Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen (no institutional affiliation stated) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Opening: Episode 94 preview and Dollar Endgame series teaser

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 94 was recorded on December 21st, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. This will be our last regular format show of 2017. We still have some really fantastic content lined up for you, including several extra shows we'll release over the holiday weekends, but these were prerecorded back in November and will not include a market wrap. So for our last regular format show, we wanted to bring you a really fantastic guest. Professor Steve Keen is one of my own personal all-time favorites. So he'll be joining me for this week's feature interview. Steve and I will begin with the usual hit list of macro subjects, from equity market valuations to the US dollar. But then we're gonna dig into something really interesting, which both Steve and I feel a passion for, which is how economics is taught in universities, the shortcomings of neoclassical economics, and what Steve is doing to pioneer a whole new business model for economics education.

Be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview, when we'll announce what we have in store for you with our 5-part year-end special series, which we're calling Anatomy of the US Dollar End Game, featuring Luke Gromen, Jeffrey Snider, and Mark Yusko. The first episode will air this coming Sunday, December 24th, and we'll announce the rest of the schedule in the postgame segment.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. First off, I just wanted to wish a happy holidays to all of our MacroVoices listeners. We got a great show coming up over the holidays and make sure everyone enjoys that.

Wrap: S&P 500, tax reform and Bitcoin mania

Patrick Ceresna: Otherwise, Erik, let's just jump right to it. The S&P 500, earlier in the week, we were talking about this idea that there could be a sell-on-news event on the tax reform. And we had literally just one day of selling and then the markets just ripped right back up.

I mean, we're right now trading around the 2,688 level. What's your thinking here on the S&P 500?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, it doesn't surprise me a tiny bit that what we've seen is this continued melt-up occurring through year-end when everybody said, oh, this is, you know, fall of '17, it's the end of the world, the sky is falling, or whatever. The reason the market didn't crash, quite frankly, is because way too many people were predicting that it would, and that's not when markets crash. I think that a further Santa Claus rally into New Year's is entirely likely.

On the other hand, 2018 is another story. Now, it doesn't feel It doesn't feel to me like it's ready for a major change because I think we need to get to that point where everybody is ridiculing the naysayers who tried to express a voice of reason about valuations. You know, Ray Dalio talking about the market being overvalued 4, 5, 6 months ago. We haven't gotten to the point yet where they're replaying those tapes on cable television and ridiculing those voices of reason. And by the way, they were voices of reason. Eventually, we're gonna get to a major change of direction, but I don't think we're quite there yet.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: And if I had to guess, I'd say the first half of 2018, we change direction, but we probably need a catalyst to make that happen. If the Bitcoin mania persists, though, I think that could actually be the catalyst. And the reason I say that is it potentially creates a feedback loop.

I think a lot of the people that are investing in Bitcoin are millennials that are kind of looking for something to differentiate their generation. You know, the stock market's for old dudes. We're gonna invest in crypto. We're hip. We're with it.

Patrick Ceresna: That's right.

Erik Townsend: I think that that could take away the fuel that would normally continue the rest of this rally. What you'd normally see at the end of a bull market in stocks is those very inexperienced retail investors that have no experience whatsoever flooding into the market for fear of missing out. If that same demographic instead floods into running this Bitcoin mania even higher, that could create a feedback loop where Bitcoin keeps going up and now it's seriously uncool if you're a millennial. to go invest in the stock market because look at Bitcoin through the roof, that's what your friends are doing, it makes more sense to do that, stock market's for old guys, and maybe that's the catalyst that ends the stock market rally.

Now unfortunately, I think the Bitcoin mania is a mania. I think eventually it's gonna end in a much worse picture than the end of this stock market rally, but that's another story. No change in my view though, if you do want to play the rest of the upside in the stock market, who knows how long that's gonna last, for crying out loud, do it with options so that you limit You limit your downside and you're not one of the people that gets caught in the rush for the exits when someday this thing does reverse direction, which there's no doubt in my mind that it will. I just don't think we're there yet.

Wrap: Dollar index 91 and 97 levels

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the dollar index because literally once Monday rolled around here, the dollar index started on a downtick and we've been selling since. We're showing a 92.81 on the dollar index. How low does the dollar go here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think the critical numbers are still 91 on the downside and 97 on the upside. 91 or above 97 is where you've got a pretty strong technical signal that a trend is in motion and we know which way we're headed. For a long time now, we've been really treading water at 94, right in the middle of that range. Yes, we've sold off in the last week or so, but, you know, we're not below 91. I think in my version of things, I wouldn't quite term it the way you did. We are, I think, treading water still in the middle of a range, but we're kind of at the low extremes of where we can go before the path starts to look much clearer towards lower resolution to this. But I really don't think it's until we break 91 to the downside that you can say, okay, that's a declarative statement that we know the direction of the market.

So I'm still waiting to see what happens here.

Wrap: Crude oil inventories, hedging and $60 resistance

Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to crude oil because that 59, 58 level was really a key overhead resistance level. And it seemed that oil, every time it rallied up there, rejected. But at the same time, we see buyers buying every dip on oil and just kind of it almost hovering towards the top end of that range. Does this feel like it's going to break out to you? I mean, are we going higher here on oil?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think we're going maybe a little higher in the sense that a lot of people have a vested interest in the oil market recovering. In the last couple of weeks of the year, there's less liquidity. If people are trying to intentionally manipulate the market higher just to get a good closing number on the year, it's much easier to do that on a holiday week than it is, you know, when we have more liquidity in the market.

It surprises me a lot, though. I thought we were going to sell off after OPEC. I suppose I could kind of count myself right in that prediction in that we did sell off, but it was a very, very small, you know, $2 sell-off. I was expecting something on the 10 to 15% down from the highs, you know, down to the $52, $53 level. We only got down to $55.82, I think was the low print. That was the 34-day moving average on the day that we touched it. And we've stayed above the 34-day moving average pretty much ever since. You know, as far as what's going on with inventory this week, That's helping if you have a theory that maybe we're gonna go up and retest the high end of that range right around $59.

Well, the market was expecting about a 3 million barrel national drawdown. We got 6.5 million barrels of national drawdown in the EIA inventory report. Cushing, Oklahoma building 754,000 barrels. Remember that the Keystone Pipeline outage from that spill in North Dakota is over now. They've got it running at full tilt, and I think you're gonna continue to see some small builds Cushing, Oklahoma, as they work to send as much oil as they can to replace what was lost during the time that the pipeline was down. Gasoline building 1.2 million barrels. Distillates building 769,000 barrels versus an expectation a little bit lower. All of this was really fairly strong bullish for crude oil. Very large drawdowns, didn't have big gasoline builds like we've seen in previous weeks. Production did tick up to a new record, but only by 9,000 barrels per day.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: per week, so that's a very small increase. The market ticked up as you would expect it to on bullish data, but then it really sold off in a pretty pronounced way, down about 25 cents per barrel in the first 20 minutes after the data came out.

It did reverse to the upside as one would expect, but the buying didn't really start in earnest until about 30 minutes after that bullish data came out, which, you know, kind of surprised me. I'm not sure what was going on there. RBOB gasoline is definitely leading the market. It was trying to break higher above $72, which was kind of a resistance level, which it did. That carried the rest of the market higher. I think the rumor that the Forties Pipeline is likely to be back online sooner than feared is tempering some of this. If I had to guess what's going to happen here, Patrick, I'd say probably there's a little bit more of a melt back up to that previous high around $59. And frankly, whether that happens or doesn't happen, I don't think it's that important because again, in the last week or two of the year, holiday weeks are very easy for people with an to manipulate the market to create whatever outcome they wanna create.

What's much more important is to watch what happens right after the first of the year. I still think that we're overdue for some downside correction. We've got record-long interest from speculative hedge funds and other managed money pools. At the same time, we recently hit an all-time record-high short open interest from commercial swap dealers, and of course, that is a direct indication of producers Producer hedging. So there's a very important question you have to ask yourself. We know for a fact that a massive amount of producer hedging has happened. That's what that swap dealer number is telling us. At the same time, we also know that there's a fair amount of junk bonds reaching maturity in the first half of 2018. So the question you have to ask yourself is, is that hedging to refinance that existing debt? In other words, to issue new bonds which are just gonna go to pay off the maturing old bonds?

Or Or is this hedging occurring in order to create financing to drill new shale oil wells? Well, the answer's very easy. Both, that's for sure. Now we get to a much harder question. Okay, in what specific ratios is it both? And particularly, to what extent is that hedging enabling the drilling of new wells? Because we have seen a turnaround in the direction of the rig count, but it's kind of lost oomph in the last couple of weeks. It's not really taking off in a big way. So is most of that hedging just rolling forward existing debt, or is most of it going to result in a whole bunch of new shale wells being drilled and therefore a bunch of further record increases in US production? We don't really know that yet. We're into the slow holiday period. Again, I don't think it's very important what happens now, but it's what happens after the first of the year.

If we continue to see the market move substantially higher, that's say above $60 in WTI, okay, that's a really, really key resistance level. If you look at the big sell-off from the highs of $120-odd a barrel back in 2014, and then there was another high before that around the end of 2011. If you look at those all the way to the bottom, the 38.2% Fibonacci retrace, depending on which high you're looking at, is either right where we are now or it's about a dollar higher than that. It makes sense to test that, then it would make sense for there to be a fairly substantial sell-off down to $50, if not considerably lower. If we don't see that, if we move just through that number and much higher, boy, it's time for me to say, hey, I guess I just plain got this thing wrong. I think what's more likely, what I'm still inclined to lean towards in my forecast at this point, is we go up and we test those levels, and then we get a meaningful sell-off down to the low 50s, if not lower than that.

Again, I should emphasize for any new listeners, I've been more wrong about oil prices in the last 6 months than ever in the last few years. So I do grade myself in terms of my recent track record, and I haven't been exactly spot-on lately. So, you know, you can take my view with a grain of salt. But if I look at all the factors between the hedging that has occurred and the fact that there's just so much wound-up speculative long interest, this market is really ripe, if the selling gets started, for it to accelerate quickly as those longs start to unwind. And I don't think it's going to happen until after the first of the year. That's going to be the tell. And we'll have more commentary when we come back in the new year. Thank you, Professor Steve Keen.

Wrap: Gold and the dollar

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold because as soon as the US dollar reversed the other week and started a little bit of selling, gold bottomed right just below the $1,240 level and has been rallying ever since. It's right now around $1,266. Now, I was watching some of these Fibonacci zones in the previous lows, which all lie in this kind of $1,270, $1,275 level, which in my opinion have to be beat. But what's your thinking here on gold? Is this going to be able to follow through or do we go back and still retest the lows?

Erik Townsend: You know, I was leaning towards lower numbers, and I have to say this rally has surprised me and impressed me with how much oomph it's had to the upside. You think $1,270 to $1,275 is going to be the, the technical level? I'll trust your judgment there. We're not through it yet. I didn't think we were going to get this high, frankly. I thought we were still headed lower. The place where I think is going to drive this is, do we see the dollar index really continue to break down? Right now we're still not at a decisive Decisive level. If you see the dollar break below 91, I think it will probably accelerate to the downside, and that would probably be the salvation for gold. On the other hand, if this turns out— the weakness that we've seen turns out to be transitory and we do move above 95 on the dollar index, then I think we're going to new lows in gold.

So I think the dollar is the important tell. I don't really have an opinion about the tape action in gold. I'm more interested in what the dollar does next.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: All right.

Wrap: 10-year Treasury yields and Powell

Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yields. And what we really saw this week was a meltdown in bonds right across the globe. I mean, we saw Euro bonds and US bonds and Japanese bonds all take a pretty heavy step down in just about 3 days. The yield went from being around that 2.35 to jumping to 2.50 on the 10-year. What's your thinking here on the government bonds?

Erik Townsend: Well, finally, you know, we've been talking about this for weeks where I felt like, hey, you know, we ought to see a trend develop, especially Especially as Powell is the apparent new Fed chairman, and we hadn't seen anything. We're just treading water at the same level. I don't know that this is a decisive move yet, but we definitely are starting to see some momentum move in the direction of higher yields. Jeff Gundlach tweeted earlier today on Thursday, the 5-year coming up on 2%, which was a key resistance level in terms of yield.

He sort of said, if we get through that, it really

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: —paves the way towards higher bond yields. Kind of makes sense if you have the expectation that a lot of people have that Powell is going to be hawkish and is going to continue to hike interest rates over time.

It seems to be logical. On the other hand, if that was your expectation, why do you see the dollar weakening the way it is? So I think there's a few signals that are not all jiving with each other, but so far it looks like maybe we're seeing the beginning of a real and meaningful trend to the upside in terms of bond bond yields. We'll see what happens after the new year.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks for the summary, Erik. Now for this week's feature interview, we welcome Professor Steve Keen back to the show. Erik's interview with Steve is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Professor Steve Keen.

Steve Keen: what caused the 2008 crisis

Erik Townsend: Steve, you are very distinguished in the fact that you're one of very, very few people in finance who not only predicted the 2008 financial crisis but can prove it, because you wrote about the fact that it would happen, why it would happen, and how it would happen before it happened. So you do have a book out this year, Which is titled, Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? The short answer is no, we cannot. The longer answer, in 140 pages, is a bargain at only about $9 for the ebook version of that. We've got a link in Research Roundup email to the Wiley Publications website where you can order that. But give us the background. What was the principal cause of the last financial crisis in 2008?

Steve Keen: Well, Fundamentally, that we borrowed too much private debt in existence and became dependent upon the rise in that debt as a major source of aggregate demand for both goods and services and also asset markets. And when that debt stopped rising, that meant total demand actually fell. So it's quite simple in that sense. Financial crises are caused by becoming too dependent on credit and credit then ceasing. And when it ceases, because credit's such a large part of demand, a huge slab of demand disappears very rapidly.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: And that first of all affects finance markets, because finance markets of course have more volatile prices than goods and services markets. And the collapse in prices then means people stop borrowing money. When they stop borrowing money, demand falls and you have a crunch.

Erik Townsend: Now, if we take that model— and I could not agree with you more that that's what happened— what you're saying is it is expansion of credit, which of course cannot go on forever. So if you were going to fix that problem, presumably you'd have You have to change the fact that what the economy is dependent on for growth is expansion of credit. What we've done since the 2008 crisis is for the government to intervene to cause the creation of much more credit. So now we've got more debt than we had previously. And I guess the question I feel that this begs, a lot of us 10 years ago said, hey, there's no way that the Fed conjuring liquidity out of thin air can paper over this process. We've got to address the core problem, which is too much debt. And until we address that problem, we're not gonna see a solution. Well, guess what? We never addressed the problem.

It's 10 years later. The sky is not falling. The market has not crashed. I actually had Hugh Hendry, who was one of the most outspoken critics of this when it was happening, say, look, it's time to throw in the towel and admit that Ben Bernanke is a genius. He pulled this off. It worked. So if it didn't work, I guess the question is, okay, why didn't it work? And what is it that's going to go wrong? Because we haven't seen the explosion of runaway inflation that some people predicted. That hasn't happened.

What's the problem with the fact that we've just solved the problem of too much debt with more debt? And what could go wrong from here?

Private versus government debt and how QE worked

Steve Keen: Well, it hasn't been too much debt that solved the problem. First of all, private debt— inducting American data— private debt in America peaked at 170% of GDP in early 2009, and then with people people paying debt down and people going bankrupt and debt being written off, it fell to a bottom of 145%, 146% of GDP in the end of 2014. It's now risen from that to 149% of GDP.

We are now at a debt level more than 20% below where it was in the aftermath of the financial crisis, but slightly above where it bottomed. bottomed in 2014, 2015. On the other hand, government debt has gone from— and this is again looking at American data— gone from 56% of GDP in mid-2007 up to just over 100%, 102% of GDP in 2013. And it stabilized at that level. It's now 99% of GDP at the beginning of 2017.

So that gives you an idea of the increase in debt. Private debt's actually fallen by 20% of GDP. But at the same time, government debt rose by about 40% of GDP. So 20% down, 40% up. Aggregate debt level's risen by about 20%. But that government debt increase substituted government monetary-driven demand for the collapse in credit demand. So if you look at the scale of government spending as a percentage of GDP, That peaked, I think, at about 10% of GDP in the Obama stimulus period. Now, that as a percentage of demand is twice the size of the New Deal.

We all know about the New Deal. We all talk about it, huge government rescue, Tennessee Electrification Plan, Hoover Dam, et cetera, et cetera. We all know how big that was, but in terms of percentage of the economy, it was half the scale of what was thrown in under Obama.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: So that monetary demand stopped the private sector deleveraging and led us to about a 20% increase in aggregate debt. That stopped the Main Street collapse. But what Ben Bernanke did had nothing to do with the Main Street story. He did the Wall Street story. And what he did was quantitative easing. Now, quantitative easing had 2 ideas behind it, one of which was completely false. And that is the idea that if you put more money into the reserve accounts of private banks, they will then lend that money out and create 10 times as much additional money in the economy. If you go back and take a look at Obama's speech in 2009, he literally uses that as a reason for the TARP program. He says that— typical Obama speak— says that a lot of folks are saying, you're rescuing Wall Street. Where's my stimulus, they'll say. And he says the truth is that an extra dollar of money in the banking sector creates as much as $10 in the real sector through loans.

A multiplier effect that will boost the real economy. That is economic and mathematical bullshit. But what he was told by Hank Paulson and by Geithner and all the— and Bernanke, for that matter— all the conventional economists actually believe that banks lend out reserves. That's what also led conventional Austrian economists, and probably also Hendry, to believing that there'll be massive inflation, it'll all fall over because of this huge increase in money. It doesn't happen. It simply cannot occur.

And even I can now even quote the Bundesbank to say that's garbage. The Bundesbank quite emphatically says reserves have got nothing to do with lending. So what you've done is stuff up the reserves of the banks. But of course, what that means is let's let's talk about the mechanics of it. In in the American case, QE was running at about eighty billion dollars per month, which is roughly a trillion dollars per year. That's really massive. Okay, far bigger than the scale of the Obama stimulus.

Actually, let me work it out. Obama's stimulus was about $1.4 trillion. So actually, it's less than that in scale, but maintained for a larger number of years. What happened is— let's work through the mathematics. You create $1 billion of money by double-entry bookkeeping on the Federal Reserve's ledger. You then put that money into the accounts of private banks. And in return, they give you mortgage-backed securities and government securities and so on. So your assets rise, and the liabilities, which are the reserves of the the banks' rise as well. That means the banks have got $1 trillion more cash than they had beforehand, but $1 trillion less of income-earning assets.

Part of the logic of QE, which did work, is that that meant that the banks were encouraged to go and buy risky assets, for example, shares. They go and buy shares. Let's imagine the whole $1 trillion of money created actually boosts aggregate share prices by $1 trillion. Who holds shares? Wealthy people, pension funds, et cetera, et cetera. They have a trillion dollars more money.

Let's presume this is just rough back-of-envelope type guesses that they spend 90% of that buying other assets, and maybe 10% end up as fees that they pay. You know, higher wages for people and the impoverished people who work in the finance sector, purchases of goods and services by them. So of that trillion, maybe 100 billion turns up in Main Street.

Now, that $100 billion turns over once or twice a year, you get about $100 billion to maybe $200 billion of additional demand in the economy. So you pump in a trillion, your real economy gets a $100 billion benefit out of that. But that's enough to mean you've stimulated the economy a bit, demand rises again. Fundamentally, you drive asset prices through the roof, as we've seen, but you don't stimulate the nurse economy all that much, but enough to attenuate the damage done By 2 things. First of all, by the financial crisis, and then by the relatively anemic levels of credit that occurred after that. So that's what actually happened. And that's, to me, one of the dangers now for the finance sector going forward, because they're talking about reversing QE. Now, if they reverse QE, that whole process also goes into reverse, and asset prices could crash.

Walking dead and zombies-to-be: private debt by country

Erik Townsend: And so is that— I mean, because I guess what I'm looking for is, where is the resolution to this? You have asserted, as I understand it, that these actions have not created a viable long- term solution to anything, and you think another financial crisis is inevitable. Is it the reversal of QE leading to an asset price crash that is the mechanism that's principally where the risk is, or is there something more to it than that?

Steve Keen: We always focus on America and the UK and most of Europe when we think about the global economy, and they're all countries which had private debt bubbles like America and private debt bursts like America had back in 2008. And in the aftermath, just like America as well, most of those countries have had a reduced level of private debt, but still quite extreme. So I'll give you the UK's example. UK's private debt went from 55% when Maggie Thatcher was in control to 193%, I think it was at the peak, when Gordon Brown was in control. And it's since fallen to about 170% of GDP. But if you, in effect, if you imagine this being like mountain climbing, both America America and England and Europe are sort of like they've climbed to the peak of Mount Everest. They're now down to base camp and they're trying to climb back up again. They're not going to get very far before they run out of wind.

So those countries I call the walking dead of debt. But there are other countries that managed to continue booming by continuing to borrow money. And they're what I call the zombies-to-be. So in terms of the walking dead of debt, that includes America, the UK, Europe, but also most interestingly, Japan.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: Because Japan was the very first zombified economy. And if you look at their history, they always had high levels of private debt because with the keiretsu system they had, a large part of the investment was financed by compliant banks within one of the big keiretsu systems like Mitsubishi and so on. So they had a high level of private debt finance. And in the 1980s, private companies started to not merely borrow money to invest in new technology, they started borrowing to speculate on the stock market. Market to speculate on commercial real estate. And the household sector got involved in speculating on house prices as well.

And you have what Japan literally called the bubble economy in that period. So if you look at Japan, Japan always had a high level of private debt because Japanese companies financed their operations not so much by issuing equity as borrowing from banks that were in industrial agglomerates that were called the Keiretsus.

Mitsubishi was a— there was also Mitsubishi Bank. So in a sense, it was debt, but it was debt within a collective level of ownership. So they always had a high level of debt finance than America had. If you go back to 1966, the private debt level in Japan was 120% of GDP, reached 140% across the 1970s. But in about 1980, the industrial sector, but also the household sector, started to borrow money to speculate on asset prices. So the private corporations were speculating on shares. Commercial real estate. The households are speculating on household price and house prices. And private debt in Japan rose from 140% of GDP in 1980 to 215% in 1990. So a huge increase in private debt, a huge level of demand. The Japanese actually called that the bubble economy period. It ended precisely on the 31st of December, 1999.

You then had a slowdown in the rate of growth of debt. It finally peaked at about 220% of GDP in the early 1990s. Since then, it's been falling, and it's now stabilized at about 160% of GDP. And with those debt levels, it meant that effectively Japanese corporations were no longer borrowing money to finance investment. They were simply using whatever retained earnings they had to try to pay their debt levels down, and the Japanese economy became became zombified. It hasn't grown. If you might remember back in the 1990s, we had movies like The Rising Sun expecting Japan to take over the global economy. Well, nobody talks about The Rising Sun anymore. So that was the very first debt zombie. Now, by not understanding the economics of that, by focusing upon models where debt and credit don't matter, when everything is in equilibrium, and where finance is efficient, economists led us to fall into exactly the same trap in countries like America.

America and U.K. and Europe. So they had a similar crisis at the time of the global financial crisis in 2007, 2008. But there are a number of countries, like for example, your northern neighbor Canada, that got through the crisis by continuing to borrow money. So they had, at the time the financial crisis hit— so to give you numbers for Canada, Canada back in 1960 had a private debt level of 80% of GDP. By 1990, it was 140% of GDP. Its debt level grew much more slowly than America's from then to when the financial crisis hit. It had much the same private debt level as America, about 100 and let's say 170% of GDP, actually slightly above the American level. But since the global financial crisis, it's gone from 170% of GDP to 220% of GDP. Now what that's meant is because private debt was rising, credit was positive, and that expanded demand in Canada. And of course, you've. had an asset price bubble.

We all know about the Canadian house price bubble. People often focus upon Chinese buying, but fundamentally it's driven by private mortgage debt in Canada as well. They avoided the financial crisis by continuing to borrow money. Now, of course, they've now reached their limit. They can't borrow anymore. They've really, really reached the peak level of debt they can service. It's starting to fall, and as it falls, there'll be negative credit starting to turn up in Canada, and Canada will have an economic crisis.

And there's many other countries that did the similar type of behavior, including China, of course, the most extreme example. China went from having a private debt level of about 100% of GDP in 2009 to 220% now. It's an enormous credit bubble that's seen all those ghost cities we know about, caused an enormous boom and stopped China having a political crisis as people lost their jobs during the global financial crisis.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: So the world is now divided into 3 groups: the walking dead of debt, and America's part of that, which has been kept alive by QE; the zombies-to-be, which countries managed to avoid the crisis by causing more private debt creation, but they're about to fall over, China being the most obvious. The next biggest is South Korea, then Canada, then Australia. Then you have a whole range of countries like Belgium, Norway, Sweden, possibly Switzerland, Singapore. which will have their own private debt crises. So the walking dead of debt don't have another crisis coming their way. What they do have is continued stagnation. And the only thing which is limiting that stagnation is the QE, which has boosted asset prices far more than it's boosted private demand.

Japan, bond vigilantes and sovereign-currency financing

Erik Townsend: Steve, I think Japan may have been a special case because although they did experience decades of economic stagnation, nothing really blew up in that economy. And I think, at least in my opinion, one of the reasons for that is there's so much nationalism and loyalty in that country. If the government tells you it's your patriotic duty to buy Treasuries, you're going to do it whether it makes economic sense or not.

Other countries don't enjoy that ability to get their populace to buy government bonds that might not make economic sense. So I wonder, is it just a case of we're turning Japanese and we're going to have economic stagnation, and that's going to happen across most of the developed countries, or is there something Or is there something much more significant in terms of a crisis on the horizon? And how do you see it going down?

Steve Keen: I think bond vigilantes are a fantasy of Paul Krugman's imagination. Actually, no, pardon me, I've got to amend that. It's a fantasy of people who Paul Krugman criticizes. On this particular point, I actually agree with Krugman. The whole idea that people would cease buying government bonds is just wrong because when you have a country which can issue its own private money, and that of course excludes members of the Eurozone, There are always going to be buyers for the bonds being issued because portfolio managers want to have government bonds as part of their repertoire. And they'll buy and sell bonds. And they don't make money on the expected rise in the price of bonds, of course, because you're talking pretty much zero interest rates. What they do is they make money in the ups and downs of that. So they need to have the bonds to do open market operations with the central bank and trade and take advantage of the gains they can make on that front.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: Front, and they always end up oversubscribing government debt. Now, in the case of Japan, for example, government debt hit 65% of GDP in '87 or thereabouts, fell until after 1990, and fell to a level of— again, I'm just looking at this up in my data system here— dropped to 55% of GDP in the middle of 1991. It's then risen virtually inexorably since then to 220% of GDP, I think probably the highest level of government debt in the world.

And it's been able to continue financing that for 2 reasons— for 3. I'll take your patriotism one on board, but it's also financial institutions wanting to have government bonds as part of their portfolio, so they simply oversubscribe them. And thirdly, if the bonds weren't bought in the aggregate by the financial sector, then the Bank of Japan steps in as an underwriter and buys the bonds anyway.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: Anyway, so the government gets financed no matter what when it creates its own currency. Now, that situation applies to America as well, of course. It applies to the U.K. It does not apply to Europe, but it applies to many of the countries that are getting in financial crises right now. So I think they're going to repeat the Japanese experience, and that is that when there's a collapse in credit, but the economists in charge don't actually recognize it as a cause, in many ways, the government automatically goes into larger levels of debt.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: level of spending versus taxation revenue. So it spends more money than it gets back in tax. It issues bonds to finance that. Its notional debt level rises, but it can always finance that because it owns its own central bank. So in that situation, you get additional demand coming in from government spending, sort of offsetting the decline in demand from private credit. And you then end up with a stagnating economy where people aren't investing.

They're not borrowing all that much. The debt levels remain pretty much constant. So you have an anemic private sector credit demand balanced by a slight level of government demand, and you can remain effectively becalmed, as Japan has for 25 years. But you don't have a total breakdown. Only in countries where you don't have the capacity for the government to issue its own money, like the countries in the Eurozone, do you have a genuine depression.

Where the next crisis hits: China, Canada, Australia, Korea

Erik Townsend: So is that what you foresee for countries such as the Eurozone? Because we've, I think, reached the point where this creation of more debt to solve the problem of too much debt— you know, as you say, we've caught back up to where, even though a lot of that private debt was transferred off of the private balance sheet onto the public balance sheet, now private debt is catching up again with where it was. So how much longer do we have and what happens? It sounds like you think the biggest problems are likely to be focused in the countries that don't have the ability for the central bank to just print more money.

Steve Keen: Yeah, that's— they are always going to be the worst, but the countries we're going to see a downturn in are really going to be countries that borrowed their way through the financial crisis. So China dramatically stimulated private lending as their response to the global financial crisis. And if the Chinese Communist Party tells you to lend money, you lend money. There's no decision about it. Just go out there and anybody with a pulse gets a loan. In the case of Australia and Canada and so on, there was encouragement by the government for people to take out more mortgages. Australia was quite deliberate about that.

In countries like South Korea, it appears that a combination of private sector borrowing, corporate borrowing, and household borrowing has also led to a housing bubble there. Of course, they're now pretty much approaching a repeat for themselves of what America went through back in 2008. They'll fall over. Once they've done it, what you have is people get effectively freaked by the level of debt.

They've got— they're carrying a huge amount of private debt, much more than they did in previous crises. Therefore, credit demand never gets to be all that high before it goes into reverse again. This has been Japan's situation. Every time the private sector started to borrow a bit more money, the government bureaucrats and politicians have thought, oh, the economy's recovered. Their response is therefore to reduce the level of government spending. When they reduce the level of government spending, that takes demand out of the economy as well. The private sector reacts and goes back into deleveraging again, credit demand And the economy falls back into a slump. And that's why I use the walking dead of debt as an expression. You never get enough energy to get any real dynamic going through. The only way to really solve the crisis is to drastically reduce the level of private debt. And in the case of America, I'm talking a private debt level reduction of the order of 100% of GDP.

In the UK's case, much the same, because the UK's level of private debt before before Maggie Thatcher started the deregulation, for a century, never exceeded 73% of GDP. In the 30 years after Maggie Thatcher came to power, it went from— when she was in control, 55% of GDP to 195% of GDP. So you've got to really reduce debt back to its historic level in each of those countries. And that's pre-bubble levels. And that's, in the UK's case, literally 100% of GDP reduction in private debt. Unless that happens, we're all going to be the walking dead of debt.

Erik Townsend: Now, it seems to me that the 2008 event really started in the United States, and housing, of course, was the catalyst that got it going, and then there was credit contagion to other sectors of the credit markets. What you're describing, though, is not a story of one country, as we had in 2008, having a problem which— of course, there was transmission effects. The United States imports so much from the rest of the world The United States sneezes, the rest of the world catches a cold.

It seems to me you're describing something much worse than that. You're saying Australia and Canada, we know, are in housing bubbles. You think that that private debt situation is about to collapse. China is so important to the global economy. They have had this massive doubling of private debt since 2009. You think that's on the verge of collapse. Europe is in serious trouble.

It sounds to me like you're painting the next crisis, and I don't want to put words in your mouth, as potentially being dramatically worse than what we saw in 2008. Is that correct, or am I reaching to say that?

Steve Keen: It's more widespread. So, I mean, as I said, if you want to identify the countries that had a crisis back in 2008, of course America's number one, but you also had the same thing in Spain, in Portugal, in England, in Ireland. And to some extent, some of the other European countries. When you add up the level of GDP that's involved, of course, America's the biggest slab. It's about 25% to 1/3 of global GDP. So that's why the rest of the world gets pneumonia when America sneezes.

This time round, if you add up the various countries, they're equivalent to about 1/3 of global GDP again. So it's a similar scale to what happened back in 2008. The difference being, of course, that each of these countries will have their crisis at a different time.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: It looks like China's already having a downturn in credit. Canada and Australia are doing it. South Korea is starting to get there. But other countries like Belgium that identified, Norway, Sweden, which are of course very small countries, they haven't yet got to the beginning of falling off the precipice. So it's more distributed over time. It's more distributed geographically. The most important point I think to qualify all that is that China is not your usual capitalist economy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: And China's Communist Party, ironically, I think is more responsive to what its people's needs are and desires are than any so-called capitalist democracy you can mention. Because when Chinese people riot, they really riot, and the potential for political overthrow is sitting there at all times for the Communist Party. So they're responsive to anything which might lead to that level of unrest. What it means is that even as the credit bubble is starting to unwind in China. China, there's enormous government stimulus at the same time, building all those high-speed rail, which frankly are useful infrastructure, building the Silk Road as part of the export program they're doing.

And I saw recent figures. It's very hard to find any figures that are trustworthy in China. But one of those statistics I saw alleged that the level of the government money creation, which is government spending more than it gets back in taxes in China, is running at 15% of GDP.

That's pretty much 1.5 times the size of the stimulus that Obama did after the crisis had begun in America. In some extent, China's negative for credit will be attenuated by the positive from government money creation in China. That doesn't apply to Canada, doesn't apply to South Korea, Australia, Singapore, Belgium, et cetera, et cetera.

They will have slumps and the government's actions will come in after the event. I see not as serious a downturn as 2008, but I see a crisis in those zombies-to-be countries that will, to some extent, derail export demand for countries like America, and that will be the contagion effect. But it won't quite be a case of getting pneumonia when China sneezes or Canada sneezes.

It'll be, you know, you'll get a slight increase in your temperature and a bit of lethargy coming out of the decline in export demand.

QE, inflation, asset prices and debt write-offs

Erik Townsend: Now, when quantitative easing was announced in 2009, When the Fed started quantitative easing in 2009, the critics were quick to say, okay, the way that we're going to pay the price for bailing out the economy this way is eventually it's going to lead to runaway inflation. Of course, almost 10 years later, that hasn't happened yet. Some people are starting to say, okay, inflation is just around the corner, it's coming. Do you share that view? And do you think that it is just healthy inflation, or do you think that there is a risk of the quantitative easing that's occurred over the last decade leading to a runaway inflation situation?

Steve Keen: No, that's naive theories of money that have led people to believe that nonsense, unfortunately. I was always saying there's never going to be inflation. That's why my site is called debtdeflation.com, for a very good reason. And that is that mathematical models I built of the economy and also the logic I'm working from, from Hyman Minsky and Irving Fisher, said that when you have a debt crisis, you have deflation, not inflation. And that's what, of course, happened. People don't remember this, but the inflation rate in America fell from +5% to -2%. per annum in about 6 months over the 2008-2009 crisis period. Now, the government stimulus bumped us up to positive inflation once more.

But people made the mistake of believing that QE, which massively increased reserves, would lead to a massive increase of lending, and therefore the massive increase in lending means much more money in the economy, and bang, you'll get inflation. That is nonsense. That is based on a very naive theory of money that says that banks multiply up reserves and that the extra money in circulation will therefore cause inflation. Banks do not multiply up reserves. I've been part of a protest group in economics for 30 or 40 or 50 years, which has been arguing that the money multiplier model is simply nonsense.

The fractional reserve model is nonsense. What actually happens is banks create money by double-entry bookkeeping, and the reserves they have play absolutely no role in that lending. Now, finally, ironically, Frankly, I think in some ways, I'm finding I can actually quote the Bundesbank on that particular front. The Bundesbank has said reserves play absolutely no role in lending.

The increase in reserves created by QE has had no impact upon inflation in the goods and services market, but it has quite deliberately had a massive impact upon the financial markets because reserves circulate between financial institutions.

Because the QE has created such a massive increase in banking reserves, that has meant that banks then go and use those reserves to buy shares, and that share buying has driven up asset prices. So the inflation that's occurred has not been in the goods and services market, it's been in the asset market.

Erik Townsend: Does that lead us to an asset inflation quandary that can only be solved by more and more rounds of QE? In other words, you alluded to the possibility that with QE shutting down around the world, potentially the process goes into reverse and you start to see a crash in asset markets. Now, I don't think they would allow that to happen. I think they would bring back more QE. So does that potentially set up the, you know, we just QE forever? We can't, we can't get out of having to do more and more quantitative easing in order to prevent a collapse of asset markets?

Steve Keen: Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I just described QE as a pact with the devil. You know, the classic stories of Nostradamus Once you've signed your soul away, you can't buy it back at a later date. So as soon as QE goes into reverse, asset prices will— the process does go into reverse.

So think about what's happening with QE. It's buying bonds off the private sector and putting money in the private sector bank accounts, which they then use to buy assets. If you go the reverse direction and sell bonds back to the private financial institutions, they now get income-earning bonds out of that.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: That, but they get a decline in their reserves. And to get the decline in the reserves to buy the shares and buy the bonds in the first place, they have to sell shares. So I think asset prices will fall over when Yellen's successor tries to reverse QE.

And when that starts to happen, because they've got so caught up in believing that making asset prices recover is a major part of making the economy recover, which again, I think is false, but having got caught in that belief, as soon as the asset prices start to fall over, there'll be panic in the financial institutions, panic in the central bank, and they'll reverse it and go back to QE again.

Erik Townsend: Steve, does that set us up for a perpetual loop where we just have to have QE forever? And if so, how do we break out of that perpetual cycle?

Steve Keen: Yeah, I think it does set us up for that. And again, you look at the history of what's happening in Japan. They've been doing QE for pretty much 20 years as well. So the only way out of this— let's go back to basics. What caused the crisis which is too much private debt and too much increase in private debt, which is credit, the solution is to reduce private debt, however you do it.

That's historically been confirmed by research by my philanthropist colleague in the States, Richard Vague, who was a man who established 2 of America's major credit card companies.

Richard's now a critic of private debt. He's done a serious analysis of it, which you can find in his deadeconomics.org. Website and his book on the topic as well. And in looking at how countries got out of debt crises around the rest of the world, he said the only way they got out of it was by writing the debt off. There was no case of a country growing out of a private debt crisis by GDP growing faster than debt unless they had a huge surge in exports, which of course applies to countries like Saudi Arabia when you have a massive revaluation in oil, of course. That got them out of their debt crisis back in the '70s.

But generally speaking, the way out of debt crisis is to write the debt off. Now, of course, we're not even talking about that. I've been pushing a modern debt jubilee for a decade now, but that's not even got into the thinking of mainstream economics. So, so long as they ignore the cause, which is too much private debt, and ignore the symptom that causes it, which is too little credit demand, so you have anemia. And Larry Summers calls secular stagnation is actually credit stagnation.

So long as you have that, you'll have the government doing its 2 forms of support, QE from the central bank and some stimulus spending by the federal government by spending more than it takes back in taxation. But every time the economy seems to recover, they'll pull out one of their 2 supports. They'll try to get back to a balanced budget again, or they'll try to end QE, and the system will fall over again and bang, wash, and repeat. So, so long as they ignore the real cause, we're going to continue with the real problem.

Reserve currency status, deficits and sector balances

Erik Townsend: I want to move on to another topic, which is the US dollar. We have a special coming up over the next few weeks where we're talking to several experts who think that the US dollar will lose its reserve currency status for a number of reasons that our listeners will get into in those episodes. But I think you have a view that reserve currency status has been a curse from the beginning. So please elaborate.

What's your view on the dollar's reserve currency status, and why is it perhaps not that bad of a thing if it were to be

Steve Keen: Yeah, because it's one of those things that Donald Trump would call a bad deal, because you get sucked into something that looks like a good deal. And of course, the good deal that Americans thought was— that they got at Bretton Woods was that we're the biggest gorilla on the global stage now. This silly bloke in England, Keynes, wants to bring in this international currency called the Bancor, which would be created by the International Monetary Fund. No, we're going to get the dollar as reserve currency. We're going to be the biggest currency on the planet. Look at us. Aren't we the big bully on the block? Beach, Yeah.

taking over from the English. Trouble is, if you do that, then people who have to get involved in foreign trade actually need American dollars, not because they are buying any or selling any goods and services to you. They need American dollars to do the trade themselves. That gives those other countries a demand for American dollars independent of what's happening with American exports or imports, which means the American currency gets to be overvalued compared to what it would be if it wasn't the reserve currency.

And consequently, American goods are more expensive than they would be if you weren't the reserve currency. So a large part of the deindustrialization of the States that has occurred in the last— certainly the last 30, 40 years, I would source back to America's currency being overvalued because it's the reserve currency. And if you got rid of the reserve currency status, you'd actually have a chance to revive American manufacturing.

Erik Townsend: Wouldn't that not also at the same time, though, lead to a loss of— you know, we've enjoyed— or I don't know if enjoyed is the right We've gotten away with politicians believing that deficit spending— deficits don't matter. And I don't think it's really the case that deficits don't matter. It's you can get away with deficit spending when you're the reserve currency and there's such a strong international demand for dollars. If that international demand for dollars goes away, doesn't that mean that suddenly deficits matter again and the US would have to spend within its means?

Steve Keen: No, this is a total fallacy. I'm sorry, Erik, but it's a total fallacy. And that's one reason I sent that paper to you to discuss with your readers. I go through an incredibly simple set of models for the UK Parliament for an inquiry they're doing into household finances, where I say, what happens if a sector in the economy tries to save money?

What I show in that paper is that if you have an individual sector saving money, that's great for the individual sector. But if there's no money creation going on, any additional money it accumulates in its bank accounts has to be balanced by precisely as much a fall of money in the bank accounts of the other sectors in the economy.

And in fact, by spending less, you actually have less expenditure. Expenditure is one of the 2 ways we— one of the 3 ways we measure GDP. If your expenditure falls, aggregate GDP falls. So the attempt by a single sector to save money actually causes a fall in GDP.

That's stage 1. So I make the point that if you're going to have everybody saving money, and of course people do, individuals and sectors and corporations all do want to save money. They want to accumulate money over time. The only way we can all do that, if there's some other sector that actually disaccumulates, somehow dissaves all the time. Now, one option for that is the banks. Of course, banks don't save because banks don't have an account out of which they lend money which they can run out of. They create money by double-entry bookkeeping. So their assets go up, their liabilities go up, and that's how they create money. And if they do that, if banks are creating more with new loans and they're getting back in repayments, payments, they can therefore increase the amount of money in all the private non-financial sector bank accounts. But of course, that comes with an absolutely identical increase in the debt of those sectors.

So there's no net money creation coming out of that. And over time, if you go down that path too far, you actually have the private non-bank sector getting into negative equity.

So the third situation I look at is where you have government money creation, meaning that governments spend more than they get back in taxation. Now governments can do that because they own their own banks. You and I can't pay our debt with the Bank of Steve or the Bank of Erik. The American government, and Donald Trump actually was quite cognizant of this some years ago, the American government creates money and it has a central bank which is obligated to finance government spending. So long as you have the capacity to create your own money, which America has, and you have the capacity to finance that with a central bank, which you also have, there is no problem in funding a deficit.

A deficit's the wrong way to think about it. It's an excess of government injections into the economy over government withdrawals from the economy. And the gap is financed ultimately by the central bank creating that money. And nobody rejects— if the government deposits $1,000 in your account, you don't send it back because it's false money. You've got $1,000 you can spend. So any government that has its own currency that has its own central bank, and this is important, that is not running a major trade deficit, can get away with it indefinitely. The breakdown is when you have a trade deficit as well.

Now, what being reserve currency has meant for America is they can run a trade deficit and not worry about it. Because if you run out of American dollars and you need American dollars for international trade, you can create them. Now, in the other case, if countries like, for example, Argentina, run out of American dollars, they've got to borrow American dollars.

And they therefore— the trade deficit ultimately brings to a stop any creation of domestic money by the Argentinian central bank.

So it isn't the case that reserve status meant that you can get away with government deficits, and after the reserve status goes, you can't get away with deficits. It means you've got away with deficits and a trade deficit at the same time. If you lost reserve currency status, You could still have government money creation, but the limit would now be whether you're running a trade deficit or not. And of course, America is running a trade deficit.

The Minsky software and downloads

Erik Townsend: And all of these ideas that you've just given a very high-level overview of are spelled out in much more detail in a paper that we have a link in our listeners' Research Roundup email. Or if you're not yet registered, you can just go to the website, MacroVoices.com, look for the download instructions next to Steve's picture on On the website. And that paper is titled Submission to Treasury Committee on Household Finances: Income Saving, Debt, Asset Markets, and the Current Account. Steve, I want to go a little deeper. I think our listeners can read that paper on their own, but one of the things that you do in that paper is you refer to models that you've developed in a software system of your own design and creation called Minsky.

Steve Keen: Yes.

Erik Townsend: Give us the background. Where did Minsky come from? Why did you develop it? How do you use it in your teaching of economics?

Steve Keen: Okay. Back when I did my PhD, I've been a critic of mainstream economics since 1972. So 45 years of criticizing the mainstream. And as part of that, I did courses in nonlinear differential equations and complex systems and chaos theory in mathematics courses. And I became aware of a range of software called System Dynamics. Which has 2 branches. It began with the work of Jay Forrester in MIT back in the '50s and '60s, and then led into one branch, which is used in management, packages like Vensim, Stella, iThink, and so on, and another branch in engineering, packages like Simulink, VisSim, and other programs of that class.

And they build dynamic models of a system using differential equations, and the differential equations are designed using flowcharts. Charts. So I saw that as a useful way of illustrating my models. But one of the dilemmas of those programming platforms is if you want to try to cable up financial flows using wiring, you get an absolute mess.

These models themselves, the people who create them often refer to the diagrams as spaghetti diagrams because there are cables going everywhere. And it was even worse when you try to model financial dynamics because every financial transaction To be properly recorded in a system has to be recorded 4 times. And I realized that over the last 10 years or so that the ultimate GUI, graphical user interface, for understanding financial flows was invented by accountants back in the 15th century who called it the double-entry bookkeeping table. Now, none of these programs had that sort of system built in.

So I developed Minsky as a way of piggybacking on the whole concept of system dynamics for dynamic modeling, but adding in the capacity to build models of the financial sector using double-entry bookkeeping tables. Okay. And that has been massively important to me over time, both as a way of me intellectually learning about money creation, but also as a teaching tool and now actually as a research tool.

Because once you define the financial flows that exist in an economy and you link that to real sector activity as well, you can build a monetary model, non-equilibrium monetary model of the economic system. And in fact, I've got a student in Portugal. Who's built the most elaborate monetary model of Portugal, which is more accurate.

His master's student model is more accurate than any of the official models held by the Treasury or the Central Bank of Portugal. So it's been a marvelous process for me.

But this entire software package so far, the total funding for it has been about $300,000, which is trivial. So I've only really scraped the surface of what I can do with Minsky, but it is Minsky is a classic way of being able to set up a monetary non-equilibrium model of an economy and see how it behaves. And that's what I do in that particular paper, is use several extremely simple Minsky models to make the logical point that if you want to have everybody saving money, the government has to spend more than they get back in taxes.

Erik Townsend: Well, and this is part of why I wanted to save you, Steve, for our last regular format show of the 2017 season, because we have got just an overwhelming number of downloads for our listeners. First, there's the paper that you just described, which uses a Minsky model to make many of its points. Start there. I think you'll be impressed with these diagrams, folks, that were all generated from the Minsky software. How much does it cost to buy the Minsky software? Totally free. Download link is in your Research Roundup email. Once you've installed the Minsky software on your computer, would you like to run and see a live animation of these models that Steve is referring to in this paper?

Steve Keen: Sure.

Erik Townsend: However, the Minsky file, which is the model that you can actually load into the Minsky software, click the play button and it animates, and in real time it goes through and shows these capital flows moving from households and so forth.

That file is also in your Research Roundup email. There's a download link for that. And finally, there is a link to a video, which is basically Steve demonstrating the use of the Minsky software. It's this same model that you see in this paper, and he describes how various parameters can be changed in the Minsky software in real time while it's running. You can see the capital flows and how they change GDP and so forth. It's a really fantastic tool, and I think you're going to find it to be very interesting. Finally, there's one more download in this week's Research Roundup from you, Steve, which is another paper that you wrote called Energy Aware Theory of Production. Please tell us what that one is about.

Energy Aware Theory of Production

Steve Keen: Well, economic theory has ignored the role of energy as a factor of production right since Adam Smith. And this to me has led to enormous fallacies in economics because it actually— economic theory, I'm not just talking neoclassical, I'm talking Marxist theory as well, and to some extent post-Keynesian theory, certainly Austrian theory.

Their theories of production assume you can produce output with no energy. Now, that's nonsense. You can produce nothing without energy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: And in fact, what we produce is really mining the energy and turning a fraction of it into goods and services, while the rest is waste energy, which we call entropy.

So we need to have a model of production which gives energy an essential role. And I argue firstly in the paper: the only school of economics to ever have done that is the physiocratic school. It was based in France, and goes back to the work of people like Richard Cantillon and François Quesnay, because they talked about land being the source of all value.

Value. Given what they knew at the time and the fact that France was predominantly an agricultural country, that was quite accurate. We shouldn't have started with Adam Smith. We should have started with Richard Cantillon and François Quesnay as the true fathers of economics.

What I do in the paper is show that the way to include energy in an essential sense is to realize that labor and capital without energy simply don't make sense. The little insight that led me to the mathematical model I developed in that paper is the thought that labor without energy is a corpse. Corpse, and capital, without energy, is a sculpture. Therefore, labor and capital can be seen as means to harness the free energy we find in the universe, whether that's by absorbing sunlight in agriculture or mining up oil and fossilized plants we call coal, which is fossilized solar energy, and burning it. There are ways to harness it. Labor and capital both use energy, and when you work through the mathematics, I finally find that the vast majority of the physical output we produce on the planet today is produced by the energy we mine using our machines. Labor basically presses the buttons to operate the machines, but fundamentally, that's what produces value in the economy.

I then showed that that's actually a more accurate model than the neoclassical Cobb-Douglas production function model, and therefore completely inverts our whole understanding of social dynamics as well, because part of The old Marxist criticism was capitalists are exploiting workers. The neoclassical response was they're both being paid their marginal product. I'm saying both those are wrong. What actually is happening is that labor and capital together in the production system are exploiting energy, and they then fight over the proceeds. It's a realistic model of production. It necessarily links economics to the ecology because to exploit energy, you must generate waste energy.

All the naivety of economists about global warming would not have occurred if they'd understood the role of energy properly.

It also implies that there's a potential future where, as we produce more and more machines that are actually intelligently managed, and we have AI managing them as well, more and more of output's going to be produced without labor. We have to prepare ourselves for a world in which labor can't get a share of the production we have on the planet through Through bargaining over— effectively blackmailing the capitalists and saying, if you don't pay us a decent wage, we won't operate the machines. It's getting to the stage where that won't matter. So we have to change our social distribution of income as well and consider things like a basic income.

Leaving the university: funding via Patreon

Erik Townsend: And again, the link to that paper is also linked in your Research Roundup email, or if you are not registered yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, look for the download instructions next to Steve's picture on the homepage.

Steve, I'd like to shift gears now to a topic which I think is absolutely fascinating, which is the journey that you've been on. You're a pretty famous guy. You predicted the financial crisis and you wrote about it before it happened, describing why it was going to happen, what was going to happen, how it was going to happen, and you nailed it.

Now, a lot of people would assume if you're a professor and you've got that kind of track record, you must be teaching at some Ivy League university, Harvard or Princeton or something. That's not true. An irony that you have described in your previous interviews on this program is that if you are a strong critic, as you have been for decades, of the neoclassical system of economics, which is so passionately embraced by the Ivy Leaguers, you can't teach at the Ivy League schools.

You almost— if you want to teach how the economy really works, you have to do it at a B-rate university because they won't have you in the Ivy League.

What's happened, I think, correct me if I'm paraphrasing this incorrectly, even that path with changes that have occurred in the university system have led you to a point where you're ready to kind of walk away from the university system, which I salute you for. I am a huge fan of education, but I think the university system is very broken. And you're kind of forging, I think pioneering your own path of teaching economics economics over the internet to people who want to learn how the economy really works. It's not a degree program. You don't get a university degree for it, but it's something that anybody can participate in.

So I'm very curious, how is this going for you? Who are the students? Because I would think that university-aged, you know, people in their late teens, early 20s, they care about getting a degree, which you can't offer them separately. Who are the students of this? How's it going? Is it catching on? Is it working for you?

And where can people who are interested in finding out more about it learn more about what you're doing?

Steve Keen: Okay. It hasn't quite got to the stage of me running an educational system, but I'm using the Patreon website. And you might have seen a bit of controversy about Patreon recently when they tried to change their fee structure, which creators like me didn't like. But what Patreon is like is a continuous-time version of Kickstarter or Indiegogo. So rather than getting funding from public as a venture capitalist thing, effectively, where you get some product back for a product launch. With Patreon, you sign up to support an artist that you like. And you sign up either to support as little as $1 a month, or maybe $1 per creation by the creator.

And of course, most of the people there are graphic artists, comedians, people running podcasts, yada, yada, yada. And I heard about it last year.

And I thought, well, I can't get any research funding to develop Minsky. I've done all that research funding. Either through INET, George Soros-funded Institute for New Economic Thinking back in 2010. I ran a Kickstarter campaign when I got shafted from the University of Western Sydney. And then when I learned about Patreon, I thought, well, I can get continuous money to fund my software programmer, Dr. Russell Standish, to continue developing Minsky. I'll set up a Patreon page. And then the government change you were talking about occurred in the U.K.

They deregulated controls over over a number of positions that different universities could offer for intake into courses in humanities and so on. And the top-ranked universities basically white-handed the student numbers for universities like Kingston, which are down at the bottom of the pecking order. Student numbers disappeared. And I found I was going to be asked to teach 4 times as much to my students, like 4 times as much teaching, and lose the capacity to do the public talking that I do. So rather than suffering from And from that, I decided to use Patreon to fund my own salary to become an independent intellectual. And it's currently raising precisely $5,331 a month from 756 patrons. And overwhelmingly, they're mature-aged people and quite predominantly engineers who want to see me revolutionize economics.

Principles of Political Economy book and supporting Keen

Erik Townsend: Steve, I know that for your Patreon supporters, you actually publish a special— it's indirectly a subscription podcast where you are teaching a lot of economic content. Anybody who supports you on Patreon for at least $10 a month is eligible to participate in that. The thing that occurs to me though, there's an old joke that the real changes in economics only come after somebody writes a book that starts with the word principles of. Seems like there's just a lot of precedent for that. You've got so many really concise theories and concepts here that I think really give neoclassical economics a run for its money. When do you write your book that starts with principles of in its title so that it can redefine the— landscape and maybe lead to something that is a major change in the way we think about things?

Steve Keen: Well, funnily enough, I actually started writing that book with that title when I was in Edinburgh, the Institute for New Economic Thinking conference, which was pretty ordinary, and the Young Scholars Initiative Festival of Economics, which is actually extremely good. And there I am in the hometown, so to speak, of Adam Smith, and I realized that I had the starting line for writing my Principles of Political Economy.

And firstly, why I call it Principles of Political Economy rather than calling it Principles of Economics is that you have to include the distribution of income in your thinking. Economics that leaves that out is nonsense economics. And therefore, you inherently have to be political in that sense. So let's acknowledge it. So back to Principles of Political Economy, which is the title of John Stuart Mill's book, or Principles of Political Economy and Taxation, which was Ricardo's.

But the reason for thinking about the opening line in Edinburgh was that I actually regard Adam Smith not as the father of economics, but the person who led economics astray. Because the physiocratic school— and he met major members of the physiocratic school in France before he wrote A Wealth of Nations— they argued that all wealth and all production comes effectively from energy. They said land, but really it says energy when you put it in modern terms, because the word energy apparently wasn't even invented till 1808, long after the physiocrats ceased existing.

But they said all wealth comes from land, which is really saying it all comes from energy. And then we have the distribution of wealth coming on top of that. And Smith says all wealth comes from labor. Now, that led to the interminable labor theory of value fights inside the classical school. That led to the neoclassicals coming out with their nonsense theory where labor and capital get their marginal product. And so I want to take it right back to the physiocrats. So my opening line of the book was to say economics went astray from the very first century. Sentence of Adam Smith's Wealth of Nations. I go back and say we should actually use the very first sentence of Richard Cantillon's— and I've forgotten his name— but Studies in Economics.

That is where we should start with energy playing an essential role, and then I go forward from there. I hope— it's going to take me years to write the book because it's as well as having a large amount of history of economic thought to it, I've got to also explain thermodynamics without drowning people in technical argument. I've got to explain monetary creation.

I have to explain nonlinear dynamics, complex systems, and so on. So it's going to be a large work, but I hope I'll be— I'm setting myself a target of finishing it before I hit 70, and that's 5 years away.

Erik Townsend: And for people who can't wait until the book is done, there's plenty of opportunity to support you on Patreon, listen to the podcast, receive your writings and other papers, and learn and participate in the process that you're going through along the way. What's the best way for people who want to get involved and follow your work to do so? Is it your page at Patreon?

Steve Keen: Yes, absolutely. It's just www.patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen and go up there and sign up. I want people to sign up an amount of money they don't notice. I don't want people to sign up and give me money that their wife or spouse talks about over breakfast. So if you felt like, for example, you feel uncomfortable giving $10, then give $3.

If you feel uncomfortable giving $3, give $1. People just do it as a no-brainer. And then they get the access to all my work for anywhere from $1 a month up. Podcasts start at $10. I start giving away signed copies of books beyond that level, but what you're comfortable with. And then it's really quite an interesting community. I'm learning a lot from the subscribers. I've got a lot of good engineers inside there in particular, some people with a good knowledge of biology, others who are in banking.

So there's an interesting debate going on. On there. The Patreon website's reasonable for that. It doesn't give as much control as I'd like for discussions, but it's a good spot. It's a good conversation. As you say, as I write drafts of the book and I write various other research papers, they go up there and I then get extremely valuable feedback from my patrons.

It's a good community. I'm quite pleased about it. It's providing enough for me to— I can't go and party every night, but I can certainly pay the bills. And continuing being an intellectual independent of all the bureaucratic and political controls that are hobbling universities these days.

Erik Townsend: And supporting Professor Steve Keen as a pioneer in reshaping economics still costs less than smoking cigarettes or a daily cup of coffee at patreon.com. We have a link to that Patreon page in your Research Roundup email. We're gonna have to leave it there in the interest of time. Steve, thank you so much for a fantastic last regular That's our regular show format of the season. We couldn't have ended it on a better note. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues. Stay tuned, folks. We're going to tell you what to expect from our year-end special.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Postgame: the debt problem is unresolved

Patrick Ceresna: You know, Erik, I absolutely love having Steve come back onto the show. You know, even though we've had him many times, I think it's just a great conversation. The story to me doesn't get old. I've always been a huge advocate of this idea that this is all really about global debt. And while we have these short-term influences like rising oil prices allowing inflationary numbers to, at least on a transitory basis, appear to be coming in higher than expected, to me, we haven't solved the debt problem. And one thing that whenever we have Steve come back on the show, it's always interesting because he just brings that bigger problem back up to be discussed. And it's always interesting to hear what he had to say. What did you take away from the interview?

Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with what you said, Patrick. You know, my view has always been, look, since 2009, we have not fixed the real problem. The 2008 crisis was caused by 3 words: too much debt. What we've done is add more debt since then. We've moved it around. A lot of it came off the private balance sheet and onto the public balance sheet, but there's still too much debt in the system and nothing has been done to address the core What I think we're all waiting for is— I didn't think we could go this long without something blowing up. I didn't think that we could not solve the real problem and just paper over our problems with quantitative easing. Will the unwind of quantitative easing lead to asset markets blowing up in a way where they get stuck being forced to do just more and more QE?

Remains to be seen, but I think Steve definitely gets the big picture, and I definitely encourage anyone who has the time an inclination to really invest some energy in learning about economics, I would pursue Steve's Patreon campaign and learn what this man has to teach. He has so much passion for teaching real-world economics, how things really work, not the nonsense theory that you find in a lot of textbooks. And he's just an amazing man. I would love to be one of his students and, and to study with him. in some kind of program. And I think right now he's not really organizing a program per se to teach students directly, but he may be headed in that direction. I hope he does.

He's a super guy and I encourage everyone to check out his Minsky software and the various other downloads that we have in your Research Roundup email.

Postgame: Dollar Endgame series schedule

Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, without any further ado, we need to talk about this year-end show that we have, the 5-part series We have Yusko, Gromen, and Snider all coming on. Why don't you fill our listeners in with what they should expect over the holidays?

Erik Townsend: Well, this came about actually when we finished interviewing Luke Gromen for his very first interview on MacroVoices. And about 3.4 milliseconds after Luke hung up the phone from our interview, you and I looked at each other, Patrick, and We said, we gotta get this guy talking to, and I said Jeff Snider, and you said Mark Yusko, and we said, oh wait, all 3 of them. And we decided to do this Dollar Bull versus Dollar Bear show, and we asked each of them if they wanted to participate. And I really wanna thank all 3 of them because at the same time, they all said the same thing. I don't really wanna be in a debate where I'm trying to prove anybody else wrong. I just would love to get in a conversation with such smart people. And we started framing

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: It is Dollar Bull versus Dollar Bear. And when we went to tape it, we quickly realized there's a much better story to tell, which is the endgame for the US dollar as the world's reserve currency.

All of us agree that it's happening, that it's already started. It's not gonna happen overnight. It's not a sky is falling thing. It took decades for the pound sterling to lose its hegemony over the global financial system and be replaced by the dollar. This will be a slow process, but it is happening, and understanding it is so So important.

Jeff Snider has an opinion that that will actually be bullish for the dollar, at least in terms of appreciating against other currencies initially. Luke and Mark see it the opposite way. They think that maybe the high is already in for the dollar against other currencies. But we had a fantastic conversation that was based on each one of them putting together very comprehensive slide decks. We used up our original 2-hour production budget just going through Jeff Snider's slide deck alone. These guys were just fantastic about making additional time available. We booked some extra recording sessions. We ended up with more than 5 hours of total content.

So the first episode airs on December 24th, Sunday. That hour-long episode will be the first half of our group discussion about the dollar endgame that is driven by Jeff Snider's Eurodollar work. And so it's very much a Eurodollar-centric conversation. For anyone who's listening who has not yet Thank you. Thank you, Jeff. I hope you've listened to our Eurodollar University series with Jeff Snider. You can find the full series at www.MacroVoices.com/edu, for Eurodollar University. I recommend that you use the time between now and when this series is released to go and reacquaint yourself with that material or listen to it for the first time. And then on Sunday, we'll be releasing that first episode, one day later, Christmas Day, December 25th, the second part, which will be the remaining half of our conversation over Jeff Snider's slide deck, which is the Eurodollar-centric portion of the conversation.

From there, in the third episode, which will air next Thursday at our regular MacroVoices recording time slot, it will be no market wrap, no postgame segment, but just entirely this third episode, which will air on Thursday. And that will be Mark Yusko's slide deck and the beginning of Luke Gromen's slide deck. Then on Saturday next week, that is the 30th of December, we'll air the 4th episode, which will consist of the balance of Luke Gromen's very interesting slide deck and a fantastic conversation that erupted over the slides that Luke brought to the table. That takes us into the beginning of our conclusions out of the whole series. That's all in the 4th episode.

And then the 5th episode will air as the feature interview in our regular format MacroVoices podcast on Thursday, January 4th, where we're going to have a regular show with a market wrap. And then in lieu of the feature interview, we'll air that 5th and final segment of the Dollar Endgame series.

This is fantastic content. It really, I think, exceeded everybody's expectations. I know from talking to Jeff and Mark and Luke, they are all very excited about it. I think we all felt like it was excellent content.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Jeff is already talking about 3 more hours of content he wants to do for MacroVoices, so we'll see if we can figure out how to fit that into next year's schedule. But I think you're gonna really enjoy this one, folks. So be sure to stay tuned to MacroVoices.com or to your iTunes feed. If you haven't listened to it yet, I encourage you to check out Eurodollar University first.

Postgame: thanks to the team and listener appeals

Patrick Ceresna: You real diehards may even want to go back and listen to that again as prep for the first 2 episodes of this year-end series because they're very much Eurodollar You know, Erik, having already listened to the series, I have to say our listeners are in for a real treat and it's going to be a really interesting holiday having to listen to all of that all over again. Nonetheless, what I wanted to just do quickly is just do a quick shout-out, thank you to all of our volunteers and everyone on the team. First off, I just wanted to do a shout-out for Dave Remley, who is the one that edits our transcripts. I wanted to do a shout-out to Sandy Beguen, who actually is our transcriber who puts all of these interviews into writing for all of you to be able to review. I wanted to do a shout out for Brad Bichon, who runs all of our social media and is the one that's sending out all those amazing tweets for all of you.

And a special thank you to Luke Jaster, who is our audio engineer, who puts these amazing interviews together for all of our listeners. So on behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, wanted to thank all of you for helping out and wish everyone a happy holidays, including all of our listeners. With that said, Erik, is there anything you wanted to wrap wrap things up with?

Erik Townsend: That'll do it. I think that, as always, we appreciate your help. Anything that you can do this holiday season— we blew our production budget, obviously, on the year-end show. Those of you who are able to donate this holiday season to help us defray our production costs, it's tremendously appreciated.

If you are not able to donate, we really could use your help with iTunes, giving us ratings and reviews on iTunes. In our year-end shows, I think we're actually going to have step-by-step

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And we'll give you instructions for how to do that, but basically you just go to iTunes, find MacroVoices, click on ratings and reviews, and that really helps us because it directly affects where we show up on the rank list of business podcasts.

The more listeners that we have, particularly the more registered users we have at MacroVoices.com, those are the statistics that Patrick uses in order to negotiate to get the very best feature interview guests. So if you haven't yet, please just take a minute, go to MacroVoices.com, register your free account. The benefit to you is that you get our free Research Roundup email every single week, which never includes any advertising or marketing. We won't spam you. We won't try to sell you anything. We'll just send you download links for the materials from our feature interview guests, such as all of Steve Keen's writings and software downloads and so forth that were featured in today's interview, as well as all of the coolest free stuff that we could find on the internet each week. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Research Roundup and sign-off

Patrick Ceresna: In the Research Roundup, our listeners will find the transcript for today's interview with Professor Keen, as well as all the links you referenced in the article

Erik Townsend: That's right.

Patrick Ceresna: That all our listeners can review. There's also a link to an interesting research piece, which is the primer on the Swedish housing market, which I thought was really interesting. There's also a link to a Chris Whalen article suggesting Bitcoin being the most impressive speculative bubble in modern history. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners and are always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. For those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next year.

Erik Townsend: Thank you.

Announcer outro, sponsor credit and disclaimer

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