John Llewellyn — Llewellyn Consulting (as introduced on the show)

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Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 19 was recorded on June 16th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. John Llewellyn of London institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting will be joining me as today's featured guest. The focus of our feature interview Will be next week's so-called Brexit referendum, and we'll be discussing the implications of the U.K. leaving the European Union in terms of how such an exit, if it happens, would affect the U.K. economy, the rest of the European economy, and knock-on effects for the rest of the global economy. MacroVoices volunteer research team captain Aaron Chan will also be joining us again at the end of today's show, and we'll have a special announcement about Aaron's rapidly growing role in the MacroVoices team.

Fed holds, Yellen's tone and the S&P selloff

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Before we even get into the equities, let's talk about the Fed, who did not hike rates on Wednesday, as pretty much everyone expected they would not. But Janet Yellen was a little more dovish in her remarks than some would have expected. So, Erik, what did you make of the FOMC press conference Wednesday afternoon?

Erik Townsend: Well, definitely, as I said last week, no hike was not news. Everybody knew there was not going to be a hike. The big question was going to be what stance Janet took in the press conference and would she continue to hold up the story That, hey, we're in a rate normalization cycle. We just didn't do it this month, maybe next month, and so forth. And as I have predicted for years now, when everything changes is when the mainstream figures out that this whole rate normalization story from the Fed is a fantasy, which I'm convinced that it is.

We had a problem in 2008 that was entirely about too much debt. And what we've responded with is creating more debt on the idea that the Fed can somehow boost the economy like jumpstarting a car, and somehow it's going to gain momentum and suddenly Suddenly take off with its own organic growth.

I don't think we're quite there yet, but I think we're getting to the point where the mainstream is figuring this out. Even Steve Liesman, who frankly is usually a cheerleader for the Fed, from CNBC, was asking the same question that I posed last week on this show, which is, what happens when the 10-year Treasury yield keeps going down and keeps signaling that there's a problem? Now, when Janet answered that question, she kind of reframed it and talked about what would What would happen if the Fed wasn't able to make enough money from its assets in order to cover its expenses? But the real question is, when do we get to a credibility problem? When does the Fed lose control of asset markets?

I have continued to feel that it probably isn't until inflation hits the stage that the Fed can't do anything. Right now, they're not admitting that they're ready to make a policy U-turn. I think that will eventually come. But the thing is, the Fed can print a bunch more money out of thin air and can come to the rescue once again. It's when we get to runaway inflation that suddenly their hands are tied. And I don't think we're quite there yet, although certainly somebody like Julian Brigden that we recently had on the program is saying that that might be closer at hand than even I thought.

Nathan Egger: And when we spoke last week, the S&P was flirting with all-time highs, trading just a week ago as high as 2,120. We've since traded as much as 80 points lower on Thursday morning, which is a pretty big down move for a single week, at least. Erik, is this the beginning of that huge move to the downside that all the prominent bears like George Soros, Carl Icahn and Druckenmiller have predicted, or just a little market temper tantrum leading up to Wednesday's FOMC press conference?

Erik Townsend: Well, consider that in the past, what the program has generally been is that temper tantrum before FOMC is for a few weeks leading up to it. Then as soon as the FOMC meeting is over, we get the recovery. This has been the opposite. It's kind of gotten worse since the FOMC meeting. So the no hike and softening message from Janet Yellen apparently is not Not enough, even after confirming expectations there would be no hike, being more dovish than expected, we still see asset markets headed lower. I think the Brexit referendum polls are probably driving a lot of that. So, where it may appear that markets are selling off even further after the FOMC, as if Janet sent the wrong message, I think it may be the message from Europe that is driving a lot of that. But definitely, we're seeing weakness here.

You know, obviously, it would have been nice to predict this at 2120 when we recorded the show last week and go short the S&P. But as I said, you know, you never know how markets are going to react.

If Janet had come back and said, this is confirmation that the rate hiking cycle is definitely over, I think we might have seen even more exuberance. Eventually, I think that Stan Druckenmiller and George Soros and Carl Icahn and the rest of these guys are going to be proven right. But it's a question of when the right catalyst comes. And I think that potentially the Brexit, which we'll talk about in our feature interview today, might be a bigger catalyst than a monetary policy event from the Fed.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

WTI top and Cushing storage at 93%

Nathan Egger: And when we recorded last week's show, WTI crude oil was trading at $51.60, and you were saying that it looked like a top. Well, we've since traded as low as $46.25 on Thursday, more than 10% drop from that high. So good call on the top, Erik. And do you still think that this is a top? And if so, how far down do you expect to see oil go from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, even in the short time since you wrote down that $46.25, which I think was the close on the futures pit, the market has reopened just in the few minutes that we have been recording show, and I'm looking at $45.85 now. So we're seeing a lot of weakness, more than 10% lower. In fairness, I suppose I did say that it was looking toppy. I also said I thought we would likely hit that $51.90 technical target that a lot of analysts were talking about. We never got there, got within 25 cents of it. So I think for all intents and purposes, we made the top. But, you know, the thing is that we don't know what's gonna happen with Venezuela. So I didn't trade that top, even though I thought it was a top, because I didn't know whether or not Venezuela is falling potentially into total societal collapse, which seems to be very possible, could be a catalyst for a move to the upside.

Now, that's not happened this week.

Meanwhile, EIA data was a little surprising. We had a 930,000-barrel draw on national inventory. That's, you know, to be expected, a draw. But I would almost expect a larger draw this time of year. We're in the end of June. We're right, you know, in the the heart of summer driving season from a refiner's standpoint. 2.6 million barrel draw on gasoline inventories kind of made up for the build last week, so that was good. But a 786,000 barrel build on distillate inventories. Distillates again are the collection of diesel fuel, home heating oil, jet fuel, and other similar products.

The big one though, 904,000 barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. Now despite the fact And despite the fact that the Canada fire situation is more under control than it's been in recent weeks, and despite the fact that seasonally we would be expecting large drawdowns this time of year, we're not. We're still seeing builds on inventory in Cushing. And of course, Cushing, I've stressed many times before, is so critical because that's where the WTI futures contract is settled, and it's storage in Cushing running out that could result in a panic in the markets.

So we can't make it through fall maintenance season unless we see more drawdowns. And I thought that the fall maintenance season would be a seasonal period of builds on inventory. We're already at 93% capacity. Even though I thought that the storage crisis would be averted by the second half, I'm now starting to think, boy, if we don't see some drawdowns of consequence or of significance in Cushing pretty soon, we're going to be really looking at a difficult situation as we head towards fall maintenance season.

What's surprising to me, though, despite the fact that we have a very difficult storage situation, 93% of capacity, a build Sold on inventory this week, so that 93% number is getting worse. The July-August spread closed at only about 52 cents, up to about 55 cents as we're speaking late session, actually in the beginning of the overnight session on Thursday evening, as we're taping the show a little bit late this week. So, you know, 55 cents is nothing close to the $2 front-month contango spreads that we saw when everybody was worried about a storage crisis back when we were at 85% capacity. Now we're at 93% capacity. And that contract— today was options expiration. The contract expires the beginning of next week. This is that crush period where you would expect potentially that spread to blow out if people were worried about a storage crisis. It seems that they're not too worried, at least from what the numbers are telling us.

Gold, the dollar and the 10-year yield

Nathan Egger: And gold was strong last week and got even stronger this week, finally broke out above $1,300 and tested $1,315 the day after the no-hike announcement from the Fed. Before closing lower, just above $1,285. What's your take on where it's headed from here, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that Janet, she didn't capitulate, she didn't admit that the rate normalization process is not working. But, you know, even Steve Liesman can figure it out. So, we're at a point where I think that the Fed's credibility is coming into question, and it definitely is being reflected in the price of gold.

As a number of guests have commented on the program, in many ways what gold serves as is a hedge or an insurance policy for central bank policy error. So, I do think that probably the bottom is in now on the gold market. At the same time, you know, we're also kind of at the top of a trading range here. I haven't bought it yet. I think I would probably wait for a pullback towards the 50-day moving average, which is still down at $1,250 or so.

But, you know, it's a question of what the news flow tells us. The Brexit situation could also be very positive for gold, and I think that if there is a vote to leave next week, that probably Probably could boost gold even further. So I think the gold chart is looking already very strong, and there could be some more upside catalysts. But again, we are kind of on the, the top of a trading range here, and I'm not sure that it's quite time to be buying hand over fist, but maybe starting to average into a long position in gold is something that would look attractive here.

Nathan Egger: And it came as no surprise to anyone that the dollar index took a big hit on the no-hike news. What do you see on the horizon for the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, it took a big hit on the no-hike news, but then it went the other way, I think probably in reaction to Bank of Japan not moving and then sort of corrected back. So we're seeing a lot of volatility there. In general, though, where it appeared from a few weeks ago like, boy, maybe there's a lot more softness than I thought in the dollar, we are seeing overall strength. We're not quite up to the previous cycle high, but we got pretty close to it, at least intraday on Thursday. And I think that in general, the dollar rally is still intact.

Nathan Egger: And you said last week that 1.7% on the 10-year Treasury yield could be something of a credibility level for the Fed, and that a move below that level could make it hard for the Fed to justify continuing its rate normalization theme. Well, I saw a 1.53% print on Thursday morning, back up to 1.57% by the end of the day. What does this mean for monetary policy and Fed credibility, for that matter?

Erik Townsend: Well, to my astonishment, this is the question that Steve Liesman asked Janet Yellen during the FOMC press conference, which Which is, hey, look at the 10-year Treasury yield. It's kind of sending us a message here. What is this gonna mean for the Fed? And I think she first kind of ducked his question, and then later in responding to another question, she made some comments about how if the Fed did not earn enough income from its other holdings in order to be able to pay its expenses, that there were other tools available to remedy that problem. Well, that's all interesting, Janet, but that's not what everybody's worried about. Everybody's worried about the fact that the 10-year is sending an outright recession signal, and how can you justify continuing a hiking cycle in the face of that?

Steve Liesman, who is usually a Fed cheerleader, as far as I'm concerned, came out afterwards saying he was shocked and felt this is the closest the Fed has come to capitulation. So, I think the mainstream, which, in my opinion, Mr. Liesman is a good proxy for, are waking up and recognizing that, hey, this story, this narrative that we've been on, which is the Fed's going to make everything better and the economy is going to return to organic growth is not working out.

As far as where we're headed, I have predicted for a couple of years now that the 1.36 low print on the 10-year Treasury yield from several years ago would probably be tested this year. And I wouldn't be surprised if— I don't know if it's going to happen this year in 2016, but before this is over, I wouldn't be surprised if we see 1% 10-year Treasury yield on US Treasuries. Seems like we're headed in that direction. And I do think that at some point we're going to maybe get one more rate hike out of the Fed before they They admit that this so-called rate hiking cycle was basically over after just one token hike. And indeed, it does— Janet Yellen's own comments acknowledged that they needed to create a little bit of buffer so that they would be able to respond with easing if an economic situation warranted it. I think that economic situation that warrants it is probably coming faster than Janet is ready for.

And I would guess that the Fed regrets not having started hiking sooner so that they could build in more buffer and give themselves more room to respond.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: But that's the situation that we're in.

Feature lead-in and note on the Jo Cox murder

Nathan Egger: All right, well, thank you for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest is John Llewellyn of London-based institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting. We're going to focus almost entirely on next week's Brexit referendum, where U.K. citizens will decide whether to initiate the process of leaving the European Union.

While the interview you're about to hear was being recorded, Jo Cox, a member of the British Parliament, was murdered in cold blood and in broad daylight. And early reports indicate that this horrific murder may have been motivated by this issue, that being the Brexit referendum, with one witness claiming that the assailant yelled, Britain first, during his attack.

This brings into question the possibility that next week's referendum vote could be postponed. Needless to say, our thoughts go out to Ms. Cox's family in this very difficult moment. Erik's interview with Mr. Llewellyn is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

How the Brexit process works: Article 50

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: One week from now, on June 23rd, U.K. citizens will vote on a referendum whether or not the U.K. should leave the European Union. For today's feature interview, we wanted to find a guest who could really speak with authority on this subject, and Nathan really came through for us.

Joining me now is John Llewellyn, managing partner at Llewellyn Consulting. John worked for the OECD in Paris, working on forecasting policy for OECD, went from there to become Global Chief Economist at Lehman Brothers, and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, John has formed his own consulting firm where he provides advisory services to institutions. He is a New Zealander, so he has no emotional skin in this game, but he does live in London and has a very ideal perspective on the Brexit issue and what it will mean for the U.K. So, John, thanks so much for joining me on the program.

I'd like to start with what is actually on the table, because this referendum doesn't necessarily dictate that the U.K. would leave the European Union. It actually begins a very complex process. Tell us how it works.

John Llewellyn: I don't think anybody knows how it works, as a matter of fact. I mean, the question on the ballot paper is, do you want to leave, uh, the European Union, or do you want to remain in the European Union? And that seems, of course, very clear, but it's not, because nobody has ever left the European Union. No country has ever left the European Union.

And all there is on the statute books about this is a provision in the EU treaty which says that a country can leave the EU 2 years after giving notice of its intention so to do.

So we don't even know the very first thing, which is, were there to be a decision in the referendum to leave, when would the European Union be notified? You see, it's Parliament that has to pass a resolution saying we intend to leave the EU. And would Parliament do that straight away? Would Parliament Wait, or would Parliament possibly seek some other way of leaving the EU than simply the notifications envisaged in the so-called Article 50? So it's not clear, and I'm sorry I can't tell you that it would be a set of cut-and-dried steps, but that's the reality.

Poll swing and the near-term UK economic hit

Erik Townsend: Well, and of course markets don't like uncertainty, and it sounds to me like if this referendum has a leave result, what it does is it introduces the beginning of a process that, as you said, nobody fully understands, and that's the last thing that markets like is when nobody understands even what's happening.

As recently as just a week ago, this was considered an outlier risk. Everybody thought, based on early polling, that it was extremely unlikely that a leave vote would happen. In the last few days, we've seen these polls turn around to where it appears that a leave result is more likely. What is your sense, being boots on the ground there in London, as to where this is headed? Do you think that it is quite likely as some of the polls are suggesting, that we could have a leave result? And if so, what does it mean, first of all, for the UK economy?

John Llewellyn: Well, first of all, on the, on the polls, I think you have to say now that it's distinctly possible. Only 7 or 8 days ago, the majority of polls indicated a majority differed in size from poll to poll for remain. But over the weekend, there was a massive swing in the polls, probably of the order of 10 percentage points for leave.

Now, there are some curious features to this. There always are. The polls that are conducted by interview and the polls which are conducted by telephone have been giving different results, although they've been narrowing. The gap between them has been narrowing to some extent. And one reason for this is probably that there are a lot of undecideds.

There are at least 10% and perhaps 20% of those voting are undecided, and nobody knows how they will swing.

A second thing to be said about the polls is that, of course, recently there was a referendum in Scotland on whether the Scots wish to remain part of the EU, and the polls got that wrong, mainly because, again, the undecideds came out to vote. And of course, the polls got the previous British election wrong too, and nobody was more surprised by that than the Tory government which came into power. So the polls, for whatever reason, have not had a good track record of late in the United Kingdom. But nonetheless, the fact is there's been a shift in the polls, and now there's nothing you can say other than that it's a distinct possibility that they will vote on balance to leave.

What does it mean for the British economy? Here there's a huge disparity of opinion between the two sides, and frankly, I'm just going to give you my own opinion. As you said, I'm disinterested. I'm not—I'm a New Zealander, and therefore I'm just living in London. But in my judgment, and partly based on my own country's experience, the near-term negative consequences for the British economy would not only be greater than are claimed by. By the people who want to remain and say if we, if we leave it would be a bad result. I think the results would be even worse than that.

And I think the reason for that is the following: the people who want to leave, of course, have a vested interest in claiming that there'd be no problem. And that, I think, frankly, is absurd for reasons that I can go on and explain to you.

Those who want to remain have to be very careful not to overclaim the negative results which come out from virtually all economists, from 9 out of 10 economists. And so they tend to be very careful about the assumptions that they make, about the models that they use, about the inputs they put into their simulations, and so on. And the result is that, in my view, the economic consequences in the first 5 years could be even more severe, probably would be more severe than those suggested by, for example, the Treasury, Her Majesty's Treasury, or the National Institute of Economic Research, or the OECD, or the IMF.

So I think the results would be very, very negative in the near term for the British economy, and on that I have really very little doubt.

Foreign investment risk and years of trade renegotiation

Erik Townsend: Now, you said earlier that what is actually on the table here is the beginning of a process that takes 2 years, and that means that if there are short-term adverse negative consequences that could lead to yet another referendum, a change our mind referendum. So there's just so many possibilities here in terms of what could go wrong in the short term. Please give us a little bit more color. What are the downside risks if a Leave vote were to occur next week?

John Llewellyn: Well, I think there are 2 downside risks. I think the most likely would be a very sharp decline in the level of foreign investment in the United Kingdom economy. Now, this This is denied by the Leave campaign who say no, investment would continue to flow into us because we are, after all, the 5th biggest economy in the world. And that phrase, the 5th biggest economy in the world, is true and it's been repeated a very great number of times.

But what's also true is that the UK is only about 3.5% of world GDP, world gross domestic product.

A substantial proportion of the investment coming into the United Kingdom, but I have no idea, and I don't think anybody can, what that proportion is, comes in because the United Kingdom is a very good place in which to do business, has a very good legal system.

You can settle your agreements under English law, which is commercially highly competent legal structure. But the motive in many cases for coming in and making that investment investment is access to the whole EU, not just access to the United Kingdom.

I was talking, for example, recently to a drug company, and they were saying that they were about to put down a distribution sector for Europe. Now, they were going to put it down the UK, and for all I know, they still may. But the question on their minds, of course, is if the UK were not in the EU, what would the UK be the right place to put it? And I said absolutely not, because you not then know what the trading arrangements would be between the UK and the EU.

And that takes me therefore to my second point, which, which links with the first, which is it's being claimed by the Leave campaign that you don't need trading agreements in order to trade. But that really isn't true. It is true that you can revert to the World Trade Organization and there's a default set of Arrangements there, which cover principally the trade in goods and provide for the maximum level of tariffs that countries can set against on your exports.

But that doesn't remotely cover the sort of access to the EU, for example, which the UK currently has by way of being a member.

Secondly, of course, not only does the UK have a fully worked out trading relationship at the moment with the EU. But it also has fully worked out trading relationships with the other 53 countries in the world with which the EU has negotiated a trade agreement, and which the UK rides on as being part of the EU.

So all of those trading arrangements, those 53 plus one, and the plus one of course is with the UK's biggest trading partner by far, would have to be renegotiated.

Now how long does that take? The Leave campaign has been saying, "Oh, I see no reason why this shouldn't be completed within the next two years." In my judgment and my experience, that is highly, highly unlikely. I spoke recently to a New Zealand friend of mine. I went through university with him, and whereas I went on to do one thing, he went into the New Zealand Treasury and was heavily involved in the New Zealand Treasury at the time that the UK went into the EU, and New Zealand as a result. Had to renegotiate its relationships with the EU on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.

And I said to him, how long did that take? And he said it took 7 years to negotiate. It then had to be ratified by all of the EU countries, and they were very quick at doing that. They did that in the 8th year, and it became operational in the 10th year.

And New Zealand's is a fairly simple structure of trade, a fairly simple economy.

Canada has just completed a trade agreement with the EU that took 7 years to complete, and importantly, it does not contain any agreement on services because that's not something which Canada has been particularly concerned to press with the EU, whereas in the UK, of course, services are a major part, the major part of its exports, including to the EU. So I think to sum up my point, The trading agreements would be highly uncertain for many years. And in that context, there'd be, in my judgment, very likely a substantial weakening, perhaps even a collapse of foreign direct investment into the United Kingdom.

Will the City of London lose business?

Erik Townsend: Now, for as long as I can remember, I think for all of modern time, the City of London, at least in the world of finance, the City of London has been second only to New York in terms of being a major capital market center where most investment banking and investment management decisions occur.

So are you suggesting that the hegemony that the UK has through the City of London in the world of finance is at risk and the City of London might be displaced if the UK were not to remain with the EU?

John Llewellyn: Well, I certainly think it's impossible to envisage everybody in the City of London or everybody in the financial services industry just up sticks and going to Paris or Frankfurt? Of course not. But there are substantial parts of activity which would be in jeopardy. I mean, one of the curious features about this, there was a move which came out of the European Central Bank, the ECB, to say that trading of foreign exchange had to take place within the geographical boundaries of the EU.

Now, the UK is the world's largest, larger even than New York, trader of foreign exchange, and this would have hit the UK quite hard. The UK appealed against this to the European Court, which found in its favor. Now, of course, the irony of this is that if that move were to take place again and the UK were not in the EU, it would have no access to the European Court, and it would presumably simply go through.

I think also in terms of a lot of trading of securities and so on, one of the indications that you can get of what it would be like would be to look at Switzerland, which for example isn't able to trade itself at all in the EU directly. It has therefore to set up an office somewhere, and it's chosen to set up offices in London in most cases, so that it has an office within, a branch within the European Union, and therefore can trade within the European Union from there.

All sorts of banks, and they've told us this, the American investment banks have said we would have to set up offices or expand our offices and hence our activities on the continent of Europe. So no, it would be absurd to pretend that the City of London would disappear overnight. And of course, it's not all about trading financial securities. It's also about insurance services and many others.

But in my view, it would, it would make a dent. And we've already been told by, for example, the French that they would welcome the chance to eat some of the City of London's lunch.

Missing trade negotiators and a split Tory party

Erik Townsend: Now, you have opined in the past that although it is conceivable that leaving might be good for the UK economy in the long run, the problem is how they get there from here, because there would be short to intermediate term challenges that would be very difficult for the UK to overcome.

Give us a sense of what those challenges are. What's on the road ahead if we do see a leave decision next week?

John Llewellyn: I think there's 2 classes of problem, really. There's the economic problems which, which I've alluded to. The fact that I think there'd be a weakening, perhaps a collapse in foreign direct investment, and a huge amount of uncertainty for a very long time over the trading relationships. I mean, let me give you a figure there which I find interesting. The UK at the moment has no trade negotiators, no people versed in the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. And the reason is obvious, and that is ever since the joined the EU back in the '70s, all trade negotiations for the UK have been conducted by the EU, which is regarded by trade negotiators all over the world as having a very competent body of negotiators.

Now, there are 5 apparently people of British nationality in the EU team. So let's suppose they came back to the UK. I don't know if they would, but let's suppose they did, would that be enough? No. We were told recently by a senior official in the WTO, the World Trade Organization, that by their estimate, negotiating those trade agreements, which I've discussed with you, the one with Europe and ones with the 53 other countries that Europe has trade agreements, would take something like 500 trade negotiators 10 years to do.

Quite extraordinary.

So Britain would have to train up 500 trade negotiators or some number, something like that, and they'd be at it for 10 years, which is 2 parliamentary terms. So I think that's one of the things which one notices straight away, and that is that Britain's legislative capacity would become— and trade negotiating capacity and civil service capacity would be taken up probably for at least 2 full parliamentary terms by negotiating all of this. So there's a lot of things like that on the economic front, riddled, of course, all the time with uncertainty, which, as you have said, financial markets don't like. But I would also add people thinking of investing in material plant and equipment don't like.

So that's one class of problem. The other class of problem, and to some extent, the UK is going to be faced with this whatever the referendum goes now, and that is that the Tory Party is now absolutely split. It's riven by this debate, which has turned really nasty from the level of the Prime Minister David Cameron and one of his closest friends Michael Gove right the way down. The party has been cleaved by this, and neither side is going to be happy whatever the result.

And so there's going to be a very, very fractious party And at the same time, in a situation where you might in previous epochs have expected a Labour government to be— a Labour opposition, I'm sorry— to be strong and critical and to capitalize on this, it's got a leader who seems curiously quiescent, not only on this issue but on a range of others, and certainly is failing to capitalize politically on it.

So we're looking, I think, at a period of weak governance for the UK. As well as a period of economic and financial uncertainty. So it's, it's, it's, it's quite a contrast with where the UK has really been over the last 20 or even arguably 30 years.

Pound, euro and dollar outlook

Erik Townsend: From a currency perspective, what do you think this will mean for the pound sterling and for the euro, both with respect to the cross between those 2 currencies, but also as those currencies relate to the rest of the world, to the US dollar and other currencies?

John Llewellyn: I have to say that forecasting currency movements is something of a mug's game, but you have to have a view. I'll offer you a view, but without a great deal of conviction. But if what I'm saying is remotely right about the UK economy being weaker in GDP terms as a result of a vote to Brexit and being weaker as a result both of weaker foreign direct investment and weaker trade, then you would expect to see the pound depreciate against virtually all currencies.

I think it's worth recognizing that in that respect, the United Kingdom doesn't start from a strong position. In fact, quite the reverse. It has a current account deficit, in other words, an excess of what it imports over what it exports, taking goods and services together, of about 7% of GDP, which is a truly enormous number.

We operate in many times with what we call the rule of four, which is that any country which has a public sector deficit of more than four percent, a current account deficit of more than four percent, or even so if it has both, normally has some sort of financial crisis within a couple of years.

So when you look at the UK's current account deficit at seven percent, that would seem big enough to do a. Job on its own. And I think that what will happen if there's a Brexit is that the hawk eye of investors will then zero in on that number and say this is a country which has now got a seriously overvalued currency.

Now, who knows by what amount the pound could depreciate, but numbers of the order of 10% to 15% don't, to me at any rate, sound crazy. Now, much of that would be vis-à-vis the euro, perhaps more than that would be vis-à-vis the United States economy.

Because although the dollar has not been particularly strong of late, the U.S. economy has no real major problems as you look look ahead other than rather soft aggregate demand. It's a it's an energy self-sufficient economy. It's an economy which adjusts to structural change probably quicker and better than most other economies. So if you take any sort of medium-term prognostication. I think the U.S. economy is the best placed in the world and probably will have the strongest, strongest currency. So I'd probably place them in order of strength: U.S. first, euro second, and then sterling under these assumptions a comfortable third.

ECB and European policy response

Erik Townsend: And what would you expect from the ECB in terms of policy response if there is a— let's say there is an overwhelming landslide vote to Brexit? Would the ECB be expected to respond immediately to try to shore up the financial system, or do you think they would take a stand off and say this is a problem the UK has created for itself?

John Llewellyn: It looks unlikely that the ECB or indeed European policymakers more generally would simply stand on the sidelines. Europe is in an interesting position, which is that its economy is recovering now, but rather painfully slowly. The policy responsibility for ensuring that there would be an economic recovery has been left almost exclusively to the ECB because the budgetary position, the fiscal position has been kept quite tight in the majority of European countries, although it's easing a bit now.

And so the ECB, quite rationally in my view, has been taking the position, now that we've got a modest recovery starting and given that we've got no inflation, we really must make sure that this recovery becomes self-sustaining. and starts to induce the corporate sector to invest in capacity expansion again.

So we've seen not only the quantitative easing policy of the European Central Bank purchase government bonds, but it's now moved into the purchasing of corporate bonds as well in really quite an aggressive way, perhaps somewhat more aggressive than had been expected by the market. So you can tell from this that the mood of the ECB is to really try to make sure that this recovery is not jeopardized. In fact, that this recovery gathers momentum. So they would regard a Brexit, I think, as just one more annoying thing which would reduce or damage or dent or hinder, whatever word one should choose, confidence in some way.

And I would guess that it would just lead them to be even more aggressive, if anything, at the margin in their policy of quantitative easing.

I think it would have wider repercussions than just the ECB, however. I was in France yesterday and Berlin three days before that, and there's a very great deal of concern at the policymaking and political level at this because, of course, there are countries in the EU in which there are significant populist constituencies which are hostile to the EU in the same way as they are in the UK.

Denmark is one, the Netherlands is another, Poland is the third. And there's no doubt that policymakers would not want to see those countries receive any greater support than they would do from the fact that the UK was breaking away.

And so, of course, one of the consequences of that is that they probably would not feel that they could be any more accommodating to the UK. There'd be a lot of emphasis on the notion if you want to stay in part of our market, you have to play by all of the rules and don't think you can do otherwise. So I think there'll be a political response, perhaps a policy response, and the monetary policy response would be, as I say, an intensifying, if anything, of the present regime of quantitative easing.

Erik Townsend: So the last question pertained to policy response.

Contagion, confidence effects, Lehman analogy and Asian dollar debt

Erik Townsend: Going back to your own views as an economist, we've talked about the UK economy. What would you see as the likely knock-on effects and consequences on both the rest of the European Union and on the global economy, for that matter?

John Llewellyn: I think the further you get away from the UK, the less certain it's possible to become. I think one of the things which I've learned over my lifetime of studying economics is, of course, that sectors of economies are linked to one another, and in turn economies are linked to one another.

As you said in the introduction, I was for many years in charge of international economic forecasting and policy at the OECD. And one of the things that we really used to, to be there for was to see how much a change in the level of activity or any other shock in one country transmitted to another.

Now, of course, one way in which shocks are transmitted is the straightforward one through trade. If a country goes into recession, it imports less, and therefore the countries which are exporting to it, export less. And I think that's a fairly well-understood mechanism. People forget it sometimes, but it's fairly well understood.

What I think is less well understood is that confidence effects are transmitted from economy to economy. One of the really interesting things is that whenever you get a slowdown in the United States, which of course is the world's biggest economy, you then tend to find there's a slowdown in other countries like the U.K. or the continent of Europe.

But if you quantify that slowdown, you find that the slowdown in the UK or the US is about twice as big as you would have expected through the direct trade linkages. In other words, there's a psychological effect.

You could call it the CNN effect, call it what you like. The point is, you can see how it works, that if you're somebody who's planning to undertake some investment on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, And then you see that the leading indicators in the United States are slowing down a bit. You think, oh, there's a slowdown coming. This is not the right time for me to be laying down new capital investment.

So you don't. And if this happens across your whole economy or across the whole of Europe, that compounds any slowdown that was coming anyway.

Now, that's the transmission from the United States to the United Kingdom or to Europe. And I would— it would be absurd to pretend that the United Kingdom is that important in the world that a Brexit in it would necessarily induce huge slowdown in Europe, let alone in the United States. But the confidence effect can be important because that affects countries' own investment levels, of course. And I think that's the thing that we're all most worried about.

I don't want to overstate it, but at the same time, I want to— I want us to remember that if you go back to 2008, if you go back to say September 12th, 2008, it was the judgment of the US Treasury that, well, if Lehman Brothers collapsed, it would collapse and it would be serious, but it wouldn't be a tragedy.

And as we now know, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the linkages, both direct financial linkage and psychological linkages between Lehman Brothers and the rest of the financial community turned out to be much larger than had ever been guessed.

And probably with the benefit of hindsight, the people in the U.S. Treasury took that decision might have said, I wish we hadn't taken that decision now, or I wish we'd handled it differently. So again, without overstating the importance of this rather small economy of the U.K., which is only 3.5% of world GDP, as I said, I think the psychological effects of its deciding to leave its major trading partner on grounds which are yet to be worked out could be rather shocking.

Certainly on the European level, they feel that very strongly. And for what it's worth, we've seen in the speeches of Janet Yellen over the last couple of days that she regards this as an element of uncertainty which is affecting even at least the pace of the rate change behavior in the United States. So I don't want to overstate it, but I've seen a couple of cases where policymakers have understated apparently small shocks which turned out to be bigger than what they

Erik Townsend: Well, now, you said earlier that the effect of this would likely be most depressive from a currency standpoint on the pound sterling, euro in the middle, and U.S. dollar benefiting the most. I'm a little bit concerned that a lot of economists have opined that a U.S. dollar rally resuming and new highs above 100 on the dollar index could create the risk of an emerging market debt crisis. Do you agree with that view, and do you think Do you think that this Brexit situation could exacerbate that risk?

John Llewellyn: Yes, I'm afraid I do. I don't know how much, how much quantitative weight to place on that, but it's certainly the case in a lot of countries in Asia, for example, that there is considerable dollar indebtedness and a rise in the rate of the dollar would make that more onerous.

It's worth recognizing that the situation is quite different from the Asian crisis in '95 and through to '98. That was a case where their banking system had been engaging in arbitrage between the low rates at which you could borrow in United States dollars and the high interest rates that most of those countries— Korea, Thailand, etc.— had at home.

So the banks borrowed cheap, lent expensively, and that was fine. Until their currencies sank, and then they were left with a hugely increased domestic currency cost of servicing that dollar debt. That is not the situation now. It's not the banks which are at risk.

We, by and large, in our macroprudential work around the world, don't get caught the same way twice. Now it seems that it's the corporate sectors which have been borrowing abroad because rates are much, much lower than they are at home. Home, and they are now exposed if that happens.

I haven't seen convincing estimates of the scale of this, but it seems pretty clear that they're not trivial. And people I speak to in Asia who try to put these numbers together say that this is probably their number one Asian risk now and that it's not trivial.

Oil: renewables, $10-$40 history and OPEC's weakness

Erik Townsend: As we continue to move further out on this, where do you see the energy price that we're dealing with, particularly the oil Where do you see the oil price headed from here? And how do you think— you know, we've actually seen quite a bit of weakness in the price of oil in the last few days as the polls have turned around. So do you think that Brexit fears are fueling this sudden weakness in energy prices? Do you think energy prices are headed to the moon from here, as many people think? Or do you think we've seen a top recently?

John Llewellyn: It's a good and it's a very important question because of course there's no doubt that hydrocarbons in general and oil in particular have for decades been the fuel of our economies, literally and figuratively. So where the oil price goes is extremely important, not only for the fate of the rich OECD economies, but of course also for a number of the emerging market economies who specialize in oil, not least also in addition Russia.

So I think the oil price is terribly, terribly important. It always has been and it still is, but it's getting less so. If you permit, what I think the true story is, is this: it's a mistake to start thinking about the supply and demand balance for oil. The right thing to do is to think about the supply and demand balance for all energy, of which oil is an important but not the only component.

And I think what's been happening over the last few years is that after a period of very rapid growth of demand for hydrocarbons, both coal and oil, on the part of China, which has been growing, as we all know, extremely fast and in a highly energy-dependent way, first of all, China has slowed.

But secondly, there's been a big increase, and there's going to be a further big increase in supply of mainly renewables. If you look at the past 5 years and see how much increase in energy demand China has represented, and then you look forward to the next 5 years, you find that renewables, solar and wind, are going to add as much to world supply as China added to world demand in the previous A decade.

So no surprise in that circumstance that as China slowed, and as China's growth became somewhat less energy intensive, and at the same time as the prospects as well to some extent already as the reality of a big increment in supply, mainly from renewables, has come on, that the price of energy fell from something around $110 a barrel at its peak. To something like $30 at its trough and now hovering around $50-odd.

That's what explains what's going on with one added wrinkle, which is the world is starting to become more economical in its use of energy. Until about 2 decades ago, world energy use grew at almost exactly the same rate as world GDP growth. They were almost one-to-one tied together in lockstep. 10 or 15 years ago, energy use started to grow a little bit less rapidly than GDP, about a percentage point less. Last year it was over 2 percentage points less. So we're seeing in total what you normally see when you've seen something, in this case the price of oil, be unnaturally high.

You find 3 things going on: conservation or substitution for other forms of energy, energy and discovery of new forms of energy.

So if you then take, say, that's the world global energy scene, and if you say looking forward, we think the world economy is going to continue to grow, but China is probably never again going to grow at that breakneck 8% or 8.5% growth that it did, and furthermore, it's not going to be as energy intensive as it was, the question you have to ask yourself is, well, then in what range will the price of oil settle?

Now, it's very interesting that if you look back all the way through past history, right to where Pennsylvania oil industry started, for 118 of the last 156 years, oil has oscillated at a price of $10 to $40 a barrel in today's prices. It even went back into that channel after the first oil shock and before the second one, which was caused by China's rapid growth after joining the World Trade Organization. Now, it's sunk back to, as we know, to around $50 today.

My guess is that barring a shock, of course, and you can never predict a shock by definition, But the normal supply-demand balance will keep oil probably oscillating in the $10 to $40 range. Now, I would be the first to admit that there's a different school of thought which has diametrically opposite view.

It says no, oil is a scarce resource, and the price of any scarce resource will rise inexorably at or around the real rate of interest in the economy. Until it finally is nearly exhausted. That's the scarce resource or the so-called Hotelling view after the economist who posited the theory.

But I think it's unlikely. It's unlikely that we'll ever use all the oil that we have under the ground.

Now, you don't need to take my word for that. What I think is much more revealing is that the Saudi government, the Saudi oil minister explicitly says, we recognize now that we're never going to sell all the oil that's under our ground. And I think rather tellingly, he uses the aphorism that the Stone Age did not come to an end because of a shortage of stones.

And I think that's the point, that we're— we've reached— we're on the cusp of a change in the world energy market in which renewables of various sorts fuels fueled by technology ultimately, which is, which is making great breakthroughs, is going not to destroy the demand for oil. It'll always be useful with places where you need a high energy demand, a high energy intensity of a fuel, like for example in aircraft.

But increasingly in other applications, I think it's going to be electricity coming from renewables, and therefore we're going to be staring at low oil prices for a very long time, and that countries like— ranging from Russia to Venezuela to the Middle East are going to have to adjust to a new reality.

Erik Townsend: Of course, the other counterargument that's been posited is that the collapse in oil prices was a man-made event that occurred when OPEC decided not to cut production in order to support prices, and that it is possible once they achieve their objectives of damaging the US shale industry and perhaps coercing Russia to either join OPEC or to cooperate with them, that They might cut production in order to support prices. So is your view that that's not likely to happen, or is it your view that they're not able to support prices by that kind of mechanism?

John Llewellyn: I think it's that they're not able. That's right. I think it's the latter. You see, if a country is to act unilaterally by cutting— and cut its oil production in order to raise prices, for it not to be worse off in terms of its oil receipts, the fall in revenues that results from the decreasing volume of sales has to be more than offset by the rise in price.

Now, roughly speaking, you need to have— it's recognized, it's reckoned that a 1% fall in production causes about a 10% price in— rise in price in the first year for oil. So what that means is you can affect your revenue by cutting back production only if you've got a 10% share of the market or more. That's in the first year. After that, the effects get smaller again.

Now, only Saudi Arabia amongst the oil producers has that share. Now, in principle, of course, it could join forces with another country, and the natural one would probably be Iran. But OPEC has never really been able to do that because the temptation in any such agreement is for both countries or 3 countries or more to sign up, but then to cheat and say, well, I'll rely on the fact the others have cut back and I'll sell more at the now higher price.

I think barring some huge geopolitical change in the world, OPEC is from a price-setting point of view now a busted flush. And of course, the big new supplier at the margin, as you alluded to, is the US with fracking.

Now, frackers, you don't by and large drive out of business because the fascinating thing about fracking is the marginal cost is coming down all the time. Nobody knows quite what the marginal cost of a new hole drilled in the United States is, but it's come down a long way. Is at least fallen to $50 and quite likely to $40.

What, of course, you've got in the United States is something like 40,000 holes which have been dug but haven't yet been exploited, and they're ready to come on and be exploited as soon as the oil price rises much above, shall we say, $50. It's likely there that we've got a highly elastic supply of US oil. For really quite a long time.

So I doubt the operative ability of OPEC to cut back supply and achieve that. And it is notable that all of the meetings that they've had so far have singularly failed to reach any agreement.

Populism, social media and 'tired of experts'

Erik Townsend: It's fascinating how many different facets of the global economy this Brexit conversation has taken us to. We're starting to run out of time. I wonder if there's any question I've missed. Is there any aspect of Brexit or what it could mean in terms of knock-on effects Contagion to other countries in the European Union, perhaps also wanting to leave. What have I missed, and what else might we want to consider with respect to this potentially historic event coming next week?

John Llewellyn: Well, perhaps I could leave you with one high-level thought, and that's the following: I don't think very many people in the United Kingdom thought that this Brexit campaign would ever reach the sort of intensity that it's reached. Reached, that it would descend into the type of bitterness that it's reached.

And one of the questions that people are asking themselves is, how is, how is it possible? What has changed? And of course, as a professor of mine used to say, when something changes, look for something else that changed a bit before.

And of course, what's new in this debate is the role of the social media, the fact that people can form constituencies with other people whom in previous epochs they would never have been able to meet. They would never have known them. But now you can find them on the web, you can talk to them, you can— in other words, I'm talking, if you like, about the rise of populism.

And however important or unemployment— however important or unimportant the UK is, it might be a harbinger for the much more important phenomenon of the US economy and US society. And when you look across the Atlantic at Donald Trump, you realize that there's a rise of populism there too. I don't want to comment particularly on the United States. I think that should be left to people who understand it better than I do.

But it was very noticeable that probably the man you'd have to call the intellectual leader of the Vote Leave in the UK, the man called Michael Gove, who was a close friend of the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleague of the Prime Minister. One of his most revealing comments, I think, when told, "Look, nine out of ten economists think that it would be a bad thing for the United Kingdom." You've been told by the IMF, the OECD, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, President Obama, former Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury. His reply was, "The British people are sick of." Experts, tired of experts.

And that is the phenomenon which we're noticing: that that somehow something has changed. That even those whose business it is to study these matters, and however carefully they phrase their their policy, are simply dismissed. They're dismissed as scaremongers. I would be the last to pretend that economists understand everything or get it right.

But they're dismissed out of hand, and I I think I end with a question to you: To what extent is this going on in the United States? To what extent is Donald Trump appealing to people who formed constituents who just say, "I'm sick of experts," or "I'm sick of elites," or "I'm sick of the ruling class," or "I'm sick of Washington D.C."

And in that respect, I think what's going on in the United Kingdom raises a very interesting specter for what might go on in the United

Erik Townsend: Well, I could not possibly agree with you more on that. I think that this election in the United States is all about the American people waking up and recognizing something is very, very wrong. And they don't know what it is. They don't understand it for the most part, but they've figured out that something is very wrong. And I think this is the first election I can remember where I don't know anybody who's voting for anyone. Everyone is voting against someone. And it scares me.

John Llewellyn: I think you would You've just described what's going on here. The extent to which people are really voting to leave Europe or to what extent they're just expressing a high level of discontent is a really moot question.

About Llewellyn Consulting

Erik Townsend: That's very perceptive indeed. As we've pretty much run out of time, I just want to close by asking you to tell us a little bit more about Llewellyn Consulting. What services do you offer to your institutional clients?

John Llewellyn: Well, that's very kind. Well, whereas you couldn't tell from my comments We're a top-down macro firm. We we offer macroeconomic services, but we also define macroeconomic to include all the other big macro drivers like demography, technological change, climate change, and so on. So we tend to offer services to some of the big investment managers, no names, no pack drill, and also to some governments and to some large corporations. Corporations about the big things which are shaped, which are in, are going to drive their future. We, we call economic drivers powerful, inexorable, and long-lasting forces.

And companies and investment managers tend to come to us when they want to see how those may play out. And that's what we do.

Erik Townsend: Well, John, thank you so much for joining us on the program. I really appreciate it. I think you've given our listeners some fantastic perspective on what next week's vote Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Nathan hands co-host duties to Aaron Chan

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger, back with you. Last week, our MacroVoices research team captain, Aaron Chan, was kind enough to help me co-host the final segment of the show because my travel schedule didn't allow me to listen to the feature interview before we taped the final segment. Well, we ended up getting a lot of positive feedback from listeners who enjoyed Aaron's fresh perspective and the questions that he brought to Erik and said they'd like to hear more of him on future shows. This comes as a blessing to me because, as regular listeners will know, MacroVoices is a part-time job for me. I have a lot of personal travel planned this summer, and to be honest, I wasn't that excited about having to carry my studio microphone with me and having to organize my travel schedule around taping the show from afar every Thursday afternoon. So I'm pleased to announce that Aaron has agreed to take over co-hosting responsibilities for the rest of the summer, starting with next week's show.

And I'll be back when my travel situation permits. Meanwhile, Aaron, thanks for agreeing to help us out as co-host. Thank you, Patrick.

Aaron Chan: Hey, Nate. It's really my pleasure, and I'm looking forward to it.

Nathan Egger: So you did a fantastic job with the follow-up questions for Erik last week, so please take it away from here.

Is Brexit a big deal? Erik vs Ben Hunt

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. So Erik, we got John's perspective on so many aspects of Brexit and its economic implications. And I notice his view is decidedly different from last week's guest, Dr. Ben Hunt, who really— who opined that the impact of a Brexit would be minimal because the U.K. is part of the E.U. and not the EMU, meaning that they have their own currency and don't use Now, I'm curious, what is your view? If the Brits vote to leave next week, is it a big deal or not for the global economy?

Erik Townsend: Oh, I think it's a huge big deal, and I respectfully disagree with Ben Hunt on this one. I think he made a very valid point that the fundamental impact in terms of what could happen certainly would be worse if they were also leaving the European Monetary Union, which could disrupt the currency.

But the thing is, as John Llewellyn correctly pointed out, It's a good point. What is being voted on next week is whether or not to begin a process which no one has ever experienced before, because it's never been done, which the rules— if you look up the Brexit referendum on Wikipedia, there is an analysis there of what's involved, and it's hard to even figure it out. It's this 2-year process. There has to be a vote of other members to approve the nation that wants to leave. It's not as simple as the The U.K. just saying, we're gonna take our marbles and go home. Thanks a lot, guys.

So, markets don't like uncertainty, and you're potentially inviting a 2-year period of nobody knowing which way is up. And I think that if you look at the breakup of Lehman Brothers, as John said, should not unto itself have been the catalyst to start the 2008 financial crisis. But it was a big enough catalyst to start something that was ready to happen already because of excessive of debt. Now, look at all of the smart people in the room, the George Soros's and the Stan Druckenmiller's and the Carl Icahn's and the Andy Xie's and the David Rosenberg's, all saying, we're in a situation where if a catalyst came along, you could see things really seriously fall apart.

Could the Brexit be the catalyst that brings that on? I don't know. Entirely possible. Just as you couldn't have possibly predicted Lehman. Would have been the catalyst. Nobody knows ahead of time, but the pump is primed. The economy is in a situation where it's waiting for a catalyst to cause this whole house of cards to come crashing down. And I think it's entirely plausible that this could be that catalyst.

Safe havens: gold, silver, yen and Bitcoin

Aaron Chan: So, my next question is about currencies, and it's really a 2-part question. John discussed sort of the safe haven move from pound sterling into euro and the dollar. But what about the yen? The yen got pounded by a weaker dollar, I think up to around 150. And what other beneficiaries of a flight from pound sterling do you see? Possibly gold? I mean, Bitcoin's at $700. So what other lifeboats do you see people running to from pound sterling?

Erik Townsend: I think that probably gold and silver will benefit. And I don't think it's so much as the gold bugs would tell you that everybody is going to prefer them. It's just a question of liquidity. There's a lot of money involved. And the gold and silver markets are relatively small in terms of their capacity to absorb large capital flows. Flows without large price moves. So I think it's quite possible that this could be a major move to the upside for precious metals.

As far as something like Bitcoin, I think probably China is driving the Bitcoin situation more than anything else. Bitcoin is particularly attractive to Chinese that are trying to hide wealth and figure out ways of smuggling it out of their country. You don't really have that problem I don't think there's a problem in terms of capital controls per se in Europe. So I wouldn't see Bitcoin as being as big of a benefactor from this situation. The yen, I think, probably, you know, Japanese BOJ monetary policy is going to influence the yen. So yeah, of course, flight capital coming out of the pound sterling could wind up in the yen. But I think the size of that effect would probably be dwarfed by the size of monetary policy effects out of the BOJ.

So if I were trying to bet on some asset benefiting from a Brexit, I would think precious metals would be the first place to look.

Oil outlook and the Saudi-Russia cartel question

Aaron Chan: Great. So we've covered crude oil quite a bit on MacroVoices in the past, and it was really interesting to hear John's take on Brexit's impact on oil prices. And he said that we'll probably likely see lower oil prices for longer. So, Erik, how do you factor Brexit into your outlook for oil?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the Brexit event likely causes a lot of people to sort of panic about everything, and I do think that we, just from last week's 5160 or so high, you know, we're probably at a cycle high, and certainly Brexit could take us back down to the bottom of the trading channel, maybe lower than that, I don't know.

But as far as the longer-term view, the one place I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Llewellyn is I really think that, although I agree that OPEC's cartel pricing capability is pretty much compromised at this point. I think they want very much to get it back. And I think that, you know, his comment about Saudi Arabia and Iran, well, that's not going to happen because, I mean, on every level— religious, philosophical, ideological— Saudi Arabia and Iran just don't ever want to be friends. Saudi Arabia enticing Russia to play ball with them. I think Russia was ready and has now stepped back, but could probably be coerced again Once the situation with Iran stabilizes and Saudi Arabia is able to contemplate a cut without it looking to their citizenry as though they are cutting at a time while Iran is increasing production, which I think is what made it untenable for them to accept Russia's offer. At some point, I think Russia and Saudi Arabia could come together and maybe, not for certain, but maybe that does restore a cartel pricing ability where they could move prices dramatically higher.

I would agree that if that doesn't happen, then I think that John's arguments for why oil prices could stay depressed for a long time, I would agree with. But I think he's maybe not giving as much credence to that possibility as I would— the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining forces with Russia and recreating the former cartel pricing capability that OPEC once had.

Populism, Podemos and EU contagion risk

Aaron Chan: That's fascinating. It'll be interesting to see that play out in the future. So my last question is about the psychological contagion that John talked about. So there was a fascinating discussion about the trade channel and the psychological channel in terms of influences between economies and industry. I thought a telling quote from Michael Gove is that the British people are tired of experts.

And right now you can see that the venom is directed at politicians, but the experts running the global economy, Erik, you and I know know, are the professorial central bankers. So do you see the populist gaze turning towards the central bankers anytime soon?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the real question is going to be the populist response of Europeans in general to staying in the E.U. In addition to the Brexit referendum, you've also got this Unidos Podemos group in Spain. Now, ironically, translated from Spanish, that means united we can, yet they appear to be favoring withdrawal of Spain from the EU. So being ununited from the EU seems to be on their mind.

Right now, Greece is sort of out of the news, but do we have another Greek crisis? I think that there is a risk at some point that if other countries are doing it and are fed up with the European Union, it could cause a contagion where several other countries exit. Once those— it's sort of like a bank run. It doesn't make sense until everybody else is doing it, and then it kind of doesn't make sense not to participate in it. yourself.

And as I think Ben Hunt very accurately opined, the Brexit exiting the E.U. was not that— it was not as big of a deal as it would have been if the U.K. were also in the EMU. In other words, participating in the euro currency.

If you were to have some of the larger countries like France and Spain, which are in the E.U., exit the E.U. and go back to their own currencies, that could have catastrophic implications for the That could lead to a Europe-wide banking crisis, which then becomes self-reinforcing. As that crisis is falling apart, the euro is devaluing dramatically. Now Europeans lose confidence in the euro system, and they want out. They want to go back to their own currencies. That would take at least ten years to clean up the mess if that happened. Now I'm not predicting that, and I don't think that that's likely. But I think that kind of contagion effect is entirely possible.

And these things are like avalanches. You know, it takes just a tiny little bit of snow falling in just the right spot to get it started. And once it gets started, it can't be stopped. So I don't think it's possible to predict it. But if it were to start to happen, it could be huge.

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Erik. It really sounds like it's gonna be spicy next week.

Nathan Egger: Aaron, I know Erik very well. And I can tell that you're really putting him to the test, and we're getting the best out of him as a result of that. So I really can't tell you how much— well, first of all, that I'm comfortable passing the baton to you for the summer and how much I appreciate you stepping up to help out with the co-hosting on MacroVoices.

So I'm really looking forward to Professor Steve Keen coming back to talk to us about alternative currencies on next week's show. But I should let you, Aaron, do the show wrap as our new co-host.

Show wrap and Research Roundup preview

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. It's time to put on the big boy pants here. So before we close, I wanted to update our listeners on what to expect for this week's Research Roundup newsletter. We've got a great video of Jim Grant speaking at Google about his book, The Forgotten Depression of 1921. We also have Shane Obata-Muzarich's extensive paper, which reviews industry and academic research about the unconventional policies and their effects on financial markets.

And finally, for those of you who might be a little bit more research or data inclined, there's a really interesting academic paper called Lazy Prices that explores a quantitative connection between changes in corporate earnings language and financial returns. The reception for Research Roundup so far has been really positive. And again, we continue to welcome any feedback or submissions to researchroundup@macrovoices.com.

So that about wraps it up for this week's program. Nate, you're going to be missed, and I hope you enjoy your travels. They're very well deserved. But I'm really looking forward to working with Erik and to continue bringing great content to our community. Again, the best way to support us is by leaving a review on iTunes. And don't forget to subscribe on MacroVoices to get the latest episodes and Research Roundup newsletters straight into your inbox. If you're Twitter inclined, you can follow Erik @ErikSTownsend. It's Erik with a K.

And myself @AaronChan_. For Erik and Nathan, I'm Aaron Chan. Till next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management. LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

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