Neil Howe — Author and demographer (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 75 was recorded on August 10th, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. Author and demographer Neil Howe has probably influenced my worldview and my investment strategy more than any person alive, so I'm really excited to have Neil joining me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll briefly review the concept of generational cycles and what a Fourth Turning is, and then we'll dive into current events and examine where we are in the present Fourth Turning cycle and what lies ahead.
This is gonna be another long feature interview, folks, but it's gonna be a very good one, and I think you're really gonna enjoy it. So we're gonna let the interview with Neil run a little bit longer than usual, and then Patrick and I will be back with another abbreviated postgame segment.
Market wrap: S&P 500 sell-off and debt ceiling risk
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's do a market wrap. But what an interesting week this has developed to being. The S&P 500 not only looked like at the start of the week that it was breaking out to being this brand new bull move to the upside, but suddenly it's turned into a full out selling rout, you know, from comments from Jeffrey Gundlach and others that are now suddenly flipping to more of a bearish stance. Now, what was particularly interesting, I was sharing that with all of my members at Big Picture Trading earlier in the week, was that Tuesday price action when the market broke to a fresh new high, it did what we call a prairie dog, like a pop and drop higher. And then obviously on Trump's comments, it reversed and the selling hasn't stopped since. I sort of equate that to being like a tell in poker when it kind of wipes out all the stop losses sitting at fresh new highs and then suddenly reverses and starts to sell.
To me, something seems a little bit different than it was even a week ago. What's your feeling on the S&P 500 here? We're trading around 2,437 as we record.
Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, Patrick, I do not think that a nuclear war is about to break out with North Korea and that the world's coming to an end. And I don't think that any war scenario is going to be the real cause of problems in the stock market. On the other hand, from a seasonality From a seasonality standpoint, it's the right time. And, you know, what I've been saying for months and months here is we've got to see what is the catalyst that's going to come along that's going to cause something that's overdue to happen, which is for this crazy bull trend in ridiculous overvaluation to be broken somehow to where the mood changes and we finally get an overdue correction. Well, it looks like a renegade tweet from President Trump may be that catalyst. And I don't think— if you look at what always happens when a war breaks out, First, there's a knee-jerk down in markets because everybody says, oh my God, a war, sell everything while we still can.
And then they take a big deep breath and they think about it and say, wait a minute, wars are always inflationary. Wars cause increased demand for products and services that are used by the military in order to fight the war. Wait a minute, war's good for the stock market. And the market goes right back up and rallies again. So normally what I would say is this is one of those false knee-jerk moments where the market's pulling
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And it's very likely to climb back up to new all-time highs again, because the war is not really gonna be that big of a deal. The thing is, the timing was just right for some catalyst to come along and break this trend, and maybe this is gonna be it. So I think that anything could happen here.
It seems that from a seasonality standpoint, we're maybe a little bit early. I would normally expect a high to happen sometime around the middle of August, so maybe we're a week early on that, but, you know, close enough, I guess.
I had actually just started before this— it was yesterday, before the big selling started today— placing orders to start accumulating put options on the S&P, because I thought if we went back to all-time highs, which I was thinking we were going to do before today's tape action, it's time to start accumulating those lottery tickets. Not because I have supreme knowledge that the market's going to crash or anything like that, but just from a seasonality standpoint, if we're going to have a problem this fall, it's Probably going to start pretty soon. So far, I haven't been filled on any of those orders. So if we get back to new all-time highs, I'll start accumulating those puts. For right now, I'm still flat on equities. I would say if there's something that is an underpriced risk, it is not so much the war risk, but the debt ceiling risk, Patrick.
I think that what people are failing to see is, you know, we go through these theatrics every year over debt ceiling, but in the past, Everybody wanted it to work out. All the politicians, they didn't want the government to default on its bills and for, you know, for there to be a major event. Now we have an environment where there is so much political divisiveness that, you know, a lot of people would love to see something go horribly wrong if it can be blamed on President Trump. So, you know, I think it's very possible that we could see a showdown that actually leads to a technical default on just one payment, only by a few days or something. I think that politicians I think politicians underestimate how much damage that could actually cause in terms of a real market panic reaction. So if there's something that could go horribly wrong here, I don't think it's a nuclear war breaking out.
That's profoundly unlikely. It's the debt ceiling that I'm more concerned with.
VIX spike and XIV unwind risk
Patrick Ceresna: Well, if I can just add that comment here is that what's particularly interesting to me is the fact that the S&P 500, while it dropped, if you listen to the comments that Gundlach made in regards to him actually buying S&P 500 puts, one of the key elements of that was that volatility was so low, and then you thought that there was going to be a big volatility spike even if there was just a 3% decline in the markets. But what's interesting is today we had that huge spike in volatility. The VIX shot up well above the 14 level on the upside, almost a 30-40% jump in one day. And the question I ask is that, could this spur a liquidity event when it comes to all those people that are record net short on the VIX, and whether them forcing— forced to cover some of these VIX positions could actually make the sell Selling even more intense.
I mean, is that something you're considering?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, it's something I've been thinking about all day today. And one of the things that I think is a lot of these newer buyers of the XIV, people that have no experience with investing and trading that have opened new accounts just so they can short the VIX and they don't know what they're doing, those people don't really know how to use risk controls. That means they're all at their day job today. They didn't know what happened today on Thursday. If they're gonna panic, they're probably gonna do it tomorrow morning. So I'm gonna be watching what happens to the VIX tomorrow morning in what some people call amateur hour, which is that first hour of trading from 9:30 to 10:30 after the stock market opens, when people who are panicking are calling their brokers saying, sell all of my XIV, I didn't know what I was getting myself into.
I'll be very curious to see if that happens tomorrow morning.
US dollar index
Patrick Ceresna: Well, absolutely. Let's move on to the dollar index, though, 'cause this is also interesting. Well, I would've at least initially thought the dollar index would be more responsive to this type of volatility, but we're not really getting too much of a movement. Now, we got that big pop on the dollar index on Friday's job numbers, but since then, the dollar's been really sideways consolidating, trading around the 93.23 level on the dollar index. What's your feeling here on what's in store for the dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the big question to ask, was that the bottom? You know, we saw, what was it, a 92.30-something print a few days ago. Was that in fact the bottom that a lot of technicians were saying a low 92 handle was going to be where it would bottom? We're seeing a bounce off of that. I don't know yet. We just talked, as our listeners remember, last week with Juliette Declercq, who thinks this is an opportunity to short the dollar against the euro.
A lot of other people are taking profits. I think Juliette Brigden is taking profits on that trade. So I'm not sure where this is going. I think there's an argument that the bottom may be in, but I really am not confident enough to start buying it hand over fist.
WTI crude: false breakout and inventory data
Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's move on to where the real price action was today, and that's crude oil. What a reversal just at the start of the day. I mean, we were up in the $50 range on WTI, and suddenly we find ourselves at the low end of the $48 handle. What's— what caused that reversal? What do you— what's your thinking here on oil?
Erik Townsend: Well, we've been in consolidation for a couple of weeks now. The key level that I think is the most important level in this market right now is $48.50. And I thought that we were going to reverse at that level a couple of weeks ago. What's happened is between Venezuela, North Korea, and also the tropical storm in the Gulf, these are all factors that have pushed us up and we had a descending triangle formation, which is normally bearish. I thought it was going to break to the downside. This morning we saw an upside breakout, which turned out to be a false breakout. $50.22 was the high print. From there it was all downhill. But we really haven't decisively taken out that $48.50 level yet. Now, there has been just in the last few minutes that we've been speaking a move down to $48.35, but that happened after the futures pit close in a thinner liquidity time of day.
As we're speaking now, the futures are actually trading about $48.45, just a nickel below that key level. And again, we're into thinner liquidity hours. I want to see what's happening in high liquidity hours tomorrow. If we can stay below $48.50, then I think we're on our way to $40 probably over the next month. On the other hand, if there's going to be a big bounce here, $48.50 is a level that's held something like 10 times before. It's going to be very interesting to see what Inventory this week was just crazy tape action, and I think it's very telling tape action as well.
What we saw was there were expectations among analysts for about a 2.2 million barrel drawdown on inventories. API, the American Petroleum Institute, on Tuesday afternoon reported a 7 million barrel drawdown. You would think that would send oil prices to the moon, and it did for less than one minute, and they had fully retraced, and we were trading lower just two or three minutes after the data came out. Then the official data comes out on Wednesday morning. EIA confirms not quite 7, but 6.5 million barrel drawdown against a 2.2 million barrel expectation, 3 times bigger than expectations. Gasoline was, on the other hand, building 3.4 million barrels. But again, it's, it's only half the size of the crude drawdown. You'd think that would have sent prices dramatically to the upside, and it didn't. We actually traded down on that data release. What those things said to me very loud and clear is, okay, This market is exhausted to the upside.
It's ready to move back to the downside. And even these very bullish numbers are not causing the spikes that they would normally occur to the upside.
A few other points on crude oil. The drawdowns that we've seen have been coming not from a loss of demand, not from a reduction of US production. US production is increasing. Demand is strong. It's all coming from import reduction. Art Berman has a lot to say about this. We've got a link to that article from Art Berman in your Research Roundup email. A lot of what I see going on, though, it suggests to me that Saudi Arabia is trying to manage the market by causing U.S. inventories to go down, which is what most people are looking at, while actually inventories around the rest of the world may be going up. Venezuela risk is still a factor. A lot of discussion about that in the news.
I think that in my estimation, if we can take out $48.50 to the downside, then this thing is over. We're headed to $40. It's still possible. We're in a consolidation range. We could still see another push above $50, but I really don't think so. The shorts have been squeezed out. The net speculative interest is top-heavy again. I think it's time for a reversal to the downside. It's just a matter of some of these things like Venezuela, Korea, and the weather clearing out of the system to make room for a reversal to the downside.
And one last point on oil. I want to— we don't have time to cover it in this episode, Patrick, but I really want to talk about this rumor about Saudi Arabia targeting the back end of the curve. All I've heard so far is just a few There have been a few comments that Khalid al-Falih, the Saudi oil minister, has talked to a few hedge funds about the possibility of targeting the back end of the curve. That news came out a couple weeks ago. If any of our listeners have any more intelligence on that or any more detail than that, please send it to me, info@macrovoices.com. It would be real helpful, and we'll do extended coverage of that next week. Meanwhile, just to keep the market wrap going here, Patrick, I want to save time for Neil Howe because we've got a fantastic interview coming up. The big story, of course, is gold. This is all the escalation of the situation in North Korea.
This chart looks really, really, really strong here. The caveat to keep in mind is it's been driven by a geopolitical escalation. If we were to see a complete de-escalation, everything blows over, it's all fine with North Korea, then I think you could see all of this strength in gold coming back out in the other direction. The thing is, I don't see it de-escalating that way. The way these things de-escalate, Patrick, is when government leaders are calm Calm-minded, and they check their egos and their bravado at the door. We're talking about Kim Jong-un and Donald Trump. Anything could happen here.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, thanks for the market wrap, Erik. Now, before moving on, I'd like to thank everyone who has taken the time to rate and review us on iTunes. It really helps us a lot. Now, for those of you that have not had the chance, we'd really appreciate your review that could be submitted on iTunes. Now, with that out of the way, joining us as this week's featured interview guest is Neil Howe, author of The Fourth Turning. Erik's interview with Neil is coming Coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Neil Howe: what a Fourth Turning is
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next is Neil Howe, co-author of what may be the most important investing book of our time, The Fourth Turning. I am such a big fan of this book personally that I literally named my own investment management company, Fourth Turning Capital Management, after Neil's work. And my own investment process centers on understanding that we're in the middle of a Fourth Turning. Now, while the book was actually written 20 years ago, I would argue that it's even more relevant today than the day it was first published. Neil, many of our listeners have already read the book, so I'm looking forward to getting an update on how things are progressing. But for the sake of listeners who may not have read the book yet, let's start with a review of the basics. What is a Fourth Turning? What is the theory of how generational cycles influence society and financial markets?
And when did the present Fourth Turning begin?
Neil Howe: Great questions. I would just maybe preface this by saying that people often ask me, you know, did I— did Bill and I start out by trying to write a book about rhythms of history? And the answer is no. The two of us were very interested— I actually was— started as a historian, actually, before I became an economist. And I was very interested in how generations are different throughout history and what implications that's had. A lot of people remember, you know, how much boomers were so different than the World War II generation that raised them. And since then, we've often, you know, puzzled over this. 2 generations, such completely different sense of where their lives were going. And we looked back in history and found, and this was actually our first book that came out in 1991, which is called Generations: The History of America's Future.
But what we found is that we kind of rewrote all of American history from the 17th century onward. And we found not only have generations always been there, there have always been noticed people— no one's noticed different generations as being different.
And there have been generational clashes throughout American history. But these generations tended to recur in a certain sequence. In other words, different generations don't arrive at random. Certain kinds of generations always tend to arrive after other kinds of generations.
And lo and behold, at the end of the book, we intuited that this was— this had a synchrony with a long-term cycle of American history that many people have noticed. And that And that is, it's about the length of a long human lifetime between the great political and civic turning points of American history, going forward from, you know, the Glorious Revolution, the War of Spanish Succession, up to the American Revolution, to the Civil War, to World War II and the New Deal, and then on into the era we find ourselves today. And that roughly halfway in between, we find the great spiritual awakenings of American history. We used to literally call these awakenings, but these were the— always pushed by the young and always very, very focused on new revolution in values. So, on the one hand, you have these turning points which are civic and institutional and involve politics and empire and the economy. These are the Fourth Turnings. And then you have these value-focused episodes which involve culture and religion and sort of the interior of life, not the exterior of life.
And of course, our most recent awakening was in the late '60s and '70s, something a lot of boomers today remember because they came of age during that period. So, this was an interesting pattern to us, and it was in the Fourth Turning where we sort of formalized that into looking We're looking at history moving through a series of social moods in a certain order. And we think there's some very fundamental reasons for why we move through history, and not just America, I should mention, but I think most of the modern world sort of moves through history in cycles like this. They can be interrupted, they can be cut short, but that there is a tendency for this. It's manifested itself very strongly in American history. And we call these, you know, each of these eras is about a generation long or about 20, 21, 22, 23 years long.
And we call them First, Second, Third, and Fourth Turning.
The Fourth Turning is the final season of history, if you will, the final generation. And that is the period of crisis. That is the period when we tear down institutions that we've built, everything that's dysfunctional, and we sort of rebuild things from scratch again. And it usually follows a period where it's bound up in a period where there's complete disgust, complete distrust with what we have, and usually under the pressure by a younger generation And we kind of rebuild. These are the civic rebirth moments we've talked about earlier. Maybe that's by way of introduction, but that book was in 1997. You're right, it's about 20 years ago.
Why 2008 and not 9/11
Erik Townsend: So, you predicted this in 1997, and in your subsequent writings, I know that you've said that the present Fourth Turning began with the Great Financial Crisis in 2008. But I'm curious, though, because when I read the book, you explained that these Fourth Turnings always start with a catalyzing event that changes the mood of society. Now, if I ask myself, you know, what seems the most likely candidate for that, I would think the 9/11 terror attacks were the big, you know, moment where the mood of society changed. So I'm curious, why do you favor the 2008 financial crisis as opposed to the 2001 terror attacks as the beginning of the Fourth Turning that we're in now?
Neil Howe: A couple of reasons. One is, is that although the, you know, 9/11 changed America's attitude towards the rest of the world, I think that the stock market boom and celebrity circuses here in the United States really hadn't changed very much. And I don't think you really had a shift, a fundamental shift in America's perception of themselves as a people, as their own country, to a fundamental degree until 2008. Also, 2001, as we explained to many people at the time, was simply too early. Every turning starts when each generation is beginning to move into a new phase of life. Back in 2001, boomers are not yet retiring. Millennials were still, you know, maybe the first one of them was barely graduating from high school. So this was not what we expected. 2008 really did coincide with sort of the generational maturity of the turning, so to speak. And I think that in terms of the basic shift in our kind of efficacy of the social system, I think 2008 was a bigger change.
The economic emergency that occurred in 2008-2009 really catapulted us into the, by far, the biggest economic emergency we've been in since the early 1930s. And we, you know, arguably, we are still living out the consequences of that with complete change in, you know, central bank policy and monetary policy, with sustaining these record-low interest rates and arguably very high valuations in financial markets. Almost anything sort of pushed by that, and people still wondering how we're going to get out from under that. The constant discussion is, you know, when is— when are central banks going to pull back on their balance sheets and actually, you know, go back to the old normal? So, I think there is this sense, even amidst the booming markets that we see today, that there is this artificial quality. People think that, you know, there's something wrong about this. We have not rewritten where we were. We are not letting price discovery and actual markets function the way they did before then. So, I do believe that it was the beginning of a whole new regime.
And I also believe that the political dysfunction, the sense of political dysfunction created during the 2 terms of the Obama presidency, and obviously also into the Trump presidency, of government completely grinding to a to a halt is gonna have some very powerful repercussions in the years shortly to come.
Parallels with the 1930s
Erik Townsend: You wrote in the book about how these Fourth Turnings are basically 20-year-long seasons in history where the bad stuff happens, whether it be Revolutionary War, Civil War, the, the really difficult times. Now, if we went back to the depths of the Great Depression, let's say in 1934, and we explained these concepts to someone living in that time, they would almost undoubtedly say, well, yeah, that's happening right now. Great Depression, that's got to be the bad times for this Fourth Turning. Of course, they didn't know that in reality it was World War II that was going to be the big event. The Great Depression was really just an opening act. So is that a pattern? Should we be concerned that maybe the 2008 financial crisis that began this Fourth Turning was the equivalent to the Great Depression and that World War II is still coming, or the equivalent of World War II in this
Neil Howe: It's certainly a danger out there. You know, we all just saw this morning how markets reacted to this war of words between President Trump and North Korea. I think that there is a rising tide of nationalism around the world. I think it's driven by younger generations, and I should say not just nationalism but authoritarianism. And I would say these are strong parallels that we see between, you know, the decade we've been living through and the 1930s, because it isn't just what happened in the economy. I mean, you consider so many ways in which this last decade has recapitulated the 1930s, starting off with the financial crisis, worries about deflation, worries about declining fertility rates and currency wars and beggar-thy-neighbor policies and, you know, radical attempts by monetary and ultimately fiscal policy to remedy the situation.
But also consider the geopolitical atmosphere of the 1930s, which was a new world in which there was no concert of great powers, no great power who was taking, you know, responsibility for guiding or leading the world. Britain had largely retreated from its global influence after World War I. The League of Nations had fallen apart. And in the 1930s was a time when authoritarian leaders and growing, you know, with growing popularity, growing number of people thought that that was actually a pretty good answer to the world's problems. These regimes were doing whatever they wanted in their corner of the world with no one really stop them. And I think today we live in a similar era. I mean, you just look around the world today, you see a vacuum of any great power or concert of great powers who are orchestrating what goes on in the world, and basically people doing what they want and creating an increasingly dangerous world.
I even think in the culture you find strong parallels. The decline in homeownership, for example, the decline in the birth rate and the fertility rate, the blanding of the popular culture that occurred during the 1930s, a very similar to what's going on with millennials today and the growing appeal among younger people, activists among younger people, younger people of a more collectivist or authoritarian notion of what kind of government works. We actually wrote a piece recently called, Are Millennials Souring on Democracy? And looking at some of these recent opinion polls around the world showing that millennials are less interested, not just in America, but in Europe and East Asia, and necessarily around favoring liberal democratic solutions. There's a growing appeal of authoritarian leaders that get things done. Well, you can see here in the United States, we have a government that no longer thinks about the future at all and can't get anything done.
So, you can imagine how turned off you would be if you're a young person trying to think of the rest of your life.
Millennials and political versus market volatility
Erik Townsend: Let's project that forward. You've written quite a bit in the book about how these Fourth Turnings evolve, and you just described some of these trends, like people becoming open to authoritarian and even narcissistic leaders. No sign of that with Donald Trump, of course. What do you think— what's coming next? As you just described, you've got millennials now that are open to socialism or things that used to be anathema to American values. In terms of what you've learned about how these Fourth Turnings play out, is that a flash in the pan where people have some wild ideas that are inconsistent with our past, but they fade away, or do those ideas take over and become I
Neil Howe: think ultimately those ideas take over. Now, at this point in time, we may see this as a very positive development. I mean, we've— I've done lots of polling on millennials for, you know, both political parties, and one of the things I see among millennials is this hugely different from older generations is how much they value what they call community. So, you know, if I ask people of all ages, do you think, you know, government should reinforce the principle of community, the principle of self-reliance? You know, older people say self-reliance, younger people, other generations, Both parties, believe it or not, will hugely prefer community. And how do you do community? Well, you have someone basically saying, here are the rules, this is what you're going to get. You may not have as many choices. Single payer sounds great. That's health problems solved. And you move forward.
Now, a lot of older generations would say, my God, you know, this is, you know, I'd rather die than to see an America turn like that. But I do I do think that, you know, again, the 1930s is a good example where the Greatest Generation, we tend to forget, embraced the New Deal. This was a generation that voted in 1932 and 1936, an estimated 85% of that generation voted for the New Deal and FDR.
This is the first generation of African Americans to vote for the Democratic Party, no longer the Republican Party, and they usually embrace this idea of a much more powerful powerful government, you know, state that would take care of things, along with the Social Security Act passed in 1935. And later on, when they, as midlife leaders with the Great Society, they tried to put in the final bricks in that huge edifice that they spent a lifetime building.
Of course, you know, a lot of boomers didn't like it very much and didn't really want to finish it, you know, finish that project that they started. But of course, that was the difference between these 2 generations. But the GIs were very much a building generation. They were hugely focused on, on the future, hugely focused on infrastructure, and they didn't mind a powerful central authority that kind of organized things.
I think in time you're going to see millennials— I think you're actually already seeing it— not minding moving in that direction. And I particularly see the inability of national leaders today to coordinate or act on anything. It's not like we have these enormous future problems, these unfunded liabilities, entitlements, we have geopolitical threats out there. It's not even just these long-term problems. We can't even get a budget passed or a budget resolution, or we can't even have this tiny little corner of our amazing, vast healthcare sector are reformed even the slightest degree by this, by the leadership we now have, I think you're going to see a big shift.
And as I see it, I think the biggest contradiction we now see is between markets and politics, right? So, in politics, we see volatility is incredibly high. If there were a political VIX, actually, there is a political VIX. There's a political uncertainty index, which actually you can, you can actually go on FRED and actually look at it, which is amazingly high levels compared to where it was for the last 20 or 30 years. There is a political VIX, but it's very high right now, as opposed to the market VIX, which is very low. So if you're doing valuation divided by some measure of volatility, which is kind of your basic complacency Index, right? That's at record high levels now in markets. But you'd have to say complacency is at record low levels in our political and public life.
We're totally nervous. We've even, I think, to some extent, fear that we've lost any kind of public square, or the ability to even have a public discourse on every issue. I think that that is a real problem. I don't think that is sustainable for long.
Countries have to decide on ground rules. They have to respond to public threats. Right now, we are a country that can't do that. I think even— it's not just passing a budget resolution, this next month is going to be a problem. I think just getting the debt ceiling raised is going to be a much bigger problem than anyone's talking about right now. So, I think that we have these threats, whether, again, we're going abroad and talking about threats or here, which pose a real danger to the markets. And I think we segment these. That's why I say cognitive dissonance. We somehow think these aren't related. Ultimately, Ultimately, I think history teaches they have to be.
Four stages and why the crisis is still ahead
Erik Townsend: By your analysis, the present Fourth Turning began in 2008 and should end sometime around 2030. So, we have roughly 12 years left in this Fourth Turning. Now, the very last part you describe in the book as the resolution. That's the time, at least in the case of after World War II, you had Bretton Woods and the IMF and the UN and all these other institutions being created, but that That happens in the last couple of years. So, it sounds like we've got about a decade before that resolution begins. So, what should we expect in that next decade for the second half of this Fourth Turning?
Neil Howe: I think this is going to be the real roller coaster ride. And I do think not only, you know, there, as you mentioned, there are 4 stages to a Fourth Turning. One is the catalyst. The next is the regeneracy, when we see some center of public trust beginning to grow around the new public agenda. Agenda. We really haven't seen that yet, although you can look at various parts and begin to see certain— I would say particularly look at what young people are doing. Every Fourth Turning, you kind of see where are young people going, where are they beginning to— who are they beginning to trust, both on the right and the left. I think that's an interesting marker. But then ultimately, you move to the crisis, and that's when this new sense of public trust, which I think won't really begin to appear once we begin to hit public problems that we have to solve, and I mentioned about 2 or 3 that we're probably going to have to hit by the end of this year, and then of course, then comes the midterm election next year, but that's when that begins to grow.
And then the crisis, when all of these problems begin to coalesce into one huge problem, it's when the Great Recession kind of met all of these, you know, the rise of fascism both in Asia and in Europe, and, you know, everything came together, you know, currency wars, everything became part of a huge problem, which by the resolution, you see, and this is what happens at every Fourth Turning, all the little problems all come together into a giant problem, and the giant problem gets completely solved. And this is This is why Fourth Turnings are not necessarily dangerous or bad things. They're good things. They're necessary things. It's when history solves big problems that otherwise, in another era, would've seemed insoluble. So, you notice that with Bretton Woods, the UN, the IMF, the World Bank, I mean, all of these institutions we created, we solved all kinds of problems. We saw that we're gonna have the recovery of Europe, we were gonna have a global financial and trade system that put an end to trade wars.
We, with the founding of the UN, we thought we had created a framework for solving international conflict. And we had a great deal of investment in the future and a great deal of peace and prosperity for the next several decades. So we did, we created a new world. We created a new civic world, not just the United States, but together with much of the rest of the world, which would have seemed unthinkable 10 years earlier.
So, I like to say, because people sometimes say, well, you know, this Fourth Turning sounds horrible, high likelihood of war, particularly of total war, you know, you have these great crises that hit, but on the other hand, it's how you create a new golden age. And I would just add that one other feature of a Fourth Turning is that because you're completely upending institutions, political and economic institutions, it tips the playing field away from, you know, the old and the established, you know, to the young and the have-nots. And you saw that hugely coming out of the last New Deal, coming in the late '40s and early '50s, with this, you know, GI generation, who for the first time, you know, the middle class could go to college, they could go into vocational programs, that for the first time they could own homes. I mean, we truly transformed transformed sort of our entry of, you know, all citizens into democracy coming out of World War II. And of course, hopefully the dream would be is to create a new opportunity for the millennial generation, who by that time will be, you know, the oldest of them will be, you know, almost approaching midlife by that point.
But that's, that's what happened last time with the greatest generation, the GI generation, and a successful outcome, we'd create that same scenario for millennials.
Erik Townsend: So it sounds like, at least if we follow the template of how past Fourth Turnings have played out, where all these little problems come together into the really big problem, the crisis, the crisis hasn't really happened yet, at least in the cycle that research shows should happen.
Neil Howe: No, I mean, it's the same way, you know, you look at 1929. Now, 1929 caused an obviously vertiginous, you know, it was a financial crisis because of vertiginous fall in GDP, much steeper than 2008, 2009. But on the other hand, it was truly a V-shaped recession. We had enormous growth, actually, from 1933 on. We had between 6%, 7%, 8% real growth per year until the next recession in '37 and so on. Then we went down again. But much of the '30s was actually a period of rapid growth. People don't forget forget that. But nonetheless, everyone felt shaken by what had happened in 1929, despite the fact that a lot of the mid-'30s were actually pretty good growth years. And I think the same thing is true today.
We feel very differently about America because of what happened in that, in that last Great Recession. And I think that actually, our ability to keep us from going deeper into that recession is actually contributing to some problems that are still with us, particularly in this problem of central banks keeping, you know, interest rates so low, keeping us still kind of not too far from the zero bound, and raising real questions among people of kind of our financial markets working properly. This is sort of the whole valuation issue of, you know, have we created a monster here?
Europe and the future of the EU
Erik Townsend: I'd like to shift gears and talk about Europe for a minute, because we have a lot of European listeners. Although the name European The European Union wasn't formalized until the Maastricht Treaty. The process of European integration really began at the end of the last Fourth Turning in 1945. We've heard quite a few guests on this program giving us different views, from Brexit was the death knell, it's all over, to Brexit was just a flash in the pan, it's not important, everything is fine.
What does the history of turnings tell us? We've really spent the first second, and third turning in this process of European integration? Is the fourth turning where it all falls apart, or is it where it strengthens and becomes, you know, the United States of Europe or something? How do you see this playing out for Europe?
Neil Howe: You know, fourth turnings are times when institutions which are deemed unworkable completely disappear, and institutions which are deemed workable are suddenly fortified. So you basically go one way or the the other. And that creates a real problem for the EU, because the EU is this pretty modern, pretty recent institution with not a lot of popular roots. It's— I would say it remains definitely in danger. Yeah, we had Emmanuel Macron, but as you remember, in the first round in France, you know, over half the French electorate voted for someone on the radical left, or, you know, Le Pen, obviously, on the radical right, who wanted to leave the EU, or on the fact that the left spoke strongly about leaving the EU.
You had basically a centrist candidate who was no one's real first choice, but he's now being celebrated as this pro-EU backlash. He reminds me a little bit of Matteo Renzi, a young technocrat who represented the center and tried to bring in Italy back. And Matteo Renzi is obviously trying to make a comeback after losing his bid to change the Italian constitution. Italy, as we see, remains in question. And I think Emmanuel Macron's future remains in question. France didn't really make any important decisions. They needed to make important decisions, and they didn't by choosing this candidate who was kind of somewhere in the middle.
I think more broadly, the generational history of the EU is very interesting because you obviously You had this civic generation which took America into World War II, you know, the generation of the resistance and the Axis soldiers and so on. But then you had this generation who were children during World War II. This would have been, you know, Helmut Schmidt or Jacques Delors, you know, one of the great architects of the EU, or Maggie Thatcher, who was, you know, one of the children, you know, underneath London during the Blitz.
But this was the generation that saw World War II. War II as children, and they traumatized by it. And the generation that built the EU were the children of World War II, and they were the ones who created all these committee structure and all these rules and all these ways in which to sort of just band all these countries together with all these regulations and protocols, because the last thing they ever wanted was a Europe that would have to fight another war against each other. And I think under their leadership, any notion of nationalism fell into disrepute and unpopularity.
I remember, like many Americans, you know, being in Europe during the 1970s, early '80s, you know, no one would ever show a national flag, no one would ever sing a national anthem.
Well, things have changed. You know, that generation is no longer in power. You have the younger generation who were the contemporaries of boomers, who came of age in a very different We're in a different era in Europe. These are the '68ers, les soixante-huitards, die Achtundsechziger, they call them in Germany. But this was a group of countercultural rebels.
They are now in power. They are less attached to the protocols of the EU. It really wasn't their project. They kind of went along with it. And now, increasingly, you have the emergence of 2 younger generations, particularly millennials in Europe, who are proud of their nations. They're more proud of their own nationality, their own national institutions, and they're showing flags again. They're singing anthems. I mean, this is a palpable difference. After 2009, with the sovereign debt crisis, a lot of people were talking about the demise of Europe over sovereign debt until Mario Draghi said he would do anything to— and he did. He would he prevented that from happening. But I also saw the real problem was not sovereign debt, but rather political, and that is politically, popularly, and politically, people did not want to be locked into a system which prevented them or even impoverished them by locking them into a system in which they could not make their own economic decisions, which would benefit their own. Economies, and I think you know probably
one of the the best parallels in thinking about you know the EU is to think about the euro as a currency being the equivalent of what gold standard was during the 1930s. I mean, the gold standard locked people in, and in the case of Britain, you know almost locked them into permanent depression until they finally got out of it. And you see the the euro today for southern. In Europe is playing a similar role.
I think there's some real challenges, and I think the EU is going to be challenged by its lack of popular depth. The elites, many of them still believe in it, and I'm sure that they, you know, hoping that will prevail. The Fourth Turning, and a Fourth Turning really reveals what kinds of institutions have roots, and that would be my one worry, you know, for the longer-term prospects of the EU, you know, through, through this Fourth Turning that we're in.
Could secession return to America?
Erik Townsend: Coming back to the United States, there have been plenty of times in history where some flamboyant politician suggests that his state should secede from the United States. And in the past, that's always just been political hyperbole. There's no serious follow-through, and the public is not willing to consider that. But your analysis shows that Fourth Turnings are the time in history when the public becomes open seriously to considering the idea of secession. So when you hear people in California talking about seceding from the United States, and a lot of people just roll their eyes and say, that's nonsense, that would never happen, is it really nonsense? Could it never really happen? Or is a Fourth Turning exactly the time when something like that can happen?
Neil Howe: It's useful to remember that obviously, you know, one of our Fourth Turnings in American history was exactly focused on secession, right? That was the Civil War, and that in certain aspects of the American Revolution, to involve secession. We now know what a horribly bloody affair that was in the late 1770s and 1780s, and a huge part of America sided with the Tories. They suffered, many of them left, a large, a sizable fraction of America, about the same fraction of Vietnam that left as boat people, left the colonies. They either moved back to England, or most of them actually moved to Canada.
But this was a— there is often, in this intense division of and polarization of people into different camps, a threat of Americans against Americans, right? Not just Americans against others, or Americans against an external danger. You do see that today.
Actually, I think the secessionist threat would have been worse had Hillary Clinton been elected, because I think secessionist threats from the red zone, I think one takes a little bit more seriously, both because of their antipathy, for many of them, for the federal government, and also for the fact that politically, Republicans dominate so many state governorships and legislatures. I think that would have been a big, bigger problem had Hillary been elected.
Well, you have Trump elected, and of course, as you mentioned, you see the secessionist movements going the other way. There's a movement in California that's obviously Obviously, the sanctuary cities movement, which kind of does the same thing.
It's part and parcel of what we call the resistance, and it is a symptom of the complete dysfunction of the government in the United States today. You have those on the left basically saying, you know, we'll do anything to stop this illegitimate leader and this leadership from accomplishing any of the ends He wants, and we're organized to do it. This is definitely something you can't imagine happening outside of Fourth Turning.
Boomer retirement and the debt ceiling
Erik Townsend: Demographers like yourself have warned us for decades now that when the baby boomers hit retirement, institutions like pensions and Social Security are going to be challenged and go bankrupt in many cases. Somehow, as indisputable as that prediction was, very little heed has been given to it by investors. Well, now that moment is upon us. The baby boomers are turning 70. Most of them are overallocated to equities because there's no yield on bonds these days, thanks to central bank policy in the wake of the financial crisis.
You've been studying this as long as anyone, Neil. So what can go wrong here, and what should we expect next as the baby boomers hitting retirement changes from a prediction to a present-tense reality?
Neil Howe: It's already becoming a present-tense That's reality. Those— the first big demographic cohorts are already moving past age 70. And that's even for the upper income, that's almost— you're almost forced to retire by the time you get to age 70 and a half. So it's already happening. And it's interesting because years ago, I mean, Pete Peterson and I, I think we wrote our first book, On Borrowed Time. It was in 1988, looking at the future of entitlements given the aging of a America.
And we, we saw there was going to be this enormous window of opportunity as a small— the Silent Generation, a very small generation born in the late '20s and '30s, you know, were retiring. We had this great opportunity.
All these boomers would be filling the Social Security coffers full by moving into their peak income earning years and paying all their FICA taxes. You had this small generation retiring. This is during the 1990s. Do you remember? This is a great time to reform Social Security. We had all this room. And as you recall, in 2000, we even had the fear, and this was aided and abetted by the, you know, cuts in defense we could do because of the end of the Cold War, but there was a fear the United States was going to run a surplus. And if you remember that, we were going to— we actually stopped issuing some of our longer-term bonds. We were really getting ready to sort of worrying about what would happen when we no longer had US debt. I mean, how would we run monetary policy. These are the things I actually remember back in the year 2000. Well, that, of course, is a total fantasy.
Now we look ahead, and we see not just post-2008, with all the emergency funding and emergency deficits run by the— particularly the first term of the Obama administration, but now looking forward, we see these enormous deficits that are virtually lost. Locked in because of the retirement of boomers. Combined with, it's always useful to remember, not just this big tide of older people, and not much growth in younger people, actually a decline now projected in immigration. Immigration projections have been hugely pared back.
I think you always have to add to that this exceptionally robust, faster-than-GDP growth in healthcare spending per capita. Healthcare is a unique problem in the United States, which we have virtually no control over the level of spending per person. The combination of this, the demographic bulge of boomers, plus the actually subdued or pared-back projections in the future of the number of working-age population, combined with this just unstoppable hyperinflation in healthcare spending. This is a tremendous problem.
Again, you're looking for evidence of dysfunction in our political system, we're not even focused on this.
It'd be great if the paralysis in Washington, D.C. were about these issues. We could at least say we're paralyzed over something important. We're not even talking about this, but I will say that one event where this could emerge is in the debt ceiling debate, and that could be a showstopper because if you have enough Republicans who basically say we are not going to raise the debt ceiling unless we do something to control this longer-term problem, that could be a total standoff. There are a fair number of Republicans in the House who say government could make do if it just lived off its tax income. We just cut back on the rest of government, we pay off our creditors, it wouldn't be so bad.
So this is— we talk about North Korea, but right now I think the real sleeper on the horizon is the debt ceiling. We're going to hear a lot more about that in the next 3 weeks.
The Homeland Generation
Erik Townsend: Neil, you're credited with coining the term millennial, referring to the generation that was born between 1980 and the early 2000s. Many of our listeners are millennials. The rest of us have millennial friends and family in our lives that give us a sense of how that generation values, and attitudes differ from our own. But there's also another generation after the Millennials, which you've called the Homelanders. Please introduce us to them. What are they like? How do their attitudes and beliefs differ from Millennials and prior generations? And what should we expect from them as they become our next generation of young adults?
Neil Howe: Every generation could be defined a little bit by what they just missed. And when you think of You know, the Silent Generation, what did they do? They just missed the Roaring '20s. You know, all they can remember as children was the Great Depression and World War II. What did Boomers just miss? They missed World War II, right? They just remember growing up in the '50s and the American high.
What did Gen X just miss? Well, they just missed the American high. The earliest they remember the world going to hell in the '60s and '70s, right? And the breakup of the family and the screaming matches between politicians and generations And Watergate and all the rest. I think what millennials just missed was that consciousness revolution, all that social and family experimentation. Millennials started out as a protected generation of kids. These are the baby-on-board kids, and then these had the Lamaze movement parents, and they had all the bicycle helmets and safety playing fields and just all of this new kind of almost moral panic over children that Accompanied the entry to millennials, and I think to understand this new generation, you really have to understand kind of who millennials are.
Millennials have been a generation of trends, first wave to last, turned an increasing focus on what you know sometimes it gets older generations to shake their heads in disapproval. But being told they're special, being confident, being sheltered and protected, you know, being given all these safe. Spaces, and this aptitude for teamwork, closeness with their family, their increasing risk aversion to personal risk-taking, which we see in everything from driving without your seatbelt to drinking and smoking, and the huge decline over time in the crime rate. I think that's the best— when you're looking for a backdrop, that's how you have to see the Homeland Generation. The Homeland Generation, what did they What did they just miss? The Homeland Generation missed everything before election of Barack Obama and the Great Recession. That is to say, they can't remember anything before that. So, this generation is hugely impacted by new relative deprivation among American families and wage earners during that period. Homelanders recall much more talk about whether we can afford stuff in their childhood than Millennials were.
And I think you could actually say in some respects, millennials, at the endpoint of that transition we saw in millennials toward protection, structure, hands-on parenting, parents spending even more time with their kids. And now, of course, after the Great Recession, we see midlife parents, particularly midlife moms, Xer moms, Gen X moms, spending less time in the workforce and more time with their kids.
So this is a generation that is used to being fussed over, protected, very risk-averse, hugely comfortable with following rules wherever they are. We actually did a piece recently on the new rulemaking culture which is surrounding this generation. Almost everything they do in life, you know, schools and the internet and so on, there's proliferation of rules actually prescribing correct behavior.
But this is, in some ways, a new version or a modern version of the Silent Generation that we saw, who were the children of the Great Depression. And we see some of the same traits, some of the same— this very intense sense of family that they're being raised with, thanks to very hands-on attachment parenting Gen Xers, as well as a huge emphasis on good behavior. It's very interesting.
Interesting. One of the most popular new curriculum being introduced in grammar school and now into middle school now is called social and emotional learning, which is to teach kids today to be nice kids, to be sensitive to others, to think about what others are feeling.
So, as you often see in generations, parents, midlife parents often want to focus on teaching their kids the very opposite things that they themselves were taught. So you have all these Gen Xers who were basically, uh, you know, when they were being raised, parents weren't around and you had to have sharp elbows basically to grow up, right? It was basically each kid for himself, right? And now they're raising their own kids to be sort of sweet and adorable. We do a lot of work with media companies and you see this huge focus. If anyone has been— looked, you know, You know, on what's playing on Disney or Viacom, today's kids.
It's very sweet. It's very adorable, and it teaches all kinds of lessons in citizenship and how to be good to your parents and how to cooperate with others, how to be friendly and nice. And this is truly a departure from the way we saw— the way we raised other kids, or I I should say, particularly back in the 1970s and '80s, the way we allowed kids to raise themselves.
Trust, patriotism and new authoritarianism
Erik Townsend: I want to drill down a little bit on that point about teaching kids how they should be behaving as citizens and citizenry and so forth. You know, if I think to the Silent Generation, my father's generation, my father, and as far as I can tell, all of his Silent Generation peers are of the opinion that it is the patriotic duty of every American to hunt down Edward Snowden torture him first and then kill him for his horrible, horrible acts of treason against the country. Whereas my generation is much more open to the idea of saying, "Wait a minute, Snowden is the best patriot of our times because we have a different definition of patriotism." Where my father's generation would define patriotism as unconditional loyalty to the national government. Period. My generation tends to see exposing corruption in the national government to be the highest act of patriotism. How do these homelanders feel? It sounds like they're almost kind of being brought up to be very much back to unyielding blind faith in the government, period, hands down, bar none.
Is that right?
Neil Howe: You know, I think you're gonna find them a much more credulous generation and a generation willing to trust. And I think the one thing that Xers realize that they— that our country is missing is the ability to trust. You know, Xers are notoriously untrusting, right? They were raised to be untrusting. And I think that there is an element, and we detail this in our work, about how every generation in midlife don't want to raise kids to be replicas of themselves. They want to raise kids to complement themselves. This is one of the reasons why Boomers who rebelled against authority and demanded the right to speak and dress as individuals. This is the generation that introduced school uniforms in the 1990s, and even Bill Clinton and Al and Tipper Gore took a leadership position on that movement. So, very often, generations actually want to compensate for their own childhood when they raise their own kids. And I think you see the same thing happening with Xers.
Xers here. They actually want to raise kids to have some of these virtues, which they themselves, which they themselves never had.
I do think that's part of a more general trend or a more general reality about a fourth turning, and that is this impetus to find a new locus of a public square of a community that we can again believe, believe in and trust. So when we suddenly see threats. I'm always amazed by the amount of public, how much the public gravitates toward intense, even bellicose, you know, national solutions. I don't know if you've been following some of these opinion polls on North Korea, but over 70% of both political parties today, the American public in both political parties, I'd say all three, Democrats, Republicans, and independents.
agree that this is a serious national crisis, and over 50% agree that we should strike now. Well, that's far more than the share of people that approve of Trump or any other particular leader. Here's the point I want to make, regardless of whether we act on North Korea or not, is that there is an underground willingness to define who we are as a stand up for something in the face of encroaching danger.
And that is the sign of a Fourth Turning, when public life on the surface seems in complete disarray, but underneath there's this desire for a new sense of community solidarity. And that, by the way, explains why in so many areas of the world you see younger generations moving toward this, what I call this new authoritarianism.
I mean, if you want to look at Japan, who's voting in the most recent election, who voted most for Shinzo Abe and who most supportive of Japan changing their constitution? Younger Japanese. I mean, who voted for Rodrigo Duterte in the Philippines? Younger Filipinos. Who's voting more for these kind of radical leaders on the right or the left, Eurosceptic movements or Anti-EU movements in Europe. Again, it's younger people. I think we've been a little bit blinded from this by looking at the attitude of millennials toward Trump, because millennials obviously didn't vote strongly for Trump, and the same thing for the UK. But then again, younger millennials in the UK voted strongly for the socialist ticket this last election. And millennials in the United States voted strongly for Bernie Sanders, which I would suggest is the new— you know, this is the new popularity of the authoritarian paradigm, the new authoritarian agenda.
Updating the book; Talcott Parsons on order
Erik Townsend: Most authors find that after their book is published, they realize things that they forgot to mention, or new developments occur that would be relevant if they had been known at the time of publication. Now, you wrote The Fourth Turning 20 years ago. So, with the benefit of hindsight, what would you change or add to the book? What's the update bringing The Fourth Turning up to today's world?
Neil Howe: You know, I think about that a lot now because I'm actually working on an update to it. I think the one thing I would just say is that although I do think that every turning has this morphology, we should not expect it's going to work out exactly like the last turning of the The current awakening is not going to be exactly like the last one. I think we can be too mesmerized by the fact that the last Fourth Turning we had started with the Great Depression and ended with World War II. I think there are more possibilities. We could be defeated in a Fourth Turning. We can completely unravel in a Fourth Turning.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Neil Howe: See, the amazing popularity of these dystopian or alternative history drama shows on HBO and Netflix today, really spelling out those scenarios. If you look at all fourth turnings, you see that it is a certain kind of social mood, but it can go in different directions.
I always allow a great deal for the contingency of history, but I will say this, and let me just add that there is a powerful thought, and this is by a sociologist who wrote in the 1950s, Talcott Parsons, and he once suggested that all social systems move through 4 You know, there's a first phase. You said society wants a strong sense of order. There's a demand for order, and there's a good supply of order. And that would've been sort of America during the American high, you know, the late '40s, '50s, early '60s. So, the next phase is a time when there's a strong supply of order, but there's a weakening demand for it. No one wants any of the social discipline anymore. Everyone just wants to be on their own. And I think that's the second turning, the awakening.
I think then we go through a phase, as Talcott Parsons would have said, where we no longer want order, so demand is low, but the supply is also low. Low demand for order, low supply of order, and I think that's the America of the third turning. That would have been America throughout most of the '80s, the '90s, and some of the '00s, a lightly governed America, an America that was more You could do your own thing culturally, and where the dominant idea was deregulation and tax cuts, basically cutting back on the size of any public obligation. And then he said there is a stage when the supply of order is low, but the demand for it rises. Right? That's the fourth turning. Right? We have institutions that cannot supply order; they cannot supply. community.
But underlying, the demand for it is rising. That is generationally driven. And right now, that's where we find ourselves.
Hedgeye work and passive investing
Erik Townsend: Finally, as we close, first of all, I can't possibly be strong enough in recommending to everyone in our audience, if you haven't read The Fourth Turning, do yourself a favor, go right now, order it on Amazon. You don't want to miss this book. But in fairness to you, Neil, that's a book you wrote 20 years ago. And I know now Now, these days you're working with our friends at Hedgeye. You have several projects underway. So please bring our listeners up to date on what else you're working on these days and what they can expect from you in coming months and years, both in terms of new books as well as on other fronts.
Neil Howe: Oh gosh, you know, we write about every manner of such trends. You know, first of all, we spend a lot of time just looking at demographics and looking at what's ahead for the population of the United States as well as other I think what's fascinating to me is this recent rise in the mortality rate. Americans are actually age-adjusted, we're actually dying faster than we did in earlier years lately, largely due to the opioid epidemic, as well as due to disappointing lifestyle gains among boomers, who are not taking very good care of themselves. Of course, that's adding to our whole burden of healthcare spending.
Fertility interests me hugely, and that's a big wildcard. Everyone's wondering when millennials are going to start having kids. will start having babies and having kids and moving into homes? Or will they be moving into homes at all? Or will they still be saddled by college debt, which is the new mortgage, the new mortgage for this generation? So, fundamental demographic issues, certainly.
I think also what we do is take a lot of both demographic trends and generational trends and try to figure out what they mean for each industry, whether it's hotels and OTAs, whether it's CPG, packaged foods, for example. What's happening in— what are the prospects for the auto industry? What is the likelihood of self-driving cars?
We do a lot of that. I would say very often, many of the people at Hedgeye are very much laser-focused on a particular sector. We sort of cross all sectors. We always just bring our own framework, our own particular generational and demographic perspective, and hone in on a particular area of interest for us. Obviously, one thing I'll be doing a lot of work on, probably the coming couple of months at least, the impact of passive investing on the stock market.
And this is something that's beginning to concern a lot of people. What is the impact of the BlackRocks and the Vanguards and the State Streets, right, as they represent a greater and greater share of every company in every industry? Does it— do we have a lemming mentality in markets? You know, most importantly, maybe more disturbingly, does it actually lead to a decline in genuine competition? Since I often regard this as the paradox of complete investor diversification, means that every investor owns a piece of every company in every industry. So who's any company competing against anymore in terms of ownership? These are actually new issues on the horizon, and there's a lot there.
Erik Townsend: We asked our friends at Hedgeye if we could share some of your writings with our listeners. They were extremely generous, sent us about half a dozen different pieces. So registered users, you can find the download links to all of those articles written by Neil in your Research Roundup email. Neil, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. We're going to have to leave it there in the interest of time. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer break
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Postgame: the big crisis has not arrived
Patrick Ceresna: You know, Erik, what a great interview with Neil Howe. You know what really I can take away from this is that when we always have these guests come on, and they're very valuable guests giving us the views of the cyclical trends and the, and the secular moves coming in the markets in the US dollar being bullish and all this macro data being bearish or bullish. But what's nice to step back and see the really big picture. And I think that's what I took away from this is that we're really looking at these generational trends and where things play out over decades. And I really just found it so fascinating to hear him. You know, what stood out for you?
Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, I couldn't agree more with you that Neil is the man in terms of the ultimate big picture guy. He really zooms out to the very The big picture.
The thing that was most striking to me, and I was afraid of it, was that he confirmed my worst thoughts about Fourth Turnings, which is the way these things tend to play out is what you see in the beginning of a Fourth Turning is a preponderance of significant problems that feel like really big problems, but it's not actually the big problem yet. Eventually, those come in together into a really, really big problem, and that's That's the one that gets systemically resolved, as was the case with the end of World War II, the establishment of the IMF and the World Bank and the UN and the various other institutions that were created at that time and so forth.
We haven't had the big event, and I don't think that it can be a world war. That's probably the fearmongering thing. Oh no, a world war is coming. That's not my prediction at all, because, I mean, if it did come, it would go nuclear and it would destroy humanity and that would be it. There would be no resolution. So in the age of nuclear weapons, hopefully there are enough smart people around the world to not have the nuclear war. So what does happen? What is the greater, bigger problem that we haven't seen yet that dwarfs the 2008 financial crisis? I don't know. I guess we're going to find out.
The Fourth Turning as Erik's investing framework
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, we planned on covering various tactics and strategies of trading the US dollar, and we discussed that in last week's But something really stood out for me when you said in the opening question to Neil that the cognizance of being in a Fourth Turning is the center of your own investing process. So I wanted to just step back and reflect back on episode 73 at the end of that interview we had with Chris Whalen, where we were talking about the kind of ways that you look at the markets. But I don't remember you mentioning anything about Fourth Turnings in that discussion.
So, what I was hoping we can maybe do here is just quickly cover that concept and see how it fits into your investment framework. Can you describe how does the Fourth Turning concept fit into the investment framework you described in the postgame segment of episode 73, 2 weeks ago?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, cognizance of where we are in the big long cycle is really the beginning of everything that I do. It's just the way my brain is wired. I have to start from the top down. And the big picture top down is we're in this 80-year-long cycle, the generational long-wave cycle that has 4 seasons. And right now we're in winter. We're in this Fourth Turning. And that's where the other themes that we talked about 2 weeks ago come from. So how do I get to an investment idea like I think the international monetary system has to have a reset and the US The dollar will eventually be replaced as the world's reserve currency. Well, we know that the dollar came into existence as the world's reserve currency at the end of the last Fourth Turning, and it seems about right to me that it'll be by the end of this Fourth Turning that we'll have a resolution to Triffin's dilemma, which we talked about 2 weeks ago, and we'll eventually see a new world reserve currency, possibly a government-backed cryptocurrency.
So I I start with the big picture of knowing where we are, and I start to look for smaller themes within that. And that's where some of those themes that we discussed last week came into play.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay. So in your framework, everything starts with the long-wave cycle and understanding that we're in this Fourth Turning. And so it's easy to see how you got so interested in the inevitable monetary system reset, which we discussed in episode 73, because the system was set up at the end of the last Fourth Turning. So it stands to reason that we're due to change it again at the end of this Fourth Turning.
Debt addiction and broken pension promises
Patrick Ceresna: So what are some of the other major themes in today's markets that you derive from cognizance that we're going through this Fourth Turning?
Erik Townsend: Well, probably the biggest one is the global addiction to debt. We've got just way too much sovereign debt, too much private debt, too much corporate debt. We have become We're addicted as a society to living beyond our means on borrowed money.
And this is a natural problem of human nature that people don't solve problems until it's too late. People always tend to want to kick the can down the road. And particularly, this is one thing I would say that is unfortunately a limitation of democracy. In a relatively short election cycle, you know, an 8-year presidential cycle in the United States, There is no incentive for a politician to take on a problem like excessive Treasury debt until it's too late to solve it. Because back when it was not too late to solve it, they would just have to expose the country to a bunch of austerity that a lot of people wouldn't understand, and it would be very difficult for them to get any political capital benefit out of that. So we are, as a society, the entire Western world is completely addicted to debt. China is catching up very, very quickly with its massive credit expansion. All of this has to end very badly, but the way these bubbles tend to go is it's going to keep inflating and inflating and inflating longer than most of us think possible until it eventually comes to a head.
And I think that does happen in this Fourth Turning. We somehow have to resolve the problem. You know what's happened for the last several presidential cycles is that in each cycle, the president over the course of 8 years doubles the national debt. So Obama doubled the national debt from $10 to $20 trillion approximately. Bush doubled it from $5 to $10 trillion.
You can't go on doubling the national debt every 8 years. It's not sustainable. At some point, it It has to come to a head. I don't know exactly when and how it does, but I think that's going to be probably the biggest driver of what's the really big problem that has to get resolved in this Fourth Turning, is just ridiculous amounts of debt.
The next thing, and it's a close cousin to that, is that the very most important social contracts that we have in society are the guaranteed pension and entitlement systems, whether it be Social Security, Social Security in the United States, government pensions, corporate pensions, what have you. All of the working people of the world have been told, look, you've got to trust the system and don't worry, there's really smart finance guys like us in charge of it. And we're going to make sure that you are comfortable in your retirement and everything's gonna be fine. You just work hard, pay your taxes, and it's all gonna be fine. Well, what's going to happen, as we talked to Neil about in this Is those promises are going to be broken, and there's no way around it. There's not enough money there. We didn't save the way we were supposed to. The Social Security system is bankrupt. It's essentially a Ponzi scheme.
It doesn't have enough money in it. Social Security trust fund is basically government loans payable from the government to the government. It doesn't make any sense. All of this has to come to a head, and what's going to happen is the good people of the world that have been patient through all this, that feel that they are guaranteed. You know, they— I paid into the Social Security system, damn it, I am entitled to my benefits. Well, you're not going to get your benefits if you're late in the baby boom generation because there's not going to be any money to pay them with. And yes, that's unfair and it's wrong and it's unjust. That horrific injustice to the people from the system is going to lead to massive unrest.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Massive uprisings of discontent, demands for change. Unfortunately, it will probably be violent in many places around the world, and eventually we've got to see some kind of resolution.
And it really comes down ultimately to wealth inequality.
Inequality, populism and the end of borders
Erik Townsend: We have a dramatic imbalance between wealthy and not wealthy people. The haves and the have-nots have never been so divided as they are today. You know, when I was a kid, capitalism was a really good thing. It was possible for anybody from any background to go and start a business and become wealthy, even if they had come from very humble beginnings. Well, that kind of capitalism has given way to crony capitalism, where, you know, the bankers that are able to capture the government regulators and get them to do what they want, and special interests buying out the actions of government, have led to such a corrupt system.
This has all got to find some resolution, and I think that that is going to mean a transition to much more populism and probably socialism. Collectivism is the trend, and everything in Neil's work says you go in this cycle to a much more collectivist social mentality. Now, don't think I personally favor that. I'm an individualist. I'm from that generation, and I'm sure a lot of people I know people in our audience are saying, you know, no, I don't want socialism. I don't want collectivism. Look, this is what happens in these big cycles. It's bigger than you and me. And so it's, it's not a do I want it or do I not want it. I'm trying to figure out how to get ready for it.
We have to realize that the world has changed in some dramatic ways, Patrick. The concepts of sovereign nations and war and enemy and border don't really make any sense anymore. How do you— how does a nation have a war with its enemy that's another nation in this world that we live in where the biggest threats are from terrorism? And one of the things that Americans aren't aware of because it's not covered in their American news is a lot of people around the world have been very, very critical of US policy saying this war on terror is a false metaphor. Terror is a tactic. It's not a party. You can't You can't declare a tactic to be your enemy. Well, the reason that we've declared this war to be against an enemy called terror is because it's really difficult to identify who specifically the enemy is. It's not just all citizens of a particular country. Even the idea of borders is not so clear because, you know, you look at something like this alleged hacking of elections.
I'm not sure that really happened, but if it had, You know, it's happening across borders in cyberspace.
So all of these concepts of how the world is designed around borders and national governments and this idea of enemies and war and peace between different sovereign nations, it's all a very different world where the various actors are much smaller than nations. And, you know, it's a form of crime as opposed to a form of war.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah. Yeah.
Erik Townsend: As opposed to national warfare that's very difficult to fight. So all of these concepts, we've got to get to some new system of order that takes into account the idea that old concepts of wars and borders don't really make sense anymore.
And I think eventually we get to probably a globalization of currency and eventually some kind of global tax system. And no, folks, I'm I'm not in favor of any of this. I think it's a horrific idea. I think that what is going to happen is that the collectivists will eventually get to the point where they denounce any kind of country that treats its citizens respectfully and doesn't tax them to death as a tax haven. And that's the enemy, and we have to take care of it by globalizing taxes so that everybody pays a certain amount and it's possible to leave your country of birth and go to a place that's more favorable in terms of its tax environment.
These are the way that the people who are in power think. I don't agree with any of those views, but I think those are the challenges that lay ahead. Does that mean it's gonna go that way? I don't know, but these are the size of problems that I think need to get resolved by the end of this Fourth Turning around 2030.
Automation and the future of work
Patrick Ceresna: You know what's a really interesting concept that I don't know if it was fully reflected in this, but what What happens if this age of technological displacement of workers and this idea of artificial intelligence and everything coming over the next decade or 2, what if that shapes or becomes a very important part of the next part of the Fourth Turning? And that's something that would be interesting to see if Neil has a view on that.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, I think you hit the nail on the head. That is going to be a key issue. And it There is a complete blank slate in terms of— if you stop and think about it, robotization of the economy is not a bad thing. It's much better for the people of the world if human beings have to do less work and machines do it for us. But the problem is the whole economy is structured around needing physical labor from human beings, and the only way that a lot of human beings can earn an income and be able to feed their families is by doing that physical labor.
If you eliminate the need for human beings to do physical labor, you've got to have a whole new system for how to take care of and provide for those human beings who used to be in the business of doing physical labor. And, you know, not everybody can be the engineer that designs the robot. There isn't a need to have so many robot design engineers that the entire population goes to MIT and studies robotics.
It's not gonna work that way. So what do you do to change this fundamental assumption of society that there's always a need for physical labor, and that's the way physical laborers end up getting paid and are able to feed their families? Is that an argument?
I'm sure it will be used by the collectivists as an argument for socialism. What we can do is have all these robots And, you know, the robot engineer guys will design the robots, and, you know, we'll take all of the productivity of society and we'll divide it by having a very, very high tax rate on the minority of people who actually have income so that we can provide for all of the people. Many of them don't have income because robots are doing all the work. How do you get from here to there without upsetting a lot of people on both sides of that argument? It's a completely blank slate, and I think it's something that we're going to have to take on as a society over the next 20 years or so. Maybe not in the scope of this Fourth Turning, but certainly we'll get to the beginnings of it, and we'll be laying the principles and foundations in this Fourth Turning for how we navigate these technology-replacing human labor issues that are going to continue to be a major mainstay of technology innovation for the next 30 or Well, you know what?
Patrick Ceresna: I'm glad we chose to go down this path. I mean, we are definitely going to live in interesting times over the next decade or 2 as we go through this transformation. I'm glad we spent this postgame talking about it. Also, thanks for sharing your views on how things will likely progress with the investment process as we move forward. But now folks, we haven't forgotten about the fact that we were meant to talk about the dollar trading tactics and strategies. strategies we promised in last week's episode. So we're going to have to do that in next week's show. Now, Erik, is there anything else you wanted to add before we close?
Outro and Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: Well, you've heard it before, folks. We really need your help promoting the show. We're getting so many fantastic guests like Neil on, and we're at an inflection point where we really need your help. I want to thank everyone who's rated and reviewed us on iTunes. If you haven't done it yet, we'd really appreciate your help. If you're able to, please donate to help defray our production costs. But most importantly, register your free account at MacroVoices.com. The more registered users we have, the more able Patrick is to negotiate to get the very best featured interview guests on the program. The benefit to you is you'll receive our free Research Roundup email. This week, for example, you're gonna get links to about half a dozen different excellent pieces of writing from Neil Howe, and there's all sorts of other There are links to cool stuff that we were able to find on the internet each week. It never contains any advertising or marketing.
Patrick, what's in this week's Research Roundup?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Neil. And like you suggested, there's all the links to Neil Howe's articles that he was kind enough to share with all of our listeners. There's also an article from Art Berman titled, Are Strong US Crude Inventory Draws Sustainable? And you'll also find an interesting blog article from Tim Long versus short Canadian lenders, why are opinions so different? You'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup.
That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners and are always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share your content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com.
Erik Townsend: Thanks, everyone.
Patrick Ceresna: Or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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