Russell Napier — Financial historian (as introduced on the show)

Announcer intro and episode preview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 151 was recorded a day early this week on Wednesday evening, January 23rd, 2019. I'm Erik Townsend. Financial historian Russell Napier returns as this week's feature interview guest. We'll discuss what's next for Treasury bonds, what the knock-on effects of Chinese policy tightening will be on global markets, whether the decade-long bull market is over, and where developed market equities are headed from here, whether the Fed is out of bullets to fight the next economic downturn, and Russell's outlook for the US dollar, and much, much more. Be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview, where Patrick and I will discuss Russell's interview, as well as sharing some insights from this past weekend's MacroVoices Live conference in Vancouver.

S&P 500 pause and Erik's short trade

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, that S&P 500 now has finally paused after 4 weeks of ripping almost Almost 400 S&P points off of that low print. We find ourselves now taking a break here. Is that Charlie McElligott scenario finally here where we're gonna take a breather for a week or two? What's on your mind?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, Charlie has a fantastic track record, and I'm even betting on it. As attendees at your class last Friday in Vancouver know, I put my first S&P short trade on, and I forget how long it's been, at least a year. And the reason is I have been convinced that the big question has been, how high do we go in order to trap enough dumb money into thinking that we're headed back toward new all-time highs before this bear market resumes. And of course, last week we had Charlie McElligott say, folks, our models are showing us there's an impulse, maybe a push-up on Friday, and then down to a retest by February 1st. And of course, these analogs are never perfectly accurate, but if it's coming from Charlie McElligott, I'm willing to give it a try. So I sold 2675 on Charlie's call for a retest, and I'll watch and see what happens by February 1st to see We'll see how that plays out.

US dollar: quantitative tightening is dollar-bullish

Patrick Ceresna: Well, that's a great call. So let's move on to the US dollar, because the US dollar more or less has been for several weeks now off of its worst levels. We've been testing just above the 96 level. What's your thinking here on the dollar? Is this the beginning of a bull breakout yet at this stage?

Erik Townsend: Well, I wouldn't say beginning of a bull breakout quite yet, but I mean, look at what you're saying. We're flirting with 96, struggling to get over 96. Well, last week we were struggling to get over 95. We had a pretty good pullback. It's no surprise that we had a pullback, because a lot of people are making, I think, the mistake of saying, okay, Fed pause, that means there's no longer a dollar-bullish argument. It's time for the dollar to reverse. You've got to remember that quantitative tightening is every bit as dollar-bullish as Fed rate hikes are. Now, if you think that the Fed is going to stop quantitative tightening and go back to quantitative easing, which I do not think is going to happen anytime soon, That would be a reason to get bearish on the U.S. dollar. That's not happening. I think that that pause or that pullback that we saw in the dollar is because a lot of people didn't think this through completely, and I think as reality sets in, we're eventually going to move higher.

When we break above 97, 97.5, it's going to kick in the technical traders, and I think we'll move sharply higher from there. We'll be close to 100 before we know it. But certainly, if the Fed were to start to signal that they are really considering not continuing quantitative tightening— Now, That would be a game changer. But until that happens, I think we're headed higher.

Crude oil: a $45 to $55 range

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil because we got all the way up to the $54 handle and it seems to have paused here. Does oil have more to go here?

Erik Townsend: Well, as I've been saying for a couple of weeks now, I don't think so. I don't expect much over $55. And of course, there's always a caveat in the oil market. A geopolitical upset, a war or something can change everything overnight. We could be looking at $100 oil if, you know, there's a major war in the Middle East. But barring a geopolitical upset, I think where we're headed is toward a consolidation range between, let's say, 45 and 55. We topped out at— what was it— 44.5 or so.

And, you know, if we get more recession indications or an economic downturn, that could bring us below 40. This week we had an unexpectedly large 6.6 million barrel crude oil build that got the selling started on Wednesday. We'll have to see where it goes. Certainly that crude oil build was good for a little bit of sell-off. Is it going to continue back down to Let's say below $50, which is where I think it's headed, maybe back toward $45. Well, time will tell.

Gold and the long gold / long dollar pairs trade

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, let's talk gold. Gold clearly has been struggling to beat that $1,300 handle and has kind of backed off of there. We're much more in the $1,280 range now. What's your thinking here on gold?

Erik Townsend: Well, as I said last week, my favorite case is it tops out here, retraces lower as the dollar index eventually recovers. But as I also admitted last week, gold has been stronger than than I expected. A daily close over 1,300 would really have to make me scratch my head. Now, what really came up— and this is something we discussed at length at MacroVoices Live in Vancouver— is a trade we talked about, oh boy, almost 2 years ago really starts to make sense in my head again, and that's to be long gold and long the dollar index at the same time. The logic there is if gold is going to break out here despite the strength That we're seeing in the dollar index, as so many people have said that it will, and to my own surprise, it's been stronger than I expected in the face of relative dollar strength. If that's going to happen, you want to catch it.

The thing is, if it turns out that I'm right and strength in the dollar is going to push gold back down below $1,200, ouch, that could be painful.

If you look at the pairs trade, long gold and long the dollar at the same time, there's a lot of arguments you can make for them to trade in inverse correlation, meaning you make money on one, lose money on than the other, but net-net, you don't lose anything. There's an argument for why they could both move up together, in which case it's a double win, but there's not a lot of arguments for why they would both move down at the same time.

So, my strategy is, I still think that $1,300 is probably going to hold this thing for now. I'm going to wait it out. I'm hoping to get a chance to buy gold much lower. I think that if the dollar really takes off, we could see gold retest $1,000 before— and I don't mean in the next few weeks, but eventually, I think we could see gold retest $1,000 before it really moves into its next major bull market. On the other hand, Patrick, if we get a daily close above $1,300 and it stays there for a few days, I'll probably put on that pairs trade, long gold and long the dollar, not because I'm so excited about gold at these prices, but because I know that pairs trade will work for the reasons that I've described earlier.

10-year Treasury yield: a 2.60 to 2.80 range

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's talk about interest rates, because what an extraordinary move November and December was, where we saw 3.25% drop down, almost down to 2.50% on the yield. And but now we've been backfilling that. We're now trading around 2.75 on the yield. What's your thinking? Was that it for this yield move, or do you think interest rates can still go lower after a pause here?

Erik Townsend: I think interest rates can still go lower. I'm not convinced that they will. I think what happened is we had a false breakout above 3.12 on the 10-year, got all the way up to 3.25. Then we kind of had a panic short squeeze that took us all the way down to, I think, what was the low print, 2.58 or so on the 10-year yield. And now we're back up into

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: To the middle, erring on the high side of that technical range between 2.60 and 2.80.

If we move above 2.80 decisively and stay there for a few days, it's really going to make me scratch my head. But I think that if I'm reading the tea leaves correctly here, there is an economic signal, recession signal, that would portend lower Treasury yields, at least on a cyclical basis. We got a short squeeze that rocketed us all the way to 2.58. The panic ended.

We're kind of rebounding off of that. So we're back to 2.75. Maybe we get all the way up to 2.80. And then I think you might resume a more gradual move lower in yield if I'm right about the recession signal. The recession signal's a false alarm, then I think we do end up moving higher. But for now, I'm leaning toward maybe testing 2.80 and then moving lower in yield.

MacroVoices Live Vancouver recap

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, MacroVoices Live this past weekend was amazing. What great reactions we got from everyone. What did you take away? from this weekend's event?

Erik Townsend: I was really— I'll just go ahead and say it, Patrick. I don't usually toot my horn this much, but I was proud of what we pulled off there. I don't think I can ever remember anywhere seeing a panel of people— as when we had our town hall forum in the afternoon, I don't remember ever anywhere seeing that much intelligence on one stage at one time. Meeting the people that came was amazing. The lengths that they went to— we had one guy come from Cape Town, South Africa, another one from Sydney, Australia. A whole bunch of people came from Beijing, and I lost count of how many flew in from cities all over Europe, all for a 1-day financial conference. And it is just incredibly flattering to me personally.

The big winner of the weekend, though, was Steve Staretsky, one of our attendees who won Macro Intelligence's draw. He threw his card into the fishbowl that Gretchen Brigden had set up. I thought that was for their retail product. Did you know, Patrick, that Gretchen gave away a $36,000 value, 1-year subscription to Macro Intelligence's not the retail product, but their full institutional product? So Steve's $250 ticket got him a $36,000 institutional research value.

Patrick Ceresna: I forgot to put my business card in there, so now I'm regretting it.

Erik Townsend: I am too. We have to make a rule next time Gretchen Brigden decides to give $36,000 away, she has to tip And give us at least a month's worth of it or something. I don't know. But it was just an amazing experience, and I really enjoyed meeting so many of our listeners and the enthusiasm and excitement that was in the room. Seeing the tweets— I gave up skiing 20 years ago, but a whole bunch of people went skiing. I saw pictures on Twitter of what looked like an incredible snow day up at Whistler afterwards, and it was just a great experience overall. So I really, really enjoyed it, and I look forward to doing it again sometime. Thank you.

Introducing Russell Napier

Patrick Ceresna: Well, no, it was definitely a great event. Yeah. And I look forward to our future ones. Nonetheless, this week, our featured interview guest is Russell Napier. Erik, let's share with our listeners why we love to bring Russell back onto the show so often.

Erik Townsend: Russell Napier is one of my favorite interview guests ever. He was super famous back in his CLSA days as, you know, one of everybody's favorite macro analysts. And I remember when I first discovered, as a listener, discovered financial podcasting, just listening to Russell talk never ceases to fascinate me. And something I've noticed, these guys who are bona fide financial historians like Russell Napier or Niall Ferguson, they, they don't just talk like everybody else is about what's happening in today's market. They really have deep perspective on how what's going on today relates to the development of finance over a period not just of decades but of centuries. And the intelligence in this man's head never It's amazing. It was only in the course of doing this interview that I found out, normally, back in the day, Russell did a lot of conferences for CLSA. He's been kind of a hard guy to get ahold of, and he wrote an excellent book called Anatomy of the Bear, but to really get more than a podcast interview out of him has been difficult.

He's got a full program, a full training course that was only offered very occasionally in Europe. They're bringing it to Toronto, and we'll talk about that in this interview. So I know as soon as you heard it, you signed up for it. I would do the same thing. I'm supposed to be speaking at MIT that weekend. Otherwise, I'd be there with you. So he's just one of my favorite, most insightful guys in the entire industry, and I really look forward to this interview.

Patrick Ceresna: Without further ado, Erik's interview with Russell Napier is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Treasury supply, reflexivity and falling yields

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Russell Napier, financial historian and the founder of the investment research platform ERIC. Russell, thanks so much for joining us again on the program. Last time we had you on was back in May of last year. At that time, you told us that it was likely that there would be continued weakness in the Treasury bond market because for the first time in many For many, many years, private savers had to finance what had become a situation of central banks being net sellers of Treasuries. And needless to say, we did see a big move up in Treasury yields since then, all the way up to 3.25%. Now it started to turn around. And I remember you also cautioned us. You said a lot of people really were convinced of an inflation prognosis. You said you thought that was not going to last. So as I see bond yields turning around, does that mean that the market is catching up? with your expectation that deflation rather than inflation would rule the day?

And where do you see Treasury yields going from here?

Russell Napier: Yeah, I think we have reached a tipping point. Back to that initial prognosis, when you see an incredible surge in the supply of Treasuries, the easiest forecast to make is that the price has to go down and the yield has to go up. And remember, that surge in supply comes from 2 sources. One, the United States Treasury, The fiscal deficit's effectively doubled over the last 5 years, so it's nearly $1 trillion. It was less than half a trillion in 2014. And of course, the second source of supply, brand new one, is the Federal Reserve. And that will be up to about $360 billion this year. Total, roughly $1.3 trillion. So we've never seen anything like that before. And as soon as I give you those supply numbers, the temptation is to say, well, yields have to go up.

However, that has not been happening for the last few months. And the reason is, I believe, that the Treasury yield is probably the most reflexive financial instrument on the planet. Remember Soros' definition of reflexivity? It is that the different— it's the reverse of the business school definition of how security prices are determined, which is those prices are determined by looking at the fundamentals. The Soros view is that sometimes, not all times, but sometimes, the security price changes the fundamentals. Now, that could never be more true than the US yield curve and the level of US interest rates. I think what message we got about 2 months ago is that at the level of interest rates then pertaining, there was ample demand for this massive supply of Treasuries. But crucially, it forced the liquidation of other securities from somewhere else in the world. That's why the equity market was going down. It was forcing a liquidation, whether in offshore equity markets or the local equity market, to cover this massive supply of Treasuries.

Now, if the fundamentals are changing, which is not just the price of equities, but economic fundamentals, if growth is slowing, Going somewhere, it doesn't have to be in America, it could be in China, it could be in Europe. But if that move in US rates is playing a role in slowing growth somewhere, then it's creating its own fundamentals, because clearly, it's creating a fundamental for lower growth and lower inflation. And I believe that is the phase we have now entered. So despite not forecasting this huge supply, because you don't have to forecast it, it's almost certain to occur. Despite that large supply, I think what happens is we liquidate other savings assets to buy the Treasuries.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Russell Napier: The Treasury yield continues to decline, and more importantly, by liquidating private sector assets, we begin to slow global private sector growth.

China: PBOC, enforced QT and the trade talks

Erik Townsend: So, slowing growth, continuing lower Treasury yields. Let's tie China into this story. How does China affect this just on its own? And then how does the US-China trade relations and the negotiations that are ongoing between President Trump and President Xi? play into this whole story?

Russell Napier: Yeah, so we need to separate China into 2, monetary effect and then get to the trade. They are linked. It's really essential to consider China's role in funding the United States government. And that currently is zero. It hasn't been zero forever, as you're aware, really since the devaluation of the RMB in '94. China was a massive buyer of Treasuries all the way to 2014. So not only did we have a much smaller supply of Treasuries, we had a guaranteed forced buyer. The PBOC never woke up in the morning and chose to buy Treasuries. It was forced to buy Treasuries. That was a residual from its exchange rate policy, but its reserves are down.

They may be fluctuating a little bit, but they're certainly not growing at the pace they used to grow at.

So the PBOC plays no role now in financing the United States government. It's very hard to get clean numbers on this because of the way the PBOC buys and sells Treasuries these days, but it's certainly possible Given the recent trends in their foreign reserves, that actually they might be adding to the supply of Treasuries to the private savings sector, because they may be, at the margin, more a seller than a buyer. So, it plays into this dynamic. If we take away a guaranteed buyer, whether it's the PBOC, whether it's the Saudi Arabian Monetary Authority, whether it's the Bank of China, whether it's the Bank of Korea, if we take away those guaranteed buyers, and remember, those buyers funded their purchases of Treasuries Treasuries by the creation of new money, not by liquidating another savings asset, then more and more of the burden of funding the US government falls upon people— that's you and me— who can only fund the US government by liquidating something else or saving more.

So the economic impact of the PBOC not being there is actually quite profound, because it's forcing a realignment of savings for the first time. And that's been underway since 2014. So it isn't new. What is new, of course, is what we referred to earlier, which is a massive increase in the supply of Treasuries. So the fact that they're not there, and then you at least double the supply of Treasuries, I think has a profound impact. But I want to stress over and over again that the impact is that other assets have to be sold to fund the government. And that's where we should be looking for that to play out. So that's the impact on the Treasury market.

Domestically, of course, what it means is that if China's foreign exchange reserves are not going up, that's its central bank's key asset, its liabilities are also not going up. And remember, the liabilities of a central bank Bank are effectively what we call quantitative easing. So actually, China's involved in quantitative tightening. It's not deliberate, planned, managed, and voluntary quantitative tightening that the Fed is pursuing. It's an enforced quantitative tightening, because when its assets come down, its liabilities have to come down, and those liabilities are primarily commercial bank reserves.

So there's 2 negatives there for the world. One, the saver has to take up more of the strain of funding the US government if the PBOC isn't there. And 2, that's a tighter monetary policy. Now, I know the world is convinced That China's running a looser monetary policy. And China can proclaim all it wants as to what it intends to do, wants to do, and wishes to do. But when you run that exchange rate management policy, your monetary policy is forced upon you. And the lack of an external surplus, they're being forced to tighten monetary policy. And it's evident in the contraction in commercial bank reserves, which has now been underway in China for about a year.

And finally, on trade, the key way trade plays into this is China desperately needs an external surplus of some sort. That's how it could have exchange rate stability. And at the same time, print a lot of money and grow. But I think whatever the outcome, I think whatever the outcome of the deal between China and America, it's incredibly difficult to see that being positive for China's trade account.

The president has gone— the president of the United States has gone looking for concessions. I think he's going to have to get some concessions. We can all argue as to what concessions they would be. But as to how that would work to the benefit of China's trade account, I think that is the least likely outcome.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Russell Napier: from this. To the extent that China's trade account deteriorates and its capital account remains static, then we are looking at further tightening of Chinese monetary policy.

Why the PBOC, not the Fed, dictates global inflation

Erik Townsend: Further tightening of Chinese monetary policy, coming back to our previous discussion about the US situation, you said it's basically forecasting a slowing of global growth. Is this a global recession signal that we're receiving? At the moment, it looks like we're seeing a bounce in equity markets from the lows that we saw over Christmas. Is that likely to turn back down as we need to liquidate more private assets in order to fund government spending and government deficits?

Russell Napier: Yes. A lot of the reason for enthusiasm in the last few days has been the comments of Jay Powell last week. There is one thing Jay Powell could do to give us a sustained bounce in the markets. I don't think a bull market, but a sustained bounce, which would be to cancel his balance sheet contraction. Now, if you want to take last week's comments as being Of that magnitude? I don't think they were. I don't think they were at all. But that is the one thing that— if last week's comments mean anything that's bullish, it would have to be that. Short of that, I don't think it makes any difference. So I don't believe he committed to that last week. I don't believe he made any indication that that is more likely. And therefore, I don't believe the comments last week are ultimately particularly important.

What I would like to stress, and I've stressed before on this call, is this is about China. This is not about America. What is going on here is 100% about China. We like to believe that the Federal Reserve is the world's most important central bank, but it isn't. The People's Bank of China is. Remember, the Fed will set its nominal interest rates based upon its inflation expectations. So the most important central bank in the world is the central bank that dictates global inflation, because all the other central bankers, inflation targeters, will have to move nominal rates to reflect global inflation.

Now, I would argue very strongly that the key determinant of global inflation is the world's second-biggest economy, China, because it— not just because of its rate of growth, but because of its rate of investment. Also, because its exchange rate was very overvalued for nearly 20 years. And the overvaluation of its exchange rate and its need to slow at the current exchange rate means that we're looking at slower growth globally, tighter monetary policy globally. And the focus should really be on that dynamic. What's forced upon China rather than what decisions Jay Powell might make. We can get the decisions of Jay Powell wrong. That's a common thing. But I think if we look focused on the overvalued Chinese exchange rate, it's very difficult to see how they get out of that particular pickle. That one is much more important, I believe, than changes in the views of Jay Powell.

Fed pivot, broad money and the global debt burden

Erik Townsend: Speaking of changes in the view of Jay Powell and the rest of the FOMC, until recently, there was Widespread expectations that there would be several more rate hikes through 2019. And, you know, between the dot plot and the Eurodollar futures spreads, everybody was anticipating plenty more rate hiking to come. It seems like we've seen a total reversal now in sentiment, in that most people are now discounting— maybe the question is not how many more hikes, but when does the first cut come. So is this change in sentiment just catching up with something that was already going on in the market, or is the sentiment change overreacting? Are we really seeing a dovish pivot where the Fed is maybe moving back toward at some point responding to market conditions by cutting policy rates again, or where do you see this headed?

Russell Napier: Yeah, so I never believed that Fed rates were going to march off 2019. You know, even last May when we discussed this, I used the word deflation quite openly, more focused on deflation outside of America and credit crisis outside America. And I think in May, we were focused on Turkey. So that is where the pain will fall. And it was very difficult for me to believe that in a world of what I saw as slowing growth and falling inflation and credit crises— it turned out there was one in Argentina as well. There's been a myriad of them, by the way, across Africa. And they are spreading even as we speak— that US interest rates would continue to go up. In fact, on May 8th, Jay Powell spoke and said that at this His impact outside of America would have no impact on his monetary policy. That may still be true. What should have an effect on his monetary policy is he's not actually creating a lot of money.

Now, I realize there'll be a lot of people who will listen to that statement and think that's a form of madness to make that statement.

But broad money, which is the money that circulates around the economy for goods, services, and has a huge role in GDP, has been slowing dramatically in America and really across the planet, very dramatically in emerging markets. In China, it's had a huge impact. A new post-war low. It's down in Europe, it's down in Japan, it's down in America. And the market was sitting back saying, well, we're looking at a tightening here. Clearly looking at the jobs market more than anything else, tightness in the jobs markets, a little bit of wage inflation, and completely ignoring the money supply data, which has been getting worse and worse and worse for about a year to a year and a half. So that is the reality. It's very difficult to buy into a world of more growth and more inflation and higher asset prices in a world when the growth of Broad money is getting lower and lower and lower.

So the Fed is reacting to that.

And as I say, one of the crucial things about this are balance sheet issues. We can look at the P&L, which is growth, but this is not a robust global balance sheet we're looking at here. The total private sector non-financial debt to GDP ratio of the world is at a new all-time high.

And from memory, it's gone from 210% of GDP at the end of 2007 to 242% today. So we're looking at a more fragile system, I would say, particularly outside of the US rather than inside Outside the US, we're looking at slowing growth and movements we see in interest rates at the long end, and now also with changes at the short end, just reflect this reality. So, 10 years of extreme and exceptional monetary policy, and we've got some of the lowest levels of broad money growth ever recorded.

Bear market outlook and the renminbi devaluation catalyst

Erik Townsend: So, you, as the man who literally wrote the book on bear markets, how do you interpret all of this, bringing it together in terms of a forecast or outlook? outlook for developed and particularly US equity markets? Is this a bear market rally that we're experiencing right now? And what would you see the rest of 2019 bringing us in terms of equity market action?

Russell Napier: So by only focusing on 4 bear markets in that book, I clearly focused on very exceptional circumstances and not the traditional definition of a bear market, which is every 20% correction. But what I would say about all 4 of those where valuations got incredibly Incredibly cheap. Incredibly cheap, below 10 times CAPE, and we're currently close to 30 times CAPE. How on earth could any equity market fall that far? Well, history is very clear. Deflation. For these 4 big ones, not the average bear market, but for the big ones, it would be deflation. And deflation is falling cash flow. That's why it's important for equities.

And a falling cash flow, should it occur, can threaten the very existence of equity if you've got a very geared balance sheet. That is true. The United States has a very geared balance sheet. The non-financial corporate debt-to-GDP ratio is a new all-time high, just gone above its 2007 level. So it's a vulnerable balance sheet. But the most vulnerable balance sheets, I think, to any deflation are outside of the United States of America. So if we do think that this monetary policy has failed, failed to generate the level of broad money growth commensurate with inflation and growth, and we're rolling back over into no growth and a risk of deflation— once again, I stress, more likely outside than inside the United States of America— then this is a very Very big bear market.

And anybody who forecasts anything needs to look at the disease and the cure. This is a disease which may, in fact, not be as bad as 2007. But the cure's used up. I know that our central bankers are always finding new and innovative cures, but this one didn't work. It simply didn't work. It stopped the collapse of the global financial system. Absolutely correct. But did it prevent a surge in the debt-to-GDP ratio? No, it didn't, because it simply failed to create enough money. So the risk going forward is that people are not so frightened of the disease, but wonder if there's a monetary cure at least. And I think that would be the most frightening thing for investors who spent nearly 10 years now being told that buying on a dip is always the way to proceed because the central banker always comes and bails you out. And I believe that, and I've said it for some years, that one day that central banker arrives and he doesn't bail you out.

It doesn't work. And I would argue that in Europe in particular, That is the evidence. I mean, European equities are below 2007 levels. They're below 2014 levels. They're not far away from their 2011 levels. In fact, the EAFE index, i.e., the whole world except the United States of America, is very similar. So, outside the United States of America, there's really quite a lot of evidence that this magic wand of central banking does not create any magic.

Erik Townsend: Let's talk a little more about how that would unfold. Let's suppose that what we're about to learn here is that this experiment of the last 10 years proved that you can in fact paper over your problems and delay the inevitable by conjuring money out of thin air. But there's still no free lunch. The piper has to be paid eventually, and there's going to be a consequence for all of this loose monetary policy. It's going to come back and haunt us. If that's true, how would it come back and haunt us? What would What would it look like? What would the mechanisms be? And what kind of feedback loops would develop in terms of creating a new bear market from here? How would it all play out?

Russell Napier: Yeah. So just to be clear, the failure was that this monetary policy created debt much more quickly than it created money. So that's the failure. And we can all look at how much money it created, but all the statistics from the BIS show it's been creating debt even more quickly. The BIS also look at what, how you would analyze their debt-to-GDP ratio to say when this becomes a problem. And they've done that. And what they've looked at is not the level of debt-to-GDP, but the pace at which it grows. And then they single out, backtesting this, certain countries where the growth in the debt-to-GDP ratio, which I believe is a consequence of this monetary policy, has hit such a height and such a divergence from its long-term trend that you can expect something to give.

A financial crisis, a credit crisis, are the terms that they The one country that jumps off the page from these statistics, that screams something has to give, is China. Now, its debt-to-GDP ratio is very similar to the United States, but the growth and the pace of growth is just at an alarming rate.

Now, I paused a little bit when I said financial crisis, credit crisis, because frankly, I just believe China would devalue and print a lot of money rather than begin to suffer the consequences of having a massive growth in debt relative to growth in money. But that is the catalyst. I can give you lots of catalysts for another deflationary shock, but I can think of none more profound and dangerous and changing things for a generation than a change in the Chinese exchange rate. So I believe that that is coming. And I believe that China could not and will not move to a new link to the dollar. They will not politically get away with undervaluing their exchange rate again. So we are looking at moving into a world where the renminbi is a flexible exchange rate, it should happen this year.

And the initial movement on the renminbi is down. That is deflationary because the dollar selling price of Chinese goods comes down. It's deflationary because of the impact it has on China's competitors. And that's where the deflation shock can come from. Most obviously, it will create bankruptcies amongst some of China's competitors on their foreign currency debt.

And maybe we can get onto this later, but I think in the very long run, it's highly inflationary.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Russell Napier: And once China lets that exchange rate go, we realize— for the first time, I think, people begin to realize that the Fed isn't determining global monetary policy, because it doesn't determine the global inflation. China determines global inflation. And believe me, with a flexible exchange rate and a truly independent monetary policy and a huge debt burden to be inflated away, China will be ultimately, after that first adjustment in the exchange rate, will ultimately be generating global inflation for the next 2 to 3 decades.

US-China tension: the Pence speech and a new Cold War

Erik Townsend: The things that you're saying kind of concern me, Russell, because it seems to me that if the biggest risk is in China, we know that China and the United States trade tensions are already very tight. The US president has been very aggressive. If China is going to experience economic difficulty and there's a transmission risk that that economic difficulty will maybe bring down the rest of the global economy with it, That sounds to me like a recipe for further political tension between the governments. Am I wrong to think that that's a serious risk? And if it is a risk, what are the financial implications? And what are the investment concerns that we should think about in terms of how further geopolitical tension between the United States and China, if that were to develop, how it might play out?

Russell Napier: Okay, so we have a blueprint for what this means. And it comes from a speech made by Mike Pence in early October at the Hudson Institute in Washington, DC. And I strongly advise anybody listening to this should listen to that and hear it, if you like, from the horse's mouth as to what the relationship between the United States and China is. And trade is a tiny tip of the iceberg in terms of the issues raised in that speech. Now, of course, it was pre-midterms, saber rattling. Were they just trying to get leverage on trade? Well, listen to the speech, come to your own conclusion.

But it attacked China for theft of intellectual property. It attacked it for pure human rights. It attacked it for attacks on religions. It attacked it for interfering in Western democracy. In fact, it was very difficult to work out a thing that wasn't attacked. Trade was just a very small part of the reasons that were brought up by the vice president for this change in relationship with China.

Now, I've spoken to many people about that, some of them in the defense business, and all of them believe this is important. They all believe it's profound, and many of them are prepared to go as far as saying this is the beginning of a new Cold War. Now, that may be too extreme, but I think, Erik, we are both old enough to remember the last Cold War. And here's some things that you don't do in a Cold War. Let's go back to that last one. I don't remember US institutional investors investing a lot of money in Russia. I think it was illegal. Didn't happen. I don't remember us doing a lot of trade with Russia, once again, for the same reason. I don't remember lots of Russians coming to visit us here in Edinburgh, nor coming to the United States of America.

If we enter a form of Cold War, it may— I mean, I hope it really isn't as bad as that, and it may not be anywhere near as bad as that. But the degree of movement of capital, of goods, and of people, which we currently expect between China and the rest of the world, could not and would not continue if this is genuinely the beginning of a new Cold War.

So investors are very loath to get into geopolitics, because, look, I wouldn't say 99 times out of 100, it's not relevant. What's relevant are cash flows in corporations and the price you pay for those cash flows. But China has become the 2nd biggest economy in the world. It's become such an integral part of the global trading/economic system that for a Cold War curtain to descend upon China and the rest of the West today would be phenomenally damaging for not just growth, but financial stability, and particularly for the Asian countries that border China. China would put them in an incredibly difficult position. They have benefited from a generation of the American defense umbrella while trading freely with China.

And if the Pence speech is in any way indicative of the future relationship, this dual benefit will not be possible. It's going to be one or the other, but getting both is very difficult. So I absolutely— and I may be reading too much into the speech of Mike Pence, but there's been plenty more from the US defense establishment There's been a lot of developments since then to suggest that we've looked at a shift towards a more Cold War.

Anybody who remembers the last one knows that that has dire implications for investors.

Is the US equity top in? The 1920s analogy

Erik Townsend: Do you think that we have reached a point where the top is in for the equity explosion of the last 10 years, which I think you and I both agree has been fueled in large part by central bank largesse?

Russell Napier: Is it over?

Erik Townsend: Or is it possible that what happens next is markets

Announcer: really start to take a dive, Powell comes riding to the rescue, and there's another round of QE or something, and it takes us to still new all-time highs in equity markets?

Russell Napier: So I believe it's over, but obviously that can happen. That second scenario is obviously a possibility, and we can try and weigh that possibility. But there was always a risk. You may remember this time last year, one of the big topics of discussion was the melt-up up, which is as the rest of the world slowed, America would import lower inflation, allowing interest rates to stay low with American growth high.

Put in a low discount rate and a high growth rate, you get a melt-up in equity valuation. As it turned out, in terms of equity valuations, if not price, they actually peaked at the end of January, and they've come down pretty significantly in America since then.

I just want to point out one thing. We are fixated with the American equity market, and we should be. It's 58% of global market capitalization. But the world is not in a bull market if you're not in America. Once again, these EAFE numbers show there is no bull market. The EAFE index is— this is without dividends reinvested, so if you want, slightly false. But looking at the capital market for EAFE in dollar terms, it is really not very far away from where it was 18 years ago.

So this is very much about a US equity bull market. There has been a bear market underway in most places in the world. And certainly since 2014, there's been a bear market in emerging markets. I see. European equities are below that level as well. So we're really talking about, can America continue to do what it's been doing, at least since 2014, arguably since much earlier, which is to continue to have a bull market as everybody else has a bear market? My answer to that would be no, because at some stage, what is out there in the rest of the world begins to infect America.

So I've written recently that this may be like the late 1920s, that through the 1920s, America had an economic boom, and America had a stock market boom, and things were pretty subdued. Viewed outside of America. But eventually, the economic problems of the rest of the world through the 1920s came home to roost and affected the United States of America. So the go-to book on this is the famous Golden Fetters by Barry Eichengreen, who argues that eventually, the problems for the rest of the world have to impact America. The question is, was it— is it happening already? Or have we got another 6 months to go? It's difficult to argue in such short-term time horizons. But my basic bet is that things are going so badly in the rest of the world that America America cannot continue to buck the trend with an equity bull market when the rest of the world's equity bear market drags on.

Is the Fed out of bullets? The Wizard of Oz scenario

Erik Townsend: Let's talk about that scenario where America's equity market does eventually take a more significant turn south from where it is already. A lot of people have talked about the Fed being, quote unquote, out of bullets now that they have done so much already. They don't have capacity. Capacity to do that much more. And of course, starting from very low interest rates, it's hard to reduce them very much.

How much— and I guess the counterargument to that would be, well, there's no limit to how much QE they could do. And, you know, they, they can go back to zero interest rates or even go to negative policy rates. What do you think? How much, if things really get bad— I guess what I really worry about is it feels to me like we're gonna have an awakening where at some point investors are going to realize, wait a minute, the Fed wants to have our back, but they can't anymore. It doesn't work anymore because the Fed is no longer all-powerful because they've used up all their ammunition. Are we really getting close to that point, or am I just being paranoid to worry about that?

Russell Napier: I worry about that as well, and I'll come to the reason in a minute, which is related with China and the lack Lack of potency of the Fed. But let's be clear what the Fed has succeeded at and what it's failed at. It's fairly, very, very clearly succeeded in asset price inflation. And obviously, when you're in the financial markets, you tend to think that that's success, because it's making you wealthier. It's making your clients wealthier. This is how we measure success. So therefore, we tend to think, well, they've always got another— something else they can fire, and they're always successful. Well, they failed to create money. This is the crucial, crucial thing. They're very good at creating narratives.

Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.

Russell Napier: —expanding their own balance sheet. Nothing can really stop them from doing that. But there's screeds of evidence now that this has not fed into broad money. So, one thing they've failed in is broad money growth. And ultimately, that has to have some role in economic activity and inflation. So, I don't think they're as potent as the market seems to think they are, because they failed in that particular issue.

Now, let me give you the sort of scenario. It's really the scenario from The Wizard of Oz, which you'll remember. Dorothy spots that the Wizard is just a little man playing an organ behind a curtain. And here's the scenario in which I think the potency of the Fed would be massively questioned instantaneously. China devalues. The Chinese exchange rate is allowed to float. It comes down. We have Chinese goods pouring out at lower dollar prices. We have bankruptcies in other emerging markets, as we did post the 1994 devaluation. And any market practitioner could say, Well, I don't care what the Fed does, because the Fed can have some role in dictating US economic activity.

But if the rest of the world is going into the tank, and the Chinese are slashing all these prices, then how potent is the Fed? So, you know, I could make a long argument that really the PBOC has been determining global monetary policy for 2 decades. They've determined the marginal rate of inflation, therefore they've determined Nobody would agree with that, or few people would agree with that.

But the day they devalue is the day that it becomes very, very apparent that as powerful as the Federal Reserve is, and as infinite as its balance sheet can become, they're not the only player in establishing global growth and global inflation.

The yen is not a safe haven

Erik Townsend: Russell, you mentioned Chinese currency devaluation potentially having very, very significant consequences transmitted risks into the rest of the economy. What other currencies around the world should we be thinking about, and what are the risks there?

Russell Napier: Well, there is one major currency in the world which is considered today by everybody to be a safe haven, but I do not believe it is so, and that is the yen. Now, why is something believed to be a safe haven? Well, capital flows into it when we have troubles. No one can deny that, and no one can deny that when there are problems in the world, the yen tends to go up. So, that's the status quo. That's the way it has traded.

However, there are 2 major problems for the yen. The first one is the Fed is contracting its balance sheet. The ECB has stopped expanding its balance sheet. There's really no prospect that the Bank of Japan is going to stop. It's going to continue. So I've made this analogy in the past, but it's like driving 3 Ferraris, all valued at half a million US, towards the first corner. They're all worth half a million until they come to the first corner, and we discover that one doesn't have any brakes. At which stage, the 2 that maneuver the corner are still worth half a million US, but the other one is scrap value. Well, that was all theoretical, because nobody else was braking But the 2 big guys are braking now So we'll see what impact it has as it becomes clear, I think, clearer and clearer and clearer that the Bank of Japan won't stop.

Now, once again, back to the analogy we made earlier with the US, it's fine for the central bank balance sheet to expand, but it isn't really creating great growth in broad money. And I think that's why the yen hasn't reacted more negatively already, because it's in the same boat as everyone else. They just can't create money no matter how No matter how hard they try, or at least they can't create very much money. However, even so, I think time will tell that when one balance sheet shrinks, one balance sheet stabilizes, and the other balance sheet keeps going like a rocket, there have to be implications for the exchange rate.

And then to that China thing, the whole of North Asia is incredibly vulnerable to a Chinese devaluation. So that is South Korea, Taiwan, and Japan. And it would be inconceivable if they were to permit the rise in the exchange rate. So I can't tell you exactly what they'll have to do about that.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Russell Napier: Get those exchange rates down. But the idea that they would sit by and watch as China devalues and they kept their exchange rates up, very, very unlikely indeed. So expect more concerted effort by the rest of North Asia to try and react.

Remember, there are 2 broad financial systems in the world. There's kind of the so-called free market system, which isn't that free, but it seeks ultimately profit. And then there's the North Asian model, which seeks ultimately the full utilization of resources. And in that model, the policymakers always have to devalue, because that's the goal. And they don't really care if they make any money, but they have to keep the full utilization of resources, whether it's people or factories.

So China devalues. There may be an initial spike up in the yen, but the Bank of Japan is going to have to get even more aggressive. And therefore, I think the yen ultimately comes down. And the big structural background behind this is one that's been around for a long time.

The Fed has shown it can reverse. The ECB can, I think, ultimately reverse as well. There's lots of private sector savings that can buy euro-denominated government debt. But Japan ran out of savings many years ago because its debt-to-GDP ratio is so high. So the other 2 can stop, but the Bank of Japan is caught in that traditional trap, which ultimately always leads to high levels of inflation.

Though nobody believes that in Japan, just because of our history of the last 30 years. But when you have a central bank that can't stop, You will get to inflation eventually. The first financial market that has always sniffed that out is the exchange rate. Despite the fact that it definitely trades as a safe haven currency, I think particularly as we get a movement in the RMB, I think we will change our minds on what the yen represents.

Why the dollar goes higher: Europe, renminbi and yen

Erik Townsend: Let's come back to the US dollar while we're on currencies. The last time we had you on the program, your outlook was very much for a higher US dollar. US dollar, and you have been proven right. But now we're coming into a period of time when there's been this reversal of expectations around US monetary policy. Suddenly what everybody thought was 3 to 4 hikes is maybe going to be a question of how many cuts come in 2019. Does that change the outlook for the dollar? Have we maybe reached a top here, or do you still see the dollar moving higher?

Russell Napier: No, it doesn't change it for me. In fact, it makes me more convinced that we're looking at the dollar going higher. And you Now, you might think, well, that's peculiar, isn't it? I mean, how can we look at a lower outlook for US interest rates? A higher dollar, first of all, I'd always considered there'd be— interest rates wouldn't be rising at the pace the market had considered anyway. But remember, the real reason this is happening is not because of economic activity in the United States per se. It's because of what's happening in the rest of the world. We are focusing on US rates a lot, but look, the 10-year German Bund yield, just 3 days ago, was incredibly close to zero.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Russell Napier: We've got a negative 10-year back again on the JGB. This is really about growth outside of America. So US growth, I'm sure, will slow. I'm sure US inflation will come down. I'm pretty sure the Fed won't be putting rates up. But things are getting much worse in Europe. They're getting much worse in emerging markets. And it's all about the— an exchange rate is the relative between these 2 things. Nor does— I can't remember if we discussed it last May, but coming up this May, we have the European parliamentary elections.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Russell Napier: And in those elections, the extreme left and the extreme right are going to do incredibly well. How well? Perhaps 40% of the entire representation of the European Parliament will be extreme left and right. They have, according to Di Maio, the Deputy Prime Minister of Italy, already agreed to collaborate. This is not unknown for the extreme left and the extreme right to do because they share one thing in common.

And the one thing they share in common is they all want to bring power back to their sovereign parliaments and away from Brussels.

Now, that is a constitutional crisis on a grand scale, which cannot be good for the euro. It questions the entire existence of the euro when you get a constitutional crisis of that magnitude. So if currencies are relative, given what I said about the RMB, the yen, and this massive constitutional crisis coming for Europe, then it's very hard for me to stand here and tell you that the dollar's going down. Just by default, the dollar is probably going up. The reasons the dollar's coming down have really nothing to do with interest rates. They're much more existential than that. China has an overvalued exchange rate, which is tightening monetary policy. Europe is involved in a failed experiment to create a single currency. And Japan has run out of savings. 3 structural reasons why these exchange rates should come down. And the dollar has questions.

The US political system has questions. The US economy have questions.

Napier's Practical History of Financial Markets course and sign-off

Russell Napier: But they're not on the scale of the questions we'll be asking when the fascists and the communists

Erik Townsend: Well, Russell, I have always enjoyed interviewing you as well as listening to interviews with other interviewers because your background as a financial historian gives you just so much deeper and richer perspective on markets than most of the people that we, we hear in the press. And it's, it's just such a treat for me to have a chance to interview you. An even better treat might And I think it might be something that you are recently working to put together, which is a class called The Practical History of Financial Markets. And this is not just an hour-long talk at a retail investor conference. This is something that is designed for investment professionals and extremely sophisticated private investors. It's 2 solid days. Tell us, how did this come about? It's absolutely fascinating to me.

Russell Napier: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: I'm very curious to possibly attend it myself. So, tell us more about it, how it came about, and what you intend to accomplish, and when and where it will be offered.

Russell Napier: Okay. Well, thank you for asking. I set the course up in 2004. I've taken it 4 times a year since 2004. So, I'm glad some of it's finally rubbing off. I'm a slow learner, but clearly I've picked up some of the lessons, and let's hope I continue to do so. The good news is we're bringing it across the Atlantic for the first time in a very long time. The course itself was put together in the early 2000s by asking fund managers with lots of experience what they knew today that they wished they'd known 40 years beforehand. And based upon the answers to that, we built this course. It's not a chronological history. It's not a developmental history about financial institutions. It's basically looking at why equity valuations mean revert, and they have mean reverted pretty consistently. I do understand that people think it's different this time, but there's some evidence already that they may be mean reverting.

We've got 7 teachers for this. It takes 2 days when we run it in North America, 2.5 days when we run it in Europe.

So we will be in Toronto on that incredible week, a week I'm sure you know very well. So on the Monday, Tuesday, we will be teaching in Toronto. On Wednesday, there's a famous value investing conference with the Ivey Business School. And on Thursday, there's an AGM for a famous value investor in Toronto called Prem Watsa. Fairfax Group. So we're trying to make that a bit of a learning jamboree for investors. And as I said, we don't come across the Atlantic very often, but we will, albeit north of the border. We also run in London on March 21st to 23rd. And for those of you who have a coat and thermal underwear, we will be in Edinburgh from the 21st to the 23rd of February.

Erik Townsend: Okay. And the dates again in Toronto? Toronto, sorry, 8th and 9th of April, 8th and 9th of April in Toronto, and there's another conference the following day if you want to get the, the jam-packed weekend. Russell, where can people find out about this and register if they're interested in attending on April 8th and 9th?

Russell Napier: Yeah, well, we have a website where you can get all those dates and a full teaching schedule to check whether this is something you're genuinely interested in and discover the price, of course, as well, at didaskoeducation.com So that is D-I-D-A-S-K-O, didaskoeducation.org. Or put my name, Russell Napier, and practical history course into any good search engine, and you'll find us quickly. My email address is there. Get in touch. It'll be great to see you.

Erik Townsend: Well, Russell, I can't thank you enough for another fantastic interview. We really look forward to having you back on the program again soon, and I hope to get the opportunity to see you in Toronto myself. So we're going to have to leave it there in the interest of time. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. MacroVoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Postgame: Toronto meet-and-greet with Napier

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview with Russell. You know, the moment I found out about about that course, I said, well, listen, if he's coming to my backyard here in Toronto, I'm just gonna have to go. So I signed up. But one of the interesting things, when we did that MacroVoices Live out in Vancouver, one of my favorite parts was the reception, which is getting together with all of our listeners and having a beer. So I went and reached out to Russell and I convinced him to actually come out for a beer and for us to have a little MacroVoices meet and greet out in Toronto when he's out here teaching that course. So any of our MacroVoices listeners that going to register for that program, make sure you email me, patrick@macrovoices.com, and I'll let you know about the reception where Russell and I will go out for a pint.

Erik Townsend: Patrick, I think that's a fantastic call. And just to share with our listeners, when we did our first MacroVoices Live in Toronto, the restaurant meet and greet afterwards was an afterthought. We didn't plan it. Somebody suggested it. We thought, oh, okay, whatever. It turned out the feedback that we got is people valued the reception and the networking time, both to meet other listeners and get a sense of their background and talk to them about markets, and to have a chance to get some actual social time, face time, one-on-one with the speakers. People told us that was more valuable than the actual program, and that's the reason we did 2 full-length receptions at MacroVoices Live.

So we already heard from Russell how to get information to get registered on the course. When we taped the interview, Patrick had not yet made arrangements. So in addition to that, follow up with Patrick directly and find out what the story is on the meet and greet.

Postgame: Erik on China scapegoating and war risk

Patrick Ceresna: So Erik, I want to go back to the interview. What did you take away?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, first of all, as I said earlier, Russell just never ceases to amaze me. He's one of my favorite people in the industry, and he's very impressive. The thing that I thought was extremely interesting was his perspective that China may be the driver or almost the controller of tightening monetary policy and pushing inflation and so forth. And, you know, I think that unfortunately, call me an alarmist if you want to, but I think we're headed in this Fourth Turning into an era where everybody's gonna be pointing fingers at one another and governments around the world are going to be looking to excuse the situations that exist in their own countries, which frankly are usually of those governments' own own making. And they're going to look to excuse those situations by putting the blame on someone else and pointing fingers and saying, look, it's those foreigners. They're the ones that did it. It's all their fault. And I think we really have a difficult setup if you look at the tension that already exists, trade tension between the United States and China.

And there certainly is a part of the American demographic that is angry and feels that, you know, China's The problem. If we get to a situation where inflation really does become a problem and we're looking for a scapegoat, this potential for international scapegoating to lead to a further rise in geopolitical tension scares me.

It makes me worry that we're headed toward more global military conflicts. And something that a lot of people just don't What we have to understand is China is not Afghanistan. If we get into a shooting war with China, it's very likely that they could win. China has developed all kinds of missile technology designed specifically for sinking US aircraft carriers. This is not Scud missiles coming out of Iraq. So the potential— and this is something which I wish that I had had the presence of mind to ask Russell about during the interview— financial historians predict war between Japan and the United States something like 50 years before it ever happened.

Because what always happens throughout history is when there is one clearly established economic leader— not, not military leader, but economic leader— in the world, and another country is ascendant and begins to challenge that economic dominance, those 2 countries always go to a shooting war. And that's what happened with the economic ascendance of Japan before World War II. And there's a good argument to be made that there's a very serious risk of shooting war risk between China and the United States. And I think that some of these monetary trends are going to be the, the seeds that eventually lead to the excuses that government leaders use in order to justify military action. And I sure hope to be proven wrong about all of that. But on that cheery note, Patrick, what did you take away from this interview?

Postgame: Patrick on Treasury funding and asset deflation

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know what? Russell, in my mind, nailed it. He just nailed it when it comes to the Treasury bond markets. So many people in my mind were looking at these massive budget deficits that were going to be run by the US government and said, because of this and because the world is not buying these Treasuries, that yields are about to skyrocket. And my view, and I got that from Russell as well, which is the government will not have any problems funding that deficit. The Treasury bond market is going to get fully funded. What is going to be a problem is draining the liquidity out of the system, and it's going to cause asset deflation because of that liquidity void that these massive deficits are running. And so to me, I see more deflationary pressures coming from that, not runaway yields. And I really got the sense that that's where he was going.

Outro and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, we're going to have to leave it there for this week. Folks, we need your help as usual, so please register your free account at MacroVoices.com if you haven't done so already. The benefit to you is you'll receive our free Research Roundup email, which never contains any advertising or marketing. It's just a compendium of links to all of the best free content we could find on the internet each week. Patrick, tell them what they can expect in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to learn more about Russell Napier's course on a practical Practical History of the Financial Markets. There was a great interview with Robert Shiller out in Davos on bear market risks, and as well, a really interesting article from Jeffrey Snider on China's eurodollar stock reaching its final chapters. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

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