Russell Napier — financial historian and consultant to institutional investors (Erik at w1745); professor, market historian and institutional consultant (Patrick at w1709) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer opening and host introduction

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 63 was recorded May 18th, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. Russell Napier has been on our guest wish list since we launched this podcast well over a year ago. So, I'm really excited to have Russell joining me as this week's featured interview guest. We'll discuss the US dollar rally, secular bull market in Treasuries, The coming pension crisis, inflation expectations, precious metals, European exit contagion, and much, much more.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Before we dive into our market wrap, I just wanted to mention that we taped today's show Thursday morning, so our commentary won't include anything that's happened in the market throughout Thursday's trading session.

Market wrap: S&P 500 stalls below 2,400

Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, when we're looking at that S&P 500, just over the last few days, we had a 50-point plunge in the S&P off that 2,400 level. What a crazy move. Is this a turning point in the market, or do you Or do you think that this is just a short-term little dip?

Erik Townsend: You know, I really don't have a strong opinion on that, Patrick. What I would say is that, you know, the usual theory in technical analysis is the more times that a given level is rejected, the stronger that resistance or support is, and that means that the less likely it is to be broken through. So, we've seen 2,400 be rejected pretty darn strongly by the market quite a few times now. That seems to be a bearish signal. So, as they say in earthquake country, is this the big one? Uh, I don't know. I don't think anybody knows. And, you know, trying to call tops and bottoms in markets is usually fool's work. You're better off to wait until an established trend exists. In this case, the trend clearly has been up, but it's been up for a long time, and I think it's pretty long in the tooth at this point. So, I don't know how to call a top. I'm surprised it hasn't broken above 2,400.

Maybe this is the top. We'll see what happens.

Market wrap: dollar index slide and buy-the-dip

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to that dollar index. And what's particularly interesting to me about the dollar index is normally we almost see like a risk-on, risk-off movement of the dollar against the markets. But yesterday, uh, we saw not only the market downdraft, but the US dollar index had a substantial down leg as well, uh, as, as it drafted all the way down to the 97 handle. What's your feeling about the dollar index here?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I've described the reasons that I am bullish on the dollar in the intermediate to longer term. And, you know, it doesn't matter what my reasons are. This chart looks awful right now. So I'm very glad to be out of this trade on the sidelines. I don't want to be short here because I am bullish on the fundamentals. But you look at this tape and you just have to say, wow, something's going on. So the question I think is, you know, where is it by the bottom?

I would love to use this as an opportunity to get into the long trade, you know, at the bottom. Doesn't everybody ever always want to be at the bottom? I just said a minute ago in equities, it's calling tops and bottoms. is risky business. So it's hard to tell where to get back in. Maybe we can talk about that after the feature interview and get into it in some more detail. But I think it's headed towards a buy-the-dip opportunity here. It's just a question of where that dip level is.

Market wrap: crude oil and the OPEC cut extension

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's actually get up, move on to crude oil here. You know, crude is just hovering just below the $50 level on West Texas. What's your feeling here as where the next move in oil is?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's been an absolute roller coaster of a week. Of course, we had seen that big sell-off that we talked about last week. Then OPEC came out with the usual propaganda song and dance, this business of extending a production cut which did not work before in the sense of making a meaningful change in inventory and stock levels around the world and in the United States. Well, it sure did work in terms of elevating the price. The propaganda was effective even if the, uh, the strategy didn't Really accomplish what it was supposedly intended to achieve. I think what we're going to see is a repeat of the same thing. We've got a whole new round of OPEC propaganda. Hooray, hallelujah! We're going to extend the production cut for another six months. Well, that's the same production cut that has not been effective, and we've seen more oil come online in other parts of the world that more than counterbalances that 1.8 million barrel. Per day cut that OPEC and Russia have agreed to and have now agreed apparently to extend.

So, uh, the 200-day moving average is a really big deal here. We did take out the 200-day to the downside, very, very strong bearish signal.

Now we've recovered above it on this news. The big question is, is this a dead cat bounce or is it going to be sustainable? And even the answer to that question has been a roller coaster ride just this week. What we saw is, uh, after the OPEC announcement, there was a big move up above the 200-day moving average, which is right around $49. Then we rolled over it all the way back down to retest $48. And I thought to myself, wow, even OPEC rhetoric cannot generate a bounce that lasts more than a day. A day later after that, and we're $2 higher. I don't think that inventory was the primary catalyst. We did see a drawdown on crude oil inventories of 1.8 million barrels. That's pretty normal for this time of year. Cushing saw a build of 35,000 barrels. Gasoline drawing down 413,000 barrels. Distillates drawing down 1.9 million barrels. So, for the most part, drawdowns across the board with a small build in Cushing.

You know, that's pretty typical this time of year.

I think that what we're really going to see here is a tug of war between the bears and the bulls. Is this whole OPEC propaganda strategy going to breathe new life into this market? Will Saudi Arabia be successful at keeping the price above 50, which a lot of people have said is the whisper level that they feel that they need to sustain in order for the Saudi Aramco IPO to be effective? We'll see what happens. Right now we're hovering on those key moving averages and look for a very substantial move in one direction or the other from here. I lean towards the downside, but you know, as I said in the last couple weeks, if this has gotten to where it's not as nearly as easy and clean as it was a few months ago when the market was way overvalued.

Market wrap: gold rallies on a weaker dollar

Patrick Ceresna: Now, let's take a look at gold. Now, when you look at gold, we had this huge push higher up to the $1,260 level, obviously driven as the US dollar weakened and the natural intermarket relationship, the inverse relationship really kicked in and we came to a very key overhead level. What's your feeling? Does gold break out here or is this just a short-term pop?

Erik Townsend: Well, we saw a low a little over a week ago at $1,214. We're back up to $1,253 as we're speaking on Thursday morning after a brief briefly testing $1,265 earlier today. Certainly looks like there's some legs to this rally at the moment. Again, if the dollar index is going to be falling over, whether I think it should or not, the dollar index is falling over, that ought to portend a higher gold price. So, you know, it's really no surprise that we've seen this move in the last couple of days. The question, as we mentioned earlier, is where is the low going to come in the dollar index? Are we looking at You know, a structural change here, or is this just a little buy-the-dip opportunity? I'm leaning towards buy-the-dip. That might suggest that the rally in gold will be short-lived. But I want to ask Russell Napier in the feature interview about this because there's also the Raoul Pal view about gold and the dollar moving up at the same time.

I want to get his take on that.

Market wrap: 10-year Treasury yields

Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's move on to Treasury yields with the 10-year. If you remember back in April, we were trading just below the 2.20 level, and suddenly we had this shoot-up in interest rates up to the 2.40, thinking that that was a key low in interest rates for the interim, and suddenly, just in a few days, we find ourselves right back at that, very close to that 2.20 level. What's your feeling on interest rates here?

Erik Townsend: Well, as I've said for the last several weeks, I think that at least in the short to immediate term, we're headed towards lower yields, higher bond prices. And I don't really know exactly what I should believe in terms of whether the structural bull market is over. I think that it's really too early to call that. I want to ask Russell Napier definitely about that. You know, is the Jeff Gundlach view or the Raoul Pal view more accurate in terms of where bonds are headed? But, uh, at least in the short term, my view is lower yields. Whether or not the low yield for all time is really in at 1.36% or whatever it was last summer, I don't know. We'll find out. And I'll certainly ask Russell Napier that.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, those are some great market insights, Erik. Now, Russell Napier is a professor, a market historian, and institutional consultant. Erik's interview with Professor Napier is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Napier: dollar outlook, yen, renminbi, euro and a new Plaza Accord

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager,

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is financial historian and consultant to institutional investors, Russell Napier. And Russell, I'm so glad to get you on the program. I have long been a big admirer of your work, and I've really been looking forward to this interview. I want to start with a subject that's near and dear to my heart, and I'm sure yours as well, which is the US dollar rally. I've been very bullish on the US dollar. I think structurally that this rally is set to continue. But boy, I woke up this morning and looked at the chart. It's looking awfully ugly. So, did I get it wrong?

Russell Napier: Well, indeed, today's not a good day to be a bull of the dollar. Obviously, there are political issues besetting the dollar exchange rate today, but the challenges for the other major exchange rates of the currencies of the world are significantly bigger. A very quick run through the 3 major ones shows the scale of this. Number one, Japan is running out of savings, and by that I mean it has insufficient private sector savings to fund its government, at least in the domestic market. Place, at least in yen. The central bank has stepped in. It's not doing quantitative easing. It's effectively doing outright financing of government deficits. That has always led to a decline in the exchange rate. It is fairly volatile at the minute, but I would expect a major further decline. Capping the yield curve and using central bank money to cap the yield curve effectively puts an unlimited scale of purchase on quantitative easing or extension of quantitative easing.

And therefore, I think the yen has much further to go. That's a structural issue. It's not a cyclical issue. It's not a political issue as we have with the dollar today that might pass this This one is structural in nature and is going to be with us for some considerable time.

The second structural problem affects the Chinese currency, and that's a very simple one. It has pursued a policy of mercantilism, managing its currency relative to the dollar and thus to other currencies. That has been aimed at taking market share in exports, but it has a profound and direct impact on monetary policy. Structurally, it's a purpose which— it's a policy which is now unfit for purpose. You can't be probably the second biggest economy in the world. And hope to run a mercantilist monetary policy. So that exchange rate target will have to go. I think most people would point to the supply and demand in the international exchanges for the renminbi and say if the policy is abandoned, that means a lower renminbi.

And finally, the euro. People are getting a bit more optimistic at the moment. It seems the European project is back on course. But ultimately, the move to a federal system in Europe, I believe, is still set for failure. We will not be able to create a coherent federal system that is necessary to back up the euro, and therefore we have a short-term rally in the euro.

Now, whatever problems America America may have with the president or other political problems, these are passing problems, whereas those other 3 problems are really far from passing. They're structural in nature. And finally, there's the amount of US dollar debt in the world borrowed cross-border.

When we get an economic recession, particularly an economic recession associated with deflation and falling corporate cash flows, there's usually a rush to pay back debt. When people pay back debt, in aggregate, they're net buyers of the dollar. So that overlays everything that happens in foreign exchange markets. It's usually irrelevant for the United States dollar, but very occasionally, as we saw in 2007, 2008, you get one of these events, a deflationary event, where people rush to pay back the debt, and it's bullish for the dollar. So, I can talk for 1 hour on the dollar alone, but that is a brief summary of the forces that remain very positive for the United States dollar.

Erik Townsend: I'm very much in agreement with you, Russell, but I'd like to kind of push on the other side of this, which is, at some point, if you and I are right, and all of these forces take the dollar higher, It could potentially blow up emerging markets where there's so much debt payable in dollars. Does that lead us to a version 2 of the Plaza Accord or some other kind of policy intervention where effectively the government is forced to arrest the ascent of the dollar? And I guess on the same vein, Donald Trump clearly wants the dollar to be lower. Does he have any ability to really change it with the other policies that he's chosen, or is he just all blowing smoke when he discusses it?

Russell Napier: Yeah, I think it's a great question. Number one, yes, it would create extreme pain for the emerging markets, particularly as I believe it will be associated with a much smaller current account deficit for the United States of America, which is something we might come back to. But it wouldn't just be a strong US dollar, it would be a strong US dollar reflecting the fact that America is simply not running the scale of deficits it used to. So, if you like, 2 forms of pain coming through the emerging markets.

The next question is a political question. Could we get the political capital to forge a new Plaza Accord. That looks incredibly difficult at the moment because cooperation is probably not high, probably the best euphemism we could use among the international community. But remember, in Plaza, the secret to that agreement was that somebody had to walk into the room and volunteer to have a strong currency, and that someone was Japan. And they volunteered to have a strong currency because they were genuinely fearful of protectionist rhetoric and potentially measures coming out of the Congress.

Now, it's not clear to me today who would walk out into the international marketplace and volunteer for that stronger currency. People might say China, but I think that's unlikely given the pressure on their exchange rate actually is downwards. I think it's unlikely that China would, you know, go through a major rise in interest rates or some measure of that magnitude to try and put its exchange rate up. So, I think we need to get these things in the right order. A crisis first, which could deliver political agreement, but the disarray in the international sphere of cooperation doesn't suggest that we'd move smoothly. to a world of the Plaza Accord. So, I'm afraid, I think there'd have to be some sort of crisis first before we got to that accord.

Napier: reserve currency change and the reverse Triffin dilemma

Erik Townsend: Russell, before we leave the topic of the US dollar, because you're a financial historian, I'd like to talk about the dollar's role as the world's reserve currency. Now, clearly, for the immediate future, the dollar has to stay the world's reserve currency because there is no viable alternative. There's no other bond market besides the US Treasury market that's deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. But boy, there's an increasing number of people around the world who are very upset about the fact that the dollar has a monopoly on the reserve currency status. We've got people like Sergei Glazyev in Russia advising Vladimir Putin to try to do everything he can to de-dollarize and move away from foreign trade in dollars. As a financial historian, are these the kind of things that lead to an eventual regime change for the world's reserve currency? Or is this just people blowing smoke in terms of whether it's going to actually change anything?

Russell Napier: Well, of course, we've seen a regime change before, and that was from sterling to the dollar. It has to be said that that regime change happened as the United Kingdom's economy became much smaller. The United Kingdom ended World War I incredibly indebted. It ended World War I with incredibly low reserves. And during that period, the United States economy had made massive, massive increases, not just in terms of economic output, but over the preceding period in terms of the number of people. So, that was a very clear— even then, it wasn't a one-off event, but it was pretty clear to most people that that regime change had happened. So, short of a one-off event, and in that case, it was a world war, which we don't foresee, then what we talk about is a slow, a gradual process until we reach a tipping point.

So, what investors have to look at, rather than, I think, trying to forecast when it will happen or if it will happen, is looking at a tipping point. And to me, the tipping point would be fairly straightforward, and that is evidence of a liquidation of Treasuries by foreign central banks that pushed interest rates higher, that pushed the yield curve higher. That would be the key bit. As you know, global foreign exchange reserves are actually declining. They're not as bad as they seem. A lot of it is exchange rate impacts, but they're not going up. They're coming down a little bit, and they haven't had any negative impact on the US yield curve. But if that began to happen, then I think we are looking at a world where we can begin to talk about the timescale of this happening much more quickly than we thought. So, I would say there's very little evidence of it yet, but that's what investors should look out for.

As you say, it should take a long time because we need to find another large liquid asset class in a jurisdiction with a rule of law. I would stress the last of those in Europe is clearly a jurisdiction like that, but I'm not sure about China. I'm not sure how comfortable people would be about holding huge amounts of assets in the Chinese currency, given the rather dubious rule of law that exists there in enforcing property rights. So just watch the global foreign exchange reserves. One can watch that, it's published, and see if any of these liquidations affect US interest rates. And if they don't, I think we are still talking about something that is some considerable time in the future.

For those of you who want a rather colorful view of what that means, there is a novel on the subject, believe it or not. By Lionel Shriver called The Mandibles. And in that book, that novel, that fictional account, Lionel Shriver looks at what happens when the Russians and the Chinese get together with a disintegrating Eurozone to create a new currency. And the Russians do have a little bit of previous on this. During the financial crisis, they did approach the Chinese and suggest that a dumping of dollars/Treasuries may be an interesting tactic to pursue. So, it's not something that has slipped their minds.

As you mentioned, but I think it's an inoperable strategy at this moment.

Erik Townsend: One more question I have on the US dollar before we move on is with respect to the supply of US dollars worldwide to support its role as world's reserve currency. The petrodollar system really has been the primary driver of that. And now what we have with the shale oil revolution is the United States producing as much oil as Saudi Arabia practically. And that means a much— first of all, the current account deficit changes. And I wanted to come back to that because you mentioned it earlier. But also that just means that we have a lot less dollars available to the global financial system. So how do you see this change in the sourcing of energy, moving it onshore, and how that affects the US dollar?

Russell Napier: Yeah, I think that's a crucial point. It's kind of the Triffin dilemma, but in reverse. The Triffin dilemma, which many listeners will remember, was pointed out in the early 1960s And it said that with everybody linking to the United States dollar, the United States, to keep the world growing, would have to run bigger and bigger deficits. But as those deficits got bigger, current account deficits got bigger, people would lose faith in the ability of America to ultimately exchange dollars for gold. And that proved to be true because the current account deficit got bigger and bigger, and that loss of faith actually occurred.

Today, in my opinion, we have exactly the reverse problem. Now, the good news is not everybody is linking to the United States dollar. Clearly, we have a lot of major currencies in the world that move freely, point to the euro in particular. But across the emerging world, we certainly have these. Across the petro world, as you point out, we certainly have these currencies managed against the dollar. And in Switzerland, we have a currency that is managed and not freely floating. In other words, we don't live in a Bretton Woods system, but then we don't live in a system of fully flexible exchange rates either. So it is important to keep liquidity in this system that America runs bigger deficits.

You pointed to one crucial reason for this, that it's not running bigger deficits, and that is shale oil and gas. At the bottom of the US recession in 2009, the US current account deficit as a percentage of GDP was pretty close to where it is today. So that's been the remarkable thing. We've had this great growth in the economy— well, subpar growth, but great growth by global standards— and no growth in the current account deficit. That is a fundamental problem for the global monetary system.

I could add other things in there. I would stress the role of the baby boom generation and the aging of the baby boom generation. I believe the baby boom generation shifts towards services away from goods as it ages. It may even eventually see its savings rate going up. A rising savings rate and a shift from goods consumption to services consumption is going to mean a smaller current account deficit. So even with growth, the current account deficit relative to GDP is not growing.

A recession, a slowdown of any sort, and America can find itself pretty rapidly in a current account surplus. And this system we have This ad hoc, jerry-rigged system where many countries have chosen to follow the dollar simply does not work in that scenario. And if you've borrowed a lot of dollars and there's not a lot of dollar liquidity out there, then it's a fundamental reason why the dollar could spike sharply higher as people seek to repay their dollar debt because of a lack of dollar liquidity. There could be a real scramble to get dollars in a scenario like this.

Napier: deflation, debt and inflation expectations

Erik Townsend: As we move on, I'd like to touch on inflation expectations because some people are starting to say, okay, the deflationary force is over, it's all inflation from here. Others are saying, you know, we haven't even seen the worst of it yet. Where do you see this headed, not just in the short term, but in the intermediate to long term as well?

Russell Napier: Yeah, well, I remain in the deflation camp. I would begin by pointing out that if inflation is everywhere at all times a monetary phenomenon, broad money supply growth is moderate. It's not high. It's not the level you'd associate with rapidly rising inflation. Actually, it's below levels that we'd associate with the great disinflation of the past 30 years. So, it's not conclusive that it's going to be inflation, not conclusive that it's going to be deflation just looking at money. To hear some people think, you would believe that the world was awash with money, awash perhaps with central bank-created money, which is bank reserves, but not awash with the broad money, the money that funds economic activity, the money that funds asset prices, the money that ultimately would be responsible for So, from a monetary perspective, I think the jury is at least out. So, why, if the jury is out, do I find myself ending up in the deflationary camp?

Well, there are many structural reasons for deflation, which I'm sure your listeners are familiar with, whether that's technological or whether it's just China and its ability to keep adding more and more capacity. But when you have a grossly overleveraged system and total global debt-to-GDP ratio is very probably at an all-time high— we don't have that data going back 100 years, 200 years, and 300 years. We don't have good data.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Russell Napier: Private sector debt data going back over that time horizon. But almost certainly we are at an all-time high for total debt to GDP. There is not a lot of room for mistakes, particularly a slowing of growth and a falling of cash flows when debt to GDP levels are that high. And any mistake of that nature with debt to GDP at that high, with inflation this low, raises pretty quickly the specter of deflation. I think we had it as recently as last February when inflation expectations were incredibly low.

They've bounced a lot since last February, but in the last month and a half, they've been coming off very rapidly indeed. I think one of the more amazing statistics is just looking at this famous 5-year forward, 5-year, 5-year, what people expect inflation expectations to be 5 years out for the next 5 years, a famous indicator that Bernanke used to quote to us. Well, it's now at 1.93%. Bernanke started launching his quantitative easing programs every time it got to 2.2%.

So, we're now below the level at which Ben Bernanke thought it necessary to launch quantitative easing in the first place. So, I might be wrong on this deflation shock. It may not come. But I think it is far, far too early to be endorsing a view that we're moving towards higher levels of inflation. And I certainly wouldn't like to be investing investors' money betting on inflation. So, the jury is out. I have an opinion, but the movement in the 5-year, 5-year forward should be raising some questions as whether this Great Reflation that people have been betting on really since last February is actually in course.

Napier: Treasury bull market and how money is created

Erik Townsend: On a related note, the 35-year bull market in US Treasuries, we've had some notable people, particularly Jeff Gundlach, say, okay, party's over. Last summer, that was it. The high is in. It's all over. It's all downhill in price and uphill in yield from here. We had Dr. Lacy Hunt on the program last week saying, no way, it ain't over till it's over, and this thing ain't over. How do you see this, Russell? Is this something that is going to continue, and does it eventually lead, as some of our guests have said, to turning Japanese, to where we just get stuck in years and years of low interest rates and economic stagnation?

Russell Napier: Yeah, it's— I agree with Lacy Hunt, it's not over. Now, there are 2 ways you can look at the long Treasury. You can say it will measure inflation expectations, and as I'm a deflationist, clearly I believe that those yields are too high and will come down. But the second one is ultimately probably more important. If you believe in the prospect of a financial crisis because the world is overgeared, there's too much debt in the world relative to income streams. And I think that situation is actually getting worse, not getting better, which is not the consensus view. But if you believe that can happen, then as soon as that would happen, particularly with interest rates being extremely low— let's put it another way— with the medicine available to central bankers being significantly more limited Let's not say they've run out, but say just use the phrase significantly more limited. People will run to the large, liquid, high-quality asset class, and that remains the United States Treasury.

Now, if we don't have a financial crisis, I think there's general slow trends down in inflation, which are positive for the Treasury market. But if we have another event of overindebtedness somewhere in the global financial system or a major devaluation. A devaluation in China, a devaluation in Japan, both pouring goods at cheaper dollar prices out into the marketplace, a breakup of any part of the euro, the Eurozone, or a problem in emerging markets. Very, very quickly, people will be rushing for the big liquid asset, and that remains the Treasury. So, I don't believe that we've seen the low for Treasury yields as yet.

Erik Townsend: I was actually very interested. We had Professor Steve Keen and then Dr. Lacy Hunt, 2 economists with very, very different perspectives, but they both came to the same conclusion that we are one way or another going to be stuck for potentially, you know, a decade or more in economic stagnation and extremely low interest rates and a trap that we can't get out of because of the overindebtedness of the entire world. Do you agree with that view? And is Japan a template for what we're headed towards?

Russell Napier: I do agree with the view. What your listeners have to try and get their heads around is how money is actually created. Money is created by an extension of commercial bank balance sheets. It's not ultimately created by the Federal Reserve. The Federal Reserve has long sought to control those commercial banks, and by controlling the commercial banks the way one would control a team of horses, manages the supply of money. But when debt is so high, there is at least a portion of the population— let's call them homeowners, probably not people in private equity, but homeowners— who consider it prudent to begin to reduce their leverage. And that becomes more true the older you get. And we have this baby boom bulge going through the system. And we have a conundrum for the global economy, if I can quote from the maestro. And the conundrum is, how do we create money without creating debt?

Or if we're not going to create debt because so many portions of the system are overleveraged and want to degear, and if banks find it very difficult to grow their balance sheets because so many of their customers want to reduce their debt, how do we grow money?

And it's a question that's not really being So, what I see when I look every day at my screen, I see lots of evidence of more debt, primarily outside the banking system through the bond market, but not a lot of credit being provided by the banks, and therefore not a lot of money being created. And if you constantly add in more debt without the money that inevitably stimulates or is necessary for economic growth and a modicum or a reasonable amount of inflation, then you're going to get yourself into a real problem. And I think that's the real problem. In terms of the timing for that, it's incredibly difficult. But this inability of the banking system to grow, which I think is demand-driven and not supply-driven, is something that the authorities, I think, have not really paid enough attention to.

Napier: pension crisis and the Bundesbank warning on insurers

Erik Townsend: I'm very curious to pick up on that point because from what you've said, you expect very low interest rates to continue for years to come. And it seems to me that that just paints an almost certain picture that we have to have a massive pension crisis. And of course, the biggest social contract promise that we have in modern society is we tell the people that actually have to work for a living, look, you can trust smart finance guys like us to run this system that's going to make sure that you're going to be comfortable in your retirement. Everything's going to be fine. As far as I can tell, Russell, it is mathematically impossible for that promise to be kept based on where we are and what your expectations, which I agree with very much, are for interest rates. So, do you agree that a pension crisis is inevitable?

And what do you see in terms of the consequences of it?

Russell Napier: So, the answer is yes, and you don't have to take my word for it. You know, I think let's just go to the Bundesbank. So, it's a paper that's not much read, but I think one of profound, profound implications for all of us. Paper written by the Bundesbank, now from memory, written in October 2014, may have been October 2015, in which they look at the term structure of interest rates. And they look at the implications for the insurance industry, and they look at the implications for savers, and they conclude that if this level of interest rates continues, it will be impossible for insurance companies, German insurance companies, to live up to the promises they have made to the holders of their policies. Now, since that was written, the whole yield curve shifted lower, and from memory, The date in that report was that by 2020, we could expect German insurance companies to be unable to meet their commitments to the— many

German insurance companies sold fixed yield commitments to their customers. I mentioned Germany rather than the United States because obviously the yield curve is much more depressed there. But also it's because that is where the problems will be seen first. So kicking the can down the road, I'm sure you know, is something that politicians like to do and can actually be done for a very long time. But based on the analysis of the Bundesbank, we cannot kick this can down the road for much longer, because the price to be paid in terms of inability to service and make good on promises to pensioners who were sold products is running out very rapidly. So, given where the US yield curve is, it's a ticking time bomb. But in places like Germany, it may be about to explode.

Napier: politicians retake the field; negative rates, cash and bank runs

Erik Townsend: As a financial historian, I'm very curious to know how you would see this playing out and what prior examples in financial history relate to it. Because my opinion here is the general public, the masses, are never going to seek to understand the intricacies of yield curves and returns and so forth. They're going to wait, and eventually when they figure out they're getting screwed, they start throwing Molotov cocktails. So, it seems to me at some point there's a public Uprising when it becomes clear that the actions of central banks in the last 8 or 9 years have basically led to an inevitable global pension crisis where nobody, no governments and corporations are able to honor their pension commitments to retirees. And of course, we've got the demographic issue of the baby boom moving into retirement at the same time. This seems like a colossal public uprising reset system kind of setup here.

Am I wrong to think it's that significant?

Russell Napier: Yeah, I think it's inevitable. The crucial thing for us is to work out which way we shift when that comes. So the reason that central bankers have been so incredibly active, and I think it's more apparent in America by the day, is because politicians are so remarkably inactive. There is a stalemate on the Hill. There has been for many, many, many years. Politicians have been unable to deliver. I would argue that that's true in other places in the world. For 30-odd years, politicians have passed political power beyond their domestic jurisdictions in Europe, clearly by passing it to Brussels. But we've done so by passing it to central bankers. We've done so by passing it to NAFTA. Power has generally been passed out of the sovereign state, and this has put a huge pressure on the central banks to deliver. But the central banks tried to manipulate markets to deliver growth. That's effectively what they do by manipulating the price of money.

If it doesn't work, then what? Well, I think the answer is straightforward. People demand that the politicians do something. People demand political action. Political action for those people who invest in financial markets means in some way reducing the power of financial markets, reducing the power of price. And I speak to a lot of people about this. People fear inflation, they fear deflation. I fear something much bigger than that, that the political reaction to this is effectively to go through one of those periods again. I would call it dark ages, where we basically, the politicians come in and they run the financial system. Where they begin to get directly involved in the allocation of resources and capital and credit. And we go back into that, let's call it 1950s, 1960s, certainly in a European context. That type of world is the world that the population demands because they look at central banks and say, well, you haven't been able to do this using so-called market forces, so let us use non-market forces.

So we're really dealing with something very existential here, that this will be a shock to the faith in the ability of the market to deliver. Not in the ability of central bankers, but in the ability of the market to deliver, and a decided move towards intervention in markets.

Erik Townsend: You already have negative interest rates in parts of Europe, and Janet Yellen has alluded to being at least open to the possibility of exploring negative interest rates as a policy solution if more accommodation is needed in the future. What is your perspective on this whole issue? Are negative interest rates a major risk? What are the potential risks? potholes and risks that people might not see coming from negative interest rate policy?

Russell Napier: Well, negative interest rates are destructive of the financial system. And we've already discussed that in terms of what they're doing to the German insurance industry. And therefore, they can be a temporary phenomenon, get you back to growth, but they certainly can't be a permanent phenomenon. Otherwise, they destroy the financial system. So it isn't conceivable to me that is a policy which is in place for a prolonged period of time, which takes us back to— and I think it's very easy when you're in a battle To say that here, who's fighting— here is who's fighting the battle. It's the central banks. We must remember that that is not the only force that can fight this battle. There is also the government. And if we ever get to that policy in the United States, it'll become pretty clear pretty quickly just how much damage has been done to the fabric, liquidity, and solvency of the financial system. And then we will move on to more direct government action.

So, I think the fallacy at the minute is to say that our only hope is Janet Yellen. Yeah. The only battle is to be fought by Janet Yellen. And there's this whole other wing of government that is not really on the battlefield as yet, seems to be tied up at the minute with other issues, but will come onto the battlefield when necessary. If you want to know what central bankers have in store for us beyond negative nominal interest rates, then Ben Bernanke is still active on the Brookings Institution He has a blog, and in April of this year, he put out a few more suggestions as to where central bankers could go to provide us with more policy. That's what he does. He's a central banker. But I think what investors have to focus on is the new team that takes the field, and the new team is government and not central banking. So, these policies are so destructive that actually we go down a different route.

We don't have a government that can do that at the moment, certainly in the United States of America, and there's no consensus on that. But a crisis can produce an incredible consensus. So, let's just see what happens when we get the next crisis.

Erik Townsend: I'd like to follow up on negative interest rates specifically with With respect to banning cash, which has been contemplated. Of course, Ken Rogoff is on a crusade to try to persuade the world to ban cash. But, you know, cash has not been banned yet, and we do have negative interest rates some places around the world. I predict that we'll have more negative interest rates around the world before this is over. I worry a lot about a run on the fractional reserve system where people recognize there's a financial incentive to hoard cash, to basically take all of the cash out of their accounts and put it in a safe someplace. Rather than pay negative interest rates in order to pay the government to hold it for you. If that happens, it seems to me you could have a collapse of the fractional reserve system. And although people have said to me, well, we only have very small negative interest rates, you're the financial historian here, but it seems to me that bank runs are emotional things.

They start when somebody panics, and once they start, they're hard to stop. Am I crazy to think that there is a risk of negative interest rate policy leading to a global run on

Russell Napier: Well, it's a bank run of a very different sort. The normal bank run is because you believe you can't get your money out. That's the normal form of bank run. So, this is a form of bank run we just haven't seen before. I think it has profound and negative implications for the financial system. I would not use the word collapse, however. One of the things that's happened to our banking system is flush full of reserves. That is what happens when central banks extend their balance sheets. They create lots of reserves in the banking system. A reserve is just a book entry for de facto cash, which can be turned into notes at any given point in time. So those reserves would would be turned into notes and go into the public and presumably go under their bed. What that is bad for is clearly bad for the economy. If you begin to strip financial resources or the funding of the banking system out of the banking system, it's not going to encourage the banks to get into the business of lending.

So I wouldn't use the word collapse. You can use that word when a run occurs because people really fear for the stability of the financial institution itself. And, you know, once— go back to those German insurance companies, there are reasons for concern in other spheres of the financial system. But this one is very bad for the economy. It's the parable of the talents from the Bible. And if people wish to store their wealth effectively under the bed in banknotes, that is not a productive use of the world's savings. And it has got to be bad for economic activity. And that's why I would fear negative rates. But there are a lot of smart people in America, even in policy circles, they know this. And to stress again, when you begin to look at how negative some of these policies turn out, then the president will look around the table, or the next president will look around the table and say, any other bright ideas?

And the other bright ideas won't be coming from central bankers. They'll be coming from Larry Summers or people like that, people of a different ilk. who believe that fiscal policy or manipulation of markets have a role to play in this as well. So, the very fact that we're talking about that as a potential and the negatives associated with it, I think, just make it clearer that the next battle will be fought not just by central bankers.

Napier: expensive equities and poor long-term returns

Erik Townsend: I could go on for hours. I'm just so fascinated by your perspective on this history, but I want to shift gears now because my listeners will kill me if I don't get your view on the equity markets. So, with all of this backdrop that we've discussed, where do you see equities globally and particularly in the US headed from here?

Russell Napier: Equities are expensive. I probably don't have to say that to your listeners. I'm sure they're well aware of that. The measure I like to use, which is currently in a little bit of disrepute, is the cyclically adjusted PE. I would point out that it's always in disrepute when it gets to a high level. That's when faith in it becomes less. When you have a mean-reverting series, and it has been over the very long term, a mean-reverting series, faith in its mean reversion are obviously at its lowest, just as it reaches its highest level. But historically, there's nothing in the record that suggests you'll get good returns from equities at this level.

The long-term return, a 15 to 20 year return from here, should at best be 2, 2.5%. I think that's the top end of the annual real return you can get from equities with dividends reinvested. That's a long way below the very long-run average of about 6.5%. The problem with that average, many people may say, well, I can live with 2.5% real, it's not that bad, and with compounding, you get a decent number. The problem is it doesn't help you with the distribution of those returns. So, at this level of valuation, you'd expect some pretty bad years. So, maybe I'm trying to be too clever. I'm waiting for those very bad years to be an investor in equities and get them cheap. Very bad years, the very worst years that I show in my book, are associated with deflation. And because I believe we're actually still on the cusp of either inflation or deflation, we certainly haven't moved to sustainable reflation and inflation, then it is possible that one of those really bad years is not very far away.

So I still urge caution on the equity markets of the world. The US market is one of the most expensive in the world, but it is difficult to see how we could have a significant setback for US equities and see the rest of the world's equity markets simply ignore that. There's much more to be said on equities, but fundamentally they're not really going to come down until their cash flows come down. Interest rates are very low. They're not likely to rise anytime soon. If corporate cash flows stay up, then I suspect equity valuations will stay up. So, it's going to have to be something that undermines corporate cash flows. And that has normally, usually been a recession. And the most damaging recessions historically have been those associated with falling prices/deflation. So, until we get an event like that, because I really can't see interest rates going up, then the equity markets are moving along where they are, but providing very poor long-term returns with a significant risk of one very bad down year or 2 very bad down years in that very low long-term future return prospect.

Napier: gold and a rising dollar together

Erik Townsend: I want to pick up on another topic that is near and dear to many of our listeners' hearts, which is precious metals, particularly gold. You and I are both bullish long-term on the US dollar. Normally, you would say almost by definition, we have to be bearish on gold. Our mutual friend Raoul Pal has articulated a gold and US dollar going up at the same time thesis. Very curious to get your view on that and how you feel in general about precious metals.

Russell Napier: Well, I agree on that unique combination, and I agree on it for this reason. It's not a call on inflation or deflation. It's not a call on higher real rates of interest or lower real rates of interest, which are all the discussions you have about the relationship between the dollar and gold in normal times.

You know, large negative real rates, buy gold. High positive real rates, sell gold. The dollar and the movements in the dollar obviously plays into those interest rate expectations. That is not particularly why I want to be buying gold.

Why I'm interested in buying gold is once again, back to this same issue. If central banking fails, something, another team takes the field. And that other team would have to be a government, not just interested in fiscal expenditure, but being more deeply involved in the allocation of credit and capital, making the financial system and savings less private and more public. Now, that's all happened before. I'm not making any of that up. It's happened particularly in the post-World War II era. And when that happens, then that's when you go to gold. It's a form of capital less susceptible to manipulation by the state. And I think that's why you get a bull market in gold even as the United States dollar goes up. Because as this dollar rises, as the emerging markets problem begin to unfold, as the, I think, ensuing deflation begins to unfold, people realize that the government is taking the field and they will feel— maybe it's just 2% more in gold, 3% more in gold, 4% more in gold, but they will feel more comfortable having some of their wealth in an asset which is less susceptible to government manipulation.

Napier: the euro and the European Union

Erik Townsend: The market herd tends to run in one direction or the other, and it's very hard to really tell the big picture sometimes. Just a few weeks ago, it seemed like the European Union was doomed for collapse. In the last couple of weeks, it's all better now. As a financial historian, Russell, what's your longer-term prognosis? Do you think that the European Union is structurally in big trouble, as some of our guests have suggested, or do you think this is going to blow over?

Russell Napier: No, it's structurally in big trouble because it has to end in some form of political union. If they can deliver some form of political union, then the single currency will work, and if they can't then it won't work. So, the problem, I think, for many people who've made prognostications about the euro is they've looked at it from an economic background, and you really have to look at it from a political background. It's a currency union which works if you finally end up with a political union.

And there are many people within it who've recognized that for many, many, many years. In the last few weeks, we've had some good news for people who think that Europe can make it to a federal state. But I think it's really highly unlikely. Across the continent, there isn't increasing dissent against federalization. And people find themselves in a terrible situation. They see themselves as Europeans. They clearly want to cooperate with each other. They see the European Union as part of that. They even, many of them, see the European currency as part of that. But they simultaneously do not want to give more of their sovereignty away to a federal state. And these things are all incompatible, which is why you get many incompatible answers to survey questions. Do you like the euro?

Erik Townsend: Yes.

Russell Napier: Do you like the euro? Yes. Do you want more power to your sovereign parliament? Yes. And these are incompatible. Now, the timescale at which these incompatibilities turn into something bigger and stronger are very difficult to assess. We don't know when they'll happen.

But as long as one believes that the people have seen as much passing away of sovereignty as they're prepared to accept, then one has to conclude that this currency union is failing. We've got another French election coming up very soon. We'll see how the new president gets on at that. But remember, if we go back to the first round of the presidential election, 40% of the French electorate voted for the Communists and for the Front National. Now, if that's replicated in the parliamentary election, we're going to have some severe problems for a president trying to rule France.

What do those 2 parties have in common? How can the extreme right and the extreme left and somehow have something in common. What they have in common is they both believe that France should not be passing any further sovereignty to the European Union. So, I think the core of that problem is there. It cannot be solved unless something happens in Europe to persuade everybody that a much more federal system is acceptable. I cannot foresee that, and therefore, I think the slow demise of the euro continues.

Napier: China, the impossible trinity and the renminbi

Erik Townsend: Kyle Bass has suggested that China is coming apart at the seams and will soon be forced to dramatically devalue the yuan, and that that could send another wave of deflationary pressure around the world. How do you see that view? What's your outlook for the yuan and for what happens next in China?

Russell Napier: So, what China's involved in is what is sometimes called the impossible trinity. It is attempting to manage its exchange rate and also manage its domestic monetary policy while allowing some degree of movement of capital in and out, and clearly not complete free movement of capital in and out, and they have clamped down in that somewhat in recent times, but clearly capital is still moving out of China. Everybody knows it. Everybody can see it. It's called the impossible trinity for a good reason. It is ultimately in the long term impossible. So where I'd agree with Kyle Bass is that the obvious and easy bit to give is the exchange rate, and the exchange rate has to fall.

Today, we can look at Chinese interest rates. Chinese interest rates are trending upwards. They've gone upwards pretty significantly. This morning, the 3-month repo rate was just below 5%. That's up from 3% last October. That's a pretty significant move. I don't believe that move is engineered by the central bank. That is the impossible trinity proving that it is impossible to manage your exchange rate and interest rates at the same time, as long as there's some arbitrage available through the capital account. So, that is not all— that is all not saying that China's collapsing, but what it's saying is that interest rates are dictating lower growth. Broad money growth in China is signed— signed very robust to most people listening to this is 10.5% year on year. 10.5% year on year is down around the bottom of the range of the last 30 years. So you've got rising interest rates, slowing broad money growth, and then attempt to defend an exchange rate.

In this scenario, as growth slows, it's the exchange rate target that has to come to an end.

It is very silly to maintain this policy. When you get to be the world's second biggest economy, when you want and know you have to become a consumer-oriented society, you better get to a monetary that makes sense. Now, they're stuck in this legacy policy, and they have let the exchange rate come down significantly, but it's just simply not enough, or interest rates wouldn't be rising. So, as we move forward into a new world where China has a much more independent monetary policy, I think we have to associate that with not a China collapse. It might be a China collapse, but it doesn't have to be. But we have to associate it with a significantly lower renminbi, and what I believe are the deflationary implications that flow once the renminbi

Erik Townsend: Russell, last question.

Napier: robots and the 1987 portfolio insurance air pocket

Erik Townsend: As a financial historian, you have a perspective that is broader than most people's. So what I'd like to know is, what question did I not think to ask? Or what issue keeps you up at night? Or how do you think about the world in a way that might not occur to some of our listeners who are not financial historians?

Russell Napier: Yeah, I think, Erik, we could just look at the more recent past to answer that question. And I would turn to 1987, and I've written about this a few months ago. The biggest thing in the financial markets today is the robot. There are lots of other names for robots in financial markets, but they are robots. And the robots have taken over much of the management of financial wealth and are responsible for much of the turnover in financial markets. We did something like this before, but not to the same extent in 1987. It's called portfolio insurance. And when things went wrong, the robots kept selling. And the people did not rush from the foxholes to buy as the robots sold. Now, the role of the robot is much, much higher than it was in 1987.

There is a prospect that the robots make the same decision at the same time. In an efficient market, the human beings, the value players, jump out of the foxhole and rush to buy the value. And I wonder if that can happen this time because of the sheer size of the robots and their involvement in managing money compared to the size of the human beings. So, it's a more recent historical analogy. But the portfolio insurance thing, why is that so worrying? Because it can happen very, very quickly. It was effectively an air pocket for financial markets. And I'm concerned that that's the sort of air pocket that we could hit again.

Interview close: Anatomy of the Bear and ERIC

Erik Townsend: Russell, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. We do have to leave it there. But before we go, I just want to let our listeners know that your book, Anatomy of the Bear: Lessons from Wall Street's Four Great Bottoms is absolutely outstanding. I highly recommend it. There's also a new product that you're offering. It's only for investment professionals, though, and at your request, we'll not provide the URL here, but certainly our institutional listeners can contact you directly to find out about your essentially eBay for investment research product. I do want to mention also that you developed a platform called ERIC, spelled with a C rather than a K in my name, and that is a platform for unbundled investment research for professional investors. You can easily Google that information in order to find it. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is brought to you by JDI Research. MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna

Postgame: Napier takeaways and the dollar buy-the-dip

Patrick Ceresna: What a great interview with Russell Napier. I couldn't agree more with his views on the US dollar, which I want to discuss in more detail. But what stood out for you in the interview?

Erik Townsend: You know, the thing I really, really enjoy about Russell Napier is he's a brilliant mind with a long time horizon. And although I'll be the first to admit that the people like Julian Brigden who are very, very good at looking at macro in terms of what's going to happen in the next 6 months. Those are the best money makers. Those are the guys that can give you advice to help you put a trade on that's going to make a profit in the next few months. A guy like Russell Napier helps you understand the world and how it works and what's likely to happen for the rest of our lifetimes. So I find it just intellectually stimulating. I prefer this kind of interview because it just goes so far beyond the short-term view of a lot of traders, which is what's going to happen in the next month or two.

So I want to go back to the subject, the US dollar, because I thought that Professor Napier's comments were definitely in sync with my own, which is it's not a good day to be a dollar bull because look at all of the hysteria in Europe.

It's probably short-term hysteria. I think that that will fade eventually. So, it's a buy-the-dip opportunity. The question, Patrick, you're the technician, is what's the buy-the-dip level? How do you know where the bottom's going to be?

Postgame: dollar index weighting and the euro

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, Erik, it's a great question. Obviously, there's a number of technicians and a number of market pundits out there that are now talking about this 95 and 92 levels on the dollar index. But I just wanted to actually, before we talk real levels, I wanted to really just go back and help everyone just reflect back on how the dollar index is made up and And what's the composition of the, uh, of the weighting? So, if you look at that weighting of the dollar index, when you take the euro and the Swiss franc, they make 60% weighting into the, uh, uh, into the index. And when you add the British pound and the Swedish krona back into the index, you're literally seeing that the Eurozone currencies make up over a 75% weighting of the, uh, of determinant of where the dollar index goes. So, why, when we talk about the dollar index, we're always talking, well, the, the, The Chinese yuan, the Japanese yen, and all these currencies like the Canadian dollar. But really, the direction that the dollar index goes is really about where the euro goes and where the Eurozone goes.

And so, really, when someone here is getting bearish this dollar index, when you're making that call that we're going to see the 95 or 92 level, it actually means that you're structurally bullish the euro. You're actually forecasting that it's going to go— let's say the euro is going to go to 115, 118, 120 on the upside, which is something that at least personally I find hard to swallow.

Postgame: Europe bear case versus liquidity-event risk

Erik Townsend: Well, but I think it's a really good point because you and I happen to be very pessimistic and perhaps even cynical in my case about the European Union and its future prospects. And certainly Russell Napier echoed that view in this interview. But we need to take a timeout, Patrick, and say that's our view. You know, other people who think that, okay, it's clear now The European Union's problems are over. It's all uphill from here. There's not going to be any more contagion risk. The Brexit thing was just a flash in the pan. Everything is rosy for the European Union. If you believe that, then it's really smart to be negative on the US dollar because a lot of my reasons for thinking that the US dollar structurally should be strong is because the rest of the world is weaker and because of the problems in Europe, which I see getting worse before they get better. If you don't share that view, then it doesn't make sense to be bullish the dollar.

So, I think that what you say is absolutely right, but we also have to respect that there are people who don't share our view about the European Union.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, Erik, the one thing I'd point out is that my opinions are obviously far different than the liquidity of a market. And if you, let's say, use that pound sterling as an example, we saw this huge short squeeze. You know, the sterling was down at the 120 level and suddenly the Brexit happens and suddenly we get a squeeze. We're up at the 130 level, a 1,000-pip advance.

I mean, there are liquidity events that occur all the time. And obviously being short the euro was a bit of a crowded trade. And so, I mean, look, while I have my opinions on the dollar index and the euro, there certainly could be a liquidity event that could surprise everyone how far and how high that euro can go. For me, though, whether it's a liquidity or net event, I actually go back to what Russell was basically saying. Look, there are structural reasons why the yuan, the yen, or even the euro should actually all weaken over the long term.

And the event with the US dollar is a short-term event. And so, you have to think about it. It is going to be a buy on dip. We just don't know where the low is, right? Where is the opportunity to buy the dip? And this is where I think utilizing an interesting option strategy strategy might be a way to approach it.

Postgame: options strategy for the dollar dip

Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more. It's one of the places where I think options are most effective, is to make an actual trade, to put a position on trying to time a market top or a market bottom is usually a fool's errand. You're better off to wait until the trend is established. If you want to take a crack at calling the top or the bottom, you really need to limit your downside risk, and options are a perfect way To basically make that bet. Okay, I think this was the top on the S&P, so I'm going to buy puts here. Well, you know what, the premium on that puts is an amount that I can afford to lose. If I got it wrong, I write it off, I walk away. It's a lottery ticket, so it goes. As opposed to putting a short on where if you want to be able to make any serious amount of money in the short, it's got to be a substantial size and you get nailed if it takes off to the upside.

So, I think options are a perfect way if you must try to pick a top or a bottom. to express that kind of trade.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, absolutely. So, let's actually kind of discuss an example and look at it and see some of the considerations. Now, the one observation I want to point, which is important, and a lot of our really smart listeners that know options already, I'm sure, are thinking it, but you do have volatility considerations.

Obviously, when big market events occur, usually have big spikes in implied volatilities, making the options relatively more expensive. And that's always something that makes the trade a little bit trickier. But one of the ways you can sort of get around that, and one of the things that I'm looking at potentially doing here for the dollar index, is to trade it through opening debit spreads.

And so in this scenario, for instance, if we feel that the euro has really run its course up to this 112, 113 area and the dollar index is going to potentially find support right here, well, we have to put our foot in the water and dabble to see whether this is the turn point. So, how do you do that while managing the risk effectively? Obviously, if someone just goes in there and buys dollar index futures, where do you put your stop losses? I mean, if you're putting your stop losses down at 95 or lower, I mean, you're risking quite a bit of potential returns in keeping such wide stops. And so, one of the things that I'm considering here is opening a bull call spread on that dollar index futures.

Considering doing it out to September between this 97 to 100 strikes. And so going out to September, and if you're buying the 97 and selling the 100, you can pretty much open the $3 spread somewhere within the $1 to $1.50 range. Uh, in, in doing so, you've limited no matter what your risk to $1, $1.50. There's no getting stopped out of the position. There is no, uh, you being noised out. You put your risk on the table right up front. And if by September the dollar index reversed and it's back up above 100, then, you know, the spread is worth the— it's $3 width. And so you've more than doubled the premium that you've put out or outlaid into the trade.

Now, what's particularly interesting about that particular one, a lot of people say, well, if you're bullish the US dollar, the US dollar index might go to 105, 110. Why, you know, you're opening just a spread that is profiting just from a move from 97 back up to 100. And my argument to that is this: the dangerous part of entering the dollar is right now. Right now, trying to catch that proverbial falling knife, that moment they say this is the bottom, and then you find out it's not, and then it just keeps going. And so, this is where you need to use some sort of option strategy to try to find and discover where the low actually is.

Once the dollar index, let's say, gets above 100, You're going to get all sorts of technical confirmations that the bull trend has reversed, and you're going to see, you know, higher highs on some levels, trend lines broken, trading above its moving averages. Whatever, you know, there's all sorts of different ways to skin a cat with technical analysis.

But ultimately, you're going to have plenty of opportunities to take bigger, more decisive long positions in the dollar index above 100. But it's when you're dabbling down here in this 97, 98 level where you really need to put this risk management component into the trade.

Erik Townsend: You know, I couldn't agree more, Patrick. If you're dabbling on trying to pick the bottom or the top of anything, options are always a better way to go. You don't want to go into a big naked long position on this dip because you don't know how much farther the dip has. So a bull call spread or just a, a call makes a lot more sense.

But I'm Let's suppose, for the sake of argument, we're gonna say that if the dollar breaks decisively above 101, that that's a signal that the uptrend is back in motion. At that point, do you roll your call spreads forward to the next expiry, or do you just go to an outright position and stay in the long trade from there?

Patrick Ceresna: I usually personally just leave the spread alone and open a brand new long position based upon technical techniques of following trend, right? And so the key of the spread is just to participate participate in the initial turn point, the part where that's most difficult to actually capture and where most people are noised out of it. Once we're above that 100, 101 level, then you could literally engage the futures contracts directly, or if you're using the ETF, you're buying the UUP, or whichever way you want to do it. But at that moment, you're taking a separate trade, trading it, and you just leave the spread alone and let— and wash that out for the profit.

Erik Townsend: That's exactly right, Patrick. And of course, for our listeners who may not be familiar, if you're unable to trade the dollar index Futures and you're trading the ETFs instead, just as there are options contracts on the dollar futures, there are also options contracts on the ETFs. UUP and UDN are the dollar up and dollar down ETFs, and these strategies work just as well in those cases. We are out of time for this week's show.

Outro and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: We really appreciate your help promoting the show, so please help us to increase the number of registered users we have. MacroVoices.com, because that is the statistic that Patrick uses to persuade really fantastic guests like Russell Napier to come on the program. If you haven't yet done so yourself, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. It's free to sign up. It only takes a couple of minutes, and the benefit to you is you get our Research Roundup email, which is a weekly compendium of links to the very coolest stuff that we could find on the internet each week, always free of advertising.

Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, in this week's Research Roundup, you're going to find obviously the link to the transcript for today's interview. As well, there's a link to a blog posting by Variant Perception talking about the stretched sentiment leaves emerging markets vulnerable. And there's also a link to a Jeffrey Snider article, which is titled, An Official End to the Rising Dollar Isn't More.

And as well, a very important link that I think all of our listeners should go and read is a link to a Ray Dalio article titled, The big picture. I think— and Ray Dalio does a great job kind of breaking down things, looking back to the 1920s, uh, all the way through to the 1970s and doing some comparison— comparative work to where we are today. Great, great article. So, you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So, that does it for this week's episode, and we appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners. And we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we will include it in our weekly distributions.

If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening. Thank you. And we'll see you all next week.

Closing disclaimer

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