Art Berman — petroleum geologist (as introduced on the show)
Announcer show open and host introduction
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish. No holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 65B was recorded June 1st, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. This is part 2 of our 2-part crude oil special featuring petroleum geologist Art Berman. You definitely want to start with part 1, so if you haven't already listened to Episode 65A, We strongly recommend that you stop and listen to part 1 first. You can find the download at MacroVoices.com.
Now, without further ado, let's jump right back into the interview with Art Berman, right where we left off at the end of episode 65A.
Slide 9: IEA forecasts and a second glut in 2018
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager,
Erik Townsend: Now, the popular mainstream media narrative is that, boy, this glut of oil, it's been a tough roll here for quite a while, but it's finally over. It's clearly ending. It's got to be the end. But if I look at slide 9, Art, it looks to me like you're actually projecting Glut Chapter 2 comes in 2018. What's going on here?
Art Berman: Yeah, you know, now we're dealing in the realm of forecasts. And forecasts are always wrong. But again, I think that the forecasts are undoubtedly notionally correct. And so what the slide on the left is showing, the graph on the left, this is IEA's forecast of the production minus consumption balance in the world. And what it's showing is that as early as next month, you know, you look at where that first downward arrow points and you see a big spike. Well, that's May.
And so, IEA is saying that the negative market balance that we've been seeing for the last couple of months is going to reverse next month. We're going to have, you know, maybe 1 million barrels to the positive. And moving forward into 2018, we're going back to, like you say, not as much of a glut as we saw peaking in '15 and declining in '16, but another mini oversupply.
That's what IEA forecasts based on all the factors that I discussed, you know, Iraq, Iran, Libya, Nigeria, Venezuela, Brazil, etc. And then the graph on the right is simply, again, taking IEA's inventory levels for OECD, which is in red, and US, which is in blue. And I can't explain exactly why they think US stocks are going to continue falling, but they have been, so, you know, maybe that's reasonable. OECD stocks, which include US are going to be flat for the rest of the year, and then both are going to increase dramatically in the coming year. So if we place any credence in these kind of forecasts, and as I say, I, I don't believe them, but I think that they're notionally correct at least, 2018 doesn't look too good as far as we're done, you know, we're finally in the clear. And I don't depend solely on this source of data. You know, we'll get to the next slide with Macquarie Research, but those guys do a really good job.
I've known the principal down there for quite some time, many years, and they, they're completely independent of IEA, EIA, and they're coming up with pretty much the same view. Again, doesn't make it right, but that's the way that I have to imagine the future, of course, supported by a lot of other trends that I see in the present.
Slide 10: Macquarie view - debt, capital markets and low prices
Erik Townsend: Well, I have some theories of my own as to how the shape of the term structure is being engineered by the people that are setting these expectations. I'll save that for slide 14. Why don't we come back to Macquarie on slide 10? Tell us why you see this financial data basically suggesting, at least in the short term for the next year or 2, that we're going to have continued production strong and prices low.
Art Berman: I think it's all got to do with 2 issues. It's got to do with everybody's got to survive in an indebted world, and that means cash flow. And that's companies, national oil companies, little oil companies, and countries. Okay, so there's only so long that, you know, that we can— I mean, even if we're losing money on each barrel we sell, we got to have cash flow to service debt and keep shareholders happy and to keep our countrymen, if we're, you know, dealing with developing countries, from, you know, dying of starvation. So, and then there's capital markets.
You know, the capital markets of the world, the credit markets and the central bank policies that we've been living with now since the financial crash, they're all geared toward maintaining more production. That's just the trend that we've seen. When interest rates are low, you know, people are willing to put their investments into riskier places like oil and gas, because they gotta have the yield. And again, we see the forward curves that I think are, you know, are kind of reflecting that. So, you know, we look at all of this. We— Macquarie, you know, looks at potential problem countries. I've already mentioned Russia, but Brazil's another country that's in, you know, They got a ton of new offshore reserves and discoveries. The country is in a terrible problem with its corruption, and you know there's riots and demonstrations every day. They gotta put some money out there.
Macquarie sees Russia and Brazil and the U.S. with all our capital markets, you know, and our rah rah make America great again, etc. These three countries they see as being the real engines of. production growth, no matter what OPEC does.
And then OPEC, they say, man, you know, good enough that you guys have apparently adhered to, to the guidelines of the production cuts for 6 months, but do we believe you can hold this thing together for another 9 months? No, we don't. And then you got our US president talking about selling off of half of the United States' Strategic Petroleum Reserves, which I think is an absolutely awful idea. But Regardless of what I think, that puts another 300 million physical barrels out there on the market on top of all this kind of stuff.
And I repeat the term structure here only to emphasize that, you know, pick any one of these, these curves you want, the most optimistic to the most pessimistic, and none of them see prices over $50 a barrel until sometime out You know, 2.5, 3 years from now, which doesn't mean it's going to happen that way, obviously. But what we're seeing, I think, is a coming together of an awful lot of lines of evidence and opinion that all bias you very much toward the low side of price and the high side of production.
Slide 11: reserve replacement, returns and the next price spike
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that everything that we've discussed so far makes an extremely compelling case, which I agree with very much myself, which is this thing is not over yet. We're going to continue to see an excess of supply and a depression in prices in oil. But boy, you know, something that— it's amazing to me just how market participants are unable sometimes to see the forest through the trees. Because I know a view that you and I both agree with is that, hey, this thing's not over yet, but it will be over. And boy, if you look at all the capital expenditure, we haven't made And all of the investment we haven't made. Once this glut is cleared, once this massive oversupply of stocks has run its course and we've drawn down those stocks back to historically normal levels, and once we get to the point where we no longer have this, and once particularly we get to the point that shale has played out, because shale is not forever, Oh boy, are we in trouble.
So what is slide 11 telling us about what's eventually coming in terms of a secular reversal in this soft oil market?
Art Berman: Yeah, slide 11 is summarizing exactly what you just described. And so the, the first slide— and all 3 of these come from Bloomberg, by the way— the first one, the dark one on the left, shows that our Reserve replacement, our oil discoveries as a world, have been declining markedly since really the 1960s or '70s. The discoveries that were made in 2016, it's the lowest level of reserve replacement we've seen since 1947. That's 70 years ago. That's really, really serious.
And so why is this happening? Well, Part of it is, as you said, we're just not spending the money. We're not investing in exploration. Of course, the shale plays are— they exemplify this. This is not exploration. This is field development. It's a known resource. You look at reserve additions in the tight oil plays, and there aren't any.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: slight additions or, you know, field extensions and such like that. But, and you look at the numbers, you look at the EIA numbers, and tight oil is, you know, something like 18 billion barrels. Now, 18 billion barrels kind of sounds like a lot, but I mean, the US uses more than 5 billion barrels a year.
So for people who think that tight oil is going to keep the US and the world going for You know, for decades. We need a whole lot more reserves if that's going to be true. So we're not finding more reserves. That's a big, big problem.
The second slide, the— on the right, on the top, the green one, that's oil and gas company return on capital employed. Okay, so, and that's of course part of the reason, the big part of the reason why the shale plays are so popular, because you go out and you, you You spend money on, you know, something in the deepwater Gulf of Mexico, and you spend and you spend and you spend, and maybe in 5 years, 6 years, 7 years, you start to see your first revenue come back. Well, that's terrible return on capital employed. Now, the positive is, is that once you get there, it lasts for a long time. You don't have to spend more money. But, but the shale plays, Conversely, you know, you want to spend a few million dollars and drill one well. You're not committing to a platform. You're not committing to long-term costs, and you get the thing drilled in 60 days or 90 days, and it's on production, and you got cash flow coming back the other way.
That's the appeal. Okay, so, but the lack of the longer term is what keeps driving that down. And then, of course, the lower slide on the graph on the right simply shows oil and gas company stock performance compared to the S&P 500, and it stinks. And there are reasons for that. So again, the, you know, the narrative is, is that, you know, we're just tearing them up, particularly here in the United States with all those, all these shale plays. And yet the preponderance of evidence says that, well, okay, but, but we're not finding new reserves. Return on capital employed is at historic lows. Right. And overall, the performance of the companies that are engaged in these activities is just not too hot.
So tell me again what exactly looks good about this. So, you know, you boil it all down, and what it says is that when we finally do work through this oversupply, and we absolutely will, and by the way, I'm, I guess I'm more pessimistic about this than many. I think it's coming in a couple of years, you know, not a decade. And when we do, we're just going to be real tight on supply, and that's going to We're going to draw down inventories like crazy, and the price is going to spike. And I don't know what it's going to be, but it's going to be big, and it's going to be bad, because the global economy can't take it. It can never take it when oil prices get up above $100.
This time around, I hate to say it, but we've never been as poorly prepared as we will be when supply gets tight again. So, that's not a very happy thought, but that's where we're going. Of course, there is an opportunity there for investors, if you can call it, right?
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Slides 12-13: oil price, GDP and debt
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to slide 12 and 13. What are they telling us as we get to the rest of your presentation here, Art?
Art Berman: Yeah, real quickly, I mean, the graph on the left simply shows oil prices in constant 2017 dollars, and what we see is that we're coming— we're recovering from the second big oil bubble. The first one was 1974 to 1980. In which supply got tight for a variety of reasons, massive overinvestment in oil and gas, discovered more than we could use, price cratered. We had a depression in the oil and gas business for 2 decades. Then the second one, beginning in, you know, really 1999 through 2014, interrupted briefly by the financial crisis, second big bubble. So Massive overinvestment, massive overproduction. That's why the price collapsed this time.
The right-hand graph simply shows oil price— this is annual, same data as on the left— with GDP. This is US GDP. And what it shows me is that whenever oil prices get high, GDP goes flat, and when oil prices are low, GDP increases. So, This is why we're having such a hard time recovering from, from the recession that we experienced, and are probably still experiencing to some extent, because oil prices got too high. And so that's why it's critical that oil prices remain low, because without that, there's no possibility of economic growth.
Erik Townsend: And slide 13.
Art Berman: Yes, so 13 is sort of the complement to that, which is debt and interest rates in the graph on the left, interest rates in blue. And what I'm showing there is 2 curves, public debt in red and all debt, which includes public, corporate, and household. And what that shows me is that so much of what we like to think of as the golden years of mostly Reagan-Clinton of economic growth were, were really You know, an adrenaline rush that was produced by low oil prices and mostly just tremendous debt. Okay, so you can keep, you can keep growth going if you borrow enough money. Some point you reach a threshold where suddenly the debt is no longer productive, and that's when your economy stagnates. And I think that's, that's where we are. And the reason, the compound reason is, is that We ran out of cheap oil sometime around 2000. The world thinks that we solved that problem with unconventional oil and gas.
And the problem is, is that unconventional oil and gas is more expensive, regardless of your breakeven price, than, than the conventional was. And the graph on the right shows US conventional oil in blue declining. Unconventional in orange increasing, and so you know something like 60% or more of U.S. production is now unconventional oil of one sort or another, either deepwater or tight oil. And tight oil alone is more than half. So we're deeply committed, and there's no going back to more expensive oil going forward. So again. You know, that's, that's the way it is, and that's the way it needs to be. But it's problematic. It's problematic for price and for the economy.
Saudi Arabia and WTI term-structure engineering
Erik Townsend: Well, slide 13 concludes the slide deck that you sent us, Art. But in this case, I had to add a few more just to facilitate the questions I want to ask you about this. Because unlike most of our guests who are here to entertain our listeners, I actually trade crude oil very actively. So when we get you in the program, it directly affects both my own personal investments and the fund that I manage. So I'd like to talk more about term structure and get your feedback on a couple of points here. What I'm showing on slide 14 is that if we go back to 2014, the WTI term structure was in a steep backwardation, meaning that each successive delivery contract was priced lower than the one before it. And that was a good deal for Saudi Arabia because what it meant is they got paid top dollar for their oil.
At the time, it was over $100 a barrel.
Art Berman: Right.
Erik Townsend: But the US shale producers that were forced by their banks to hedge their forward production a couple of years out, they had to sell their oil for a 15% or 20% discount below the current spot or front-month futures price in order to lock in those hedges 2 years out on that curve that you're seeing.
Now, by the time we got to February 11th, 2016, which was the low in the oil market, the day that we showed that $26 low on front-month futures contracts, we had reversed that term structure into a steep contango where each delivery contract was priced considerably higher than the one before it. And what that meant was that now Saudi Arabia was taking $26 for its oil exports, but those shale producers that were hedging their production 2 years out, they were still able to sell that 2-year forward contract for above $40, and that for a Permian Basin at least, that still was above their breakeven prices. So that was not a great deal for Saudi Arabia. What's happened now What we're seeing now, as we move on to slide 16, is we've gotten to the point where the term structure has completely changed its shape. And my contention is that this is no coincidence or accident. I think it is being engineered by Saudi Arabia.
What they're doing with this 9-month production cut is they're forcing the beginning part of that curve up high. They want us to think that the market is tightening later this year, and that's a reason to pay Saudi Arabia higher oil prices.
But what they're doing, I believe, is they're intentionally adjusting their messaging to set expectations of a return to higher production next summer in 2018. Why would they do that? Because what it's doing is it's forcing structural backwardation into the curve, as you see through 2018 and 2019 on page 16 of the download. That means that even though OPEC's getting top dollar for their oil, the U.S. shale producers that have to hedge their production 2 years out by selling those futures contracts, they're having to hedge at a much lower price. That makes it harder for US shale producers to get the funding they need to drill their oil wells, and that's exactly what OPEC wants.
And I contend that OPEC is adjusting their messaging. Goldman Sachs, and also another article I saw on ZeroHedge a couple of weeks ago, agreed with my view on this, that it is literally term structure or forward curve engineering on the part of Saudi Arabia through their rhetoric and their messaging, which is creating this term structure. I think this is a gift, Art, to speculative investors.
Art Berman: Hmm.
Erik Townsend: Who share my view in peak cheap oil, specifically that we're headed towards much, much higher oil prices once this glut clears. And as we've just discussed, the glut's not over yet.
Buying long-dated futures: the December 2020 contract and timing
Erik Townsend: It may have another year or two to go. But if we move on to slide 17, take a look at the 2020 delivery contract. Or actually, let me go back for just a minute to slide 15. Everybody thinks, oh boy, look at that $26 price, that was the buying opportunity of a lifetime. Well, it really wasn't an opportunity to buy crude oil with a long-time horizon. View at $26, because if you had bought the front month, you would have had to roll it forward every month, and you would have paid a huge premium to that contango every single month that you rolled the contract forward.
If you had instead said, okay, look, I've got a long time horizon, I'm gonna buy the 2020 contract so that I can buy it and hold it, cash it in as we get closer to its expiry date in 2020, well, you would have had to buy it between $45 and $50, not nearly at the $26 level that the front month was trading at.
So moving back to slide 17, let's look at that decision December 2020 delivery contract. This chart shows the price action just for the single-month December of 2020 contract. Now, when we hit that low on February 11th, 2016, where the front month traded at $26, we never saw less than $46 on the 2020 December contract. Well, look at where we are now on the right side of the chart. We're almost back to that same level. Front-month prices are about twice as high as they were then, but you're still getting almost the same buying opportunity. And I think we're going to head to a new lower low below $46 as a result of Saudi Arabia's efforts to force the market into backwardation in order to cause the effect that they want. If that's true, I think it's a godsend for long-term speculative investors who want to buy on the long side of crude oil futures. But we don't want to buy the front month because we've got a view that it's going to go up in the next 2 weeks.
We want to buy long-dated futures because we believe the price is going to go dramatically up over the next 5 years. If you want to do that, either by buying the futures outright— you have to be careful because there's fairly thin liquidity in these long-dated contracts— or perhaps a better strategy is buying call options on those long-dated futures contracts. If you want to do that, it looks to me like Saudi Arabia is about to give us a gift horse here. By forcing the curve into backwardation.
Now, the thing is, Art, if that's your view, and it's very much my view, and I'm very, very much looking forward to accumulating a large position in long-dated futures and call options on long-dated futures. If that's your view, you got to get the timing at least approximately right. So is 2020 far enough out, or maybe the glut won't have cleared by then? Seems to me we've got to first draw down inventory, then as shale ramps up in reaction to price, That's going to keep the price down for a while until eventually the shale operators have kind of blown their wad. The U.S. is drilled up like Swiss cheese and we've run out of production capacity to grow our production in the U.S. Does that point really come before 2020? Are we out to 2025? Where do you think the right place to be playing the long-term speculative investment in the peak cheap oil upside long play is going to come?
What year do you think we should be targeting?
Bakken, Eagle Ford and Permian: when does shale growth end
Art Berman: That's a great and very difficult question to answer, but let me approach it at least qualitatively. My sense is that we've got 3 important shale plays, tight oil plays in the U.S.: the Bakken, the Eagle Ford, and the Permian. And it seems pretty clear to me that the Bakken and the Eagle Ford are really pretty much done in terms of growth.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: They've both declined quite a bit.
The narrative is, well, that's because of price, and as soon as price comes back, you know, they'll go back to drilling. Now, I've got a post out there on the Bakken that has a lot of very compelling information that says, no, we've reached optimum infill spacing based on gas-oil ratios, water production, etc. And, yeah, you can drill a lot more wells, but you're not accessing more reserves. Okay? You're just accelerating rate. And so what that means Yeah, you might be able to move daily production higher, but probably never going to reach max levels again, and it's going to decline like crazy after that. So, basically, my view is, over the next year and a half, the realization that the Bakken and the Eagle Ford are really done in terms of growth— I'm not— don't misunderstand me. They're going to continue producing a long tail for a long time. They're not done, but they're done for growth.
Okay? That puts the entire burden of U.S. production growth on the Permian Basin. I think that by 2020, it's going to be pretty darn clear, okay, the Bakken's gone, the Eagle Ford's gone, and we're going to start seeing the hair on the Permian Basin. And the hair on the Permian Basin is water production, that already the water cut, the percentage of water divided by the sum of water plus oil, is upwards to 85%.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Art Berman: Okay. Now, for people that don't pay attention to oil and gas on a regular basis, you might say, well, so what? And the so what is a big deal, because, first of all, disposing of the water is expensive, but more importantly, the issue there is that we, you know, you drive around in your car on interstates and you see pumpjacks, okay? And those pumpjacks, that's what you do when you start to lose reservoir energy, when the gas goes away. You put a conventional reservoir on a pump and you can suck more oil out of it. We're talking about shales here, okay? That if you can do that— nobody's successfully done it yet because the rock isn't good enough. And you put a pump on it and all you do is you produce the fractures that you've already swept. And so when you run out of reservoir energy, all you got left is water, which costs a ton of money to dispose of.
So what I'm saying is, is that I think that by 2020, it's going to be obvious that the Permian cannot cover for the failure, the decline in the other tight oil plays. And then what? And then what? And the answer is, I don't know, but I don't see any other tight oil plays on the horizon that are going to come in to fill the void.
So, we're not going to be out of oil. We may not be in a serious problem yet by 2020, but I think the writing will be so plainly on the wall that we're— that there's an impending problem that the price is going to go up. And I think that's, that's what you're looking for, Erik.
Closing: Berman's blog and Labyrinth Consulting
Erik Townsend: Well, I can't thank you enough for another fantastic interview, Art. We went considerably over our usual time budget, but I didn't want to shut you down because it was really worth it. Very quickly, in closing, artberman.com is where people can find your blog. Folks, you're crazy not to subscribe to Art Berman's blog. It is free, the content is excellent, and if you have any interest in all that the oil market Go to artberman.com, sign up and register your email for the free blog there. Very briefly, Art, before we have to go, for our institutional listeners, tell them what else you do at Labyrinth Consulting.
Art Berman: I'm just a consultant. I'm available and have a lot of clients who want me to tell them about value, leases, value of companies in their portfolio. I can give you a bottoms-up look of, you know, what their reserves are really worth and what their real breakeven price is based on objective information as opposed to headlines.
Erik Townsend: Art, I can't thank you enough for another fantastic interview. We are going to have to leave it there. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back and we'll be joined by Kevin Muir, the author of the very popular Macro Tourist blog, as we discuss what we discussed with Art as well as some of Kevin's analysis on China's role in the crude oil market. That's all coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: guest requests and mailbag
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Postgame: Erik's takeaway on long-dated crude futures and Saudi backwardation
Patrick Ceresna: I'm always happy to bring Art Berman back on the show because when the two of you oil guys start talking, it's always such high-quality content. But today we're bringing further insights to this show from another commentator on oil and other macro markets who's been getting some attention in the press lately, and that's Kevin Muir of an author of the very popular Macro Tourist blog. Erik and I are delighted to welcome Kevin to our postgame segment to keep the discussion going. So Kevin, say hello to our MacroVoices listeners.
Kevin Muir: Hi, thanks for having me today. Looking forward to it.
Patrick Ceresna: So Erik, what did you think of, uh, the interview with Art Berman?
Erik Townsend: You know, Patrick, I love talking to Art Berman. He's got fantastic graphs and charts. I really enjoy his blog as well. But the thing that's just really hit me about this interview is this stuff about the term structure, the extra charts that I threw in there around slide 14 or so.
And I really think that we're coming into a setup here, you know, for people who have a long time horizon, the view that eventually this glut is going to be over and oil prices are going way higher. It just has to happen.
And I don't know if it's going to take a year or 2 years or 3 years to clear this glut, but we're going to get there somewhere. Now, I've been in this situation before where I had We had a view that oil prices were headed much higher several years down the road, and usually you're fighting a really steep contango in the shape of the forward curve. In this case, it looks like Saudi Arabia is going to engineer backwardation for us because they're trying to injure the shale drillers' ability to finance their stuff. That's just an incredible opportunity for an investor with a long time horizon to start to get into long-dated futures several years out or calls on futures. And of course, there's a lot of liquidity issues you have to understand to do that.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: But I think that the opportunity that may be created here is just going to be phenomenal. So that's the focus of really what I took away. And if I interpret Art's comments, I don't think any of us really knows what the timing is going to be of when this glut is cleared and when the market moves substantially higher. But we all seem to be in violent agreement that when that happens, it's not just a little bit higher, it's a lot higher. So I'm guessing, you know, maybe a basket of long-dated futures and calls on futures, 2020, '21, '22 in there somewhere. Somewhere, I got to believe by '22 that this is over and that we're at much higher oil prices. If we can buy those futures in backwardation in the next 6 or 12 months, I think that's going to be great. I don't think the time to buy is yet. I think Saudi Arabia is going to continue to engineer backwardation into the belly of the curve, and bring it on, boys.
I can't wait.
Liquidity and risks of long-dated futures and options
Patrick Ceresna: Well, Erik, trading long-dated futures doesn't always have a lot of liquidity. What are some of the considerations that our listeners need to know when taking these kind of trades into consideration?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm really glad you brought that up, Patrick, because first of all, trading futures is not for beginners to start with. A phrase that I'm fond of is futures are like firearms. There's nothing wrong with firearms. There's nothing wrong with futures. But this is not something you play with. It's not a toy. You can hurt yourself very, very badly with either one. It's something that you really have to educate yourself and learn a lot about. We've done shows about trading futures in the past with Jack Schwager, so that interview might be a good place to start for someone who's interested.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Trading long-dated futures is a whole different ballgame though, because there's very little liquidity. Some of the rules are, generally speaking, the June and December, particularly the December contracts, are the only ones that have any liquidity in them in the longer-dated, several years out. In fact, only June and December trade more than, I think it's 3 or 4 years. If you start looking at 5, 6, 7 years out, there are contracts that are established, but they have incredibly low open interest.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: The next thing to understand is that anytime that there is any kind of panic or market sell-off or big event going on in the market, the liquidity dries up and you can be looking at a $4 difference between the bid and the ask on those long-dated contracts.
So you get to a situation where if you have to abandon a position in a hurry, you really get killed. So it is not for the faint of heart. I think that in general, for a number of reasons, there's a very good argument to be made that calls Calls on long-dated futures as opposed to outright futures contract might make more sense because you can more easily just set up a resting limit order to acquire those calls and, you know, wait for it to happen. But again, you're trading in thin liquidity. You cannot liquidate these positions quickly. So it is definitely not for the faint of heart, most assuredly not for beginners.
Breakeven versus shut-in prices: Kevin Muir and Erik on Berman's data
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Kevin, I wanted to bring you in here because you had an opportunity to listen to that interview. I just wanted to know what your thoughts were about the interview with Art Berman.
Kevin Muir: The part that I like best about Art is the fact that he wasn't just some Wall Street guy sitting on a desk somewhere. He's actually on the ground with those oil companies and learning about all the various issues that they're facing. And the thing that's really surprised me, that was really just kind of made me fall off my chair, was the fact that when he said that the breakeven cost was $45, this is contrary to all the different things that we hear on Wall Street in terms of when guys talk about breakevens being $30 or $35.
This is much, much higher. So this was just kind of something that really, really piqued my interest and made me think, if it's $45 is the breakeven price and we're now sitting here at $48.50, that means that there's very little downside before we're going to get supply disruption and we're actually going to find that the bounces from $45 are going to actually be much stronger than we think. And he actually said something to that effect. He said that there would be short excursions down to $45, and that's actually what you see. We had a couple of spikes down there, and very quickly it was met with buying, and we were back to $48.50.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that's an excellent point, Kevin, but there's a couple of other things that we should consider here, which is we're talking about breakeven prices, and you would think that these oil wells would only be drilled if intelligent people evaluated the market and decided that we were gonna be able to produce oil above the breakeven price. Honestly, I don't think that's how it works. I think the guys that drill oil wells are in the business of drilling oil wells anytime that they can get financing, and as long as they can get financing, they're gonna keep on drilling oil wells.
Now, the breakeven price is very different from the shut-in price. The shut-in price is the level at which your cash cost of extraction— that's just paying for the electric bill to run the pumps and the staff that are there— doesn't justify continuing to produce oil, and you actually shut the well Well, in and put it in storage and wait for better prices. That's a much lower number. That's probably below $20. So I don't think that the higher breakevens that Art is talking about are necessarily going to prevent the price from going down below $45. I think that it's quite possible that the price will go down.
But the part that I really took away from that aspect of the conversation is the reflexivity aspect of this, which is Art's basically saying, yeah, of course, if you have a fire sale on anything, if nobody is hiring oil service companies because nobody's drill in wells because we've got this, this just depression in the shale oil revolution. Well, guess what? That's turning around. So the fire sale's over. We're not going to have deep discounts on the cost of oilfield services companies providing their service, and those breakeven prices are going back up again. So it seems like Wall Street thinks, oh, they've done all of these efficiency improvements and now the breakeven cost is down to $35 or $30 or whatever it is. No, the breakeven cost came down to $30 when there was a fire sale going that couldn't possibly be sustained because the companies offering their services at fire sale prices would go out of business if they continued it for very long.
They had to do it for a little while. Now their prices are going to come back up and the result is going to be higher breakevens. And so the market is not discounting what's really happening.
Kevin Muir: Yeah, and the other thing that was really interesting was the fact that he said the breakeven costs for the majors were the same as the— for the smaller nimble guys, which is again another thing that's completely contrary to what most of Wall Street thinks. Wall Street thinks there's all these small little technological tight oil companies out there that are able to produce for $30 or $35, and Art's telling us the opposite.
Erik Townsend: Well, and as he said, you know, what is this Wall Street guys love to talk about? Well, there's been a whole wave of multiple new efficiencies in oil and gas drilling. They're a bunch of prep school kids that went to Ivy League universities for finance degrees that don't know how this stuff actually works in the real world. As Art said, pad drilling, that's rigging up and drilling a bunch of oil wells from one spot, has been And a huge increase in productivity and efficiency. Okay, what else? What other efficiency improvements are these guys talking about? And there really are not a lot. So, you know, sure, that's— technology is more pervasive, there's more people doing it, there's more competition, but in terms of really profound advancements in technology and efficiency, pad drilling is really the main thing. And as Art said, it's not that big of a deal.
Kevin Muir: And then the other point where he said that a lot of the reduction is because the companies wrote off the high-cost reserves. That was extremely interesting, and that's something that not a lot of people are talking about.
Muir: is China buying crude oil futures?
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, listen, I want to jump in here because, Kevin, you know, you wrote a fantastic piece that got picked up on ZeroHedge It was called Crude Oil Spec Positioning Revisited, and you had a whole theory or thesis on China and crude oil markets. Why don't you share with all of our listeners what you wrote in that piece?
Kevin Muir: Sure. Um, I, I follow the CFTC reports pretty closely, And when I see an extreme, I often find, like, for example, the Canadian dollar right now, it's at an extreme. It's at an all-time short in terms of the amount of speculators and other professional traders that are betting against Canadian dollars. And what I find often is that when that happens, the attitude amongst traders, it corresponds. I see it. I watch my Twitter. I see everyone leaning against it, everybody talking about all their short positions. And I see the kind of the sentiment corresponds to what I see on the actual report.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Kevin Muir: And one of the things that puzzled me was the fact that over the years, ever since 2010, we've had this growing net spec long position in crude oil futures. And it's basically for 25 years, the net crude oil spec position kind of oscillated between these 2 levels. Then in 2010, it just took off and it exploded higher. And everyone was talking about all these Wall Street guys were talking about the fact that there's all this speculation in crude oil. And I just didn't see it. And in fact, when I kind of thought about it and I looked at what most people are thinking, I would actually argue that most guys are bearish, that most guys were sitting there thinking that OPEC wasn't going to be successful. Most guys were leaning against the whole idea that they would be able to keep prices up there. For me, the data did not jive with the actual sentiment amongst the traders. So then I started to kind of think about it.
Now, one of the troubles about when you look at the speculative positioning on the CFTC reports is that you're just looking at net specs, and that can be influenced by increases in open interest. And so one of the things you can do is you can basically adjust it. You divide the net specs by the total open interest, and that smooths it out a little. But even when you do that, you found that basically it still was very, very elevated net long position in the crude oil contract.
And so I kind of started to think about this, and one of the thoughts that I had is I realized that if you look at the Chinese imports and if you look at what happens in 2004, they imported 10 million metric tons of crude oil. By the end of 2017, this was up to 35 million tons. It was a 3.5 times increase. And so I started thinking about that, and I was thinking about the fact that at the same time, China was filling their SPR, their Strategic Petroleum Reserve. And there's all these articles about how the Strategic Petroleum Reserve was getting full, and they were thinking about how this was going to cause— all the Wall Street guys who I thought were all bearish were talking about how this was going to cause, once it got full, it was going to cause oil to fall.
And then I started to think, and I overlaid the chart of when the net spec position broke out with the actual crude imports, and I realized that it happened at the same time. And so I started to think to myself, what if China, instead of just buying actual physical commodities of crude oil, is actually also buying futures? And if you think about it, they're sitting here with this huge foreign exchange balance and they have to do something with their dollars. It makes complete sense to do something in terms of putting it in some real assets. And so I kind of posited the theory that maybe China is in the futures market and China is buying futures.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that's a fascinating idea because, I mean, as you say, if they're running out of room in the SPR and they still want to buy more oil and it all adds up, it's hard to tell whether that's really happening though. But I— what I want to challenge you with is I know what a lot of people would say, which is, Kevin, you totally missed the argument because since about that same time, what's become extremely popular in the US with retail investors is these ETFs like USO, which invest in crude oil futures in order to give retail investors a way to to play the price of oil. So why wouldn't it make sense that the answer to your apparent conundrum is simply that the ETFs are who is behind all of this new open long interest in crude oil futures?
Kevin Muir: You're absolutely right. That's the biggest pushback. And what we've done is we've created a chart that we've included in the package. And basically what I've done is I've taken the USO total shares outstanding and I've plotted that alongside the net speculative position in crude oil futures. And what you'll notice is that in 2010, when the shares outstanding of the USO exploded higher, at that same time, instead of what you'd expect is to see the net spec positioning actually increasing, if that theory about the ETFs is correct, instead it was the exact opposite happened. And you can see that the net spec was actually declining during that time. So if anything, they look like they're inversely correlated, not positively correlated.
So I don't buy that it's the actual— the ETFs that are causing the increase in this net spec position.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, I just wanted to step in here and just let all of our listeners know that this chart that you're referencing is actually going to be included in that Research Roundup email that we sent out.
Trading calendar spreads and spread options
Patrick Ceresna: So you can find that as a separate chart, not in the main chart book, but as a separate add-on chart in there. Now, I wanted to quickly ask you though, Kev, you— we were talking earlier before we started recording the show, and you were talking about the trading of spreads in the oil markets. I just wanted you to share with our listeners Just some of the insights into that.
Kevin Muir: Sure. Well, a couple of episodes ago, Erik was talking about executing spreads between different months and/or different years even. And one of the things that I told Erik, I said this, that a lot of people take— don't understand, and he takes for granted that he goes and trades these, but a lot of people don't understand the nitty-gritty mechanics of actually going ahead and trading those spreads. It's important to understand is that you don't actually have to sit there and enter an order to buy one at one price and then immediately sell another one at another price.
The exchanges actually offer a contract that is actually basically one minus the other, and there's a quote on it. So if we're talking about a spread that's trading at $2, you might go find that if you pull up that spread, you'll see a bid offer of $1.95 at $2.05 offer, and then you can stick in at $2 and execute that spread much more easily without the risk of one side taking off on you.
Erik Townsend: Well, there's another aspect of that too, which is CME has now introduced options on calendar spreads. So if we're talking about time spreads, where you are long one month and short an equal number of contracts in some other month, you can actually trade options on that spread directly as a calendar spread option that's listed by CME. So there's lots of different ways to play this. And, you know, if we look at what I think Saudi Arabia is up to, they're going to try to artificially engineer backwardation into the belly of the curve. Anytime you artificially engineer something in, in order to achieve a goal, which is what they're trying to do, It's gonna come back out most likely. So the place where I see the opportunity for the time spreads is if you can figure out when those time spreads get into their steepest backwardation, that's when it's time to bet on the mean reversion, that eventually they're gonna flatten or even go back to contango before that calendar spread option expires or before the first month in that calendar spread, if you're trading the outright futures, expires.
I do want to just close on this point though by saying we're talking about some fairly darn sophisticated professional trading here in terms of futures spreads and so forth. Please don't anybody try this if you don't know what you're doing. You really— as I said, futures are like firearms. You've got to learn how this stuff works before you try to trade it. So with that caveat in place, Kevin, I want to thank you again for joining us on the program today. We really appreciate your input.
Kevin Muir: Well, thank you for having me. Thanks for having me.
Registration appeal and Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: And, uh, from there, you've heard it before, folks, we really need your help. We are getting some fantastic guests on the program. The way that Patrick is able to get these rock star guests is primarily by telling them how many registered users we have at MacroVoices.com. That's the statistic that proves to our guests that it's worth their time to do this. So please, if you haven't already, register your free account at MacroVoices.com. It's free. We promise not to spam you or sell your email address or do anything else sleazy. The benefit to you is that you'll get our free Research Roundup email, which is a compendium of links to both content such as Art Berman's chart book that goes with our feature interviews, but also just the coolest stuff that we could find for free on the internet each week. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Art. Uh, all— both of the part 1 and part 2 are going to be put together in the one transcript. You'll also find the link to the chart book that Art and Erik put together to accompany the interview. You'll also find the link to Kevin's article that we discussed in this postgame. Also, to stay within that oil theme, there's a link to an article on the OilPrice.com site for Nick Cunningham's article suggesting it's not OPEC but China that dictates the oil prices. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners and are always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with that #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include in our weekly distributions.
Now, if you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, Thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Announcer outro, sponsor credit and disclaimer
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to Tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com, the internet's premier source of online education for traders. Please visit BigPictureTrading.com for more information. Please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly Research Roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week. You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library.
And the more registered users we have, the more we'll be able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register. Your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to Mailbag@MacroVoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. MacroVoices is presented. For informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.
MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com and by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management, LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.
Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.
