Charles Biderman — TrimTabs (as introduced on the show)
Announcer open and episode preview
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 25 was recorded on August 4th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We're back to our usual macroeconomic focus this week with Charles Biderman from TrimTabs joining me as today's feature interview guest. Charles and I will be discussing the U.S. dollar rally, the general economic outlook for the U.S. and abroad, Brexit contagion risk, Treasury yields, and much more.
Market wrap: equities, GDP and Trump's sell call
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. This week, equity markets retreated briefly from last week's all-time record highs, with E-mini S&P futures trading as low as 2,141 at one point on Tuesday after Donald Trump told his supporters to sell stocks. But equities have since bounced back, and E-mini S&P futures closed at 2,159 on Thursday afternoon. Erik, any update on your outlook for equities?
Erik Townsend: Well, the big news, of course, was Friday's GDP print, which was much lower than expectations. That pretty much nailed any expectation of a rate hike at the next FOMC meeting, that caused the dollar to take a nosedive. And I think that's really the cause and effect here, was the dollar took a nosedive on GDP, that caused everything, whether it was equities, gold, oil, whatever, to rally on the dollar weakness. In terms of my overall view, it's not very much changed from last week. As I described it, basically, I think that economic fundamentals definitely do not support anything close to the valuations that we see in asset markets right now. But I also think that the The rest of the world is looking a whole lot worse than the United States, and the risk is to the upside that we could have a bunch of flight capital from other countries coming into the United States, strengthening the US Dollar Index and strengthening US equity markets, just because there's no other alternative.
So it's not a case of I think the economy's great and I'm bullish. It's rather I want to be short, but I don't dare to be short because I think that anything is possible here. So I'm on the sidelines. As far as Donald Trump, I think he's just trying to set up an I told you so moment.
He says when equities are fairly richly priced that people should sell. He was very careful to say the reason that they're as high as they are is because the Fed is printing money and the easy money policy is leading to this. So he sets himself up if equities go down dramatically before the election to say, I told you so. And if they don't go down, he can say, I told you so, it's central bank money printing that's keeping them up at these levels. So I think it's just political posturing in terms of his comments.
Market wrap: crude oil inventories and storage risk
Aaron Chan: Yeah, this is definitely the first time that I've heard a presidential candidate offer some kind of financial advice, which is pretty interesting. But 2 weeks ago on this program, when WTI crude oil was trading around $46, you predicted it would soon take out key support just above $44. And you also said that from there it would be a quick ride down to $40. Well, you sure called that one right, Erik, and WTI traded as low as $39.20 this week before bouncing back above $41 after Wednesday's inventory numbers were released. So what's next for crude oil?
Erik Townsend: Well, let's start by covering those inventory numbers because they're actually very interesting. Expectations were for a 2 million barrel drawdown on crude oil inventories nationally because that's what's supposed to happen this time of year in summer driving season is drawdowns on inventory. We got a 1.4 million barrel build on national crude oil inventories. That caused the market to instantaneously nosedive. That's where we got the print. I think it was actually $39.19 was the low print just seconds after the inventory data came out because people were reacting to the headline number. But then they turned to page 2 and said, wait a minute, critical Cushing, Oklahoma inventory was a 1.2 million barrel draw. So we saw a 1.4 million barrel nationwide build, but a 1.2 million barrel drawdown on Cushing inventory.
Much more importantly, though, gasoline inventories, which, as you'll remember, have been building for the last several weeks in a row, which is Which is not supposed to happen this time of year. Well, we did get a massive 3.3 million barrel drawdown on gasoline inventories when only about a 200,000 barrel drawdown was expected. That really is what I think caused prices to instantly rebound very, very quickly, retracing the loss on the headline number. Distillates— distillates again is diesel fuel, jet fuel, kerosene, other stuff that they make from crude oil in addition to gasoline— that was a 1.2 million barrel build on inventories.
Wow. So I think the combination of the 3.3 million barrel draw on gasoline inventories— remember, it is, you know, the beginning of August, it's summer driving season— a drawdown in gasoline inventories is very much to be expected this time of year, although this was certainly a larger one than anyone expected. It also comes in the wake of several large builds on gasoline inventories. I don't think it's that big of a deal, but that seems to have been what propelled crude oil to rally massively back not only above $41, And as you said, briefly above $42. The high print was $42.08 on Thursday afternoon.
I don't think this is going to last. And the reason I say that is the gasoline drawdown was not that big of a deal. Distillates building, national inventories building. Yes, Cushing was a drawdown. That's helpful. It makes a little bit of space. But we needed a much bigger drawdown than what we saw. And the nationwide number was a build. And, you know, that's not supposed to happen this time of year. We are moving now out of summer driving season.
That sounds very counterintuitive because obviously from a consumer standpoint, hey, it's the first week of August, it's the middle of vacation schedules. What you have to consider though is that from a refiner's standpoint, there is a long lead time from the time that it takes to process the crude oil through the refining process. Then it has to be distributed to a regional distribution point where a truck eventually carries it to a filling station. Put another way, All of the gasoline that is needed to supply American drivers through Labor Day weekend, the crude oil to manufacture that gasoline has already been purchased. It's in the refining process. So in terms of crude oil demand, summer driving season is basically coming to an end right now. That means that we should be looking for a return from drawdowns on inventory to builds on inventory. Well, wait a minute. We haven't been having significant drawdowns on inventory. We've been having builds, and now we can expect those builds to get larger.
I also think, if I look at the action in the time spreads, I've talked about this a lot in previous shows, where the time spreads had been widening. So my curve steepener trade that I've talked about on the program before has been just performing beautifully until that inventory number came out. Now, what I've said in the past is I think the reason that the time spreads are widening has to do with expectations about a storage crisis being a potential risk around fall maintenance season. I wasn't 100% certain of that. Well, I'm with you. I'm a lot more certain of it now because the confirmation came immediately in the wake of that inventory report. Those spreads narrowed considerably. They're starting late Thursday afternoon to widen again as I look at my screen here.
So what we're seeing, I think, is confirmation that this spike up is really about expectations that we could have a storage problem this fall, and that means all eyes are moving to storage crisis risk. I don't think— again, we could talk about technical levels here. We're just— we had broken down below a channel. We're just on the verge of testing again from the bottom. A lot of times in technical analysis, when there's a significant breakdown, you'll see a rally back up to just kiss that line. That seems to be what's happening, but frankly, I don't think the technical analysis is what's important here. I think it's all going to be about the next 3 or 4 or 5 inventory reports. If we see, as I think we could, some really significant builds on national inventory, and particularly builds on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, it really could spell much lower prices. There are now some mainstream analysts that are starting to predict a retest of the February lows.
I don't know if that's going to happen or not, but I think that it's going to be the fundamental data, the inventory data, that's going to decide that.
Meanwhile, I notice Venezuela is still deteriorating badly. News out this week that they have decided to accept food instead of cash for payment for oil from Jamaica. Jamaica. So I didn't know that Jamaica grew enough food to export it. It seems like things are getting really desperate there. Now, Venezuela has, to a lot of people's surprise, not really seen any dramatic decrease in crude oil production despite all of the horrible things that are going on in that country. Now, how long can they continue to hang on if they're at the point where they have to take food instead of money for payment from Jamaica? You know, it sounds to me like the situation there is pretty darn dire. Yeah.
Market wrap: gold
Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, it sounds like an absolute tire fire there. Now pivoting to gold, I've been watching a technical consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377, let's call it. And we've seen the market test both the high and the low ends of that range in the last couple of weeks, with the high end coming into view this week as the yellow metal traded as high as $1,373 early Wednesday morning. So Erik, what's on the horizon for gold here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that the low GDP print and therefore expectations that a rate hike is unlikely, that's the reason that we're back back up to the high end of this trading range. You know, people are thinking that if the Fed doesn't hike, it potentially means more dollar weakness, and that could be good for gold. But we're still in that consolidation range, and I don't think until we've seen a decisive breakout one way or the other that we really know where it's headed. And I also think, again, similar to what I said about crude oil, it's not that you can look at some chart pattern and say, oh, okay, I see a, you know, a reverse inside-out head and shoulders here. It's going to be about the fundamentals. If we continue to see economic data that leads us to think that the dollar index is going to be weaker, I think that's going to be very strong for gold. If the dollar index bounces back off of the 95 or so low that it just tested, and especially if it breaks out above 97, then I think that we're going to see, you know, a nosedive in gold.
I don't really know where it's headed yet, and I think we have to wait and find out.
Market wrap: Treasury yields and the dollar
Aaron Chan: So, 10-year Treasury yields are back above 1.5% this week after testing the mid-140s late last week. So, Erik, what do you see going on in the fixed income space?
Erik Townsend: Well, you said above 1.5%. They were in the low 150s. It's back to 1.50% now as we're recording on Thursday afternoon. And what I would say, similar to the last couple, I don't so much have a strong opinion about I don't know where it's headed in the short term, but I do have a very strong opinion that we're in a consolidation range, and it's going to be very telling if we break down below that 1.35 level that has been the low so far in yields, high-end prices. That really tells me, okay, this was not just a short-term temporary Brexit reaction thing. This is what I have been predicting, and also our future guest today has been predicting for years now, which is that we would eventually get All the way down to 1% yields on the 10-year. Is that happening? Was this just a dead cat bounce after Brexit? Is it going to roll over? I think if I see a move north of 1.7%, okay, that tells me it's not time for my thesis to play out yet.
If we see a drop below 1.35%, I think that the cards are on the table and the train has left the station. We're headed for 1% yields. Whether or not that's going to happen by the end of the year, as Charles Biderman had once predicted, I don't know. But I do I do think that those 1% Treasury yields are coming.
Aaron Chan: Right. The dollar index has been trying to break through the key resistance around 97 for the last couple of weeks, but it looks like it has softened this week. So what's going on with the dollar?
Erik Townsend: I think that the big softness in the dollar was entirely a reaction to the very weak GDP print. I think that the reality that the United States is very close to recession and would already be in recession if not for overly accommodative monetary policy is becoming much clearer now.
You know, maybe I should be kicking myself. I've been telling myself for the last couple of weeks, boy, if we get another dip down to 95, I'm going to buy dollar index futures because I really do lean towards the bullish case that the dollar rally is going to continue. I saw it and glanced at my screen and I saw 94.97. I thought, boy, should I buy this? And, you know, I chickened out. I didn't pull the trigger. And the reason is just because I think it's a timing thing.
If we see a lot of shit hit the fan around the world, Japan, China, Europe falling apart, as I think a lot of risk exists in those economies, that's going to strengthen the dollar. But if the U.S. falls into recession first before those things happen, that's going to be very weak on the dollar. So, you know, I think it's— I do lean towards the bull case for the dollar index, but I didn't buy that dip to 95. It is now Almost back to '96. And I think the 94.97 may have actually been the exact bottom tick so far. But I don't really have any regrets that I chickened out of buying it there because I just don't have the conviction that this game is over yet. And I think we really have to wait and see. Listen to how many things we just talked about, whether it was the price of gold or the price of oil or the Treasury yield.
A lot of things are in consolidation ranges and we don't have signals yet as to which way they're going.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: I think we need to wait until there's a clearer, more decisive indication from markets before I would be comfortable actually putting a trade on here.
Aaron Chan: Right, so holding pattern. Thanks for the market update, Erik. This week's special guest is Charles Biderman from TrimTabs Erik's interview with Mr. Biderman is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Interview: politics of fairness and the economics of hopelessness
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is TrimTabs' own Charles Biderman. Charles, thanks so much for joining me on the program.
Charles Biderman: Thanks for having me.
Erik Townsend: It's a real pleasure to get you on, and we've gone a couple weeks now without doing macro interviews. We thought we could take a break because it would be dog days of summer and there'd be nothing to talk about. So much for that idea. But before we get into it, I'd like to start with the big picture, not just the outlook on the economy, but where do we stand in this whole story of central banks and the economy and everything? How did we get here? And what's the context for where we are before we start to look forward?
Charles Biderman: Well, that's the perfect question to ask. And to me, it all starts with our basic political philosophy post-World War II is that life should be fair. I call it the politics of fairness. So it's unfair— it's only fair people should have all their healthcare costs paid for by the state.
It's only fair education. It's only fair everybody should have big pensions. You shouldn't be able to get fired. All these type of things is like the politics of fairness. And if you look at the so-called progressive agenda, liberal agenda, or whatever, the agenda that's been passing laws in the West, it's all about politics of fairness.
So the politics of fairness has created Unfortunately, the economics of hopelessness. And what do I mean by hopelessness? You've created such headwinds to growth that with no growth but a lot of fairness, you have— there's no hope for the future for the participants in the economy.
On the other hand, the headwinds to the economies of Europe and the United States are being ameliorated, so to speak, or attempted to, by the very smart people from academia who've never done anything in terms of creating jobs or running anything other than, well, I have a great idea, let's flood the world with free money and we'll levitate asset prices and hopefully there'll be a trickle-down effect.
So the economics of hopelessness You know, it's not been working to create growth. And the end result of the economics of hopelessness is Donald Trump and radical Muslim activities. Because, you know, these European— these Muslim kids in France or Belgium have no hope for the future. They're in a cradle-to-grave protected economy where they get everything handed to them so that they will survive, but there's no hope.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Charles Biderman: So, you know, when an ISIS recruiter says, come to Syria, we'll pay you money, you can rape women, kill people, have fun, and/or you could stay in France or Belgium and, and be on the dole for the rest of your life with no hope for the future.
In the United States, we have the jobs were hollowed out, but there's nothing to replace them. Why is there nothing to replace them? Because the laws
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Charles Biderman: The regulations are so— now that it's very hard to start a new business. Instead of creating— let's— okay, this company moved their staff to Asia to produce widgets. Let's take that space and create an incubator. Let's have no taxes for the first year for anybody starting a business, no withholding taxes. Let's give them free internet, free this, free that. No, let's make it harder to start a business. If you start a business, you have to make sure everybody can get their healthcare benefits if they work certain hours. And you need licenses to start a business that could be impossible to get through a bureaucrat. That's why bribery is so endemic outside the United States, because that's the only way you can get through the bureaucracy is with bribes.
So anyway, that to me is the big picture, that headwinds to growth— look, growth occurs when something more new happens More new ones than old shutters. Unfortunately, in the United States, the last couple of years, for the first time in the United States history, more companies are closing their doors than opening— than new companies starting up.
That is not growth.
Interview: US economy, dollar and Brexit
Erik Townsend: And where do you think we are right now in this story? I mean, we just had a dismal GDP print last Friday. A lot of people think that we're headed towards a recession, but I mean, look at the stock market. So what's your take on the economy?
Charles Biderman: Well, I'd say if it wasn't for zero interest rate policy and helicopter money, we would be in a recession. The best that they can do with free money is to get us just above the flatline. And you have to keep levitating stock prices and bond prices to do that.
So how long will they be able to do that? Not forever. What will be the catalyst? We'll know after the catalyst happens. You know, it's like you have tinder. Something is going to light a match and burn, you know. But what will that be and when will it occur? It could be sometime later this year, could be— I don't know, could be another year.
I've given up predicting when foolishness will stop. If that makes any sense as an answer.
Erik Townsend: It does. Let's talk about the U.S. dollar rally. You know, we've heard every view on this program from the top is in and it's all downhill from here to it's just getting started. Do you think that there's room for more dollar appreciation as we see more flight capital coming into the United States?
Charles Biderman: Well, I would say, you know, Japan and the euro will probably decline against the dollar. But I would say the dollar is going to decline against foreign emerging market currencies because, other than China, which is probably as bankrupt as the West in terms of— when I say bankrupt, I mean mark-to-market bankrupt.
To me, if the United States marked to market all our obligations, we'd be trillions of dollars in the hole. And if we were a public company, the auditor would never sign saying that we had any chance of survival. You know, and the same with the European, except for Germany, and England is also bankrupt. You know, the future obligations that our politicians have committed us to, there's no way, you know, the present value that you have to— if you're a public company, you have to include your future liabilities, your best guess as to them.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Charles Biderman: The present value of them, and they're way in excess of any— you know, incomes would have to grow by 8%, 9% a year, national income, all the entire income that the United States generates, 8%, 9% a year to even begin to be able to cover the future expenses.
Erik Townsend: Speaking of Europe and the situation there, we've heard views on Brexit that have ranged from it was just a flash in the pan to the end is nigh and the European Union is doomed. What's your take? Is exit contagion going to be a serious risk, and what would it mean to the rest of the global economy?
Charles Biderman: Well, I hate the euro government personally. It's atrocious how a free market or free, you know, free trade between members of the common market has become a regulatory nightmare where they have people telling them how— what the Parmesan cheese should be like, what the size of this, you know, egg shape, egg color. I mean, it's ridiculous. The headwinds to business are outrageous based on all these do-good decisions. You know, it's only politics of fairness is creating incredible bureaucratic inertia nonsense. So on the one hand, I'm totally in favor of free and open trade.
On the other hand, I think the euro experiment is doomed, and I think England was smart to get out. And hopefully they'll be able to keep a free trade or reciprocal trade or, you know, something the way Switzerland is doing. So I think it's probably a long-term benefit for England.
Interview: Treasury yields and negative-yielding debt
Erik Townsend: In the wake of the Brexit referendum, the U.S. 10-year Treasury recently retested its 2012 low. Actually, I think it set a new series record in the process. And, you know, you and I have both predicted that we'll eventually see 1% yields on the 10-year, but there's quite a few notable people. Jeff Gundlach from DoubleLine was out recently saying, okay, it's time to short Treasuries here. This is it. The bottom is in for yields. I don't think so. What's your take in the short to intermediate term? Have we seen a bottom here, or do you think that we're going to see even lower Treasury yields?
Charles Biderman: Well, I'm still long leveraged 10-year Treasuries, and I have no intention I don't think they should be thinking of selling anytime soon. I mean, there's no growth in the world, and the only real yield in 10 years is in the U.S. And if the economies of Europe are not rebounding, there is no growth on the continent outside of Germany.
So, you have, you know, Italian banks. I mean, banks are broke, and the question is, how do you save them? And no one seems to care.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Charles Biderman: Because the ECB is buying all the sovereign debt from Italy, and Italy can then guarantee all the you know this is insanity. So that can't be good longer term. Will the ten-year break one percent by the end of this year, which is what I predicted? Could be maybe you know might be a little longer, but the only the flight of money to some positive yield. And safety to me says that the 10-year will go below 1%.
Erik Townsend: Now, if we kind of take this picture global, you know, already around the world we literally have tens of trillions of dollars worth of negative-yielding debt. And it just, it blows my mind that we could have negative-yielding Treasury debt around the world. So how is that even possible, and where is this headed? Do you think we're eventually going to get to negative interest rate policy in the United States and negative-yielding US Treasuries?
Charles Biderman: No, it's just avoidance of the reality that Europe is broke. There is no way that the EC— countries of the ECB can generate enough income to pay its debts. So if you can't generate the income to pay the debt, how about making the interest rate that you owe negative so that Negative interest rates allow central banks to print more money, an infinite supply of money.
Pay, you know, I'd like to pay my bills. I'll print money at a negative interest rate. Wouldn't that be a nice world to live in where I know here's how I'm going to pay my debt? I'll print paper and I'll— and you pay me to buy the paper.
Interview: the endgame is government bankruptcy
Erik Townsend: How do you think this story eventually ends, Charles? Because, I mean, if you—
Charles Biderman: Bankruptcy. They're avoiding bankruptcy. Look, when you lend money and you can't pay it back, either you go bankrupt or you inflate the heck out of it. But I don't think Germany will allow a repeat of the Weimar experiment. And at some point, there's going to have to be massive adjustments.
Look, we have— there's a strange divergence occurring globally. We have an incredibly powerful, robust broadband internet global network where every email address is the equal of every other email address. Sex, age, money doesn't mean anything. You know, the only thing that means anything is government control of the internet in that region. And assuming there isn't, except, you know, in only a handful of places, or maybe not Not small handful, but thinking about China particularly, it's a very robust worldwide phenomenon.
On the other hand, we have this rotten superstructure called government bureaucracy, and all the loans, and all the pension obligations, and all the future promises that there is no way in heck can be funded by the economies. So if you can't pay your obligations, you have to restructure your obligations. Restructure your debt, and it's called, in essence, it's government bankruptcy reorganization. That has to be where we're headed, and we're slowly realizing it. Right now, the problem is the powers that be think they really know what they're doing. You know, Paul Krugman thinks he's a smart guy. He got an award. He got a Nobel, you know, I mean, look Look at central bankers. I mean, they're central bankers. They have to know what they're doing, right?
But they don't. It's all these— so the smart guys have to be debunked and people have to realize, and I think they're beginning to. You know, that's part of the Trump movement, that the guys in charge really have no idea what the hell is going on, and yet they make these claims that they do, and they make predictions based upon—
Erik Townsend: Predictions.
Charles Biderman: on how smart they are and how smart the models they've created, and it never works.
Erik Townsend: So what does the endgame look like? Because if you had told me 10 years ago that, look, what's going to happen is investors all around the world are going to be so excited by the opportunity to lend money to insolvent borrowers that they're going to bid the price of bonds up to the level where they have negative yields, and they're going to be satisfied and keep buying them, I would have told you you're nuts. But that's what's happening. So does it— do bond prices eventually crash when people wake up? How does this end?
Charles Biderman: Well, it ends in bankruptcy and reorganization of governments. I mean, it's gonna— you know, you have a robust global internet world and you have geographically restrictive government entities that create laws, pay money to entities That, you know, they pay to the powers that be, the interest groups that, you know, so you have this like whole superstructure and they— how do they pay for it? They're just printing money and they're losing total relationship to the underlying economy.
And at some point, you know, you just sever that from the bottom. And cents on the dollar, you pay, you know, the bonds are worthless. Those zero-coupon bonds, negative interest, you know, so the people who bought them, they're going to lose a lot of money if they hold them to, you know, a long-term bond.
There's no way that those bonds will be paid off in 10 years. They'll either be refunded with more garbage debt if people— or they'll have to be sold at a tremendous discount. And again, you know, I'm talking about Unfortunately, in the next 6 months, who knows? You know, the markets are still likely to go up until people recognize the emperor is really naked.
But right now, we believe, you know, we're still willing to think the, you know, the emperor knows what they're doing and they're not walking around— but they are naked. But, well, no, but they know what they're doing. Is the, you know, I mean, if a central banker talks, people listen.
Erik Townsend: Why? Well, but I mean, you're a smart guy, Charles. You understand this problem, but you're levered long U.S. Treasuries, so you're rushing to lend extra money to the U.S. government knowing that they can't pay back.
Charles Biderman: I'm trading to make money.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so, but it is a greater fool trade, isn't it? You're trading because you're going to find a greater fool to sell those
Charles Biderman: Yes. Unfortunately, I've always been early. You know, in December of 1999, using a modest cash flow analysis of the amount of unlocking IPOs from the '90s and option conversions given to insiders, that about $70 to $80 billion a month of new shares would need to be bought going into 2000. to keep the merry-go-round going, and there just wasn't that money around. So I predicted the market would crash in February, early February, after the year-end money went in. And in February, I watched it keep going higher and higher through April when it finally broke, and it was painful.
Interview: equities in a global meltdown; who runs central banks
Erik Townsend: Well, speaking of crazy markets, I want to run an idea by you because I know that you think in terms of pure supply and demand and cash flow for shares. And, you know, when I look around the global economy, I think we're in real trouble. I think the U.S. is one rate hike away from being pushed into a recession. I think the European exit contagion is very real. I think that Japan and China are maybe set to go from very bad to even worse.
I can't believe I'm saying this, Charles, but I'm actually having a hard time deciding whether that's bullish or bearish for U.S. equities. Because obviously in the old normal where economic fundamentals Then that would be a very bearish view. But, you know, all it's going to result in, if I'm right about the things that I just said, is more accommodative central bank policy, more money printing, more easy money. And I think it's also going to lead to a whole lot of flight capital coming out of Europe, Japan, and China into the United States. And that appreciates the dollar and it appreciates U.S. risk assets. So, I think it could actually be bullish for equities if the whole world, especially if it's the rest of the world before the United States, starts melting down. Am I right? Is that crazy to think about it in those terms?
I mean, it's obviously backwards.
Charles Biderman: I agree with you with one significant caveat, and that caveat is it appears that the smart money is realizing that the central bankers can't do anything, and their actions— I mean, look at what's happening in Japan. They're making, you know, they've gone as far as they could go, and they're trying to go So, you know, even further, I mean, listening to that nitwit Krugman, and it's not working even on the markets anymore.
Even with the government Japanese Central Bank buying Japanese ETFs, the markets are not going up anymore. So, they realize, the markets realize that the Japanese Central Bank is really powerless to do anything.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Charles Biderman: There's still, you know, as long as the ECB is buying government bonds and keeping, you know, and there's no endgame yet for the Italian banks and the Spanish banks, there's still this myth that some fantasy world lender will make everybody whole, even if the banks can't collect the debts, that the caveat really is when, as more and more smart money realize that the central banks can't do anything and, and their actions are useless, as that be— you know, I'm saying there's less and less oomph going to be, less and less push on the helicopter money, to at some point they'll do a helicopter raise and the market will go down, and that's the endgame.
Erik Townsend: Do you think there's a catalyst that ties their hands so they can't print the money, or you think they do print the money? They do the helicopter drops.
Charles Biderman: It's just, you know, when you set the stage for a blaze, a big fire, it doesn't take much to eventually set it off. And yes, the media will say whatever that was that set it off was the key, but real— no, it's the, you know, the central banks are talking through their hats. You know, look, you got to understand who runs central banks— mostly bankers and economists, right? Right. Now, when I went to Harvard Business School a long, long time ago in a galaxy far away— no, the smart guys went to McKinsey, First Boston, top consulting firms, or they went to Fidelity or Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley. The guys who couldn't get those type of good jobs next went to the banks.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Charles Biderman: So, the smartest guys don't go to the banks.
And also consider that people who become economists never do anything. I mean, they get paid for talking, but they never make any money. They've never made any money. If they could make money, they wouldn't be an economist, they'd be a trader.
So, you have economists and bankers, not the smartest people, not the most accomplished But they're running the central banks. Isn't that crazy? You have, you know, nitwits, and they've never really done anything, and they make these pontiffs, you know, they talk about how they're going to do this and how they're going to do that, and so what? Nothing works.
Interview: markets as governor of the Fed; the endgame signal
Erik Townsend: One of the views that I've had is, you know, if I look at the— history tells us that the central bankers are going to continue to be reckless in their policy as long as they can get away with it. They're not going to suddenly wake up one day and say, hey, it's time to be prudent.
Charles Biderman: The markets are going to stop them.
Erik Townsend: And I guess that's the question in my mind, is how the markets stop them. You know, clearly, if we suddenly had runaway inflation, that would stop them. It would tie their hands. But we don't have anything close to that now. What are the other catalysts that would do it?
Charles Biderman: The market has been stopping them. You know, they talk about we want to raise rates.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Charles Biderman: They say they're going to raise rates, but then the markets, the smart guys in the short-term Treasury markets, don't bid up the price. So, historically, the Fed doesn't move— they say they're going to raise rates, but they never do it unless the market predicts it. In other words, traders really think, yeah, the Fed's going to do it this time, and the underlying is this way and that way, and so they bid up yields.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Charles Biderman: And so, they have to raise yields, bid down price, or sell, whatever, to get the underlying trading instruments in line with the future rate rise.
But they keep talking about September and year-end, and the markets have— and so, they've never moved when there's less than a 60% probability within 3 months. And right now, it's like a 30% probability. So, they keep talking about they want to raise rates, but the The markets say they're not, and they're not. So the markets are now, in essence, determining the Fed's ability to raise rates.
Now, as I said before, when the Fed cuts rates, it does some kind of easing, and the markets sell off. That's the endgame. That's when things are going to get really nasty.
Erik Townsend: So I take it then that you're explaining— if I were to pose the question, hey, the Fed had signaled a rate hike was coming, S&P was at basically all-time highs. We hadn't had this negative GDP data at that point. It seemed like they had no excuse for not raising rates, but they didn't. And it sounds like you would answer that question by saying the answer is because the market didn't predict it. The market hadn't bid the rates up.
Charles Biderman: Yeah, the market's looking and seeing that things are weaker than, than the Fed is. You know, the market— look, we're growing 1%, 2%. And the only reason we're growing 1%, 2% is because we We have zero interest rate policy in essence, that if they start hiking it, the economy is going to tumble. And the traders— the Fed can't do that. So they don't believe the Fed's going to do it.
Erik Townsend: We've already gone longer between the first hike and supposedly the second hike is still coming than ever before. So they're already teetering on loss of credibility. Do you think we're ever going to see that second hike?
Charles Biderman: Teetering? Teetering?
Erik Townsend: Well, it depends on— I think they lost credibility 10 years ago.
Charles Biderman: Yes. The nitwits on CNBC who, or Bloomberg, who tout everything as, oh, the latest flash number says the economy is rebounding, or real estate or auto sales definitely show an improvement in the economy. I mean, those guys, they're teetering, maybe. You know, like, their ratings depend on a bull market. In bear markets, those guys don't make money.
I think more, you know, Bloomberg sets are getting turned off now given the shrinkage in the buy side, as, you know, people are taking money out of hedge funds and buying passive. So Bloomberg is definitely bullish. They need more machines sold.
Erik Townsend: In terms of your own view, though, do you think that the Fed is going to stay the course and get at least to a second hike in the so-called rate normalization cycle, or you think it's just a question of time before the U-turn in policy and they start to ease again?
Charles Biderman: Well, I just don't see any improvement in the economy. I mean, we're seeing a little pickup here. To me, it's a bounce from the Brexit reaction pullback by companies. You know, Brexit happened, and for a month or so nobody did anything, and they were, you know, held back. And now that they see it's really a much of a non-event. The world is not going to collapse, they went. So there's a little pickup, but it's not a— it's not a sustainable recovery. And so I just don't see what's going to take, uh, you know, considering the headwinds to growth we have, I don't see how they're going to have any economic growth in the economy other than specific areas like broad, you know, internet or social media
Erik Townsend: Well, and you could also argue, you know, Bank of England just eased again yesterday. So you could argue that as more capital goes into the U.S. out of England, that's providing some support for the U.S. dollar. They don't need to hike right now.
Charles Biderman: No, no, they don't need to hike. I mean, they want to get out, but they box themselves in. And like I said, the bad times are going to come when They boost money supply or do some kind of easing and the markets sell off. That'll be when even the conventional wisdom types realize that central banks can't do anything.
Erik Townsend: And so that really is the signal then for the endgame. From an investor standpoint, how do you respond to that signal? What do you do at that point?
Charles Biderman: Sell.
Erik Townsend: Would you close your long positions in Treasuries too, expecting that the bonds follow the stocks down?
Charles Biderman: Not initially. First equities. But here's, you know, but then again, let me say that I would— when I said sell, I would only sell companies, uh, long-term. I still think the globe— we're in a global expansion based on the internet. So companies that are capable of growing free cash flow and are growing free cash flow I would not sell, but I would look to average, to, you know, average in as the markets collapse.
I'd be a buyer over time. Companies that need funding or are, you know, interest rate driven as buys, I would not want to be long those.
Interview: TrimTabs fired from the Float Shrink ETF
Erik Townsend: Well, I do want to change the topic completely. We didn't know this when we booked you because Because it's new news, but your company, TrimTabs, is suddenly in the news. You and I both know in this business of fund management, if you deliver crappy performance on a consistent basis, you get fired and replaced by somebody else. That's just how business works. But your story is quite a bit different than that. You conceived the investment strategy, you yourself personally, as I understand it, conceived this float shrink strategy, which I want to talk more about in a minute, and this TrimTabs FloatShrink ETF is actually managed by another firm which had contracted your firm to run the, the money, to be the sub-advisor that makes the investment decisions, until very recently when you were very publicly fired from that role. But you had been delivering spectacular performance, like 19% plus annualized returns as of the end of March. That earned TTFS a Morningstar 5-star award.
That's the highest there is. And I believe you were actually the best-performing active-managed ETF in existence according to some measures.
Charles Biderman: Equity, yeah.
Erik Townsend: Equity ETF, okay. So in a year when a lot of hedge funds that have much, much higher fee structures are underperforming the major indices, how in the world could that be construed as lousy performance? And I mean, what's going on here? How is it possible that you guys got fired from this management position?
Charles Biderman: Again, let's take a bigger picture approach. Look at AdvisorShares, who we were a sub-advisor to. They had the brilliant idea that they could pick individuals or sub-advisors who could manage a portfolio and outperform the sub-index. And we were the only one that did that. So, the problem that AdvisorShares has is that they have a faulty business model and they were losing money. And they're losing, you know, they have shed assets for the last 2 years.
And when you shed assets and you get paid as a percentage of assets, you know, your revenue is declining. So, somehow or other, Wilshire offered them some kind of deal. And they replaced us with— the fund is now called the Wilshire Buyback ETF, and it's underperforming us. You know, if we have a— we kept the format of the original TTFS.
I mean, the Wilshire Buyback Fund, they're keeping our ticker symbol, which is not nice of them, but they have the right to. We're launching a new fund called TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF sometime in the next couple of months or less. And we have the— to keep the performance line going, we have a portfolio, a specialized, special managed account in existence that invests the same way that TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF invested.
And that's outperforming the Wilshire Buyback by 100 basis points in July.
Erik Townsend: 100 basis points annualized or 100 basis points in July?
Charles Biderman: In July. In one month, we outperformed by 100 basis points. They changed the— instead of 100 companies at 1% each, they went more big cap. They're not necessarily looking at free cash flow. They're not necessarily looking at a debt-equity ratio. You know, the guy who runs it thinks he knows what he's doing. And the 2 prior funds he managed that we could find were both for AdvisorShares, and his results for both of those— he received a 1-star Morningstar rating, which means the bottom 10% performance. And given the July performance, now we understand why he got a 1-star. Because he thinks he's smart. And so anyway, they've lost since they kicked— you know, the amount of assets they have is shrinking.
And hopefully the people who are taking their money out will put it into our new fund when— after we launch.
Interview: how float shrink works and new funds
Erik Townsend: I want to— before we get to your new fund, I want to talk about the strategy itself, because frankly, you know, it's very creative for an ETF. Usually you don't see that innovative of a strategy, you know, other than in a hedge fund So how does this float-shrink strategy work? What does float-shrink mean? What is the strategy for this active management scheme?
Charles Biderman: Well, in essence, it is— we offer hedge fund results at an ETF price. And prior to the Volcker Rule, TrimTabs Investment Research the company that provides the research, and it's— our clients are basically institutions, we were 25% of Our minority shareholder was Goldman Sachs, and when the Volcker Rule happened, which said that firms like Goldman Sachs could no longer trade for their own account, we lost 40% of our revenue that day as all the prop trading desks on Wall Street got our float shrink and cash flow data, or were clients of ours, I should say.
And so we decided to launch our own fund. And we launched on October 11th. And the basic premise is that if a company is growing free cash flow over a 6-month period and they're using a portion of that free cash flow to reduce the share count and they're not borrowing to buy— in other words, there's no change in the debt-to-asset ratio— the value of the remaining shares should go up. up by at least the float shrink.
Does that make sense?
Erik Townsend: So basically you're saying if I'm running my public company and you're running your public company and I'm spending my profits on dividends or whatever, but you're spending yours on buybacks, there's going to be less availability of your shares. You're consuming them and you're going to continue consuming them, and that's going to keep the price up. And it happens a lot because these corporate buybacks are often motivated by management compensation. You know, the CEO is going to be commissioned on the, on the share price. He's going to do whatever, whether it makes sense long term or not, he's going to boost the share price. So you're basically—
Charles Biderman: Yeah, if they take— but if they only take a portion of their free cash flow to reduce the share count, so meaning that they have more cash on the balance sheet at the end of the 6-month period and less shares, Then I would say that the value of the company should not be changed, because— but if there are less shares outstanding, the price of the remaining shares should go up to equal the float shrink.
And in point of fact, what we've discovered is companies that reduce the share count using free cash flow trade at a premium to the float shrink. So, in other words, if they're doing a 4% float shrink a year, they might trade at a 6% premium, or 2%— they might be up by 6% instead of 4%, 4% accounting for the float shrink and a 2% premium. And if you think about it, companies growing cash and giving a portion back to shareholders, you know, so it's like if you own— as a result of float shrink, existing shareholders own more.
Erik Townsend: And of course, I think most of our listeners are familiar with the float refers to the number of shares that are available, not in hand that don't sell, the long-term holders. And float shrink is the reduction of that.
Charles Biderman: I have no— you know, we look at share count. I'm not interested in buybacks. If a company does a buyback on one side of the desk and then sells options or convert or sells shares on the other side, to me, that's— I don't care. I just want to know the net change in shares outstanding.
Erik Townsend: For something like this, obviously you've backtested this, you've figured out some trade.
Charles Biderman: Well, we've been going for over 5 years. So we're— and our results equaled our backtest.
Erik Townsend: But you, you— I guess what's interesting to me about this story, normally when somebody finds, you know, a secret sauce, a strategy that will work, that backtests well and actually works in real life, what they usually do is they hide it in some super-secret black box. They won't tell anybody how it works, and they structure it as a hedge fund so they can get a 2-and-20 fee structure.
You've chosen to go the total opposite direction. You're doing it as an ETF with a much lower fee structure. And you're telling people in an interview like this one and many others that you've done publicly exactly how it works, which means they could copy your strategy. Why that approach?
Charles Biderman: Well, believe it or not, over the years I've discovered that investors are not as smart as I think they— as I thought they were, because I've been talking about this for 5 years, as you said, and I don't know anybody else who does it in a public vehicle. So my question is why no one has copied me. I don't know.
So, if no one's copying me, there's no problem in talking about it. And even if they do copy me, fine. That would create more credibility for the method. There's plenty of shares outstanding. I mean, obviously, if there was $20 billion investing in FloatShrink, it'd probably eat up all the advantage, if you know what I mean. But this— hey, if there were some more people doing it, it would be better. I think that's a good point. It would just add credibility to the process. It's such a small amount of money in— I mean, our old fund peaked at $250 million. Now, after the redemptions that these nitwits have received, thank God, you know, they're down to $140 million, I think, in assets.
So there's not a whole lot of money in FloatShrink but we're starting other funds.
Erik Townsend: It's refreshing to see, you know, an innovative strategy like that. through an ETF, so it's available to retail investors and not restricted to accredited investors.
Charles Biderman: Well, and also, I mean, if I could tout my own horn, so to speak, the brand is really free cash flow. So if you had just invested in companies growing free cash flow over the years and avoided companies with negative cash flow, you would have made money. You would have outperformed each year.
And why people don't have free cash flow as the key metric I don't know. I mean, earnings— billions of dollars of computer time have been spent analyzing earnings and sales and investing on, you know, trying to predict earnings, trying to predict all that stuff, and no one's ever come up with a model. Or maybe because so much money has gone in there that there's no differentiation. You know, without knowing something ahead of time that you shouldn't know, using earnings as an investment model doesn't work.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Charles Biderman: Work or sales, but free cash flow does. So we're coming up— we have an international fund, TrimTabs International Free Cash Flow, FCFI, that's been out for close to a year.
It's been out a year. We're planning on launching other funds, small-cap free cash flow, tech, emerging market, all kinds of stuff like that. And we have in the pipeline, we're planning on— we have nothing And no Fed paperwork, so I can talk about that.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, thanks so much for sharing the strategy openly with our listeners. I know that— I'm sure you don't have a ticker symbol yet for the new ETF, but when you do, I imagine it will be at trimtabs.com. Is that— I know when you're not busy recovering from being fired for no apparent reason, you also do quite a bit of writing on markets. So before we close, for our listeners who want to follow your work, is that at trimtabs.com or
Charles Biderman: Well, TrimTabs.com, and also, I also do, because of all the new stuff and I've been doing less writing, I no longer do the daily or the videos and the blogs, but on my Facebook page, I have all the times I go on. I'm on regular with Rick Santelli once a month, and other times there are other articles I write are on my Facebook page. So, if you don't mind looking at pictures of me in Hawaii, walking on the beach.
In between those, there are links to the articles I've written or written about me and my TV appearances.
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, Charles, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Aaron Chan will be back with me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer break: guest requests and suggestions
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: what ties central bankers' hands
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, I agree a lot with what Mr. Biderman said there, and I'm constantly thinking about the catalysts. And I noticed you're asking not only Mr. Biderman but several of our past guests about what could bring this all down, like what could tie the central bank's hands around their back. So besides runaway inflation, what else are you seeing in terms of catalysts?
Erik Townsend: Let's look at the overall picture here, Aaron, because what Charles Biderman said is something that I've said in the past, which is that the thing to watch for is when central banks continue to print money, continue to be accommodative, as they continue to conjure more money supply out of thin air with the printing press. When they do that and markets go down anyway, that's the thing to watch for. Now, I couldn't agree more with Charles that if that happens, absolutely, it is a huge, very important signal, and it means that the market has lost confidence in the Fed. And even more printed money is not going to save the day.
The view that I've come around to in the last couple of years, though, because I was saying that since 2009, the thing that I've come around to is, boy, in this crazy world that we live in, if you print money out of thin air, it has to go someplace, and it goes into asset markets. And that means that this charade is going to continue, I think, until something ties central bankers' hands so they can't get away with printing money out of control. And to my thinking, the most important question— and to be sure, again, if what Charles Biderman described happens, which is they're printing money like it's going out of style and it's not helping, asset markets are going down anyway— that is a huge signal. I'm afraid that that might not happen. I think that maybe we can just keep on inflating asset markets until this thing gets to the point where something ties central bankers' hands.
And so, to me, the $64 trillion question That I think is just the most important topic right now in finance are, what are the things that could happen that would prevent central bankers from being able to print money out of thin air and use it to prop up the economy and asset markets?
One thing that we've discussed before on the program is inflation. If we had runaway inflation, which we definitely do not have right now, although Alan Greenspan actually commented this past week that he thinks that we might be coming—
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: I mean, back close to it. If we got runaway inflation, then central banks would be forced to hike rates in order to prevent the inflation from turning into hyperinflation. So, that would tie their hands. They wouldn't be able to exhibit this recklessly accommodative policy that we've seen for the last few years.
The only other thing that I've been able to think of so far that would tie their hands would be political backlash If there is some kind of frustration where let's say a political candidate really takes a strong position and gets the country united around the idea that, hey, all of this money printing is not for the benefit of we the people, it's for the benefit of Wall Street. What we've accomplished with quantitative easing has been to prop up asset markets which help rich people and they don't help the common person. What we need to do is from now on not We cannot spend any central bank money on propping up asset markets. If we're going to print money out of thin air, it can only be used for, let's say, infrastructure programs or helicopter money.
You know, just giving a check to everybody in the country or something. If they go in that direction, and now the mechanism of transmission of this newly printed money cannot, because of some political resistance, go into asset markets, it has to go into poor people's pockets instead. Well, that would certainly completely change this picture we have. Short of those 2 things, it seems to me that as long as we have a deflationary backdrop, the central banks can get away with continuing this. And the more that they get away with it, the more complacent they become.
And if you look long-term at history, what history teaches us is that major, massive inflations like the Weimar Germany event were preceded by significant rounds of deflation. And I think the, you know, my logical model for this, how it works, is in a deflationary backdrop, you print money, a lot of people raise their hands and say, this is not smart, this is not good, it's going to cause massive inflation. And then that inflation doesn't happen immediately. And so the central bankers become more and more complacent, and they print more and more money, and more and more money, as Rudi von Havenstein did in Weimar Germany.
Aaron Chan: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: Eventually, that deflationary backdrop transitions into inflation, and you've printed so much money at that point that the inflation runs away and you have a hyperinflation risk. I don't think we're there yet in this story. I think we have a ways to go. But as I see it, until you get the adverse effect of this, central bankers can get away with continuing to do this. And even as much as I don't like I don't like it, and I think it's immoral because it's causing such an incredible risk.
The longer this thing goes on, the longer they prop things up, and the longer this charade is allowed to continue, the harder the eventual fall will be. There can be no free lunch. As Ludwig von Mises so famously said, there is no way to avoid the adverse consequence of a massive credit expansion as we've had. The question is whether or not to be a grown-up about it and deal with the problem head-on, or wait until there's a colossal crash. And what history has taught us is central bankers wait until there's a colossal crash. I don't think that we have any imminent risk of that. I think they can continue to print trillions of dollars and prop asset markets for a while longer here. And yes, it is setting us up for a much worse than 2008 kind of event someday.
But I don't think it happens until something ties their hands. I would be delighted if markets could be the governor, as Charles Biderman suggested in this interview, and the central banks are printing money recklessly and irresponsibly, and markets say, no, this is crazy, this doesn't make sense anymore, we're going to allow asset markets to sell off even in the face of all of this easy money policy. So far, we haven't seen that, and I don't think we're going to. Wall Street is a very short-term, you know, short-sighted kind of culture. And if there's free money for the taking, people are going to invest it in asset markets and continue to blow this bubble bigger and bigger.
And I think that we have to look— so, you know, what I'm trying to ask as many of our guests as I can is, I've thought of one clear trigger, which is if we had runaway inflation. Let's assume that that's still a ways off. What are the other triggers that would tie the central bankers' hands so they couldn't continue this charade? Because Because when something happens to take away their printing press, look out below. It's going to be an ugly picture.
Postgame: Greenspan, negative rates and cash hoarding
Aaron Chan: Right, Erik. And I don't know if you've seen that chart, but you can— the deflation and then followed by the hyperinflation that you talked about in Weimar Germany, there's actually a really nice chart of that that shows how the inflation goes down, or you have disinflation, then massive inflation afterwards. So it seems like one of those things that happens slowly and then all at once, just like bankruptcy. But interesting you bring up the Greenspan interview on Bloomberg. We were talking about this last And Greenspan actually talks about the introduction, or the possible introduction, of negative interest rates in the United States and what that would lead to in terms of a run on the fractional reserve system here in the United States and people packing currency into their vaults. But there being a limited amount of currency for this to happen. So would you want to expand on that a little bit, Erik?
Erik Townsend: You know, I felt so validated to hear Alan Greenspan saying these things. You know, I've been talking on this program for a long time about my view which is that as we get to negative interest rates, there's a huge systemic risk which central bankers are not taking seriously enough. And that is that by having negative interest rates, you create a financial incentive for people to hoard cash instead of keeping it in the bank. And if people are hoarding cash and putting it in safe deposit boxes, that means that the fractional reserve banking system could potentially be at risk of Of failure, because all of a sudden, if people are taking all this cash out to put it in a safe deposit box, the banks are under-reserved, and they don't have the ability to service their other accounts, and you get a huge systemic risk.
Now, admittedly, for that to happen, you'd have to have a whole lot of cash hoarding, because, you know, you'd have to draw out all of the reserves from the fractional reserve banking system. Something I hadn't given enough thought to, and I can't believe, It's an ex-Federal Reserve chairman who woke me up to this risk, as I thought, you know, this is about the size of the reserves that banks need to hold. How much cash hoarding would it take before you actually had a risk systemic level to the whole fractional reserve system falling apart? And it's a lot of cash hoarding. What Alan Greenspan himself pointed out in this Bloomberg interview is even though the money supply Which is trillions of dollars, is not going to get used up.
There's only so much physical banknotes, actual cash dollar bills in circulation. And if people start to hoard cash, what you'll have is a run and a shortage of physical currency. It's not a question— I think the way I would describe this, I was thinking about something that would have to happen further on before my scenario even begins to play out. You get to where there is a shortage of physical banknotes just because people are hoarding them and putting in safe deposit boxes. Now, that's what Alan Greenspan said in this interview, and I thought it was tremendously validating because I couldn't believe a Federal Reserve chairman would confirm my views on this particular subject.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: But it got me to thinking, Aaron. I thought, wait a minute, there's a whole angle here. You think about George Soros and reflexivity. What happens if what Alan Greenspan said starts to play out, which is you start to have a shortage on physical banknotes.
So, there's plenty of money supply in the banking system, but there's not enough actual pieces of paper for people to put in their vaults in order to hoard cash as they're taking it out of the bank. Well, you know what governments very much want to do, which is to outlaw cash. And they would like us to believe it has something to do with terrorism. I think that's nonsense. I think it has to do with governments having more control, people having less privacy, And being able to tax people and control their finances and not allow people the economic freedom that they used to have. Well, let's suppose that Alan Greenspan's scenario plays out and there's not enough banknotes. Well, you might say, well, that's not a big deal because they could easily just print up a bunch more physical banknotes in order to replace some of the electronic money supply that exists in the banking system.
Well, why would the government do that if they don't like people having cash? They would like to ban cash, but it's very hard to do because it presents all kinds of constitutional legal challenges and so forth. Well, it occurred to me, you know, the gold bugs like to talk about the decoupling of the price of physical gold from paper gold. What if there was actually a decoupling of the price of physical cash from cash in your bank account? So, what if all of a sudden the bank said, Look, there's a shortage on physical banknotes. We can't get enough of them because they're being hoarded. The government, of course, would tell people it's terrorists that are hoarding this. It's all a result of terrorists. We can't print more banknotes because we don't want to help the terrorists. So the new policy is, if you want to take $20 out of your bank account by writing me a check for $20 and I deposit it into my bank account, that's fine.
But if you want to take a $20 bill out of the ATM, They're gonna charge you $21. There's a 5% surcharge for taking physical cash out of the system. Now, you haven't legally banned it. You've just put a cost premium on it.
That means you don't have to deal with the constitutional challenges and all that stuff. I hope I'm not giving anybody in the government ideas here with this interview. But I realized it would be very much in the government's interest, if you believe their agenda is what I think it is, to allow a premium in the cost of physical paper cash to develop over the cost of money in the banking system, because it just creates a disincentive for people to hold physical cash. And I can't believe it's Alan Greenspan who prompted me to come to this theory.
Postgame: negative rates and the thrift question
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, the question that pops up in my mind, and I understand what you're saying about the premium over cash, but in the situation where people are actually hoarding cash and putting in their vaults, or I guess for many people putting it under their mattress, It probably belies some sort of mistrust in the system. So, how do you keep things going after that? I mean, is it some kind of digital currency? How do you get people to trade and to participate in commerce again when there is this giant, as you say, premium on cash?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that it's a question of when we get to negative interest rates. What happens is when you have negative interest rates that are significant enough that large financial actors Depositors can say, hey, we've got, you know, $1 billion in the bank. It makes much more sense to have $1 billion in cash and put it in our own vault so that we don't have to pay a privilege in a negative interest rate for having it. The vaulting is cheaper. Well, you've got to pay for the vaulting, you've got to pay for the security guard. So, it has to be not just, you know, a 3 basis points negative interest rate. It's got to be a significant negative interest rate. But if we got to the point where deposits in banks cost you 1%, somebody with a whole lot of money would say it's better to take cash.
As a few people with a lot of money take it out and you have that draw on the system, the government could easily print more physical banknotes, but my contention is they might not want to. And I think that it is very much, if you listen to a lot of politicians, we've gone from a society where it was the job of government to teach people social responsibility and financial maturity. You should have savings and investment, and you should protect yourself by saving some money for a rainy day. We've actually gotten to the point where the government is trying to prop up the economy by encouraging spending, including encouraging people to spend beyond their means on borrowed money in many cases.
So it's actually being viewed as, as socially irresponsible to have savings, because if you're a rich guy, You owe it to the rest of society to spend that money. And there have even been proposals from some politicians saying, you know, what we should be doing is creating some kind of debit card system where you have to put your money in this card that has an expiration date, kind of like airline frequent flyer miles. If you don't use them by a certain date, then they're going to expire.
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And so they're encouraging irresponsible economic behavior from citizens, and there are people in charge of the government think that's a good idea. So as long as those people are in charge, I think we're going to see this continued pressure that anybody who has savings ought to be spending it to support the economy. And things like negative interest rates, which create a disincentive from saving and encourage consumption, are going to be favored by government.
So I think it's a pretty nasty picture. And what it really comes back to is the viewpoint of government has gotten pretty crazy. You know, when I was a kid, you went to the bank, you talked to a politician, whatever, they would say, young man, you need to learn responsibility. You should have a piggy bank. You should learn to save for a rainy day. You know, people who went through the Great Depression learned a big lesson about debt, and there was a whole generation that wouldn't touch debt after that. We've forgotten those lessons, and we're going completely in the other direction. And I think we are headed towards negative interest rates. We've already got them in a lot of places. in the world. I don't see any reason why we can't get there in the United States unless the runaway inflation happens. Then you have to see some monetary policy tightening. But, you know, when we had 4% 10-year Treasury yields, everybody thought it was crazy and they couldn't possibly go lower.
Now, you know, we're below 2%, and I think we're headed below 1%.
Postgame: gold versus real assets
Aaron Chan: Yeah, it seems— it may seem a little extreme, but I can almost imagine this dystopian future where Where you have these Uncle Sam posters saying, I want you to spend, right? And it's really crazy because when you think about capitalism, what does capitalism require? Capitalism requires capital. And how do you get capital? You get capital through savings. But you can't be saving if there's negative interest rates. So it's like a Looney Tunes universe to me. But Erik, you mentioned the gold bugs earlier, and I know that a lot of our listeners are interested in gold. I mean, where do you see gold in this context or in this situation?
Erik Townsend: Yeah. Well, I definitely think that gold will be a benefactor for sure. When, when this stuff starts to happen, as you get to negative interest rates, one of the obvious ways to protect yourself from negative interest rates is going to be to buy precious metals, because it's accomplishing something similar to the idea of hoarding cash in a bank account, but you're putting it in a store of value that even if the currency itself were to lose value, Which, if we get to massive inflation, it will. And I think that that big inflation is coming someday. I don't know how far off it is. The hedge against that massive inflation is precious metals. The thing you've got to realize is that precious metals, in terms of their capacity to absorb massive capital flows, can only happen with a huge change in price.
And of course, the gold bug community loves to predict that massive change in price with so much savings coming out of the fiat money system going into gold, it would result in a dramatically massive increase in price. Well, that's true, but as that starts to happen, people realize, you know, it's already— the price has already moved too much. It's no longer a bargain to be buying gold when it's $5,000 an ounce, or who knows what it will get to someday. I think also that the mistake that a lot of gold bugs make is they assume— they hear these predictions, and they are credible predictions.
People who are saying that we will eventually get to $5,000 to $10,000 per ounce gold prices, I think that's absolutely realistic. I think it's going to happen. It's going to happen in our lifetimes, for sure. But the thing is, that doesn't mean you're going to get rich because you bought at $1,000 and the price goes to $5,000 and now you have 5 times as much purchasing power. What's going to happen is you're going to have the same amount of purchasing power. You're not going to lose purchasing power because the value of the currency went down like the people around you did, but you're going to preserve your purchasing power. It's not a get-rich asset. It's a stay-rich asset to preserve your wealth in the face of a currency depreciation. We don't have that in the United States right now. We have appreciation of the US dollar.
I think that's set to continue for a while. Eventually, we'll get into a dramatic depreciation.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: Gold will be a fantastic hedge, but it's not a get-rich asset. It's a stay-rich asset.
Aaron Chan: Yeah. And one of the things that I remember most from your interview with Raoul Pal from Real Vision is that we have to try and understand these assets on a relative basis. So gold relative to everything else. And when basically gold has a positive carry relative to Treasuries or, say, Bunds, it's really fascinating to think about where that might be headed in the future. And Erik, I guess the smart people will get into precious metals, but the even smarter people will be converting their precious metals and the gains that they're getting on precious metals into real assets, be it like agricultural land or real estate or means of production. Wouldn't you say so?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I mean, the trade-off you have to understand here— first of all, real assets are going to be the place to be when we eventually get to the big inflation. We're not there yet. Where you're going to want to be when the inflation happens is in real assets, but the trade-off is precious metals are are the ultimate preservation of purchasing power, but they are not productive. They don't make anything. Something like a farm that is producing agricultural products that are essential to feed the people around you, that is actually producing wealth. Now, it has the downside that unlike precious metals, you're potentially exposed to the monetary system and the economy, and you know, you, you could lose a lot of value if some big depression happens, whereas you might be hedged against that in precious metals. But the precious metals are not going to create new wealth. They're only going to preserve purchasing power. So it's just a matter of understanding the difference between productive assets versus hedging assets.
And I think it's a question that a lot of people haven't given enough thought to.
Postgame: fall guest wish list
Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, I don't know too much about gold's nutritional content, but I think you're right there. So I think that's all the time we have for this week. Erik, is there anything you'd like to add before we close?
Erik Townsend: Well, folks, what if I were to tell you that Aaron is working on a fantastic fall lineup of rockstar guests featuring Mark Hart, Sam Zell, David Hay, Neil Howe, Martin Armstrong, Russell Napier, Jeff Gundlach, Felix Zulauf, Nouriel Roubini, Art Cashin, David Rosenberg, Stephanie Pomboy, Dylan Grice, and yes, even our most requested guest, Kyle Bass. Are you as excited as we are about that lineup? Well, don't get too excited yet because actually those are the names of people on our wish list who are currently ignoring our interview invitations as much as Aaron is trying. And it's understandable why, you know, these are super famous, super busy people, and there are dozens of financial podcasts now. A few years ago there was only 2 or 3.
And unless they've heard of us or someone has put a good word in for us, their handlers are going to just ignore our emails, which is what's been happening.
So folks, we're not asking for your money, but we really do need your help. If there are people in our audience who either know these people personally or know someone who knows them or know how to get a message in their ear, please put in a good word for us, particularly if you are a client or investor in one of their funds or something like that. We just had one of our regular listeners who is a client of Gary Shilling hook us up with Gary. And of course, if that introduction comes from a client, it gets a very different reception than a cold call. So we're very excited to have Gary coming up later in August. And we really could use your help, folks. Those of you who are in the business and are on the Bloomberg platform, you know that a Bloomberg message carries more weight than a regular email with a lot of people in the finance business.
Right. So if you can help us persuade these folks that MacroVoices really is worth their time, we'll be able to bring you that fantastic lineup. Couple of selling points that might be helpful if you're putting a word in for us: we are one of the very few podcasts on the net that is fully professionally produced. We have an audio engineer in a studio, professional recording studio, that produces talk radio essentially, that does all of our production and editing. It's not just a Skype call that's been tape recorded and played back. back on a podcast someplace.
We are hosted by an active macro hedge fund manager, yours truly. A little bit different from most of the programs on the internet. And this next one is particularly important if you are talking to hedge fund managers, some of the people we most want to get on the program.
We now estimate that we have in excess of 2,000 accredited investors who are regular listeners to the program. In the interest of full disclosure, I should tell you that where that number comes from is we actually have just over 500 of you who have registered at MacroVoices.com and told us that you are accredited investors. But we also have about a 4 or 5 to 1 registration ratio. If we look at our download statistics versus our total registration statistics, only 1 in 4 regular listeners has so far registered at MacroVoices.com. So if you extrapolate from that, we think there's about 2,000 accredited investors listening to the program.
And of course, that's so important to a fund manager. Because those are the people that are eligible to invest in their fund, potential customers. So I'm going to read the list one more time: Mark Hart, Sam Zell, David Hay, Neil Howe, Martin Armstrong, Russell Napier, Jeff Gundlach, Felix Zulauf, Nouriel Roubini, Art Cashin David Rosenberg, Stephanie Pomboy, Dylan Grice, and of course, Kyle Bass. We would love to get any or all of these people into our fall lineup on the program. They need only to email Aaron, that's aaron@macrovoices.com, to book their interviews in October and November. I think we're already booked through the end of September.
Aaron Chan: Actually, Erik, I just heard back from Russell Napier yesterday afternoon, and he sounded sincerely interested in appearing on the show at some point, but said that he was busy right now and asked me to get back to him in a couple of months.
Erik Townsend: Dude, that's fantastic news. Russell Napier is one of my all-time favorite financial commentators, so I really hope We hope that you can close that deal. Still, listeners, if you know Russell, please feel free to still put in a good word for us. It sounds like he's not quite committed yet, but he's interested. And as far as everyone else is concerned, if you know the other people on the list, please help us persuade them that MacroVoices is worth their time.
Postgame: register at MacroVoices.com; Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: The other thing you can do to help us is please register your free account at MacroVoices.com, especially you accredited investors. The more people we have registered, it's a statistic that we can give to guests and say, Look, we've got this many people listening, we've got this many accredited investors listening. The hedge fund managers love to hear that, and that helps us get the most desirable guests recruited for the program. And of course, when you register, you get the benefit of receiving our free Research Roundup email every week, which gives you all kinds of interesting information about supplemental materials from our featured guest— charts, graphs, so forth— as well as all of the coolest free research that we could find on the internet every If you don't want it for some reason, it's no problem. There's a safe unsubscribe link. You only have to click it once and you won't get it ever again. But we found that everybody that's been getting it so far, we have an incredibly small number of opt-outs from the Research Roundup and everybody seems to be really enjoying it.
So, Aaron, why don't we tell everybody what's in this week's Research Roundup?
Aaron Chan: Yeah. So we've linked the Greenspan Bloomberg interview that Erik and I were just talking about. And we've got commentary on the latest Q2 US GDP print from 720 Global. And Gavekal Capital, as well as Art Berman's latest thoughts on oil. Finally, and I'm sure many of our listeners will be familiar with Jason Zweig, notes that the search for yield is now becoming reckless. And from our listeners, many of you may also be familiar with Michael Medici, who is a regular contributor in the listener forums, as well as one of our biggest proponents on Twitter. He's got an interesting article about what it means to be the guy on the other side of the trade. So expect that and a lot more in this week's Research Roundup.
Outro and disclaimer
Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for this week's edition. Our goal is to bring you the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics, and our subscribers play a massive role in helping us recruit such guests. As Erik mentioned, we're working diligently on an all-star lineup, and we continue to seek your help. Be it a retweet or follow on Twitter, or simply sharing the podcast and forwarding the Research Roundup newsletter, every bit helps us grow our community and to reach industry rock stars like Kyle Bass, Jeffrey Gundlach, Mark Hart, Stephanie Pomboy, and Martin Armstrong, just to name a few.
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.
Aaron Chan: Finally, we have a lot of smart people in our pro finance community, and a lot of you also do your own writing and analysis. If you'd like your article to be featured in an upcoming edition of the Research Roundup, feel free to shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter.
You can follow Erik @ErikSTownsend or myself @_AaronChan_ for the latest news on MacroVoices or general market commentary. Also, don't forget to follow our main account @MacroVoices. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.MacroVoices.com. Once registered, You'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.
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And we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants. And do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, Visit MacroVoices.com.
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