Jeff Snider — Chief Investment Strategist for Alhambra Partners (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. And now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Episode preview: Snider on the dollar
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 64 was recorded on May 25th, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. Just as we feared and predicted could happen, the US dollar has broken down below key support, despite the bullish views of both myself and several prominent guests, such as Russell Napier last week. So, we're bringing back one of our most popular guests ever this week. Jeffrey Snider is Chief Investment Strategist for Alhambra Partners and is without a doubt the most knowledgeable person that I know with respect to the Eurodollar system. I think you'll find Jeff's views on the US dollar rally and what's really driving it completely different from what you've heard from our other guests, and they offer a very compelling alternative explanation for what has fueled this dollar rally to date.
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. And before we dive into our market wrap, I wanted to mention that we taped this show around 2 PM on Thursday afternoon, so our commentary doesn't include anything that's happened in the markets throughout the remainder of Thursday.
Market wrap: S&P 500 breaks above 2,400
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, when we look at that S&P 500, we finally broke out above 2,400. It seems to be holding initially. What's your feeling here on the S&P 500?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I think this is it. I've been saying for several weeks here that even though I think it's already dramatically overvalued, it feels to me like we're just Fighting off some round number resistance at 2,400. I predicted that we would move above it. There were a couple of quick little tests, you know, just a couple points above it for a couple of minutes, but now we are several hours of sustained trading action as we're speaking around 2:15 on Thursday above the 2,400 number, and I think it's going to last. I won't be at all surprised if we see a fairly quick move up to 2,450, maybe even 2,500. No, none of this makes any sense on a fundamental valuation level, but remember how the late stages of bull markets work. It's when everybody gets into a hysteria and a belief that the market can do nothing but go up, and the media goes wild, and Time magazine says stocks can never go down again.
That's when you know the top is in, and we're not there yet. So, I think that we are in the late stages of a bull market. I think that we just broke through a very key number at 2,400, and I won't be surprised if we see more upside, even though I don't think it makes sense.
Market wrap: US Dollar Index breaks support
Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, Erik, maybe at the postgame we should talk a little bit about Shiller's comments on that, but we'll save that for the postgame. Let's move on to the US Dollar Index, which still is hovering around that 97 level. I know that Jeffrey's going to have a few comments on this, but what's your thinking here on the dollar index?
Erik Townsend: As you say, Patrick, our interview with Jeff Snider is going to focus entirely on the US dollar, but that's going to come from a different perspective of alternate explanation for what's been fueling this rally. So, let's just focus on the technical levels and what we're seeing in the tape action this week. The key support was 97.5, 98, something like that. We traded as low as a 96 handle this week. We're back to a low 97 handle on Thursday afternoon.
You know, clearly, we've broken that key level. The biggest question on my mind is, okay, so how low is it going to go? I do want to buy the dip here, but I'm not going to get excited to buy 96.5. I think that we're headed to 95 anyway.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Just because there was so much long interest. If that starts to unwind and everybody's on one side of the boat and bails out together, we could easily see a pretty dramatic sell-off. Is that to 95? Is that all the way down to 92? Does it go even lower than that? I really don't know. I would look to more experienced technicians than myself. What I'm trying to figure out, what I'm spending a lot of time thinking about, is what's the number to start buying at? And I don't think it's here, but I do think it's coming.
Market wrap: crude oil after the OPEC extension
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil because that OPEC meeting came and went and suddenly we have a reversal down on crude. What's your thinking here?
Erik Townsend: Boy, you know, there's just way more that I have to say on crude oil than we have time for. So let's come back to this after the feature interview with Jeff Snider. And I want to get into the term structure and some trades that I see there and some trades that I actually put on in the last couple of days. But as far as the usual headline information, of course, OPEC, rather than inventory, which is usually the big driver of prices in a given This week it was the OPEC meeting, and as pretty much everybody expected, there was a lot of hype and hoopla leading up to this. The inventory numbers did help because there was a bigger-than-expected drawdown that just added fuel to the bullish fury. 4.4 million barrel drawdown in crude oil inventories nationally, 741,000 of that at Cushing, Oklahoma. Gasoline drawing down 787,000 barrels, distillates 485,000 barrels. So, Drawdowns across the board. That, of course, is bullish.
A whole bunch of hype about how OPEC is gonna solve the future of the world for everybody. It all led up to a massive, massive rally way above the 200-day moving average leading up to that OPEC meeting.
And this resulted in a chart pattern that I call a golden stick save. Now, that's a totally made-up-by-me name. What I mean is, when you see the 50-day moving average descending rapidly, and boy, ever since— And boy, ever since that big sell-off we had on April 19th, it looked like that 50-day moving average— looks to me like a kamikaze pilot that rolled inverted on a dive on an aircraft carrier was gonna go blasting straight through the 200-day. Sure enough, just before the 50-day crossed the 200-day, which would be known as a death cross, a very, very bearish signal in technical analysis, OPEC saves the day with a whole bunch of rhetoric. We go screaming way, way, way above the 200-day moving average. That causes the 50-day to about-face and basically parallel, just a hair above, above the 200-day going right up into that OPEC meeting. And guess what? OPEC announces their 9-month extension of the same program that was not effective at changing inventory levels in any meaningful way.
And everybody is all excited. And once the news happens, you know, it's buy the rumor, sell the news. It wasn't a big enough deal. It doesn't really matter that much. Gosh, who could have seen that one coming? And on Thursday afternoon, after the OPEC news came out early this morning, we're seeing basically a crash in prices from a high print of $52 $42 earlier in the day, testing briefly on Thursday afternoon a $48 handle. We're now just barely above $49 as we're speaking at about 2:20 on Thursday afternoon. Be very, very curious to see whether we close above or below that 200-day moving average, which right now is around $49.58 or so. And I think that's going to be a telltale.
But my base case here is we're probably headed lower. I think that the OPEC hype has played out. And I would say, though, that I think that I think that the better opportunities for trades here are in time spreads, in the term structure, as opposed to trying to pick a target price level and trading the front-month contracts alone. So, we can come back to that in postgame. I don't want to take up all the time before we get to Jeff Snider's interview, because that's going to be excellent.
Market wrap: gold at $1,250-1,260 resistance
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to gold. And gold popped all the way up to $1,260 earlier in the week, and that seems to have been the key overhead resistance. It's actually a technical level I've been watching with my members, and we've been just flatlining between this kind of $1,250, $1,260 area.
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, if I look at the chart here, we broke above the 50-day moving average for the first time in a while, a little over a week ago. And, you know, we've been testing it 1, 2, 3 times, it looks like. I think that what we're seeing is that phenomenon of what was resistance turning into support. And I won't be surprised if we see a breakdown below the 50-day. And I think if that happens, we'll see an acceleration to the downside. Now, my rationale here is commodities in general have been showing some very very bearish technical signals. This OPEC charade has sort of saved the day. Commodities in general were kind of in a holding pattern because of the dramatic rally we've seen in crude oil. If I'm right and that rally in crude oil is over and we're going to reverse to the downside in crude oil, I think the commodity complex in general is in trouble. I think that it doesn't look like we're seeing any big escalation of geopolitical tension.
The situation with North Korea has not escalated as some people feared that it would have by now. It seems like maybe things are getting a little better. I think that you could see gold selling off here, but I don't really have strong conviction on that trade. There have been times in the past where I really have a conviction about gold. Right now, I'm kind of just waiting and seeing.
Market wrap: 10-year Treasury yield outlook
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury bond. And what we've continued to see is that the yields have not only really collapsed from the 2.40 level a couple weeks ago, but what's interesting is after testing very close to 2.20, we've really started flatlining here and we haven't really seen yields aggressively moving higher. What's your thinking here on that? interest rates?
Erik Townsend: Well, we are back down below 2.25%, and I think lower is still to come. At the moment, you know, we're seeing the bounce in oil. We're seeing a lot of things going on. As these things sort of filter out of the system, I think you will eventually see a drift lower. It seems like right now there's support from a yield standpoint around 2.20%. When that breaks, I think 2% is the next critical level, 1.8% probably after that. And then the next thing to come into view might actually be all the way back to a retest of the 1. 1.36%, which was so far the low that we've seen in the US 10-year Treasury yield. I don't know that that's going to happen short of a recession, but I won't be surprised if that recession comes. And I don't mean in the next few weeks or months.
I mean in the next year or so.
Patrick Ceresna: Returning as this week's featured interview guest is Jeffrey Snider. He's the Chief Investment Strategist and Head of Global Research at Alhambra Investment Partners. Erik's interview with Jeffrey is coming up. Coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Dollar reserve role and Eurodollar basics
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next is one of our most popular MacroVoices guests ever, Alhambra Partners' Jeffrey Snider. Jeff prepared a fantastic book of more than 50 graphs and charts for this interview, so I strongly recommend that listeners download it before continuing. Registered users already received the download link in your Research Roundup email, and we explained for everyone else how you can register and get the download earlier in the program. Now, Jeff, in your past interviews, which have all focused on your work on the Eurodollar market, you've given us some of the best and most advanced content that we've ever aired on MacroVoices, as evidenced by your popularity with our listeners. So I really want to thank you for That excellent content. But quite frankly, Jeff, even some of the finance professionals in our audience have felt it a little bit overwhelming because you take such a deep dive straight into what swap spreads are telling us about the Eurodollar shortage and so forth.
So, what I'd like to do, if you don't mind, is to start today's interview by reviewing the key points that I've taken away from our prior interviews and asking you to correct me if I've gotten it wrong as we introduce the basics. Let's start with the US dollar serves as the world's reserve currency. And what that means is 2 things. First, the global trade— for example, France buys crude oil from Saudi Arabia— they're going to pay for it in US dollars. Second, central bank reserve assets, which you could think of as the piggy bank or savings account for an entire country, are denominated in US dollars. Specifically, US Treasury bonds and notes are the preferred reserve asset of most central banks around the globe. So, the consequence of all this is that there's an enormous artificial demand globally for US dollars. We don't need Swiss francs in the United States because they're not used in the United States.
But the Swiss do need US dollars in Switzerland because they're needed both as a reserve asset and to settle international trade. So, in order for the global financial system to function, there has to be some kind of balance. There has to be enough US dollars to support the global financial system, or else everything breaks. By the same token, I suppose you could argue that there can't be too many US dollars.
Now, if I understand it correctly, Jeff, almost all of the work that you do centers on analyzing the health of the global financial system based on whether or not there's a shortage or excess of US dollars available to meet the requirements of the global financial system. The Eurodollar market, which we'll talk about in just a minute, is the primary analytical tool that you use to gauge the health and well-being of the overall global financial system with respect to whether or not the need for US dollars can be satisfied by the available supply. But before we move on to Eurodollars, how am I doing with the basic concepts so far?
Jeff Snider: Erik, you have it mostly correct. I mean, that's the basic need for dollars around the world, is that in the beginning we have to focus on international trade and how international trade works. And the way it works is, as you pointed out, in this dollar need and this dollar supply and all of the mechanics related to either the supply of them or the demand of them and how they all interact.
Erik Townsend: Okay, cool. So let's move on to Eurodollars next. Normally, bank deposits are made in the national currency wherever the deposit is being made. So if you deposit money in your bank account in Toronto, you're going to do that in Canadian dollars. If you deposit money in a bank account in Paris, it's going to be in euros. In Thailand, it's in Thai baht, and so forth. But in countries other than the United States, it's normal and usual for individuals, businesses, and governments to also own a local bank account that's denominated in US dollars. So, for example, most Mexican businesses have dual-currency bank accounts so that they can keep most of their savings in US dollars and only maintain a balance of Mexican pesos necessary to meet their working capital requirements for their operations.
Now, the phrase Eurodollar was originally coined to refer to US dollars on deposit in non-US banks someplace in Europe. But the name Eurodollar is really historical at this point. If you have US dollars that are on deposit in Hong Kong, those are Eurodollars. If you have US dollars in your Mexican bank account, those too are Eurodollars. So, in other words, Eurodollar is just finance slang for US dollars that are on deposit at a bank Other than inside the U.S. banking system.
The next point that I took away from your prior interviews was that Eurodollars in an offshore bank work just like U.S. dollars in a U.S. bank. In other words, when you deposit those U.S. dollars, the bank just doesn't sit on them. They loan them out to somebody else who wants to borrow them and is willing to pay interest because that borrower needs U.S. dollars for whatever reason. Perhaps they're running an import-export business or whatever it might be. Now, before we move on to the Eurodollar futures market and what it can tell us about the health of the global financial system, how am I doing so far with the understanding of how Eurodollars play into this story?
Jeff Snider: So far, you've got it pretty much correct. You're absolutely right that there's a global connection of banks in all sorts of locations all around the world transacting businesses denominated in US dollars. But where it really gets mind-bending, where it really takes a turn into the more complex stuff, and we'll get to that a little bit later, is that, you know, that bank in the Cayman Islands that's doing offshore trade with that Mexican bank you referenced in dollars, doesn't actually need to wait for somebody to deposit dollars into that Cayman Islands location in order to create them.
And so, what actually happens is the system has moved over the decades away from a deposit-centered monetary system into one where these Eurodollar banks, wherever they are, simply create them out of thin air. And so, that has a number of implications for not just the global economy, but also the global markets and the way global money behaves.
Erik Townsend: Well, and I think it's very fascinating to me, too, I'm curious, though, that your view about how Eurodollars play into this system has such an impact on very fundamental things like the value of the dollar itself, because we've had a lot of guests on this program recently who have articulated a fairly consistent secular bullish viewpoint on the US dollar versus other currencies. And to very briefly summarize the views of several of our guests, they basically think that the US economy is healthier than other economies around the world. They think that interest rate differentials will attract capital away from negative-yielding European sovereigns into US Treasuries.
Donald Trump's policies pressuring multinational corporations to repatriate assets into the United States are all dollar-bullish factors, and that these are going to lead to a massive dollar rally that maybe is only half over at this point, despite the recent downside in terms of short-term tape action that we've seen this week in the dollar index.
Now, if I understand your view correctly, Jeff, ironically, you think that these bullish predictions these other guests have made are going to be proven true in the sense of the US dollar appreciating. But you think that they have the story completely, totally wrong. You think that the reasons that the dollar is really going to appreciate have nothing to do with those fundamentals and everything to do with this global Eurodollar shortage, which is the center of your analytical work at Alhambra Partners. Am I right to say that, or am I overstating your view?
Jeff Snider: No, I think that's exactly right. The other thing to realize, of course, is that the appreciation in the dollar isn't a straight-line event. It doesn't happen all at once, nor does it go consistently day after day. And so, there are fits and starts like any market. But essentially, the story is exactly that. If we're talking about global Eurodollar banks who simply have the ability to create dollars out of thin air, but then are no longer really willing to do that, what happens in that situation where the system gets acclimated to global Eurodollar banks being able to do that and willing to do that on a consistent basis? That's where you run into all these problems. And that's where you run into, as you described it, the global Eurodollar shortage.
Eurodollar University idea and the chartbook
Erik Townsend: Well, it's fascinating to me, you know, the whole world of macro investing. It's actually possible to have a thesis, Make money on it, pat yourself on the back for maybe a period of years for being so proud of yourself for getting it right. And I've been through this before in other markets and other trades and realized, wait a minute, I had no idea what I was doing. I got lucky. It actually went in my direction for reasons that I never even understood. So it's very fascinating to—
Jeff Snider: And then you lost everything and you're like, right?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, that's right. So I wanted to start with that review because I know that once you dive into your chart book, the facts and figures are gonna be flying at a mile a minute. And I wanna take a quick timeout here to let our listeners know. Jeff and I talked about this off the air because he gets this a lot where he dives into the, the nitty-gritty of this and people get lost. So, we're actually talking about maybe producing a full hour-long primer, an introduction on the Eurodollar system, how it works, and why it's important to the global financial system. In other words, something akin to the quick review that we just did now, expanded to a full-hour podcast interview. Eurodollar University, so to speak.
Folks, if you like that idea, let us know on Twitter, because we're thinking about doing it as part of our summer program lineup, and we need your feedback as to whether it's necessary. As for today's interview, I want to let Jeff go deep, as he's so good at doing, because I know a lot of you are waiting for that. So, this particular chartbook of 50-some-odd slides, which again, you've got the download link in your Research Roundup email, folks. If you're not already subscribed, look for the instructions on how to get it next to Jeff's picture. on our homepage at MacroVoices.com. This one's titled To Disappoint Again. Now, I'm guessing that's a reference to the so-called reflation trade, and I'm guessing that you're not buying that it's going to save the day. So, please elaborate as we get started with the chartbook here.
Reflation, Dalio and swap spreads
Jeff Snider: Yeah, you're exactly right. And the idea about reflation is that something different has happened where the global economy has gotten past all of the financial and economic storm of the past few years and finally put itself in a better place. And that better place is actually meaningfully different so that we can start getting back to the business of normal again. It's been 10 years since the economic crisis started, and it's about time that we actually go back to something more like normal, even if we don't ever get to normal, at least something more like it. I think that potential has captured the imagination of quite many people and quite many investors. And I think there's, again, a big mistake or some flawed premises behind that.
Erik Townsend: Okay. As I look at the next few slides in your presentation, you've got a quote from Ray Dalio here saying that it's unusual for social and political tensions to be so bad when the economic conditions are so good. But then you kind of point out quite a few slides saying maybe they're not so fantastic after all, looking at crude oil, looking at copper, looking at 10-year Treasuries. We're not going to have time to pore over every single one of these slides. So, give us an overview of the next several slides. What's the big picture story here?
Jeff Snider: Okay. In fairness to Mr. Dalio, what he was really saying is that we have all sorts of long-term issues that we need to be concerned about, but at this particular moment, things do appear to be moving in the right direction, and in some places, maybe even downright good. And what he was saying is that despite all the evident contradiction included in that analysis, that that must be the case, that things must be good because whether you look at oil prices being up sharply, commodity prices in general, the US Treasury market is acting as if things are going to be better because normalcy would mean rising nominal interest rates and a steepening yield curve.
And those things did happen at the end of last year. And so, it does seem to be a contradiction where the world does seem to be in a better place, but yet we notice that things aren't right, whether it's social or political tensions, or even just general dissatisfaction in a way that we haven't observed maybe since the 1970s. It doesn't seem to be the case. There has to be something wrong here. And so, what are we missing? What is it about the current economic climate that doesn't subscribe to the idea That things are good and, you know, the long-term concerns will eventually become something we have to worry about.
Erik Townsend: I want to move on to slide 7 next, Jeff, because I noticed something that we are moving for the first time in this interview to an environment where we're looking at a positive swap spread. And I know you have emphasized the importance of this and anticipated in our past interviews. So, let's take a quick step back. When we look at slide 7, swap spreads, swap of what? 10-year what for 10-year what? And what is the significance of that turning positive in recent
Jeff Snider: Well, swap spread refers to the quoted price of an interest rate swap in US dollars above the US Treasury yield. And so what it attempts to measure is the amount of risk contained in that swap price, because obviously people treat the US Treasury yield as a risk-free rate. Therefore, in order for a counterparty to engage in an interest rate swap, they're going to need some kind of premium to do so, because when you enter an interest rate swap with a counterparty, there is some risk to doing so. So, there should be a positive spread between the interest rate swap price and the US Treasury. But what we have seen since 2008 is intermittently swap spreads have turned negative. And what a negative swap spread actually means is nothing. It's a complete nonsense idea. The market is not saying that the US Treasury is more risky than the bank counterparty on the other end of the swap.
What it tells us is that there is something wrong in the money-dealing capacity, the systemic money-dealing capacity, the availability of balance sheet capacity across the entire dealer network to essentially keep the system from becoming nonsense, to keep these swap spreads positive.
And so one of the things that has happened during this reflation that maybe made it seem like things were turning back to normal was the 10-year swap spread, which had been negative for a couple years consistently, had turned positive in late February and into March. And so again, it was another indication that, hey, maybe things are actually improving, that if the swap spread turns positive, even at the important 10-year maturity, then maybe balance sheet capacity is coming back online, therefore the rest of the markets will behave as if things are improving, and then eventually the economy will improve from that. So there does seem to be, at least in this narrow view and this narrow focus, some basis for the reflation idea.
Erik Townsend: So, it seems to be very consistent with a narrative we've seen across macro in general, which is since the election, or some people would say before the election, there has been some kind of upturn. And whether it's Donald Trump or it's another case of us attributing something to Donald Trump that really was just happening anyway, as any But a lot of people have noticed that this reflation trade is either out of steam or about to run out of steam or has already run out of steam or something. And I just want to get your view correctly, because you are saying there's a ray of hope here on slide 7, but as I look forward at slides 8, 9, 10, and so forth, it looks like your overall view is still that something is very wrong. Is that correct?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think we're making a lot out of what is actually very little. The fact that the 10-year swap spread turned slightly positive is in no way, shape, or form indicative of a reflation trade. of anything other than it's just not as bad as it was last year. I think that's kind of the theme of this reflation is that people are trying to make too much out of this. Yes, the economy has improved this year. Market conditions, whether it's swap spreads or basis swaps or any other kind of Eurodollar activity or indication, they are slightly better this year than they were last year, but that's such a low bar to surpass that it's ultimately meaningless.
And I think one of the ways that became almost hyperbolic Well, it's too much exuberance with inflation. The PCE deflator in the US finally hit 2% in February for the first time in almost 5 years. So you had the Federal Reserve's target of 2% inflation, which they're supposed to enforce. I mean, it's an explicit target now. And they did an extra couple QEs to make sure that they could hit the 2% target. And yet it didn't happen until February 2017. But yet people are focusing on the fact that it did happen. The fact that the PCE deflator and the CPI are above 2%, as if that is meaningful in a way that denotes actual improvement, as Mr. Dalio said in the quote that we provided outside the presentation, that things must be good because things look like they're normalizing.
Erik Townsend: Well, and that's been a theme we've heard from other guests, as some people have said, look, a return to secular inflation is a good sign. It indicates that, you know, in a healthy economy, the Fed has to fight inflation, not deflation. Do you think that we've actually seen a turnaround, or is this a flash in the pan that's not going
Jeff Snider: No, it's a flash in the pan. And inflation is probably the most prominent example of that because it's nothing more than the base effect of oil prices. So, you know, but in the interest of overall analyzing the climate that we're in, you know, we also have to account for Federal Reserve policy. You know, it's not lost on people that the Fed is raising rates at the moment. You know, they've done 3 rate hikes in the Federal Reserve, which is now a band. They've done 3 rate hikes over the last couple years. And so, it feeds into this narrative that, okay, we've got 2% inflation, the Fed is raising raising rates, things look positive. The 10-year swap spread went above zero for the first time. It does seem like things are even officially progressing in the right direction.
The Fed, for its part, hasn't actually acted to try to put the brakes on that, because why would they? It's in their interest to get people feeling happy about the way the world is. In several instances, they have what I would call refused to clarify the situation. They've highlighted all of these positives, and And then later on, whether it be official statements or speeches, they've actually stated the world as it actually is, or have they actually viewed it at this point. But for now, it appears to be in their interest, and implicitly what they're doing, is to allow people to think this, that this reflation is real, and therefore the hope is that it becomes real.
Caribbean banks exit in 2011; TIC data and gold
Erik Townsend: So, if I summarize slides 1 through 12 in the chartbook here, what you're really saying is that there are a lot of reasons to think that things are fixed and getting better, and a lot of indications showing us that, hey, it's better than last year. Maybe we've seen a turning and it's all going to get better from here. But then in slide 13, I wonder if that's coincidence that it's unlucky number 13. You kind of say, wait a minute, there's some context needed to understand all this. And I think that context is going to explain why you don't think everything is really turning rosy after all. So, why don't you walk us through the next several slides?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, you're right, Erik. And I think what we're witnessing here is that those initial slides are almost like a sleight of hand. They're a magic trick or a bit of illusion where I think, again, people are making a lot out of what really isn't very much. So I think what we need to do then is step back and take a look at the— whether it's the markets or the economy from a much wider perspective, and to examine again, you know, the internals in the monetary system and global financial condition that's behind all of this, and to actually try to analyze and unpack whether or not that's actually the case. Has anything actually meaningfully changed in 2017 as compared to 2016. And the more we do that, the less we find reasons to be hopeful about the current state of affairs, not just the long-term state of affairs, which remains frustratingly unchanged.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so you point out on slide 14 that the 2011 crisis was mostly about Europe. Please explain what you're talking about here, and then starting on page 15, you've got several graphs and charts that show us some of the Treasury International Capital data And please explain what it's telling us about the US dollar.
Jeff Snider: Sure. And one of the most important parts of the Eurodollar system, especially in its basic construct from its initial founding in the 1950s and 1960s, the way that you talked about it at the beginning, where there were these dollar deposits in particularly Cayman Islands and Bahamas banks. The Caribbean banks have played a central role in the Eurodollar system all throughout its history until 2011. What we find in 2011 was that the Caribbean banks who had completely ignored the 2008 crisis, for whatever reason, decided they didn't want to do it anymore. I'm sure there's any number of reasons, and you could probably call the individual Cayman Island banks and ask them why, but I think mostly it was because of their longstanding relationships with European banks that were doing dollar business with them, because 2011 crisis was very European-centric. It had a lot to do with with the inequalities and inconsistencies in Europe, that Caribbean banks, this Caribbean part of the Eurodollar system, judged their European counterparts as too risky to continue doing dollar-based business with them.
So, what you find is, in May 2011, there was an abrupt withdrawal, and it hasn't abated since that. So, despite the passage of almost 6 years now, or more than 6 years, the Caribbean part of the Eurodollar system is not restoring that lost capacity.
Now, I want to say something about the Treasury International Capital Now, this is not a dispositive comprehensive view of the Eurodollar system. It's only a limited picture of it from a particular angle. What the Treasury Department captures is reported dollar liabilities of the kind that you described at the outset, these deposit liabilities between US banks and their offshore counterparts. And so, what we're witnessing by the TIC data is one angle of the Eurodollar system that we can use in concert with other angles to try to piece together an overall view of the whole system, which remains completely obscured.
We talked about in 2008 very briefly the idea of shadow banks and shadow capacity, and that was a very, very particularly good term to use, because what happens in the Eurodollar system is it all occurs, or mostly occurs, way beyond our view. We can only get at it through indirect means, and this is one way of trying to be able to piece together what's going on out there in the shadows, and if we use that as a basis to, again, corroborate other different views, we can start to put together a comprehensive view that tells us something meaningful about the system. And so what this particular piece of data says is that in 2011, the Caribbean part of the Eurodollar system decided they didn't want to do it anymore.
Erik Townsend: Now, I can't help but notice that there's a striking similarity. If I just look at this chart, I wish I had a Bloomberg where I could overlay the gold price on top of it, because everything And then things just up and up and up and away until May of 2011, then it falls off a cliff. Is there a connection to what happened to the gold price to this chart, or is that just coincidence?
Jeff Snider: No, there is definitely a connection. Uh, I don't— it's not a direct connection, obviously, but there is definitely intricate relationships between this part of the Eurodollar system and the behavior of gold prices, because gold is a reflection in several different ways of the global financial system. And I think that, you know, the gold price did know Quite correctly, according to all the textbooks, that in 2011 there was a monetary problem that wasn't going to be fixed. And that's why I think you see gold prices that peaked around that time and only went lower from there, because it was essentially a deflation signal.
Europe, Asia and Japan as Eurodollar creator; QE and OCC derivatives
Erik Townsend: So, we've been talking, of course, about slide 15, which is claims on Caribbean banking system. But as I see on pages 16 and 17, you've got essentially the same chart for Europe And for Asia, the charts are very different shapes. So, what story are these charts telling us about how what happened in Europe and in Asia was different from the Caribbean? And how does that flow into slide 18, which I think aggregates all of this?
Jeff Snider: Slide 16 is the European banks. Again, it's the proxy for cross-border dollar transactions with US banks and European banks. What it tells us is that European banks or American banks stopped doing dollar business with European banks as early as 2007. So where the Caribbean banks exited in 2011, European business took a hit in 2008, 2007. And as those 2 regions, banks in those 2 regions were exiting at various points in the early recovery period, behind them were Asian banks, which is on slide 17, which were banks in Asia decided that they were going to continue to do the dollar business that the other banks were not willing to do. For various reasons.
Primarily, what it tells us is that this Eurodollar system over the last couple years has become more Asian in nature. And when we get to slide 18, what it tells us is that the Asian banks that were picking up the dollar slack were not doing so in enough capacity to offset the shrinkage in Caribbean or European banks. But marginally, as the overall system contracted, it was becoming more Asian in its characteristics. What slide 19 shows us is that of those Asian banks, they've been primarily Japanese.
So the Japanese banks are sort of the bedrock marginal capacity that's been added to an overall shrinking system.
Erik Townsend: Japan has its share of economic problems right now. So what does that portend for the future of Japan's ability to essentially— you know, if you think of a central bank as the lender of last resort, It sounds like Japan is the Eurodollar creator of last resort. What happens when they run out of resort and don't have the capacity to create more Eurodollars?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, that's kind of an interesting way to put it. And I think you're— it's kind of right along the lines of what's happened. And it's very much related to the fact that the Japanese economy has been a mess for so long. I mean, when you think about something like the yen carry trade, I think people think about it in the wrong way. The yen carry trade, as it really is, the basis behind it is not that people borrow yen cheaply and then find dollars uses or higher-yielding assets to invest in. It's the fact that Japanese banks have all of this yen that they have nothing to do with because they don't want to invest it in Japan. And so, what they merely need to do is to swap that yen into dollars or some other kinds of currency, but primarily dollars, to do something useful with it because they're not going to deploy them in Japan.
And so, you're right. I think in a sense, Japanese banks have been the one outlet for Eurodollar capacity in the system willing to undertake these kinds of money-dealing activities where clearly the Caribbean banks don't want to, and clearly European banks don't want to. That's one of the ways in which the Eurodollar system has become more of an Asian dollar system, behind them all being Japanese banks doing whatever Japanese banks do.
Erik Townsend: On page 20, you're showing this Eurodollar money supply reference the various phases of quantitative easing. And there's a pretty clear pattern there that after QE3 ended, it seems like, you know, all these lines are starting to turn down if they weren't already pointing So, is that telling us that without quantitative easing creating more base currency around the world, that that has exacerbated the Eurodollar system? And I guess the question that begs for me is, a lot of us think that eventually, not in the immediate short term, but eventually, the Fed will probably do another round of quantitative easing. Is that gonna provide relief in the Eurodollar shortage when that happens?
Jeff Snider: The most effect that we had out of QE was simply the incentive In other words, for brief periods of time, certain banks took quantitative easing to be positive, when in fact, in truth, it really didn't have much effect at all. What slide 20 is telling us is another angle to observe and analyze the Eurodollar system. We have the TIC data that tells us one facet. Now, we have the OCC data, which is the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, who compiles call reports from the various money-dealing banks in derivatives.
What we see from this data, what it tells us about the Eurodollar system as a whole, what we can infer from it, is that as the Eurodollar system became more Asian over time, it also became more derivative over time. Because again, Japanese banks who had enormous quantities of yen looking to swap them into dollars needed to be able to swap them. Quite literally, it was a derivative issue. That's why you see in the post-crisis era, you see rising gross notional volumes of forex derivatives, as compared to shrinking volumes of interest rate derivatives or credit swaps and call swaps, because the character of the Eurodollar system has evolved over the last 10 years, as you would expect it to. Nothing ever stands still. And so, from 2011 forward, it became more Asian and more FX-related. And that tells us a lot about the irregularities over the last couple of years and what they actually mean.
China, the PBOC balance sheet and de-dollarization
Erik Townsend: I'm looking at the next several slides, and there's quite a story to be told here, starting with reflation. Just walk us through the next several slides in the deck here.
Jeff Snider: Sure. We're talking about more of an Asian dollar that's more FX in nature, but we're really talking about what is the Japanese banks doing at the margins of the Eurodollar system is overall shrinking. What they're doing primarily, or what we can anticipate that they've been doing, is they've been supplying Chinese banks with dollars that the Chinese banks need. Again, referring to your opening statement about who needs dollars and why, the Chinese banks and the Chinese corporate sector need dollars just as much as everybody else does. From what I can piece together, they've been supplied with those dollars from the Japanese bank.
That's also consistent with the Chinese monetary system as it actually is and has been since its reform in the 1990s. If you take a look at the PBOC's balance sheet, which is on slide 24, the bulk of the asset side is made up of foreign assets, which are primarily, not necessarily completely US dollar-denominated assets, but primarily the Eurodollar-type assets from that are on deposit or that are stored at banks, Eurodollar banks around various jurisdictions around the world.
With that dollar basis or that Eurodollar basis on the PBOC's balance sheet, what that really means is that the Chinese monetary system is dollarized. It has a dollar basis, just like in the old days, currencies used to be backed by gold.
In the modern era, the Chinese monetary system is backed by Eurodollars. And so that presented a major problem for the Chinese authorities, especially in late 2013 and early 2014, when they started to experience the direct effects of this Eurodollar retreat. Even though they had been supplied by the marginal increase in Japanese banking capacity for dollars, overall, Japanese banks appear to have gotten cold feet too, for reasons that that are either specifically related to China, the risks of Chinese autonomy, as well as the reform agenda that created possibilities of defaults among at least the corporate sector, and perhaps even some of the smaller banking system, especially the shadow banking system in China.
But overall, what happened in terms of Chinese money supply and bank reserves, which are the bedrock of the RMB system, is that the dollar retreat from even Japanese banks starting in 2014 created enormous pressure on the Chinese system, because if your asset side is shrinking as a central bank, you can either offset it in internal RMB programs, printing RMB and using it for various liquidity in various means, or you can allow the liability side, which is the money side of your balance sheet, to contract with the assets. That's what the Chinese actually chose to do in 2015. There was actually a contraction in their bank reserves from March 2015 until February 2016.
The way in which they chose to offset that initially was what is presented in slide 26.
In other words, they used the traditional monetary stimulus means. They cut interest rates, they cut the reserve requirement, thinking that by doing so, they would allow Chinese banks who built up a tremendous amount of RMB reserves would then deploy them so that the PBOC wouldn't have to adjust to its shrinking asset base.
What they found out was that that was a horrible choice to make, and it was the wrong choice to make because Chinese banks ended up hoarding RMB rather than supplying the system with it. You had the parallel contraction in bank reserves along with the hoarding, and the result was obviously the global turmoil that presented itself all throughout 2015 and early 2016.
Starting in February 2016, the dollar system didn't change. There was still a dollar problem on the asset side of the PBOC's balance sheet. balance sheet, but they decided instead that they were going to not allow that to contract bank reserves. They went from February 2016 forward, the PBOC has gone on essentially an enormous RMB expansion, but that also creates a problem too. Even though they've gotten bank reserves growing again, which is presented on slide 27, it's not growing at nearly the rate it needs to, and it's not growing anywhere near enough to offset the contraction in 2015.
The reason for that is because as they add RMB through these various programs, which you see on slide 28, the result of which is they have de-dollarized the PBOC balance sheet, which means RMB, the Chinese currency, has been de-dollarized. The PBOC has a very hard balance to choose from, whether or not they want to continue to allow the monetary system internal to China China to continue to contract, or whether or not they want to just go for it and print as much RMB as possible. And I think what they've tried to do is try to balance those risks in a way that I guess made sense to them, but in a way that has caused all sorts of other problems that maybe they anticipated and maybe they didn't.
And that's where we get into slides 30 and 31, which is that as they have allowed bank reserves to grow, but in a restricted fashion, They have essentially placed a liquidity ceiling on their largest banks. And because there's a liquidity ceiling on the largest banks, those banks then have an option, which is to either continue their activities in internal Chinese money markets, or to lend as they're supposed to, according to their lending and loan targets. And obviously, they've chosen the latter, which means that the internal Chinese system has been stripped of its liquidity capacity. Okay. Alongside the US dollar system. And so what we get then is where we find rising Chinese money market rates, as I've shown in slide 32, that are then an indirect and removed reflection of overall dollar system.
So we pay attention to the Chinese monetary system because it's another way of analyzing the Eurodollar system and how its dysfunction becomes something that we can visibly observe.
Erik Townsend: So as you're saying here, Jeff, on slide 33, what we're looking at, if I try to summarize everything that we've discussed so far, is the dollar pressure that we talked about in your interview last year. It hasn't disappeared. It's a little bit less than last year, but structurally, all the factors that are leading to this, and the one that you mentioned that scares me, is this de-dollarization thing, because that has the risk of turning deeply political.
Sergey Glazyev in Russia is pressuring Vladimir Putin to try to partner with China to de-dollarize, to get rid of dollars. And you've said that Asia has become the primary creator of Eurodollars that are needed to keep the dollar's role in the global economy working. So, it seems like a huge vulnerability, and that definitely gets my attention. But I think we're kind of changing gears here on slide 34 forward. Give us a little bit more perspective.
Swap spreads and anti-reflation
Erik Townsend: on where swap spreads come into this picture. What are swap spreads telling you? Why are they such an important part of this story?
Jeff Snider: Again, when we go back to a negative swap spread, it's basically a nonsense indication. And so, its only value is to tell us that something is wrong. We can imply or infer from that that banks, that money dealer banks that would normally be in these markets, that would police them and patrol them to keep them from becoming nonsense, sense are absent. It's another form of the breakdown of covered interest parity, where we used to be able to depend on a hierarchy of all these kinds of money dealing activities that made things predictable and dependable. A negative swap spread is essentially another indication that there's a shortage of something somewhere.
When we add it to the mix of this Asian dollar FX translation of the Eurodollar system, it tells us that there is a shortage of bank balance sheet capacity, especially among the big Eurodollar banks who have essentially shrunk at very parts or at various junctures during the recovery period.
So, the swap spread, we stand back and look at it from a historical perspective and not just over the last year. What you see is that it hasn't really improved all that much. And what I've shown on slide 34 is the 30-year swap spread, which is one of the first to go negative because a 30-year spread or a 30-year interest rate swap is much more balance sheet intensive than, say, a shorter maturity. And so, therefore, Therefore, banks that are short in balance sheet capacity are going to retreat from the 30-year space first, and that's exactly what we observe.
Even though there's been minor improvement over the last year, in the last couple of months, it has reversed again.
What that tells us is 2 parts. One, that the overall system hasn't really changed, it improved a little bit, but it hasn't really changed. The second part, and probably maybe the more important immediate Part is that even though there was some improvement, it may have started to reverse already, and we're already a couple months into maybe what we could call anti-reflation.
And when we look around the rest of the system, whether it be swap spreads, the yield curve, even commodity prices, that's exactly what we see from a wider historical perspective. You know, commodity prices are not up; they're just not down as much as they were a year ago. And so, you know, the oil. Oil price, it's up a pretty impressive amount from last year, but it's still 50% lower than it was 3 years ago. We can't just ignore that fact. We can't just ignore the fact that oil is not $100 again, which might indicate a normalizing economy, or that the yield curve is not completely normalized to something even close to a pre-crisis.
Erik Townsend: Jeff, you mentioned CIP, covered interest parity, and I just want to mention for our listeners who may be interested in that, that we We covered that subject in fairly significant detail in our last interview with you. We don't have enough time to really do justice to it today. But for people who want to understand CIP, listen to Jeff's last interview on this program. Now, in the interest of time, again, I want to just summarize. If I look at slides 41 through 50 or so, what you're really doing is presenting some very, very compelling data, which I would summarize to say essentially says, look, reflation Inflation is not solving the problem, and to whatever extent it may have been partially solving the problem, it's either rolling over or finished or done. And I think you've put a very good argument together here. So, what I'd like to do is move on to what I think is the really important part of this subject, which
Dollar outlook and the ratchet effect
Erik Townsend: is, what does all of this tell you about the health of the Eurodollar system?
That is, the availability of US dollars to support the global economy, and since it is in— I know that the short answer to that is going to be that we have a shortage. What are the implications of that both for the dollar index? You know, if the dollar appreciates too much, it could lead us to another Plaza Accord. There could be an emerging market crisis. What do you see as both— summarize the big picture of what's wrong, but really the knock-on effects and what the consequences of this eurodollar situation could be?
Jeff Snider: Well, when I look back at the history I think what's striking about it, especially from the perspective of 2017, is again, what I said at the outset was that the dollar bull, for lack of a better term, because I don't really like to use the term dollar bull because that connotes a positive type of situation, and it's really not. But the rising dollar, or whatever you want to call it, doesn't happen in a straight line. It occurs in these various episodes, in these discrete episodes, the panic in 2008, The recrisis in 2011, and then the Asian change in 2014 that greatly affected China, Japan, and all the emerging markets.
What it really tells us is that every time one of these things happens, every time there is this dollar event, another part of the Eurodollar system gets knocked offline. In other words, some form of capacity, whether it's geographic, whether it was the type of derivatives, whether it was whatever part of the individual parts of the Eurodollar system system, after each of these crises, it comes offline, never to return. The overall impact has been something like a ratchet effect or a noose where the global economy is further and further pressured, or further and further strangled or constricted, however you want to characterize it, after each time. There is no recovery in the dollar system, which I think tells us a great deal about why there is no recovery in the Because as the eurodollar system only goes in one direction, even if it's in pieces, piece by piece, the global economy suffers each of these dollar events and then never recovers from it.
And that's what we're witnessing, I believe, in 2017, where yes, things are somewhat better, but relatively better to last year, but that doesn't mean a whole lot. It doesn't really tell us a lot about actual conditions. The eurodollar system only seems to go in one direction, which— and what does that portend?
Well, for the dollar overall, I think it tells us that the rising dollar is still the path of least resistance, though it may not happen tomorrow. It may not happen next month, and we don't know exactly when it will happen.
But overall, as a trend, that seems to be the one indicated. But the larger implication, the larger question about the global economy and global markets is, you know, where does all this end? How does it all end? And I don't think there's enough information, and certainly not enough capacity to be able to say in 2017. Seen exactly how that happened. I think your reference to the Plaza Accord, or even another Bretton Woods type conference, would be a positive outcome, assuming that the people that attend these conferences actually know what the hell they're talking about, which usually isn't the case, especially in the 21st century.
We have to not only educate people about what's going on, we have to make sure that the right people know what's going on, and so that the right people are in position to be able to fix this, because The greatest implication out of all of this is that after the passage of 10 years, a whole decade, it's pretty clear that the Eurodollar system isn't going to be fixed. It's not going to fix itself. There isn't a QE out there that's going to do it. It's a system that is broken, and therefore, a broken system that's going to need some solution at some point. Really, the variable is, do we do it before it breaks down in another really radical and destructive fashion? Yeah.
Triffin, deficit spending and a global currency
Erik Townsend: You mentioned all of the wrong people with the wrong skills being in charge of these things, and I can't help but think like a politician here. If the problem is not enough global supply of US dollars, I could imagine a politician saying, well, that sounds like we need to run larger current account deficits, do more deficit spending, and borrow more money in order to create more monetary base in US dollars. And I don't I don't think that that's healthy in the long run. But to some extent, if I've understood all your— all of your arguments, they do kind of justify that rationale of there needs to be more dollars.
And one of the ways that you could create them would be, as Robert Triffin described back in the 1950s, the US running larger current account deficits in order to supply more dollars to the rest of the world. Do you think that that's going to be part of what happens next?
Jeff Snider: Well, I think you're right. On the surface, that seems to be what we're arguing for. If the world is short of Eurodollars, then create more Eurodollars. It seems to be that simple. But where Robert Triffin was wrong in the 1960s, it would be wrong in the 2010s. In other words, you don't create more of something that doesn't work. And that's the point here. The Eurodollar system is itself and always was inherently unstable. Therefore, it can't survive its own internal contradictions. And now that we're all aware of these internal contradictions, like it or not, that's the reason why all of these banks are getting out of the Eurodollar business, because they know it It doesn't work.
And so, somebody stepping in, whether it be a government or some other capacity, to try to recreate the Eurodollars or increase the quantity of Eurodollars in the global marketplace is the exact wrong thing to do, because then you're creating more of something that doesn't work. The solution to this is to find out what does work, what can be stable.
And unfortunately, I think you're correct, Erik, that most politicians don't think in that kind of depth. And so, the easy solution would be to say, you know what, if we have a shortage of Eurodollars, Let's just do more of them.
And that would be the exact wrong thing to do. I think, by the way, that's, that's the Japanese solution in their own internal yen. That's why the Japanese have lost several decades, because they've just decided, well, we'll keep doing more of the same thing that doesn't work.
Erik Townsend: I could also imagine politicians saying, look, this is evidence to justify why we need to move to a global currency, which a lot of politicians would like because it tends to centralize It leads to the creation of a global central bank, and it potentially allows governments to be more effective in taxing people.
Do you think that a global currency would provide any relief for the kinds of structural problems that you see in the Eurodollar system?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, I think you're right to point that out too, Erik, because, you know, it's hard to argue against what you're proposing, you know, centralization of a global currency. Is an inherently dangerous situation. But yet, how do you say, no, we shouldn't do that, when the current system just doesn't work and hasn't worked for so long and created such enormous costs that it's destabilizing even in the most stable countries like Europe or the United States? So, it's hard to argue that we don't need a global currency, because I think we do, because the Eurodollar is a global currency, whether we like it or not. It's an ad hoc put together in haphazard fashion. Over many decades, but that's exactly what it is. If we're arguing to replace the Eurodollar, we're essentially arguing for a different competing global currency.
The task is to get it right. We want to do it so that it's not something that can be too centralized, but in some ways, it has to be stable. It's going to be a tremendous problem with all sorts of competing factions, all looking to do different things, where So, it makes it a very difficult thing to solve.
Wrap-up and Alhambra
Erik Townsend: Well, I cannot thank you enough, Jeff, for another fantastic interview. And I just want to describe to our listeners that what we've done here is we've gone through your book of charts that really shows us current data, what's happening this year in markets, updated graphs and charts that make this case. But as you and I have discussed off the air, another opportunity that One of the things that we may explore is to do a more foundational, timeless session where we're going to talk not about what's happening this year, but just essentially Eurodollar University, explaining the Eurodollar system in more detail than we did at the beginning of this interview, so that people can really develop a foundational understanding of how it plays into the global economy. So, please let us know on Twitter if you like that idea. You can tweet us @ErikSTownsend And @JeffSnider_AIP.
Let us know how you like that idea because we are considering it as part of our summer lineup here on MacroVoices. Before we close, Jeff, tell us a little bit more about what you do at Alhambra Investment Partners.
Jeff Snider: I'm a research director here in retail investment advisors located primarily in Florida but with offices throughout the country. And we do the portfolio management services that are tailored to this more high-end view of evaluating Global macro and market risk.
Erik Townsend: And people can reach you through your website at www.alhambrapartners.com. And I think we've got a link to that in the Research Roundup email. We're going to have to leave it there, but Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Postgame: reaction to Snider; wanted: the other side of the Eurodollar argument
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to the program. Back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: You know, Erik, it's always interesting to listen to Jeffrey. He is bullish the US dollar, but he's bullish from a distinctly different perspective. What stood out for you in the interview?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think, as you said, it's a totally different view on what's really been driving this dollar rally. And I have certainly been in the position before of making money on a trade, feeling so proud of myself because I'm so smart that I I understood the global macroeconomy and I made the right trade. And then a year or two later, I figure out that I had no freaking clue what was really going on, and I made the wrong bet for the wrong reason, 'cause I didn't understand and I happened to get lucky. Wouldn't it be funny if Jeff is right and all of us who have had this macro-driven view about the US dollar actually have totally missed this real story, and the reason we've been profitable in that trade is actually because of this global Eurodollar crisis that Jeff describes? I'll tell you, Patrick, what I would really love to find, maybe some of our listeners can help us.
I listen to a guy like Jeff Snider. He's so smart. He knows so much about Eurodollars. His whole story makes perfect sense to me. It seems very logical, very well thought out. But I can't think about it critically and say, what's the other side of this argument? Because I don't know enough about it. I would love to find a guest to invite on the program who knows every bit as much about the Eurodollar system as Jeff Snider does, but for whatever reason has a contrasting view, thinks that Jeff has it all wrong and it's It's really the other way because of such and such and so forth. I would love to hear the other side of this argument because I can't find any fault with what Jeff says. But on the other hand, I'm not nearly as expert as he is on the international capital flows and indications. He's talking about swap spreads are telling us a story about the Eurodollar system.
Makes sense to me, but is there another side of that argument? I'm not sure.
Trade: short Dec-Red crude oil time spread
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, you included a chart in this week's Research Roundup on the term structure crude oil market. Now, you included it for all of our members to see, so why don't you explain what you're seeing and why you wanted to share it with everyone?
Erik Townsend: Well, why I wanted to share it with everyone is I really saw what I thought was an outstanding trade opportunity for more sophisticated traders who are able to trade spreads in the futures market. I have started, in the interest of full disclosure, to short what's known as the December or Dec-Red time spread. What that meant— I don't know where this crazy lingo comes from, the traders I like the slang, Dec red. Who made that up? I'm not sure. What it means is the December '17 through December '18, the 1-year time spread, the difference in price from the December '18 and the December '17 futures contracts for crude oil. If you look at the chart, the link is in your Research Roundup, where it says Evolution of West Texas Intermediate Crude Oil Futures Term Structure, that top term structure that you see in the light color there is the March '30/December '29 term structure.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: 31, end of March. The third one down is the end of April. And you can see that what's happening is we're moving from backwardation in March to a little bit less backwardation in April. And then by May 8th, we get to no backwardation and there's contango in that Dec-Red spread which is inside the red box. So it's actually an upsloping line. I think that that is the secular trend. That's where we're heading as the OPEC narrative collapses. What happened in the lead-up with all this hype and hoopla to the OPEC meeting is you got that second term structure from the top, the one in the brightest yellow, and you see there that there's a pretty steep backwardation. I actually bought— I should say I shorted a whole bunch of Dec red spreads yesterday at about 90 cents. So it moved from a contango of about 18 cents to a backwardation of about 90 cents. I think it went as high as 95 cents.
I'm kicking myself, believe it or not, Patrick, because I only put on a short of about 900 contracts. I was waiting for it to move all the way to $1 of backwardation where I was gonna double down on that, and unfortunately we never got there. So my trade size isn't where I want it to be. But as the futures traders in the audience know, 900 contracts is a pretty big position. So I was hoping to share this trade with listeners so the more sophisticated listeners that trade futures could maybe put it on. Unfortunately, we've We've moved from 90 cents of backwardation all the way down to 35 cents of backwardation. So I guess the entry opportunity was missed. I expect that we are going back into contango there. And I think that this was basically just an emotional reaction to, oh boy, OPEC's going to have an announcement that's going to create backwardation in the market. Everybody's putting the trade on.
Think back to 6 months ago when the same people were betting on the calendar spread options from June to December, and they thought that was going to go into backwardation. Well, that just expired. Look at the left side of this. You see that contango on the front of the term structure? That has to be there if there's a storage issue. The only way we can get to backwardation at the front of the term structure is if we don't have a shortage of storage capacity. And it is going to come out of the system, but it's going to take a long time. So the people who are betting in, in the other direction, thinking that there's going to be more and more backwardation in that Dec-Red spread which is— some people call it 2018 strip. Meaning the difference between the beginning of 2018 and the end of 2018. I think they're wrong because we are not going to draw down storage quickly enough in that timeframe.
By the time we get to Thanksgiving of 2017, when those calendar spread options would be about to expire, I think you're going to see that spread in contango. And when we got almost to $1 of backwardation, it just seemed like a screaming short to me. I guess we've missed the entry opportunity, unfortunately, at this part. But I still think it's a great trade. I still wanted to share the chart with our listeners.
China SPR build, Art Berman and OPEC
Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks, Erik. But now I wanted to also just quickly talk about— because Erik, you included me in that email exchange that you had with Art Berman, and Art Berman responded by saying he's still in that camp that supply will exceed demand, forcing a range-bound oil price. And I was reading that, and then I looked onto ZeroHedge and I saw that one article that was talking about China's Strategic Petroleum Reserve. And what was interesting about is that in this article referencing Scotia Russia Bank's Rory Johnston. They're talking about a 1 billion barrel petroleum build in global inventories, and they were trying to point out that the OECD only measures 35 to 45% of the oil reserves— obviously American and European oil reserves— but it's China's huge strategic petroleum reserve that, according to these satellite imagery from Orbital Insight, are suggesting that there could be as much as 600 to 700 million barrels of oil building, and that suggesting that China may very well be reaching its capacity and that they're already slowing the pace of buying oil.
How would you interpret something like this? What's your take on the story?
Erik Townsend: Well, I did see that article. I thought it was fascinating, and I would recommend it to our listeners. We've got a link to it in the Research Roundup email. The thing I would point out though is, although it is painting a very interesting picture, they're saying that China has probably accounted for 1 million barrels a day. Now, remember, this OPEC cut that everybody's all so excited about is only 1.8 million barrels a day total in aggregate between OPEC and Russia. So, more than half of that, 1 million barrels a day, this article is saying, was being consumed by China, basically filling up its Strategic Petroleum Reserve. When that thing is full and they don't have any more room, that means that there's gonna There's gonna be a million barrels of demand coming out of the system because China doesn't have any place to put more purchases of Strategic Petroleum Reserve assets. It all makes perfect sense. But you know what I would say?
I don't know for sure whether that article is right, and neither do the people writing it. Because if you read between the lines there, they're talking about satellite images, they're talking about how JP Morgan had estimated last year that China's SPR was already full, and it turned out that that was wrong. And now the satellite imagery says that it's really bigger than they thought, but maybe that's wrong too, and maybe it really is filling up now. Well, maybe it isn't filling up. So I think the way that this plays in is if they're right, and I think that we should think of this as a hypothesis, not a proven fact or anything, but the timing of it, if it's right and China is about to reduce its oil purchases by 1 million barrels a day because they've run out of places to stockpile it, the market is not gonna interpret that correctly. They're going to interpret it It's almost
as if OPEC's production cut extension has somehow worked miracles, and it's almost as if that 1.8 million barrels a day was working as well as a 2.8 million barrel per day cut. Well, of course, it's not really from OPEC, it's from China. You know, déjà vu. We were just talking earlier about Jeff Snider and how maybe his explanation is right, and those of us who had a completely different view about why the dollar should rally just got lucky. So, I think that the risk is, if that article, which I view as speculation proves to be right, it's going to result in a loss of demand that will be misinterpreted by the market as OPEC's production cut being much more effective than it really was. And I think that will fuel the strength of OPEC rhetoric going forward. So, that's the way that I see it influencing things.
But is it actually, you know, a for sure thing? Now, I don't know, and I don't think they know either.
Shiller's CAPE comments; SPY call options
Patrick Ceresna: Now, finally, I wanted to actually discuss discuss the big Main Street media headline of Robert Shiller suggesting stocks could increase 50% from here like they did in 2000. And you know what, the media has just taken this by the horns and construed it to be so super bullish, you know. And I, I'm trying to reflect as to what, uh, Robert Shiller is thinking here when, when he's making this kind of a comment, because on the On the surface, it really feels like he just went Martin Armstrong, where Martin Armstrong is talking phase shift was where we're going to go parabolic in the stock markets. And really what I interpret Robert Shiller doing here is saying, well, look, just because his index, the Shiller CAPE ratio, is very close to 30, doesn't mean that it has to stop here. He's trying to be objective. He's saying that back in 2000, it hit 30, but then just kept going to 45. And, you know, so he's just kind of trying to put this objective view that, look, that doesn't mean the stock market has to reverse here.
But by construing it bullishly, I kind of look at it and say, well, look, in 2000, it did go from the PE ratios of 30 to 45. But if you held for 2, 3 years and you held till 2002, 2003, you got murdered. So you actually had to be a trader to have participated in that move higher. And I think by accident here, they may be actually drawing a lot of the dumb money and retail into the market from someone that is naturally not a market timer.
Erik Townsend: Well, I couldn't agree more with your view that what Shiller really said, not the way it was reported, was just to say, hey, just because the market has gotten to an overvalued level by his historical measures doesn't mean it's not gonna stay irrational any longer. And, you know, the market was overvalued in 1999 and early 2000, but it kept going up from there. And I think that what is most interesting to me, though, is the media's reaction, because as you said, they're taking something out of context and they're just putting a ridiculously bullish spin on it. Well, what happens, Patrick, in the late stages of bull markets is that the media does precisely that. The, you know, the old joke Is that, you know, the top is in when the cover of Time magazine says stocks cannot go down, and there's lines around the corner of people trying to open retail brokerage accounts who are not qualified to trade or invest in anything.
And, you know, the dumbest money comes in at the very top, and that's when it's all over. We're not there yet. And I think that Shiller is right, that there's plenty of room for the hysteria to continue. The media is doing exactly what the media is known to do in the late stages of bull markets, which is to put a bullish spin on everything even though it doesn't really make sense. And that's what's happening here. But the question in my mind, since you're the guy who teaches traders, is how do you trade this? Because, you know, you want to be bullish if it's going to go higher, but at the same time, I wouldn't want to be exposed to a big long position in the stock market because you never know when that reversal is going to come, and boy, it's going to hurt when it does.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, Erik, I'm sure our listeners aren't going to be shocked by my answer, but call options are a no-brainer here. I look at Uh, asymmetry of using options, but it's about the fact the volatility is so low. Now, while many of you may see the VIX trading down at the 10 handle, so when you look at options on the SPY and you're going out, let's say, to July, you're getting an implied volatility on a call option that's just slightly in the money, very close to 9%.
I mean, you have almost no volatility risk. You're not paying any big-time value, and you get the asymmetry that your risk is defined to the cost of the option. And so at this stage, if you're turning around and you go long the market, which is some of these really cheap options that don't have a lot of vega risk at this stage, you can participate on the upside. And at the same time, if the whole rug gets pulled out from under this market, your risk is limited to the cost of that option, which allows you the exit strategy in an illiquid market, right?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, the thing I would question you on though is you're talking about about going long call options. That makes perfect sense. They're cheap because the VIX is cheap, but the VIX is a measure of short-term volatility, cost of 30-day maturity options. So, if you have this view, do you buy very short-dated options and roll them forward every month, or do you go several months out and buy a longer-dated option? And I would assume if you do that, you're going to pay much higher Implied volatility because the contango in the VIX term structure is so steep.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, absolutely. Like, if you go out to the December options on the SPY, which is the S&P 500 SPDR, you're getting up to about a 12% implied. And so really it's the shorter-term options, that June and July expiration, where you're getting those single-digit implieds. And so you do want to stay short-term. But more importantly, if we are in that stage where, like Martin Armstrong is suggesting, we're going to get into a phase shift on the upside, this is not going to take months to resolve. It's not like the S&P 500. Is going to be sideways for the next 3 months and then start moving in August or something. Really, this is the make-it-or-break-it moment, right? If we see that the market is done consolidating through the month of April and May and we get the breakout, we should see the market really make this move in the short term. And the thing is, we can't be guaranteed that the move is going to happen, but you want to participate.
And so you, you can really stick with like a June or July option. Like we talked about off air, you know, if you turn around and stay with the short-term options, if the SPY starts working, let's say the S&P 500 pops 50 S&P points and we're at the 245 level on the SPYs, you can just roll up and out on the option, lock in the intrinsic value. You turn around and buy another at-the-money or slightly in-the-money option, and you can keep rolling out so long as the bull phase is rolling. And eventually you're going to be wrong at one point, but you're extracting all your intrinsic value along the way. And then when finally it drops, the options that you have are going to expire, but that's it.
Erik Townsend: Well, I couldn't agree more with that. I just want to reiterate what you said and make sure our listeners heard it. In this kind of environment, I do think a big move up in the S&P is quite possible, but a big reversal to the downside will be coming at some point. I don't know when. You want to be capturing that profit. So short-dated options where you're paying super cheap implied volatilities, you buy those calls, and as you've got profit in them, you don't roll them forward at the same strike, you roll them up at the money so that you're capturing and locking in that profit. So eventually you might roll it 2 or 3 times. There's eventually a big move to the downside. You forfeit the premium on that last option you bought, but you've already locked in much more profit on the earlier ones. So that strategy of rolling up and out is absolutely critical.
Unfortunately, we are going to have to leave it there. For those of you who want to learn more about this, Patrick is in the business of teaching people how to One of his
Crude closes below the 200-day average
Erik Townsend: courses is all about options. I want to leave it there for now. I do want to touch very briefly, because as we've been speaking, the crude oil pits have closed. We did close today on Thursday well below the 200-day moving average. If that holds through the end of the week and we stay below the 200-day moving average, which is right around $49.55 or so, $57, in there somewhere, that is going to tell me that we're probably looking at a retest Test of that $43 level and lower. If we see a bounce back above the 200-day before the week is out, that probably brings a big question mark into play. But I think we're probably headed lower from here on crude oil. We do have to leave it there.
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Outro, Research Roundup and disclaimer
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So, Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Jeffrey, as well as you're going to find a link to the 50-plus page chart book put together by Jeffrey Snider to accompany the interview. You'll also find an interesting article from ABC News discussing the trouble with the Chinese economy and more particularly what it means for the Australian economy, and also a link to the CNBC interview with Asher Edelman discussing the plunge protection You'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners and are always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. For those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share their content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions.
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Jeff Snider: Thank you.
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