Simon Hunt — China expert (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Simon Hunt: Hello, everyone.
Announcer: Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Episode preview and Erik's Real Vision screen test
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 34 was recorded October 6th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. When I spoke to you last week, the Chinese yuan was not yet part of the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights system, or SDR. This week it is, and accordingly, we have a China-centric show planned for you this week, with China expert Simon Hunt joining me as this week's featured interview guest. Simon and I will be discussing the massive credit expansion that's occurred in China since 2008, what drove it, and why it's starting to come under control. We'll also discuss the yuan's inclusion in the SDR, inflation, the dollar index, and much more.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan Before we dive into this week's markets, I'm sure the Real Vision television viewers in our audience were surprised to see you make your TV debut this week, interviewing Real Vision founder Raoul Pal for an update on many of the topics you discussed with him here on MacroVoices just 3 weeks ago. So Erik, what's going on here? Do you have aspirations for television fame?
Erik Townsend: You know, I really enjoyed meeting Raoul in person and spending some time with him. I think he's one of the absolute best macro thinkers of our time. And frankly, getting to know Raoul on a personal level is just as compelling as listening to him talk about macro. We share a lot of things in common. We both retired in our 30s thinking we were going to move to the beach and found out that that wasn't the panacea that we thought it was going to be. We're both sailors, we're both scuba divers, and we're both rum drinkers. So we didn't do any sailing or scuba diving on this trip, but I'm not going to come I don't want to comment on their rum drinking. In general, though, yeah, Real Vision is looking for more video interviewers to cover different geographies, and I find the work that they do, and particularly the guests that they're able to attract, absolutely fantastic. So, this was something of a screen test for me.
They didn't announce that publicly. If anybody in the audience liked that, please let them know, because they're deciding whether or not to give me an opportunity to do some more interviews for them, which I would very much enjoy doing. I want to just reach out to Twitter users John Shippen and Bill Hein, who both were very kind in their tweets about this particular episode. And it really touched my heart when I got home after 14 and a half hours on airplanes and found those tweets in my notifications.
Aaron Chan: Right. And we should remind our listeners that you can get a 1-week free trial of Real Vision Television by going to www.realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices. The free trial will allow you to watch Erik's interview with Raoul, plus hundreds of other fascinating interviews.
S&P 500 range and election debate volatility
Aaron Chan: All right, moving on to markets. So even as presidential election drama heats up on both sides, S&P 500 stock index futures have managed to muddle through the last week, rarely trading outside of a fairly tight band between 2,140 and 2,160. Now, by Thursday's close, the E-mini S&P futures contract was trading at 2,155. Erik, any change to your outlook on equities?
Erik Townsend: Well, not a whole lot has changed. What I said last week is that I think we're in a consolidation range as the market waits for an indication as to who's likely to win this election. And as we haven't seen any definitive indication of that this week. That's narrowed the trading range a little bit. I think that we're likely to see very considerable volatility on Sunday evening during this next presidential debate. Now remember that not only do the markets trade on Sunday evenings, but it's a very thin liquidity time. It's the kind of time when you can expect very big moves to occur even on small amounts of news. So if there is an obvious winner, if somebody is really kicking butt in the debate. If that's Hillary, I think markets move sharply higher. If it's Donald, markets sharply lower. And I've— as I've described before, when I say markets sharply lower if Donald is winning, it doesn't mean that the market is saying Donald's the wrong guy.
What it means is that the market is saying Hillary would mean business as usual, where Fed policy is basically for sale to Wall Street in exchange for campaign donations. Donald has shown signs of maybe not supporting that any further. So, So, for that reason, I think that if it appears that Donald is gaining in popularity, it's going to hurt the markets, at least in the short term.
Once that outcome becomes clear, whether it's on debate night or not, before or after the— or at the time of the election, I'd expect a fairly big move in equity markets. But frankly, I don't think it's the beginning of a major trend. If Hillary wins the election, I would expect a move much higher to what could be a blow-off top and maybe just all downhill from there.
Aaron Chan: Okay.
Crude oil, the OPEC deal and inventory draws
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, crude oil has been on fire with front-month WTI futures topping $50 for the first time since June. Erik, what happened? I mean, what launched crude oil prices into orbit? Is this all fallout from the OPEC deal?
Erik Townsend: No, I don't think it's a result of the OPEC deal. As I've described before, the OPEC deal is utterly irrelevant to supply and demand because all they've agreed to do— they haven't actually agreed to do anything. They've agreed to maybe at the November meeting, at that point, agree to a production cap at a level
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: Which represents essentially an all-time record high of production. So, it doesn't mean anything other than the symbolic importance of people are finally starting to work together to stabilize markets, which they weren't doing before.
The thing is, as much as I think the OPEC deal is utterly irrelevant to supply and demand, inventory reports, on the other hand, most assuredly are relevant. And despite the expectations that not only Art Berman and I have had, but also Goldman Sachs has been very vocal about saying, Q4 Oh, baby, you're going to see massive builds in inventory. Well, guess what? It's not only is it not happening, but it's going the other way.
This week, we saw a 3 million barrel drawdown on nationwide crude oil inventories. Meanwhile, Cushing, Oklahoma, 569,000 barrel build on inventory. That's going in the other direction. But, you know, compared to 3 million barrels nationwide and also a drawdown last week, really, Cushing is just treading water. Gasoline, 222,000 barrel build. Okay, that's going in the other direction, but it It pales in contrast to a 2.4 million barrel drawdown in distillate inventories. So net of both distillates and gasoline, big drawdown in finished products, big drawdown in crude oil. And it's ironic that, you know, at the time of year when we were expected seasonally to be drawing down on inventories, we were building inventories. And now that we've moved into the time of year when seasonally one would expect builds in inventories, we're getting drawdowns. So it's like seasonality is working in reverse this year. And again, it's not just Art Berman and me who have had this view. Goldman just a couple of weeks ago said that a move back into the $30s was inevitable because of all of the builds in inventory that they saw coming in Q4.
Well, if that's going to happen, it better happen soon because Q4 is upon us and we're just seeing drawdown after drawdown after drawdown. Sam Madani tells me he thinks that exports are a big part of it. There has suddenly been a rash of exports of both crude oil and finished products out of the United States. The East Coast gas I think the gasoline pipeline disruptions may have explained part of that. There may have been gasoline that was landlocked that got exported because there was no good way to move it someplace. I'm frankly not even sure of that because I've been traveling for the last week and haven't been able to really dive into it.
As far as how much farther this could go, as far as the OPEC effect, I think that's probably played out as much as it can. But it was time for everyone to, you know, hunker down and get ready for all the builds on inventory, and we're going in the other direction. 5 weeks now of inventory That's sure starting to sound like a trend to me, very much unexpected. So, if the view that I've had and that Art Berman has had and Goldman Sachs has had, that prices are headed much lower in Q4 because of inventory builds, is going to be proven true, we better start getting those inventory builds pretty darn soon.
Gold breaks below $1,308
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, if it's any consolation, you sure got the call on gold right. Finally, I don't have to introduce the topic of gold with the same old broken record about a consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377. But Erik, last week you declared that the pattern actually looked more like a descending triangle, and you said that a downward resolution of that triangle was looking more and more likely. You went on to say that would probably portend a much more bearish outlook for gold. Now, you sure nailed that call. The barbarous relic traded as low as $1,252 on Thursday morning and closed Thursday's session at $1,256. The chart looks pretty ominous. Is there farther to go on the downside, and what's your intermediate to long-term outlook for gold?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's hard to say where the downside target is. I think that Fed policy is driving this. Increasing rate expectations for the next meeting probably was the catalyst. Once we broke that support, I was not the only one watching 1308 as key support. As soon as we saw a decisive breakdown below that level, it accelerated. And in the last few days since that's happened, there's been more downside. Is there going to be even more downside? What's the final bottom? I don't know. I think it's going to depend on the news flow more than anything else. Certainly the The technicals suggest that there could be more downside, but in the grand scheme of things, we're headed towards a buying opportunity here. And I think that the long gold, long dollar index pairs trade that Raoul Pal and I talked about both in our interview 3 weeks ago on this program and then again in the Real Vision interview just this week is probably going to be the way to play this because, as we'll get to in a minute, we're also seeing considerable upside in the dollar index this week.
Right.
10-year Treasuries: Raoul Pal versus Gundlach
Aaron Chan: For the last few weeks, we've been reflecting on your decision not to buy the dip, as you'd originally planned, by buying 10-year Treasury futures when the yield dropped briefly below 1.70% about 3 weeks ago. Well, guess what? The market is giving you a second chance, Erik, with 10-year yields trading at 1.72% on Thursday afternoon.
Are you going to pull the trigger this time?
Erik Townsend: No, I don't think I am. Actually, I'm pretty much decided not to. And it's tempting. It's very possible this 1.7, 1.73 or so percent Treasury yield has clearly been a resistance level in yield, a support level in price. So, a technical trader would definitely be tempted to buy here.
The thing is, I listened to Jeff Gundlach's interview on Real Vision Television recently. He makes exactly the same argument that Raoul Pal makes. Raoul Pal makes a bullish argument saying it's time to go long 10-year Treasuries. Gundlach makes the opposite argument, saying, for almost the exact same reasons that Raoul stated, it's time to go short 10-year Treasuries. And I called Raoul out on this in the video interview we did with Real Vision. And he said, well, it's a matter of timeframe. He's looking at a shorter time horizon than Jeff Gundlach is. And I totally agree with Raoul's logic and rationale there.
The thing is, I think that Gundlach makes a very good point, which is we're at the end of a 35-plus-year bull market in bonds.
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Do you really want to try to jump into this trade at the very tail end of it and make a profit on that ride from, let's say we go from 1.72% all the way down to 1% on the Treasury yield? Do you really want to try to take that risk right now? Or is it time to say that whether it's over right now or not over right now, eventually we're headed towards much higher yields and it's probably a little bit late in the game for this?
Gundlach makes an excellent argument, which is, if you wanna make a trade, there's probably other trades to make where you're not getting in on the very tail end of a 35-year-old trend. So I think Raoul is probably going to be proven right. I think he's going to make money on his trade in the short term, and then eventually Gundlach will be proven right in a longer timeframe. I don't really want to jump into this one right here.
US dollar index above its 200-day average
Aaron Chan: And finally, a topic you and Raoul discussed at quite some length, the US dollar. It broke above its 200-day moving average this week, trading on a 96 handle as we're taping this show Thursday afternoon. And it looks like it may be poised to retest resistance somewhere just above 97. I mean, is this the beginning of the big move to the upside?
Erik Townsend: I think it could be. The breakout above the 200-day was clearly significant. We're 96.71 as we speak Thursday afternoon, just after 4 o'clock on Eastern time. And, you know, the breakout above the 200-day moving average has already happened. We were seeing a bunch of resistance right there around 96.5 or so. We're above that. We're going to have a closing print above that today.
97, I think, was it 97.39 or 97.89? I can't remember what the high print was on this cycle. That's going to be the next thing to watch for. And I won't be surprised if we break above it. I do think, as Raoul and I have discussed both on this program and on Real Vision, this is a hard one to call. Every time you're sure you know where it's headed, it seems to reverse and go the other way. So, I'm still waiting it out, but I think that we may be headed for the beginning of the big move here.
Aaron Chan: Well, great. Thanks for the market update. Simon Hunt is a recognized expert on China. And since the yuan was just incorporated in the SDR, the International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights, we're bringing you Mr. Hunt for some perspective on the backstory that got us here. Erik's interview with Mr. Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Simon Hunt: China's credit expansion, Xi and the anti-corruption drive
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Simon Hunt. And Simon, thank you so much for agreeing to help us out with this interview on short notice. I wanted to get a China expert on the show this week because of the upcoming inclusion of the Chinese Renminbi in the Special Drawing Rights of the IMF. But before we dive into that minutia, let's take a big step back because I think a lot of Westerners, myself included, don't really have a clear picture of how we got here with China. Since 2008, there's been a massive credit expansion in China. So give us the backstory. What's going on with China? Where did this credit expansion come from? How did we get here?
Simon Hunt: Big question. You have to remember that the government in place in 2000, in that period, came from the Chinese Youth League, whose power base is in the local governments and provinces. And it was assets in that area that suffered from the initial reverberations of the 2008-2009 global recession.
They pumped in enormous amounts of credit, much of which fed back into not the real economy but into the kleptocracy that was governing the country. When President Xi came into office there was a severe risk that the party was losing control because the mass was beginning to rebel against the corruption that was taking place at the center.
He decided that in order to— in order for the party to retain control and to get the masses back on board, There had to be a significant restructuring of the economy based on the center taking power and based on a very powerful anti-corruption drive.
So in order to do that, President Xi has had to get control of most of all, if he can, the levers of power. This is what's been going on the last three odd years. Part of that, part of what happened was global. Global growth slowed to a snail's pace. Commodity prices collapsed, and it left the Chinese financial system with enormous stroke enormous undisclosed debts.
This new government, led by President Xi, Xi decided that the issue had to be confronted, and this came out very clearly in the famous or infamous letter in the People's Daily of the 18th of May this year, written by an undisclosed writer but purportedly President Xi's personal. Economic advisor.
And it was made very clear in that letter, and anybody who read the entirety of it knew what was coming, which was that we cannot continue with the policies that were pursued by the previous government. Debt cannot go on forever. We have to restructure. There will be pain.
It took a long time for President Xi's clique to appreciate the depth of the problem. And this was because the size of the debt, not just as a total figure, but between companies with— if within different supply chains, was simply enormous.
And I can give one personal example. Example, a company that I was very close to earlier this year got into very serious trouble because many of its clients in Beijing and in the provinces went bankrupt and left them with huge debts on their books. But the bank supported them because if they had allowed that company to go, then the chain reaction right down that whole chain of supply would have been enormous.
So the government has realized that rather than taking a sledgehammer to the debt problem, which many in the Western world have been saying they should do, decided that this was not something you could successfully accomplish in 1 or 2 years. It has to be a very thoughtful slow process. And that's what's happening now.
So to take a recent example, a state-owned steel company was made bankrupt. The creditors pushed it. And the main creditor, of course, is the government. So what this signals is that credit markets are going to do the job that they have been designed, designed to do. So we are going to start to see state-owned enterprises that have little chance of survival being made bankrupt with the full support of its creditors.
What we are seeing also in the private sector is the banks have got very tough. Where banks see little sign of recovery, bad management, indebtedness, etc., etc., they're pulling the plug. The world is now saying China has this huge debt problem, it can't resolve it. Not true. They are, but the process is being very painful.
And the pain is also being experienced not just in China, but in the West, as the companies that banks were previously supporting are finding that the credit that they did have in the West is no longer there.
So that's where we are today. The question now is what happens? Well, it's very interesting because what we are now seeing in the last few months is in the private sector as well as in the SOE sector, profits are starting to improve as bad credit is expunged, as cash management has improved by necessity.
And in fact, in the latest 2 months' figures, you've seen a surge in profitability. So what I submit is that China is on the right path, that government knows that it has to continue to restructure and reform. The restructuring and reform has been slowed down by this political battle between the Chinese Youth League, of which Premier Li is the current leader.
And the president's clique, which basically says the center, i.e., Beijing, is the overall authority and that the provinces should obey that authority. So we have seen also monetary policy is accommodative, true M1 is rising quite rapidly, profitability of industry is improving.
Infrastructure spending is increasing. The government, the NDRC, recently released 25 infrastructure projects. 22 of them were frozen earlier this year because of corruption. So you are now getting the combination of accommodative monetary policy Fiscal policy is also being accommodative. The fiscal deficit will probably rise to somewhere between 3.5% and 4%. So what we can see is a recovery coming through. It's already started and will gather pace through the rest of this year and certainly into next year.
Erik Townsend: So to summarize, we've got a massive credit expansion in China since the Great Financial Crisis, getting out of control at one point to where it was just fueling corruption, kind of a crackdown this spring, and the government taking proactive action to get it under control. And you think that they've got their handle on it and it is headed in the right direction now.
Simon Hunt: Right.
Yuan joins the SDR: dollar and inflation outlook
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to the SDR. With that backdrop of what's going on in China, why would the IMF consider including the Renminbi the SDR? What's the backstory? What— why— what's the significance of this? How did it come about?
Simon Hunt: That is a very, very big question. I think one can surmise that there was a huge internal battle within the IMF to allow the RMB to be included in the SDR, which happened on the 1st of October. The protagonists led by America, or primarily America, probably voted against its inclusion.
From what I understand, Lagarde was a very brave person and fought against their opposition. One can guess that China also used various levers to ensure that the RMB was included. It. Now that it is in the system, and if you look back every time that the Fed has indicated that it might increase interest rates, the PBOC ensured that the RMB had a dive.
One can argue, and some now do in, in high places, that real monetary policy is no longer being managed out of Washington, but now out of Beijing. So what do we see happening? First, I think that over the next few months, you are going to see an even stronger dollar, which will prick commodities, commodity-producing countries, and asset values.
My guess is that various support measures will be introduced by many governments, including the United States, and that the real underlying new financial structure masterminded by the few big people is that we now shift from a deflation environment into an inflation environment. which will be supported by global fiscal deficits to finance infrastructure expenditure.
Inflation, commodity boom and the 2019-2021 plug
Erik Townsend: I'd like to expand on that topic of inflation because a view that I've had for a long time has been, you know, we're in this environment of money printing, of central banks just conjuring money out of thin air to solve their problems, which I contend cannot go on forever. Well, what would stop it from going on, of course, would be if we started to have a problem with runaway inflation. First, would you agree with that view? And second, if you do, how long do you think it takes before we get to an environment that's sufficiently inflationary that it starts to tie the hands of central bankers?
Simon Hunt: First of all, central bankers initially will welcome any form of inflation. But as we all know, central bankers are basically behind the curve. Having thrown— what is it— $12 trillion, having bought $12 trillion of assets globally since the Lehman crisis, there is a huge amount of money sitting within the financial system earning very little returns.
What we see coming through is that with fiscal deficits expanding to help finance infrastructure spending, that— and this is supported by global M1 data— we are going to see a faster recovery in 2017 than is the consensus forecast and that of the IMF, World Bank, etc., etc., which makes me very happy.
This in turn will lead to an inflation of commodity prices which bankers will welcome. And I think that the combination of what you are also going to see is funds that have been stuck within the banking system will suddenly find that better returns will be found by investing outside the banking system— infrastructure projects, etc., etc.
So unexpectedly, you are going to see the start of inflationary pressures. These could well be augmented by developments like oil prices rising far beyond the consensus view because of developments in the Middle East, metal prices doing what they have always done, which is that the real turning points both up and down in metal prices come from the huge inventory chain of finished products, components, semi-fabricated products, etc., within the manufacturing chain.
That is what has always caused the peaks and troughs in metal prices. So as the global economy recovers and prices begin to pick up, then you are going to the inventory chain in the manufacturing sector being filled again as it's been depleted. And thus you see a switch from inventory being held at the raw material stage into the manufacturing stage. And that lays the groundwork for the big rise that will happen over the next 2 to 3 years in commodity prices.
This is not going to be a sustainable rise. In my view, it will last for two to three years because the masters of the global system, to coin a phrase, know that the current financial system is totally unsustainable. You cannot have debt continuing to rise faster than GDP.
So either the system itself will implode, or else they pull the plug. As things currently stand, I think. that, that plug is pulled somewhere between 2019 and 2021, and it will then be followed by really severe deflation of asset prices. So the coming period of rising asset prices, which will last 2 to 3 years, should be used to prepare for the disaster that is then going to unfold.
Will China devalue the yuan? Bass versus Hendry
Erik Townsend: Okay, let's go back to the renminbi for a minute. I've been watching with interest kind of a proxy battle of the Great hedge fund managers through their Real Vision interviews on Real Vision Television, as well as your own interview recently. Kyle Bass has opined very strongly that the PBOC will be forced to markedly devalue the yuan in order to deal with the unwind of this massive credit expansion. Hugh Hendry has countered that that's utterly ridiculous, that the consequences of a major devaluation would be so extreme that they cannot possibly They can't afford to do that. There's no way it's going to happen.
And then recently, I think Grant Williams put that comment from Hugh back to Kyle, and Kyle said, Hugh doesn't understand. I'm not predicting that they're going to want to do this. I'm predicting this is going to happen to them against their greatest resistance. There will be no stopping it. They will be forced to recapitalize their banks as all the bad credit starts to unwind. And in that recapitalization process, they'll be forced to devalue dramatically. Who's got this right? Or perhaps neither of them do. And there's another view.
Simon Hunt: Well, I think my own view, let's put it that way, is that people forget that China's long-term growth, like over the next 10, 15 years, is going to be double that of the advanced economies of the Western world. So we're talking 4 to 5% versus about 2%. So growth is going to be one way that debt can be washed out.
Secondly, if China wanted to tomorrow to completely wash out the debt, it's got the resources to do it. But if it did it, the consequences on the rest of the world would be extremely dire and probably more dire than within China itself. Most of China's debt is internal, and this is something, as I said earlier, that President Xi's group have now got firmly in hand.
Secondly, there is a— how can one call it— an emotional element to this whole discussion about the RMB. The president feels that a strong RMB means strong leadership and a strong economy. They're not going to allow it to collapse. And now that the RMB is within the SDR. They can use the SDR system if they so wanted to defend the RMB.
On another note, the PBOC or the Chinese government has a firm commitment to continue reducing its holdings of U.S. Treasury securities and other American debt. As they see it. It's a nil long-term investment. The proceeds of selling that debt does not altogether go back into China, as people have assumed.
A lot of it is being held in cash, probably still in dollars, which at the appropriate time will be put to better use, either in infrastructure projects or in Asian currencies where they see. better long-term returns.
Why China stockpiles commodities
Erik Townsend: Another topic I'd like to get your opinion on. I had a fascinating experience back in 2012. I was traveling around the world. In Australia, I met a fellow who actually is an engineer on one of the big ships that delivers coal and iron ore to China from Australia. And we were talking about the significance of those exports to the Australian economy. And he looked at me and he said, Erik, it's in the harbor. And I said, what? And he said— he described to me a scene that he has seen dozens upon dozens of times, which is they pull into port in China, they unload thousands of tons of coal and iron ore that, you know, cost millions of dollars. This is very expensive stuff. And as they're pulling away from the pier, they observe the Chinese literally bulldozing it into the harbor, just stockpiling all these commodities that they're purchasing apparently for later use. What's going on? What is the backstory?
Why in the world is China stockpiling raw commodities literally to the point of bulldozing them into the harbor because they have no other place to put them?
Simon Hunt: I, I can add to that. I think that in other metals too, China has been deliberately stockpiling putting the material into unreported locations. The sums are very large, enormous. I think there are several reasons for this. First of all, they are an importer of key commodities to drive their economy.
Should relationships with America deteriorate any further, It's quite possible that America could turn off one or more of the sea route choke points. So if you're a planning nation, which China is, you have Plan B. And Plan B is we have to have these contingency plans.
So I think that what has been going on and is ongoing is that it's not just the coal and the iron ore or whatever. It's actually the finished metals as well, which are basically bought through the the SRB, the State Reserve Bureau. And my guess, and it's only a guess, is that they will be significantly larger buyers over the next two years than they have been over the last two years.
Another point: China doesn't basically does not want dollars. So stockpiling metals, buying natural resources is a part of the dollar diversification program. So, and finally, the Chinese financial system would very much like to see higher commodity prices because the severity of their non-performing loans in that sector sector, both to producers, fabricators, importers, traders, etc., is simply enormous.
So yeah, they have built big resource reserves and they're going to get bigger.
The China-Russia alliance
Erik Townsend: I think that's a good segue to another topic that I find profoundly interesting, and I'm surprised that no one in the West seems to pay attention to it, which is what appears to me to be a rapidly growing alliance between China and Russia. We see this in the South China Sea with the disputed islands. And as you just alluded to, this de-dollarization campaign that Sergey Glazyev in Russia has masterminded, trying to encourage people to stop conducting trade in US dollars and use other currencies— China seems to be very rapidly warming up to that. So what's your take on this apparent alliance between China and Russia?
Simon Hunt: I think it's a very deep strategic alliance. It's military, it's economic, it's financial, and it's cultural. And I think it's been brought about by force of circumstances. Both countries realized that America wanted to contain what Halford Mackinder called the the center, which was the whole of Central Asia, from becoming a global power.
So they've been forced into this alliance, which they now find to be mutually profitable. Parts of the alliance, Russia will be the leader, and other parts, China is the leader. But they are working together very closely. To give one example, Syria.
China has actually sent or is in the process of sending what they call peacekeepers to Syria to support Russia. I mean, this is a— there's a mega, mega change in the global chessboard, and it's centered around Russia, China, Iran, Iraq, the other BRICS countries, and now I understand even Turkey. So you then have— think about it— you've got that whole rim of countries stretching from China China, through to India, Pakistan, Iran, and into Turkey, and through into the Middle East as one, one alliance.
Erik Townsend: It's the anti-NATO.
Simon Hunt: It's anti-NATO. It's anti-America. And the real question is, how does America respond? It doesn't want to lose its unipolar status. What's it going to do? And I think that we could, over the next couple of months, get a horrible shock. Quite what it is, I have no idea, but I think that shock is probably going to come before the presidential election.
Erik Townsend: I've been trying to ask all of our guests, without taking a stand yourself, to just objectively opine on what the consequence to global markets would be of either a Trump or a Clinton presidency.
Simon Hunt: I'll answer that by saying outside my discipline. Okay, but I, I do I do think that with Trump, you'll get the initial emotional knockdown. And when sanity returns, I think it'll be very positive. But I think that if Hillary gets in, you'll get the initial emotional uptick. But when people look at things carefully, I think they'll get extremely worried. And I would suspect then that equity markets will be dumped.
Dollar outlook: near-term strength, then a secular fall
Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's move on. I'm particularly keen to understand your view on the US dollar, because frankly, we've had so many guests on this program that have all taken a bullish view, although it has not played out as the bulls have expected it to. I believe that you have a structural bearish view on the US dollar, which is a welcome change just to get a contrasting viewpoint. Please explain.
Simon Hunt: Yeah, I think, though, that as I mentioned earlier, that over the next month or two, we're going to see a very strong dollar driven by Washington antics. It's almost the last throw of the dice. But I think that by the middle of next year, and timing is elusive, but I think by the middle of next year, you are going to see the beginnings of a secular fall in the dollar, which will be pretty massive.
Why? Because a very large part of the world has grown wary of America's arrogance. Its financial antics. I was with people today. I'm in Singapore. People today in Singapore say we can't open a bank account if there's an American partner there. A family friend of mine in Switzerland is opening a new art gallery.
His partner is an American, and he said, "I cannot open an account in a big international Swiss bank because they don't want to have anything to." do with anybody who's connected to America. That's the sort of thing that is going on globally. People— excuse my language— are just thoroughly pissed off with what America is trying to do. It's being bully boy tactics. And they're now saying enough is enough. And more and more of world trade is going to be conducted outside the dollar system.
A system reset around 2020 and gold's return
Erik Townsend: Okay. And I'd like to move on now to a prediction that I think you made in your recent Real Vision television interview. I believe that you said You said that the global economic system is within 5 years of a major reset. Can you explain what you meant by that? And, you know, that's obviously a big—
Simon Hunt: Well, I'll do it in very general terms because I can't do it specifically. The current system is completely unsustainable. You cannot continue to have global debt rising faster than global GDP. Something has to give. But you can't restructure in a semi-okay environment. You've got to have a crisis because no government is going to play ball in a sort of okay environment.
So one way or another, you are going to have a mega crisis within the years around 2020, and then you will see a new system being introduced which will include the reemergence of gold into the monetary system.
Erik Townsend: Simon, before we close, for people who'd like to follow your work, I know you did an excellent interview on Real Vision Television just this last week. Where else can people follow your work?
Simon Hunt: Yeah, I have a website, Simon Hunt Strategic Services, and anybody can contact me on my email, which is simon@shss.com.
Erik Townsend: Well, Simon, thanks so much for joining me on the program. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. We'd love to hear from you. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Postgame: Erik's failed collapse call and what ties central bankers' hands
Aaron Chan: Great interview, Erik. You know, there are quite a few aspects of this interview that I enjoyed. In particular, I was struck by Simon's prediction for the next stock market crash in 2020. Now correct me if I'm wrong, but I don't think we've ever had another guest come on with a specific year for the next great crash. So 2020, is it time for us to pack up our stuff and head to the mountains?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, it's interesting. My reaction to that was first one emotionally of sort of solidarity. I felt a connection to Simon because it's been exactly my prediction. Within 5 years, the whole thing falls apart. Just one problem. That prediction is one that I made 7 years ago. And so I've obviously been proven wrong or early, depending on how you want to look at it. And it hasn't fallen apart.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: So I have to question, I think that the notion that this cannot go on and that it has to end badly, as so many smart people have said, there's just no way we can solve our problems by papering over with printed money and not really addressing the root cause of any of the issues that are affecting the global economy. So it has to come falling apart someday. But to say it has to happen within 5 years, how do you know it's not 10 years? I got that one wrong. The one place where I would agree very much is that—
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: The way I've come to look at this is the charade is going to continue indefinitely for as long as central bankers and governments are able to get away with it. As long as there's a deflationary backdrop that allows them to conjure money out of thin air and use it to prop up asset markets, they're going to do that.
And it's gonna keep going. It will probably get bigger before it gets better, in the sense that as they continue to get away with this, they become more brazen and more complacent and are likely to do even more of it.
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Nothing is going to change that, and they will succeed at propping up asset markets using these techniques until something ties their hands. And there's two somethings that I can think of. The big one is runaway inflation, and clearly we don't have that now. I don't see any immediate signs of that. But when we get to a situation where the macro backdrop is one of runaway inflation—not just a little bit of inflation, which central bankers would welcome with open arms—but runaway inflation—now all of the All of a sudden, they can't get away with this stuff anymore. They'll be forced to tighten monetary policy in order to combat the inflation and prevent it from developing into hyperinflation.
They won't be able to offer all of this excessive accommodation, and the whole house of cards comes crashing down. The thing is, this deflationary backdrop has been much stronger and has lasted much longer than I ever expected. How am I to know, and how is Simon Hunt to know, that it's going to change? Well, his prediction— and I think this adds a lot of credibility to his argument— His prediction for why he thinks it's going to change is he sees inflation on the horizon sooner than I do, frankly. If he's right about that, first we'll get the happy kind of inflation that they've been trying so hard to create, and the central bankers will declare victory and proclaim themselves to be geniuses because they succeeded at creating their beloved 2% inflation. Then we'll get to 3% and 4% and 5%, and all of a sudden we'll figure out that it's running away and that it requires a Paul Volcker monetary sledgehammer kind of reaction. action in order to contain it.
And that's where the party is over. Is Simon correct that that's some— you know, to say the timeframe for that is to be between 2019 and 2020? That's a bold call. I have learned that I am certainly not able to put time parameters around these things with any kind of accuracy. I have been either way early or way wrong, depending on how you want to look at it, when I thought it would have happened by now. So I've learned to watch and wait. And I think it's entirely possible that his timeframe could prove right. I think it could start tomorrow, and I think it could go on for another 20 years. We're in uncharted territory here, and we don't know how long central bankers and governments can get away with what I consider to be reckless monetary policy. We haven't even gotten to reckless fiscal policy. That probably comes next.
So, you know, I don't think it's clear when the endgame starts, but it's going to be scary when we get to it.
Who funds the next cycle: fiscal stimulus after the election
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, since you brought up inflation, I want to press you on Simon's deflation-inflation-collapse timeline. Now, it's clear Sure, we are in a disinflationary environment, and despite all the central bank asset purchases, but I'm wondering who picks up the slack in the next inflationary cycle if it were to happen in the first place? So many of the largest economies in the world have mammoth debt-to-GDP ratios. So who's left to do the infrastructure spending or the deficit spending? And is Simon basically calling for QE4 in 2017?
Erik Townsend: I don't know whether he's calling for QE4, but I think the answer is that the next president of the United States is going to be very comfortable with deficit spending, and I think that you're going to see fiscal stimulus in size. And there's certainly an argument that eventually that comes back to bite you, and I think it will come back to bite us. But I think it will be successful at least in the short term, or it depends on how you define the word successful. If you're setting up for a very terrible outcome further down the road, is that success? Well, it'll be perceived as success at least in the short term because they will be successful. They're both successful at boosting the economy, kind of getting things going so at least the numbers look good for a while. And there will be a perception of economic improvement with either outcome in the presidential election.
They've both pledged to spend ridiculous amounts of money. Clearly, there's no tax revenue to support that spending, so it has to come from deficit spending. And you can get away with it in this environment of ultra-low interest rates. When the long bond starts to back up, When inflation starts to rear its ugly head again, that's where we're in trouble. And we haven't seen any sign of that yet. I definitely think it's coming, but time will tell how long it takes for it to show up.
Controlled demolition of debt: Duncan versus Bernanke
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, I want to pivot over to politics. Simon's expertise in Chinese politics was interesting to hear. And from the sounds of it, he thinks the government has the situation under control, even alluding to the fact that they are allowing certain companies to fail. Now, this reminded me of your conversation with Alex Gurevich from a couple weeks back about there being no historical precedent for a debt unwind of this magnitude. Now, can you successfully conduct a controlled demolition of something for which there is no precedent?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the key is your own words in the question of there is no precedent. Nobody knows the answer to that. I will be the first to admit that my view has I've been cynical. I look at— there's no precedent for ever having had this kind of ridiculous credit expansion. I look at the risk of a cataclysmic unwind, and I think that that risk is so high and the consequences so dire that, in my opinion, the policy actions that we've seen to date have been reckless. Now, you could take a different view. One that comes to mind in particular would be Richard Duncan, who we interviewed on this show several months ago. And his view was basically that central banks are doing exactly the right thing. This is unprecedented action, but it is necessary because if they didn't take these unprecedented actions, then we would have a dramatic collapse now instead of later. And at least by trying this, there's a chance to see if it's going to solve the problem.
Can you somehow pull this, this tightrope act off of walking a tightrope in a hurricane and not falling off either the inflation or the deflation side of the tightrope as the wind cranks up to Category 4 or Category 5 hurricane-force winds? I don't think so. I fear a really horrific outcome of either an inflationary depression or a deflationary depression, depending on which way it plays out. And I think that all of this monetary policy has exacerbated that risk.
The counterargument, the Ben Bernanke argument, is no, as long as they manage to keep their balance, they can magically use all of This printed money and all of this debt to save the day, and then unwind it, mop up all that liquidity, and, you know, gracefully bring the economic system back into equilibrium, having averted a crisis through all of this government intervention. If that actually happens— and I don't mean in the, you know, just there's no crash in the next year or two— but if we get to 20 years from now and they pulled this thing off, there was no cataclysmic consequence, and it all came out just fine, then Ben Bernanke deserves not only the Nobel Prize—
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Nobel Prize, but, you know, 200 Nobel Prizes. Unfortunately, I'm very skeptical that that's going to happen. I think there's going to be a really, really bad ending, and I'm not the only person who thinks that. You listen to Ray Dalio, you listen to George Soros, you listen to Stan Druckenmiller.
All of these super accomplished people are saying, hey guys, this party is coming to an end. I'm not smart enough to declare, okay, right now, today's the day, it's ending, this is the beginning of the endgame. I've made that declaration several times since 2009, and I've been So I'm not going to make it again. But at some point, the endgame starts, and I think it's going to be ugly.
US relations with China and Russia, war risk
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, lastly, I wanted to get your take on the geopolitical theater. One of the reasons Simon cited for China's stockpiling of base metals and commodities was a hedge against the event that relations with the United States were to deteriorate. Now, this obviously hinges on who is elected president in November, but instead of the question we've been asking our guests on how each candidate will affect markets. I want to ask you, Erik, how do you see either candidate affecting relations with China?
Erik Townsend: Oh boy. Well, certainly Donald Trump has been most outspoken about China. What remains to be seen is how that rhetoric in campaign time leads to actual actions in office, assuming that he were elected. So I am concerned.
Frankly, my cynical joke has been, we got to wait till November to find out whether Hillary is elected to go start World War III with Russia, or if Donald is elected to go start World War III with China. Now, I say that as an exaggerated joke. I don't really have any reason to believe that Donald is going to start World War III with China. But certainly, the rhetoric that he's been slinging has been one of, let's get tough, let's make China pay their price, let's be tough with China. And I think that if you look at the history
Aaron Chan: I think that's a good point.
Erik Townsend: And the escalation of the U.S. involvement in the South China Seas with these freedom of navigation exercises challenging China's creation of these artificial islands, which I think are really all about creating artificially gas and oil drilling rights. Donald has been very outspoken. He's going to take a tough stance with China, and I fear that that could lead to a dramatic escalation with China. Hillary, I don't think, is likely to start with China. I think she's going to go pick a fight with Vladimir Putin. to be a personal vendetta there between Putin and Clinton. So one way or another, as Simon talked about in this interview, there is a growing alliance between China and Russia. And I think that if the US picks a fight with either one of them, it's going to grow into a fight with both of them. And I think it could end very badly.
I think that both the American government and the American people have developed a complacency where they kind of feel like, you know, if you look at all the wars of the last 20 years, the US basically goes in and kicks ass.
And of course, there's been a huge amount of collateral damage and difficulty and blowback, frankly, from all these wars with the Middle East. But, you know, you go into a country like Iraq and you're the strongest military force on Earth. It's a David and Goliath game. And obviously, the US is going to be the military victor in a conflict. conflict like that. China and Russia are military superpowers. They have both developed missile technology designed to sink a U.S. aircraft carrier. They are not playing with Monopoly money. They're not playing with— what's the analogy with—
Aaron Chan: They're playing for keeps.
Erik Townsend: They're playing for keeps. This is not a proxy war. This is not— and, you know, if we get to actual military conflict with China Russia, I think that we have greater risk of total nuclear winter, end-of-the-world scenarios than we ever had during the Cold War with the Soviet Union. And it seems like it's not registering for anybody. People just don't see it as a big risk. I see it as a tremendous risk.
Listener appeal and this week's Research Roundup
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that's all the time we have for this week, but anything else you'd like to add?
Erik Townsend: Well, our regular listeners know the broken record. It really helps us, folks, the way we get the very best guests on the program is by growing our listener base and our reputation. So if you can help us out by telling your friends about MacroVoices, retweeting our announcements of the show so that other people see it, forwarding your Research Roundup email to your colleagues so that they'll want to get their copy too, all these things help us to get more registered users. More registered users is a statistic that Aaron uses to recruit the very best guests for future interviews on the program. The benefit of registering, of course, is you get our Research Roundup email every week. If you don't want it, it takes one click to opt out of it. But so far, we've had a very, very low opt-out rate. It's basically a compendium of free links to all the best research we could find on the internet.
We'll have to get a link in there this week to the Real Vision interview that I did with Raoul Pal. Certainly, if you liked that, please let Real Vision know. They're deciding— that was my screen test. They're deciding whether they want me to do more of those. So your help is definitely appreciated there. Aaron, tell them what they can find in this week's Research Roundup.
Aaron Chan: Right. And this week we've got a full lineup of articles, including Crescat Capital's Q3 investor letter highlighting the topping and rolling over of a key macro indicator that measures the valuation of all global financial assets owned by US persons relative to their after-tax income. Now, Jesse Felder of The Felder Report also shared an interesting video in which Jason Cummins, a former Fed senior economist, in a rare bout of self-awareness for an orthodox economist, articulates the fact that Central banks are far from independent and, in fact, are dependent on public faith that is quickly waning. Finally, we've gotten ahold of Art Berman's 17-page slide deck from his presentation at the recent Houston Geological Society dinner. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend, Erik with a K, and myself @_AaronChan_.
For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
Aaron Chan: We'll chat with you next week.
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