Hugh Hendry — Legendary fund manager (as introduced on the show)
Announcer opening and episode preview
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 37 was recorded on October 27th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Legendary fund manager Hugh Hendry has been one of our most requested guests. Hugh will be joining me as this week's featured interview guest. We'll discuss the US dollar rally, Hugh's views on post-Brexit Europe, why he's more benign than some of his peers relative to Japan, His outlook for equity markets, Treasury yields, and much, much more.
Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude, gold and Treasuries
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. S&P 500 touched 2,150 briefly this week and closed Thursday session at 2,127. Erik, any changes to your equity outlook?
Erik Townsend: Not a whole lot of change, although I do want to correct something I said last week. I commented that that trend line we've been in all year, the uptrend that starts on February 11th of this year and then goes through that Brexit low on the 24th of June, that we were trading below that. And actually, I, I made the mistake of going by somebody else's chart when I looked at that. Some people draw a trend line from the intraday low, which was $18.02 back on the 11th of February. But, you know, most technical analysis books would tell you you really should work from the closing print, not the intraday low. And if you draw that line from the closing print on those 2 days, we're still just barely above the line, but right on the hairy edge of it. So depending on which one Which way you draw that line, are we below that critical support level or are we right on it?
I think I could make the argument either way. As you said, though, we're trading— you know, a lot of technicians have said that the previous highs that we had back, you know, going to almost a year ago can't be violated to the downside unless— or if they do, that that's going to be a very bearish signal. 21.25, some technicians have said. I've seen others saying 21.20 is the magic number. If we close below that figure, that means that it portends a much more bearish outlook. Well, we're right on the hairy edge of that. It was 2,124.5 just about 15 minutes before the close here on Thursday.
S&P futures have recovered all the way to 2,126, you know, a point above that critical level. What's going to happen in the next few days should be very telling for the equity market.
Aaron Chan: Right. And before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index. The DXY made an important upside breakout 2 weeks ago with a daily close above 97.50. Now, last week you observed that the breakout was holding, but not really accelerating to the upside. How's it looking this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, right after that interview last Thursday, Friday we saw a big move higher. We have a couple of times now traded on a 99 handle. We're at 98.87 as we're speaking around the close on Thursday. So, you know, we're very close to 99. It looks like we are seeing a slow and steady move higher. Keep in mind, of course, that the true breakout, the really important breakout, That would be above the previous cycle high, which was around $104. We've still got a ways to go in that. But as far as the consolidation range that's been in play since February, you know, we're holding more than 2 weeks now above that $97.50 level, just teetering on the edge of a $99 handle as we're speaking Thursday. So we're getting real close to it. There was a pullback earlier this week all the way down to $98.31, and we've recovered nicely from that, back up almost to $99 at the end of the day Thursday.
So it looks to me like the move to the upside is continuing, but it's kind of a slow-as-she-goes move as opposed to a really exacerbated breakout with a lot of exuberance behind it.
Aaron Chan: Right. We'll be watching that closely. All right. Well, drilling forward to crude oil, WTI reached new cycle highs last week, trading above $52 for the first time this year. But now we're back below $50. So, Erik, what's going on with crude here?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's been a heck of a week. You know, we saw oil selling off early this week as more and more people were figuring out that an OPEC production cut was not really all that likely to come together. Iraq has been saying that they don't like the numbers that OPEC was using to represent their production. For a while, there was a huge move up Thursday morning after a headline said that there was some discussion about a 5% production cut from the all-time high.
They conveniently left out the fact that Russia very promptly said, no way, we're not going to play on that game. So, you know, it's— it was selling off. Inventory has been a roller coaster ride this week. There were expectations of a 2 million barrel build on inventories. Of course, we're right in the smack dab in the middle of what seasonally should be a restocking period for crude oil inventories. That 2 million build expectation was doubled when the American Petroleum Institute, which does the private survey, predicted on Tuesday afternoon that we would see a 5 million barrel build on inventory. That caused the market sell-off to accelerate to the downside. But then on Wednesday morning, when the EIA report came out, 553,000 barrel drawdown, other direction, opposite of what was expected. The price of WTI crude oil futures rocketed up more than a dollar within seconds on that news. And it was also a very large drawdown of 1.3 million barrels in Cushing, Oklahoma.
Hmm. 2 million barrel drawdown on gasoline, 3.4 million barrel drawdown on distillates. This is all, you know, in theory, these drawdowns are very bullish for crude oil. So we did see that very rapid move up, but there was strong resistance around the $50 level. And once the headlines wore off, the sell-off continued and we retraced fully all the way back down to, you know, low $49s.
And we've seen now we're $49.62, around the close on Thursday. There's been a little bit more strength here on Thursday, but in general, the big inventory pop didn't make that much of a difference. And what's fascinating to me is all the headlines that I'm reading have returned to the rhetoric about how concerns are returning about a supply glut. Look, those of us who were not distracted by all of this OPEC rhetoric over the last few weeks have been concerned about this supply glut, and frankly, the inventory numbers have been proving us wrong. We're right in the middle of when we should be seeing big builds in crude oil inventory, and we're seeing drawdowns. So that story about the supply glut—we need to see a whole bunch of big inventory builds in a hurry here if that theory is going to continue to hold any water. Seems like it is getting more and more attention now. But seven of the last eight weeks have been bullish inventory drawdowns.
Production did increase this week, reflecting the shale drillers going back to work. That probably had a lot to do with. why once the headlines had faded, we saw that retrace back to the downside in crude oil prices. But I'm waiting to see what happens with the inventory numbers. I'm ready to change my view and turn bullish. I'm not quite there yet, but I'm on the edge of it.
Aaron Chan: Right. And moving on to gold, it's gained a little ground since we spoke last week, but only a little, trading at around $1,270 on Thursday afternoon. What's the update on the yellow metal?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I'm going to actually disagree with you a little bit. It's true that in nominal terms, we've only gained a few dollars since last week. But the fact that gold is going up at all in the face of this very strong U.S. dollar strength, really, you know, that is a testament to the strength of the gold market. One would expect with all this dollar strength that gold would be taking a nosedive.
So, the fact that we're still $1,269 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon, that we're, you know, basically $1,270, Even after the dollar has very decisively broken out to a new cycle high here, that gives me more and more faith that, you know, maybe I was thinking we were headed to the low 1,200s after I saw the breakdown from that descending triangle pattern. I'm starting to wonder now if, if maybe we missed the bottom. Maybe that 1,243 print from 2 or 3 weeks ago was the low and we're just headed uphill from here. So I'm watching it carefully. I want to see what happens with the dollar, if the dollar continues to be strong, whether not gold can continue to hold its own. But to me, the chart looks very strong here.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, I agree with you, Erik, and that's a great observation. It looks like it's basing out here. All right. Lastly, 10-year Treasury yields are up about 10 bps this week, trading at around 1.85% on Thursday afternoon. Erik, any change on your outlook here?
Erik Townsend: No, no change really. You know, I'm definitely going to ask Hugh Hendry his view on this. We've heard from Jeff Gundlach and from Raoul Pal, you know, kind of opposing views, which Raoul has described as really being about different time horizons. I'm on the sidelines I think most likely that Raoul's view will play out in the sense that we probably will see this bounce continue, maybe up to 2% or so before eventually we get into recession territory and much lower 10-year yields. But, you know, if I look at how much confidence I have in that 1% 10-year target versus how much confidence I have in something like gold moving higher over the next few years, I feel much more confident that there's better places to put this trade on. The thing I will watch for, though, is when When we get to sub-1% yields, I'm going to be looking for the long-term strategic short play on Treasuries. But, you know, if you take the Raoul Pal view that we're coming into a buying opportunity for a tactical long, he's probably right.
It's a little bit too aggressive for me. I'm going to wait for the short play, which is maybe a year out.
Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update. Hugh Hendry of Eclectica Asset Management in London is perhaps one of the most iconic and well-known hedge fund managers of our time. His macro views are extremely well respected in the industry, and his interviews on Real Vision Television have drawn record numbers of viewers. Erik's interview with Mr. Hendry is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Dollar breakout and the Fed's fork in the road
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is one of our most requested guests ever, Eclectica Asset Management's own Hugh Hendry. Hugh, thanks so much for joining us. Thanks for joining us and taking time out of your busy day. I want to dive right into the US dollar. We are seeing what most people would consider to be a breakout back to a 99 handle on the dollar index. A lot of our guests have said that they think this dollar rally is set to resume in earnest as a lot of capital from the rest of the world flows into US dollars. What's your outlook for the US dollar? How do you see this playing out?
Hugh Hendry: Okay, so I, I believe like Almost everyone in my community are long dollars. I feel that it's somewhat premature to say it is a breakout, but it is— the conjecture of the breakout is very, very appealing because it would be a breakout on the basis of 30 or 40 years, which would suggest it could be a very, very powerful breakout. But it's not quite there, and indeed, the principal factor I think dominating markets right now is this kind of binary situation that we keep finding ourselves in, which is I believe that the US economy has now successfully, if you will, re-engineered itself to deal with the fact that the dollar rose roughly 20% against the rest of the world after the Jackson Hole meeting of August 2014. If you remember, we went from 80 on the dollar index to about 104.
That acted as a tremendous brake on the US economy, and we've had subpar growth. I think that's been recycled, and I think all of the evidence now indicates that the US economy can operate robustly with where the dollar trades presently. And with the backup in nominal yields that we're seeing, with yield curves steepening, One has to believe that we are live. We are going for a rate increase by the Fed in December. The question is what comes next? Because so the fork in the road really is, does the Fed do one, but kind of signal that it's one quarter point each year, and therefore it's going to be— it wants to engineer a function of being behind the curve that actually wants to see inflation, that it wants to permit inflation running higher? In order to offset the deficit and the undershooting, if you will, over the last few years?
In which case, then, already we're seeing signs where the US inflation-protected securities are beginning to trend— it's tentative, but they're beginning to trend positively against the nominal equivalent. And that would be an environment, again, which would be helpful for gold. Or is this the case where the Fed feels emboldened to again, to use these binary terms, but rather than being dovish, to be hawkish.
If so, and the Fed indicates that this is now— it feels it can raise rates again and again, then I think your supposition of a dollar rally is very valid. I think we'd move quickly into 104 to 105 to 110 range. But beyond that, it's very hard, because I do believe that that, again, would act as a brake on the US economy. So we're all watching. I'm afraid it's very unsatisfactory, but we're all watching.
But currencies, I think you have to— the Fed gets a very hard time for having not raised rates more over the last 2 years. But people forget that the currency did the policy tightening. And so we have to watch.
Brexit, the Italy-Bund spread and euro exit risk
Erik Townsend: You said recently that the Brexit vote helped to reassign the probabilities of questioning the euro, and you gave an analogy. You used the analogy of the U.K. leaving the gold standard in '31, when at the time there were 45 members, and a couple years later, there were only 12 members. Do you think that we're on the precipice of European exit contagion becoming a major macro issue, or is Brexit going to blow over?
Hugh Hendry: Well, let's talk about it in terms of, I think, what are the probabilities that the market is assigning to these big questions? The market reveals its thinking when we look at the yield spread between the 10-year Italian BTP bond future and the German Bund for 10 years. And presently, that spread is 130 basis points.
Now, before the advent of the great financial crisis in 2008, that spread was 30 basis points, which is to say Europe had converged There was no sovereign risk that BTPs were the equivalent of German bond yields. And therefore, there was zero probability, if you will, of disintegration of the system.
And we can contrast that with the other extreme, which was at the height of the drama surrounding Greece back in the summer of between 2011 and 2012, and that spread between Between the core, if you will, the core engine of Europe, Germany and Italy, it blew out to 600 basis points.
And so my take on that is every 100 basis points of movement in that spread between those 2 sovereign bond markets of Italy and Germany seems to suggest a 10% probability of system or regime change. Right. So as I said, in 2007, zero probability. In 2012, a greater than 50% probability that someone would exit.
Today, it trades at 130. And so the market is saying it's kind of like a 10% probability that the system breaks. And that's what I would challenge. I think with the advent of Brexit, and I think with the failure to resolve the problem with the banking system, which is just profoundly greater in terms of its size and its importance in the credit mechanism within Europe vis-à-vis the US. I think that probability is too low.
And I think it's going to creep higher, especially because we have a very busy timetable for European political elections. Not only do we have this referendum in Italy, which is not going well, And we'll find out in the first week in December. But you have the French going into their national elections next April. You have the Germans having an election. You have the Dutch having an election. And I think all of the fears and the angst which were captured with Brexit, I think they're going to feature again clearly in these European elections. And I think most notably in France, where it would seem that the right-wing candidate of Le Pen seems like an odds-on certainty to go into the runoff in terms of determining who will lead the country.
And what I'm thinking is I think it's more likely to be a stable, strong European nation that rejects the status quo, as opposed to where we were back in 2011, where it was whether the weak economies could bear the pain of remaining. I think it's turned around now, where the rich, strong economies are saying there's just less and less political wherewithal, that the upside, the rewards from the system now just don't seem apparent. So that's why I'm curious about that trade. I think a 10% probability is just too low.
Erik Townsend: And what would be the next domino to fall? Is it France, then, if something starts to come apart?
Hugh Hendry: Well, the most immediate one is the Italian referendum. And it's the story written large of Europe. The referendum was a good idea. The policy that they're trying to enact seems sensible, so they're trying to challenge the fact that nothing really ever gets done in Italy, that they always suspend the hard decisions almost forever.
By trying to give more power to the party that wins and give them a mandate to pursue those policies for 5 years uninterrupted, if you will, that sounds like a good thing. However, with the foolishness of the political scene It has been transformed into a referendum on the popularity of the Prime Minister, and of course the present Prime Minister Renzi is struggling from the malaise, which is that Europe isn't working. So that's the first, that's the first clear and present danger, and from then on we just get more and more events.
An ally to that is. That Brexit itself is becoming the dominant policy, is consuming the policymakers. Europe worked, the promise of the European integration was one of rewarding that they were better together. Whereas it is, I was going to say subtly, but there's no subtlety, you have the French Prime Minister and others warning that Brexit is a hard negotiation, that the UK has to be punished for the decision. And so I fear politically, when you move from a rewards-based system to a system which can only survive with punishment, that is a system whose days are numbered.
The Italy-Bund spread trade and European banks
Erik Townsend: Is there a trade opportunity out of all this now yet, or is it hurry up and wait and see what happens?
Hugh Hendry: Well, my team and I had something of a eureka moment going back about 4 or 5 weeks ago. So we had been trading— and again, I would say a lot of our peer group had been trading— the spread, the yield spread between those Italian and German government bond yields.
That spread, as I said to you, was 130. And what we know is that since March 2014, that spread has failed to trade below 100 basis points. Below 100 basis points, that would be people being willing to pay more and more for the Italian bonds. And it's remarkable if you think for over 2 years, 2 and a half years, when you think that the ECB finally submitted itself to quantitative easing, it got the Bundesbank onside.
And so lots of, if you will, positive monetary developments have occurred over that time frame. But investors, in their wisdom, have decided that at 100 basis points, Italy feels very rich versus the German bonds. And so people are unwilling. So it would seem the only way you can break that 100 basis points would be for the Bundesbank to give its permission for the ECB when it's doing this quantitative easing and buying the sovereign bonds in Europe.
If it were permitted to buy more, a disproportionate amount of the peripheral bonds, then that would challenge my trade. But in this environment, I cannot see, with the number of monetary hawks who reside in the corridors of the ECB, I can't see how they would permit that. So for me, it has the notion of being asymmetric. We are 30 basis points below a line which has held. It's held for 2.5 years. If it breaks, I would challenge whether I should hold that position. I'd be looking to close that position. However, if the odds begin to favor another country seeking to terminate its relationship with the present regime, then you could see that trade trading 300, 400, 500 basis points higher. So it has the whiff of Asymmetry, asymmetry, I have to say to you, is one of the most overused words in the macro community. Everyone delivers, everyone promises it, but fails to deliver it.
This would seem to be an area where it's on the cards, but it's a negative carry trade. The eureka moment was that my team and I were able to determine that we could actually co-join that trade with other European-related trades, and we could eliminate the negative carry so we could have a positive carry trade. So I don't care when it happens. I just have a misgiving that we could get a fatal policy mistake. And from the modeling that we have, we believe we could make a lot of money. So on the other side, I don't like discussing the other side because it's a new trade. But it plays to the heart of the problem.
The problem with quantitative easing is clearly it undermines the profitability of the banking sector. And I think if you go back to one of the Bundesbank's reservations, they believe that economic recovery is a function of strong risk-seeking banks. And you don't get that with quantitative easing. So we've seen in the last 2 months that the European bank stocks have rallied. I mean, global banks have rallied. By the order of about 30%. It's been a tremendous and sharp price movement on the expectation of yield curves being steeper, on the expectation of higher interest rates.
Now, that just shows you the inconsistency of the world we live in, because Europe today, if anything, needs easier policy. And the banks, of course, need higher rates. They don't work. The system doesn't work. And therefore, Something has to give. I think that's my fear, that when it gives, when it breaks, it's going to be unpleasant.
Benign on Japan: BOJ yield-curve control
Erik Townsend: Well, it's certainly hard to argue with a positive carry and a big asymmetric return opportunity. Let's move around the world to Japan. You also said not too long ago that you were a lot more benign toward Japan than some of your peers in the industry. I think that was before the BOJ really came full on and said yield control, or yield Yield curve control is us, and really took on greater ownership of the Nikkei. Does that change your views in terms of being benign towards Japan?
Hugh Hendry: I think it reinforces the view. The only complaint with it is that it doesn't offer an immediate catalyst for moving asset prices. I think what, again, what the Bank of Japan— it was a very dovish action by the Bank of Japan, and they're saying that actually they would like to see inflation overshooting its target on the upside.
Now, of course, they can only dream of that scenario because for the last 20 years, it's been the opposite. But they were saying that it's a bit like John Lennon, give peace a chance. The Bank of Japan was saying, give inflation a chance. OK? What the Bank of Japan are laying out is that they do not want any incipient inflationary pressures to be eliminated. By the private sector, if you will, hiking interest rates immediately on any first sign of incipient inflationary pressures.
So it's a very bold, a very strong message. But it's a message for the future, if you will.
And the other complaint is that does that mean— let's say we had, again, a policy error out of Europe. And of course, the expectation is that when bad things happen, you get the repatriation of capital back to Japan, and so the yen appreciates. Is it the case that they would prevent 10-year bond yields?
My understanding is that it's set at zero. And if the private sector wants to push yields below zero, I think the Bank of Japan would allow that. Others disagree and believe that the Bank of Japan, at negative rates, the Bank of Japan would be selling their JGBs. Which would perhaps confound or compound the problems at that point. We'll see. I think it's experimental, and they have to suck it and see somewhat. But what it does require, regardless, what it does require, they've given an open pass, an open invitation to the Japanese government to spend more money.
Now, the Japanese government certainly has not been shy in spending money. I think the criticism is the projects that they've chosen to spend money don't seem to have done much to address the fortunes of Japan.
If I was to have a wish list, Japan, and indeed the UK, I believe, could do this. But they should be willing to run bigger fiscal deficits and cut corporate tax rates. Corporation tax rates in Japan are very high. Japan has struggled for 25 years. I don't see why Japan could not, say, abolish corporate tax rates and say, we are this island of enterprise and we welcome others. And my goodness, I think that would get things moving quickly.
And lastly, on the benign or benevolent view on Japan, I just think at the cultural and political level, it feels more homogeneous than, say, Europe. Europe is trying to force many, many countries and many, many different regimes of past experiences with inflation and deflation, et cetera, into one one-size-fits-all, whereas with Japan, it's just one entity. They don't have these competing different sovereignties, if you will, having to be submerged into one national policy.
I think if any country were to get the political mandate it really to let rip at the fiscal level, then I think there are fewer obstacles in Japan than we find in the rest of the world.
Why Hendry turned bullish: QE, creditors and debtors
Erik Townsend: The next question is one I've really been looking forward to asking you, Hugh, which is about the evolution of your views on developed market equities. Obviously, 5+ years ago, you were famously, famously bearish. And when you first turned bullish, the way I remember, or the way I perceived what you were saying at the time, was essentially, okay, this quantitative easing propping up asset markets. It's crazy, it's wrong, it's immoral. But hey, who knows how long they can keep this charade going? In some of your more recent interviews, it sounds like you don't think it's a charade anymore. You actually think that we're in a sustainable secular recovery. Is that right?
And, you know, help me understand how your views have evolved and what your current outlook is for US equities and other developed markets.
Hugh Hendry: Well, managing money is a lonely and a complex activity. And in some respects, it's an impossible task. We are trying to determine events which have yet to happen. So we are soothsayers trying to predict the future. We should really be in a circus. Instead, we're housed in skyscrapers in New York and London, et cetera. And we have this pretense of knowledge, which really doesn't exist. There is no knowledge of the future. And therefore, when I do have set out a view, a belief system, then I believe that belief system has to be subject to a time stop loss. And I gave myself no more than 2 years to be able to capitalize upon that view, which allows me to build the portfolio. So first and foremost, we had stopped ourselves out of that view of the world. That view of the world wasn't working. And it was particularly painful in 2013, because we missed— all global stock markets rose 30% in dollar terms.
So that was a Thirdly, I took exception to, if you will, the morality that I was choosing to pursue in the judgment of central banks, and I felt that that wasn't my role. That is the role for people when for citizens when they are electing leaders to run their countries. It's not the role of a hedge fund manager.
And then fourthly, I looked at what the the policy had achieved. And the policy, I think we all have to be very thankful because we did not get a depression. Back in the early months of 2009, you could not rule out that we could have taken the path which we saw with devastating implications for regular house, regular people pursuing their regular lives.
Would have been damaged immensely. So as we sit here today, the US economy is on the verge of one of its longest economic expansions in the last 50 or 60 years. Now, immediately the criticism is, yes, but the magnitude of the expansion has been modest, which I accept. However, when we're looking at the pace of the expansion in GDP, We have to remember that this has been the first economic expansion in living memory which has occurred without the private household sector taking on more debt.
Again, I think in terms of quality, the quality of this economic expansion is good, and it's long. If you'd given me that, if you said, here's the outcome if we pursue this policy, back in March 2009, I'd have bitten your hand off. Yeah, I mean, that's a great outcome.
And again, contrast that— the European nations, again, lacking the homogeneity of cause and with different factions fighting, it was disastrous. They raised interest rates, if you remember, back in 2011, and it wasn't until until the end of 2015 that they finally committed to having a looser policy. And I fear that, again, ordinary households have suffered owing to that policy. I think the ECB has been too hawkish, that monetary policy has been too tight. And therefore, Europe has wasted and has lost the opportunity that has been afforded to America.
For all of those reasons, I had to say, you know, swallow my pride and say I was wrong. And that, you know, people like— and again, when I go to say this, but Bernanke was right. I think he was courageous, and he engineered a sustainable US recovery.
The final point, which is very technical, but if you think of the world or our economy, It is split between—you can generalize and say we have two parties: we have debtors and we have creditors. Households and companies are the debtors. We have these great ideas. We wake up every morning with wonderful ideas how we're going to change the world. But of course, changing the world requires money, and we never have enough money.
And so thankfully, we have another class, which are the creditors. And these guys—they always have money. But they never have any ideas about what to do with the money. And the genius of the market-based economy is that it brings the two groups together, and the system works because the people with ideas get financing, and those ideas go on to change the world in a better way.
Now, when you look at the last thirty years, what I fear happened was. That companies and households were being asked to pay too much, that if you will, the creditors— and let's call them the bankers— not through any bad intentions, if you will, but they were being overrewarded to lend us money. So we were paying too much money. And I think that's why you saw 2 very bad developments. You saw debt continue to rise as a percentage of GDP. Which makes the economy vulnerable to shocks. And of course, you saw this grotesque disparity in incomes that creditors tend to be rich. And if you overreward rich people, then they get richer versus everyone else. So the rich got richer.
And it was all a function of this transfer mechanism called the interest rate effectively being too high. And what I believe the kind of unheralded And the purported genius of quantitative easing was that it sought to change that. It sought to eliminate this transfer levy to the rich people, to the rest of us. And it succeeded, because what it's done is it has brought interest rates down, not only overnight rates, but of course, right out to 10 years, rates are by and large flat.
They're flattened in real terms. And so— And so today, the private sector, if you can get credit, if your bank is willing to lend you money, it is lending you money at a fantastically attractive level, which can only be good for enterprise.
And my conjecture there is that— and indeed, the thought bubble which led me to that reasoning was, if interest rates are too high, if we're overrewarding credit This explains why stock markets, the S&P has lost 80%, 8-0% of its value versus a vol-adjusted holding of 10-year Treasuries. And over the last 40 years, when you think 40 years, we had Microsoft, we had Apple, we had Google, we had Facebook. You think of all the remarkable positive things that happened in America. At the entrepreneurial level, where we created businesses that went from zero to global leaders. And at the same time, we had immense economic growth from the rise of China, which itself was remarkable. And yet, on a vol-adjusted basis, stocks massively underperformed bonds. That tells me that there was a rent transfer to the creditors. The bond market represents the creditors.
So as I look forward, what I can see is that since the advent of quantitative easing, American stocks have stopped underperforming government bonds on that risk-adjusted basis, because now you're not overpaying for credit. And that has to be a good thing. So I think there's some cause to look at the world more positively, but My fear just now is that Europe and the quagmire of the policies of Europe, if we could resolve that, then I think life would look better.
Negative yields, bond vigilantes and inflation
Erik Townsend: Okay, but the consequence of all this is we now have more than $10 trillion of negative-yielding sovereign debt around the world. And there are obviously significant consequences to that. Perhaps the biggest is that there's so much of it now, and there's been So much credit expansion, I don't think most governments could go back to historically normal interest rates because they couldn't possibly service their debt if that happened. So it feels like the mother of all liquidity traps that we're sort of stuck in this negative yielding. And you've got very well-respected people like Ken Rogoff at Harvard saying we need to go deeper into negative yielding, ban cash, all this kind of stuff. How do we ever get out of this? What would the unforeseen consequences be? And I guess also what trading opportunities are created by this situation that we find the world in now?
Hugh Hendry: Well, so the negative— as you say, $10 trillion of negative rates. And I suspect over the last few months, they've become less negative, because clearly nominal bond yields have risen sharply in the last 6 weeks. But the true irony is that the central banks have succeeded making credit very cheap. But the irony is that governments, as representatives of households, are not using that present.
The central banks have delivered— we talked about Japan. The central banks have delivered this incredible opportunity to borrow money and be paid to borrow money by the capital markets. And you go to Germany. Germany, and they're running a balanced budget. They don't want to spend money. You go to the UK, you go to the US, that actually having a fiscal expansion is politically— it's the last thing any politician wants.
And so you see, this is the problem, because some of your listeners heard my last comments, and I'm saying, hey, if you can borrow from the bank, this is the best opportunity you've had in 40 years. And they'll be saying, yeah, it's all right for you to say, but when I go to the bank, the bank says, No.
Well, the government can borrow the money for you. The government can borrow and be paid to borrow and provide better services. The list is long in terms of what you could do in terms of infrastructure in the US and elsewhere. But there is just no political will to go there yet.
So I find that odd.
I find that the biggest Second, I think you're very right, because clearly, we have bond vigilantes. We have people who constantly fear inflation. When the Fed announced quantitative easing in March 2009, people said— we had the metaphor of Zimbabwean hyperinflation. And it was profoundly wrong. And what we're we're discovering is that in a mature political economy, it is very hard for policymakers to create inflation. Now, why is it hard? It's hard because the sovereign bond markets are gigantic. And those prices clearly is an interaction— in the modern markets, an interaction between central banks and the private sector, but the private sector is large of, whereby, as we've seen in the last, what, 4 to 6 weeks, US 10-year Treasury bond yields have gone from 1— well, if we take it from June, July of the summer, US 10-year bond yields have gone from 1.36 to what? Where are we today? 1.86 or so. So the private sector has tightened rates by 50 basis points at that 10-year level.
When you look back at the episodes of hyperinflation, in Germany and elsewhere, you find you just didn't have this private sector policeman, if you will. The size of the sovereign bond markets were minuscule versus their size today. And therefore, their ability to actually set interest rates was less, and policymakers were unconstrained. So I would say to you, even with these negative rates— and I think you touched upon If there are policymakers and they want to generate inflation, good luck to them, because it's hard. That's why, again, that takes us why the Bank of Japan had to come in and say, we give you absolute promise that 10-year bond yields will not go above zero. That's the first radical step of this proposition that central banks banks, unless they promise such dramatic measures, then the private sector will tighten policy.
And we won't see in the next 2, 3, 4 years, we won't see the Fed make such a promise. And therefore, if the economy in the US picks up steam, if the dollar rises, then you'll find that the private sector will be tightening policy, not the Fed. Fed, but the private sector will be tightening policy, and the economy will— I would expect the economy would slow down, and you won't get the inflation. So it's clearly, these are complicated, convoluted matters.
But that's how I react to the description you gave me.
Treasury yields: Gundlach vs Pal and hedged yield parity
Erik Townsend: So where would that leave you in terms of your outlook for US Treasury yields? We've got Jeff Gundlach saying, okay, guys, the 35-year bull market in bonds is over. The bottom is in for yields. Raoul, on the other hand, is saying buy the dip. We're headed for sub-1% on the US 10-year before this is over.
Who's right?
Hugh Hendry: Well, I would preface that Jeff is saying he's not arguing that bond yields are going to go shooting up. He's just saying he thinks the low is in, sort of thing. But my interpretation of what he's saying is those 10-year Treasury yields could just remain in this range, like 1.30% to 2% for the next X number of years.
Raoul, of course, is saying that they could go lower. I agree more with Jeff for one reason. And I think this has not been disseminated and picked up by the popular media. In the summer following Brexit, actually, I think what we saw was the convergence of US 10-year rates with the rest of the world. So what do I mean? So you're sitting there saying, what am I talking about? Because Japanese And 10-year German Bunds are yielding zero, whereas in the summer, US 10-year got to about 1.35%, 1.36%. But at those levels, foreign buyers of Treasuries got no yield uplift.
We live in a world where big financial institutions don't want to take any risk. So if you've got a very large pension or insurance endowment or one of these sovereign wealth and they are, say, based in Europe or in Japan, and they're buying US Treasuries, they will swap the dollars. They don't want to take the risk of movements in the euro-dollar or dollar-yen. And when they take out the financial— sorry, the foreign exchange risk, they have to make a payment to eliminate that risk. And that payment is captured by the OIS spread, the US LIBOR LIBOR. And as you know, that has shot up.
And so when you factor in how much you pay to hedge your foreign exchange, in the summer of this year, I would say to you that US Treasuries converged their yields on a, if you will, foreign exchange parity basis converged that they were all priced at the same level.
And I always thought that the US Treasury bull market would come to an end when US rates converge with the lower rates in the rest of the world. So I think that's happened. But I suspect that they're going to remain around these levels.
And to answer your point of where is redemption, how does the world survive with this gargantuan quantity of outstanding debt, the answer is that real rates Real 10-year US rates today are zero, and they're likely to remain at zero. And I suspect they may go negative. In the summer of 2012, we saw real negative rates of about -0.6% for US Treasuries. And so if you can run with negative real yields for 20 or 30 years, years, you will see an unwinding of debt, because economic growth will unwind it as a percent. So debt to GDP will come down.
I think that's really the— I think that is the policy which is being pursued, that the system needs to keep rates priced at these levels.
I think the system can prevail. I think it can prevail because if we look back in history, we don't have— if you look back in US history, we We had the infrastructure boom of canals, of railroads. We had the huge productivity revolution in the 1930s, but we had the buildup of chemical plants, of telecommunications. In the 1950s, we had the movement of people living outside cities. And so we needed a huge infrastructure boost to join suburbs to the cities. Today, it's not obvious that we have something. something for governments really to get behind and to spend a lot of money.
And therefore, I think you're going to see— and I think the best-case scenario is a very slow deleveraging by the world operating with negative real Treasury yields or rates.
China and the yuan: the case against devaluation
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to the Chinese yuan. And I've been very curious to watch your views and contrast them with those of Kyle Bass on this subject. As you know, Kyle has obviously been extremely strongly of the opinion that China is going to be forced to devalue dramatically. And when Raoul Pal put that question to you in a Real Vision interview, you said, no, no, look, the consequences of that would be so great, there's no way they're going to let that happen. And I don't know if you caught it, but in the next interview, Grant Williams put your comment back to Kyle Bass, and Kyle said, no, no, no, Hugh doesn't understand my view. I agree with him. They would never let that happen, but they're not going to have a choice. They're going to be put in a situation where they're forced to recap their banks as this mountain of credit expansion comes falling down. And against their strongest objections, they're going to be forced to allow the yuan to devalue dramatically.
How would you respond to that view that Kyle expressed?
Hugh Hendry: Yeah, I did see that interview and I was frustrated because I felt Grant and Raoul were not really passing on the substance of my argument. So first of all, yes, I was saying that an overnight devaluation would be dramatic. And I think I was offering to jump out the hotel window if we woke up tomorrow and that was the case. And there, I was suggesting that really, it's unnecessary.
It's unnecessary, and it would provoke such an obvious reprimand from the rest of the world, that it's not obvious that it would be a remedy.
So you know that for the last 10, if not 15 years, I think the US Treasury has had to report to Congress a report on China's FX regime, and pretty much has concluded that China has been a manipulator, that they've been prepared to put up with it, but by and large, China China has organized itself whereby its currency has been lower, or cheaper, if you will, and it's gained a competitive advantage.
So against that backdrop, the notion that the US would sit idly by and allow China to unilaterally come through with a 20% overnight devaluation, I find hard to take. I think what you would see immediately is that there would be immense tit-for-tat, that the US would impose sanctions.
Be import restrictions from China. I think that would be followed by the satellite nations of Japan and Korea. I think even the Europeans would object. Large tracts of industrial activity in Europe would be wiped out by such an FX regime. I think then the Chinese would, of course, react, and they would make it impossible for Western companies to invest more in China, and they would make it tougher on them.
You would get to a situation where the whole WTO system of the world It would unravel very quickly, and my point is: Would it be necessary?
Again, we are talking about the world's largest creditor nation that runs a huge trade surplus that is not obviously suffering from the level of its currency. And secondly, there are so many powers available that don't require such a contentious policy decision. So they can tighten up the capital controls, which is by and large what they did over the last year. They tightened up; they made it harder to take money out of the system. So they have that fiat ability to make it harder.
And then, with regard to the underlying problems of the domestic Chinese economy, they see they would seem to be overplayed. Is there a problem with bad debts in the banking system? Yes. Was there a problem with the Japanese banking system with bad debts if we go back 20, 25 years ago? Yes.
But those problems in the banking system were pretty much socialized. The government pretty much took on those debts. And Japanese debt-to-GDP levels— government debt-to-GDP levels went higher. So for my mind, the Chinese government could easily easily, by allowing us a 10% per annum expansion in debt to GDP, could resolve the bad debts residing in the banking system.
And then finally, the big issue and the big fear, if we go back 18 months ago, was clearly overinvestment. And it was especially the overinvestment in the tier 3 cities in China. And it was so immense that it probably represented almost 20% of economic activity. And we were left with, I think, what, 40 weeks of oversupply of property.
And again, what they've done, they've loosened the internal passport, hukou system, whatever it's called. And so they've made it easier for people to move into those areas. They've removed the one-child policy, which, of course, is abhorrent as it is. Various policy maneuvers, if you will. And what we see is that the worst fears, which were postulated 18 months ago, have not been fulfilled, that those property prices are rising, that the amount of surplus property in those tier 3 has dropped precipitously. I think it's about 18— it's either weeks or months down from 40.
So my point was that China was actually a grown-up nation. In terms of— I've always made the distinction between sovereigns, that you have a tier 1 and a tier 2.
And I felt that some of the bearish dispositions to China were looking upon it as we looked at Thailand and some of the Asian countries, the Asian Tigers in the 1990s, that had these huge problems. Now, they had huge problems because because they were subject— they were borrowing money from overseas. And when that money got yanked, then the system fell apart. China's problems are internal.
China is of such a size that it has to be compared with the US and with Europe. And these countries, given the scale of the internal market, they have more autonomy in terms of what they can do with their money. Monetary and fiscal policy without fearing a collapse in the currency. So they've exercised that autonomy.
Their steps seem to have provided a remedy. The economy has not gone into freefall. It's stabilized around about 6%. And finally, of course, they have favored the household sector.
I think they did get a fright after the financial crisis of 2008, where they saw that they had a susceptibility to overseas demand. Demand in terms of exports. And when that fell sharply, they did have some industrial tensions with workers being laid off. And so they looked at it and said, perhaps our model relies too much on selling to the rest of the world.
And we should pivot and make our growth more centered upon domestic or autonomous growth that we can control. And to do that, they've allowed wages to rise. So Chinese citizens have captured more of their productivity gains over the last few years. Chinese citizens get more positive real rates than they got previously.
And Chinese citizens, if you look, the renminbi versus the euro has appreciated. So you're seeing swathes of Chinese people around the world because they're feeling wealthier. So Chinese households— the Chinese household sector had been squashed, if you will, to favor the large enterprises and to favor the exporting of China Inc. And going back 5 or 6 years ago, I think the Chinese pivoted to say, hey, listen, I think we squashed the household sector too much. And now it's time to reward them.
And if we do so, then we will get this autonomous growth, which will probably put a floor on our GDP, round about somewhere between 4% and 6%.
You have to remember that consumption as a share of GDP was only 34% in China. And we've never— that's— I can't— people throw figures around, but that is a remarkable figure. It's 50% in the Philippines. We've never seen a major economy have such a low share of GDP accounted for by consumption. And so the opportunity And the opportunity to promote economic growth in China was to pursue domestic policies which encouraged more household wealth, and therefore more spending, and therefore more Chinese economic growth. And I think they've pretty much delivered that.
So I still find myself at odds with that thesis. And again, for me, when I listen to the complaints about China, my The second point is that the clock is running. If you can't capture your thesis within 2 years, you're probably wrong. If people were wise to that discipline, we would have less widowmakers, if you will, from the JGB trade of the last 25 years. You have to be able, as a macro manager, capture your contentious thesis within a— let's be generous— within a 2- to 3-year time period. Beyond that, I think you've got to kind of— you've got to pack up and find a new trade.
Costs of turning bullish, and pivoting back to bearish
Erik Townsend: For my final question, I'd like to shift gears onto a much more personal note, and that is about the personal experience that you, Hugh Hendry, have had over the last few years. Because you basically built a brand around being the most outspoken bear in the industry, famously advising people to panic and schooling Nobel laureates on how things work in the real world. And people were cheering you on at the You then got to a point where you recognized, as you just said, after a couple of years, your view wasn't working, and you changed your view. You must have known that by turning bullish, that would actually cost you redemptions and a reduction in assets under management, even if you were right. And you were proven right. You did the honorable thing. You did the noble and ethical thing, which is to change your positions to reflect where you thought the market was headed, and you were absolutely right about that, but it still cost you in terms of fees and assets under management, and to some extent notoriety in the industry because you had such a brand built.
What has this experience been like for you to have done the right thing, to have done the ethical thing, and to effectively have been punished for it, I would guess, in terms of the income that you produce because you're no longer that outspoken Scot
Hugh Hendry: Yeah. As you say, I recall sitting in front of my computer where you have to press that send button on the email and thinking, ooh, this is going to be painful. I think there was a German philosopher— I can never pronounce the German— Vonnegut. And he said, if you're going to pretend to be someone, make sure you're comfortable being that person you're pretending to be.
Erik Townsend: Be.
Hugh Hendry: And I've always been true to that. So I'd say beyond that, there was the way— my view of hedge funds was that they were a band of outsiders. They were the pirates. They were watching things, and they were willing to have a go when they saw opportunities. And then the world kind of— more money came into the system, and it became more a function of your back office service ability and how many analysts and support staff you had. And i.e., you had to look more like the Royal Navy than being a pirate. And there was a time where I felt that I started pretending to be the Royal Navy.
And that's where my— if I have regrets, it was the period where I was pretending to be someone that I was deeply uncomfortable being. So that, that shifted when, when I, when I pressed the send button. I said, it's gonna cost me, but I've got to do what feels right for me. And that's, you know, my fund— the rewards to managing other people's money can be high, but it can be capricious, and it can be a very short-lived experience.
We have managed money for now 14 years. And so we've stood somewhat the test of time. And it comes from the willingness to make those hard decisions. But for me, I need to spend a lot of time on my own, my thought processes. It's impossible to put me in an office surrounded by other people. I make too much noise.
I like to be play music and walk around. And I'm very distracting to the other deep thinkers within my organization. So I have to be penned off, if you will. And there are times where I just seek that solitude just for the deep thinking which is necessary in the endeavor. So I have that. But I can't let your question pass without, of course, reflecting on the fact that my business business did get smaller.
And so the biggest regret is that you have to lose staff. And that's a grotesque and horrible experience. But I would say that my business was too large in terms of the people we had. And I think I've now found a level where I'm happy spiritually. I'm happy intellectually. I'm happy.
And we've just sent this letter, of course, with our European European blowup trade. And so now we have the ability to— should unforeseen and unfortunate events strike, especially in Europe, or external factors come through and risk becomes very elevated, volatility goes shooting up, I now have a profile which I can make money in very bearish outcomes.
And what I'm finding is my phone— since I sent another letter saying, oh, I'm back, I'm bearish Again, I'd be welcome back, if you will. So perhaps the lesson is listen to the clients. There is a profound amount of bearishness on the part of macro— people who wish to invest in macro portfolios today.
And what I've learned is that it doesn't matter if you're right. People will not invest in a macro fund with a large equity weighting in this environment. I think they are looking upon macro just now as offering a degree of portfolio insurance against the elevated prices of risk within client portfolios. And so you have to offer a portfolio whereby if bad things happen, you are almost guaranteed to make a lot of money. So I've pivoted once more, and we certainly have trades in our book which gave us the profile that we had going into the storm of 2008.
I'm back into that strange world where storms would create big returns for my portfolio. We'll see.
Erik Townsend: Well, Hugh, I cannot thank you enough for a fantastic interview. I'd love to go into more detail on that recent note you had about the post-Brexit trade. We'll get a link to that article into our Research Roundup email that goes to our registered users. Sadly, we are out of time and can't go any further. For our accredited and institutional investor audience, of course, Eclectica-AM.com is the website for Hugh's hedge fund business. And for the rest of us, just thank you so much for a fantastic interview, Hugh. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Postgame: the QE debate
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Wow. What an awesome interview, Erik. You guys were really on such a roll, and unfortunately, we don't have a lot of time for postgame today. As an aside, apologies to our listener, Davy Nelson, who actually asked a great question about the long dollar, long gold trade, and we'll try and address this question in a future episode. But Erik, we've got time for one question, and I wanted to get your take on what Hugh said about QE being unheralded success.
Because it is the mechanism that transferred wealth from creditors, i.e., those with money, to debtors. Now, I'd argue that the exact opposite has happened, especially when you think about the asset inflation we've seen with QE, and just thinking about who owns financial assets in the first place. I mean, it appears to me that QE has made matters worse, not better, and is part of the reason governments around the world are actually immobilized by populist uprisings. So what are your thoughts here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I am definitely humbled by, you know, I have so much respect for Hugh Hendry. brilliant minds of our time. But I too was shocked by that comment that he now believes QE is an unheralded success. I was frankly very inspired by his previous sets of views about QE as being immoral. So, you know, I definitely want to pay homage to my great respect for Hugh. Maybe I'm just slow to come around to his new views. view, but I don't see it that way. And a question I had wanted to ask him, and unfortunately we didn't have time for today— he's made a comment in the past about how he eventually, when he turned bullish, decided he needed to turn down the volume, was the expression he used, on voices like Dr. Marc Faber or James Grant, who have expressed a very bearish view about how this all ends very, very badly.
And what I wanted to ask him is, You know, I too have come to the opinion that you've got to turn the volume down on those voices, because a mistake that I used to make and no longer make was because I was persuaded that those guys had it right in the long run, I assumed that that meant it was somehow imminent that things would fall apart. And that's just not true. These things take a lot longer to play out than you think they would.
I'm still persuaded that Dr. Faber and Mr. Grant have it exactly right as far as this will end very, very badly because governments have just created so much debt and conjured so much money out of thin air, and they've gotten themselves into what I think is the ultimate liquidity trap where there's literally too much sovereign debt that it would be unserviceable if we ever went back to anything close to historically normal interest rates. And you can't possibly have all the pensioners of the world ever get their pensions if we don't someday get back to normal interest rates. So I see this as all ending very, very badly in the long run. The view that I have come around to is my feeling of 5 or 6 years ago that it was imminent, that everything was about to come falling apart.
No, clearly quantitative easing has succeeded at— what's the word I want to use— at staving off this process. problem and buying us time. Now, I think it just makes the eventual resolution worse in the end. But boy, I am humbled to hear a man as brilliant as Hugh Hendry taking an opposing view, because I have so much respect for him.
In fact, a lot of my negative views are informed by what Hugh thought 5 years ago. So, if the pattern is he's 5 years ahead of me, maybe I really need to listen to this interview a few more times. times and see if I can come around to his viewpoint. But so far, no, I think that the endgame is eventually very, very bad. I think what may be true is that Ben Bernanke bought us much more time than I had previously appreciated was possible.
Aaron Chan: Well, I agree with you, Erik. And I think one of what it really speaks to as well is sort of his intellectual malleability and agility. And that's definitely something that all our listeners can take away. Well, that's all the time we've got, unfortunately. Anything you'd like to add?
Research Roundup preview and sign-off
Erik Townsend: Well, I just want to point out the reason that we're able to bring you a really big name like Hugh Hendry is because some of you guys are cooperating with us and helping us out by retweeting us and particularly by registering at MacroVoices.com. When Aaron reaches out to Hugh Hendry and Eclectica Asset Management in the future, as we continue to reach out to more of these big names that you want to hear, like Kyle Bass. The more registered users we have, and particularly the more accredited investors that we have registered in our database, that's the statistic that Aaron uses to sell these guys on why it's worth their time. So please help us out. Sign up for your free account. You get as a benefit of that the free Research Roundup email each week. Aaron, let's tell them what they can expect this week.
Aaron Chan: Great. You know, the mix of video and textual content has been very well received, and we continue this week with Ray Dalio's latest speech at the Council on Foreign Relations CEO Speaker Series, wherein he runs the macro gauntlet and offers his latest views on a wide range of macro topics. Next up, we have Thomas Schumann Capital's presentation on water as an asset class, where they make the case that water is the next big environmental investment opportunity. Now, those of you who've seen The Big Short and are fans of Michael Burry, Currie will find this presentation to be particularly intriguing. Finally, we've got Felix Zulauf's latest thoughts on markets and commentary from David Hay, who makes the important observation and sounds the alarm that markets are underpricing an increasingly hostile U.S. Congress. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
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Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.
Aaron Chan: @ErikTownsend and myself @AaronChan_. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
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