Paul Brodsky — Macro Allocation Incorporated (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. MacroVoices episode 26 was recorded on August 11th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. We'll be discussing why Paul believes that the global financial system needs a reset, the staggering mountain of debt around the world, an in-depth discussion of Treasury yields, and much more. We're also going to experiment with a format change this week, adding a discussion between Aaron and me about a listener-requested topic after the guest interview.

Equities: record highs and melt-up risk

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P 500, with E-mini S&P futures trading just north of 2,185 at one point just before Thursday's close. Erik, has anything changed in your view on equities?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's basically the same. You know, the chorus of bearish voices is growing. Goldman had a note out this week. I saw an analysis saying that Carl Icahn is still 150% Net short the S&P. And of course, the big boys like Carl don't disclose their positions publicly. People analyze their public filings to try to deduce what their holdings are. As of his latest public filings, it looks like Carl is still super short.

You know, as much as I don't dare to go short, because as I've described in previous shows, I think that there is a real risk of a melt-up here as a result of flight capital and U.S. dollar appreciation, I wouldn't really want to be long either. So I hope, as I've described this melt-up, that it's not been perceived by anyone as my recommending new long positions. To the contrary, I would suggest anyone who's fully invested and has been for a while might consider taking some profits here because there's some really, really smart people that are joining the chorus of bears that are saying that this market is seriously overbought and due for a major downside correction. The one caveat I would add to that, though, is a lot of the people saying these things

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And a lot of these guys are absolute rock stars of the industry, but they're old-school rock stars. Stan Druckenmiller himself said in an interview not too long ago that the reason he shut down Duquesne Capital and turned it into a family office just running his own money is because his skills at producing outsized returns worked in the old normal where economic fundamentals were the primary determinant of asset prices.

And in this new normal where it's all about central bank policy, you know, a lot of these guys' skills don't work anymore. I wonder if there's a possibility that even these super-smart people will be proven wrong, and boy, if that starts to happen, there is a lot of short exposure here. That means there's risk of a big short squeeze developing. So I see more and more reasons that I think the bears are right in terms of economic fundamentals, but I think that we could see a surprise in the opposite direction. If there is a trade here, I'd say it would probably be a straddle, thinking it's not going to stay where it is. The problem with the straddle is that the cost of the VIX is super cheap in the short term, but Once you start to get to longer-dated options, all of a sudden, that volatility costs through the nose. So unless you have a reason to think something's going to happen real suddenly, it's hard to justify that trade.

So I'm still on the sidelines as far as equities are concerned.

Crude oil: inventories, OPEC jawboning and spreads

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, that sounds consistent with your melt-up, crack-up, boom hypothesis. Well, last week you said crude would continue to bounce on last week's inventory numbers, but you predicted the exuberance probably wouldn't last beyond this week's inventory report. Well, looks like you got the call right on, and we saw WTI trade as high as $43.50 on Tuesday before inventory came out. But after Wednesday's inventory report, crude oil took a nosedive, trading as low as $41.10 Wednesday afternoon. But then on Thursday morning, WTI prices shot right back up to even higher than they were before the inventory data came out, trading as high as $43.86 on Thursday.

Erik, what the heck is going on with oil prices, and what's your outlook for crude from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I guess to correct you a little bit, I did get it exactly right in the sense that I thought that I was expecting once the data came out, the inventory data, that it would be over. And sure enough, after the data came out, prices went straight down. I didn't expect them to go straight back up again. So I got that part of the call wrong. And I guess maybe what we need is another week of reality here. And to answer your question as to what's going on, you can divide what drives the oil market into 2 categories of things. The first I'll call reality. And that, of course, is the hard data that we get on inventory. And we've got some very bearish numbers, which I'll get into in just a minute.

But the other side of And the other part of this, which tends to drive a lot of this market, is propaganda. And oh boy, the OPEC jawboning, it's exactly what got us up to $43.50 the first time around. The inventory report introduced a little bit of reality into the market that got us down to $41.10. And we're back up to— what was the high today? $43.86. I think that was entirely based on this jawboning about supposed production freezes and so forth. And I think this is nonsense. I think that it doesn't have anything to do with reality. But, you know, I made that call this spring and I said this Doha production freeze thing is nonsense. There's not going to be any production freeze. I suppose you could say that I got that call right in the sense that there was no production freeze. But oh boy, it didn't stop the price of oil from doubling in the meanwhile on propaganda. And I think that's what's been affecting this market.

As far as inventory is concerned, expectations were for a 2 million barrel drawdown here in the middle of summer driving season against national crude oil inventories. Instead, Instead, we got a 1 million barrel build on inventory. So that is definitely a very bearish sign. We would normally expect, as we get into the shoulder months after summer driving season is over, to start seeing builds in crude oil inventories. Seems like those builds are happening sooner than expected, and I predict that they're going to happen bigger than expected as we get further into the shoulder season here. We also had a 1.2 million barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventories, and again, Cushing, Oklahoma is critical because that's where the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract is settled.

Gasoline, on the other hand, 2.8 million barrel drawdown, and likewise a 2 million barrel drawdown in distillates. Well, a lot of people saw that as very bullish initially. I don't really think so. You know, the fact that in August you're seeing big drawdowns in finished products because people are driving doesn't really surprise me. I think that the fact that we're seeing crude oil building in inventory a little earlier than it normally would, with significant increases in the last 5 weeks in relative inventory. I think that's the bigger story. U.S. production was off slightly. That may have something to do with it. Also, Oman said that they would not attend the OPEC meeting. I think that that probably had as much as the inventory did to do with Wednesday afternoon's sell-off.

The thing that I've been watching very, very carefully, though, is the time spreads, and that is, again, the difference in price from one delivery month to the next. My curve steepener trade was performing beautifully until last week's inventory numbers. Then those spreads started to contract a little bit. Well, as soon as Wednesday's inventory data came out, the spreads started expanding again, which is exactly what I would expect. It confirms in my mind that the reason that the spreads have been expanding is because of fears of a storage crisis as we get further into the fall. Now, on Thursday, when we had this big run-up in front-month oil prices, we didn't see the contraction. We went to a higher price on Thursday afternoon than we had seen on Wednesday, but we didn't see anything close to the narrowing of spreads. What that says to me, I tend to feel that the spread traders or the professional oil traders, where a lot of the speculators, the directional traders on the front-month futures contract, are just hot money hedge funds that perhaps are not as well educated on energy markets.

It seems to me like the smarter money is concerned about a storage crisis. So it all portends an outlook to me for lower prices. I think we're headed at least down to $35 or so. Does it go lower than that? Maybe even a test of $25, you know, below the previous lows of $26 that we saw this spring? I don't know. That's going to depend on the inventory numbers that we see over the next few weeks. The Saudis are pedaling as fast as they can. They just announced another all-time record high. They are clearly producing as fast as they can, but still jawboning, oh well, there might be a meeting that might include some discussion that might involve stabilizing prices. And that's causing, I think, a lot of panic buying on Thursday. I don't think it's going to last, but frankly, I didn't think it was going to last past this week's inventory numbers.

Maybe we need another week of bearish inventory numbers before it takes hold, but I think we're going to see lower prices here before this is over.

Gold: consolidation range and Joshua Hall's article

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, definitely seems like they're loosening up their jaw muscles. So pivoting to gold, there's going to be plenty of discussion on that in the interview, but we've been watching a technical consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377, as we said last week. And it looks like we're still stuck in this range, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're still stuck in that range, 1,342 as we're speaking late session on Thursday afternoon. And, you know, I think as far as the short term is concerned, we're in that consolidation range. We've covered that in past shows. I don't think that we need to elaborate any further on that. We've got to wait and see which way we break out of that range. As far as the bigger picture, longer term, though, I read an excellent article this week by one of our regular listeners, Joshua Hall, who is an independent financial advisor. Joshua's basically taken a look at supply and demand fundamentals in gold. He points out that really only about 31% of demand for gold is coming from investment at this point. And basically, to summarize his contentions, he's saying, you know, between Brexit and, you know, negative interest rate fears and so forth, there's been this run-up in gold, but he doesn't think that the supply-demand fundamentals are supporting it going much further.

He thinks that there's a good chance of it rolling over to the downside. And that's very, very much in line. You know, he's done more research than I have on the supply and demand fundamentals. But Joshua's views and my views are remarkably similar. And I agree with him that I think there's room for gold to trade lower here before this is over. I don't know whether there's a lower low than the $1,050 or so that we saw at the end of last year, but I do think it's still possible, especially if the Fed continues on their rate hike agenda that they've been talking about.

One caveat to that, though, is that Joshua and I share the same macro outlook. He's very careful in his article to disclose that he's dollar bullish and believes that we're going to have a deflationary backdrop for the short-term future. And that's very much my view as well. If Joshua and I are proven wrong on those things, we'll be proven wrong on gold, too. So, you've got to think about what you think about the U.S. dollar and what you think about inflation versus deflation. But if you share our views, then I think there's room for maybe that I would expect that trading range to resolve lower, below 1308. A closing print below 1308 would be the indication that maybe the sell-off is on.

10-year Treasury yields and the dollar index

Aaron Chan: 10-year Treasury yields traded in the high 150s early in the week, traded back down to 150 on Wednesday, and they're now back to 156. Erik, what a roller coaster ride. So any update on your views for the Treasury?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's definitely been a roller coaster this week. As far as my view, it hasn't changed very much. I think that we are in, you know, a bounce process, and it remains to be seen Whether it's a dead cat bounce or not. Above 1.70 would tell me that maybe my view needs to be changed. But right now, I'm expecting that we are headed towards lower yields. I expect eventually to get to a 1% yield on the 10-year. How long that takes, does it happen this year? I don't know. But 1.35, which was the previous low, it would be the low end of the range. 1.70 would be the high end of the range. And a breakout in either direction would tell me that it's likely to continue in that direction.

We're going to get into much more detail with Paul Brodsky in terms of Treasury yields in today's feature interview.

Aaron Chan: Right. And the dollar index looks to be rolling over again, trading on a 95 handle. Any update on your dollar outlook?

Erik Townsend: 95.87 as we're speaking. And no, you know, we're kind of consolidating along here. I don't really have a strong view in the short term as what's going to happen. I continue to think that the most likely resolution of this consolidation is going to be to the upside, but I'm waiting for a decisive breakout above 97 to really confirm in my mind that that's on. So, for now, we're kind of in a holding pattern.

Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update, Erik. This week's special guest is Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated. Erik's interview with Mr. Brodsky is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Paul Brodsky: global debt mountain and the need for a reset

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated. Paul, thanks so much for joining me on the program. You've recently kind of been in the press a bit. ZeroHedge had picked up on an article and an interview that you did for Epoch recently. We've got a link to that included in our Research Roundup email this week for our registered users. One of the things that you said that seems to have gotten a lot of attention is that there is a global mountain of debt forming, and you think the global financial system is going to need a reset.

What do you What do you mean by that? What reset are we talking about?

Paul Brodsky: Well, first, Erik, thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to speak to you and, uh, and your listeners. The mountain of debt is not a new— is not a new thing. I think your listeners probably are very well aware of that. Where I come down on this whole thing is with the insurmountable leverage that has been built not only within Treasury ministry debt, sovereign debt, but as well as private sector debt, household debt, corporate debt. And it's not the debt per se that I define leverage with. I won't get too into the weeds with this, but it's the actual amount of money that's available to service and repay it. That's where I see the ultimate problem arising from. Money, and very quickly, I'm referring to base money, which simply is cash in circulation plus

Erik Townsend: Yes.

Paul Brodsky: Bank reserves that are held at central banks.

And if you were to take the big numbers, you come away, depending on how you look at it, with there is much, much more credit and broad money aggregates than there is base money. So eventually, that has to start eating into the production of goods and services and the incentives that producers have to work for that money. Because they have to service more and more debt. And so I think that's one of the reasons we've seen interest rates drop dramatically and even go negative in parts of the world, in Europe and Asia.

And it seems to be biting, taking a pretty significant bite out of global output, i.e., GDP. So that's, that's kind of where I, uh, I'm starting this from, looking at money outward into what that means for global credit growth and demand growth and good and service growth and economic activity, and then bringing it back and figuring out— trying to figure out what it means for the future of global growth and obviously of asset prices.

Long Treasuries, exit signals, TIPS and Europe

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to tie this in, though, to the trends that we're seeing, because obviously what you've just described is kind of a longer-term, big-picture view. In the shorter term, I know you've recently expressed a bullish view on long-dated U.S. Treasuries. You were kind enough to send us a sample of one of your investor newsletters. And I know you're bullish on long-dated Treasuries, and I agree with you very much. I think yields are headed lower. But in the grand scheme of things, you know, consider this in context. You're talking about loaning money to what I think, by your own description, is an arguably insolvent borrower, because you think somebody is going to buy that loan for you later on when yields are even lower than they are.

Paul Brodsky: Right.

Erik Townsend: Even though in real terms, it's probably impossible for this borrower to ever repay that loan. What kind of crazy world are we living in where— I think you and I both agree, by the way, on that trade. I think from a tactical standpoint, it's very likely that yields are headed lower and there's capital appreciation opportunity in long-dated Treasuries. But holy cow, what does it come to that we both think it's a good idea to loan money on an unsecured basis to an arguably insolvent borrower for 20 years at 1.5% interest?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: I mean, this is just crazy.

Paul Brodsky: Well, I wouldn't— I do think we're on the same page. You mentioned tactically, and I think that's what we have to keep in mind. I don't think we have to get too cute at this point and saying, well, we're— you and I are going to be able to time this thing better than everyone else. I think there is going to be enough time to, in my view, generate a good amount of capital appreciation from long-duration Treasuries.

What goes into that is a strong dollar. Secularly, over time, I think the dollar at least will be stable, certainly in an environment where output growth is contracting and where we may see contraction itself, certainly in real terms. As you brought up, I think the remedy to that is central bank money printing, or you alluded to the— and that certainly takes away the real purchasing power of currencies. I think the Fed will have less of that to do than other central banks, and so I think the dollar will be on a relative basis strong.

We have to be out of our minds if we think that That it's a good deal to get 1.5% or 2.3% on long bonds over 10 or 30 years, and if we're buying these assets for their coupons and annual income. That is not the trade as far as I see it. I see a period of 6 months, a year, 2 years, maybe 3 years or 4 years even. Where their prices are going to appreciate markedly.

Also involved in that trade is the fact that there are all sorts of buyers in the market for sovereign debt. They're not all rational actors when it comes to the— when it comes to income. For example, there are central banks that need to buy sovereign debt around the world. There are banks that don't get capital charges if they own Treasuries, and all they care about is spread between their funding levels and whatever else they go buy— they go out and buy on the other side so they can collect 1.5% to 2.3% pretty much and lever that that up all they want.

And then again, you have, uh, all sorts of hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds out there that could put on an arbitrage where they would short, let's say, German Bunds, 10-year Bunds, and buy U.S. 10-year notes and take out the spread and leverage that up. So all trades are not the same to For the investor that just looks to buy bonds and collect a coupon, yes, it's absolutely an irrational trade. But I think given interest rate differentials around the world, there, there could be a ways to go for sovereign yields, for Treasury yields to drop.

Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more with everything you just said. And I would even add to that that if things get worse in Europe, if there's an exit contagion, that just adds to the flight capital coming into U.S. Treasuries. So I think it definitely supports the I appreciate the arguments you've made in favor of this tactical trade, but it begs the question, how do you know when it's time to get out? What would you be looking for? What would tell you that it's time to close that long position or even consider a short position?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think one of the things to look for would be a significant narrowing, narrowing of the spread between sovereign interest rates on sovereign debt. So the interest rate differential snugging up, and who knows what the number is. That. But hopefully, we'll know it when we see it. And one of the ways that I'm comfortable operating in the markets is scaling in and scaling out.

And one of the things, for example, that I did in my— in our model portfolios, our tactical model portfolios for MAI, was to take a very significant position down by a So I think we had 20% allocated to the long Treasury position, and we took it down 15% at the end of last quarter. And as we backed up a little bit, meaning higher yields, we're looking maybe to put that back on again.

Or if we, you know, drop down dramatically, we may take some off again. So, and maybe then— and what we did on the other side of that was we took a bit higher position And TIPS and Treasury inflation-protected bonds.

So we're kind of transitioning as yields drop to put on the trade where we benefit once the reversal happens that we see coming. But there's no way to time that, as you know, Erik, and all we can do is try our best to scale in and scale out.

Erik Townsend: Now, I think that you've also expressed a view that Europe is probably closer to the endgame of of this whole debt situation than the United States is. Does that create an opportunity for either a hedge or pairs trade that would be, say, long US Treasuries and short European Treasuries?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I have an admission to make. I have, I have, after great study and after having been at this a long time, I'm having a very difficult time with Europe, understanding how it may play out. And in large part, that's due to the currency issues that they have, that being, you know, they, they obviously have a common currency, but they don't have common fiscal measures. And I think that brings into play, and just in a very broad sense again, it brings into play the potential at any time for the euro to begin to fray. And I think Brexit was a shot across the bow for that, even though they're not in the euro.

I think it shows that at the first sign of trouble or weakness, you might see countries figuring out that are a part of the euro figuring out that they might be able to get out. Because I don't have a great sense of the currency undermining the entire debt structure across Europe, I'm a bit hesitant to take a stab, even a tactical stab, if I see something out of place.

We do that, but I have an issue there. So I'm just not playing. It's not as though I'm— I am not short the euro per se, but unless something just stands out as being overly, way too out of line, not Not to take, not to take a stab at it. I don't see the need to be involved in Europe right now.

How money printing ends; debt versus base money

Erik Townsend: Something that you've written quite extensively on and spoken quite a bit about in recent interviews is the trend that we've been in for several years now of essentially the central bank money printing is going into supporting the financial economy as opposed to the real economy. And, you know, some people have said that's immoral and shouldn't be and so forth. But it keeps on going. So my question, and something I've been puzzling on quite a bit lately, is how does this eventually end? And I don't think it does end until something ties the central bankers' hands and they're not able to just keep printing money with reckless abandon anymore. Runaway inflation would tie their hands, but we have no sign of that at this point. What other factors might tie their hands, or how would you see this trend of money printing supporting the financial and not the real economy?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think what we have now is, is kind of a water torture effect where the longer that the financialization of our economy plays out, the greater the wealth and income gaps are becoming, the more it is eating away at production and at middle-income earners. Class wealth production. And it's happening slowly, in my view.

And that is already occurring. So the first thing I would say is that natural economics may serve to provide the impetus behind the final, you know, push towards some type of reconciliation.

I couldn't tell you what the catalyst would be if that If that were the case. But it's certainly a dynamic that we're all witnessing happening right now. You see a lot of political economists pointing fingers at each other saying, well, this is the reason why, and this is the solution to it. We have to raise the minimum wage, or we have to do something else, and that would jumpstart the economy. And I think everyone knows that they're really— that none of these things are solutions at all.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Just putting Band-Aids on a bigger problem, which, as I mentioned up front, is the leverage that is starting to eat at production.

So it could happen organically like that. Or I think more of a flashpoint might be if banks, the banking system starts to have difficulty with profitability.

I think one of the main reasons why the Fed in the United States is desperate to raise rates isn't necessarily because they feel they're going to surpass their 2% inflation target, but because they want to see banks be able to remain profitable in a low and zero interest rate environment.

And so that is a real issue, I think, that could get in the way of and force the hand of policymakers To take action and let the markets get to what they think are fair value or more fair value, take a laissez-faire approach if you will.

That in turn would catalyze some action. I think what you have to have is some type of crystallization of public opinion around having someone fix the problem that I spoke about being this organic move away from production. And that would probably take some type of market event, I feel. So, you know, if, if policymakers backed away from the markets, from supporting the markets— and we know they do, that's nothing conspiratorial, they— we know they do that in the foreign exchange markets. We know they do that in the sovereign debt markets.

And in Japan, they're doing that in equities. So, if they back away from this quantitative and qualitative easing and let the markets find right pricing, I think it would be lower. And in that case, I think you'd find once stock markets decline and maybe real estate markets decline, then it would put It would create public pressure for someone to come in and save the day. And that, of course, has always been the role of policymakers and government.

Erik Townsend: One of the things that's fascinated me is the number of so-called experts that you'll see on the cable channels talking about the deleveraging which has occurred in the economy since 2008. And I just— I wonder what chart these guys are looking at, because I was just looking the other day at a total U.S. debt chart showing both corporate and sovereign debt in aggregate.

And we've got almost $10 trillion more debt in the United States than we did in 2008. So, you know, there was a very, very brief deleveraging into 2009, and we've just piled on more debt. I think, though, in some of your recent writings, you've actually opined that the relationship of debt to base money is more important than the total amount of debt. Can you elaborate on that view?

Tell me if I've gotten it correctly, but elaborate on what you're talking about?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah. Yeah, um, that kind of goes to, to what we started with up front with the leverage. I think the, the way— when you— if you look at purely pure accounting identities, uh, leverage is credit and/or bank assets over base money. Base money, as I said before, is, uh, is cash, currency in circulation, and bank reserves held at the Fed in the United States.

And so, if you look at the amount of credit out there, depending— in the U.S., what the Fed acknowledges is it's about $70 trillion, 7-0 trillion. Base money is about, depending on what you're looking at, but it's about, let's call it $4 trillion or so. So, credit over actual money is a big multiple.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Even if you look at M2, which is the broadest measure of money in our bank accounts and money market funds and so forth, that's about $13 trillion. So there isn't enough money with which to service and repay the debt.

Now, all the debt doesn't have to be repaid, but what comes into play here are demographics, which obviously in the United States, we're getting older, and many of us would like to retire, and we're shifting, and, and we— so we can't settle our assets with cash. In other words, we can't extinguish the debt because it's overleveraged.

And so you— we either have to make more base money with which to service and repay the debt, or some of the debt, Or we're going— the natural thing is to see something called debt deflation, which is we'll see the value of the debt go down.

And that could be workout situations, cram-downs, or just outright failure to pay and marking them down to zero. Now, that can't really happen in the country because Because one person's debt is another person's asset. That's how we work. That's how we work. So that would put great pressure on the banking system. And of course, the Fed can't have that. So to keep the banking system liquid and solvent, it would have to print the money with which debtors can service their debt so that credit Creditors will not have to mark down the value of their assets.

And that, I think, is the dynamic, how it all has to play out. And I think that goes to the whole notion that we've been discussing roundly here, which is how that impacts economies and assets.

Fed buying gold at a fixed price; why not helicopter money

Erik Townsend: I know that you also have a view that one of the ways that governments might respond to this situation, essentially If all of this debt is too big to be repaid in real terms, you have to inflate it away. And you've described a scenario where central banks might use more quantitative easing, but use the money to buy gold. Could you explain first that view, and particularly something I didn't hear in another interview recently, why do you think they would do that? I mean, I love the idea, but why do you think central bankers would consider that?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah. Well, I don't think they want to do that. I don't think it's in, it's in their big picture idea of how to proceed and how to maintain confidence in their currencies that they are responsible for. But we have to keep something in mind. There's only 2 assets on, on the books of central banks. One is reserves, and the other is liabilities.

One is the debt that they're buying through quantitative easing, and the other is gold. And that's it. And a few years back, I don't know if you remember, but Ben Bernanke was asked in front of Congress why the Fed still had gold on their balance sheet, and he said tradition.

And it had no economic merit, and he wasn't quite sure why. I'd like to take a moment to say that, well, that's not true. That was a bit disingenuous, because there's a very good reason why not only the Fed, but other central banks around the world hold gold on their balance sheets, and parenthetically, are buying a lot more around the world.

If you look at China, if you look at Russia, their official bodies, their central banks are buying a lot of gold as we speak, hand over fist. And that's because they're buying it for reserves. So, the reason is because if a currency board has to devalue its currency, it has to do it against something.

And the historic item against which currencies have been devalued has been gold. And so they keep gold on their balance sheet in the event that they have to do that. That and then fix it to an item.

And so the process by which a central bank would do it— and I think it would have to be the Fed because, uh, that's, uh, you know, US dollars is a hegemonic currency around the world, and so the Fed would have to be involved— is, for example, the Fed would say, okay, we are going to purchase or tender gold at X price an ounce, and call it $5,000, $10,000, $15,000, something high enough to attract gold sellers and high enough to be inflationary, because the purpose would be to inflate the currency, which is devalued, which is the same as devaluing the currency.

So, if they said, for example, okay, we're going to buy gold at $15,000 an ounce, we'll tender all your gold. The process of announcing that would not be inflationary, but the process of, of actually creating the money out of thin air with which to then purchase the gold at $15,000 an ounce, that would be highly inflationary. It's the same process, by the way, that quantitative easing is, which is creating the money out of thin air with which you would— you then buy debt.

But instead of debt, you would be buying gold.

What we're seeing now in Japan is they are doing something called qualitative easing, which is buying riskier— well, let's not say riskier, but credit and even equity-related instruments rather than just, you know, JGBs, rather than just Japanese bonds. So instead Instead of creating the money to buy financial assets, you would be creating the new money to buy gold and thereby devaluing your currency.

One of the things this would likely do is give dollar holders pause, because obviously their savings is being diminished in purchasing power value.

So, what might have to happen is the Fed would have to say, okay, we're buying your gold at $15,000 an ounce, and we're going to then maintain that level. That would be the fixed exchange rate, then, at which the Fed would buy or sell gold. And that, in effect, would revalue gold at— or revalue gold, but revalue US dollars at that fixed exchange rate.

The benefit that would have— there's pros and cons, obviously, to doing this. The pro, the biggest pro would be it would create more dollars with which to service and repay debt. The inflation would obviously raise wages dramatically, raise consumer goods and It would raise consumer goods and service prices dramatically. But what it would not do is raise the value of the debt. In other words, your mortgage would still be, let's say, $300,000, even though your salary, your income would go from $50,000 to, let's call it, $150,000. So it wouldn't take away the balance sheet item of the obligation, but it would—

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Decrease the burden of repaying it. And that's what inflation does.

That would be the great benefit to inflating away the purchasing power value of our currency.

Obviously, the biggest con to doing this would be it diminishes all of our savings held in dollars or dollar-denominated assets, that the purchasing power value of all of our savings, and it would really kill pensioners and people on fixed income. And so it's a solution to our leverage problem, but it does have a significant impact on the other side.

Erik Townsend: Obviously, gold bugs would love this story because anyone holding gold bullion would suddenly be able to sell it for $15,000. But I guess to me it begs the question, if the goal here is effectively to devalue the currency by forcing inflation so as to reduce the real value of all of that debt on the books. If one option is to buy gold, as you've described, which benefits a handful of people who own gold, and another option is to print up a whole bunch of money and either, you know, use it as helicopter money or use it for infrastructure spending or some other more politically popular use of the money.

How would it end up in a gold scenario as opposed to something that's maybe more politically viable? Am I missing something about the mechanism of those other types of spending not accomplishing the same thing?

Paul Brodsky: Well, a central bank really can't print money unless they do something with it. I guess, you know, they could go to their printing presses and print out a bunch of currency and drop it from helicopters, But then you wouldn't have any confidence at all in the currency itself. You'd have a Weimar situation, 1922 Germany, where people were walking around with wheelbarrows full of money.

It would be the end of the currency in short order. I think you would need to— and you would also have issues with credit. Pricing. You couldn't, you know, you'd never be able to price a good or a service if you did that. So there has to be some methodology to it. There has to be some sense of order if you are to do that.

So again, I think there's good precedent for devaluation, how to do it. One of the ways that countries, you know, if you're Venezuela or some other third world world economy, you know, they have always been able to devalue their local currencies against, uh, dollars or rands or, or whatever, or euros or whatever, whatever else is close that, that their societies can get their hands on.

If the dollar were to have a problem, there probably wouldn't be another currency because the dollar is hegemonic. So, that's when gold would have to come into play. And you really couldn't lop off a couple zeros, or pardon me, add a couple zeros to everything, because, you know, just on balance sheets and call it a day and say, okay, so the value of your pension fund, the value of your 401 or IRA is now worth $1 million.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: worth 10 times as much, for example, but your purchasing power is worth 10% of what it used to be, it really wouldn't do you much good as a society. So they've got to follow protocol and go through the channels of actually overseeing a currency.

So you really couldn't print the money and shovel it out there. the way they tried before and failed, always failed.

Gold miners, petrodollar and hyperinflation

Erik Townsend: Well, obviously the scenario you've described would very much benefit anyone holding gold bullion. But if I'm not mistaken, in some of your model portfolios, you're preferring gold mining shares over the bullion. Is that a leverage argument, or is there more to that? Why the shares instead of the bullion?

Paul Brodsky: Well, in late 2015, we took a decent-sized position in gold miners because they had been beaten up so much. And obviously, I'm predisposed to like gold. And so that was, as you say, a levered play. Since they've run up dramatically in the first half of 2016, we've actually scaled out of them.

I have a love-hate relationship with gold miners. I love their resources. I love the fact that they're sitting on holes in the ground full of an item that might be revalued higher by, who knows, 5 or 10 times. We have no idea. However, I don't like their operations. I think they've been— generally speaking, there's always exceptions.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: But I don't like— I haven't liked their operations. It's been very frustrating the way they've allocated capital to mining projects and to exploration, things like that. And so I've been using their strength so far to scale out, which is, you know, which means I may give up a bit down the road if they continue to rise. The way I think about gold miners miners is that, at least I did last year, was that it was a, on a risk-adjusted basis, a very positively skewed trade.

And I think that has become more equal now. And from here, it would take a further rise in the price of gold to see them outperform bullion. And so, So, I don't mind scaling out a little. I still own gold miners, but I'm lightening up on that position.

Erik Townsend: You mentioned earlier the hegemony of the U.S. dollar. Now, if we go back to 1971, when President Nixon took the United States effectively off of the gold conversion standard, you know, there was a lot of hype and hoopla about, oh, no, this is going to bring hyperinflation. And, of course, the hyperinflation never came. A lot of people would say the reason is that the petrodollar system saved the day, the deal that Henry Kissinger made with the Arabs to essentially reinvest their oil profits in US dollars and US Treasuries.

What does the current oil situation mean? Is there a risk to the petrodollar system collapsing? And does that put the US dollar's hegemony as a reserve currency at risk? Or do you think that it just has so much de facto acceptance at this point that there's no real other alternative?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think there's a lot of moving parts. I think, uh, what Nixon did in '71 and what occurred officially in '73, which at that time was 2 years too late, where they, they actually officially took Bretton Woods out of play, was then manifest ultimately in hyperinflation in '79, '80, '81.

Hyperinflation, in my view, is a politically administered thing, not a force of demand overwhelming supply, but rather what happened back then, and I think could happen again and has happened more recently, is you have oil producers suggesting that they're not going to satisfy the demand in the marketplace. Place. And that's more of a political catalyst than anything else, or supply-driven.

Having said that, I think oil is a large influence, but not the only influence, that will generate inflation looking down the road. I think we could have continuing disinflation and even deflation. Looking forward, where the prices of goods and services drop generally, I think the countermeasure to that because because the way we're structured in this global monetary system, we cannot have deflation or else our banking systems would collapse and our our household balance sheets would collapse. But I think that in itself would prompt a politically administered inflation or or hyperinflation.

And you could do that by, as we talked about before, devaluing the currency. Oil may play into this, but again, I think there's a lot more at stake. And the good news is I don't think wars are going to be a catalyst around this. I don't even know if trade is going to be a catalyst around this hyperinflationary scenario that I see, as it was in 1979, where you had oil embargo, the oil embargo.

I think more than that, because countries and trade pacts seem to be pretty solid So what I see happening with oil, it's not a sideshow. It's a point of leverage, certainly. But I think recent discoveries of shale and new technologies in the United States have really evened the playing field there.

And so I'm not so sure that that's going to play into this as it once did.

Capital overmarked versus production; hedge fund rumor

Erik Townsend: I think we could go on for another hour, and I would love to do so, about how How the current deflationary backdrop will eventually transition to inflation. But unfortunately, we're out of time for today's interview. Paul, you were kind enough to send us a sample of the type of research that you send to your paying subscribers at Macro Allocation Incorporated. We're going to include a link to that in the Research Roundup email, which our registered users at MacroVoices.com should receive at the same time as this interview. Paul, could you give us a sense of what is in that sample piece so people know what they can look forward to.

Paul Brodsky: Well, I'd be delighted. It seems to me that diverging capital and output growth over a 45-year period implies that either capital growth of the past was not actually capital growth at all— I'm talking about capital growth, that's the capital markets— because it consistently surpassed production growth. Or, and maybe this is getting too in the weeds, but it's explained in the piece. The value of capital today is is overmarked relative to the means of production that ostensibly uses it. By that, I mean the market itself might have a ways to drop so it can reconcile things. So I think I point out that there's there's a sign that. We're looking at that may say this is the case.

That should be enough of a tease.

Erik Townsend: Okay. And again, our registered users at MacroVoices.com will already have received a link to that piece. For anyone else who wants it who's not registered, you can just register at MacroVoices.com and then look to the Research Library tab on the menu, and you'll be able to download it there. I want to cover one One more thing before we close, Paul. There are rumors circulating on the street that you may be launching a hedge fund, perhaps around the beginning of next year. I know from a regulatory compliance standpoint that you're not at liberty to make any specific representations about the fund other than to accredited investors. But can you confirm or deny that rumor? And if our accredited investor audience wanted to contact you to find out more about what may be happening, how would

Paul Brodsky: Well, as you may be aware, Erik, from being in the business, I cannot confirm or deny such a rumor, but I'm happy to talk to anyone about anything at any point in time. And just contacting me at pbrodsky@macro-allocation.com is the best way to do it.

Erik Townsend: Okay, fantastic. Well, thank you so much for your time. Well, thanks so much for a great interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

New format: listener-requested topic

Aaron Chan: Erik, you mentioned at the beginning of the show we're going to experiment with a format change this week. So can you please tell our listeners why the change?

Erik Townsend: Well, we really like the format of the first part of the show where we do a market wrap. We usually aim for 10 to 15 minutes there, went a little bit over it this And then we do, of course, our featured interview, which is the highlight of the show. What we had been doing previously is you, Aaron have been asking me questions about that feature interview. And, you know, as I listened to a few reruns of the show, it just seems like we're rehashing the same stuff. Our featured interview guests are experts. They know what they're talking about. For us to rehash it felt a little bit redundant. And meanwhile, we've had listener requests to cover specific topics.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: that we could cover ourselves. So what we're going to try is a little bit of a change to format where after the guest interview, we're going to do a listener-requested topic each week. And we'll set up a thread in the listener discussion forum where you can request specific topics you'd like us to cover. And similarly, by all means, give us feedback on how you like this format compared to the old one.

Is US dollar hyperinflation a risk? Hyperinflation versus high inflation

Aaron Chan: Right. So in that vein, listener discussion forum user Pepi Lamoco— sorry if I butchered

Erik Townsend: Appreciate that.

Aaron Chan: Posted a question this past week asking whether we're intentionally avoiding discussing hyperinflation risk in our conversations with guests about the monetary policy endgame. And Paul Brodsky mentioned hyperinflation in this interview. So, Erik, let's start with the subject of hyperinflation.

Well, what's the big picture? Do you think there's a real risk of US dollar hyperinflation at any point in the future?

Erik Townsend: No, I don't. But we've got to clarify what that means. It's kind of ironic, actually, that it worked out the way that it did. We picked this topic of hyperinflation. I didn't know Paul Brodsky was going to end on that point. So, it looks like it flows together very nicely. That was actually a coincidence.

The thing is that people use this terminology differently. I do not think there's any risk at all of hyperinflation in the strictest definition of that term. However, I do agree with Paul Brodsky when he is predicting something, you know, at least as big as the late 1970s. I don't call that hyperinflation. I call that high inflation.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And they're not exactly the same thing. So I think we need to clarify the terminology before we go too far.

Aaron Chan: Right. Then why don't we clearly define hyperinflation and then contrast that with high inflation, as you've described, so we can speak clearly about what the difference is?

Erik Townsend: Well, you will hear some people, including Paul Brodsky in this interview, use the phrase hyperinflation, and they'll say like we had in the 1970s. And there, in that case, I think just, you know, the prefix hyper means a lot of something, and a lot of inflation, you might call it hyperinflation.

But the strictest definition, if you look in a macroeconomics textbook, of hyperinflation is a little bit different than that.

So let's talk first about what is inflation. Inflation is when there is excessive money in the money supply, and that is driving up prices because there's more money chasing a fixed amount of goods and services. That drives the price of those goods and services up, and it sets up kind of a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. Where the increase in the price of goods and services causes workers to demand higher wages so that they can maintain their standard of living. Those higher wages then in turn increase the cost of delivering those products and services. That causes the producers to increase their prices, and that again begets more wage inflation because again workers are demanding higher wages. So it's a self-reinforcing process. But it's all about available money in the money supply that's chasing and driving up prices.

True hyperinflation, or perhaps I should say in the narrow definition of that word, hyperinflation, is not about prices going up. It's a wholesale loss of faith in a currency. And so it appears that prices are going up because there is a rapid increase in prices, but what's really happening is the value of the currency itself is collapsing.

Now, there are several different definitions of hyperinflation, depending on which textbook you look at. One common one, though, is 50— 5-0% per month of price inflation. So, what is that annualized to? 1,000% plus annualized. By that definition, even the early 2000s Argentina inflation event wouldn't qualify as a true hyperinflation, because that was about 80% annualized, not 1,000%.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: 1,000% annualized. So it really depends on who you're talking to as to what definition you're using. In that strictest definition that I use for hyperinflation, no, I don't think that's coming in the US dollar at all. On the other hand, if you want to say the kind of inflation that we had in the 1970s, I think it's going to be worse than that before this is over.

So one of the characteristics of a true hyperinflation is a phenomenon that economists call dollarization, and that's where people lose faith in the currency. This happened in Weimar Germany. This happened more recently in Zimbabwe, where they were actually trading telephone calling cards as currency because nobody believed in the local currency. But the reason economists call it dollarization is because the US dollar is the most likely thing.

You know, the Argentinian merchant says, I won't take pesos anymore, even though the law of the land says I'm supposed to, I don't care. I trust US dollars. I don't trust my own country's currency. I'm only going to sell you the potatoes you want to buy if you'll pay me in US dollars. Well, how could you have a dollarization of the US dollar where people abandon US dollars and use US dollars instead? You know, that doesn't make sense. Would they use Canadian dollars instead? And for that matter, how is it possible that people could abandon the dollar if the dollar is the world's reserve currency?

Which is the preferred denomination of central bank reserve assets.

Almost by definition, you can't have a hyperinflation of the reserve currency. It would have to lose that reserve currency status in order for a true hyperinflation to occur. And history teaches us, frankly, that big systemically important currencies like the US dollar don't hyperinflate. It's a phenomenon that is unique to small systemically non-critical currencies like the Argentinian peso. So again, I'm using the most strict definition of the word hyperinflation in that narrow definition that refers to the collapse in the value of a currency. I don't think that that's possible for the US dollar, or I should say profoundly unlikely. It would take extraordinary circumstances. But I certainly do think high inflation, higher than the 1970s, is quite possible and quite

Aaron Chan: Okay. Given an accurate definition of hyperinflation, you think hyperinflation is extremely unlikely, but that a period of several years of high inflation is almost inevitable. But before we move on to talking about high inflation, why don't we cover what it would take to actually get a true US dollar hyperinflation, just for the diehards in the audience?

Erik Townsend: Well, I mean, to truly get the kind of hyperinflation where we're talking about the definition that means a collapse in the value What would have to happen to devalue the currency? I don't know. President Hillary Clinton starts World War III with Russia and loses. That would do it. Russia— and maybe a more realistic one— Russia and China persuade OPEC at some point to stop taking dollars for oil and to only accept gold or some gold-backed currency. Some people have suggested that Russia and China might someday try to introduce a gold-backed currency. That's Sergei Glazyev's De-dollarization strategy. So far, it hasn't gained much traction. If something profoundly changed in world politics, where the United States hegemony over the world economy wasn't there anymore, that's the kind of change it would take. You would have to have a massive change of sentiment that caused central banks around the world to stop preferring US dollar-denominated reserve assets.

Right now, the US Treasury bond is their favorite reserve asset.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And you've got to remember, there is no other bond market in the world that is deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. So there is no alternative right now. You'd first have to have an alternative, then you would have to persuade other central banks around the world to lose faith in the US dollar. You know, the US losing a nuclear war would be the level of event that it would take for that true hyperinflation scenario to really play out.

Aaron Chan: So the US dollar hyperinflation Hyperinflation is clearly possible in the wake of nuclear holocaust or an utterly profound change of sentiment around the world about the role of the US dollar in the global economy. But it sounds like short of that, it's just not going to happen. So, that brings us to the sustained period of high inflation. So, why do you see that on the horizon and what could it actually bring?

Erik Townsend: Well, and again, we should point out that a lot of people, including Paul Brodsky today, will use the word hyperinflation to describe this scenario, which I call high High inflation. And basically the problem is that the global debt is unrepayable in real terms. There is so much debt, it is mathematically impossible for it to all be paid back in real terms, meaning while preserving the value of the currency. So there's really only 2 ways to make that debt go away. Either you have to forgive it with some kind of debt jubilee, and as long as the people with the money are still in power, which for now appears to be the case, In this case, that ain't gonna happen.

The other option is to inflate it away by intentionally having central bank policies promote inflation. And sure enough, we've seen the Fed wants to promote inflation. Now, they wanna get to 2% inflation. I think that they run the risk of overshooting that dramatically, and we'll talk about why that's true in just a minute. But the scenario is basically that central banks are trying to promote a small amount of inflation. They're fighting a deflationary pressure that allows the central banks to get more and more complacent about conjuring more and more money out of thin air because they convince themselves that they can get away with it without it resulting in inflation. And the more that people predict inflation, as has happened, and it doesn't happen, the more cocky they get. And eventually you get to the point where that deflationary pressure exhausts itself and inflation returns. And It could potentially run away very quickly and go out of control.

Now, that doesn't mean a true hyperinflation in the strictest sense of the currency collapsing in value, but I think 5 to 10 years of 20% per year price inflation in the U.S. dollar is entirely possible. And, you know, the way that that happens is the Fed is aiming for that 2% inflation, and it's not happening, it's not happening, it's not happening, and they keep printing more and more Eventually, it starts happening, and all of a sudden, it's 4%. And they say, oh, well, it overshot by a little bit, but that's nothing. We won't worry about it. And then it's 6%, and then it's 8%.

You want to buy your gold before that happens. The question, and it's always very difficult to time markets, is, you know, is the bottom already in in gold? Is it time to really back up the leverage truck and buy all the gold you can? Because we know that's coming someday. Or could it be that the deflationary trend in the economy Hasn't run its course yet, and there's room for gold to sell off even further to new lows, perhaps below $1,000 an ounce, before it's over.

I am very, very confident of the scenario that we eventually get a period of several years of extremely high sustained inflation in the U.S. dollar, because it's the only way short of a debt jubilee to resolve this excessive debt The question is, when does that happen, and is there more deflation first? That's the $64 trillion question.

Six-month milestone and Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Well, unfortunately, we're out of time for this week, Erik. Is there anything else you want to cover before we close?

Erik Townsend: Well, MacroVoices is officially 6 months old. This is our 26th episode, and that's about the point where my talk radio mentors tell me that a show really starts to gain traction and market share. And we're really hoping that that will happen because that's what will allow us us to bring you even better guests. The more listeners that we have, the bigger and better of a reputation that we have, the more that people have heard of us, the easier it is to recruit the Kyle Basses and the Hugh Hendrys and those other difficult-to-get guests that we haven't been able to get on the show yet. So you can help us out by telling your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices. Register at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already, especially you accredited Because that's what our hedge fund managers love to hear, that they, they have people that are qualified to invest in their funds that are listening to the program.

And of course, as a benefit of registration, you'll get our free Research Roundup email, assuming you want it. You don't have to. You can opt out by clicking the safe unsubscribe link at the bottom. But so far, we've had an extremely, extremely low opt-out rate. People seem to really like it. And I know, Aaron, you've got a loaded Research Roundup. This week, it looked like it was a page and a half long of links to free stuff. What do you got for us?

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik. So with the topic du jour being negative rates and the thirst for yield, we have an article on James Grant's recent keynote speech at the annual Benjamin Graham Conference, where he offered his prognostication on negative interest rates. We've also got the latest from Jesse Felder on how the search for yield has led to utility equity valuations trading at 3 sigma, meaning standard deviations, above their historical averages, which is statistically similar to residential real estate at the height of the last housing bubble. Finally, Artemis Capital Management introduces Rodman's Paradox. Yes, that's Basketball Hall of Famer Dennis Rodman, which describes hidden and nonlinear benefits when adding a nonconformist but negative-returning asset to your portfolio. And from our listeners, we've got the latest gold price forecast from Joshua Hall, as you said, Erik, Andrew Levine's defense of Elon Musk's subsidies, and Michael Medici's take on last Friday's nonfarm payrolls.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic.

Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for us for this week's edition. Thanks again for your support and feedback. We're really excited about the listener content that's coming in, and please keep sending in your submissions. If you'd like your article to be featured in an upcoming edition, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter. Again, if you find value in this podcast, the best way to help us is by retweeting and following us on Twitter and sharing MacroVoices with your friends, family, and colleagues. Thanks, everyone.

Colleagues. You can follow Erik at Erik S. Townsend or myself at _AaronChan_ for the latest news on MacroVoices or general market commentary. Also, don't forget to follow our main account at MacroVoices. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

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