Richard Duncan — Chief economist at Blackhorse Asset Management in Singapore; author of The Dollar Crisis; formerly ABN Amro, World Bank, James Capel, Salomon Brothers (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 12 was recorded on April 28th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've got Richard Duncan coming up as today's special guest. I'll be talking with Richard about the genesis of the 2008 credit crisis, the theory and history of quantitative easing, and why, unfortunately, Richard shares my view that history teaches us that economic challenges like those the world faces today often lead to war. All of that and much more is coming up when Richard joins us after today's market wrap.

Market wrap: Fed minutes, BOJ and the equity market

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Erik, I personally find it extremely difficult to refer to anything regarding the FOMC and Janet Yellen as exciting, but I know that our listeners who do follow and invest in equities would have been on the edge of their seats yesterday expecting this release, latest release of the FOMC minutes. What did we get from the Fed yesterday, Erik, and what's happening in the stock markets right now?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think actually the BOJ not taking action last night had more of a market impact than the Fed did. You know, the Fed did pretty much what was expected. I'd say what I think is changing here is the Fed seems to be softening the message of we are in a rate hike cycle and we're definitely going to have more rate hikes coming. And they're, they're stressing the need for patience more. I think this is very important and very telling because if we had the stock market crashing in they had to save the day with another Jim Bullard speech to bail out the market. It would all add up.

It seems to me like the Fed's kind of running scared here. What are they scared of when the stock market is almost at all-time highs? What's going on? I think that they are backing off of their tightening policy. I think it's probably a good idea because I do think that the global economy is slowing, but it doesn't seem like the messaging really matches what they've said in the past. So I wonder what has the Fed so spooked.

I also noticed we traced almost We saw almost all of the BOJ correction during today's session on Thursday. By noon, it was almost a complete retracement. Around 3:00 PM, last hour of trading, which is usually when equity markets are most busy and exciting, we saw a huge move to the downside with at least, as we're taping mid-afternoon, still trading in New York, it looks like a big move to the downside is beginning with no proximal trigger hitting the wires yet. I'm sure that some news event happened in the last few minutes as we're recording this, and it's probably about to hit the wires. By the time you hear this, you'll know what triggered that.

In general, though, I think you have to look at this equity market, as I said last week, and say, this just looks out of sight. It looks to me like it's headed for new all-time highs. I can't explain it. I don't think the fundamentals support it. That leaves me on the sidelines.

One thing I do want to point out is one of my bearish arguments that I made against the S&P 500 more than a month ago was that I think a lot of the strength in the last several years has come from buybacks, corporations buying back their own stock. And I said we're in this quiet period around earnings where they're not allowed to do that. That's going to take a lot of buying pressure out of the market during the month of April. Guess what? Month of April's over. We're coming out of that period. Corporate buybacks are going to come back into the picture. To me, that just looks like it's going to bring more upside potential to this market that I think is profoundly overvalued. I do think that it doesn't make sense, but I have to stand on the sidelines until it starts to do something that I can equate to some That's my fundamental view right now.

It is just crazy to me.

Crude oil: Cushing build, $50 Brent and the steepener trade

Nathan Egger: So maybe more all-time highs and everything is awesome. I, I, yay, I hope so. And, uh, of course crude oil comes next. I'm bracing myself a little bit here, but, uh, Erik, is there any chance you can give our listeners a normal length update this week and breathe? Don't forget to breathe this time.

Erik Townsend: You don't think I was long-winded last week, do you?

Nathan Egger: Not much.

Erik Townsend: I know that Chris Curran, our audio editor, didn't say anything about having to stay up till 4 in the morning. He hasn't mentioned it. Oh, the invoice For the overtime, yeah, I remember that now. Let's keep it a little tighter.

I think that there's some really exciting stuff going on. There was a 1.9 million barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. Both Art Berman and I have opined that the reason there's been so much strength in oil is it's really the Cushing inventory builds that are the catalyst that should cause selling pressure in the market.

Well, we got our catalyst that we were calling for, and there's been strong upward tape. Action in the face of it. So it seems like sentiment is so strong and so bullish right now that it really is going to take a lot. That 1.9 million barrel build in Cushing, although I think that's extremely significant and should have created more selling pressure, it came in the face of a national, a nationwide draw on inventory and a finished product draw on inventory. So I think the market is saying, hey, this thing is ending. Are they paying attention to the weather in Houston? Have they noticed that all those ships are still stuck waiting to get into the Houston Ship Channel? And when they do, all that inventory— inventory, by the way, doesn't get recorded until the ship clears customs when it arrives port, is when the— I learned that on Twitter last week— is when the inventory is counted. So when that happens, when the weather clears, I think we could see a big national build on inventory.

If we see more builds on Cushing inventory, the combination of those, boy, that That ought to be a huge downside catalyst.

Guess what? I've called a whole bunch of downside catalysts in the last couple of months and it hasn't happened. We've just got to accept that there is huge, massive upside sentiment right now, and that's what's driving the market. I think $50 Brent is a very obvious target. It's a psychological round number. Still got about $2, $2.50 to go in order to get there. I would imagine that that's coming. I don't think the fundamentals support it, but the tape action has been really strong. We're going to need some kind of catalyst. I did speak with Art Berman. I asked him since our long interview last week to really think about, are we missing anything? Art says he can't find anything that he's missing. He thinks this is irrational exuberance. Situation in Houston, I do think there's good reason to think that next week's inventory report might be the big one where a lot of ships come into port and that oil gets counted.

That will, of course, depend on the weather. I'll be watching. Samir Madani's work on Twitter, as we discussed last week, in order to see where he thinks that's going. But I think that's coming. The thing is, what we do have now is what was previously record short interest in speculative short interest in crude oil futures is now approaching record long interest.

That's a perfect setup for a major reversal, but that reversal is not going to come until there is a major catalyst because there is just so much positive sentiment. If I were Prince Salman— and I want to say first, I make the assumption that Saudi Arabia's desire here is to continue to suppress prices in order to do damage to other producers, and I believe that their goal is eventually to coerce Russia and some of the other large producers into agreeing to joint production cuts, but I don't think that we're there yet.

If I were Prince Salman, I would Wait for that inventory report, the big inventory report that might be coming next week, where we get a big build in both national and Cushing inventories. And then I would the very next day or the same day come out with some kind of announcement that says we're turning the screws up here. We're going to produce an additional million barrels per day starting right now. I don't think he's got the ability to do that, but he certainly has the ability to say that he's going to do that. And I wouldn't be surprised to see him play that card, to see Saudi Arabia look for where the market is ripe to react. Reverse and to try to catalyze a sudden and extreme downside move. It ain't happening yet. The shorts have been crushed here. I've stepped out of this trade and I am waiting to see what happens. We need to see some kind of catalyst that breaks this just really, really strong bullish sentiment in the market.

I do believe that the fundamental analysis that Art Berman and I have offered is correct, but it is clearly not

Nathan Egger: Erik, last week you mentioned that a term structure steepener trade may be better than an outright short at this point. Can you give us an update on your thinking around that trade?

Erik Townsend: Sure. Let's review the logic from last week, and then I'll give you the update. What I said is, if you have the view that I have, which is that there's a very significant risk of a very, very big downside move before this thing is over, possibly new lows lower than the $26 that we saw before, but you don't dare to go short because you've been overrun already by this massive bullish sentiment. What you want to look for is an asymmetric return opportunity where you can make a huge return if that big downside move happens, but you don't lose very much if oil just continues to drift higher. The trade that really stood out to me is a term structure steepener. In other words, you're betting that the contango is going to get steeper, and specifically, you're betting that the curve, which is almost flat now— I mean, not completely, but it's compared to what it was, it's very close to flat, that it can't possibly go into structural backwardation from here.

And the reason I thought that seemed very, very unlikely is that backwardation tends to occur for 2 reasons. One has to do with storage, how much storage capacity is available. It's a supply and demand thing at the front of the curve in particular. What contango is really measuring is the cost of storage from one month to the next.

It also, especially in the back end of the curve, is very much affected by long-term expectations of the market. And my view has been you've just got to believe that oil prices are headed much, much higher from here. We know that they're already below the long-term cost of production. So I think this is a man-made problem. It's created by Saudi Arabian policy— actually Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates working together on this market share strategy. And eventually, they will— it will be revealed what they wanted. They'll get what they want or they won't. There will be some negotiation. We'll probably at some point get to production cuts and a return to north of $80 oil. So I think that if the expectation has to be of much higher oil prices in the future, and you don't have a storage problem right now, I think, how can the curve go into backwardation? So that means If you make that trade, you've got a huge upside and a very limited downside, as long as that backwardation is something you consider to be very unlikely to occur.

Much to my surprise, and that I've just told you my view, a much bigger fish in the world of macro than me is Goldman Sachs' Jeff Currie. Jeff was on Squawk Box, I believe, the other day. I was traveling, just been more than 20,000 frequent flyer miles logged in the last 3 days, so I've been a little bit out of the loop. I was shocked to hear that Jeff Currie of Goldman Sachs is predicting a move into structural backwardation in the crude oil market. I managed to pull up his April 22nd research note, and I'm going to read a quote from it directly.

The key to our commodity returns forecasts during the second half of 2016 is not the price level, but rather our view on a positive carry in key commodity markets due to the expected return of backwardation. Goldman expects a return of backwardation. Holy cow, how could they think that when obviously expectations are going to be for much higher oil prices? Well, the answer, as Mr. Currie continues, he says, at the micro level, the sharp drop in long-term price expectations has helped to create the near-term disruptions in supply and destocking that helped fuel the recent rally.

But this does nothing to resolve the longer-term supply overhang. This, according to Mr. Currie, reinforces tightness in the front of the curve and weakens the back of the curve.

So he is saying essentially that the market has a huge supply overhang, and that is going to cause market expectations— that is, what people think is going to happen— to assume that the back end of the curve, long-dated futures, are going to stay low priced because nobody thinks the price is going to go back back up.

Nathan Egger: Wow.

Erik Townsend: Well, when you're that far off in opinion, and I certainly disagree very, very strongly with that view because I think it's very clear that this is a man-made problem that will be eventually resolved by a negotiation of some kind, and that production cuts will lead to a very rapid rebalancing and return to higher prices.

The thing is, the part of my view that is about backwardation not happening isn't based on fundamentals. It's based on market sentiment, because that's what drives this. If Goldman Sachs says that market expectations are for the back end of the curve to be weak and the front end to be strong, I think it's crazy, and I think the logic doesn't make any sense.

But Goldman doesn't just opine on the market. They actually have enough influence to define the market view. So if they keep saying things like this, and especially if other banks share that view, Whether I'm right or wrong doesn't matter. The market perception is going to enable the curve to move back into backwardation. Now, I would certainly welcome a move back into structural backwardation because it enables some other trades that I'm extremely fond of. I don't know what's going to happen here, but it does change my view because the whole reason that I saw so much asymmetry in the term structure steepener trade was entirely based on my idea that we couldn't see backwardation because surely everybody must be thinking like I am, that oil prices are headed much higher in the next couple of years.

Goldman is selling a story that I think they have a lot more influence on the market than I do that says the opposite, and they can change perceptions. I've backed off a little bit. I do see an opportunity in that trade, but I'm not sure that the asymmetry is quite as strong as I originally thought because I think that the market is a little bit further out of touch with reality than I previously thought.

Gold hugging the 50-day moving average

Nathan Egger: And last week we skipped gold due to us being in the middle of a 2-part gold series, and we had a lot to say, obviously, on other subjects. But Erik, are you seeing any signs here of a resolution of this trading range we've been in, in gold? Is anything changing for you? What do you see on the horizon?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's really been a month now that gold's been doing what I call hugging the 50-day moving average. In other words, it goes up and down, but every single daily bar, almost every single one I'm looking at a chart right now. There's a couple that don't touch the line, but almost every day gold trades through its 50-day moving average. As we're speaking Thursday afternoon, it happens to be on a high at $1,269.40 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon.

Okay, it doesn't look like any major breakout. We haven't seen a new cycle high or anything, and it looks to me like what the market's doing is hugging the 50-day moving average, waiting for a signal. And I think the waiting that it's doing is to see what the Fed does.

If there is another rate hike, if they follow through on the next meeting, Nobody really expected it in this meeting, but if the next meeting has a rate hike, I think it's going to be really hard for gold. If the Fed backs off, and especially if we get more dovish commentary out of Janet Yellen or other Fed governors, and we see that gold price move substantially north of the 50-day moving average, where it's not hugging the line anymore, I might start to believe in this rally. But right now, I think gold is waiting for a signal, and if it gets a signal that the Fed is serious about continuing the hiking cycle, I think it could mean some significant more downside.

Nathan Egger: Well, we had a mammoth show last week, so we're going to keep things moving and go straight to Erik's interview with Richard Duncan coming up next right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik introduces Richard Duncan

Erik Townsend: Today's feature interview will focus on monetary policy, the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency, and in general, quantitative easing. Is it a good idea, a bad idea? Are we done with it yet? Where are we headed? This is a subject that I find fascinating, but I find it's hard to find the right guest. A lot of guys who are writing about this stuff on the internet, frankly, have no background. They're conspiracy theory bloggers talking about the US dollar's going to hyperinflate and the stock market's going to crash. I never quite figured out how that works. Kind of like falling off a building and Dying of hypoxia because you fall up instead of down.

Today's guest is no conspiracy blogger. Since beginning his career as an equities analyst in Hong Kong in 1986, Richard Duncan has served as Global Head of Investment Strategy at ABN Amro Bank in London. He's worked as a financial sector specialist for the World Bank in Washington, DC. He's headed equity research departments for James Capel Securities and Salomon Brothers in Bangkok. He also worked as a consultant for the IMF in Thailand during the Asia crisis. He's now Chief economist at Blackhorse Asset Management in Singapore.

This guy has been around the block when it comes to macro, yet he still has a view. He wrote a book called The Dollar Crisis, which in many ways predicted the events of 2008. And no, it's not another conspiracy theory that the US dollar is going to crash tomorrow.

Richard, let's start with what your book, The Dollar Crisis, predicted and what happened in 2008. What caused the 2008 event? And Let's start with a framework, and we'll go from there into the government's response.

From World War I to the 2008 credit bubble

Richard Duncan: Erik, okay, thank you for— first of all, let me thank you for having me on this program. It's an honor to be here. And okay, so let's do start with what caused the crisis of 2008. It's become such a politicized world and subject that many people are very confused about how the crisis came about to begin with, and seem to have the impression that it's something that went wrong 20 years ago, or perhaps 30 years ago.

But actually, I would suggest that where we are now, really, this crisis originated as far back as World War I. And this is why. In World War I, all the European countries went to war with each other, and they didn't have enough gold to fight the war. So they went off the gold standard, and those governments started printing a lot of paper money to finance all the government bonds that they had to issue to finance the war.

And so all of that paper money and all of that government debt issued during World War I, that led to a worldwide credit bubble that we call the Roaring Twenties. But in 1930, all of that credit couldn't be repaid. And at that point, the international monetary system collapsed, the international financial system collapsed, the banks failed, and international trade collapsed.

And the Great Depression started. And that lasted for 10 years.

And during that 10-year period, Germany became fascist and took over Europe. Japan became militarized and took over Asia. And then World War II started. And then at that point in 1940, the United States government increased its spending by 900%. And that 900% increase in government spending ended the Depression.

Of course, World War II killed 60 million people. Now, at the end of the war, our side won, but policymakers were terrified that if they cut back on the government spending, that we would collapse back into depression. And that was a horrifying prospect, because at that point, the Soviet Union had half of Europe, and communism was spreading like wildfire around the world.

And during the Great Depression, the US itself became quite socialist. And so there was a fear that there would be a communist worldwide revolution.

So from that point on, the government didn't cut back on its spending in the United States. Government spending just increased rapidly year after year. So if you look at a chart of government spending going back, say, to 1900, World War II looks just like a very small blip now compared to the amount of spending that's occurred ever afterwards.

So first, many people blame the government for for what's gone wrong with the global economy and for creating this bubble. And of course, in some respects, that is exactly right. But the alternative of not spending all of that money in war would have been a fascist takeover of the world, probably, and a defeat of the United States and the remaining democracies that were still in existence in 1940. And the number were not many.

So it was necessary to have that increase in government spending, and afterwards we continued to spend more and more. And by doing so, particularly effectively under President Reagan, who ramped up government spending quite radically, the United States defeated the Soviet Union.

But it took more and more government spending, and so decade after decade. Year after year, government spending increased and the debt grew. And by the 1960s, there was not enough gold left in the United States to allow the Fed to continue backing dollars with gold. Up until that time, there was a law that The Fed had to maintain at least 25% gold backing for every dollar that it issued.

But by the late '60s, so many dollars had been— had gone overseas for one reason or another, the Vietnam War, or banks investing in Europe, or corporations investing in Europe. These other countries had the right to convert those foreign-held dollars into US gold. So during the 1960s, the United States lost half of its gold reserves.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Richard Duncan: And by the time President Nixon closed the gold window, as they say, there were something like at least 4 times as many dollars overseas as the U.S. had gold available to allow those dollars to be converted into. And so we stopped backing dollars with gold, domestically in 1968, internationally in 1971.

And that was That was the end of what was left of the gold standard. Afterwards, credit absolutely exploded. Total credit in the United States first went through $1 trillion in 1964, and over the next 43 years, it expanded 50 times to $50 trillion by 2007. And what I mean by total credit— credit and debt are 2 sides of the same coin. Total credit is equal to total debt. So total debt, government debt, household sector debt, corporate debt, financial sector debt, all the debt. It went from $1 to $50 trillion in 43 years.

And that explosion of credit, which by the way, couldn't have happened if we'd continued to back money with gold, that explosion of credit completely transformed the world. It created the world we live in. It is the thing that allowed Asia to industrialize. The entire modern world was built on the back of that explosion of credit.

But the problem arrived in 2008, when the American households could no longer afford to repay all of the debt they had incurred. And at that point, credit started to contract.

Erik Townsend: Now, where is the proximal trigger in this story, Richard? Because, as you said, 43 years of massive credit expansion through, obviously, several economic cycles, good times and bad times. But 2007, 2008, all of a sudden some straw broke the camel's back. What happened?

Richard Duncan: Wages and income in the United States started stagnating in the 1970s. But by pushing up home prices, by extending more and more credit through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and extending it to household sector, the household sector, it created a housing price boom and then bubble. And as the housing prices inflated, that allowed the Americans to take equity out of their homes and continue to have an improving standard of living, even though their wages were stagnant.

But this went on and lasted and helped for quite a long time, 15, 20 years perhaps. But by 2008, the Americans just had so much debt, and the structure of these mortgages, as you as you well know, some of them people were not required to pay any interest for for one or two or three years, and then they started having to pay interest, and there were all kinds of schemes, and the whole thing just blew up once people hit the point where they couldn't afford to pay interest on all of that debt. Any longer, then the banking system blew up and the shadow banking system blew up. And we were in a 1930s moment again.

But rather than allowing the 1930s to replay— in the 1930s, the policymakers really did believe in laissez-faire and market forces, and they just more or less stepped back and let market forces work. And so market forces did work. Market forces established a new market-determined equilibrium. But unfortunately, that equilibrium was at a level of GDP in the United States that was only half the size that it had been in 1929.

And it was a level of unemployment that ranged between 15% and 25% for that entire decade.

So in 2008, rather than allowing that to replay, this time policymakers did did absolutely everything in their power to keep this global credit bubble inflated. And they did that with trillion-dollar budget deficits, in large part financed with paper money creation on a multi-trillion-dollar scale. So they have managed to keep this global bubble inflated for 8 years now.

And that's where we are. We still have a massive global credit bubble, and it continues to be Inflated by government policy. And without government policy, it will deflate into a 1930s-style depression, and policymakers are determined not to allow that to happen.

How quantitative easing worked

Erik Townsend: Okay, so to summarize what we've talked about so far, you've got 4 decades at least of massive credit expansion blowing up this bubble of credit. That bubble starts to pop in 2008. The government decides not to allow it to pop, and the remedy that they propose is to print money in order to rescue the economy. And I think that's obviously a very contentious subject— was that the right thing or not? But they've done what they've done. So let's go next into what is the theory of how quantitative easing works, because I think Mr. Bernanke tells us it's about stock. There's also this flow argument. What's that about? How does quantitative easing work, or what are the different views on how it works? And what were they trying to do? And how effective do you think it's been in the last 8 years in terms of stopping this bubble from deflating? And I think you and I both are more concerned about whether or not stopping it was a good idea.

We'll come later on in this interview to what's going to happen next.

Richard Duncan: Okay, well, quantitative easing can't really be analyzed on its own. In other words, it wasn't only monetary policy that was in effect. It was monetary policy combined with fiscal policy. And US government debt, we had budget deficits of more than $1 trillion a year for 4 or 5 years in a row. And since 2008, US government debt has increased by $9 trillion. That's a 140% increase in US government debt.

And so how quantitative easing worked is, well, first of all, it wouldn't have been possible for the government to run these trillion-dollar-plus budget deficits a year without quantitative easing, because borrowing so much money would have pushed interest rates to a very high level, and the higher interest rates would have crushed the already destroyed property market and pushed home prices down further and further and further, creating a depression.

So So by printing what turned out to be, in the United States, $3.6 trillion, that enabled the government to finance this $9 trillion of government spending since 2008 at extremely low interest rates. So you got the fiscal kick of that $9 trillion of government spending that creating— you know how the GDP is calculated. The economy is made up of personal consumption, household consumption, Business investment, government spending, and net trade.

So that government spending was nine trillion dollar kick that boosted the economy very radically compared to what would have occurred without nine trillion dollars of government spending. After all, the U.S. economy size is now only about is roughly seventeen trillion. So that it QE first of all, first and foremost, it financed.

Against the fiscal stimulus. But in addition to that, when— so the Fed, quantitative easing, the Fed prints money from thin air and it buys government bonds or a combination of government bonds and/or bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie.

So when the Fed does that, when it buys those bonds, Whoever it buys them from, they then end up with that amount of money. Let's call it $3.6 trillion, and they have $3.6 trillion in cash. What are they going to do with it? Well, they're going to buy other assets with it, and a lot of the other—and money is fungible, so it really doesn't matter what they buy.

They could buy old government bonds that would push up the price of the old bonds. And push down their yields. And so people, other people who would have bought Treasury bonds yielding 5% buy corporate bonds, which are now yielding 5% because the government bonds are only yielding 3%. And people who would have bought the corporate bonds at 5% are now buying junk bonds.

And a lot of people end up buying stocks.

So before the first round of quantitative easing started, the US stock market was in freefall.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: But when QE1 started, that was the bottom, and stocks started going up, and the economy revived. But QE1 ended, stocks fell, the economy hit a soft patch. So pretty soon they launched QE2.

That pushed the stock market back up. That revived the economy. Then they ended QE2, and we get the stocks skid. The economy hit another soft patch.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: And so they launched a very big round of QE3, long and large and long-lasting, and the stocks went up and up and up.

And as a result, household sector net— stocks went up and also property went up. And so as a result, household sector net worth went up. In other words, the wealth of the public. And so household sector net worth, let's see, I think it's now $87 trillion.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Richard Duncan: $6 trillion. That's up, if I recall correctly, almost 60% from 2009.

So that was entirely the result of quantitative easing. There was no other magical reason asset prices went up 60% after 2009. It was because of the fiat money creation and using that fiat money to buy financial assets.

And so that enormous increase in wealth created a big wealth effect. And so people spent more money, and that boosted the economy in the United States. That created jobs in the United States. So there was much more consumption than there would have been otherwise. And that pulled in more imports into the United States. And so that allowed other countries around the world to export more.

And so that's really the main 2 ways how quantitative easing worked. It worked by financing the fiscal stimulus and by this incredible increase in wealth that it brought about.

Did QE succeed? Better to die tomorrow than today

Erik Townsend: Now, in terms of how it's worked, if I go back to 2009 when QE1 was announced, what I was saying at the time is I said, this is insanity. We have become a nation of debtors addicted to living beyond our means on credit. The United States went from being the biggest creditor nation in the world to the biggest debtor nation in the history of the world. And as we have a bursting credit bubble, the government's response is to encourage everyone to borrow and spend more and print money. And I said, we have to change our ways. We can't continue doing this. It's going to end very badly. There's no free lunch. You can't just bail the economy out with the printing press. It won't work, is what I said.

I think a lot of people would say, boy, it's been 8 years. Clearly, they were successful at propping the stock market up and recovering the losses, at least the nominal losses, that had occurred in the stock market. And, you know, there's not been any runaway inflation so far. The massive negative consequence that I and other people thought might be coming as a result of this hasn't happened. So a lot of people would say this has been really, really successful. The government's done a fantastic job. QE has worked. It saved the economy, and we can just keep on doing more of it as we need it from here. I'm very skeptical of that, but how would you answer someone who— Well, who says, hey, a lot of people predicted things would go wrong and they haven't.

Richard Duncan: Well, of course, there was good reason to have those concerns and a lot of common sense and all of those things that you, you just mentioned. But as it turned out, the policymakers, I believe, had the, the opinion and that if they allowed the credit bubble to collapse, that the Great Depression That would follow would be so catastrophic that perhaps our civilization wouldn't survive.

So, in other words, the steps they took, even if they weren't really quite sure if they would work in the long term, they were just happy to live another day. So the policy was based on their belief that it's better to die tomorrow than die today, because if you die, you're dead forever. You can't get any more dead than dead. So it's better to die 8 years later if we die tomorrow than it would have been 8 years earlier. I mean, just think about the last 8 years. I didn't even have an iPad 8 years ago. You know, I've enjoyed the last 8 years.

I'm completely pleased that they have kept this global bubble inflated for the next 8 years. And recall, this whole artificial economy that we have Some people call it a fraudulent economy. This didn't begin in 2008. This began in 1940 when the U.S. government increased its spending by 900% out of necessity to win the war that ended the Depression.

So 1940—that was 76 years ago. That's how long this fraudulent, as some people call it, system has been functioning—76 years. Years, more than 2 generations. So if this bubble pops now, or 8 years ago, or 8 years from now, the consequences, the collapse will be so catastrophic that it will, you know, just think what happened in the 1930s.

All the banks failed, all the savings were destroyed, international trade collapsed. So we had protectionism, and then we had war. What would be different this time? Well, this time we have probably 3 or 4 times as many people on the planet, and we have nuclear weapons. So it wouldn't be pretty.

So a lot of people still hold the opinion, you know, okay, we brought this on ourselves. We've been spending too much money, consuming too much, borrowing too much. And those things are all true. But I would just again like to emphasize A lot of that was to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese who attacked us, and then later the Soviet Union, in which we succeeded as a nation led by a government with government policies and government direction. After all, during World War II, the U.S. government took over complete control of the economy, over what was produced, how it was distributed. They controlled prices. And they controlled labor up to the point of sending people off to war to die.

And that was when capitalism died. We've never returned to a form of capitalism after that. The economy's been government-directed ever since. And that's what people really need to understand. We've had a government-directed economic system for 76 years. If we let it collapse, then the game's over. So people need to understand that if the debt contracts, One person's debt is another person's asset.

So if debt shrinks, assets shrink. It's just one is equal to the other. So we need to— we know there's a problem. There is a very big problem. We have a very high level of debt relative to GDP in the United States, and it's a worldwide problem. So yes, we all understand that there is a very serious problem.

And this is how the problem came about, starting in World War I, when we went off the classical gold standard, allowing a big bubble to form. So now, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to let it collapse, or are we going to find a better way to solve it?

Why no hyperinflation: globalization and fiat money

Erik Townsend: I want to focus on specifically the timing and the imminence of this. A lot of people thought that by extending and pretending, by printing more money to bail our economy out, that as you have described, that would just make the next crash worse. And a lot of people have said it's imminent, it can't go on much longer, but they've been saying that for 8 years. So your description is that we've basically just continued the inflation of an artificial bubble for another 8 years. Can the government keep doing this for another 8 years, another 20 years, another 30 years, or is there a point where we just have to face the piper here?

Richard Duncan: Well, I'm afraid we're going to find out. But what people have overlooked is that in the past, I mean, they're absolutely right. If governments and central banks had printed so much money as they have done this time, it would have very quickly led to hyperinflation. So just even take a mild version, a very mild version of that. In the 1960s, President Johnson was spending too much money on the Vietnam War overseas and the domestic welfare Great Society programs at home, and so that overstimulated the economy, and that led to full employment and full capacity utilization.

And at that point, we were still on the Bretton Woods system, and at that time, international trade between nations. Balanced. There was balanced trade. That was just that was the way the gold standard worked, and that was the way the Bretton Woods system worked.

So the U.S. was essentially just a national economy, and when it hit full employment and full capacity, then it generated inflation and wage push inflation. So we had very high rates of inflation in the '70s as a result, and Paul Volcker had to crush the high rates of inflation with extremely high interest rates. rates, causing a very, very painful recession in the early 1980s.

Then President Reagan is elected, and he has much larger budget deficits than Lyndon Johnson did. I think it was 5%— the budget deficits were 5% of GDP for 6 years in a row. But we didn't get a new massive round of inflation in the United States.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: Something had changed.

And the thing that had changed was the United States, no longer on the Bretton Woods system, discovered that it could run very large trade deficits with other countries. It didn't hit domestic bottlenecks in the United States because it could buy things from other countries like Japan, or increasingly all kinds of other developing countries around the world with very low wages.

So the United States started running very large trade deficits, initially with Japan. By the mid-'80s, the trade deficit hit 3.5% of GDP, which was completely unprecedented. And by 2006, it hit 6% of GDP. So we no longer had a national economy. We had a global economy. And rather than being constrained by inflationary pressures caused by domestic bottlenecks in the United States, We had a global economy in which 2 billion people, even today, 2 billion people live on less than $3 a day.

So there are no constraints on labor. We have an infinite supply of very, very, very cheap labor. I would say the going wage rate in the manufacturing sector is something like $7 or $8 a day now, with no benefits.

So that is extremely deflationary. Globalization is very, very deflationary. It puts downward pressure on US wages and wages in all the developing countries, and it makes things much, much cheaper to buy. So globalization has allowed us to avoid these domestic bottlenecks. It's resulted in extreme deflationary pressure that has offset all of the inflationary pressure. That normally would have accompanied this explosion of credit, and later this explosion of paper money creation.

And so this time, that's why this time is different. We're in a different world. It is a combination of fiat money and globalization that's never occurred before. It is a unique moment in history, and that's why we've gotten away with it, and that's why they will continue to get away with.

Credit is the new money: the 2% rule

Erik Townsend: Okay. When you say that they'll continue to get away with it, you know, what we've described so far is essentially, we've got real problems, structural problems. The government's solution is printing money, which I see as not really solving any causal problem, but definitely it has been effective as a Band-Aid to paper over our problems and cover the symptoms. So far, it's been working that way.

Right now, the government's telling us we're going to begin a rate normalization cycle. So, we're going to get away from this money printing and not do any more of it.

Richard Duncan: Right.

Erik Townsend: Some people are skeptical. What does history teach us about what happens when governments start printing money and they say they're going to stop printing money? Where is this headed and how does it end? Because what you're describing is essentially they have to keep continuing to print money. They're getting away with it because of deflationary force. Doesn't that mean at some point the deflationary force ends and they still have to print money in order to shore up the economy and we get an extreme inflation event?

Richard Duncan: Well, all right, well, let's talk about money and credit. In the past, when dollars were backed by gold up until 1968, there was a difference between money and credit. Money was money backed by gold, and credit was the promise to repay money at some point in the future.

But now, I would suggest there is no longer any difference between the two. There's no difference whatsoever between money and credit. If you take a dollar bill to the Treasury Department, in the past they had to give you some gold for it. Now they'll just give you another dollar bill.

So there's no difference between a dollar bill and a 10-year Treasury bond. They're both credit instruments. One pays no interest and one pays almost no interest these days.

So in the past, people monitored the money supply Because that determined how much credit could be created. Credit was a multiple, a function of how much money there was. So it made sense to track M2 because it told you how much credit we would have in the future.

But now it's pointless to track the money supply. The money supply is completely irrelevant. Credit is the new money. It's the credit supply that matters now.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: So rather than monitoring how much M2 grows by, what everyone needs to focus on is how much total credit grows by. And going back to 1950, anytime that total credit— again, meaning all types of debt, government debt, household sector debt, corporate debt, financial sector debt— anytime total debt or total credit grew by less than 2%, adjusted for inflation, Then the United States went into a recession.

That happened 9 times. And each time the recession didn't end until we had another big surge of credit expansion. So once 2008 hit, then credit stopped expanding and started contracting. And at that point, we of course had a very serious recession, but things would become very much worse. Because Because we have such a big base now, credit, as of this year now, credit's grown to $63 trillion. It's hard to make it grow by 2% a year.

The household sectors can't borrow very much more because household sector wages aren't increasing enough to support more debt. So that leaves Fannie and Freddie, which is in conservatorship, the corporate sector, the banks, and the governments.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: So credit is not growing rapidly enough to drive the economy anymore. In our modern post-Bretton Woods world, credit growth drives economic growth.

And if we don't get at least 2% credit growth, we have a recession, a very long one, until we get another surge of credit. So the problem is, is now we're stuck in a situation where we can't get credit to grow much more. I think this year it was about, adjusted for inflation, in 2015 it grew by 3%. But that's because there was no inflation, only 0.1% CPI inflation. So we don't have enough credit growth to make the economy grow. And if credit starts to contract, that means assets will be destroyed and we will spiral into a deflationary Great Depression.

So, it's important to understand that credit is the new money, and we have to monitor the credit supply just the way that we used to monitor the money supply in the past.

What happens next: more borrowing, welfare, war or technology

Erik Townsend: Okay, Richard. So, where does that leave us in terms of what happens next and what history tells us? The government says that we're on a rate normalization cycle. We're done with quantitative easing. It worked. The economy is at liftoff, meaning that the government expects now there will be natural organic growth in the economy. The government won't need to intervene. Everything's going to be hunky-dory from here because Ben Bernanke solved all our problems. Guessing you don't agree completely with that view, but what do you think happens next?

Richard Duncan: Well, I mean, no, that's completely untrue. As you look around the world, the world is really in recession. Global trade is collapsing, and the IMF has just revised down its global GDP forecast again to something like 3%, which is quite recessionary by by global growth standards. Commodity prices have crashed. And this morning, they announced that US GDP grew by 0.5% in the first quarter.

So we're in a very serious crisis, and policymakers understand that, regardless of what they say. I mean, they, they were going to increase interest rates. They did increase interest rates by 25 basis points in December. But now they're saying, well, Well, we thought better of that, and we're not quite sure when we're going to do it again.

And so we have a big problem, and we have to think about how we're going to solve it. I mean, the policymakers are thinking about it, and the American public also needs to think about it.

Now, you have a lot of very bright and well-meaning people who tell us that we just have to reduce our debt. We have been spending too much. And, you know, the price of the punishment for people who spend too much is they must suffer. And so if we cut back our debt, there'll probably be, you know, a couple of difficult years, and then we'll be back in some sort of laissez-faire Garden of Eden, and we'll be back to the races and everything will be fine.

But that's just so wrong. If we allow this global bubble to start deflating, it could get out of control and spiral into a Great Depression. And the depression would probably last so long that no one alive today would live long enough to see its end.

So policymakers and the public need to think about a different solution rather than reducing our debt. Now, what can the solution be? Well, they just can't keep printing money and money and money, because if they print so much money, they're eventually— they will buy up all the government bonds and push all the interest rates to zero.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: And that's going to cause a new, an entirely new set of problems. So in one sense, monetary policy and quantitative easing—they're already running out of ammunition. They've created these benefits that have kept this global bubble inflated, combined with fiscal deficit spending for eight years. But now they've got to the point where they're printing so much there aren't enough bonds left for them to buy, and interest rates. So therefore, the bond prices are going. Up and bond yields are going down. And we have a lot of negative interest rates around the world. Not too long ago, $7 trillion of bonds were trading at negative interest rates, making it very hard for savers to plan for their retirement or pension funds and insurance companies to remain solvent or for banks to make any money.

So the monetary policy on its own, the quantitative easing, is running into very serious constraints. The negative benefits may now So that's not going to work. So what else can we do? Well, the households can't take on more and more debt because their income is not going up because globalization is pushing it down.

So where does that leave us? Well, the corporations have been borrowing more, but most— they haven't been investing more because it doesn't make sense to invest in the United States because it's much more sensible to invest in China. Okay. Invest somewhere where wages are seven dollars a day, so they borrow, but they just use the borrowed money to buy back their stock, and which benefits the corporations and the shareholders and the managements who get big bonuses. But it doesn't help the country or the average American.

So that really just leaves the government and the government potential to borrow. So right now, the U.S. government has something like let's just call it 100%. Government debt to GDP. The GDP is about $18 trillion and the government debt's about $18 trillion. So one way to keep this bubble inflated for many more years is simply to have the government borrow more.

And they can do that, and this is very likely to happen.

So the policymakers are going to keep this bubble inflated because the alternative is too dire to consider. So it's going to require more government borrowing and spending. So then the question comes down to how should the government borrow? Now, many people think, you know, think, oh gee, we got 100% government debt to GDP. Surely that's, that's got to be too much and we can't keep doing this.

But that's wrong.

Japan's bubble popped 26 years ago. In 1990, Japan's government debt was 60% of GDP. Now Japan's government debt is 250% of GDP, and Japanese interest rates are negative. There is deflation. There is no hyperinflation, and the Bank of Japan's printing money like it's going out of style. So the US government's debt is only 100% of GDP, and the government can borrow money for 1.8% a year.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: On 10-year government bonds. So what is the most sensible approach going forward is to have the government borrow more. And then you have to ask, well, if they're going to borrow more, how are they going to spend it?

And there are really 3 main ways they could spend it. They could just have much larger social welfare programs. Or they could have a war. Let's say we could attack Iran and spend several trillion dollars in that process. Or there's a third alternative: they could borrow money and they could invest it in new industries and new technologies.

In fact, over the next ten years, they could easily afford, for instance, to invest a trillion dollars in solar energy and a trillion dollars in genetic engineering and a trillion dollars in biotech and a trillion dollars in nanotech. Tech. And if they did invest on that kind of scale, then they could induce a new technological revolution that would result in the creation of new jobs, new industries, new growth, technological miracles, and medical marvels that would allow the United States to grow out of this crisis.

So that is the most sensible approach. But given that the consensus among the American public now, after so many years of propaganda from Fox News and the likes of CNBC. They believe that the government can't possibly do anything right or couldn't possibly manage anything like that, and that government is bad and anything involving the government is doomed to fail.

Of course, ignoring the government's success winning World War II and defeating the Soviet Union and sending a man to the moon, and all of the other technologies that have resulted from government investment. Things like all of the things that go into a smartphone that make it smart were the result of government-funded investment programs, such as the internet and GPS and Siri, and almost everything else in smartphone that makes it smart.

So the general public doesn't believe that because they've been exposed to so much propaganda for so long from people who are keen to see the government lower taxes, particularly on the wealthy, that this option doesn't seem like it's possible politically. But who knows? Politics are now in such flux.

It seems that the Republican Party has just been stolen by Donald Trump. The Republican Party seems to have been abandoned by the Republican members of the party in favor of someone proposing completely radically different policies than the Republican Party has espoused.

And for that matter, the Democrat Party itself is also under siege from Bernie Sanders for the similar reasons. So who knows what is possible in politics? But unfortunately, what we're more likely to see of those three possible options—more spending on welfare, more spending on war, or more government spending on sensible investments—war may well be the most probable outcome.

And that would certainly boost the economy for several more years. But it is increasingly difficult to find the right size. Partner to have a war with. Venezuela is far too small, and Russia and China are far too nuclear. So, you know, maybe Iran, you know, Iraq served the purpose for a while, but that's done.

Maybe Iran, but, you know, unfortunately, those are our options, and those are the options that are probably going to have a good chance of playing out.

Policymakers are not going to allow this bubble to implode as long as they can possibly prevent it. And so policymakers are going to choose how to increase government spending, and if necessary, they'll finance it with more paper money creation.

Helicopter money and the dollar's reserve status

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, Richard, this is a fascinating interview. We're starting to run out of the time. I just want to hit a couple of important topics. QE for the people, or helicopter money as some people call it, is one. The other, of course, back in the 1960s, French finance minister, later president of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, coined this term exorbitant privilege, claiming that the United States has extraordinary privileges because it's the reserve currency issuer. These days, a lot of people in China and Russia, particularly Sergei Glazyev, are intentionally scheming to try to strip the United States of its US dollar being the reserve currency. Does that matter? Could that bring about major change, or is that just political rhetoric? Can you try to address those 2 topics before we close?

Richard Duncan: Sure. Well, QE for the people, or helicopter money, that essentially just means printing money and giving it to the people. That's not a very good idea because the people would just go out and spend that money on consumer trinkets made in China. So that would benefit China's economy, but it would not do very much for the U.S. economy. And once the money was spent, it would be gone, and they would have to do it again. So it'd be much more It's sensible to print money and have the government invest it in new industries and technologies that would actually generate massive profits and pay for itself many times over. So that would be the way to do helicopter money, is to print it and give it to the government for investment purposes.

Now, in terms of is the dollar going to lose its reserve status, and is China planning to try to put the yuan in place of the US dollar? Or is Russia— are Russia and China conspiring to do away with the dollar standard? No, they're not. The dollar standard works very, very well for China.

For instance, last year, the US trade deficit with China was $360 billion. Now, that created enormous growth in China and employed tens of millions of Chinese people who were very happy as a result. And politically docile. If we had any other standard in which the United States had to pay for those imports in some other currency other than dollars, just for simplicity, let's say gold.

The US has something like, I think, $80 billion worth of gold. So after about 2 months of Chinese imports, the US would have no more gold. They couldn't buy one more pair of Chinese tennis shoes. So China's economy would completely implode, and China's economy would be destroyed, and the political system would probably fall apart.

So the last thing China wants is to force the United States to pay with some other currency than dollars, which the U.S. doesn't have, because China has been transformed as a benefit resulting from the dollar standard. So, they may say what they want, but there's no escaping for them from the dollar standard. There is no replacement for the dollar standard.

If the dollar standard collapses, the global economy will collapse with it into a very, very severe global depression. And the Chinese know that.

MacroWatch and a listener discount

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there just because of time. But before we go, I want to share with you, Richard, when we conceived this podcast, the original name I conceived for it was going to be MacroWatch, and I Googled it and you beat me to it. You've got a fantastic product and you beat me to the best name on the internet. What is MacroWatch? Because this podcast turned out to be MacroVoices instead.

Richard Duncan: Well, Erik, well, I, I am glad I beat you to that name. MacroWatch is a video newsletter, so it's a newsletter that monitors macroeconomic developments and their impact on Not only the economy, but on asset prices. So every 2 weeks I make a new video. Effectively, it is me making a PowerPoint presentation describing some important aspect of the global economy, such as the latest news by the European Central Bank and their increase of— their big increase in quantitative easing last month, and how that's likely to impact impact stock markets and currencies and bond yields.

So that is Macro Watch. This has been going for 2 and a half years. The archive now has 24 hours of video presentations, which I believe present a framework that explains exactly what's going on in the global economy, what policymakers are doing, What they're likely to do next, and how that's going to impact not only the economy but asset prices.

Erik Townsend: Well, I'll tell you what, since you beat me to it, I'll be a gentleman and let you keep the name. How about if you reciprocate by giving MacroVoices listeners a discount if they're interested in Macro Watch?

Richard Duncan: Thank you very much. Yes, I would be delighted to take you up on that offer. If your listeners will go to my website, they can Google Macro Watch or Or RichardDuncanEconomics.com and click on the orange subscribe button. If they use the coupon code VOICES, then they can have a 50% discount to subscribe, and that will give them a 1-year subscription for $250 instead of the normal price of $500.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Richard, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Nathan Egger and I will be back as Macro MacroVoices continues right after this.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Erik compares his views with Duncan's

Nathan Egger: Erik. Obviously, you're interviewing Mr. Duncan here, so the focus is on his views, but I'm curious how your own perspective compares with his vis-à-vis where we are in this story of monetary policy history. Where do your views agree with Richard and where do they differ?

Erik Townsend: Well, that's a great question. It's amazing to me how similar our views are because he has a very different political orientation than I do. I'm a government skeptic. I don't really identify with any political party, but if I had to pick one, it would probably be libertarian. Obviously, Richard Duncan is much more of a believer in the power of government, and I certainly respect that view. That's what MacroVoices is all about, is bringing you contrasting views. For a guy who's as far off as I am in his political orientation, we really see a lot of things the same way.

He says the government couldn't let 2008 go. You couldn't just let the market take care of itself. They had to bail it out because we literally— civilization itself could have been at risk. I don't know that I agree completely with that. Part of that might be true, okay, but I would say, what if you go back to 2000? If they had not responded to that event with easy money policy, if we hadn't had all these previous rounds, clearly there was a point where this was recoverable. I agree with him that we've gotten to a point of no return where the only way this credit expansion can resolve itself is in a horrific bad outcome of some kind. I totally agree with him on that. But I think the way we got here was specifically because of government failures.

And I think had the Fed not responded to the 2000 dot-com burst by printing money, they wouldn't have enabled the housing crisis, and the 2008 event wouldn't have been as bad. By doing what they've done and printing more money, they basically guarantee that the next crisis will be worse. Can we possibly get through the next one to another one after that? Well, if they continue to respond this way, they'll get progressively worse until eventually it all falls apart. How long does that take? I don't think anybody knows.

The place where I really have a different view, though, is that I think it's all about the straw that broke the camel's back. I agree completely with Mr. Duncan that what happened is we've had 40 years and an acceleration in the last couple of decades of just crazy credit expansion that we're living and spending beyond our means. What I asked him though is, okay, why suddenly in 2008? What was the straw that broke the camel's back? My view is that it's entirely about a complete government failure, massive control fraud. We had a huge ripoff of the entire economy by the issuers of mortgage-backed securities that were, you know, liar loans and all this stuff.

The regulators were asleep at the switch. The rating agencies didn't do their job. Everybody was bought off. Nobody went to jail. I think it's entirely about a complete failure of government and massive control fraud, and really the exploitation of the weakest people in American society who got suckered into these mortgages that they couldn't afford and didn't understand what they were signing up for. So I see that as the trigger that basically ignited a powder keg of debt that I couldn't agree more with Mr. Duncan had been sitting there ready to explode for decades.

I think that what's really interesting though, and the place where I really respect Mr. Duncan's view, is he does, unlike the mainstream that just refuses to acknowledge that we have a real structural problem here, he does see, as I do, that we are in a doomsday story here. We've gotten to a point where there's really no option for the government but to keep doing these bailout actions. They're not solving any core problem. I don't see how that's going to change. Someday we're in real big trouble. What you have is the mainstream just is blind to that, and then you've got these conspiracy bloggers who are telling you that the US dollar is going to hyperinflate starting tomorrow morning.

What I perceived from this interview, and what I agree with wholeheartedly, is that we are a doomsday story of credit expansion, but it's been going on for decades. And to say it's about to come crashing down tomorrow is crazy. It could go on for another decade. We don't know. At some point, I think this has to end very badly. And unfortunately, I agree with him completely that history teaches us the way this stuff got resolved last time when we had this kind of huge, crazy credit response was with a world war.

And I couldn't agree more with his observation. That's never happened before when there were nuclear weapons. We're in a completely different environment, and I think that he makes a good argument. The government doesn't have much choice but to keep putting Band-Aid solutions on until eventually it's not enough and everything falls apart. I hope to enjoy my life between now and then because I think the world's going to get real ugly after that.

Postgame: election year, protest votes and war risk

Nathan Egger: Well, you and Richard are both giving a perspective that involves war and what, what next big war could look like. But you can't speak about this in a US election year without considering who the next president of the United States is going to be. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Erik Townsend: Oh yeah, you know, I think that where the United States is at right now is one massive nationwide protest vote. I don't think that people really love Donald Trump as much as the poll numbers would seem to suggest. I think what's going on with both Trump and Sanders, is that the American people are so sick of everything going on that they want to vote in a protest way.

And I liken this— I think the first wave of this that we saw was the Occupy Wall Street movement and the Tea Party.

Now, people will probably think, what are you talking about? Those are 2 totally opposite things. I don't see them as opposite things at all. What I see is everyday people who don't understand very much about economics figure out intuitively that something is very, very wrong, that they're getting screwed over by their own government, and it's not fair, and it's not right, and it's time to say enough is enough.

Then, based on their political orientations, because most of them don't understand how all of this stuff really works, they ally themselves either with an Occupy Wall Street— let's just blame anybody who's ever, you know, had anything to do with the financial markets, it must be their fault.

And then there's the opposite Tea Party orientation, which, you know, pulls in the libertarian side and the other extreme. I don't think either Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street, either one of them really ever knew what they were talking about, but they reflect a growing intolerance by the American people of how badly the government has gone astray.

And I think what we're seeing in this election is nobody's trying to elect the best president. They're trying to elect the guy who is most different different from what was there before. And I think it sets us up in a really, really bad situation because, frankly, Mr. Trump has been very clear that he is not afraid to use the authority of the presidency in order to get tough with people that he feels are a threat to the United States. Hillary Clinton has had a lot of very strong rhetoric, tough talk rhetoric, I don't really know where Mr. Sanders would stand in terms of a war president, but frankly, I think Clinton or Trump are more likely at this point to take the election. And I don't really have a strong opinion on either one of them other than to say I don't think anybody is a pacifist here.

And I think that if there's a situation that is ripe to be resolved by armed conflict, I think that we're coming into a period of history where the people that are in charge, not just in the United States but in other governments around the world, They're ready to rumble, and this is what a Fourth Turning is all about. This is what Neil Howe's research is entirely about, is just how society goes through these moods, and it's a cycle that goes 80 years or so. Right now, the world is in a bad mood called a Kondratiev Winter or a Fourth Turning, and I think it's going to get worse before it gets better.

Nathan Egger: Certainly, if we look at the voting records of Hillary and Bernie, they are very similar, and they are far from from pacifists. Trump is an outlier, but his stage presence doesn't suggest to me that he's going to be doing much backing down from

Sign-off, next week's guest and disclaimer

Nathan Egger: anybody anytime soon. Kind of scary any way you look at it.

Well, we're bumping up against our time limit for this week, so we're going to wrap it up here. We really hope you'll tune in next week when we'll be speaking with Satyajit Das. He's the author of the international bestseller Traders, Guns, and Money, a really fun and informative book. Highly suggest reading that.

Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. Ratings and reviews are a huge help to us. So if you have a moment, please do so. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices and follow Erik directly @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. Please drop by our listener forums where we like to continue these discussions.

You can communicate with Erik directly. You can also engage with Erik directly and send him your thoughts and get more of his. You can find those forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. You can also suggest future show topics, future guests, and post questions for Erik, which we will, I promise, answer on the show from time to time when we find time. We've been running overtime lately.

For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

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