fact, even rating company pressure now starting to build on some of these as they get close to their, you know, their debt covenant limits in terms of cash flow relative to debt service.

So what you could see is a debt paydown with, you know, maybe a nominal amount of share buybacks. But share buybacks have been running at $500 to $600 billion a year for years. Years, really a fever pitch. And, you know, the trouble is these guys are buying their own shares back at, you know, higher and higher prices, which is more, ever more dilutive to core earnings. You know, people say, well, it's good for earnings per share, but realistically what it does is it actually lowers earnings, especially if you're borrowing money to buy back your own debt, which they clearly have been doing.

So I think it's more of a mixed bag as far as this, you know, repatriation theme? It's getting probably like so many things overplayed.

Erik Townsend: Well, I've seen a lot of analysis by some very, very smart people saying that really the equity rally of the last few years, corporate buybacks has been at the core of it. And it's all about super low interest rates and, you know, the ability to borrow a lot of cheap money and use it to buy your shares back. If what you're saying is right, I mean, it sounds like the market's got the direction wrong on this. Because if they lose that deductibility of interest, and suddenly these buybacks are not attractive anymore, that could be a major secular shift in direction for equity markets to the downside.

Am I overstating that? Am I misunderstanding this? Because it sounds like from what you're saying, this could be pretty big.

David Hay: It could be pretty big. We just don't know, of course, what the actual tax code is going to look like. It's just that right now, I think the market's looking at it as only the positives. They're only looking at lower tax rates. They're not looking at the potential lack of or loss of interest deductibility.

So I think it's a little bit of, you know, looking at the glass as only half And so, yes, I think that that's where—

Valuations, the Fed and Plaza Accord 2.0

David Hay: I just think in many ways, as you've already alluded to, there's just been an overextrapolation of the benefits of Trumponomics. And, you know, again, if you go back to the Reagan era— and I think a key point to make about Reagan is when he came in there, first of all, he came in, you know, after a very rough economic period under Jimmy Carter. And it got rougher, as you pointed out, because Volcker was given the green light to raise interest rates dramatically.

And then at that point, you had a very nice economic recovery that started fairly early in Reagan's term. Well, Trump is coming in at a very late stage of the economic cycle, and he's also got a market that instead of trading at a single-digit PE, it's trading at one of its most expensive valuations ever.

In fact, one thing that, you know, you get into the— I'm sure you've had the debate with various people about what is really the PE of the market, and it tends to be a debate of almost religious intensity. You know, whether you use the trailing PE, the current PE, the forward PE, the Shiller PE, it's, you know, it gets pretty confusing when you start to go through those different scenarios. We like to keep it simple and look at price-to-sales, and because sales, as you know, are much harder to manipulate, they're not as distorted by just the economic cycle.

But right now, particularly the median price-to-sales is outrageously high. In fact, it's higher, substantially higher than it was in 1990. Which really speaks to how overvalued mid and small-cap companies are versus back in the late '90s during the tech bubble when they were actually very inexpensive. So you have unquestionably in our minds, and I think anybody that looks at the, the various metrics that have worked over time, you can also look at market cap to GDP, which has been Warren Buffett's favorite. You can look at total household exposure to equities right now, which is also very high, not quite as high as it was in And there's a very tight correlation between when households are heavily exposed to equities and future returns. And as you would imagine, when that's the case, future returns tend to be very low.

So all these things say the same thing. It's just that I think the most— the cleanest is looking at it on a price-to-sales basis.

So hugely different part of consideration when you look at the market that Trump is inheriting versus what Ronald Reagan Reagan got. So it's not just the economy. And as you pointed out earlier, and Raoul has eloquently expressed in the past, this is a very, very mature economy. So we are due for a recession. And I think one of the things that could be a trigger is the Fed.

You know, this has been a very timid Fed. But now they've got kind of a green light to raise rates. And I think the market is saying there's no way they're going to raise rates 3 times this year, which is really what the dot plot is saying. But I think they could. I think they could even raise more More than that.

Because Janet Yellen views it, you know, she's now a lame duck Fed chairman. And she, you know, I think she could basically point the finger at Trump and say, hey, this is your deal. And you wanted interest rates to be higher. You've said all along they're too low. We're gonna, we're gonna give you exactly what you want.

And I do think that if that's the case, you are going to get some kind of a Plaza Accord 2.0, because as those rates go up, it's just going to push the dollar through the roof. So you could be right in being that it's perhaps a little premature to be too bullish on gold, because if the dollar does go further until that Plaza Accord 2.0 happens, then it's probable that gold will go even somewhat lower.

But I don't think you get a lot of downside. Just the sentiment is so negative right now, you probably don't have a lot of exposure downward.

Erik Townsend: Well, and that was actually going to be my next question, so you're reading my mind, is this US dollar rally. You know, there are just so many bullish factors, and I agree with all those bullish arguments, but how much farther do you think that this dollar rally can go? How high can the dollar index get before the damage it causes in emerging markets causes central bankers to take action? And, you know, as you said, Plaza Accord 2.0, some kind of coordinated action to arrest the dollar rally. It seems to me that that's inevitable. I just can't decide when that would occur or what the threshold would be. Any thoughts?

David Hay: Well, I agree with you, it's inevitable, but I also agree with you, it's almost unknowable. I'd say you probably have to see a lot more market stress than you're seeing right Right now, I mean, it's— yeah, there's been a bit of a sell-off in emerging markets in both equity and debt, but it's been pretty orderly so far. So far, you're definitely not seeing the kind of extreme angst that was happening a year ago and into mid-February of last year, when you supposedly did have kind of an unofficial Plaza Accord, the so-called Shanghai deal, which is still not really known whether that happened or not.

But, of course, that did coincide with the market bottoming and credit spreads starting to come down dramatically. And, by the way, credit spreads, which are a huge influence on financial markets. They're very calm right now. If anything, they continue to ease. So there just isn't— I don't think there's the pieces in place yet to create that kind of an agreement. I think it's going to have to take a higher dollar and probably more Fed increases and more market turmoil.

But at some point this year, I think those things will all happen.

Bond yields, late-cycle signs and the global debt trap

Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and move on to bond yields. You know, Jeff Gundlach has suggested that the 35-year bull market in bonds is over. And, you know, potentially it's time to be strategically It sounds like you described a tactical view earlier, which is that you see a long trade, at least for now, because it's overplayed. And I think, as you say, even Jeff Gundlach himself has said that. Do you think he's got the call right, though, that in general, the big picture, once a correction happens, is that, you know, this has played out? Or do you think that maybe the Raoul Pal view, which is we could still be headed, if we get that recession, recession towards sub-1% yields is still on the table. I've been having a hard time deciding this one myself.

David Hay: Well, I think you hit the nail on the head. If we have a recession, rates are going lower, particularly in the United States. The ability for them to go a lot lower overseas is fairly limited. But certainly, in the United States, this huge yield gap, which is another supporting factor for the U.S. bond market— I mean, money is fungible across borders. And if you're a European investor and you're looking at where Treasury yields are and you're thinking, geez, and they've got a strengthening currency, and why not move money over to the US?

So I do think that puts a bit of a lid on where our rates are. But if we, you know, recession is, as we've already mentioned, extremely overdue. You're seeing a number of late-cycle indicators. And one of those I would actually point out is one that most I hear brought out kind of bullishly lately, which is how optimistic consumers are in the wake of the election. So consumer confidence has done kind of a moonshot. Shot. But if you look historically, that also is a late-cycle indicator, and it also tends to coincide with tops in the stock market.

But beyond that, if you look at auto sales, auto sales are strong, but they're strong with almost unprecedented incentives being given to move the metal. You're seeing dramatic rises in subprime auto loans and subprime auto loan defaults. defaults. And you probably have seen how these guys have stretched out to 84 months or whatever on the auto loans.

And they're doing rollovers into new vehicles with negative equity. So there's— it's almost kind of like shades of what happened with housing back 10 years ago, now playing out in the auto area. And of course, autos are interest rate sensitive. Interest rates are moving up. The housing market's interest rate sensitive. Mortgage rates are up substantially. Mortgage affordability wasn't that great before the big up move.

You're starting to see rents fall in a number of cities, including amazingly even Seattle, with this tremendously strong economy we have here.

So again, you look at it, the art bubble, for example, has already popped. The collector car bubble, that's popped. Penny stock bubble popped a while ago, biotech bubble. So we've had— it is interesting that we've had a number of kind of these serial bubbles, and then— or mini bubbles, and then they burst. And maybe that's what's allowed this thing to keep going longer, because that's kind of created this cleansing process on a sector-by-sector, asset class-by-asset class basis, and you haven't had everything going down at once like we did back in '08.

But still, that doesn't change the fact that, you know, we're how many years now, 8 years roughly into a recovery expansion, and that's a very, very long expansion. And so, as I say, you don't have to look very far to see evidence that this Yeah. And that one is getting a lot of gray hairs on it. But that is the key. I think you're right. If the next recession, rates are going to go lower, and I wouldn't be surprised to see us take out the low of around 1.3, 1.35 on the 10-year Treasury in that kind of an event.

But could they go higher in the meantime? Sure. I do think what you're going to see is— because some folks have said, well, if you believe the Fed's going to be raising rates, you know, at least 3 times this year, won't that mean that Treasury yields go up? And not necessarily, because what you're likely to have happen, particularly as they raise more frequently and get deeper into that cycle, is more of a yield curve flattening and eventually an inversion.

And of course, that will be the classic ringing the bell of a recession impending.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I think we're very much in agreement on that. But let's move out to the longer term, because clearly at some point someday, we've got to get, you know, through this bond market bubble, if you want to call it that. And someday we're going to get higher yields. And what I just can't figure What we have to figure out is how do we ever get out of the debt trap that has been created by all of the credit expansion that's occurred since 2009? Because we can't go back to historically normal interest rates without bankrupting governments around the world, because they can't afford to service their debt. So, if the government has to keep interest rates low in order to be able to service their debt, but they also need to be able to raise rates to combat inflation someday, but they can't, you know, what does that lead us to? Do we eventually get to inflating away all of the success Massive debt.

How do you see this thing playing out in terms of all the debt that's been created? I just read a report, and now we're at 325% of global GDP in, uh, in total debt around the world. Holy cow, how do we get out of this?

David Hay: Well, you're right, and I think that's an update of the McKinsey report, which had previously said there had been a $57 trillion increase in global debt since the financial crisis. And I think this latest one you're referring to, they said it's up another $11 trillion. So, it's just, it's a staggering amount of global debt that we have got out there, and that is one of the reasons we believe that interest rates are not going to go up as much as a lot of the bears are postulating right now.

So, we totally agree with that. We're more in the Lacy Hunt camp, and I don't know how much you know about Lacy, but he's had a tremendous track record both in terms of economic forecasting and actually running bond portfolios with Van Hoisington. Yeah. And their view is that you're precisely right, that if you look historically, when debt levels get as high as they are right now, you tend to be in a chronically slow growth period of very low inflation, even at times deflation.

And I still think that paradigm is probably dominant despite the Trumponomics aspect. So that's really, I think, going to be the multi-trillion-dollar question as this year unfolds, is the battle between kind of the renewed animal spirits of Trumponomics versus the hard, cold reality of this massive debt load.

And I would also throw in, you've also got demographics. I mean, Donald Trump is not going to be able to create a population boom. In fact, if anything, he's kind of working against that with anti-immigration, because that really has been the saving grace for the US relative to the rest of the world for as far as— because, as you know, GDP is a function of labor force growth and productivity.

So if your labor force growth is very low because of aging demographics, which it is, then you limit immigration, that makes it even worse. So the hope has to be productivity. And productivity, as I'm sure you're also aware, has been in a long bear market. Now, maybe that's going to change. I mean, I think that's where you hope that Trumponomics is, and things like the regulatory rollback start to help productivity. And I think that's in the best interest of all of us. But I think we've got to be realistic that it's not likely to go up dramatically.

Hopefully, we can stop the downtrend and increase it a bit, but you've got you know some real factors weighing on that, including the fact that there's about 95 million adult Americans who are now out of the labor force and probably not likely to come back in anytime soon. So that's a major drag on productivity.

So, but I think beyond that, the just really the number one reality is this massive debt load, and I think you're correct that it puts the governments in kind of an odd position. They really don't want to see fast growth that would lead to higher interest rates because that would be devastating to their budgets.

So then you get into the situation where it's kind of the Japanization, if you will, of the developed world, where we kind of follow the Japanese toward lower and lower interest rates on these higher and higher debt levels, and it almost creates a situation where stagnation is almost what the governments are after. They might not admit it. Admit that. But you're right, it's just if you were to normalize rates, that's why we think in this Fed tightening cycle, yeah, they're going to try to push them up as much as they can until something breaks, because then that's going to give them the ability to cut during the next crisis.

But we think that, you know, if you got to 2% on the Fed funds rate, that's probably going to create some serious pain. So it's— we're just not going to see— we don't see any time in the near future a return to what we would consider to be quote-unquote normal interest rates, kind of in the 4% to 5% range on the Fed funds and the Treasury.

Precious metals outlook

Erik Townsend: Let's touch on precious metals next. Obviously, we've seen some weakness since the election. You know, at one point I was thinking that maybe the hike in December would mark a low point, and so far that's playing out. But I'm starting to think, with all these bullish factors for the dollar, maybe gold has lower to go, and it's maybe not until we get that Plaza Accord 2.0 on the horizon that gold bottoms. What do you think? Is the bottom in yet? Do we have lower to go? What's your view on precious metals?

David Hay: Well, it's bullish long-term, but I would agree with you. I don't know if we've hit the bottom. I think there is a tradable rally there right now because of the extreme negative sentiment. To the extent that that works off and gold rallies a bit, then, you know, we'd probably take a more guarded view.

So I'd say, you know, to give you our best guess right now, that we'd be short-term bullish, maybe medium-term cautious, long-term bullish.

China: currency, debt and Treasury selling

Erik Townsend: Okay. And let's move on to China. Obviously, we just had a major intervention in the last 24 We saw that in the last 24 hours where there looks like they're trying to squeeze the yuan shorts out of the market. Where do you see the China situation going? And how big of a risk do you think it is in terms of contagion to other global markets?

David Hay: Great question. You know, it's funny that back in 2015, whenever the renminbi was weak, the markets were, you know, they were terrified. And the renminbi has actually gone down a lot versus the dollar over the last several months, but there's been very little spillover to the financial markets. And it's probably because it's everything going down versus the dollar. So if you look at the renminbi versus the basket of other currencies, it's been, you know, quite stable. So that's probably why we're seeing less anxiety.

I just think the problems in China are more than the currency. I think that it's like we're discussing for the planet overall. They have a ton They have a ton of debt, and the debt increase has been just— it's unprecedented for any country in such a short period of time. And to also give another factoid that might surprise people that think that infrastructure is going to be the panacea for the U.S., in the last year, China spent $500 billion on new infrastructure, and yet their growth rate has continued to decelerate.

So, it's— I mean, what they've tried to do, you know, they've tried to wean their economy from one that's heavily driven by borrowing money for big capital projects, building steel plants or building new airports, and get to more of a service-based economy. And I think they're making progress there, and I think over time they'll be able to do it. But it's been a pretty rocky road. I mean, they have used things like an equity market bubble to try to keep the economy going. They've used another housing bubble here recently to try to keep the economy going. And I don't think it's healthy. I don't care who you are, what country You are.

And China's obviously got enormous currency reserves, which are dwindling a bit, and huge savings. And that's probably the number one advantage they have is their tremendous domestic savings. So they don't owe any debt really outside the country of any consequence. I'm sure their, you know, their assets are far, far above their liabilities, though I can't quote you that number off the top of my head.

So they do have a better ability than a lot of countries to delay the pain. But there's already, you know, we've seen some pretty disastrous stuff happen out of China in the last couple of years. And I wouldn't be surprised to see another major shakeout, shakeout, probably more in the real estate market there.

And with some of these sovereign wealth— excuse me, not sovereign wealth products, but these wealth management trusts that they use, that the banks issue that are, you know, they're like subordinated bank debt that pay higher rates. And those look to be quite Risky. So I think that is certainly, if you were to identify one of the big macro risks out there, would be some kind of a blowup in China. Our partners at Gavekal know much more about China than we do, and I'd say they have a fairly neutral view. They're not worried about an Armageddon kind of situation, but they do acknowledge that there are some pretty extreme excesses going on in the real estate market right now.

Erik Townsend: I doubt China is going to be the thing that blows this bull market out of the water, but it's I know one of the things that people have started to speculate on is that China may be forced to dump a lot of its US Treasury holdings in order to deal with their own situation, in order to deal with the yuan devaluation.

Do you agree with that view, and do you think it's big enough to pose a serious threat to the US Treasury market, or do you think we can absorb potentially China having to dump a lot of its holdings?

David Hay: I think so. I mean, they've been in kind of a gradual liquidation mode for a while, and without any real— I don't think that's been the driver of the Treasury market sell-off. I think it was much more a function of the election. And as I said, you've got, you know, that's not just European investors, but also Japanese investors that look at this tremendous yield spread that Treasuries offer over their own domestic securities. So I think that provides a counterbalance for Chinese selling. So I suspect that they will continue to sell, but I don't think they're going to do I don't think they're going to do anything really drastic unless Trump decides he's going to slap a bunch of tariffs on it and really trigger a trade war with China. Then they may retaliate by dumping their Treasury portfolio at a much faster rate.

Europe: euro, Italy, Le Pen and Fillon

Erik Townsend: Speaking of European investors, let's talk about the Europe situation. We've heard a lot of different views on this program from different guests, some saying, you know, Brexit marked the beginning of the end. It's all over for the European Union. That's it. To others just saying Brexit was a flash in the pan. Don't worry about it. It's going to be fine.

What's your view on the evolving situation in Europe? I know, I think Marine Le Pen just made some comments in the last couple days about maybe taking France off of the euro. Where do you see all of this playing out?

David Hay: Well, our view on Europe for years has been that the euro was going to fall to around parity. And this is when it was 1.40, 1.50, 1.60, when Tom Brady's wife wanted to only be paid in euros, and I forget which rapper it was wanted to only be paid in euros. And, you know, we thought that was kind of classic top of the cycle for the euro.

But now we're getting close to parity. And so the euro is pretty undervalued, incredibly undervalued for Germany, you know, much less so for Italy. So it's actually helping the European economy right now. The European economy is definitely perking up. And I think people tend to vote their pocketbooks. So that's probably taking a little bit— And it's actually similar. Marine Le Pen's comments lately have been not as anti-euro as I thought they would be.

And it is interesting, if you look, as you probably have, at some of these country surveys, most of these countries, actually, they don't like a lot of things, you know, Brussels and the, you know, kind of the micromanaging that comes from all the bureaucrats there, but they like the euro. It's just always amazing to me that even in Greece, during the worst of that crisis, they did polls of the Greek citizens, do you want to stay on the euro? And they were overwhelmingly in favor of staying with the euro.

So, it may be a little tougher to break up than I thought at one time, but I do think it's still a pretty unsustainable situation. For example, you look at Italy and the debt level, they have 130% government debt to GDP, which makes us look good, not easy to do, and an economy that's been in and out of recession multiple times over the last 15 years or so since the introduction of the euro, and I don't see that changing. I think Italy is just headed on a downward spiral, and that's such an important country. And then you've got France, which seems to be doing a little better, and I think that is one of the positives, is that it looks like probably Fillon is going to be the next president of France, unlikely to be Marine Le Pen. And I think he's got— he could revive confidence in France in a similar way to what's happened with Trump here, maybe with the even more sustainability.

So, I don't think this is going to be the year of a European meltdown.

Master limited partnerships recovery

Erik Townsend: Dave, I know that you guys are very involved at Evergreen in a different side of the oil market than I focus on. I trade oil futures, but you guys, I know, are very expert at MLPs, which, of course, are the master limited partnerships that own a lot of oil infrastructure. Can you tell us a bit more about that market? And particularly, you know, is the bottom in? Is it time to be buying MLPs? Obviously, We saw a big sell-off in energy. How do you see this situation moving forward?

David Hay: Well, we still like it, but we've got to be realistic. It is an area that has had a monster move, and kind of against all odds. So, if we were to roll back the clock to about a year ago, the negative sentiment towards MLPs was just staggering. In fact, it was worse than negative sentiment. It was actually forced liquidation along the lines of 2008. So really what you had is that during the boom period from kind of 2011 to 2014, mid-2014, you had a number of new funds that were set up, closed-end funds that owned MLPs on leverage. And even in Japan, supposedly Japan had over $50 billion of MLP funds set up. And when they started falling out of bed in late 2014, and that accelerated into 2015, a number of these leveraged investors like the closed-end funds funds that were 30% roughly leveraged started getting margin calls.

So you literally had 3 different episodes of forced liquidation, margin-driven selling in MLPs during especially the summer of 2015, and then it kind of hit the crescendo early in 2016. And those forced liquidation periods always create enormous opportunities if you're not leveraged and you have cash, which we did.

And I wish we— I said we waited until the very final flushout before we started buying, but you never know that. You never know if there's only going to be one round or 2 rounds, but you just got to go in and buy systematically, which is what we did. So when it seemed like everybody in the world was selling MLPs in January, February of last year, we were on the buy side. And since then, there has been an enormous rally, particularly some of the ones that were most beaten down, where in many cases they've had a Triple off the bottom, and even the more stable names are up 40-50% or more.

So it's you were not at the bottom by any means, but it's kind of like if you'd bought financial stocks in 2008 after they had been annihilated. Once they had their initial move, they kind of consolidated. We saw that with MLPs in the last few months of last year where they backed off and kind of went sideways a bit, and then another upleg. So we think there's another upleg coming. It's actually been kind of playing out here over the last few. So, I think you have to be realistic about how much they can go, but you're still able to get— I mean, for example, the premier MLP out there right now has still got a yield of about 5.5%, and it grew its distribution at a 5% rate through the worst of the energy meltdown. And as you pointed out, these guys own the energy infrastructure assets.

So, they're really— I mean, to use a simplistic term, the toll collectors in the energy world.

Erik Townsend: Right.

David Hay: And if you look at MLPs in aggregate during that horrible, horrible year of 2015, a true industry depression in energy, they actually on aggregate raised their distributions through that. So we think that they do have further upside, but it's just going to be a lot more modest than what we've seen over the last year.

Evergreen Virtual Advisor and the Gavekal relationship

Erik Townsend: Now, Dave, I really enjoy reading your Evergreen Virtual Advisor, which, by the way, for our listeners, it's one of It's one of the very few free newsletters that actually has substantive content on it. It's not just advertising. It's good stuff in there. We're going to have a couple of sample issues of EVA in the Research Roundup newsletter that we send to all of our registered users at MacroVoices.com. So, for registered users, you can find a copy of it. I definitely recommend it. It's a free subscription, and it's good stuff there. So, you know, don't miss out on that.

David Hay: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: Good stuff when it's free. But I'm curious about your relationship with Gavekal, because of course Gavekal is an institutional advisor. What's the connection? What does Evergreen do with Gavekal?

David Hay: So we are partially owned by the Gave family. So that's really our number one connection. But also, Louis Gave is one of my very closest friends. So that's— those are two of the reasons why. And I think it's— there's a bit of a symbiotic relationship in the fact that We are their main foothold in the North American market for private wealth management. They also have a money management firm based in Denver, but that's more institutional and not really a retail-facing type of operation.

So I think we fit a niche for them, and the benefit for our clients and for the EVA readers is that, in fact, once a month, we actually run a handpicked, what we think is one of the most interesting of the Gavekal pieces. That's actually what we're running tomorrow.

So it's, you know, I think definitely benefits our readers. It certainly helps us in terms of having access to their very bright minds, not only Louis, but his father Charles, who's pretty legendary in our business, and Anatole Kaletsky, who's one of the more influential financial strategist commentators in Europe, and a number of other very bright analysts that they have on their team.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

David Hay: So you're right, you know, institutionally they have a great reputation. They're not as well known retail, but we're trying to change that.

Erik Townsend: Well, fantastic. I definitely recommend that our readers check out the newsletter that we— again, we sent you a link to that. And I really want to thank you for an excellent interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: financial deregulation

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that was a great interview, and I really enjoyed the early discussion about Trumponomics and repatriation. Another potential policy avenue is financial deregulation. And I guess if you don't think that can happen, just take a look at Trump's administration picks. I mean, a lot of Wall Street connections there. So if you just look at the bank stocks so far, you could say that a good chunk of the rally probably centers on steepening of the yield curve. But Erik, do you think the market is pricing in deregulation? And if so, what might that look like and what would the effects be?

Erik Townsend: It's going to be very interesting. You know, Trump's rhetoric about draining the swamp and getting the corruption out and so forth, it's going to be very difficult for him to let all of his Wall Street boys just take care of their own, so to speak, in his administration. But then again, they are all his Wall Street boys.

As you say, look at the picks that he's got. So, I don't know how this is going to work out. I think you're right that the market is definitely already discounted that That there's likely to be a lot of accommodation and deregulation and friendly-to-Wall-Street kind of regulatory policymaking. But boy, how hard is that going to be opposed by the Democrats? And how much say do the Democrats really have? You know, both houses of Congress are going to be Republican-controlled, but how, you know, how in sync with the Trump administration are even the moderate Republicans? So, So, I don't think that anybody knows yet, and I think it really remains to be seen, but I think that you're definitely on the right track that the people that he's chosen are going to likely have a very accommodative attitude towards Wall Street.

Postgame: high inflation versus hyperinflation

Aaron Chan: Right. And before we move on to the next question I had, I actually want to move back and get you to clarify something. Erik, can you explain the difference for our listeners who just joined us? I know you've explained this maybe a couple months back, but can you explain for our listeners, what is the difference between high inflation and hyperinflation? Where is that line?

Erik Townsend: Well, hyperinflation, using the term correctly, some people use them interchangeably. You know, you'll hear people talk about, oh, we're gonna have hyperinflation like we had in the 1970s. We didn't have anything remotely close to hyperinflation in the 1970s. It was feared that we could get there, but we never got anywhere close to it. Hyperinflation is not a matter of prices going up because there's more money competing for goods and services. It's about prices going astronomically through the roof because the value of the currency is collapsing. And this is what's happened in places like Zimbabwe when they've printed too much money, is essentially the currency becomes practically worthless and there's a perception of prices going up. In reality, the price is not going up. The value of the currency is going down. It's falling apart.

High inflation, as I described earlier in the program before the interview with David Hay, has to do with too much money chasing goods and services and pushing prices up. And that too much money comes from if you're printing money, conjuring it out of thin air in order to buy bonds, in order to support the asset market or keep interest rates low or whatever you're doing, that money has to go somewhere and it ends up being inflationary. That kind of inflation could easily produce, I think, certainly double-digit, maybe as high as 20% annualized rates of inflation for several years. That's the That's the only way I could see an eventual resolution to this massive debt bubble that we're in. Will that actually happen? I don't know, but that's kind of where I think the future lies potentially. That's not hyperinflation though. Hyperinflation, one textbook definition— there are several different definitions, but one of the most popular ones is hyperinflation is when there is more than a 50, 5-0, percent rate of inflation.

Aaron Chan: Wow.

Erik Townsend: rate of inflation per month. Prices are going up 50% per month. That annualizes to something north of 1,000% per year. So, by that definition, even the Argentine inflation of the early 2000s didn't technically qualify as a hyperinflation. It was just extremely high inflation. So, you know, we're, we're really talking about 2 different animals here. The scenario that I do predict for the United States is eventually There's got to be several years of very high sustained inflation. Let's say between 10% and 20% per year of price inflation. That's not the same thing as hyperinflation, which would be a collapse of the currency. And I don't really think that that's possible for the US dollar unless there was a radical, radical change of power and somehow the United States was no longer the, you know, the military superpower that it is today.

Postgame: euro parity and trading the euro

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for clarifying that. Thank you for clarifying that, Erik. And the last topic that I want to touch on, I actually want to revisit what you said about Marine Le Pen, one of the candidates in France, about taking France out of the European Currency Union. Well, from my own reading and research, there are commentators and analysts predicting euro-dollar parity in 2017. So, Erik, I want to ask you, how would you trade this in 2017? What's your view on this? And what is your view past 2017? Yeah.

Erik Townsend: You know, I am generally of the view that the European Union has always been doomed. The euro currency, you know, it's the argument that was made before it was introduced, which is you're trying to introduce a monetary union without a fiscal union, and that's just a bad way to design things. So, and I think the Eurocrats were hoping that they would eventually get their fiscal union and solve the problem by bringing everybody under a United States of Europe. Europe kind of, you know, new tighter political alliance. Instead, I think it's likely to fall apart. But boy, the timing on this, you know, I think that already there's been so much short euro speculation. Yeah, the euro should continue to depreciate. The dollar should continue to appreciate. Am I trading it? You know, am I short the euro? No, I'm already long the dollar index. And of course, a very large component of the dollar index is the euro currency pair, euro-dollar pair. So you're already short the euro if you're long the dollar index, and that exposure is enough for me.

I don't want to have a separate position to be short the euro explicitly. I think that the overall capital flow into US dollars— I see that as more of a global phenomenon. A lot of that will come from Europe, and I'll get my exposure to euro weakness through my long position in the dollar

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for that, Erik.

Sign-off and Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Anything else you'd like to add before we close?

Erik Townsend: You know, as I always say, we really need your help, folks, promoting the show. So please retweet us when we announce the show on Twitter. And most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. It only takes a few minutes. The benefit to you is you get our Research Roundup email, which includes a compendium of links to all the best research. Be sure to check out this week. I know we've got David Hay's newsletter, which is a free subscription. I recommend I recommend that one. And there's a lot of other good content in there. So what else is in there this week, Aaron?

Aaron Chan: Well, this week we were lucky to have our listeners supply nearly all of the articles for Research Roundup. So a big thanks of appreciation to those of you who contributed. There are a bunch of great reads in there, and it's on a broad range of topics. So really be sure to catch up on those. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program

For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @MacroDialogue. Thanks, Patrick. Didact. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan Chat with you next week.

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