Gary Shilling — author of the popular Insight newsletter (as introduced on the show)
Announcer opening and episode preview
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is. Bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 28 was recorded on August 25th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've had quite a few listener requests for a feature interview with Gary Shilling, author of the popular Insight newsletter. Gary will be joining me as this week's featured guest, and we'll be discussing the U.S. dollar, Treasury yields and the long bond trade, why Gary's bearish on US equities, junk bonds, and crude oil, and much more. Aaron and I will also be discussing Triffin's paradox, the petrodollar system, and Russia's de-dollarization strategy after this week's feature interview.
Market wrap: equities, oil inventories and OPEC, gold, Treasuries, dollar
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P 500. Erik, I probably sound like a broken record at this point, opening each week's show with that same worn-out line, but hey, that's what the market keeps giving us, with E-mini S&P futures trading north of 2,191. at one point earlier this week, just a point or so higher than last week's all-time high, and closing on Thursday afternoon at about 2,171. Erik, has anything changed in your view for equities?
Erik Townsend: Well, not very much. I continue to very strongly agree with the chorus of bears who are saying, hey, the economic fundamentals just don't support these equity valuations. But frankly, I've been saying that for a couple years now, and I think I've got the, the argument right in terms of the fundamentals, but the tape just keeps on marching higher. So I think a lot of it is flight capital coming into the United States from Europe and China and Japan. But one way or another, you know, you can't fight the tape. So I'm on the sidelines here.
Aaron Chan: Right. Last week you remarked that oil prices were also higher than fundamentals dictated, but you said that they might stay there until next month's OPEC meeting proves itself to be a non-event. You went on to say a bearish inventory report was a needed catalyst to bring about a meaningful downside correction. So how did this week's inventory numbers fare?
Erik Townsend: Well, consensus expectations were calling for about an 800,000-barrel drawdown on national crude oil inventory. We got a 2.5 million barrel build on inventory, counter to expectations. That definitely was bearish. And frankly, we got builds on inventory across the board. 375,000 barrels in Cushing, Oklahoma, which of course is critical because it's where the WTI futures contract is settled. Gasoline, 36,000, pretty small build, but a build just the same. And distillates, 122,000 barrels, again a build. Slight decline in production, but you know, I think we haven't seen anything yet.
Build was against an expectation of a drawdown, so that sent the market lower when the news came out. But I expect these builds to pick up markedly as we get into shoulder season here, out of summer driving season.
Relative inventory is the key, not just what the absolute number is, but how it compares to historically the same week of the year, because oil prices are very seasonal. So we need to see some really big builds. I think they may be coming. That would shock the market lower. Or we need to wait for the OPEC meeting to come and go.
I don't expect that there's going to be really any meaningful change there. One scenario I have given some thought to, though, is that, you know, there is a change here, which is a year ago, it was pretty clear that Saudi Arabia was intentionally trying to talk down oil prices to damage their competitors.
Now, it seems like Saudi Arabia is willing to play ball at least a little bit. I don't think that they're going to decrease production in any way, but it seems like they're willing to make statements that are designed to jawbone the market higher. So, you know, there could be a scenario set setting up that might actually lead to a freeze. Now, keep in mind that a production freeze, when everybody's already producing at record all-time high production, really is meaningless in terms of supply and demand fundamentals. But it would have a very favorable propaganda effect. I think it would propel prices higher, at least in the short term.
And in the past, I've said it's just plain not going to happen because of Iran. And this problem is that Saudi Arabia doesn't want to cap its production while Iran is still increasing production. You know, they could spin that the other way. They could intentionally overproduce, which it certainly looks like they're doing. They're at record, all-time record output right now. They could overproduce a bit and then say, we're gonna put a cap on, when in reality they cannot possibly increase any further, and then make Iran out to be the bad guys that aren't playing ball with everyone else who is capping their production. So, you know, they could spin the propaganda another way. That's conceivable, but I don't think it's likely. I think the most likely outcome is no change from that meeting. There was actually a statement out of Saudi Arabia this afternoon saying that at current price levels they don't see any need to freeze production. So I think that really most likely takes it off the table.
But, you know, there's an outside chance that that could happen.
Bottom line, what we're really waiting for is a meaningful change in this trend of builds on national inventory. If we start seeing 5 million barrel weekly builds, that is going to send prices straight down. Hasn't happened yet. I won't be surprised if it does. We're definitely moving into a critical period for the oil market, though, as we come out of summer into the shoulder season.
And accordingly, we're going to be bringing Art Berman back next week. We're going to do an oil-centric program for next week's Labor Day weekend show. So you can look forward to that coming up.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, definitely looking forward to Art's interview. Now, broken record alert, we've been watching a technical consolidation range in gold between $1,308 and $1,377 for the last several weeks. Now, Erik, you've been saying you were leaning toward the bear case until we got out of this consolidation range. Now, we tested $1,321 this morning. So it looks like your bear case, or bear call, may be starting to play out. So what's your outlook for gold this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it is playing out, because not only did we test $1,321 this morning, $1,325 or so at the close, but this is happening in a weak-dollar environment. We've bounced up a little bit. I think when we taped the show last week, we were just barely over 94. Now we're up 94.71, but haven't even touched 95 all week. So we're still seeing dollar weakness. You would think that that would be supportive of the gold price, and gold is still selling off. Part of that could be colored by options expiration. We're coming into OPEX for gold futures. That may have an effect on it. It might explain some of the heavy volume that we've seen in the last couple days. But, in general, the way things are playing out is towards that bearish case. I won't be sold that we actually have sealed the deal until we see a daily close below $1,308.
But, for now, we seem to be trending towards the lower end of that trading range.
Aaron Chan: Okay. All right. That 1308 is the post-Brexit level. So shifting over to Treasuries, the 10-year Treasury yields edged back up a bit this week, printing about a 1.58 on Thursday. Any change in your outlook for Treasury yields?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's pretty much the same. I guess what I would say is maybe different. I've been saying for the last few weeks, you know, maybe what we're seeing in this bounce up in yields off of the Brexit low of 1.35, I think it was, maybe it's just a dead cat bounce. Well, it's been a couple months now since Brexit. So if it's a bounce, it's a bigger, bounce than a dead cat bounce. It's a dead tiger bounce. I don't know. But whatever it is, it is persisting. Unless we see a move above 170, it doesn't really change my outlook. I think we're going to muddle along here for a while and eventually see lower yields.
Aaron Chan: Okay. And the dollar index was at 94.09 when we taped last week's show. And that looks to be the low print so far with rebound this week, albeit a small one. We've yet to trade below 94 or above 95 since last week's show. So, Erik, what's your outlook here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm still watching it closely. I didn't really expect to get down to 94 here. I thought we were going to muddle along between 95 and 97 and eventually break out to the upside. I am still favoring that upside breakout scenario, but for the moment we're seeing some weakness here. I think Janet Yellen speaks tomorrow at Jackson Hole. That could, you know, obviously result in a huge move in either direction depending on what she says. I definitely think that the Fed is running out of ammunition to keep saying, hey, we're going to hike rates at the next meeting, really we are, trust us, and then not doing it. So, you know, there's a credibility question here. I think that either a decisive no rate hike or a rate hike, whatever happens in terms of a rate hike, obviously the dollar index is going to move in the opposite direction.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, Friday is definitely going to be interesting. So thanks for the market update, Erik. By popular listener request, this week's special guest is Dr. Gary Shilling, author of the Insight Investment Letter. Erik's interview with Dr. Shilling is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right here at MacroVoices.com.
Gary Shilling interview: the dollar as safe haven and the Triffin paradox
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Dr. Gary Shilling of AGaryShilling.com and, of course, the author of the very popular Insight newsletter. Gary, thanks so much for joining me on the program. I'd like to start with the U.S. dollar because so many other things hinge on the dollar view.
I know you have potentially a very bullish long-term view on the U.S. dollar. Something that I've found is that a lot of guests on this program have had that view, but they almost all seem to have different reasons for feeling that way. So, please tell us your views on the dollar and particularly why you see the potential for a long-term bull market in the U.S. dollar.
Gary Shilling: A lot of it has to do with the safe haven aspect. Now, you can say that we don't have Everything right in the U.S. economy. We're growing at about half the speed you'd expect after the deepest recession since the '30s. 2.1% real GDP average growth since the recovery started in the middle of 2009. And we certainly have a lot of other problems, a lot of political turmoil and so on and so forth, income polarization. But we're clearly the best of the bad lot. We're the slowest falling rock. We're the tallest midget, or the one I like. We're the valedictorian in summer remedial school.
There are a lot of other factors, and as a matter of fact, talking about currencies in our September newsletter Insight in some detail, but I think more than anything, it's simply the safe haven effects of the dollar, the fact that we have faster growth than virtually any other developed country, and you look elsewhere, The turmoil in Europe with Brexit, Japan just can't get Abenomics working, China slowing growth and potential problems there, a lot of things we can go into detail. But I think fundamentally it is the safe haven aspect of the dollar.
And also bear in mind that 87% of the foreign currency trades are in dollar.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: In other words, if you look at the trading for both trade and capital accounts, 87% of it involves the dollar. There's many, many transactions around the world between countries and investors that are in dollars that the U.S. has no participation in. It isn't U.S. exports, it isn't U.S. imports, it isn't U.S. investments, but the dollar is the international currency.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: And, you know, another thing, too, there's really a shortage of dollars. Our deficits have come down dramatically. They were $1.5 trillion back in 2010. They're now about $450 billion. That's still a lot of money, but it's a dramatic decline, and it means that there's a lot fewer dollars being pumped out there into the rest of the world. And the rest of the world needs dollars. When you have this tremendous dependence on the dollar, for trade and investment flows. If the dollars don't keep flowing out, the rest of the world is in trouble.
One of the interesting aspects of this is something called the Triffin Paradox, named after Robert Triffin. He was a Belgian-American economist, was at Yale for a number of years. And what he pointed out is that, yeah, we have a current account deficit now and trade deficit, and we've had that chronically.
But if we didn't have it, the rest of the world would be in big trouble, because when you need dollars to facilitate all this trading and investing, for those things to increase, you need an increasing flow of dollars, and that you need by a current account deficit. Again, if we achieve a national aim, which maybe Trump would prefer, of having a balanced trade and current account— current accounts, boy, the rest of the world would be in deep doo-doo.
The long bond trade: 2% target and convexity
Erik Townsend: Well, that's certainly a possibility. We'll get later in the interview to potential political outlooks. I want to move on, though, to the U.S. long bond, Treasury bond. You probably in many ways are the father of the long bond trade. You declared back in 1981 that we were at the beginning of the bond bull market of a lifetime. And of course, that was an incredibly unpopular view in 1981 with the 30-year Treasury yield north of 15% and a lot of people fearing that it was just headed to infinity from there.
But you got that call perfectly. I know that you are still bullish on the long bond. And I guess my question to you— I happen to agree, by the way. I think that yields have further to fall. But clearly, at just over 2%, if you're buying duration risk, you're not buying it for the yield. You're buying it for capital appreciation.
That means you've got to think that this bond bull market is not over yet. So, I guess my question is, you know, we're 35 years into this. It doesn't have another 35 years to go. So, how do you know when it's over or almost over, and what would cause you to start to think it's time to close that trade?
Gary Shilling: Well, first of all, bear in mind that I have never, never, never bought the long bond for yield. I couldn't care less what the yield is as long as it's going down. I bought it for appreciation. That's basically the same reason most people buy stocks. They don't buy them for dividend yield, although we might come back to that. That is pretty much the current investment theme. But I've always bought them for appreciation, and that means declining rates. Now, you can say, okay, you started off at 15.2% at the bottom in price, the high in yield, in October of 1981, and that's when I said, That's right. We're entering the bond rally of a lifetime, and now you're down to, you know, about 2.5%, and you say, wow, and my target is 2%, so you say you're almost there.
But there is something called convexity here, and what it means is that the increase in price for a given decline in interest rates increases tremendously as rates go down. It doesn't do that in the case of zero-coupon Treasuries. A 1%— 1 percentage point decline at where we are now in 30-year zero coupons is about 20% appreciation, and it's not much different going from 15 to 14 as it is from 3 to 2.
You get— but on the coupon bonds, you get a lot more bang for buck because of the convexity in the trade. So, I think that there's— I think there's still There's still life there, and as I say, it's been a tremendous investment.
I mean, if you— and we have a— I've got a chart that I love. It's my favorite because it's not only what I predicted, it's one that I personally participated in, and in our money management operations, our clients have enjoyed it, too. And it basically shows that if you bought the long bond, and we use zero coupons because you get more bang for buck as rates go down, of course.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: If you bought that in October of 1981, when you did have that high in yields and low in price, and then you rolled it over each year to maintain maturity or duration, the same for a zero, of course, and then you compare that with buying the S&P 500 at its low in July of 1982, and look at that on a total return basis, including reinvested dividends, what you find is that That the Treasury has outperformed the S&P over that period by 6.5 times. 6.5 times.
Well, as you say, that's history. I think we've got further to go. And if we go down to my target of 2%, you've got about another 15% appreciation on a zero-coupon bond.
Erik Townsend: Now, in order to understand when this might be over, we'd have to understand first what is driving it. So do you think it's flight capital coming out of Europe and China and Japan? Japan that's going to continue to drive yields down, or do you think it's just that yields need to go down because the yield spread is so high in, in contrast to other sovereign debt, or is there something else that's driving this?
Gary Shilling: Well, the fundamental driver for 35 years has been the decline in inflation. You look at the correlation between Treasury yields, Treasury bond yields, and year-over-year change in CPI. It's a very, very tight correlation, has been for this whole period. It was on the way up when yields were rising from right after World War II to the peak of 1980, and it's been on the way down. So, my forecast really was— my forecast of this bond rally of a lifetime was driven by my conviction, and that started in the late '70s, and I finally wrote my first book on that in 1981. My conviction that inflation was unwinding. And as you pointed out earlier, that was not a popular view at the time. I mean, matter of fact, that book published by McGraw-Hill, the title was Is Inflation Ending?
Are You Ready? And my answer to the first question was yes, it's ending. And the second one is no, you're not ready, because everybody had all kinds of tangible assets in their portfolio, which are the darlings of inflation. And they didn't have enough of either stocks or bonds, which would benefit from the unwinding of inflation.
And that was so little believed that the sales of the book were a dud. As a matter of fact, McGraw-Hill basically gave us the last 1,000 copies because they couldn't sell them. But, interestingly enough, in 1986, years later, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the Boston Globe business editors, both independently, ex post, exhumously reviewed the book. It was long out of print by then, but it was an empiric victory. But, as I say, it was not a popular view, and I think that's been— the reason I say that, it's been that way all the way down.
One of the interesting things about investing in long Treasuries is you've almost never had irrational exuberance. It's not like stocks, where things get really carried away, because the chorus
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: The herd has constantly bellowed, no, no, rates are going up, they're going up, they're going up. You read the media today, and so it's like, when rates go up, when rates go up, when rates go up, and they begrudgingly admit that Treasuries and other sovereigns, developed country sovereigns, have way outperformed everything else so far this year, and they have, obviously, over this whole time period.
You do have the advantage that you don't have a lot of fellow travelers in this, a lot of conviction. But I do think that we're going down further. Now, as I say, it's driven by the unwinding of inflation, and I think deflation now is an odds-on bet. That's what I've been forecasting for years. But there are other factors as well that you touched on. One is foreign demand for Treasuries. Like the dollar, this is a safe haven.
And another interesting aspect of that is, is the interest rate spreads between U.S. and developed— other developed country sovereigns. I've got a table using 10-years, because most countries, that's their standard, the 10-year. And the spreads, except for relatively few countries, almost every other country has lower yields than the U.S. So, a foreign investor can buy Treasuries with a yield spread in their favor, and, of course, if I'm right and the dollar rallies against their currencies, then they get a translation gain as well.
So, that's a further factor. Also, as I mentioned, they're making fewer of them, and as the deficit comes down and there's a, you know, there is this constant demand demand for dollars to basically fuel trade, trade and investment flows around the world because it is the dominant currency.
Hedging the long bond and why U.S. stocks are expensive
Erik Townsend: Now, you've got a big advantage over a lot of investors. You've been right about this trade for 35 years, so you've got a pretty good accumulated profit. But if I were looking at new money coming into a long position in the long bond, I'd think about hedging it with something just in case there were a turnaround in rates. Would you think that, you know, a short position in junk bonds to hedge that would make sense, or is the spread already too wide between junk and Treasuries?
Gary Shilling: You know, I've got to confess, I've never been all that fast and fancy on hedging trades. I've tried a number of them over the years in portfolios we manage, and boy, there have been times when I managed to lose on both sides. And I think a lot of the, you know, the fancy option strategies and the straps and straddles and all the really exotic things, you know, these may be great mental exercises, and maybe there's some guys who are brighter than I am who can carry them off, but I've just sort of had the straightforward view. If you believe in something, you invest in it. If you don't, you're on the sidelines. But, and I'll, by the way, I never invest against our fundamental views. I'm either in or I'm on the sidelines.
I would never, at least right now, I wouldn't short bonds if I felt that they'd achieved their objective or were momentarily set aside. I'd simply be out, but I wouldn't be short. But, you know, and again, if you look at it, if we're going to 2% on the long bond, I think that gain is probably better than most other things. And when you talk about hedging, shouldn't you hedge almost everything else now?
I mean, look at stocks. If you look at Shiller's P/E, it would take a 40% decline Uh, from where you are now on the, on the S&P, uh, to bring you back to its long-term 16.7 P/E that goes back to 1880. And in the last 15 years, that P/E has been above that average most of the time. So, if it still holds— and, of course, that's always a question, is the long-term average applicable? But if it holds, then you're gonna spend a lot of years below it.
And now, should you hedge stocks?
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Gary Shilling: You know, anybody's got a portfolio of long stocks, hey, that's been a great winner since March of 2009, and it's really been driven by the Fed. Stocks have floated on a sea of Fed money. You haven't had the economic growth. You haven't had the revenue growth of corporations to sustain it. You've had a lot of cost-cutting, but that doesn't seem to be sustainable anymore.
So, should you hedge stocks? I mean, what shouldn't you hedge, Stan?
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to stocks since you mentioned the dividend yield issue before. You know, it's striking to me there are so many incredibly successful and smart people, whether it be George Soros or Carl Icahn or Stan Druckenmiller, who have just come out with incredibly bearish views on U.S. stocks. But the market just keeps marching higher anyway, in amazement to everyone. Do you think that this demand for dividend-paying stocks is driving that? Is it something else? What's going on? here, and I know you have a short view on U.S. equities. What is your rationale for being bearish on U.S. stocks?
Gary Shilling: Well, I think overall U.S. stocks are expensive. We are not short stocks in our— in actual portfolios we manage, but it is a strategy that we're— that we certainly are thinking seriously about. But we are long— we are long defensive stocks in our portfolios. And principally consumer staples and utilities, and we have been for the last, last 3 or 4 years.
Now, what's interesting is we, we did that to be defensive because I felt stocks were expensive, and I also like the idea of higher-than-normal dividend yields that you tend to have on these defensive stocks as giving you some, some cushion. As it turns out, they've been the top performers in recent years, and of course we've gone Recently, I think sentiment has gone almost ballistic on the idea of dividends. And you know, you have this this kind of interesting situation of people buying buying bonds for appreciation and stocks for yields, and it's the reverse of what you normally expect. But there has been this rush for for dividend dividend-paying stocks, and you know, to to a certain extent, it's it's simply this. Right. It's this huge, what I call zeal for yield. It's this conviction that people have that they deserve, that God gave them the right to higher returns.
And you see that, for example, in public pension funds. You know, a lot of them still have 7.5% assumptions on their investment returns. I think that's way, way, way too optimistic, but they don't want to approach state legislatures and say, we're going to have to cut benefits. So they move out on the risk curve and they're moving into anything. And when they don't see the yields on fixed income securities, they move into private equity, into hedge funds, and are now retreating because hedge funds have been lousy performers in recent years.
And real estate, that's probably the latest darling, but also dividend-paying stocks. And, you know, not only in the U.S., but they're looking at that Junk bonds and emerging market debt and equities. I mean, it's a whole spectrum of things, but I mean, we benefit from it. And as I say, I didn't really anticipate this mad rush. We just said, hey, let's take a defensive position because stocks are going up, and I feel we needed to be aboard in some form, at least modest positions in defensive stocks.
Crude oil: OPEC price war and marginal cost
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to crude oil. You've been very bearish on crude oil. I think that some of your price targets are in the $10 to $20 range. What's your thesis there? How do you see it playing out? What's the timeframe, and what do you see coming?
Gary Shilling: Well, I spelled this out actually early last year, right after OPEC refused to cut production, and that's what they did on November 27th, 2014, when all of us were sitting down to our Thanksgiving dinners. Now, the reality is this: OPEC is a cartel. Cartels exist for only one purpose, and that is to keep prices above equilibrium.
So, that encourages cheating. Somebody wants more than their fair share, either in or out of the cartel. So, the leader of the cartel's job is to cut its own production to accommodate the cheaters; otherwise, prices collapse. Well, that's what's been happening for years. And if you look at OPEC, In the last decade, up until very recently, all the growth in world oil production was non-OPEC. OPEC was virtually flat.
Well, led by the Saudis back then, late November 2014, OPEC said enough is enough. We're getting tired of being the swing producer. We're getting tired of cutting back and seeing somebody else grab market share. So they basically said we're going to play a very
Erik Townsend: Right. Right.
Gary Shilling: We're going to play a very sophisticated game of chicken. We're going to see who can take lower prices the longest. And at that point, the Saudis had about $450 billion in foreign exchange reserves. They're running through it at the rate of about $100 billion a year, because their expenses are so high. They need to, to buy off the population. You know, nobody really works there. It's all the imported labor and so on and so forth. That's another story. But in any event, they basically said, we can take lower prices longer. We're going to see who's going to back out first. And of course, at that point, OPEC was producing 30 million barrels a day.
They basically took off all constraints. They're now producing over 33 billion dollars a million barrels a day. And of course, the Saudis are flooding the market, and they are competing fiercely with Iran, which is back in the act with the sanctions off, for markets in Europe and Asia.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Gary Shilling: Well, anyway, when you look at this game of chicken, and it's a price war, and you say, okay, where is the chicken-out price? Well, the chicken-out price is not the cost of meeting budgets. That's irrelevant. Now, in the case of the Saudis, it's $96 a barrel. It's $120 a barrel for Venezuela. It's about $50 for Kuwait. But whatever it is for whatever country, that's irrelevant when you're in a price war.
Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.
Gary Shilling: Also irrelevant is the full-cycle cost, the cost of drilling a new well from scratch and getting the oil out and to market. What is relevant is the marginal cost. In other words, once the well is drilled, what is the cost of getting it out? The pipes are laid, the overhead is covered, and so on and so forth. And in the Permian Basin in Texas, that's $10 to $20 a barrel, and in the Persian Gulf, it's even lower. And so that was the The price target that I came out with early last year, prices then were about $65 a barrel. They had obviously come down from $100. They got down to $26 a barrel last February. They rebounded to $50, backed off a bit. I still think we're headed for that. Let me give you an analogy on this marginal price to make this absolutely clear. Let's assume that at an intersection there are gas stations on all 4 corners.
Now, one of those gas stations starts to cut prices in order to gain market share. Well, the others have to follow, because motorists can just drive across the street to tank up. There's nothing specific about— gas is gas. So they all start cutting prices, and they keep going, and then it's a price war. It's a gas war. And the prices keep going down. Now, where do they stop? They don't stop at the full cost of running that station, including the labor
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: The overhead, the rent, etc., etc. No, no, no. They cost it— they stop at the marginal cost. They stop at the cost of getting the gasoline off a tank truck, plus the required state taxes, of course. And in other words, it's the marginal cost. And that's what happens when you're in a price war, and that's what this game of chicken amounts to. We did have a rally in oil prices early last year. Everybody thought the Fed was going to That the American frackers were going to fade, that those are short-lived wells.
But guess what? Their cost has dropped precipitously, and they've gotten involved in this, in horizontal drilling, where they drill not one well with a rig, but they drill down, turn the drill dreads and drill bit, and they can drill 20 or 30 wells from one platform. And, by the way, that's the reason the rig count doesn't mean anything now, because the rigs they've taken off.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: Line of the old vertical rigs, and it's the horizontal rigs which they've tapped, and they're the ones that are the source. But anyway, even then, so you had that rally early last year, and then reality set in and we started to see the renewed decline as they got down to $26 a barrel on WTI last February. Then you've had another rebound. Now I think things are starting to sell off. Now I think it's the same thing. People realize that production is not going down.
And, of course, another interesting thing here is that— just keep your eye on marginal costs, not full costs, because what happens is, when you have a situation where you may be losing money on a total cost, on a full-cost basis, average-cost basis, There's still— there is actually more encouragement to increase production, because as prices go down, companies, and particularly very heavily indebted oil producers, desperately need the revenues if the alternative is bankruptcy. So as long as the price exceeds the marginal cost, they're going to produce, and they're going to produce even more the lower the price, because they need that money to service their debts. And, of course, then you get into the majors. And here these guys are paying out more in dividends than they are earning. And so they really have the same situation. They're encouraged to produce more, not less, even the Exxons and the BPs and the Shells of the world.
Oil storage, contango and timing of the low
Erik Townsend: Do you have a time horizon in which you anticipate the final low in the oil market?
Gary Shilling: Well, what I'm looking at there is inventories. Because production globally is now exceeding demand by 1 to 2 million barrels a day. It's about 95 million barrels a day, and it's an excess of 1 to 2 million barrels a day. And the storage tanks are filling up. 2 places to keep an eye on. One is Cushing, Oklahoma, which is one big tank farm. That's the farm— that's, of course, the delivery point for WTI.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: And where that price is determined, and those tanks are about 85% full. And then there is— then the— in Europe, it's Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp. That's really the— if you look at the map, it's the mouth of the Rhine River, and that's where oil comes in, and those tanks are filling up as well. Now, there are alternatives.
You can store— there's floating storage. Oil can be stored in tankers, even railcars, but it's much, much more expensive. It's about $1.50 a barrel.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: In a tanker versus 40 cents a barrel in Cushing. So, it gets much more expensive. But another interesting thing is going on there with a very steep contango in the futures curve.
It has been very profitable to buy physical oil, to store it, and sell forward, sell in futures And lock in a profit. Now, that— what that has done is it has increased inventories in the short run, but as those contracts mature and the oil is delivered, it means a lot more oil on the market. So, you've got another interesting feature there that suggests that we are headed for a top. How long is that going to take?
A rough guess, I'd say maybe another 6 months.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Commodities: China and excess capacity
Erik Townsend: Okay, obviously oil is the world's most traded commodity, but commodities in general have been very weak. A lot of people were declaring a year or so ago that the bear market in commodities is over, and obviously it's not over. We're seeing continued weakness across the board in commodities. What's driving that? Is it just deflationary pressure in the economy or something else?
Gary Shilling: Excess capacity, pure and simple. What happened was that I think that what happened is, and you really have to go back to China, globalization, probably the greatest economic development in the last 3 decades, basically amounted to the shifting of production, most of it in manufacturing, from Western Europe and North America to China and other developing countries.
Now, that didn't really change global production, it just changed the focus. But a lot of commodity producers, hard rock miners in particular,
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: Were dazzled by the tremendous increase in commodity use by China. And they account for, you know, over 40% of world demand for— annual demand for tin, lead, zinc, other nonferrous metals, huge amounts of oil, coal, iron ore, etc., etc. So, the feeling was that this huge explosion in commodity demand was going to last forever.
Well, what these guys weren't really thinking about is, what are they doing with those commodities? Well, they're not using them for internal consumption. No, no, no. They're turning them into exports. And where do those exports go? They go to North America and Europe. And if you've got slow growth in North America and Europe, which you have, you don't have inherent demand for those exports. Now, the Chinese covered up that problem for a number of years by huge infrastructure spending, but the result was a lot of ghost cities. Huge, huge debts. But in any event, Chinese growth is slowing.
Well, what happened, going back here to the 2000s, in response to this leap in commodity prices— and, by the way, it started in 2002, actually February 2002, and China joined the World Trade Center at the end of 2001, so it's no coincidence. It was really a whole China play.
What happened was there was tremendous investment.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: In all kinds of commodity production. And you look at some of these things like copper, copper mines, coal, etc., they can take 5 to 10 years to come to fruition. But then they— they're, you know, tens and tens and tens of billions of dollars each. But there was this huge investment and financed with very heavy leverage. And, of course, what happened was that when that production came in, came on stream,
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: You didn't have that rapid growth. The growth hasn't— global growth hasn't collapsed. It just has not— has not lived up to expectations, and the supply has been huge. And, of course, you have a very interesting situation here. It's back to this marginal cost argument. You get some of these big new commodity developments, and these guys have a tiger by the tail. They get into these and they're losing money, and they know that unless prices just went through the roof, they're going to lose money regardless. But they're going to lose less money if they complete the mines than if they cut and run.
So, you see this ironic situation where there is a pressure to complete them. And you look at some of the iron ore producers, and what do they say? They rationalize this by saying, oh, yeah, but we're going to produce iron ore at less than $50 a ton, and that'll be cheaper than the competition in India. And, you know, it's a nice story, and maybe they're going to be right.
Erik Townsend: Right. Right.
Gary Shilling: But I rather suspect it's more an attempt to rationalize what's really an inherently bad investment. But if you look at it, in the last 2 or 3 years, there hasn't been one major hard rock miner CEO that has not left, either saw the footprints on the ceiling or been shown the gate by the board. This has been a tremendous excess capacity situation, and with slow growth in the world, it's going to take years to eat it up.
Helicopter money and fiscal stimulus
Erik Townsend: I want to move on to monetary policy. A lot of guests on this program have predicted that we're headed for some form of helicopter money. Do you agree with that view? And if so, what form do you think it would take? Would it be infrastructure spending or just outright, you know, transfer payments? How would it happen?
Gary Shilling: Yeah, here's the reality. You've had zero or declining growth in real incomes for most people in Western Europe and North America for over 10 years.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: All the growth of what there has been has been the people on the top. But the vast majority, 90% or more, have had flat or declining real incomes.
And this has caused a lot of frustration. The example I like to use is that old movie Network, where this guy Howard Beale, he'd been fired as a TV anchor, and he gets out of his chair and runs to the window and opens it up and yells, I'm mad as hell! I'm not going to take it anymore!
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: Well, I think that's where voters are. And they've basically said mainstream politicians aren't delivering the goods, so we're going to go to the fringes. And they have. You look at the popularity of Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front in France, far right, anti-immigration. You look at Jeremy Corbyn, very much to the left, head of the Labour Party in Britain, far right, far left parties in Spain, Germany, Italy, Canada. You've now got Justin Trudeau, very much a leftist, replacing Stephen Harper, a conservative. And, of course, in this country we've got the likes of Bernie and Trump. And I think this is— in other words, people are saying, we're going to try something else, and it may be the lunatic fringe, but we're going to try something else.
Well, this, I think, is not going unnoticed by politicians. And regardless of who wins the election, I expect there's going to be a big push for fiscal stimulus. I actually wrote this up in March of last year in our newsletter, Insight. The title of the article, The Next Big Thing. And the next big thing is fiscal stimulus. In other words, I think when the new Congress and the president get back, whoever it is, in January, we're going to see a huge push to do something, because monetary policy is impotent. Monetary policy just has— and we can go into detail on why— but monetary policy has just not promoted real economic growth for, I think, very clear reasons. So now the move is, is to fiscal policy.
And that brings in the helicopter money idea. Helicopter money, it, it, it— what it really means is that there's big fiscal stimulus, and the resulting deficits are financed by By central banks. Now, you can say, well, what's the difference between that and quantitative easing? Eh, not much.
And you say, well, okay, isn't that what happens anyway? There are some important distinctions. In developed countries, and this is true of major central banks, the Fed, the BOJ, the BOE, ECB, they buy securities, but they buy them on the open market. In other words,
Erik Townsend: Yes.
Gary Shilling: The Treasury's issuing them, but the market gets in there, intervenes to determine the price.
In a banana republic like Zambia or Argentina, they issue the paper directly to the central bank, and, of course, so there's no limit on what they issue. There's no vigilantes in there, and you ultimately get a wrecked economy. Well, that's true most times. In other words, central banks are independent.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: But when you're in wartime, they're not. Matter of fact, in World War II, money supply in this country was growing at a 25% annual rate. Well, why? Obviously, they were doing their bit to help finance the war. In other words, in wartime, central banks are really arms of the government. They are not independent, regardless of what they want to say or believe.
Well, we're now in a war against slow growth, and so I think that this is what is going to happen: helicopter money. There's going to be big fiscal stimulus, and it's going to be financed by central banks buying the securities, not directly from the government. No, no, they don't want to do that. They're not going to act like banana republics, but there'll be pretty much a tacit agreement, just like there is in any wartime. Now, where are the areas where we might see this big fiscal push?
Well, in this country, there are 2 of them that we've identified and talked about in our newsletter for many, many months. One is infrastructure spending. That's something that both Republicans and Democrats pretty much agree on, and Lord knows we need it— roads, bridges, railroads, all kinds of infrastructure improvement.
And the second one, which would probably get more play if the Republicans controlled Washington, is defense spending. And they would point to China building these military bases in the South China Sea. artificial islands. They point to Putin trying to reestablish the Russian Empire, invading Ukraine, Japan coming out from under their post-World War II neutrality. So, these are the 2 areas that I think really are likely candidates, and I think we will see this big push. And helicopter money, all that means is that the central banks are going to be very, very cooperative in financing the deficits resulting from big fiscal stimulus.
Erik Townsend: Right.
The Age of Deleveraging and the Trump-Clinton question
Erik Townsend: Gary, you wrote a book back in 2010 titled The Age of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies for a Decade of Slow Growth and Deflation. And I'll summarize the gist of the book was, until the debt gets paid down, you anticipated that the economy was in for stagnation, slow growth, and deflation. And obviously, you have been exactly right in your predictions about stagnation, slow growth, and deflation. But at the risk of picking nits, I've got to come back to the title, The Age of Deleveraging. Clearly, that's what we need to be doing, but the opposite is happening. There's been no deleveraging since 2010. There's been nothing but an increase in the total amount of debt, both sovereign and private, since then. You know, is that out of sync with what you were expecting?
Gary Shilling: I disagree with you in your statement there, because I don't look at debt per se. I don't think it's meaningful. There are very few There's no economic measures which in themselves mean anything. It's always relative to something else. And if you look at, if you look at, for example, household debt, and this is total debt, mortgage debt, consumer loans, credit cards, auto loans, you name it, and look at it in relation to after-tax income, you've got to have a denominator on these things. That ratio started at 65% in the early '80s. That was the beginning of the big leveraging up. It got up to 130% in the mid-2000s. It's now down to 104%. So it has come down dramatically, and most of it because of mortgage debt. The same is true in the financial area. On a global basis, we've had deleveraging. You have to put a denominator under these things to make any sense out of them.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so you're deleveraging relative to income as opposed to an absolute term.
Gary Shilling: Yeah, I mean, if you had absolute— if you had absolute deleveraging in the sense that you were reducing debt in a growing economy, it wouldn't be a growing economy, it'd be a depression.
Erik Townsend: Okay. One more question before we close. You mentioned earlier the potential impacts of a Trump presidency. In general, what do you see in terms of Trump versus Clinton? How would that decision impact markets? What would investors want to be watching for?
Gary Shilling: There, I think you might have some ironic results. If Clinton wins, and, by the way, the recent breakout of stocks may be an indication that investors have, in effect, said that she is going to be the winner, and, yeah, she's moved further to the left than Obama, pushed there by Bernie, and that may be— that's not a favorable climate for investors. But it's sort of the devil you know versus the devil you don't know. But in any event, if you have— if Clinton wins, it's kind of more of the same, very much an income redistribution attitude, but no dramatic impacts.
Trump, on the other hand, is this loose cannon kind of image, and I think that could have some interesting results. Stocks would very well suffer, but ironically, you could have a run for the dollar and Treasuries.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Gary Shilling: That they are the ultimate safe havens in the world. And when people get scared, they head for the safe havens, even though, in this case, they're U.S. securities. Machiavelli said it's better to be feared than be loved, because if you're loved, people can fall out of love with you, but if you're feared, that's likely to persist. And I think that's the— I think that probably would be the case with Trump. So, ironically, if Trump wins, I think you could see a run for the dollar and Treasuries.
Insight newsletter and contact details
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, unfortunately, we are out of time. Before we close, I know that a lot of people are interested to know a little bit more about you and where you can follow your work. Your firm manages money for both high-net-worth individuals and institutions. You also publish the Insight newsletter. And I think it's important for people who aren't familiar with that, it's not another 5-page newsletter. You're usually 30 to 40 pages of content there. Tell us a little bit about the newsletter, and is it possible for our listeners who might want a sample copy to obtain one.
Gary Shilling: Certainly. This is a letter that, that discusses economic and investment themes. It's not a tip sheet. We're not telling people buy this hot stock today, buy it tomorrow, etc., etc. We're talking about general economic things, what's going on in terms of interest rates, a lot of things that we've, we've discussed
Erik Townsend: Yes.
Gary Shilling: Today, we cover. It's a monthly publication, and we do discuss our specific investment strategy in there every month, and you really, obviously, were aware of that when you asked some of these questions.
We'd be delighted to send anyone a sample copy if they're interested, and we have a toll-free number. It's 1-888-346-4646. 1-888-346-7444. 1-888-346-7444.
Erik Townsend: And of course, your website is—
Gary Shilling: Website, yeah, it's www.agaryshilling.com.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, Gary, I cannot thank you enough for a fantastic interview. We really appreciate it. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues.
Announcer: guest requests and mailbag addresses
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for future guests. for how we can improve the program.
Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: Triffin's paradox explained
Aaron Chan: So Erik, Dr. Shilling mentioned Triffin's paradox briefly during today's interview. Now I know you've written quite a bit on that subject, so why don't we elaborate on that subject for today's post-interview topic? Give us some color on Robert Triffin and his paradox.
Erik Townsend: Well, it's interesting, you know, everybody who reads Triffin seems to have a different take on what the actual paradox was. As Gary described in this interview, Triffin observed that if you are the world's reserve currency issuer, there's a tremendous artificial demand from other nations. They need to have your currency, and that allows you to do things like get away with running a current account deficit. And the way that I interpret Triffin's writing, the actual paradox that he was writing about comes down to this: how do you decide what currency ought to be the world's reserve currency in the first place?
Well, clearly, it's got to be whoever's the strongest credit. And in 1944, at the time of the Bretton Woods Conference, Without a doubt, the United States was the strongest credit. You know, the whole world was laying in ruin. The United States had very little damage on its own soil, so it made perfect sense for the dollar to be selected because it's the best credit. Well, what happens when a nation is selected to be the world's reserve currency?
What it does is it basically gives that country license to get away with doing things that it could never get away with otherwise, and to borrow and spend with reckless abandon to the.
Aaron Chan: That's right.
Erik Townsend: To the point that the currency eventually becomes no longer worthy of serving as a reserve currency. And to my interpretation, that's the paradox that Triffin was talking about, is how does the currency become reserve currency? Because it's the best credit. What happens when you are the reserve currency? You can get away with doing things to your currency that make it the worst credit. And Triffin actually said after the gold— you know, a lot of people thought when President Nixon was forced to abandon the gold convertibility standard, that that resolved Triffin's paradox. Triffin's dilemma, because that basically proved Triffin right, that the U.S. wouldn't be able to stay the course because of its— what Triffin called military adventurism was his prediction. And of course, the Vietnam War resulted in a massive buildup of debt.
So, you would think in some ways that if the U.S. was forced to abandon the gold standard, that resolved the dilemma. But Triffin actually commented in an interview a couple years after that and said, no, it doesn't resolve the dilemma, because even though the U.S. was forced abandon the gold standard, the fact remains that the dollar is still standing as the world's de facto reserve currency, even though the Bretton Woods system broke down with going off the gold standard. It's still serving as the reserve currency, and that means eventually the U.S. will continue to borrow and spend recklessly, and eventually it won't be suitable as a reserve currency anymore.
Postgame: Nixon, Kissinger and the petrodollar system
Aaron Chan: So hang on. So President Nixon taking the U.S. off the gold standard was originally predicted by many people to mean that the dollar would lose its global reserve currency status, but it didn't. So what saved the day?
Erik Townsend: Well, Henry Kissinger had— who was Secretary of State at the time— was smart enough to recognize how important the dollar's reserve currency status is, and he knew going off the gold standard that that risked potentially losing that status. So he got on a plane and went over to Saudi Arabia, sat down with the Saudis, and basically made them an offer they couldn't refuse. He said, look, you guys, Guys, here's the story. We got this really big military. You're like a little country. You know, these little countries, they get overthrown. Our CIA sometimes makes that happen. We wouldn't want to see that happen to you.
So here's what you're going to do. You're going to take dollars only. I can't do the accent any longer.
Aaron Chan: Erik Montana.
Erik Townsend: Kissinger basically told the Saudis, look, we want you to make a policy that you're going to sell your oil for US dollars and no currency other than US dollars. You're going to reinvest the profits from the oil production that you make in U.S. Treasury bonds. So essentially, by making a deal with the Saudis, and that was in exchange for essentially protection in mafia terminology, that meant that the U.S. military would make sure that the current power regime in Saudi Arabia stayed in power and that the U.S. essentially had their back with military support if they were to run into any trouble in the Middle East, which of course in the '70s was a A very volatile place, as it is again today.
So, Kissinger basically architected this petrodollar system, as it's come to be known, where by requiring the Saudis to reinvest all of their oil proceeds into US Treasuries, you're getting the support in the US Treasury market that previously existed because of the gold convertibility. And you're also, by transacting all of the business for the world's biggest and most important commodity, which is crude oil, Right. By forcing that to be transacted in dollars, it effectively sets a de facto standard that international trade in general is going to be settled in dollars.
So, that's essentially what happened, was the petrodollar system has allowed the global reserve currency status of the US dollar to continue, even though the United States effectively defaulted on the original provisions of the Bretton Woods Treaty, which is that it was supposed to be convertible into gold at a fixed rate of exchange of $35 per ounce. Right.
Postgame: reserve currency status and Russia's de-dollarization plan
Aaron Chan: Okay, so what you're saying is effectively the reason the US dollar has remained the world's reserve currency for 45 years after Nixon took us off the gold standard is all about the petrodollar system of Saudi Arabia and other major Arab producers selling their oil for dollars and then, in turn, reinvesting the profits in US Treasuries. But these days, more and more producers are starting to accept other currencies for oil, be it yuan or rubles. And with the current supply glut, it's questionable whether there is even any profits to reinvest in US Treasuries. So what does that mean for the dollar's monopoly on U.S. reserve currency status going forward?
Erik Townsend: Well, in my opinion, there's a huge complacency that everybody just assumes that the U.S. dollar has been the world's reserve currency ever since Bretton Woods in 1944. It survived as the world's reserve currency despite the loss of convertibility into gold in 1971, 45 years ago last week. So people assume there is no other alternative, and it is absolutely true that there is There is no other bond market besides US Treasuries that is deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. So there is no alternative to the US dollar in terms of a global reserve currency.
I think people are very complacent in assuming that's never gonna change, because Russia, with Sergei Glazyev, who's an economic advisor to Vladimir Putin, has architected this de-dollarization scheme, which directly is designed to attack the dollar's hegemony And he's trying as hard as he can to persuade as many countries as possible, particularly in the BRICS countries, to stop accepting US dollars for oil and for other international commerce, and to conduct that commerce in rubles, in yuan, in other currencies. And the reason he's doing that is not because he, you know, loves rubles and wants to see them used more. He knows that the US has what was famously termed exorbitant privilege by the French finance minister, later President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. I'm sure I'm mispronouncing that. My apologies.
Aaron Chan: That's pretty good, Erik.
Erik Townsend: I'm trying. So, you know, basically, Glazyev knows that the U.S. enjoys this exorbitant privilege of being able to go into debt essentially for free without the consequences that other nations that are not reserve currency issuer would suffer if they were to try to do so. And he's sick of it, and he's doing everything that he can.
Aaron Chan: Sure.
Erik Townsend: Sergei Glazyev is not the most powerful man in the world. He doesn't have the ability to make this happen overnight. But the BRICS countries represent about half of the population of the planet. And yeah, it's not the well-heeled half of the population that gets to make up the rules.
But there is a growing international frustration with US dollar hegemony. And there are more and more voices around the world saying, hey, it's true that there is no viable alternative. alternative to the US dollar as reserve currency. That's a problem, and it's a problem we need to start working on solving.
And I don't think anyone in the United States takes this seriously. If you mention the de-dollarization plan, Sergei Glazyev, anybody in the US government is just gonna laugh you out of the room and just say, oh, they're just blowing smoke. Yeah, it might be true today, but there's growing sentiment, and there's more and more people around the world that are getting frustrated with the American hegemony over the world financial system.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, that's fascinating stuff, Erik, and it really makes me wonder what will happen geopolitically, whether the US will even allow this to happen in the first place without some major conflict. And I really wish we could continue this conversation, but unfortunately we're running low on time. So anything else you want to cover before we close?
Postgame: thanks to ZeroHedge and a call for listener growth
Erik Townsend: Well, I want to thank ZeroHedge publicly Thank you, Tyler. Last week we begged for help. We said ZeroHedge hasn't covered us in a while. And sure enough, they picked up last week's interview with Jeff Snider and did a really nice feature article for us, which resulted in a whole bunch of new subscriptions. So we welcome aboard ZeroHedge readers who are just joining us over the last couple of weeks, and thanks go out to Tyler for the help with promotion. And folks, we really need your help as well. The more that we can increase the name recognition and the number of regular listeners, and particularly registered users at MacroVoices.com, The more that helps us to get better guests on the program. I know, Aaron, you're working on one really high-profile guest that we might be able to get at the end of September. That's not booked yet.
Aaron Chan: Don't give it away, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I'm not giving it away. We'll keep it a secret. But it's not booked yet, so we'll wait to tell you who that is. But we're working on it, and what it takes, you know, if you retweet us, if you post links to MacroVoices on Twitter, on discussion forums, and so forth, The more that we can grow the listener base, the more we can bring you the guests that you want.
When you register your free account at MacroVoices.com, you'll automatically receive our free Research Roundup email, which is a weekly compendium of links to all the cool research that we could find on the internet, as well as anything in support of this week's feature interview. So, Aaron let's tell them before we wrap up what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Postgame: Research Roundup highlights
Aaron Chan: All right, thanks, Erik. So this week I want to start off by highlighting an article by Macro Ops, which details a new SEC rule set to go in effect on October 17th, which will require prime and muni market funds to float their NAVs and impose redemption fees and liquidity gates. Now, this is a big deal because companies and banks that get their day-to-day financing from commercial paper will soon encounter an even greater dollar shortage as investors pile into Treasury bills to the tune of possibly $500 billion in the next few months. So this is definitely something to watch closely going forward.
We've also got recent interviews from James Grant and Stephanie Pomboy. Mr. Grant reiterates his bullish views on gold and gold mining stocks and states that the former is a very timely way to invest in monetary disorder. Now, Ms. Pomboy doesn't pull any punches either and rips back the curtain on the struggling U.S. consumer. She also reiterates her bullish view on Treasuries and gold and expects spreads between investment-grade and high yield to widen. Finally, as a sort of prequel to last week's phenomenal interview from Jeffrey Snider, Snider of Alhambra Partners. He recounts Brazil's recent experience with dollar shortage and how bilateral credit arrangements with China saved the day. Well, for now. But what is clear is that monetary bodies of substantial mass are intervening in the Eurodollar markets, and this continues to pile up evidence for the persistent global shortage in dollars, and therefore a feather in the cap of the strong dollar thesis.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even Also, thanks to our listeners who've submitted their articles and content. If you'd like to share your work with our community, you can shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag. Don't forget to follow our main account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and episode releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend or myself @_AaronChen_.
For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Aaron. Chat with you next week.
Outro and disclaimer
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.
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MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. And now back to the program. Only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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