Jeff Snider — Alhambra Investments Chief Investment Officer (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is a special edition of MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. Now for this special edition of MacroVoices, Here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik introduces Jeff Snider and the dollar executive summary
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Alhambra Investment Partners Chief Investment Officer Jeffrey Snider. Now, listeners, as many of you know, Jeff and I put together something we call Eurodollar University, which is still available free of charge at MacroVoices.com/edu. The thing about Eurodollar University is it's a little overwhelming. I've forgotten how many hours of podcast audio it is, but quite a few, and we go into all of the gory details of of the history and origins of the Eurodollar system. We've had requests from listeners to give maybe a more concise executive summary, a shortened 1-hour version of what's the big picture of what's going on with the dollar, what's this Eurodollar system, and how come the economy seems to work a little different than it used to before the great financial crisis. So that's going to be the subject of today's interview. And of course, it wouldn't be Jeff Snider without a terrific slide deck full of really beautiful graphs and charts.
You can find the download link for the slide deck that accompanies this interview. And by the way, I strongly encourage you to download it first so that you can look at the slides as you're listening in the Research Roundup email that you received if you're a subscriber to MacroVoices.com. If not, just go to our homepage at MacroVoices.com, look for the red button that says Looking for the Downloads next to Jeff's picture.
Jeff, we've got all these big questions about the dollar, recessions, and so forth. But, you know, if I kind of pull this all together in terms of what we've heard from our listeners, they're telling us, look, it seems like the economy used to work differently before the Great Financial Crisis. You know, we'd have these recessions that would last for a few years, and we generally, at least after the fact, had an idea of what caused them, whether it was the S&L crisis, the various other things that happened in the '90s. There was a mild recession in 2001, was probably overshadowed by 9/11.
But then after we got to the great financial crisis, it seems like everything has changed and it really is more central bank policy as opposed to a business cycle that seems to be governing economics. So give us the big picture here. What's going on and how come things seem to work different than they used to?
Why the post-2008 economy works differently
Jeff Snider: Yeah, I mean, that's what we're talking about really. Who or what screwed up the big picture? And no one seems to be able to put a finger on it. You know, we've got socialists and populists, each of them who are vying for whose neck goes first in the noose or under the guillotine if we get that far.
And in the middle, all the so-called experts, whether you want to call it the establishment or not, they all think that the world has gone mad, that there's nothing wrong anywhere, and that people are a bunch of crybabies who don't appreciate how awesome it actually is out there. And all that does is push people even more toward the extremes. The very fact that the world is moving in polarizing directions is all the evidence you need that the establishment or the experts, they've got it all wrong.
People aren't generally crybabies, not collectively. Sure, they howl and make a lot of noise when a recession shows up. And when a recession does show up, it threatens their own place in the world, and that's why they tend to make a lot of noise. But once the recovery starts, they're quiet as a mouse again. Economic security is the key ingredient in all of this, and that means opportunity.
It's also true that this is the best time in human history to be alive. Medical advances, technology, the overabundance of food, et cetera. For most of the world, this is as good as it has ever been. But we also live in a nonlinear world, which means rate of change is what ultimately matters.
The best it has ever been means a whole lot less if that best is only a little better than the last time it was the best. We expect things to get a lot better consistently, noticeably better. And when the rate of change changes, we actually do feel it collectively.
Opportunity feels like it has been squeezed out and you see it around the edges. And that's when the torches and pitchforks come out, not because the whole world looks like it's sliding back into the Middle Ages or something like that, but because far, far too many people can tell the rate of progress and opportunity, the rate of progress and opportunity has stalled, that something has curtailed it. And so economic security becomes too much of an issue, even as GDP keeps setting new record highs. If each new record high in GDP is only a tiny bit more than the last record high, look out.
Erik Townsend: Jeff, we had you back in early January 2020 in a MacroVoices All-Stars interview where you showed very clearly with a slide deck and so forth that 2008 was very different from every single past recession. Even central bankers and economists admit that it's different today and that it all changed in 2008. Now, what they say was that the economy is what's changed. Structural forces behind what they call R-star meant that the economy is growing by a lot less than it used to be. But to them, that's okay. What you said was, no, the economy is being held back, and it's being held back by— I'll almost call it a hidden force, something that the world is not really in touch with. And the world's not okay because of this, but not everybody is in touch with what's holding it back. So what is holding it back?
Jeff Snider: Well, yeah, you know, if global economic growth was, was doing the best that it could possibly do, I don't think we would be seeing, you know, populism, socialism, and all these other forms of more extreme cases. If the Great Recession had been just a big recession, then last decade would have been more like the '90s. We wouldn't still be focused on that last recession, which is now more than 10 years in the past. And authorities have it all backward in every single way possible. They keep saying the problem is us, you and me. The voting public is voting for extreme candidates because we're all a bunch of crybabies who don't know how good we have it. The economy is different today and economic growth is so much less, meaningfully less, because we broke the economy.
In America, they say there are too many drug addicts and former industrial workers who just refuse to go back to school and learn to code. The problem is always us from the establishment perspective. But people are getting the sense that maybe it's them. It's time to start voting and acting like it. And not just getting that sense, they've had that queasy feeling all along. It started all the way back in 2008 too. The idea that maybe those people we've put in charge really don't quite know what they're doing.
But given how everything seemed to be going at the time, how bad it really could have gotten back then, most people gave them a chance to fix it. There wasn't enough time or even enough time to do a full accounting of what went wrong and why. And so, Everybody wanted to just get it right going forward, forgive and forget. And so over time, especially the last few years, that's when the dichotomy got too big. They say it's booming now. They say everything's been fixed and it took a little longer than they thought, but they've done it. They've had success. And even if most people agree in the big picture sense, I mean, just look at the sparkling unemployment rate, we can still tell that something isn't right. And if this is a boom, it's an unfair one and therefore socialism. It's an unsure one, therefore populism.
Something is missing from it, even if most people just can't put their finger on the big picture problem.
Bernanke, the subprime narrative and V vs L
Erik Townsend: Jeff, for a lot of people, I think it was difficult to give Ben Bernanke a second chance. Even at that time, most people understood that the Fed must have made some mistakes in the lead-up to 2008. Now, you don't have the worst banking crisis in 4 generations show up on your watch as Fed chairman without some questions and doubts about your personal performance.
But you're right, back in October of 2008, when stocks were melting down, or November of 2008, when the TARP program was changed, or December, when we got zero interest rates and QE, people just wanted it to stop. And they turned to the guy who was in office or on the job at the time, which was Ben Bernanke, which was quite natural. But the thing is, Jeff, you know, like you said, it's been a decade since then. And we've been through 3 different Fed chairs since then.
So yeah, you can criticize Ben Bernanke for what he might have gotten right or wrong in 2008.
Jeff Snider: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: But look, we've been past Ben Bernanke. We've had Janet Yellen. Now we've got Jay Powell. And it seems like regardless of whether Bernanke was good or bad, central bank performance under the leadership of several different, really very smart, well-qualified people doesn't seem to be solving the problem.
Jeff Snider: Yeah. And it's, you know, are we allowed to criticize them? I think that's part of the problem too, is that it seems like once the crisis happened in the aftermath of QE, It became off limits to criticize the after-crisis performance. And a lot of it has to do with complexity. The global financial crisis has been already one of the most studied events in human history.
People have been looking at it and thinking about it, and they've been writing and speaking about it for 12 years now. And still no one really has any idea what went wrong. Something, something, subprime mortgages. That's what you hear. And remember, Erik, you and I, we did a joint presentation at Harvard last year, where we talked about how the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, which was the government's official response and the official record of the financial crisis, it had produced an 1,100-page report on it where it said the word subprime something like 800 times.
Erik Townsend: I think the actual count was 784. And I've got that number etched in the back of my head because it was such a fascinating thing at the time.
Jeff Snider: Yeah. And what it represented was a concerted effort to blame Greedy Wall Street bankers for the whole thing. Not just to blame them, but to do it in a way the public would immediately understand. That's what subprime mortgages really represent. And if subprime mortgages had been the majority of the crisis, then things like QE and ZIRP would also make sense. It would sound like Ben Bernanke, he screwed up the crisis, he screwed up the panic, but he sure made up for it when the chips were down. I mean, he bought all that toxic waste from these ailing banks, and that's what eventually led us to this big booming economy we have now. But Bernanke was right about one thing. You can start on slides 3 through 5 here, and I'm showing his quote on slide 5.
What he said back then was recovery was a simple black and white option. If the financial system was fixed, then recovery would happen. If it wasn't fixed, as he told Senator Chuck Schumer in February of 2009, then the economy would founder for some time. That was his words. Now, what's really eye-opening about Bernanke's exchange with Schumer was what the senator had actually asked him. The question was, and I'll read it right from the congressional transcript, I am asking you, were you more of a student of V theory or the L theory in terms of where we are? We know we're going down now and we have not yet hit bottom, but will we bounce up quickly in all likelihood or just stay flat? So to get the economy to bounce up quickly, that was the point of QE and zero interest rates, the psychology of it, to get consumers to stop thinking about the crisis and to start spending again.
To get businesses to stop worrying about banks and to start hiring, investing again. To turn people from recession wary to booming happy, it all started with getting them to stop thinking about banks. Thus, Bernanke's answer: if he would fix the financial system, then yes, V shape; if not, no, L shape.
But no one ever asked exactly how QE or ZIRP would make that difference. He and other officials like him had standard boilerplate answers ready. Whenever asked, and all they did was sketch out these broad theoretical dimensions, but by and large, everyone would just assume these were legitimate and tested programs. It was never considered how, how exchanging bank reserves for other often very useful assets was an actual monetary answer to a very real, real-world monetary breakdown. Something had gone wrong in ways that seemed new and strange. The suddenly very open, complex monetary problem that was once hidden deep inside a system that no longer appeared to be what everyone thought it had been up until that point.
And ironically, it was because of these complexities, despite 2008, Bernanke was given the benefit of the doubt that the Fed, after having been so badly outmaneuvered by a global monetary imbalance it was powerless to stop, the Fed would all of a sudden become technically proficient almost overnight. So you, Chairman Bernanke, have performed as bad as any central banker in history to February 2009, but from here on, we won't criticize your skills or doubt your competence. We'll just assume you've got this covered so long as we don't see another Lehman Brothers on the front page of Wall Street Journal.
And that is how the crisis is largely remembered in small bits and bite-sized pieces. Subprime mortgages, Lehman panic, QE, end of story. Greedy Wall Street bankers had been a big part of the problem, sure, but they were far from the whole thing. And ultimately it had very, very little to do with subprime mortgages, the real tip of the iceberg situation.
Central banks are not central: FICC and QE myths
Erik Townsend: Jeff, it's interesting that you brought up that presentation we jointly gave at Harvard Business School in April of 2019. As you were speaking, it just reminded me of what you're showing actually in today's slide deck on slide 6, comparing and contrasting what you've uncovered is the global reserve currency system, which is what you think really is the governing factor here, and comparing that to what almost everyone else seems to believe is how the system works and is supposed to work. And it all begins with this idea of central banks being central. Now, you say central banks are not central, so I'm hoping that you can give our listeners a sense of what you mean by that. And given how things unfolded in 2008, it really does seem like that might have been the case. No matter what the Fed did or any other central bank, Nothing seemed to work. They could stop the crisis by treating the symptoms, but no matter how hard they tried, it's as if the financial system was kind of operating to its own drummer, if you will, with a mind all of its own.
And what the Fed was doing was treating the symptoms but not really treating the systemic problem. If that was true, it really does raise substantial questions about the crisis aftermath. If central bankers really aren't central, What would that mean for recovery? And what was QE really if it wasn't what people say it was?
Jeff Snider: Yeah. Well, more than that, if central banks aren't central, then what is? And this is the real heart of the issue, the big thing of all the big things. But you're right, Erik. For most people, that's just so far out of line from what we've been taught ever since day one, from everything you see on TV or read on the internet. You never fight the Fed because it's the most powerful bureaucracy ever conceived. There's no possible way that it could be anything other than central. Not only do I say that's not true, I then try to explain that what is central is something called FICC, what we euphemistically call bond trading as a catch-all for so many of these opaque, complex banking behaviors that few have ever heard of and fewer still have ever spent more than a thought or two contemplating.
But Ben Bernanke was right about that one thing. Fix the financial system, there would be recovery, V-shape. Fail to fix it, no recovery, L-shape. And this gets into several other misconceptions about QE, which was the presumed solution to do the V-shape. If most people don't really know what it was on any technical level, it's at least presumed that if nothing else, it was a huge giveaway to the big banks. It was its own form of bailout, a way for the Fed to print money and just hand it over to Goldman Sachs and Merrill Lynch.
It's become part of the myth. The financial system must have been fixed because the fat cats on Wall Street have been living it up these past 12 years, what with All these central bank handouts all over the world. The 2010s must have been the best decade ever for banking. And yet it's so far from the truth. And one way you can tell QE had so little impact was in banking. It has been the worst decade for the industry since the Great Depression.
Banks have shrunk since 2007
Erik Townsend: Well, if you've owned bank stocks during that time, you probably already know that that's been the case. Banks are lagging badly as share prices for everything else, it seems, are heading to the moon. And frankly, what I question, Jeff, is why everything else is heading to the moon. I don't think it's really organic economic drivers that are taking them to the moon. But the more time goes on, the more banks stay behind. So it does appear like there's a serious disconnect between popular perception about banking and what may have really gone on.
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and you can really see that on slide 8, how banks are really lagging everything else. And what bank stocks are reflecting are risks, not just risk, but those personified in what are shrinking institutions. In nonlinear terms, they've changed direction as the share prices show. But even in absolute terms, many, many banks are actually smaller today than they were on the eve of the financial crisis. In a lot of cases, banks have actually shriveled to just husks of their former selves. If you go to slide 9, back in January 2020, UBS Chairman Sergio Ermotti was complaining That the only way forward for many of them profitably would be merger or some other combination. That regulators who he singled out had left them with only the option of what he calls shrinking to greatness. And you can see how that's been true, the shrinking part at least. Go to slide 10. UBS is a fraction of its former pre-crisis self.
Since the end of 2007, total assets at that bank have been reduced by an astounding 60%. Not only did the bank get smaller, it has stayed small. And you can also see how UBS is just one extreme end of the bank spectrum. It's far from alone on it. Fellow Swiss bank Credit Suisse has shrunk in absolute terms too. Then you go to slide 11, you see the same at other European banks, especially those like Deutsche Bank. Go to slide 12, you see it at British banks. Slide 13, even American banks, which have been by far the best performing of the bunch, they're mere shells of their former selves, especially the old marquee names like Citigroup and JP Morgan. Even Goldman Sachs. Goldman today holds fewer assets than it did at of 2007. That's 12 years ago. 12 years, and the bank is smaller.
Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, as a graduate of Eurodollar University, it doesn't surprise me at all that this is happening, because what you described in Eurodollar University is these big banks were running, frankly, a shady money printing operation that very few people understood, in the shadows, in the background. And they were making a boatload of money doing that. And something broke around 2007 before the crisis even began. Where that money printing machine that these guys were running in the shadows stopped working. So it's no surprise to me that banking isn't what it used to be, but I don't think it's necessarily because of subprime mortgages that banking's not what it used to be. I think it's this other stuff.
So let's back up here a minute, moving backward over the ground that we've just covered. You're showing our listeners how banks around the world are actually getting smaller. Now, that's a pretty definitive sign that it hasn't been a very good 10 or 12 years for them, despite what everyone assumes about QE, which, you know, a lot of people perceive QE as basically a handout to the bankers. They're printing money out of thin air. They're using it to buy these bonds from the banks. They're giving all the money to the banks.
Well, if we go all the way back to Ben Bernanke, who said in February of 2009 that you either fix the financial system and you get a V-shaped economic recovery, or you don't fix the financial system and you're stuck with that L-shape. What we're seeing, if you look at banking performance, is the banks are actually behaving, corroborated to some extent by bank stock prices, a little bit more along the lines of not being fixed. Is that correct?
Derivatives: what the OCC data shows
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and that's just where it all begins. You know, it's one angle to look at the problem, which is, you know, really banking rather than purely central banking. If we go further and begin to look behind the curtain into that world of what you just talked about, you know, the hidden shadow money or what we call bond trading euphemistically, what they actually have been doing in FICC, that's where we go from seeing something is wrong to appreciating what that something must be.
Slide 14 is a very good place to start, and that's with derivatives. Like everything else, these have been misunderstood too. You know, you hear stories even today about Deutsche Bank and its tens of trillions in derivatives outstanding, and it sounds like the conventional narrative.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jeff Snider: You know, that Ben Bernanke or the ECB and the rest of the government bailed out the banks and look at them now, they're worse than they ever were before.
It's just not true. And, you know, I'm not sitting here sticking up for the banks either. Let me make that perfectly clear. Banks and modern banking are the big problem. I just want everyone to understand what that problem actually is instead of the misconceptions and myths that have proliferated, have been perpetuated since 2008. I want people to have a realistic sense of what's really going on because that's the only way we can fix this thing.
Now collectively, banks have been scaling back at everything. What we're looking at in slide 14 is the information that the OCC puts together in its quarterly report on derivatives. It's a compilation of figures compiled from call reports that domestic banks are required to submit to the— what is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, one of the major US bank regulators. And what these gross notional totals tell us, even though they total into the several hundred trillion, and that's what scares most people, Is the raw scale of it. But what these notional tell us, that's not even the interesting part of it. It's the way the total changes in time and what that insight gives us into what's really going on and what is money central.
Sponsor message
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Now let's come back to Jeff Snider. Jeff, this derivatives situation is one that I still struggle to get my head around.
Derivatives inflection points: 2008, 2011, 2014
Erik Townsend: And frankly, I was guilty in the beginning of what I think a whole lot of people in finance do. They roll their eyes, they shrug their shoulders, and they just say, You know, gross notional totals into trillions of dollars of derivatives, hundreds of trillions. That's nutso. It's crazy. You make these emotional statements without really understanding in detail what those risks are and what the interdependencies between those derivative instruments are. It's clearly scary. It's this great big huge thing. But I don't think it's a great big huge thing that a bunch of people who are criticizing it understand. Understand in detail. I think they're just so intimidated by the size of it, they're like, okay, this can't be good.
So like everything else that you've shown us about the banking system, there's a very clear demarcation of inflection right around 2008, the global financial crisis. Banks undertook exponential growth of their derivatives business as well as other assets before that great financial crisis event. And now What was it that the UBS CEO said? Shrinking their way to greatness. Only the thing is, I'm not persuaded that it's necessarily consistent with greatness. So what's going on here? Are they really shrinking derivatives, and is it greatness or not?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think, Erik, you make a good point, is that, you know, we get scared by the tens of trillions— actually, hundreds of trillions in gross notional, and we don't think about what is the purpose behind them. Why are there so many derivatives? What are they used for? And as we talked about a little bit in Eurodollar University, These derivatives are used for balance sheet control and maintenance of the banks themselves. And so, you know, there are a couple of inflection points that are noteworthy and relevant here in what I'm showing you on slide 14. 2008 is only the first inflection point. As you pointed out, Erik, the rate of change was indeed high beforehand and it was steady for a very, very long time. That's why it got so big. That was the exponential growth. But what happened in 2008 was just the first time the rate of change changed. And that was the banking system taking stock of the global financial crisis and more so the crisis response and giving it a small chance to, okay, maybe they got something right.
The banks dipped their derivative risk-taking toes back in the water, but they never really got all the way back in. And then along comes the second liquidity crisis in 2011, and that was it. That was when the decision was really made to shrink to something other than greatness. You're right, because it's not greatness.
It was a reluctant decision on the part of the banking system. It was not one that they did consciously in board meetings. It was the reality of the situation. The risks were too high, and these were liquidity risks that were too high. And the banks understood how there wasn't enough opportunity, meaning profit potential, to do all of the things that banks used to do freely and unfettered in the pre-crisis era. But what stands out perhaps the most, certainly on this chart, is 2014.
That's when the shrinking was made permanent. 2008 started the banking system on a different path. 2011 confirmed that was the way really things had to go. But 2013 and '14, that was when the consequences of that path started to harden and really show up in all the wrong places. And we don't appreciate the magnitude as much in the US as they do elsewhere around the world because we're privileged by the dollar. From 2014 forward though, around the rest of the globe, it was as if this monetary bomb was set off. They still haven't recovered from it. It was as if someone had flipped a switch and the whole thing changed permanently.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Hang on a second, Jeff, because I think we just shifted gears there. We were talking about derivatives, but I think now you're talking about more than just derivatives. Is that right?
Bank capacities, TIC data and the dollar
Jeff Snider: Yeah, Erik, you're absolutely right. If we go to slide 15, we'll take a different look at bank capacities because that's what derivatives and all this other— we're really talking about bank capabilities and capacities. What they're trying to undertake is the monetary roles of a global reserve system that depends upon those capacities. And it's those bank capacities which are central. Not the central banks and their smoke and mirrors of rate cuts and asset swap QEs.
So what we're seeing on this slide, again, slide 15, is TIC data The Treasury Department also gives information from bank call reports. In this case, what US banks are doing in relation to offshore banks spread all over the rest of the world, and all of it is in dollars, and it's mostly short-term monetary liabilities and assets. As you can see, before 2014, there were the ups and downs that correlated with what happened in 2008 and again in 2011.
And you can see it more clearly on slide 16, where I've taken the same data and turned what were quarterly changes in US dollar bank liabilities and accumulated them into rolling 6-month periods to give them a little bit more of an obvious visual reference. After Q2 2014 though, you can see, I mean, that was it. That was when the path of shrinking to greatness became the only one the banking system could take. And it was the pure inflection point. And you and our listeners probably remember something about Q2 2014. And it wasn't the best job market in decades, and it wasn't the booming overheated economy that Janet Yellen was predicting her first year on the job after she took over for Ben Bernanke, who claimed when he left office how everything was in really, really good shape.
And if you flip over to slide 17, you could see just what I mean. These TIC figures like the OCC derivatives numbers, these aren't merely academic data we put on charts for the fun of it. Unlike the QEs, we can observe and catalog all the ways in which the central bond trading stuff Because most of it, if not the overwhelming majority of what I'm showing you, is in that FICC domain, how this stuff all correlates to real-world market prices and behaviors. In this case, on slide 17, the almighty dollar. The inverse correlation is visually striking. It's also intuitive. You know, it's not just the dollar either. If you go to slide 18, you can see how it impacted another major economic input in terms of the oil market.
Virtual dollars and the role of the reserve currency
Erik Townsend: Okay, Jeff, it seems like what you mean by this is really taking the money supply analysis that was fashionable in the 1970s and '80s and bringing it forward into a 21st century format. To put it simply, when there are more dollars, the dollar's exchange value falls. And when there happens to be fewer of these dollars, the dollar's exchange value rises. But what you're saying is the real key to that process is not what everyone thinks it is, which is central banks and their quantitative easing programs. It seems instead to be related to things that the banking system is doing that most people don't really understand. So, Jeff, that's completely at odds with how most people perceive the way the system works. Most people think it's really almost entirely about these quantitative easing programs today. You're saying no, it's, it's not that QE is driving the whole economy. It's other things going on kind of in the shadows that are really driving money supply.
Is that right? Am I on the right track?
Jeff Snider: Yeah. And the sad fact of this, it's not even 21st century advancements. It's actually 1960s advances, which were then applied heavily in the 1970s. It just sounds new and modern because monetary scholarship pretty much dried up in the '70s. The way the monetary system actually functions, which is this credit-based system, bank-centric system, it was never written into the economics textbooks. The textbook only took the monetary system up to say maybe 1955 and then just left off from there. And we're just assuming, central bankers too, that nothing has changed over the last 60 years, which is a ridiculous proposition.
And this is usually where I tend to lose a lot of people too, because we aren't really talking about dollars, not in the way we're all taught about money.
These are not dollars like physical Federal Reserve notes, stacks of 5s and 20s and 100s being shifted from one vault to another. These are virtual dollars. They're mere ledger entries on various banks' computer screens. Rather than stacks of cash, these are bank liabilities and they're all denominated in dollars. Therefore, to create more of them, you need banks to do the creating. If banks don't want to create them, guess what? They don't get created, nor do they get redistributed and circulated the way the globalized economy needs them to be. So the TIC data the derivatives figures, all the market information like swap spreads and cross-currency basis, all the stuff that we talk about, They're all saying the same thing. Banks don't want to do money in the way they used to. They'd rather shrink their way out of the business.
Erik Townsend: Jeff, you said something there that strikes a really strong chord with me, and I think probably with a lot of people. When you talk about redistributing and circulating US dollars and the banking system being at the center of that process, what you're really talking about here, Jeff, is the role of the US dollar as the world's global reserve currency. And the US dollar isn't just how the world prices oil. There's a whole lot more to it. And I'm going to go out on a little bit of a limb here, and I'll say I am personally convinced that the finance industry doesn't understand the significance of reserve currency status and what all of its consequences and implications are.
And if I sound like I'm the conceited, self-important guy who thinks he knows everything and nobody else does, unfortunately, no, I don't get it either. I'm still struggling to fully understand all of the consequences and implications of the US dollar's reserve currency status. Frankly, what the meaning of reserve currency is in today's world, I think, is very different than it used to be before we had modern electronic systems that can move money around the the world at the click of a mouse. The game has changed, and I don't think most people understand it. Now, most of our listeners are familiar with the SWIFT system, which is the global international wire transfer system, but they may not have a really good grasp of just how important all of these different parts are and how they play into a global reserve currency system. So give us a little bit of perspective.
Triffin, SWIFT and the fall in correspondent banking
Jeff Snider: Well, Erik, I think you're absolutely right, and I would agree with you. You know, people in the finance industry, and I would say the government too, Not only do they not know anything about what a global reserve currency does, they don't even talk about it. Nobody talks about this stuff. It's all just myths and legends and shorthands and shortcuts that everybody just assumes a bunch of things because we don't talk about them. We don't understand. We don't appreciate what a global reserve currency actually is. And there is so much more behind it. There is so much that goes into a global reserve currency that it's almost impossible to describe it to somebody who's never really encountered it before.
Now, there are really 2 primary components to it, to the global monetary system or any global monetary system.
And the first is what Robert Triffin pointed out all the way back in 1960. There has to be enough currency, whatever that currency is, so that it can translate monetarily all of the things we need the reserve currency to be able to intermediate. So from trade financing to foreign investments or even things like hot money. The second is simply to be able to get all that money to the places where it needs to go. To efficiently, fluidly, and most of all predictably match the supply of funds which banks create with the demands for the funds. Now, that's both the markets, money markets globally, and on the boring side, the payment system, the SWIFT system. And it's much more sophisticated and intricate and much deeper than you might think.
Now, in the old days, we talked about this in Eurodollar University, you just move gold bars and coins around. That was slow and it was cumbersome and it was a pretty difficult way of conducting global businesses. And then again, as we talked about in Eurodollar University, something called bankers' acceptances started to replace that.
And so, for many years, more than a century, there's been different ways for people in various locations to get paid in a way that they want to be paid.
Now, with the dollar as the reserve and this Eurodollar as the true reserve, that's how it actually gets done in the modern system. But it requires a very broad participation. Banks all over the world have to be able to talk to each other and settle these claims and do so in a reliable way in dollars. And that's the circulation and redistribution function. And what we've seen, especially over the last half decade, is that banks really don't want to do it as much as they used to do.
Erik Townsend: Now, that changed right around 2014, I believe. So what changed? Why did it change? And how has it changed the world that we live in now?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, you're right. There's a group called the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure, CPMI. And it's a trade association of sorts of those banks and various global agencies that are attached to the BIS or kind of attached to the BIS. The headquarters is in Switzerland. And they've been tasked with collecting data and monitoring the payment system using the various data and elements that the SWIFT people give them. Now they want to figure out why, as you can see on the next series of slides, which are slide 19, 20, and 21, there's been a serious reduction, reduction in payments capacities globally, what's called correspondent banking.
Now, there are substantially fewer corridors according to the SWIFT data that CPMI has compiled, which is the first slide in the series. And what these corridors are, are ad hoc, almost on-the-fly bank networks that global banks organically create to efficiently process the absolutely dizzying number of payments requests.
And the primary reason there are fewer correspondents taking part is the US dollar terms. What that means is the nuts and bolts of the monetary system, the internal workings which are necessary to maintain this supposedly seamless, efficient global system. And that tells us something very important about both sides of the monetary problem, why it isn't working as well as why no one has done anything about it.
Why banks retreat; fix or rebuild
Erik Townsend: Jeff, let's take these topics on one at a time. Why specifically isn't it working? And when you say that, I assume you mean the banking system, which is really the monetary system too.
Jeff Snider: Yeah, Erik, it's a package deal. Banks don't want to do any of these monetary things like they did before. In the pre-crisis era, they put up with SWIFT and these ad hoc corridors, even though it was Huge pain in the ass because they made, as you pointed out before, they made tons and tons of money in money, this virtual monetary system. It was all the incentive they needed to take on the burdensome responsibilities of creating these Eurodollar liabilities and then being able to send them all over the globe to every corner of the globe in microseconds. In short, banks needed to invest, they did invest in a better infrastructure and then maintaining it so as to carry out the necessary function of the global reserve currency from which, again, they were raking in the revenue. So they readily undertook all the required and boring functions as well as the market stuff. And so after the crisis, all of that changed.
The whole risk-return calculation was upended. Bank capacities are now expensive and they're fraught with numerous problems, liquidity risk being the primary one.
As a result, as we can see through all this data, banks are getting out of the whole money business, the systemic capacity both to create these Eurodollar liabilities and redistribute them. Both of them have been curtailed. That's what we see from TIC. It's what we find in SWIFT. It's in almost every bond trading and bond market price, an increasing shortage of not just money, but monetary capacities, which isn't money in the traditional sense. It sure isn't QE.
It's these bank products and bank liabilities and bank capacities. So QE has no bearing on these things. And that's why the Great Recession wasn't a recession. The initial monetary problem that showed up in 2008 was not resolved. It was simply an ongoing process that continues right up into 2020.
Erik Townsend: Jeff, in a big picture sense, it seems relatively simple and straightforward. We have all this data and evidence that banks are in fact shrinking. And if banks are shrinking, cutting back on all of these different capabilities, well, that has to mean that the monetary system itself must also be shrinking too. And that's why we continue to see these symptoms of a monetary shortfall. No matter what the Fed or any central bank does, it seems like somehow, even though you can't really explain it by looking at central bank behavior, it seems like we always end up with a shortage of US dollar liquidity on the global market.
Jeff Snider: Well, you know, that just means Ben Bernanke was right, at least about what would happen if he failed, you know, which it does appear to be the case. The financial system was not fixed. And the consequences do align with those fears of an L-shaped economy, as well as, as you're pointing out, all of the other things that we see in the global monetary system and global markets.
What Ben Bernanke was getting at, like it or not, that's the system we have. That's the one that's been building and building for decades. And really, there's only 2 choices here. Either we fix the banks, and I mean really fix them so that they can behave like they used to, or we have to start from scratch. It's a total reform.
By the way, as I was trying to say before, I'm not at all in favor of the first option. The bank-centered approach is not how the monetary system should work, but we have to realize, we have to recognize those are our only choices.
Either work with the system that's in place, whether we like it or not, and be realistic about the fact that that is the system that's in place, or we change it up entirely. And no matter how you feel about Wall Street and the other global banks that have performed the global reserve currency nuts and bolts, Right now, they are a necessary component to the system as it exists, and it's a lacking one.
So, you know, if you aren't in favor of doing something else, which entails its own set of dangers and pitfalls, you know, changing the monetary system up would be a tremendous undertaking, then the only other option is try some way to go back to the way it was in 2005, for example. And if you don't want to do that and you don't want to start over, that's why we're stuck in a global economy that won't grow. The system doesn't work and it doesn't change.
Why China and Russia cannot replace the dollar system
Erik Townsend: And that's the other point that you're going to make, right? Banks aren't creating and distributing US dollar liquidity the way we need them to. But it's not like it's a total complete failure. This malfunctioning monetary system is a consistent drag on the global economy. And this is the force that we talked about at the beginning of this interview, the hidden force that seems to be holding the economy back, but that very few people actually understand. Now, that raises other questions. Why doesn't someone come up with an alternative? I mean, the banks used to make a boatload of money with their little dodgy in-the-shadows system. You would think somebody would notice that there's an opportunity to come up with their own money printing machine. I mean, we hear all the time about China and Russia and how close they are, allegedly, to dethroning the dollar. So why wouldn't China and Russia get together? and say, hey, look, this US dollar liquidity system, the commercial Eurodollar system used to support it.
Something broke down. What an opportunity for us to rush the market, displace the Americans, and come up with our own jointly issued China-Russia currency that replaces the US dollar and provides enough liquidity to supply the system so that it's not held back the way it has been held back
Jeff Snider: Yeah. And the Chinese arguably have the most to lose from the way things are right now, especially since 2014. If you go to slide 22, I think that puts it into perfect perspective. I mean, the Chinese are getting slowly squeezed by it year after year after year after year. So it would seem they have the most to gain from getting out from under the Eurodollar system. And you're right, I hear it all the time too.
The dollar's on its way out. Countries are diversifying their reserves. There isn't a day that goes by that we don't hear a story about that. Any day China's gonna unveil its alternative reserve plan, except it's just never gonna happen. You can't just say you're going to replace the current reserve system. It's not a denomination. That's a big point here. It's a system. What analyzing this Eurodollar system does is it reinforces the notion of just how much there is to the global reserve currency.
What is actually required of it in practice? It takes an enormous commitment of resources and really ongoing effort to get this thing to work. You have to have modern money available as well as infrastructure behind it, meaning not just deep sophisticated markets, but you also need all of these other capacities like we're talking about with SWIFT and the massive payment systems. So even if you were trying to replace it, you wouldn't be able to hide it. It requires so much cooperation and a build-out, a really massive build-out of capabilities. There would be no way to keep it super secret year after year after year after year.
So a global reserve currency is an enormous all-encompassing paradigm. And that is why, despite the current system's persisting malfunction and decay, it's still here. It's a comedy of errors on all sides. Ben Bernanke says he fixed it. The Chinese aren't ever going to be able to replace it. It's just too big. But yet it does just enough for a modest amount of economic growth, which is really not enough economic growth in the grand scheme of things. But at the same time, it hasn't repeated Lehman Brothers, which simply makes it the worst of the worst case.
The system didn't abruptly end in 2008. 2008 wasn't potentially the balloon popping. It was simply the first pinprick that began a process of letting the air go out of it and has been a slow, almost imperceptible leak ever since. So much so that as the air goes out, barely anyone notices except for these intermittent anomalies, quote unquote anomalies, like the repo market or the dollar that only seems to rise for reasons people can't quite put their finger on. But when you step back and look at all this evidence and put it together, it really is, as you pointed out, Erik, it is It is pretty simple. The economy's L case, less of banks, less money, less economic growth.
And it's a steady process of banks stepping back. The global financial crisis wasn't the whole thing. It was just the first thing. Therefore, again, getting back to our original premise, the economy isn't broken. It can do much better. But to do better, first people have to understand what's been going on this whole time. It wasn't an economic boom, not really. And that's why so many people keep moving toward political and social extremes, why so many people all over the world are unhappy to the point of being more and more disruptive.
Where do we go from here: Erik on digital currency
Jeff Snider: There is something wrong, and right now, there is nothing we can do about it.
Now, having said all that, Erik, I spend all my time looking at the way the system is now or the way it's gotten to this point. I don't spend a whole lot of time, certainly not enough time as I probably should, thinking about where do we go from here? And I know very well that you wrote a whole book about this question. And so, I wanted to ask you, what do you think we're going to do from here? How do you think this might get resolved? What is one of the pathways out of this big economic monetary rut?
Erik Townsend: Oh, it's very clear to me, Jeff, and it's going to be revolutionary change. And as you said, you have to either change a lot of things or you got to just redesign the system. I think ultimately it comes down to a system redesign.
And what I'll reckon back to an analogy I think is relevant. I was a software entrepreneur in my first career, and I remember a meeting with a big national travel agency in about '94, '95. And I was a consultant at the time, and my company did very sophisticated e-commerce and web-based systems back before that was the in thing to do. And they said, look, you know, we really think this web thing is gonna be big. And we imagine a future where instead of using the phone for our travel agents to talk to our customers, we imagine that our travel agents will talk to our customers through the web. And we want your help architecting the system that gets there. And I just, in that moment, I'll never forget it. I'm like, how do you, in a customer meeting, politely say, dude, you are a walking zombie. Your entire industry is about to evaporate and you don't see it yet?
You know, they're paying hundreds of dollars an hour, which was a lot in the early '90s, for me to come in and give them advice. And the best advice that I could have given them was look for another industry to start a new business in because you're going to go away. And needless to say, we didn't have an ongoing relationship with that company.
Jeff Snider: Right.
Erik Townsend: It's very, very clear to me there is going to be a digital currency revolution over the next 25 years. I don't mean that cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin are gonna take over the world. I strongly disagree with the view of the Bitcoin maximalists who think Bitcoin is everything. But they're onto something. They have invented something with digital currency, which is profound. And it's not just a better way for money to work. It's an opportunity to re-engineer the entire fractional reserve system. banking system. So I think the replacement for the US dollar as the world's global reserve currency, you're absolutely right, it's broken.
There's an opportunity for somebody to come in and fix it. But I think that to say that Russia and China would come in and look at, hey, we could do another conventional currency, we can do a yuan-ruble that's going to compete with the dollar as the global reserve currency, that would be crazy. And China and Russia both Both know it. If you look at what PBOC is doing, if you look at Sergey Glazyev an economist in Russia who's been a leader there, they're all looking at digital currency technology and they've got the big picture. They're saying the US dollar is the world's global reserve currency. It is impossible for China and Russia to try to compete with it with another conventional currency. What could compete with it is a digital global reserve currency. And I'm sorry, Bitcoiners, I know you love your Bitcoin, but it wasn't designed to be the systemic currency of the world. It was designed to compete with government-issued currencies.
What we'll eventually get to is a government-sponsored digital currency system that will replace the US dollar as the world's global reserve currency. Now, that could be a US government-sponsored You know, digital dollar, or it could be a China and Russia sponsored, or it could be, and this is the part that scares me the most.
Fortunately, Facebook seems to have been shut down in the short term, but it could be Silicon Valley saying, hey, wait a minute, if we could design not a cryptocurrency that appeals to libertarian guys that love Bitcoin, but a cryptocurrency, or rather a digital currency, which is designed to appeal to central bankers of the world as a better alternative to the US dollar, we could kind of like take over the entire global monetary system so that we're in charge of it instead of governments being in charge of it. I think that is scary as hell, but the talent to create and engineer that system lies in Silicon Valley. So I just wonder what Google is up to that they haven't told us about yet. But I think where we're ultimately headed, and as you say, I did write a whole book about this, The title is Beyond Blockchain: The Death of the Dollar and the Rise of Digital Currency.
And it wasn't my idea to put the catchy alarmist-sounding title in. That was the publisher's idea. What it's about is the reasons why I think the US dollar will be replaced as the global reserve currency by a digital global reserve currency.
Closing plugs, sponsor tag and announcer outro
Erik Townsend: If anybody's interested in the book, you can find information at MacroVoices.com. For Beyond Blockchain. Meanwhile, Jeff, you also publish all kinds of terrific work on your website at alhambrapartners.com. Listeners, I strongly encourage you to check Jeff's writings out there. He's also frequently featured on ZeroHedge and other places. That's a wrap for today's show, folks. Again, we'll be back next week, August 6th, with our regular format, including a market wrap and. Post-game segment. This episode was made possible by toptradersunplugged.com.
Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit macrovoices.com/sponsorinfo. For the MacroVoices Podcast Network, I'm Erik Townsend.
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