Russell Napier — Economic historian (as introduced on the show)
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Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 292 was recorded on October 7th, 2021. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better serve the needs of both market participants and society as a whole, and by escrow.com, the world's most secure online payment system from a counterparty risk perspective because the funds sit in escrow.
Economic historian Russell Napier returns as this week's feature interview guest. We'll begin by exploring whether the developing situation in China changes the inflation calculus, and then go on to talk about rates, inflation, and where this whole macro picture is headed. Then be sure to stay tuned for our post-game segment when Patrick's ChartTech is titled, What's Next for the Markets, Energy, and Gold?
Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude oil, gold, 10-year yield
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Erik, let's talk this S&P 500. Boy, that was quite the 1-2 day little reversal. We find ourselves North of 4,400 on the S&P. What's your take on the price action?
Erik Townsend: Still wanna see north of 4,436 just to be above that cluster of moving averages to say that the bounce is really on. This is kind of what I expected a little later than I expected. I thought it was gonna be before we got as far down as we did before we saw this reversal. But I don't think the taper announcement is going to be enough to crash the market. We've been through these tapers before. Everybody knows that Eventually, the Fed's going to come to the rescue. So I don't think the market is going to freak out as much as it did on previous taper announcements.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's get on to that US dollar, which continues to hold up relatively well. You would think that in this kind of almost risk-on impulse that happened in equity markets, that the dollar would have at least been giving something back, but really holding here north of 94 on the index. Anything you see here on the dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with what you said, but by the same token, we're still holding south of $94.50. You know, we got the breakout to $94.50. What I really look for is the follow-through after a pullback. You want to see that daily close above the previous one. So you've got a pattern of higher highs. Haven't had that yet either. So I think there's two sides of this coin. Jury's still out. We need to wait and see what happens.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. I wanted to get your take on crude oil. I mean, we pretty much hit $80 and we since then saw a bit of a pullback, almost $5 off the highs on an intraday basis. We're back here around $78 at the time of recording. What's your take on oil?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that this story couldn't possibly be more bullish. And the reason I say that is I think the fundamentals are bullish. We've seen a breakout in the last week above the previous cycle high, and that happened on the back of an unexpectedly weak inventory report. In other words, we were expecting to see a whole bunch of great big bullish drawdowns in inventory the last couple of weeks, including this week. We're actually getting builds on inventory, but it's not crashing the market. It causes little hiccups. And then the bull market resumes. And I think that we're still headed higher. I said originally $80 before Labor Day. Well, we'll call it close enough at where we hit yesterday was within 20 cents of it. So I was what, 6 weeks late? I still think that we're headed higher, probably to mid-80s to 90 by year end and higher than that into next year. Of course, lots of things could change that.
But right now, that's, that's what I see on the horizon.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, how did the inventory numbers come in this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, as I mentioned, it was a build this week. Crude oil building 2.3 million barrels. Cushing, Oklahoma building 1.5 million barrels. And the builds continued across the board into the finished products with gasoline building 3.3 million barrels. Distillates was a drawdown, but only a de minimis 369,000 barrels. So it doesn't really do much to offset the rest of the complex. So we're not seeing the big drawdowns that some people expected. US production, meanwhile, ticking up another 200,000 barrels to 11.3 million barrels per day. So the rally is very strong. The trend is up, but we're also facing, frankly, some not all that encouraging fundamental data slowing things down a little bit, but I don't think reversing the direction.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's touch on gold. Really, uh, has, uh, stabilized ever since that little dip the other week. It meant the stage where it's still nowhere near clearing $1,800 on the upside, but certainly consolidating here. Do you think a short-term bottom could be in gold, or is there more downside still to come?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the tell is going to be in the next few days because right now the price action is above the short-term moving averages, 5, 8, and 13-day, but below the cluster of long-term moving averages. Something's got to give one way or the other. It's like a triangle pattern in a trendline chart that one side of that is going to break and probably the price trend is going to accelerate in whichever direction that is. In the next few days, we'll know which side of that we're going to break on. But, you know, the last few times we've been in this predicament, it ended up being a break to the downside. So until we see a break Until we break out above that cluster of intermediate-term moving averages, the 34-day, 55-day moving averages, and so forth on gold, I think the trend is down and it stays that way until we see a decisive change.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, let's wrap up by touching on that 10-year Treasury yield, which is still pressing to multi-month highs right now, trading around 1.56%. What's your take on rates?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as I've said before, what recent history has taught us is that this market seems to see a red line in the sand right around 1.7%, where above that level, people start freaking out and thinking, oh my gosh, the bond bear market crash is coming. Here it is.
I think that that's probably excessive fear, and we'll see what happens if we get back to 1.07. But I kind of don't pay attention to what happens at 1.53 or wherever we are today, because I don't expect anybody to really get concerned until you get to 1.65, 1.70 or so.
Why Russell Napier is back
Patrick Ceresna: This week's feature interview guest is financial historian Russell Napier. Now, Erik, why did we get Russell back on the show this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, Russell's a very famous guy going back to his career at CLSA decades ago. Probably one of my absolute favorite podcast guests, absolutely brilliant guy. He was an outspoken deflationist or disinflationist for many, many years, switched to inflation, and I'm particularly keen to ask him what he thinks about the developing China situation, if that's gonna flip him back into the deflation camp.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Russell Napier is coming up as MacroVoices continues right after this message from our sponsor.
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Napier: China's exchange-rate crisis and an inflationary devaluation
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is bestselling author and advisor to many financial institutions, Russell Napier. Russell, it is great to get you back on the show. I know you've got a new book out, which I'm really excited to read. It's called The Asian Financial Crisis from 1995 through 1998: The Birth of the Age of Debt. And I'm waiting actually for the audiobook to come out in a couple of weeks so that I can listen, which is my preferred format rather than read, but it's available to order right now.
I wanna talk first, you know, we've been talking to every guest about this inflation-deflation debate. You were one of the first people to really tell us, hey, It's time to just have a secular shift in thinking because we've got a secular shift toward inflation. And you've been a very outspoken deflationist for many years. I've really been looking forward to asking you this. Does the situation in China change your tune? Because that's turning some people back to deflationists.
Russell Napier: Sure. So the answer in any intermediate timeframe or long-term timeframe is no. But let me discuss the situation in China because it is currently somewhat deflationary. And could get worse before it gets better. The question is, why? And the answer is because they have a managed exchange rate, which for many years, actually, has been keeping monetary policy too tight. If you look at the People's Bank of China balance sheet, it's one of the few that hasn't grown. In fact, it's really not much bigger than it was in 2017, which, when you think what has happened in Japan, the European Union, and America, the United Kingdom, is quite remarkable. Many people look at that and say, well, that's a choice of the people in the Bank of China. It isn't a choice. It's forced upon them because they have a managed exchange rate, which controls the size of the PBOC balance sheet. Now, there are mitigating factors like capital controls, but that is the bottom line.
Broad money growth in China, just about 0.8%, is one of the lowest levels ever recorded. These are the classic situations in which you'd expect to get to some sort of credit crisis. And that's where we've got to. Now, obviously, property has been overbuilt in China for many years.
I write in the book that the Thai property market was clearly overbuilt in 1993, but we didn't get a catalyst to reveal that until 1997.
Well, now we have the catalyst for China, and that is that monetary policy is too tight. So here's the bottom line. Does China accept This type of monetary policy has been forced upon it by targeting the exchange rate on the basis that you can only target one monetary variable at a time, or do they do something about it?
So here's the— Michael, this is a property crisis. Looks like a property crisis, but ultimately, it's an exchange rate crisis. Everybody knows what you do when you have a decline in property prices or a credit crisis associated with risks in the property market. That is the main form of collateral across the financial system, the banking system, and the non-banking system. Everybody knows what you do. You cut interest rates and you print money. That's what you do. There's no reason to think that just because Xi Jinping is unelected, that he would follow a different path.
The question obviously is on timing, which maybe we can come back and discuss. My view is that we don't go far down the path of pain in the property market. Lower Chinese growth, something that looks like a credit crisis, until Xi has to move to what everybody does in a situation like this.
Now, just one more minute on that. It does mean a lower exchange rate. If Xi cuts interest rates and increases the supply of money, it will give you a deflation shock. I have no doubt that the markets will see that as deflationary, but it is actually very inflationary. And it's inflationary for 3 key reasons. Number one, tariffs. There will be tariffs against it. This is not 1994 with China devaluing. This is a big economy. The world couldn't cope with the consequences of China pouring cheap products in dollar terms into the world. Number 2, it's only happening because China's printing a lot of money. It takes a while to get to consumer goods and consumer price inflation, but it does get there. And number 3, it kickstarts a huge capital investment boom in the rest of the world as we try to replace all the stuff we're not buying from China.
That may sound like a complicated roadmap, and it is complicated by the fact that it's difficult to be right on the timing. There may be one more deflation shock. It doesn't make me want to move away from my call for inflation, nor particularly change the portfolio, because I think it'll be very, very quickly that people will begin to realize that this time, unlike 1994, this movement on the Chinese exchange rate is actually not Deflationary, but ultimately is inflationary. And finally, it really does trigger the Cold War. It's really a case of forcing everyone to take a side. Do you devalue with China, or do you not devalue with China? Because of the great pressure from the developed world not to do that. So a little hiccup, if you like, in the road, but that doesn't make me change my portfolio, because basically, I don't think I'm smart enough, or quick enough, maybe, to know how to play that and getting back in when we have this final—
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: Wrinkle in the deflationary shock.
Central banks and phase 2 financial repression
Erik Townsend: Okay, Russell, what I'm hearing is you're really basically sticking to your story on the secular inflation call, but also acknowledging that China could give us kind of a little whiff of deflation before the inflation really gets going. Let's move on to when the inflation really does get going, because I hear so many different perspectives and people have different views that range from, look, the only connection between interest rates and inflation is the one that the central banks intentionally create by raising interest rates to fight inflation. And, and interest rates don't need to move with inflation unless the central bank commands it. Other people would say that's a natural relationship. And still other people would say the central bank needs to do everything it can to prevent rates from following inflation as they normally would in typical cycles.
Which one is it? But also, what's the right prescription and what's going to happen here? Because frankly, I think central bankers all over the world aren't really sure what they're doing and they're trying to figure out their next move.
Russell Napier: Yeah. I'd go slightly further than that and say that they're impotent, that they can't do anything. They can talk it, but they can't walk the walk. And here's the reason why. It's not that higher interest rates are just unacceptable, and they are. They're not unacceptable. They're usually pretty unacceptable anyway to most people, but they're unacceptable now because debt-to-GDP ratios are so high and they would cause huge havoc.
It's also worth looking at from the private sector debt service ratio. Interest rates are quite low. Maybe we can carry even more debt than before. But actually, there are certain countries that really jump off the page with even low interest rates, where their debt service ratios are too high. China would be one of those, but actually, France would be another. Canada would be almost top of the list. In other words, it's like Jack Nicholson in A Few Good Men. You want the truth, you can't handle the truth. We can't simply accept it. Interestingly, America can live with slightly higher interest rates. Its debt service ratio is really very, very far below where different places across the world, there can be some raising of interest rates, but clearly not to a level that reflects current levels of inflation. So, that is the absolute key question now.
The question is not what is the level of inflation. The question is, when again will we live in a system where interest rates can reflect the prevailing rate of inflation. I obviously think inflation is going to be high, therefore I think interest rates would have to be higher still. However, it's not going to happen. Now the question is, how do they stop it? It's not about central bankers and short-term rates, it's about what we used to call market-determined rates. And I say used to call because there is this yield curve, and that yield curve is at least as important in terms of interest rates as the short-term rate controlled by the The central bankers, at the minute, we all know how they're controlling it. They expand the balance sheets, the central banks, to buy that debt and hold down the yield. That's where we are at the minute. In the long run, you simply cannot do that.
And it's not that you don't have the power to do it, because of course you do. You can expand your balance sheet to infinity. The reason that you have to stop is that liquidity you are creating is adding to the inflationary mess. And you don't want to create that liquidity because it adds to the inflationary mess.
And that didn't happen from 2009 to 2020. Minsky. But I think it's already happening. We can see it in inflation. Now, this is something we've talked about before. So at that stage, it has to stop being the central bank and it becomes savings institutions. You have to force savings institutions to buy those government bonds because they don't create any liquidity when they buy the government bonds. You're not adding liquidity to the system. You stop using the central bank and you force the savings institutions to do that. That's what I call— Minsky. Phase 2 financial repression. It's bad for equities because these institutions are not like a central bank. They have a finite amount of money, and if you're going to buy something, you have to sell something. What they're going to sell is primarily equities.
Then finally, why is the central bank actually embedded? Why are they not irrelevant? Because they don't control the supply of money anyway. You go to the Bank of England website, you'll find a lovely little article on how money is created, and it's obvious that virtually all the money in the world It's being created by commercial banks. If the governments get control of the commercial banks and can influence the rate at which the commercial banks expand their balance sheets, then the governments control the supply of money, and he or she who controls the supply of money controls monetary policy. The central bank will simply look on impotently. The long-term interest rate will be set by the regulator. They will force the other institutions to buy it. The supply of money will be determined by the government who controls the growth of commercial bank credit.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: And the central bank will be sitting writing interesting papers about how it used to control monetary policy.
Power shifts from central banks to governments
Erik Townsend: I want to integrate these last 2 topics that we've discussed, Russell, because when you were talking about China, your conclusion was that central bankers are going to be confronted with a situation where they are forced— their hand is being forced to deal with this FX issue that you anticipate existing for China. Well, okay, wait a minute. It sounds like what you just said about the challenges that central bankers are going to face dealing with inflation starting to run away. How are they going to stop the rates? It seems like those are integrated. So to what extent could there be surprises or curveballs that China throws at central bankers that limit or curb their ability to deal with this inflation?
Russell Napier: That's a very good point because it really depends on the PBOC itself. So, so there are curveballs that could be thrown at the central For instance, if I'm wrong, let's say Xi Jinping actually likes lower growth, likes deflation, likes the fact that certain organizations are going bankrupt and are actually going into government control.
Well, that's going to create for the central bankers with interest rates at zero, that's going to create certain problems with it. However, it's the governments that respond to that, and the governments would simply force the central— the commercial banks to lend more money and create more money. My fundamental thesis is that the PBOC contributes to inflation, that that's a curveball, if you like, that they're being dealt by their own government anyway. So it exacerbates it. But where I could be wrong is that Xi likes this form of forcing assets from the private sector to the public sector. And that's a huge curveball for central bankers because they have really nowhere else to go. And just to be clear, there is an answer to this. And the answer is take power away from central bankers. And that has been the answer now for 18 months. I think whichever way you split this, whether you think there's a deflation shock first, or the PBOC just prints a lot of money and we get inflation, either way, the answer to this is take power away from the central bankers and pass it to the governments.
I've been making forecasts for the public realm now for over 25 years. You don't always have the same degree of confidence in your forecasts, but that monetary policy is passing to the hands of the government and away from central bankers. It seems to be the most obvious thing we can say. And yet, if I pick up the financial newspaper and look at the front page of Bloomberg, the first 5 stories will be about the Federal Reserve. There's kind of a muscle memory here that tells us the central bank controls these things. And whether it's passing to the PBOC or whether it's passing to the indigenous governments of the developed world, it's not their realm anymore. This is not the realm— We've been here before, 1942 to 1951. In America, nobody bothered to look at what the Federal Reserve was doing because it wasn't relevant. They looked at what the government was doing in terms of mandating the purchase of government bonds.
So, all roads lead to the same place, which is the impotency of central banking.
Erik Townsend: Russell, I couldn't possibly agree with you more personally that taking power away from central bankers ought to be the answer here. But frankly, there's a lot of things that I think ought to be the answers that I know perfectly well are simply not politically viable. In this environment. Now, you know, when I hear my libertarian friends talking about how things should be, it's like, okay, if you want to tell yourself that you'd like it better that way, that's an interesting mental masturbation exercise. But as far as that actually happening on this planet, the trend is very much toward collectivism. It's very much moving away from capitalism. A lot of younger people really think socialism is appealing. There's MMT. All of the trends that seem to actually be active are telling me that as much as you might want to see central bankers have power taken away from them, I think the actual trend here is exactly the opposite.
Would you agree with that? And if so, what are the consequences? I mean, how's this thing gonna, gonna turn out?
Russell Napier: Yeah, so I do agree with that, but of course your libertarian friends think it should be taken away from central bankers and passed to the private sector. That's what they want to see, and that's perhaps why they own Bitcoin, because that's a private sector currency. But you're right, the power comes from central bankers. It's not leaving central bankers because suddenly the governments have decided that the private sector will be much better at doing this stuff. Quite the reverse, it's leaving central bankers and going to government, because the government has to achieve some of the things you've just mentioned there.
Pretty high up that list is the redistribution of wealth. Probably even higher than that is a green investment boom. Now, the market may or may not provide those things, but the governments have run out of patience to allow central bankers to determine the price of money and hope that the market delivers those things. So, I'm afraid for your friends who think power should be taken from central bankers, it's going in the wrong direction. It's not heading to the markets. It's quite clearly heading to the governments to meet the green investment boom, to meet the redistribution of wealth, and finally, to move wealth away from savers to debtors, which is not the dream of people who foresee there being no central bank one day. They foresee there being hard money, and in a world of hard money, debtors are paid back in dollars, which have the same purchasing power at which they lend.
So, yeah, they're right. Power is leaving the central bankers, but it's not going in the direction that they think. And it's inevitable. And as you say, we're not here to forecast what we want. We're here to forecast what is likely.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: And what is likely in all the forecasts that I've talked about so far are all based on politics. And the politics are really simple. The debt-to-GDP ratio is so high that debt has to be inflated away. And you do not inflate it away by handing the party grip money to independent central bankers, nor the private sector through cryptocurrencies.
Bonds and equities outlook
Erik Townsend: Well, since we're in the business of translating all this stuff to outlooks people can make money from, what do you get when you grok this all together, Russell? think about an outlook for bond rates? Is the 35-year bond bull market finally over? And if so, does that mean that a bond bear market has to start, or do we just stay at this sort of low-rate situation for years to come?
Russell Napier: Yeah, it's a great question, isn't it? Because in a market-determined interest rate, you'd expect interest rates to go up to reflect inflation. But if I'm saying to you they're not allowed to, then actually you don't lose money on bonds in nominal terms. And that's not to say you can't lose a little bit in In the next year, year and a half, or whatever, bond yields can reset up higher. They might go lower a little bit first to try to devalue, then they might go higher.
But the bottom line is your losses in bonds are in real terms and not in nominal terms. And at the outset of this call, you said that very clearly. We can't live with the Volcker response. We can't live with bond yields at 5%, 10%, 15%. So we're not going to get them. So those great nominal losses that we made on bonds— simply aren't going to happen. That, that doesn't— definitely does not make them wise, because the losses come, uh, in real terms. They become certificates of confiscation, but that confiscation comes in real terms.
So we are absolutely in a bond bear market, but I think we should measure bond bear markets in real returns. We should measure everything in real returns anyway, but I think that the real returns for bonds will be shocking for at least 15 to 20 years. But actually, the nominal returns may not It could just be flat. That's what happens if you cap the yield curve. There is no volatility. There are no capital losses. But in real terms, you lose a lot of money.
The interesting thing is what happens to equities. That is more complicated, and I think it differs from sector to sector. But here's the real concern. If the static yield curve is a product of forcing savings institutions to buy government bonds, they have to sell something.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: And what they're going to have to sell is equities. Now, that makes me— when we get to that stage, and I should stress, we're not there yet, and we could be months away, or we could even be a year or two away. We're not there yet. But when we get to there, I still think within the equity asset class, which is a huge asset class, there will be companies that do exceptionally well from this combination of high inflation and low interest rates that you can buy. But the equity asset class as a whole will be under severe difficulty. Yeah. Liquidation pressure from all these institutions who forced loan interest rates low. This is the fascinating thing about financial repression.
It sounds like the easiest thing in the world.
Oh, so I get it. The yield curve is low, inflation's high, buy equities. That sounds so simple. Why wouldn't you buy equities? The growth rate is up, nominal growth rate is up, the discount rate is high, buy equities. But if the only way to keep that discount rate down is through forcing savings institutions to liquidate equities, it's a lot more complicated for equities than than people think. Anyway, we're not at that stage yet, but when it comes, you'll need to be very good in equities.
I think there's a certain type that can do quite well, and I'd much rather own that type of equities to try and preserve the purchasing power of my capital than definitely touch the bond market. Of course, it is good for gold as well when we get to that stage.
The 4% inflation threshold for equities
Erik Townsend: Russell, let's talk about how this inflation cycle is likely to play out because a lot of people, you mention inflation to them and what they think is, oh, inflation, bad for the stock market, like the 1970s. And, you know, clearly we don't have that situation here. So what's your problem?
I would say that the actual lesson, if you study your history, and you're certainly the greater financial historian here, is that the way inflations almost always go down is they're really good for the stock market. That's asset inflation in the beginning. And then something changes and they get to really bad for the stock market.
What's the something that changes? What actually is it that happens where inflation goes from good for asset prices to bad for asset prices? How can that be, and how do we know when we're there?
Russell Napier: Yeah, so I've done a study of this historically, and certainly looking at America post-World War II, there is a nice guide for everybody. And, uh, let me— I'll explain why the guide has worked, but then probably why it isn't going to work and what will work. When inflation is— when inflation has been low and rising, and when it hit 4% is roughly when you should have been selling equities. So as you say, it's initially good for equities, particularly if you're coming from a low level, because if you're coming from a low level, the market is probably pricing in deflation. And that usually, at least according to my first book, is usually very bad for equities. But as it grows to 4%, actually equities go up. And interest rates may be going up as we go from 1% inflation to 2% inflation. 3% inflation to 4% inflation, but it doesn't matter. Equities go up. And why do they go up? Because the growth rate is rising faster than the discount rate.
And the rise in the discount rate, the rate at which you discount back future earnings, is not impinging upon the growth rate. And therefore, if you get a gap between the growth rate and the discount rate, you get higher net present value, you get higher equities. That's it. So what happens at 4%? Well, what happens at 4% is historically, the That is when the central bank has said, "Oh, wait a minute! Four percent inflation—that is dangerous. That is likely to trigger inflationary expectations, extrapolative inflationary expectations." As you know, the Fed has been for some time I've been absolutely fixated with inflation expectations. We need to do something. We need to do something, and what they need to do is to start to drive the discount rate to a level that brings down the growth rate. That is historically. Or at least in economic theory, that's how you control inflation. You put rates up to have an impact on demand, and by bringing down demand or slowing demand, you have an impact on prices.
But that's negative for equities.
That's when you get to negative for equities. You've got a higher discount rate causing a lower growth rate, and historically, this is when the whole thing begins to fall apart. You can see the problem with that analysis. What we've been discussing and how you started this interview is we can't live with those forms of discount rates.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Russell Napier: rates anymore. So maybe equities go to infinity. Maybe that's what happens, because the growth rate keeps going up, high inflation— remember, the great component of the growth rate will be inflation— and the discount rate doesn't, then why do equities not go to infinity? So back to my key point here, and this is crucial, because the market's looking for a deflationary bust to end this, as we saw in 2007, 2008, or it's looking at the traditional too much inflation, rising interest rates to end this.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: My call is it is neither. What ends this is a level of inflation that forces the central bankers to stop expanding their balance sheets, and then forces them to get the savings institutions to buy bonds and liquidate equity. It's a very peculiar end to the equity bull market, because it's forced by something which is a non-market force. Deflation, lower corporate cash flow, market force. Inflation, necessarily higher market force. Market rates, market force. And I'm saying that, nope, we don't get that this time. What we get is this administrative intervention to keep interest rates down, which forces a prolonged liquidation of the equity market. So that's a pretty extreme forecast because it doesn't usually happen that way, and probably hasn't happened that way since 1940. But anyway, that's what I think is going to happen, and that's how this equity bull market comes to an end.
And that's what I'm writing for my clients. I'm looking at indicators as to when we move from what I call phase 1 financial repression, interest rates held low by central bankers, to phase 2, interest rates held low by forcing savings institutions to buy government bonds.
Who represses first: debt service ratios and the dollar
Erik Townsend: Russell, when you talk about stage 2 financial repression, now that's an action of central banks. Central bankers act on their own local currencies. That means that we can expect this phase 2 of financial repression to appear at different times at different places around the world. So what do you expect? Is this something that happens first in the US or it happens last in the US as the rest of the world follows, or how does that work?
Russell Napier: Yeah, so, so this is absolutely the crucial thing because the first rule of a financial repression for a saver is get your money out of the country. I mean, it's really categorically simple because the government is using your savings to achieve political goals. And you might say, well, my savings are fine, but if you're in any form of regulated financial institution whatsoever, that's what's going on. So to the extent that you can get your money out and get your money out of the country, that happens.
So in other words, the exchange rate goes down. So when we move to that form of repression, there's going to be capital outflow and your exchange rate is going to go down. Now, if it was like Bretton Woods, where we all sat in a lovely hotel in New Hampshire and everybody did the same thing At the same time, then no one's exchanging it, maybe they could go down because we'd all done it at the same time. It was a use of a global monetary system based around financial repression. But that isn't where the world is today, for sure. The prospect of us all sitting down and agreeing in Germany, France, United Kingdom, China, Japan, and America that we all do this at the same time is highly unlikely. And highly unlikely because it's deeply political. We're talking about a big decision by an individual country, government, and central bank to move wealth within society. The idea that we all come to the same conclusion at the same time and do that is unlikely.
Now, how do we work out who goes first? Remember, the key implication of going first is a lower exchange rate. We go back to something I mentioned earlier, which is the private sector debt service ratios. We look at those. Why do we look at those? We say, well, here are the people who can live with Somewhat higher interest rates. But here are the people who are already seeing so much of their private sector cash flow going to service debt that when rates go up even a little bit, there's going to be a private sector debt crisis here. And what we began is, we can't live with rates that would bring a private sector debt crisis. So, the answer to that question for me is China and Europe. China and Europe have got much higher private sector debt service ratios than the United States.
Some numbers on that. An interesting number is that when America ran into its last major debt crisis, end of 2007, we were looking at a private sector debt service ratio of about 18.5%. In other words, 18.5% of all private sector tax credits were going to service debt. And that was enough, given the rise in interest rates we'd seen prior to 2007, for something to crack, for someone to struggle to pay back interest and create a default in the private sector debt market. In the banking system and create lots of problems. Now, America's still at 13.5%. It's come crashing down. Interest rates are down. But more importantly, the household sector in particular has degeared. The corporate sector hasn't. So it's more robust, and interest rates can go up. But France and China are just over 20%. Now, historically, that is exactly the level where you've had issues when interest rates have risen. Issues, we go back through the 3 periods that are covered by the database— 1998 in Asia, 2007 obviously in America, 2011-12 in the European sovereign debt crisis.
Any country that had a private sector debt service ratio up towards 20, interest rates go up, finds itself in a crisis. So those are the countries that have to repress first, because those are the countries really where they just can't permit market-determined interest rates.
So it's a bit of a toss-up at the minute as to who's versus China, or is it Europe? But the bottom line is the dollar goes up. I've long been a fan of the dollar, and that is a very non-consensus opinion. It hasn't actually been the correct opinion, but this is incredibly bullish for the United States dollar.
I think Americans may be fairly pessimistic about the long-term outlook for property rights in America, and you certainly won't hear me saying that America can avoid a financial repression because it can't in the long run. But it's the last to go. Interest rates can go up somewhat, and that's when we see the real shock. We see a tightening, not dramatic tightening, but we see some move by the Central Bank of America and deadly silence in Japan, China, and Europe.
And then people begin to realize that a financial repression is coming somewhere else before it comes to America. And remember, the crucial thing about this Most people will tell you that currencies are— there's real effective exchange rates, there's interest rate differentials, and that's what drives exchange rates. Quite a lot of the time, that's true. But sometimes you reach regime change. That's what we're talking about. We're talking about regime change. When that regime change comes first to somewhere else, you wonder what the regime change is. The regime change is interference in private sector property rights through the regulation of financial institutions. So people will flee to where that isn't happening. Now, it may get to America eventually, but as long as it doesn't get there, then America gets lots of capital inflow.
I would make a case for some emerging markets as well, which would probably benefit from capital exodus from countries like China and the European Union. So the sequencing is important. I think America is at the end of the queue, and therefore, it's very positive for the United States dollar.
Could equities inflate indefinitely? Control of interest rates
Erik Townsend: Let's come back to something you said a couple of minutes ago about the scenario in which, as interest rates are repressed, that we get to essentially equities inflating indefinitely. So many people are convinced that we've had this monetary experiment since 2009 that's, you know, just going crazy, it seems. Surely it all has to end badly someday and a big stock market crash is coming.
What if it's the other way? What if the way that this all ends badly— and I would describe it as an inflationary Great Depression— where you have a situation where basically they have to inflate that debt away, they can't control interest rates, there's no way to keep them down, and you have this runaway inflation where asset prices are through the roof in nominal terms, and you almost have equities serving the That's the role the US dollar usually rolls during the process of dollarization in a hyperinflation of a smaller currency system. But in this case, what you've got is the people in the United States are moving more and more out of cash and into equities just as an inflation hedge. Is that a realistic scenario that could happen?
Russell Napier: Yeah, so I think that it isn't a realistic scenario. And the one bit of that, I can follow the logic through that, and the one bit where I disagree And that is they lose control of interest rates. So I can see exactly why you're saying in a market economy, because in a market economy, of course, you can lose control of long-term rates. That's our money. We are the savers. If we want to demand 15% interest rates, because we think inflation is going to be 12%, then we would do that. But I can't see how they would lose control of interest rates, because they control the savings system. Now, if I'm wrong on that, then we can definitely get to your scenario.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Russell Napier: So just to be clear, I don't think equities get to an infinitely high number because the nominal growth rate keeps going up and discount rates don't go up. I think that's what we've been living in really since 2009.
That's why we are where we are. And it can go further, for sure. But at some stage, you can't keep using the central bank balance sheet to do this. So the only way that discount rates stay low is because you're forcing savings institutions to sell equities to buy bonds. Now, if If for some reason, the central bankers or the government said, no, let's let interest rates reflect inflation, well, I would be wrong. And there's more chance that things go in a very different way. But I think they can control interest rates. That's the difference. So I don't think this ends by rapidly spiking interest rates.
I mean, incredibly high levels of inflation, rapidly spiking interest rates, that's not where I think we're going.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Russell Napier: But it's probably for the worst possible reason. It's because the government steps in to control these variables, not because they're not the right variables to have, or the market would put in there. It's because the government controls the variables. Now, that slides your economy along the continuum from market economy towards command economy, but that's what financial repression is. And that's what it is, red in tooth and claw, and that's what we have to expect. So nearly everybody, including me— I've been in the market markets for over 30 years.
What have I seen? I've seen a world of more markets and less government, at least until maybe 10 years ago. And I have to accept that the next 30 years is more government and less market. And if I keep saying to you that the market price will be X, that isn't where we have to finish anymore. We have to say, does the government like price X? Are they going to do price X? And I'm mostly using an entertaining That's the whole puzzle is what are the unintended consequences of price action? That is the history of intervening in prices. There are unintended consequences. So that's why I don't think we get to the scenario you just outlined, but maybe they do lose control of interest rates. I think it's very unlikely given the sociopolitical consequences of losing control.
Gold, crypto and real rates
Erik Townsend: Russell, in this game, sometimes we get our calls right and sometimes we get them wrong. But something I find really interesting is I think the guys that are long gold all made the right call for the right reasons. And what we're seeing is the inflation is happening exactly as we predicted. But guess what's not happening? Price of gold. What's going on? Is this just about cryptocurrency stepping in to, to crowd out interest in gold, or what's, what's happened?
Russell Napier: Yeah, I certainly think crypto is a little bit of it, but it's certainly not all of it. Just on crypto, by the way, whatever you think of the market forces for crypto, everything we've discussed tells you one thing. If the government is to achieve what it seeks to achieve through financial repression, it cannot allow the supply of money to be dictated by the private sector, full stop. And that's ultimately what the dream of crypto is, a private sector currency, and it isn't going to happen. And China may have been the first to act, but there'll be others. So in terms of gold standing in the shadow of crypto, that will not last forever, because something will have to be done about crypto if it ever begins to fulfill its function. Which is as a currency. The governments can live with it as a speculative asset class the way they live with baseball cards as a speculative asset class, but they can never live with it as a currency because it would take so much power away from them.
So that will fall away from gold. Gold has suffered a little bit from rising interest rates. I mean, they haven't risen much, but they have risen a little bit. It also had a huge rotation into gold back in early 2020, which has come out as People rushed out of equities, and they've gone back into equities, and they've come out of gold.
But the bottom line for gold is it is a play on negative real interest rates. And the very definition of financial repression is negative real interest rates. And I challenge anybody to work out how we get rid of all this debt in the system without negative real interest rates.
That's the case for gold. There's another interesting wrinkle for gold that's come along, though— the politicization of credit. I haven't really had time to talk about, but is inherent in all the comments that I've made. The politicization of credit is evident and obvious, and there are certain things that people will not be allowed to fund. Not, hey, you'll have to pay more interest, but just you won't be able to get credit to fund this.
Gold mining is potentially one of them. I realize how many people are listening to this, they own gold miners as well as gold, but in terms of the green agenda, if you had to list all the things that are We're spending all this energy for A, well, there are lots of things that are legitimate to expend energy for.
Keeping ICU units open with energy, nobody doubts that whatever carbon you have to burn to do that is a legitimate thing. But keeping Bitcoin miners going and keeping gold miners going is something else. Now, that is incredibly bullish for the price of gold. It's the price of capital for all sorts of things that are now considered to be unproductive. Inflation goes up, then the price of the gold that's already above ground— and I should say already refined, because most of it's refined below ground— is incredibly bullish.
Then financial repression means interfering with where you can put your capital, and they may get to gold eventually, but I think people look back to '33, they look back to the Roosevelt edict on gold ownership, and they say, this is going to come, and maybe it comes eventually, but you've got to I remember back in '33, gold was a big part of people's asset allocation. I mean, gold was money, and money was gold. The dollar was pegged to gold, and people owned a lot of it. So if you wanted to financially repress, you had to go after gold. And now, well, you might get there, but you look at the pile of paper assets out there, you look at the wealth that you could redirect from equities into bonds, from private equity into government bonds, and if that's what you want to do, well, maybe you get to the eventually, but then its total market value is so small that it's right at the bottom of the list.
So, that is a re-encapsulation of the case for gold. I think maybe fundamentally the only thing that's new there is this green agenda. I don't think we've fully worked out what it might mean for the production of gold.
Erik Townsend: Russell, you're describing gold as a pure play on real interest rates. That's interest rates adjusted for inflation. But Russell, Real interest rates have been dropping like a rock, and they're really low now, and gold's kind of where it's been. So, how do we interpret that? Does it mean something's changed and the balance is different, or does it just mean this is an inefficiency in the market and right now gold is undervalued and we ought to be buying it?
Russell Napier: Yeah, I just think, I just think it means it's delayed. I mean, it's an extreme example, but if you go to '45 to '71, the gold price didn't go anywhere. We had negative real rates for quite a long time.
Erik Townsend: Well, it was pegged during that time, right?
Russell Napier: Because it was pegged during I don't know if I'd go that far. I don't know if I'd go that far. But it's a prolonged period of time for the gold price to— I mean, it can take a long time for the gold price to work it out. That's all I would say, because there's so many financial assets in the world. And there are other ways you can play this. You can buy TIPS. You can buy Bitcoin. You can buy other things. So there are other financial assets that perhaps people go to first. I just think gold can take a while to catch up. And it certainly is taking a while to catch up, but it will catch up.
There's our overhang that we began this by discussing, the risk of an overhang from China, deflation risk from China that has affected all commodity prices. We're not just talking something in the last 6 weeks, really, but I think in the last 6 weeks, that's had a pretty negative effect on gold. So look, I spend my life talking to professional investors, and obviously, I've been talking to them about gold for some time. They don't own it. They don't own it in size. They don't own it in scale because they think that they, you know, it's not the sort of thing they can have in their portfolio. They prefer large liquid securities, and that's where they tend to go to, particularly into equities. That changes in a financial repression because you're not allowed to.
So, you know, it's kind of saying that people are trying to play inflation through pieces of paper. More pieces of paper are available to do that than where in any case. We've had it at any stage in history. But eventually, as you realize that those pieces of paper are being manipulated or your ability to own them is being manipulated, you go more and more to gold.
New book on the Asian crisis and online course
Erik Townsend: Well, Russell, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. But before I let you go, I got one more question, which is, you really made some waves back in 2016 with your book, Anatomy of the Bear. All of a sudden, we got a new one. It's called The Asian Financial Crisis from '95 to '98, Birth of the Age of Debt, available now on Amazon in book form and soon to be available for those of us who prefer audiobook form.
Why a new book now at this point in your career? What's the occasion? What's the book about? What can people expect to find when they read it?
Russell Napier: Well, there is a bit of an occasion because it's been 25 years since I started writing, so that was an occasion to, to revisit something. But the reason for revisiting that particular episode, like my first book, is that I had written contemporaneous opinion. I had attempted then to forecast the future. And this is the crucial difference, I think, between my books and history books. History books look back with the benefit of hindsight and say, this is what happened. I look at what people thought was going to happen that didn't. Now, most historians don't pick that up. They look at events.
But when you're in our business, you're constantly looking at the future. So, I thought it'd be good to go back and look at how we got that so wrong. Not only did we get the fact wrong that there wasn't going to be a crisis, and there was, but also why people were still selling at the bottom. So, I did that. But behind that is a much, much bigger story. And that is how we set the foundations for the age of debt by allowing Asia and other emerging markets to devalue and undervalue exchange rates. And I won't go into the full mechanisms of that, but that created the age of debt. And actually, more important than all of that, that was the beginning of this great conflict between a form of capitalism which comes from the United States and a form of capitalism that comes from North Asia. The North Asian, what I would call more of a social capitalism.
In those days, it was Japan and it was Korea, but now we add China into that. And we're still living with that battle between these two. And in '98, when I lived in Asia, people were convinced that the Western form the American form had prevailed, and it didn't. There was a form of truce, and it seems to me that what's happening is we're becoming more North Asian. That's what financial repression is all about. So there's a lot in that book, and it's kind of on kind of all those different levels. And the other thing that I'm really excited about is after, after 16 years of running my course on financial history, we're finally putting it online. So that's fantastic, whether it's fully online video version of that course to teach people the lessons from financial history as well. And they can find out about that. And if you put my name and course into Google, you will come to the page, and you can find that.
Just send me an email. You'll find my email address there. And I'll tell you about that course. It's not quite ready for launch yet, but within a month, we will be able to offer that. I think it's 1,500 professional investors have taken it. And now it's available to anybody anywhere in the world. So after a long, hard slog this year to get that ready, So that's 2 big projects I've finally, finally finished off. It's been a tough year, but COVID allowed me to do these things. That's the other sad reason for this.
You know, I've had the time because of COVID to do some of these things that I've long wanted to do.
Erik Townsend: Well, I have not seen that class yet, but I can't wait to see it online. I know my co-host Patrick Ceresna actually took that class in Toronto and spoke extremely highly of it and quite enjoyed meeting you as well. So we look forward to getting you back on the show for an update in a few months. Meanwhile, Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right after this message from our sponsor.
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Postgame: reaction and S&P 500 analogs
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it's always a pleasure having Russell back on the show. It really was interesting that he had a bullish take on the US dollar and including a bullishness on gold. It's going to be really interesting to see how that sequence plays out in the next couple of months and years.
Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more, Patrick. And I think Russell is one of the few people thinking outside of the box and looking at all the I think a lot of the dollar has to crash sentiment is misplaced, and people are not considering that, you know, that it's a relative measure, the dollar against other fiat currencies that are also experiencing similar central bank manipulations. I don't know what the polite word is there, central bank management of their currencies. In any event, Patrick, let's move on to the postgame chart tech, which this week is titled, What's next for markets, energy, and gold? Listeners, you'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. Now, if you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, click the red button that says looking for the downloads. Patrick, page 2, we're looking at the S&P here, and hey, we're back above that 50-day moving average, just barely.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, no, we are. And really, uh, what I wanted to kind of ask the question is, is it this simple that the correction could be over and that there's a new bull phase underway. And what I wanted to do is just reflect upon some of the deeper market corrections that we've had in the past couple years to kind of use as an analog of what are the different possible ways that this plays out. Now, as we are getting above the 50-day moving average here, and then you could draw a descending trend line along the highs to kind of see that breakout, I wanted to reflect on, uh, the market correction that happened a year ago in, in, uh, September, October of 2020. It's circled there on the chart. And what was interesting about that period is we went through a very similar sequence of correction.
That was, uh, this, uh, multi-week drop in September that had the market trade below its 50-day moving average. But that wasn't yet the end of the After a very robust snapback rally that almost retested the previous highs, the market went down and revisited the lows all over again in the month of October.
And I think the interesting part using that analog here is that, you know, is this correction really over, or is there still more time that has to pass as the market establishes a base before it they can go higher. And when we go to page 3 where I have the S&P 500 during the 2018 and '19 period, I wanted to capture that period after Volmageddon and during the Christmas Massacre of that year.
And in both situations, you had a scenario where you had an incredibly robust rally the other way that lasted in, in many cases over a week, in some cases even 2 weeks in duration. And then subsequently went back to retest their lows. Or in the case of, of that November-December of 2018, it went and made a fresh round of selling to even lower lows, creating that 10-20% market correction back then. The point I think I'm trying to get across here is that just because we had a very positive reaction today on the upside, we could arguably still even make it to 4,500. But if any of these past corrections are a sort of a roadmap, it's still entirely possible that the market revisits the lows or even makes lower lows going into November before we really establish the end of the market correction.
EUR/USD and USD/CNH
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to page 4. EUR/USD looks like it's moving to new lows. What's going on here?
Patrick Ceresna: Oh, that's interesting because, uh, Russell was talking about the fact that, uh, the euro and, uh, the renminbi were 2 currencies that were vulnerable that could drive that US dollar rally. And I just thought it was, uh, worthy of us to just pull up some charts to look at it. And what is interesting is that the euro very distinctly is bearish and breaking down. And while there are other currencies that are buoyant, and it looks like that, uh, you have, um, the dollar index in a very big channel and trade range, the euro continues to demonstrate very clear weakness and continues to deteriorate. And, uh, it'll be really interesting to see whether this trend continues. I mean, could we see a drop down to 112 to 114 on the euro? And will that be the backdrop of a, of a US dollar rally? And that's certainly something that's on my mind. When we go to page 5, the interesting one here is that US dollar as it trades against the renminbi, what we saw was a substantial decline in that US dollar against the renminbi throughout 2020.
And really, this entire year has defined a very narrow trade range for that US dollar against that yuan. And what will be interesting here is to see whether or not Russell's view starts to materialize, that the US dollar maybe potentially starts to rise here. I think that this is a A chart to watch.
Crude oil
Erik Townsend: Patrick, let's move on to my favorite chart, crude oil, number 6. Very nicely breaking out of that green resistance band. And I want to point out, breaking out of that band at a time when we were getting some actually bearish inventory reports.
Patrick Ceresna: Right. I think the most important observation, uh, $80 was an upper target for a swing high, and not, not a major high, but just a measured move to the upside. And what one of the things that I'm going to be watching for is if the bulls continue to, in a very healthy way, consolidate the price here above its previous highs, that green band that I have there, and above its moving averages. If we see a multi-day consolidation where, where it's being very well defended, that could be a base for a continuation pattern to the upside. And I think these are really interesting So that's a key level to watch whether the buy on dip materializes
Oil time spreads: rolling Z1/Z2 to Z2/Z3
Patrick Ceresna: there. But Erik, what I wanted to do on page 7 and 8 is kind of get a peek at what's going on on those oil time spreads. I mean, that's one of your favorite trades.
What are you seeing here on the way that the term structure is developing?
Erik Townsend: Well, our long-term listeners know that my favorite trade for the last year or so has been long this Z1/Z2 time spread. The chart for that is shown on page 7. It's definitely time to close that trade. It's hit its target, which was a $10 move from -2.80 all the way up to 7.20. It's above that today. It's not that I don't like the trade anymore, it's just that that Dec '21 contract is getting too close. So it's time to roll this to Z2, Z3. So for example, as we're speaking right now, if you were to sell Z1, Z2, you could sell that for 7.20. $6.47 and just roll it down to Z2Z3, which you can buy right now for $6.24. So that difference of $1.25 or so is really the same type of exposure to the market, just moving the timeframe out. And I expect that we'll see that dollar of price change even if the price of crude oil stayed the same.
And I think we're actually going to see a bigger price change in Z2Z3. Because I think that the price of crude oil is going higher. Now, Patrick, most people look at time spreads either using a chart like this where we see one specific time spread charted over a long period of time, just like you would chart a stock or something, or else they use a term structure chart which shows all of the contracts at once. What I like to use is a different style of chart which is shown on page 8, and that's where we have each of the 1-month time spreads separate separately charted in a different colored line. And the reason that I find this chart to be particularly useful is because it shows me visually the dispersion between different contract months. So as you look at what's going on through the month of June there, you had a cluster of different 1-month time spreads all in the same general range, and something happened where all of a sudden that yellow one, which is the September to October of 2021 spread, blows out all the way to $1.30 at one point.
Well, what's going on there? What that is is event risk. People were worried that there was going to be some kind of supply shock or running out of inventory situation in Cushing, Oklahoma in August if we had had the feared massive drawdowns. When that didn't happen, the entire complex crashed. And you can see now that most of those spreads are moving back up. It doesn't look like they've moved anywhere close to as high as they were, but really most Most of them have moved higher than they were back in the June timeframe. The reason that those few spreads, which have all expired now, went so high was because people were worried about an event risk, which has already blown over at this point. And that's the reason that those summer spreads all crashed so dramatically down below the price action. What I see here is an indication of growing backwardation without that dispersion. That just means structural increase in the price of crude oil.
So I think this chart is telling me that the crude oil rally is not over yet, and we're likely to see all of these 1-month spreads move higher into the $70s and $80s.
RBOB gasoline
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to page 9, Patrick. RBOB gasoline taking off to the upside as well.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, it's really interesting because really oil started to trend first, but what, what is really Actually, arguably natural gas started to trend before even oil broke out. But really what we saw is gasoline finally joined the party. I mean, the last week has legitimately seen the full-on breakout above that, you know, $2.15 a gallon level. And this trend is really underway. And I think the setup is almost identical to the one we just talked about on crude oil, which is will we hold above its previous highs and above those moving averages during a consolidation, so long as it's pretty well defended. It'd be really interesting to see whether another further bull follow-through can occur where we see prices get to like $2.50 a gallon.
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, something I want to point out is that gasoline is a completely different game than crude oil in terms of the political significance of it. If, as you said, crude oil prices are going up but gasoline prices are not going up, only people in the care. But when you get gasoline prices hitting new multi-year highs, that's when politicians get involved and start doing incredibly stupid things that sometimes have consequences that are exactly the opposite of those intended. So it's time, as gasoline gets to multi-year highs, and we've already got a fairly contentious political situation, for this to become a big political issue. And I wouldn't be surprised if it does.
Natural gas
Patrick Ceresna: Well, Erik, you know, what I wanted to do is look at page 10 where I have that natural gas contract. This is the Henry Hub, the North American contract in November 2021. And what's really interesting is that nat gas has truly been in a, uh, bulling all the— all year pretty much. I mean, it started really in the second quarter of the year, but it's been working its way higher in this beautiful step pattern where we've, uh, pretty much seen nat gas prices double in the— in just half a year. The, uh, interesting Interesting part about the price action in the last week has been that we've had numerous times where natural gas tried to sell off and immediately is met with buying. But the velocity of the intraday swings is just so intense. It's amazing, just the intraday whips of 50 to 70 cents in some cases on that. And I wonder, I'm trying to figure out what exactly is driving such a intraday volatility, is it potentially that we're reaching the upper boundary or the peak level where there's some very active profit-taking occurring?
I'm not totally sure yet, but it's certainly very interesting to observe that this is happening. And I certainly think it's something to watch in the coming week or two.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the political volatility in Europe, Russia versus Europe gas deal, et cetera, is what's leading to all of the price volatility. In general though, Patrick, the Natty contract is known to commodity traders as the widowmaker for the reason that the guys who only learn half of the fundamentals and try to trade that contract usually end up losing their shirt. So natural gas is something that I make a conscious choice not to pretend to be an expert on. I let other people trade it. But I'm sure that what's driving this though is Putin and Europe and all of the gas situation. And the contention of what's going to happen, particularly if we have a cold winter this winter.
Gold chart
Patrick Ceresna: All right. And finally, I wanted to just touch on here on page 11, just quickly look at the gold chart. And what we can identify, very similar to what you suggested in the market wrap at the beginning, is that the downtrend in gold has been very pronounced. And there, there is nothing yet bullish about this chart pattern. What I really am curious about is, is that what we have seen and over again is a pattern where once a short-term swing low occurs on gold, it usually fails to bullishly follow through, creating what often technicians refer to as wedges or flags on the upside that generally fail and then roll over on the downside. When you look at the descending trend line and where the moving averages and Fibonacci zones all lie, I think that we We can generally say that if the price of gold in the coming week or two decisively remains below $1,800, it remains vulnerable that the downtrend will remain the dominant trend.
And I think that, uh, that's a really interesting pivot to watch for a potential shift, is that if, uh, for whatever reason the bulls are able to muster up some positive, uh, price action north of $1,800 and, and hold it, that would probably be the first bullish development we've seen in the last 6 months. And so that's certainly the thing to watch here in the coming week or two.
Erik Townsend: I agree, Patrick. And, you know, you could draw that top trend line that you have where you have it, or you could go all the way back to the August of 2020 peak, and it would almost connect to the same place. And, and, you know, look at the bottom, which would be a horizontal line across at $1,680. Now remember when we had Saxo Bank We had Saxo Bank's commodity chief, Ole Hansen, on the show, and he told us $1,680 was a really, really key technical level. If that doesn't hold, look out below, baby. Well, what's happened is we've got a wedge forming, and the base of that wedge is at the same level, $1,680, that Ole told us was a really critical level. So either we're going to get down into that wedge and, you know, we'll wait till the last minute before we see which way it goes and break out to the upside. Okay, the big gold bull market is on, or if we break to the downside, I think it's a pretty ominous sign.
And folks, if you enjoy Patrick's chart techs, be sure to check out page 12 where you can sign up for free to
Sign-off and Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: a free trial of Big Picture Trading. Get Patrick's webinars 5 days a week. We're gonna leave it there for this week's show. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better serve the needs of both market participants and society as a whole. And by escrow.com, the world's most secure online payment system from a counterparty risk perspective, because the funds sit in escrow. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the chartbook that we just discussed here in the postgame. There's also a link to an article discussing Moody's forecasts that the oil industry must spend $542 billion to avoid a supply shock, as well as a Darius Dale interview on is inflation transitory or secular. You'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the market, and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com, and we will consider it for our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.
You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. That's Erik spelled with a K, and myself @PatrickCeresna. Patrick Ceresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
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