Jeff Snider — Alhambra Investments CIO (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Episode preview
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 107 was recorded on March 1st, 2018. I'm Erik Townsend. We're going to take a closer look at gold this week, but from a different angle. Regular listeners know that Alhambra Investments CIO Jeff Snider is a leading expert on the Eurodollar system. Jeff is going to walk us through the history of ups and downs in the gold market since 2008 And once again, we'll learn that the events in the Eurodollar system neatly explain moves in gold that most analysts never thought to associate with Eurodollars. Jeff sent us a chart book that you're not going to want to miss, as we'll refer to it throughout the interview. Registered users will find the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you're not registered yet, just go to our homepage at MacroVoices.com and look for the download instructions next to Jeff's picture on our homepage.
After the feature interview, Patrick and I will be back for our postgame segment when we'll give you an update on the equity market correction using the same series of charts that we featured in the postgame segment a couple of weeks ago.
Market wrap: S&P 500 after Powell's testimony
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, that S&P 500 really seemed to have turned on that Humphrey Hawkins testimony by Powell. What do you think? Is this the big turn?
Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with you that it was the Humphrey Hawkins testimony that was the turning point. I think that was a market probably ready for a catalyst to turn to the downside. As our regular listeners know, from our coverage of this a couple of weeks ago, the way these corrections usually go is they get to a certain level and then we get a move back down to retest the lows, that W-shaped double bottom pattern. It doesn't always go that way, but as we discussed a couple weeks ago, most corrections tend to play out approximately according to that agenda. We were flirting with about 61.8% Fibonacci retracement levels, started to trade a little bit above that, maybe to shake out the stop orders that were there above it, and then And sure enough, we're moving lower.
So I think the top is in for the bounce, assuming that this was a bounce. Of course, we don't know that for sure. It could be that we just take off to the upside from here. But I think that now the question is, are we going to have a full retest of the lows?
And how much of a retest? Do we go all the way back down to the same level that we saw a few weeks ago? Or is it, you know, not quite as low? Or is it substantially lower? Now, of course, a new bear market is still a possibility. We can't rule that out either. But I prefer Remember the scenario that this is most likely a correction that is probably going to end after the bottom is retested. That could mean at a higher level, could mean a lower level, could mean the same level.
I want to revisit this subject in our postgame segment, though, because I've got questions for you about options strategies. Now that vol is more expensive, obviously option premia are more expensive, but I want to consider whether options or outright trades are the best way to play what could be a significant bounce in this market.
Market wrap: US dollar breakout or false breakout
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's, uh, take a look at that US dollar because the— after double bottoming on the downside, we had a break above those highs that occurred last month and we pushed almost to the 91 level. But today we're seeing that reversal back down. Is this a breakout in the dollar index for a squeeze higher? What do you think here?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, here's what I can say authoritatively with absolute confidence. This question of whether the dollar is bottoming and about to take off to the upside, or if this was a false breakout that's about to reverse to the downside, That's probably the most important issue to pay attention to in markets. It's the thing to get right. It's the thing that you really want to have your eye on. That I can say with absolute certainty. I don't mind admitting, Patrick, I don't know the answer. And if there's anything I can teach people, it's the very well-known in the world of people that go on CNBC and Bloomberg. When they don't know something, they usually just flip a coin and then they try to sound as authoritative and confident as they can, making something up because they know that that's what sells.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: We're not going to do that on MacroVoices. I don't know what's going on here. What I can tell you is this week I finally see, you know, people saying double bottom last week, and I'm saying, okay, we're seeing lower lows and so far only lower highs. I haven't seen the higher high to break out of the downtrending pattern. We got the higher high this week, but we haven't seen a higher low yet.
And I can't help but point out that Juliette Declercq, who has been bearish here, has really gotten a lot of these calls on the dollar right in the last year.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: She actually anticipated that we would see this move. She thought the euro was going to come down somewhere below 1.22, which it has, bottom, and then reverse upside. And she has targets much higher. So is this the beginning of me being proven right in my bullish calls from several months ago, or is this just that head fake that is going to fake us out and then we end up lower on the dollar? I don't know the answer. What I do know is this is the thing to keep your eye on because it's most important. Let's ask Jeff Snider for his view. Obviously, he's following this very closely.
Market wrap: crude oil inventories and speculative longs
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, let's move on to crude oil. We definitely have a short-term reversal back down. Do you think that this is heading to a little bit of a lower low here, or is this just a quick little spurt lower in selling?
Erik Townsend: Well, remember what I've said in recent weeks, which is it's going to be about the fundamentals. It's going to be about the numbers. I definitely think that there is room here, especially with this massive one-sided— everybody on the same side of the boat, speculative positioning to the long side. If that big speculative long starts to unwind in a meaningful way, and it has begun to unwind, but only in a very, very small way. If it gets into a meaningful unwind, we could see a really big sell-off.
The thing is, there's no reason for that unwind to happen unless people start to abandon their long positions. And what would cause that, which I have been anticipating, but it's been a little slow in coming, frankly, is a series of bearish fundamental news in the world.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: weekly EIA data reports. Now, as I've said, it's going to be in the numbers. That's what's going to control things. Last week we had a bullish surprise, took us up $1 in minutes. This week we had a bearish surprise on inventory.
Crude oil building 3 million barrels nationally. Now, Cushing, Oklahoma, still drawing down 1.2 million barrels. And although that doesn't sound like that big of a drawdown compared to what we've seen in recent weeks in Cushing, you know, it's still a drawdown in a week when we've got a national build. And I think it's very much reflection of this shortage of heavy oil blending stock that's needed in order for the lighter oil coming from the shale plays to be refinable. Gasoline building, and this is really unusual. At this time of year, normally you expect drawdowns in finished products because the refineries have reduced their refining capacity in order to retool their equipment from winter grades to summer grades of gasoline. So you'd expect a drawdown in the finished products. We're building 2.5 million barrels of gasoline inventories this week. Distillates on the other hand, drawing down 960,000 barrels, almost a million barrels there. Production up again, only 13,000 barrels per day, but still up.
That puts us at 10.283 million barrels per day. And of course, no surprise, this was a bearish surprise on inventory, and that took the market straight down in reaction. Quite notably down, I would say. However, I would also say that today, Thursday, Kind of looked like a reversal candle, and that's when you see a really big, big sell-off at the beginning of the day, and then the market ends up closing back right where it started again.
We had that reversal candle pattern, at least in today's daily candle on the chart. Now, on the other hand, we also closed today below all of the short-term moving averages for the first time. So that's a really bearish signal. On the other hand, the reversal candle is a bullish signal. I'm not sure where that leaves us. In the grand scheme of things, I said last week that I thought we were probably pretty close to done at that 61.8% Fibonacci level, the retracement of the move back up. I thought it was going to end and reverse to the downside, as has happened. I was a little bit early on that. It went another dollar or so higher from when we spoke last week, but then it rolled over.
So now the big question is, did we see a bottom at $60 today, or a little over $60 this morning, which we certainly saw a pretty good bounce off of that, or is this just a case of the Or is the market getting a little bit ahead of itself and it's going to sell down in coming days? I think the real answer to that has to be in the fundamental data. I don't really have a view on what the market does between now and next Tuesday afternoon when the API inventory comes out. I think it will be API and then EIA inventory data next week that really controls things.
I won't be at all surprised, though, just based on the tape action I've seen today, if tomorrow, Friday, is an up day and we see a significant bounce, maybe up to $62.50 or so. It would be nothing at all out of out of the ordinary to see a bounce here up to the 5 or 8-day moving averages, which are up there around $62.50 or so. Big question on my mind, though, is, you know, are we headed lower, say a number like $55, lower than the previous low? Are we just looking at a retest of $58 and change, which was the low that we had a couple of weeks ago? Or could it be that we were done today, just above $60? Again, fundamentals are going to drive this. So far, we've seen nothing in terms of this sell-off that would even begin to invoke a massive unwind of those speculative long positions.
It's gonna take several weeks of bearish data before that would actually come into play. Now, if it does come into play, hold on to your seatbelt, folks, because there could be massive downside with the amount of levered-up speculative long positions. If all that gets unwound and everybody panics out of their longs, it's gonna be an elevator trip straight down for crude oil prices.
The thing is, we've only seen one week of bearish inventory data and quite a few surprises in recent weeks that were a lot more bullish than people expected. So, it really is gonna be what the fundamentals tell us. Right now, I think we're in the beginning of a bounce that'll probably go a little bit higher, and then inventory into next week is really gonna tell us what happens next.
Market wrap: gold and the 10-year yield
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold. Any ideas here as to what's happening with gold other than its correlation to the dollar here?
Erik Townsend: Well, the correlation to the dollar is the big thing, and of course, this is the subject of the interview We have a feature interview today with Jeff Snider, so I want to save the lion's share of the gold coverage for the feature interview.
I'll just say here that when the dollar has been looking weak, we're testing highs in gold. As soon as the dollar starts to look strong, all of a sudden gold just rolls over and goes dramatically down. I really think it's all about the dollar. There have been some times in the past— maybe we can come back to this subject in our postgame segment— there have been times in the past when the dollar and gold decorrelated, but right now we're seeing that very strong inverse correlation.
So it really is a question You know, is Juliette Declercq right that this bounce in the dollar is over and it's about to head straight down? If so, this is a buy-the-dip moment for sure on gold here. On the other hand, if Juliette's wrong about that and the dollar really is headed higher, as a lot of people have suspected that it may be, well, in that case, gold probably has quite a bit further to run to the downside. Let's get Jeff's opinion on that at the end of the feature interview after we've got his perspective on the last few years of tape action and how it relates to the Eurodollar system. Okay.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to that 10-year Treasury yield, because we were a stone's throw away from 3%, and suddenly we find ourselves at the kind of 2.80 level. Was that it for that move? Do you think that we're going to throw back the yield even further? What's your thinking here on interest rates?
Erik Townsend: I'm going to go back to what I said in the US dollar segment just a few minutes ago. I don't know, Patrick. I can tell you authoritatively and confidently, this is the important thing. It's really the dollar The dollar, Treasury yields, and your view on inflation. Is inflation about to come back in a big way or isn't it? Some people are saying inflation's in the rearview mirror, it was just a scare, we're in a deflationary debt deflation situation, don't worry about inflation. Other people think it's about to rear its ugly head in a big way.
Figuring out inflation, dollar, and Treasury yields is the key to understanding where we are in this macro story. I feel very, very strongly about that. And I don't mind admitting, as far as Because, you know, it's very easy to say, well, we saw rates back up almost to 3%.
No surprise that a psychological round number is kind of a resistance level, and we're seeing a pullback lower from that, and maybe we're gonna go back up and go higher. That doesn't really say anything substantive or useful. What we need to do is go deeper into these issues and really get into the cause and effect of why we're seeing this trend. How far can it go before something breaks in a big way, and what's gonna break first? Is it going to be the equity market? Is it going to be the ability of the US government to fund its deficit spending? Is it going to be an inflation surge that results from these fears?
We really need to get this big picture together. And what I'd like to do is really focus our efforts, Patrick. Let's try to get a real interest rate expert on the show as soon as we can. So, see what you can come up with for next week, but let's really dive into this issue. I'm not going to pretend to know all the answers. We need to call in some heavier guns and get some better perspective, because one thing I But what I will say that I'm very confident on is those are the 3 issues to focus on right now.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks for that summary, Erik. For this week's featured interview guest, we have Alhambra Investments CIO Jeffrey Snider. Erik's interview with Jeff is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Jeff Snider interview: the 1925 gold swap precedent
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Alhambra Investments Chief Investment Officer Jeffrey Snider. Our regular listeners, I'm sure, recognize Jeff's name because, of course, he's been the star of Eurodollar University, which is still available at MacroVoices.com/edu for Eurodollar University. And that is a very, very in-depth examination of the Eurodollar system.
Jeff Snider: Thank you.
Erik Townsend: We're going to take a look today, though, at gold coming from a different perspective. Jeff's experience and knowledge of the Eurodollar system uniquely qualifies him to understand a little bit deeper picture than you hear and read about on the internet when it comes to gold.
Jeff has provided an outstanding slide deck to accompany this interview. You're definitely going to want to download it. You can find the download link in your Research Roundup email, or if you're not yet registered, just go to MacroVoices.com and look for the download instructions next to Jeff's picture on our homepage. Jeff, welcome to the show. So, why don't we go ahead and dive right into your slide deck here? As you talk about the history of paper gold, starting on slide 4, you talk about the gold swap, and I think that's a really important concept because a lot of people know that central banks engage in these gold swaps, but frankly, a lot of us don't understand the backstory of why they do this, how it affects the system, and what the mechanics are. So, what are gold swaps? Why do central banks engage in them?
And how did this all come about?
Jeff Snider: Sure. Thank you, Erik. I think the first gold swap, or at least the first recorded instance of a gold swap, is a good place to start. There were some gold swaps that happened earlier in the 19th century, but at least the one in 1925, there was some recorded history with it and some information about it. And I think your listeners, at least those who are interested in gold, are going to recognize the year 1925 for its significance, which was that the United Kingdom in that year went back to the gold standard after being off of it since the beginning of World War And Winston Churchill had insisted that if the UK go back on the gold standard, that it do so at the pre-war parity, which meant that there was significant strain in the financial markets and in the economy for doing so.
Now, the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, stood ready to aid the Bank of England in trying to defend the pre-war parity despite all of those difficulties. And one of the ways in which it did was this first gold swap in 1925. And essentially what happened was the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, on behalf of the Federal Reserve System, made $200 million of gold bullion available to the Bank of England for its disposal in whatever transactions it might take in defending sterling at that pre-war parity price.
What's important about that is that it aids both sides of the equation, because of the way a gold swap works is that essentially the central bank agent that is providing the gold exchanges it for what's called a gold receivable. If you look at slide 5, for example, I've kind of sketched out roughly what this gold swap meant. $200 million in gold was made available to the Bank of England, which it would then sell in the market for sterling at the price that it wished to defend. They put those sterling currency into an account in London on behalf of the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. So, what really happened was gold disappeared from New York and ended up as cash in the UK denomination in London.
But for accounting purposes, The Federal Reserve Bank of New York showed a gold receivable where gold used to be, and so you've heard the expression as good as gold. In this case, it's literally taken to be that because a collateralized account on behalf of a counterparty central bank was in the thinking of people in New York and London as good as having gold. Because if for whatever reason the Federal Reserve Bank of New York needed its gold back, there was sterling in an account where it could have theoretically buy it back, and so. So, the gold receivable was taken as equivalent to actually having bullion on hand in a vault in New York City.
And so, both parties were satisfied. The Federal Reserve Bank of New York got to continue reporting the same amount of gold in its possession, while the Bank of England was supplied additional metal in order to help defend the sterling at pre-war parity.
Gold receivables, IMF reporting and gold leasing
Erik Townsend: Okay. So, basically, England goes back on the gold standard, says that our pound sterling is worth just as much as it used to be in gold. The open market says, no way, if that's true, People take the gold. That means they don't have enough gold. They borrow some effectively through this gold swap from the US central bank. But the way that the accounting works is they're basically pretending they didn't give that gold away, which really got sold to people in England who recognized that the pound sterling wasn't worth what the government said it was worth. But what's happening is the gold's coming off of the reality of the balance sheet, but it's, it's not being taken out of of the accounting. Is that still the way that things work today, and what's slide 6 telling us?
Jeff Snider: Yeah, that's exactly the convention as it stands now. Um, and again, there are legitimate reasons for it. I mean, you can make the case that a gold receivable is as good as gold because you're not likely to default from a counterparty central bank. In other words, if the Federal Reserve Bank of New York asks for its gold back, the Bank of England is not going to refuse. It's going to happen. And so, in the modern conventions, that's still the case.
And what slide 6 shows us is that in the conventions of the International Monetary Fund, when this question was raised in 1999, the ruling, the convention was that on official reports to the International Monetary Fund, central banks and other government official agencies are not required to disclose how much gold they have as distinct from gold swaps or gold receivable. So, those 2 things are combined because in the conventions of how these things work internationally, those 2 things are taken as equivalent. Even though essentially they're not. You're right to point out the fact that the metal kind of disappears into the market with the promise that some other central bank at some other time will buy it back at some future point if it's ever desired to be converted into actual bullion. So that's an important point here in terms of actually analyzing what a gold swap is: is that it dislodges stored physical supply into the marketplace in a way that it's hidden.
And it's often confusing.
Erik Townsend: So, we're taking gold out of a vault, selling it on the open market, but because the party that did the selling was a central bank, their credit is considered to be bulletproof. And so, for accounting purposes, we're going to pretend the gold is still in the vault. Am I exaggerating to say that that's the way this works?
Jeff Snider: That's the way this works. And, of course, it opens the door to all sorts of conspiracy theories, because obviously people have argued, and do argue still, that if there's more receivables than gold, then there's no gold left. And how would anybody know the difference? And the point of fact is we don't know the difference. We don't know how much gold has ever been swapped out and how much gold remains, because nobody's ever been required to make a distinction there. And what our interest here is, is defining why that would be. Why are central banks interested in doing this kind of transaction, other than the fact that they're intentionally trying to mislead the public, which I don't think is the case? Again, there's legitimate reasons for all of these things to happen. You may not agree with why they're being done, Or the times of when they're being done, but there are legitimate reasons for this.
And one of the things that I think it's important to understand is taking that the next step.
Gold swaps tend to be between central banks, or one central bank to another, like the 1925 example between the Federal Reserve and the Bank of England. But starting in the '60s and '70s, and really the 1980s forward, we started to see a lot of gold lending and gold leasing, which was between central banks as one counterparty owning gold, gold and gold producers, miners, those kind of firms that go out there into the world and actually dig up the stuff from the ground.
And gold lending and leasing is, again, there's nothing nefarious about it. It's, it's 2 different counterparties coming together for a mutually beneficial transaction. On the one side, the central bank side, the reason you want to engage in the gold lender or gold lease is because gold doesn't pay interest. Now, that's not a big deal for somebody like the Federal Reserve, but for smaller central banks who used to own a huge percentage of their foreign reserves in gold, that was a big issue. Because a central bank is still a bank in that it has to earn some money for something. It has to at least cover its own expenses. In a lot of places, there are needs and requirements of central banks to actually earn money on their assets. And so, a central bank is interested in turning what is a non-interest-bearing asset into an interest-bearing asset.
On the other side of that, a gold miner faced with something like falling prices of gold is going to be interested in hedging They want to lock in the price where it is before it falls further. Let's not forget the process of mining gold. There's a time lag involved. You dig it up out of the ground, but it still needs to be assayed. It needs to be measured. It needs to be purified and refined. So between the time that you actually get it out of the ground and know how much you have in your possession and the time it actually is marketable is considerable.
And we get to slide number nine. We have this gold forward where the gold producer is selling forward physical metal. It's metal that they don't have. The only way you can sell physical metal that you don't have. Is by borrowing it from somebody who does. And who holds the most amount of gold, or who used to hold the most amount of gold, was central banks. And so a gold forward was nothing more than a miner or producer that wished to hedge against falling prices forward borrowing gold held on behalf of whatever country, whatever central bank counterparty, and paying an interest rate to do it. That's the GOFO rate, or the gold forward rate. And so all parties are satisfied here.
The producer is hedged because they've sold forward gold that they don't have have, which is then easily replaced by their actual production. So, it's not like they're really short metal that they can never get back. While at the same time, the central bank is happy because it's turned out, it's mobilized its stockpile of physical metal, receiving an interest rate for it, while at the same time not reporting that it actually sold gold into the marketplace or lent gold into the marketplace, I should say. Because under the convention that we discussed earlier, A gold receivable is the same thing as bullion on hand. So, the central bank gets interest. Nobody knows that the gold is gone. The miner gets hedged, and the whole thing works really well.
Manipulation theory and the 8 a.m. gold puke
Erik Townsend: Jeff, I want to pick up on something you said a few minutes ago. You mentioned that this leads to lots of conspiracy theories. Now, there are plenty of people in the gold bug community who think that there is a secret conspiracy of central bankers who are intentionally working with one another, conspiring to suppress the gold price.
And, you know, a lot of people, myself included, have been skeptical of those views, saying, you know, I really don't think that central banks are engaged in that. But the gold bugs make a really good point, which is they say, you know what, if that's not what's happening, explain why the heck it is that for some strange reason, right around 8 o'clock in the morning, it is very common to see what some people call gold pukes. All of the sudden, somebody sells hundreds or thousands of contracts all at once.
Jeff Snider: Right.
Erik Townsend: Once in the futures market. Now, any competent futures trader knows that that transaction happening all at once rather than gradually is going to dramatically affect the price. And so the critics or skeptics in the gold bug community say, look, how is it possible that these massive sudden sales that for some reason seem to happen at 8 o'clock in the morning could possibly be occurring if it's not somebody with really big heels like a central bank intentionally dumping gold for the express purpose of manipulating the price lower.
How would you answer that?
Jeff Snider: The basis of the question is correct. I mean, who is it that's in the marketplace who doesn't care about the price, right? If you're dumping gold all at once and you're driving the price down, obviously you don't care about the price. But are there other explanations other than a central bank trying to manipulate the price lower? I think the answer is yes, and, and I think that it's actually Pretty. No, I won't say simple to diagram out, but at least there is an alternate explanation that fills all of those requirements. And it gets back to the setup with gold lending and gold leasing, and the dislodgement of previously stored gold into the marketplace, often all at once. And I think we have to start asking ourselves: Why would that be? Why would this happen all at once? What are those periods in time where somebody who doesn't care about the price of gold is just slamming it on the market?
And so I think 2008 is a very good place to start trying to piece together what might be happening that isn't central bank manipulation.
And just to say one more thing, I mean, going back to the arrangement between gold lending and leasing between a central bank and a mining company, there's no risk for a central bank in price, and there's no legitimate reason for them to actually take an interest in price because the gold leasing trend or the gold leasing arrangement is by its very nature negative on price. Right. For reasons that have nothing to do with monetary policy of any central bank around the world, because it's dislodging previously off-market stored gold onto the marketplace. That's a key point to remember moving forward: is that when this stuff happens, when there's an uptick in lending and leasing, for whatever reason, it's price negative. Has nothing to do with manipulation; it's just the natural supply and demand mechanics of the way these things are set.
2008: gold pukes and repo fails
Erik Townsend: Jeff, you said 2008 was a good place to start in terms of understanding this. Why don't we move on to starting at slide 12? You talk about what happened in the 2008 crisis and how gold fared through that. Walk us through this next series of slides.
Jeff Snider: Well, one of the striking things about gold in 2008 was that for a while there, it didn't perform very well. I mean, most people hold gold as a hedge against end-of-the-world type stuff, and the closest we've come to experience something like that was in 2008. As you can see clearly from the chart on slide 13, Fundamentally, gold was in an uptrend up until March of 2008, and I think that's what most people expected. Not only did you have the weak dollar trend and commodity prices and inflation and all that, but you also had an increasing interest in gold as a safety hedge, given that everything was going wrong at that particular moment in time. And all of a sudden, out of nowhere, we got in the middle of March 2008 one of the first real big gold puke, where it didn't make sense. Fundamentally, gold was positive, but yet for the next eight or nine months. gold was really negative. Didn't seem to hold as good of a hedge
against all that was going wrong in 2008 as it should have. To explain that, I think we need to realize what it is that gold can be at specific points in time. Why are people dumping gold all at once, not caring about the price? What is the most striking thing about 2008? The fact that it was a liquidity panic, a monetary panic. In other words, there was a shortage of money. There was a shortage of liabilities.
Erik Townsend: Hmm.
Jeff Snider: And among other things manifested within that overall trend was a shortage of collateral. One of the most prominent parts of the 2008 panic was the fact of mortgage bonds and other kind of instruments being repudiated in the repo market.
So if we go from slide 13 to slide 14, what you see pretty clearly is that these gold pukes line up pretty well with repo market fails. And repo market fails are nothing more than an indication of collateral problems inside the dollar system. System. And if we think about gold as it pertains to this lending and leasing arrangement, it's actually sort of like a collateralized loan where somebody can borrow a financial asset— gold, in this case, a physical metal sitting idle at a central bank— and use it to help alleviate a collateral shortage system-wide. Now, when you do that, of course, if you're going to be lending cash against gold, you'd have no interest in holding it because holding gold requires storage, it requires cost, So if you're lending cash against gold because you intend to use gold for something else, you've overcollateralized your lend and lease, which means that say you're doing $100 worth of gold lending and leasing where you put on a 10% haircut, for example.
You don't care if you dump it all at once in the morning because you're overcollateralized. Your only obligation in that lending and leasing arrangement is at some future date you have to put back physical metal. What you're betting on is that essentially you can be able to do that at a lower price.
So, you don't care what the price is today, you're just moving on from the gold. The reason the person is putting gold towards you on the opposite side is frankly because they have no other choice. A banker, a commercial banker, or some other institution that is running into collateral issues in the repo market might appeal to their store of gold, or whoever else's store of gold they can find, as a kind of last resort collateralized method to borrow your dollars. And so that, I think, answers the question of who it is that these specific moments in time where especially funding conditions in dollar markets are not robust, and in some cases are very bad, why gold prices tend to go down at those times.
And if you look at the chart on slide 14, that first gold puke corresponds exactly with Bear Stearns failure in 2008, which triggered a whole bunch of dollar problems, repo market problems. Repo market fails actually look on that chart to be smaller, but only in comparison to later in 2008. We're talking about more than $2 trillion in fails in the later weeks of March 2008. I mean, that was just a massive problem, a massive seizure of the repo financing market in US dollars at that time. And what ultimately ended that particular downturn in gold was in May 2008, the Federal Reserve removed some collateral restrictions on its TSLF auctions. If you look at slide 15, for example, the press release from the Federal Reserve at that time, They allowed primary dealers to pledge AAA-rated asset-backed securities in addition to everything else that the Fed was taking.
In other words, the Fed knew that it had a collateral problem on its hands, and when it loosened the eligibility restrictions for collateral in these auctions, all of a sudden gold stopped going down because at that moment, these financial counterparties on the other side of the gold lending leasing arrangement weren't so stressed as to use gold as a last resort.
In other words, they were able to use other paper that had been previously Seriously restricted from the repo market such that they didn't have to get rid of their gold or mobilize their gold stores.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so just to clarify my understanding of this, when we're talking about repo failures, we're not talking about the gold itself being the asset that is in a repurchase agreement, but rather these big banks are using repurchase agreements to finance massive, massive transactions. Many of those are in over-the-counter derivatives that are very dependent on counterparties. And as you start having fears of counterparties failing, Something that's never supposed to happen starts to happen, which is delivery failures in the repo system creates an absolute crisis situation for a bank where they urgently need cash no matter what. What do you do if you're in that situation? You sell your gold, 'cause you don't have any other choice. Is that essentially what we're talking about here in terms of what happened and why these big gold pukes started when the tri-party repo system was starting to fail?
Jeff Snider: Yeah. That's how it works out. I mean, that's how it looks. It's not exactly where you're selling your gold. Remember, we're talking about a gold lending arrangement, but that's exactly how it works out in terms of the price. The more that the repo market system is stressed in terms of a collateral shortage, the more people have to appeal to last resort kinds of alternatives, including gold, which means the amount of gold lending goes up. Remember what I said before, the more, the more that there is of gold lending, the worse it is for the gold price because it's dislodging previously stored up and off-market supply of metal, both paper as well as physical. And so it's an increase in supply all at once on the market, which ends up being price negative. And so it's a connection between funding market illiquidity and collateral issues and why the gold price ultimately goes down in relation to Because it works out kind of like what you said, where it looks like banks are just selling anything and everything all at once.
It's not exactly how it works in the transaction, but that's what happens in the price.
2008-2011: QE, safety demand and the European crisis
Erik Townsend: Okay, so 2008 hits. A lot of people think on a fundamental level that ought to be positive for gold, but what actually happens is because they need cash so badly, or they need liquidity so badly, it has an adverse effect, a negative effect on the price of gold for the rest of 2008.
But then things turn around at the end of 2008. Now, a lot of people have said, okay, look, the reason is because they announced quantitative easing, and that was perceived by a lot of people as just outright money printing that's going to debase the currency, should be just wildly positive for gold. But, you know, I can't help but notice that gold really started to recover in price not after QE was announced in March of 2008, 2009, but really at the very end of 2008. So, what turned it around? Was it quantitative easing, or was it just that these other factors were finally starting to come under control?
Jeff Snider: It's a little bit of both. Remember, there's 2 sides of the gold coin here. We're describing the downside, and the upside of it is what we talked about before, that the demand for safety as a hedge against central bank errors or just general currency risk. And one of the things that turned it around in 2008 was the fact that that demand for safety overwhelmed any negative factors from whether it be leasing or dollar illiquidity. Because quite frankly, by the end of 2008, there was no more denying that the world had a very, very serious problem. And that continued all the way through 2008, 2009, into 2010 and 2011. And in 2010 and 2011, of course, we had the European problems, which many attributed to or were expecting that it would potentially break up the euro. And so there was a massive euro currency risk that became embedded in the gold price But even though that was happening on the upside, there were still these collateral irregularities taking place quite regularly.
In fact, way too regularly. You should not see these kinds of things happen if the monetary system is recovering. So, as the gold price was going up in 2010 and 2011, there was all sorts of anomalies in the gold market that were consistent with what we had seen in 2008, even though they didn't necessarily work out in price, because the upside or the demand for safety was stronger at that point.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeff Snider: The bid for gold was stronger at that point than the negative factors from collateral. And that didn't— it stayed that way until September of 2011, simply because the balance was far more toward people expecting currency safety until the Eurodollar problem in 2011 became far too big to ignore.
BIS swaps, unallocated gold and September 2011
Erik Townsend: Jeff, you mentioned what happened in 2010 and '11. I think that takes us to slide 17 in the deck. Talk us through what slides 17 and 18 are telling us.
Jeff Snider: Well, there are a couple of anomalies again, or aberrations, whatever you want to call them, in the gold market that popped up in especially 2010. Remember, 2010 is supposed to be a year of recovery, not just in the economy, but in the financial markets. Because we had ZIRP in the US, we had ZIRP in Europe, we had QE in the US, we had all of these positive monetary factors. And yet, in the middle of 2017, it came to light that the Bank for International Settlements, which is the central bankers' central bank, had swapped 346 tons of gold with 10 European banks in December 2009 and January 2010.
And people couldn't figure out why that was, because again, things are supposed to be recovering. Why the hell are they taking gold out of the hands of European banks? And the reason was, of course, continued funding anomalies in dollar markets.
What was reported along the way as these things became more and more investigated was what had happened during the bull market in the 2000s was that European customers in particular who were interested in buying gold because gold was in a bull market may not have been potentially people buying gold for gold properties, had been buying gold, but physical metal, and depositing them with their local bank for custody. When they were doing that, the bank gave them a choice about what type of custody they would choose. And one of the options was unallocated gold accounts. And the reason most people chose that was because it was a much lower price point. In other words, the bank charged you a hell of a lot less for an unallocated account than an allocated account. But an unallocated account was a very big difference in terms of legalities and who actually owns the metal. An unallocated account means that you're just depositing the bank with the gold.
The gold then becomes a liability of the bank, and what they essentially— what they give you back in return is essentially a warehouse receipt. It's not actual title to the metal. All the bank is saying is that if you ever ask for your metal, we'll give you metal back, not necessarily the specific bars or the specific whatever that you deposited. And what that allowed was, in times of stress and strain, Because that metal became a liability of the bank and not a separate constructive bailment as an allocated account would be, these European banks, including Swiss banks, found that they had a deep pool of unallocated gold that was their own liability that they could mobilize. Again, their only restriction or their only liability was that they would have to put the same kind of metal or the same amount of metal back if their customers ever asked for it back. And what happened in 2010 as the European crisis wore on and got worse was that these European banks started to appeal to those stores of unallocated gold.
They started to motivate them into the lending and leasing arrangements, which tended to be negative in price. The more that happened— where that really broke out was in later 2011 as the dollar crisis worsened that year. It's September 6th, 2011, the Swiss National Bank shocked the markets by pegging the franc to the euro, essentially trying to get away from the dollar. Balance, which triggered all sorts of responses across the US dollar funding markets. And you can see once again, another big massive gold puke that actually represented the exact top in the gold price. It has never been back to that point.
And if we look at that in terms of the bigger picture, the Eurodollar picture, we went over within Eurodollar University, it coincides exactly with the final systemic break in the Eurodollar system. In other words, up until 2007, Eurodollar system rapidly expanded, exponential growth everywhere in every kind of offshore asset, any kind of offshore money-dealing capacity you might ever think of. From 2007 to 2009, obviously, we had the panic, we had a setback and whatever.
2009, 2010, and early 2011, there was a partial recovery that goes alongside the return or the higher price in gold from 2009 forward, 2008 forward. And so, the Eurodollar system was partially rebuilt up until this moment in 2011, when all hell just broke loose again. And so gold was used and deployed as collateral in what was another dollar problem, another dollar crisis, essentially, which marked for many, many of the banks involved in it, a complete systemic break. They realized that no matter what the central banks did, no matter what the Federal Reserve did, ECB, or whomever else, they were not able to fix the Eurodollar system. Of course, that's obviously true, because no central bank actually acknowledges the Eurodollar system It became a situation where 2011 forward, the system was irreparably broken. There wasn't even the possibility of a small recovery in it. And that's how it started, how it snowballed in terms of the gold price was again, if you look on slide 18, another big collateral issue in September of 2011 that coincides with another big gold puke that triggered the next stage lower in gold.
Erik Townsend: And I think it's very clear here that all of these Eurodollar problem spikes very much, not just in 2011, but the prior ones, coincide with changes in the direction of the gold price.
Central bank holdings, negative GOFO and the LBMA
Erik Townsend: And it's certainly a narrative that you don't hear in most of what you read about gold. Moving on to slide 20, Jeff, I think that central bank gold holdings are a topic generally that lead to a lot of confusion. So, please give us the big picture in this next series of slides. Why are central banks holding gold, and particularly, why Why is it changing? Because post-2008, some banks were divesting their gold holdings for some reason, while at the same time other central banks around the world were increasing their gold holdings. So, what drives all of this?
Jeff Snider: Again, we've got to start from the perspective that we don't really know exactly what's going on in the central banks, because going back to what we talked about with the first gold swap, a gold receivable is treated as the same thing as physical bullion. In, in terms of a central bank accounting system.
So, when we talk about, you know, I'm presenting here the Bank of England's reported gold holdings, and this is something that they've reported in their annual report for a long time, but only recently broke out by month. And what they're doing in their custody of gold holdings is they have gold on behalf of not just itself, but also other central banks, but also commercial banks and other commercial interests here. And so, I think it's important to distinguish between what central banks might be doing as a matter of monetary policy. As it pertains to gold, and what commercial banks are being forced to do as a matter of funding and dollar liquidity issue. If you look at the chart on slide 20, there's a striking relationship between the amount of gold held on custody at the Bank of England on behalf of other central banks and commercial banks and the price of gold from 2011 forward.
And we have to ask ourselves immediately, you know, where did that gold go? And whose gold was it that disappeared out of the Bank of England's custody? And so I think if we go back and think about that in terms of what happened in 2008 and 2011, it seems pretty clear, though it's not obviously defined specifically that way in the data, that whose gold disappeared was commercial banks because of this lending and leasing relationship. If we go to slide 21, for example, we see the 1-month forward rate for gold. Remember, the forward rate for gold is the interest rate paid to lend out physical metal. What we find is that there's a relationship between the GOFO rate and the tendency of gold to disappear in the manner that we described in 2008, 2010, and 2011.
Now, usually when we talk about gold leasing, it's tied to LIBOR because, you know, if you're a cash owner, you have an alternative that you can select between lending cash against gold collateral at an interest rate and just lending cash into a specific unsecured interbank market, which is what LIBOR actually notes.
If you go to slide 22, you see the relationship pretty well, where the forward rate was high in 2011 and 2012 and then became very low, as in preparation for what we see in the Bank of England data, where the amount of gold in custody just disappeared. Now, normally, you know, again, LIBOR is supposed to determine which way it goes, which direction leasing takes. But in this case, it's not LIBOR that we're really interested in. It's the zero rate, the zero by Because you think about it from the perspective of the cash owner, why would you lend cash at a negative rate, especially in a gold leasing arrangement? What is it about gold that would essentially allow you or essentially force you to pay somebody else to borrow cash from you with gold as collateral? And the reason is obviously because the gold that you're getting back in return is more valuable than the cash you're lending.
And the only reason that would be the case is if systemically there is a collateral problem whereby you expect profit from the collateral shortage. And if we further analyze these negative forward rates against what we see, this disappearing gold in Bank of England custody, and it's not just the Bank of England custody, throughout 2013 and '14, gold disappeared in a lot of different pockets.
What we find is that the gold forward rate was often negative during those periods, which from our perspective of the Eurodollar system and the dollar system, system in general, what it's telling us isn't necessarily about gold. It's the gold market telling us something about dollars. So whenever we see the forward rate go negative, and we see gold disappear from official stores, that tells us that there is a funding problem, a collateral problem in these global Eurodollar markets, one that we wouldn't be able to see or might not be able to easily see otherwise. And so that's how we need to analyze the gold market in terms of how it relates to the Unfortunately for us, you know, if we get to slide 24, for example, you can see at certain points that the forward rate was negative, not just at the short-term maturities, but was negative out to 3 months and sometimes 6 months, which again was an indication of the strength of the severity of the problem. And, you know, how much demand was there for gold as collateral?
It got to be at certain points a big, big, big problem. And unfortunately for us, For us, the LBMA decided in late 2014, just as this was really starting to become a very big issue, especially outside the United States in these offshore eurodollar markets, they decided they were going to discontinue publishing the forward rate. As of, I believe it was January 30th, 2015, they were no longer going to publish any information whatsoever about the gold forward rate, which deprived us of our ability to really really get a really good sense of how bad the problems were in these particular parts of the funding markets.
And again, it gets back to what we talked about earlier, conspiracy theory. And conspiracy theorists would say, well, why are they discontinuing them? Because they're obviously hiding something. And I don't really know what the answer is. They've never provided an answer. And if you look on their website for why they discontinued GOFO they really don't provide any rationalization whatsoever. They don't give us any reason. And what that does is it makes it harder for us to lodge legitimate Criticism against these kinds of things, legitimate criticism against the dollar market because it opens the door to the idea that there's some vast conspiracy here. The thing is, I don't think there there really isn't a conspiracy. It's more of the fact that the Eurodollar system, especially past 2011, never really healed, never really restored, and never really recovered. And after 2011, especially in 2013 and 2014, it was getting a lot worse. That's what these forward rates are telling us.
That's what this disappearing gold. was. It was telling us that the dollar system, before the dollar actually started rising in exchange value against other currencies, long before it, that there were irregularities in these funding markets that were so severe, they were distorting gold markets to a massive, massive amount. It was a tremendous distortion in gold markets, which warned us that the dollar system was getting worse heading into what eventually became the rising dollar.
The 2011 peak and the 2013 slam
Erik Townsend: Moving on to slide 25, I see on On this price chart on the left side here. Some, some things that I want to ask you about. First of all, I see obviously the 2011 peak. So that was the top. And the question that that begs is, why did the top happen when it did? And I think you may have already answered that with the spikes of problems in the Eurodollar system, but I don't know if that's the full extent of the answer. But if I look then ahead, it seems to me like really from the 2011 peak, right to the end of 2012, that looks to me like what could have been a consolidation pattern. There was plenty of room to think maybe that the market was going to head towards new higher highs after that. But holy cow, look at the beginning of 2013. It's like somebody flipped a switch and all of a sudden, the gold market is headed straight downhill from there.
So, why the peak exactly when it was in 2011? Why did things appear to stay in a consolidation pattern through the end of 2012, and why did everything suddenly change at the beginning of 2013 that was so bearish for gold?
Jeff Snider: Well, the 2011 peak is, again, I think, explained by the fact that that was the last straw for the Eurodollar system. Again, between 2009 and 2010 and 2011, it partially recovered. Bank capacity partially came back. Some banks were expanding. Again, some banks were taking risk, and these are you know global eurodollar banks. They were doing some of the things that they had done before, but they were doing it more measured and more cautious. And then this 2011 crisis showed up, and by September of 2011, it had become clear that it was again another global crisis, especially in these offshore currency markets. That was something that the central banks not only could they not solve it; they didn't even know it was there. They had no idea what was going on. And so, if you're a global eurodollar bank in that position. Position, now having to face the prospect of a second global crisis, you're going to say, that's it, I'm done.
This Eurodollar system just doesn't work for anybody. And so, from that point forward, the Eurodollar system has never been the same, and there was no possibility of recovery.
And I think that's why gold had peaked at that particular time, because it coincides exactly with what was the final top in the Eurodollar system. To your point about what happened in 2013, distinct from 2012, I think, again, we have to consider the fact that in 2012, there was a whole bunch of central bank Mario Draghi in July 2012 made his infamous promise. The Federal Reserve in September of that year came out with QE3, and then in December, QE4. And for a lot of people, especially in these offshore markets, QE3 and QE4 were not comforting. They were, again, more evidence that these central banks were, at best, behind the curve. They didn't know what the hell they were doing, and they couldn't solve the issue. And so, the dollar system tightened effectively, not loosened. Of course, that runs against mainstream interpretation of what quantitative easing is.
But here we have dramatic evidence in early 2013, long before the word taper was ever uttered, where this tremendous gold slam, especially in April of 2013, that indicated that the dollar system was getting worse, especially in the global offshore spaces.
But that's not how it was interpreted at the time. If you go back into that period, a lot of the central bankers, a lot of economists, a lot of the more optimistic people, a lot of optimistic commentators took the drop in the gold price at that moment as if that the recovery had become real and that the recovery had actually cemented itself, and that the gold market was telling them that the fear and the negative impacts of 2008 had finally passed. When in fact, what we see going forward was the drop in the gold price in 2013 was a tremendous warning about what was to come, even though it was a year and a half later in 2014, was the idea that these internal parts, these internal hidden parts of the Eurodollar system were not only dysfunctional, but they had gotten worse again. And so, it was a way to observe in real time, if you could understand what the markets were telling you from the perspective of Eurodollars and dollars, that the gold system was saying, you know, things are getting worse, not better, even though it looks like superficially, Initially, it was consistent with the idea of reflation recovery.
It was, to put it in general terms, deflation, not inflation.
Dollar index and the 2014 dollar squeeze
Erik Townsend: Jeff, let's move on to slide 27 and talk about how dollar index futures fit into this story. Obviously, gold is priced in dollars, so it has an inverse relationship with the strength of the currency.
Jeff Snider: It's something we talked about at the, at the end of the year with this dollar squeeze or this dollar If you go back again to 2013, as the price of gold is getting killed, and you don't recognize all of this stuff, the lending and leasing and what that means in terms of collateral and what that means in terms of dollar markets, it definitely does look like gold is saying, hey, things are getting better. People are dumping gold because they're more confident and optimistic about the markets and the economy. And even the dollar index got better. The weak dollar is consistent with reflation, or the pre-crisis period, the dollar fell between 2001, 2002, and 2008. In fact, the bottom in the dollar was the day Bear Stearns failed.
So, it did look like on the surface, the price of gold was consistent with reflation and recovery. However, if we start to factor in, you know, the negative forward rates, if we start to factor in the disappearing gold in terms of dislodging previously stored supply, it told us that something beneath the surface wasn't Right.
If you look at it in terms of DXY or the dollar index, up until middle of 2014, you had all of the stuff going wrong in the gold market, yet it hadn't broken out into any major way in terms of the rising dollar or dollar squeeze, as we call it. If you turn to slide 28, that's exactly what you see. Unsurprisingly, those warnings in the gold market proved to be right on the money, so to speak, in 2014. Right. We were warned by the gold market as early as late 2012 that these things were getting worse, and eventually they were solved. They were going to break out into another global dollar crisis, which is what happened. And that's, I think, the key point going back to the peak in 2011 was that the market was saying these things are not going to be solved. And because of their constant irregularity, their constant problem, and all all of these vital funding markets, that eventually things are just going to break as they did starting in the middle of 2014.
The dollar squeeze at that point was on, and it had in many places catastrophic consequences. You look, you go to places like China and Brazil, Brazil in particular, Brazil's economy was utterly decimated by the rising dollar period, and it has never recovered from it. Even though that was 2 years in the rearview already, Brazil economy has never recovered from the rising The Chinese economy has never recovered from the rising dollar, nor has its financial system.
And so this was another dollar liquidity crisis, which was in many ways described well ahead of time by the irregularity in gold. Once you understand the mechanics of leasing, understand what that means in terms of collateral, it tells us something very important about the state of the system in a way that no central bank is going to be able to to be able to fix or solve. Unfortunately, again, for whatever reason, the LBMA The RMA has decided in its infinite wisdom that it will no longer publish the forward rate, which means we have to struggle a little bit, a little bit more with even less information going forward.
Gold and the dollar since 2016
Erik Townsend: Moving on to slide 29, we're looking at the gold price more recently in the last year or so. Feels like the mood has changed. You know, there was definitely a downtrend there. Seems like maybe the bottom is in. There's been an uptrend in gold. Definitely the action in gold prices has felt different in recent months. So, what's going on? What's behind the mood change in gold here that we've seen since the beginning of 2017?
Jeff Snider: Well, both gold and the dollar, going back to 2016, are behaving just like they did in 2010 and 2011. It's the reflation and recovery scenario, which makes sense because we went through the rising dollar downturn, which was a severe, severe liquidity shock across the world. And so, it stands to reason that there would be some retracement in it. So some abatement in the liquidity pressure and some abatement in monetary pressure in that reflation trend. What we see, especially recently in the last 6 months, is again, we find these gold pukes, and they not only do we find them, we find that they correspond again with repo market irregularities, these collateral fails that indicate that there is a collateral shortage, as there's always been a collateral shortage. But there are periods where these shortages become acute enough that the become problematic. If they're so problematic that they cause the gold market to decline substantially, especially all at once in these slams or pukes, whatever you want to call them, then obviously, there are still problems in the Eurodollar system.
And that's what the gold market is telling us. Even though there is reflation, there's positive sentiment, there is even inflation expectations, we still think, like, go back to 2013, The irregularity in the gold market is telling us that maybe we should pay attention, that even though the dollar has been falling for, what, a year and 2 months now, that might not necessarily continue to do so because the liquidity squeeze or the dollar squeeze, the next episode in it might be just around the corner. You know, you go back to any of the dollar episodes or the falling dollar previously, especially the one in 2011, up until April of 2011, it looked very much like the dollar was going back to the pre-crisis falling dollar period. And then it abruptly stopped out of nowhere. And the reason was because the dollar squeeze had abated in 2010 and 2011. To some degree, the irregularities in funding markets continued, as noted in these aberrations, anomalies in the gold market.
And I think that's the important point here is even though the gold price is higher, again, we have to recognize the 2 different parts of the gold market, there's always going to be inflation and safety bid driving the price higher.
But against that, there's the times, these times where collateral problems, illiquidity, dollar squeeze, however you want to characterize it, are going to force it into downside risks. And eventually, if these things become serious enough, as they had in 2011, as they had in 2013, they can become quite severe price negative for gold. And not just gold, what that would mean for the rest of the world and the rest of the financial system. financial markets. And I think we've already seen some of that in the last— at the end of last month, you know, the stock market crashed. I mean crashed, but it was liquidated at the end of January and early part of February, not just here, but across the rest of the world too, as an indication that these warnings in the gold market are telling us that the dollar system, as much as reflation appears to be the dominant sentiment, underneath all of that, there are still the same problems that are unresolved.
Outlook: will the dollar squeeze return?
Erik Townsend: Jeff, where does that leave us in terms of your outlook? I think if I've understood your view previously, it was that there's probably still more downside for gold here because the dollar squeeze effect that we've talked about means that you expect that the dollar will move higher. When we discussed this at year-end, you and I definitely sounded like the smartest guys in the room talking the dollar bull story, but the chart's kind of proven the other guys right.
One, do you still see it that way? And 2, what if the other guys are right and the dollar continues to slide to the downside? Does that mean that gold takes off to the upside from here, or how do you see this playing out?
Jeff Snider: Well, taking your second question first, I think that's true. If we're wrong about the dollar squeeze and that the dollar system is fine and there's nothing really wrong, then it should continue to fall and the gold price will continue to rise. I sincerely doubt that's the case, however, and I'm not surprised that the dollar has fallen as far as it has, or for as long as it has, simply because sentiment has changed, and that it takes time for these things to be processed inside the system.
Again, go back to what we were talking about. The gold price dropped precipitously in early part of 2013. And yet it wasn't until the middle of 2014, more than a year later, that it finally broke out into a major worldwide problem. In other words, the dollar didn't reverse higher for more than a year while these gold irregularities were happening. The same thing happened in 2010 and 2011. Between the middle of 2010 and April of 2011, the dollar was falling precipitously, the same as it has been now. In fact, it fell further back then than it did now, while all of this stuff was going on in the gold market, not just the gold market, but the repo market and funding markets and European markets and all sorts of these other things. And so it wasn't until whatever triggered the ultimate breakout in 2011 that reversed the dollar higher. I guess my overall point here in analyzing the gold market and what's behind the gold market, especially in these collateral spaces, is that we're still seeing these same kinds of irregularities even in later 2017.
So even though the US dollar is falling in exchange value, there are still the same types of behavior that we saw previous to other dollar spikes in 2014, as well as 2011 and forward. And you can go back to 2008 too, irregularity in the gold market, and then a dramatic reversal in the dollar starting with Bear Stearns. And I think that's ultimately the point here is that, you know, the dollar is going to fall until it stops falling. You know, it'll keep going down until it doesn't. And we can't really predict what it will be or what it might be that reverses the dollar at that point, therefore negative for the gold price, because, you know, you can never anticipate what it actually is. And what the gold market is telling me in conjunction with the repo market is that these kinds of irregularities that we continue to see raise the probability that at some point, some undetermined future point, the dollar squeeze will be back on, the falling dollar will stop, the dollar will reverse, and that will probably be negative for the price of gold as well as a whole bunch of other stuff.
And when you put this all together, what's happened over the last 6 months tells me that these warnings in these various markets aren't just happening, they're escalating. Again, that's why I mentioned stock prices about a month ago, because there was an escalation in the series of warnings we've been seeing inside the dollar markets over the last 6 months.
Interbank lending statistic and Eurodollar University
Erik Townsend: Jeff, one final question. I want to shift gears completely to another topic, because one of our generous donors who makes MacroVoices possible sent me this question, which is just perfectly up your alley, even though it's off our topic today of gold, which is that recently there was an announcement that interbank lending statistics were being discontinued. And, of course, this leads the conspiracy theories off to, what are they hiding? What's going on here? Is there anything to this?
Jeff Snider: There's a couple of clues here that it was nothing more than a data discontinuity. And I think the reason they discontinued the series was because they realized that it had produced a large discontinuity and a large negative discontinuity. Annuity that people were interpreting incorrectly. Just a short answer of what actually happened was the line item for interbank loans was not in a comprehensive line to begin with. And the first clue of that was that it was only about $70 billion or so. That's not even close to the total interbank market. And so that particular item was only capturing a small portion of what actually goes on in these kinds of places. And because of that, it means it has specific definitions of what part of a bank call sheet it's tracking from. And if there was a definition change on the call sheets or in the tracking, tracking system from turning call sheets into data, that just represented the change.
The fact that somewhere along the way, whatever the Federal Reserve is doing in its H.8 system dropped one part of whatever collated into that one line. And so it was nothing, it was nothing that actually happened in the interbank market. It was just a data discontinuity.
Erik Townsend: So it's one of those things that got turned into a big deal, even though it Jeff, you've become something of a celebrity with our regular MacroVoices listeners, but since we have lots and lots of new listeners, I just want to point out a few resources that are available.
You were so kind as to provide us a very thorough Eurodollar University. That is a 4-part series that really goes deep on the history of the Eurodollar system and provides a lot of context and understanding. understanding of how important it has been in terms of fueling a lot of macroeconomic trends in the last 20 years or so. I'd like to announce too, I think I've alluded to this on the show before, but that Eurodollar University really only took us up to just before the point in 2007 where the Eurodollar system kind of fell over and broke. We are planning Eurodollar University Season 2.
Jeff Snider: Yes.
Erik Townsend: Yet to be produced, which will talk about the breakdown of the Eurodollar system that occurred in 2007 and everything that's happened since then. Of course, part of that is what we covered in today's story in the gold market. The other resource I just want to point out is our year-end special, which included you, Luke Gromen, and Mark Yusko talking about what the endgame for the US dollar would look like. And ironically, even though you and I
Jeff Snider: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And you and I have been bullish on the dollar relative to other currencies. It's not really bullish. It's more like a short squeeze. You've explained very succinctly why you really do think the dollar's hegemony over the global financial system is ending, but it's just ending in a way that is likely to put more upside pressure on the value of the dollar relative to other currencies. That is the subject of our 5-part year-end special at the end of 2017.
Both of those are available at MacroVoices.com/edu, for Eurodollar University, and they're highly recommended. They've been among some of our very most favorite content that's been most popular with listeners. Before I let you go, though, Jeff, I know you've got a fantastic job there at Alhambra Investments. You get to do research and publish both interviews like this, as well As well as a whole bunch of written research that you do for your clients there. Alhambra is, of course, a retail investment advisor in Florida. You get to have all the fun, Jeff, doing Eurodollar research and looking at the gold market and so forth, but your colleague Joe Calhoun has a whole team of professionals that are providing retail investors with investment advisory services. Please tell us a little bit more about what Joe's team does there in Florida. Florida, and how people who are interested can contact Joe for more information.
Jeff Snider: Well, what Joe does and what the investment team at Alhambra does is they try to make sense of everything that we've been talking about, all the complexities, all the risks involved, and try to turn them into investable strategies with an eye toward making sure that we have a handle or we have a good idea of what the risks are with investing. The most important part of managing money for other people is understanding exactly what the risks are to anything that you're trying to do or trying to accomplish. And so those guys, Joe and his team have done a terrific job with turning what are very complex issues into investable strategies that are available to a wide range of potential customers.
Erik Townsend: And for our listeners who may be interested in Alhambra's services, who would like to contact Joe, what is the best way to reach him? Maybe you can give us his email address and phone number.
Jeff Snider: Yeah, you send Joe an email, he's going to respond. His email address is jyc3@alhambrapartners.com. And they can call us if anybody still uses a telephone. Our office number is 561-686-6844.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. And again, that's Juliet Yankee Charlie 3 at alhambrapartners.com. And that is Joe Calhoun's email address. Joe is a super guy We really appreciate him making your time available for us. We're really looking forward, Jeff, to getting into taping season 2 of Eurodollar University in coming months. That is going to have to be a wrap for today. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Postgame: Snider vs Declercq on the dollar
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview we had with Jeffrey. It's always great to have him back, always some interesting new insights on different ways to look at the Eurodollar markets and its impacts on things like gold. What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: You know, I really enjoyed the interview. I love talking to Jeff. He's a super smart guy. I think the big takeaway for me, it's not so much what Jeff said, but it's the question that he posed at the end. I think Jeff has been very clear that his views in terms of timeframe, he's not a short-term, you know, what's the trade in the next week kind of guy.
So, on one hand, he's saying, hey, he really thinks the fundamentals are set up to take the dollar higher. On the other hand, you've got someone like Juliette Declercq, who's an institutional advisor, who's very much in the business of getting the timing right. And she's saying right now, She thinks dollar lower is the next move. Doesn't mean they can't both be right. Juliette can be right, dollar lower, and if 3 months from now dollar moves higher, Jeff, I'm sure, would tell you, oh, yeah, I never thought it was necessarily gonna happen in a certain timeframe. I'm just telling you eventually I think that's how this plays out. So there is room for both of them to be right, and I think what happens next with the dollar is gonna be really telling. And certainly, with regard to gold, I think it goes much lower if the dollar continues to break higher. Looks like we may see that Juliette's being proven right again.
Can tell you that she did anticipate that the dollar would move higher. She told her clients to watch for a specific level on the euro, and she hit it just about perfectly. And now it looks like the euro is starting to rip higher this afternoon. She has targets much higher. Is it going to get there, or is this just another blip? We don't know, but it's going to be very interesting to play out. Anyway, I want to move on because we're a little bit short on time. The interview ran a little bit long.
Postgame: S&P 500 correction template chartbook
Erik Townsend: Listeners, please refer to your Research Roundup. There is another download link for a post-game chartbook, and we've got a really great chart here on slide 1 that Patrick put together. This is the same chart that our regular listeners will recognize from a couple weeks ago, which is showing past corrections of 10% or more that have happened since 2007, how they generally played out, what the pattern has been.
And Patrick, I've got to tell you, just look at how the latest update here— you drew that top pink box showing what the target range would be for a bounce, not in reaction to this chart, you drew this a couple of weeks ago, and look at how we have perfectly filled out the S&P going right up to the top of the pink box, top of the range of what you thought was possible for a bounce, and it looks like now the move lower to retest the lows that you predicted a couple of weeks ago was likely to come appears to be in the works. So what do you see happening next here on this chart?
Patrick Ceresna: First off, you know, I wanted to highlight the fact that this wasn't actually a forecast. This was simply a template. What we did was we overlaid all the past market corrections and we just simply asked the question, well, if this scenario played out in similar way to the way the old past market corrections have played out, then this would be a template for how it would look. And so it wasn't really a forecast, but rather kind of a roadmap. And it's very interesting that so far it is actually staying within the boundaries of what we would have expected to happen. One thing, when one looks at this chart, it looks like we are forecasting the stock market to head down to like 2,500 and 2,400 on the S&P. And I want to just make sure it's very clear, this is not a forecast of us thinking it's going down there, just saying what has happened in the past, it could be a map that way.
In the same regard, I also want to point out there been corrections in the past where it didn't even reach the double bottom low below. And so there is always a chance that even a correction down to 2,600 is all we see and it somehow reverses here. I mean, I think the key thing when this market sell-off phase occurs, we have to come back to what we asked originally. We first had to make an assumption, and the assumption was, is this a market correction Or is this the start of a bigger bear market, something that is more prolonged, or a change in the overall flow of the whole market? And we made the assumption that this was a correction, and at the end of it will come a buy on dip. And I want to emphasize that while, you know, it looks a little scary, like there's coming another correction down, if this still fits this narrative, the focus over the next couple of weeks is to discover where the shorter-term buy-on-dip opportunities, not so much as fearmongering that there's another scary leg coming to the downside.
It'll be very interesting to see how it plays out for sure.
Postgame: options versus outright longs
Erik Townsend: Well, and I wanted to ask you this question exactly, Patrick, because as our regular listeners know, we were talking for many months about what a great opportunity was presented by the cheapest implied volatility in recorded history creating the cheapest options in recorded history. That story is over. Volatility is back up. Option premia are expensive again.
On the other hand, if I look at this and I think, boy, it does appear to be that we're setting up for some kind of buy-the-dip opportunity, but I don't mind telling you, Patrick, I don't want to buy outright equities down here. I really do think that the risk of a 1987-style event— you know, we both think the most likely outcome here is that you see a bottom and we move back up and probably eventually in the next few months come back to new all-time highs. That's most likely. It doesn't mean it's the only scenario. We could have the beginning of the next 2008-sized crisis starting in the next few weeks. So I'd much rather buy options, call options, as opposed to taking a long position on stocks. But holy cow, we've already got much more expensive volatility. And if If we get down there to, let's say, 2,500 on the S&P, we're going to have much more expensive vol than we have right now, and that means even more expensive option premia.
So what do you do if you're trying to take advantage of what might be a buy-the-dip opportunity? I'd really rather express it with options as opposed to an outright long, but I think the options are going to be really expensive when we get to that point. What do I do?
Patrick Ceresna: I don't like to look at options. Options necessarily always as expensive or cheap. Just because the VIX is at 22 and the vol premiums have picked up on options, one would immediately say, oh, that means options are expensive. But let's be realistic. For instance, in the last 24 hours, the S&P 500 dropped 100 S&P points. What is the right vol for a market that can move 100 S&P points in 24 hours? So if you look at that and you ask, well, is 22% implied actually a good number for this type of day-to-day volatility. And one could make an argument that maybe it's actually cheap relative to the types of swings we're having. The bottom line is you can't just assume it's expensive because we're at a 22 VIX right now. The markets are going to make big swings here. I mean, if we see any déjà vu of what happened a month ago, I mean, we could theoretically We could theoretically drop 100 S&P points here in the next couple days, theoretically.
To me, vol is actually sort of right-priced here. I wouldn't say it's cheap anymore, but for the volatility we're seeing, it's still tradable. And so therefore, I think using options here is still a very good strategy. The way I look at it is like we put this idea out there that, look, we think that this could be sort of like the summer of 2007. And the fact that we're in the late business cycle, We know that, you know, overall that this doesn't play out very good if you're looking at a year or more in time. But on the short term, it may offer an opportunity to be bought on dip. But buying the dip here on equities that you could get stuck on and experience a nasty drop, there's no asymmetry to me in it. And so therefore, using options as a way to create a much more compelling risk-reward proposition is, is still a very viable thing here.
You know, I mean, those people that are really worried about getting hit by vega, we talked about the other week. about using debit spreads. It's a possibility as one of the ways. But I mean, just even undertaking directional trades here with protective puts, even that simple of a strategy as that, to me, offers still better asymmetry than just going long the equities alone.
Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely agree that some kind of protection makes sense because although I agree with you that the more likely scenario is a correction that bottoms and then moves back up again. You never know when the next 1987 is going to hit you in the face, and this is not the time to be running without insurance. Let's move on though.
Postgame: gold-dollar correlation
Erik Townsend: On the next couple of slides, it looks like we're looking at gold-dollar correlation. What's on your mind here?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, I thought that this was a worthy conversation to have since Jeffrey spent the entire session just talking about gold and the Eurodollar. And we always in the pre-games are talking about the movement of the dollar and then subsequently make that connection to our listeners that, you know, it's having that impact on gold. And I really wanted to add a visual for people to see how strong of a correlation gold and the dollar have had. And so what I did on this chart was I overlaid an inverse of the dollar index, and then I put on the EUR/USD, and I put on gold bullion, which is the lighter orange color versus the darker orange. And the observation I would make here. First of all, with the dollar index having such an incredibly heavy weighting of euros in it, the movement of the euro really decides where the dollar index is going. And you can really see that gold behaves with a very strong correlation to the inverse of the dollar because I flipped it, right?
So the observation further to that that I would make here is simply the fact that there was that saying from Alan Greenspan. Greenspan. To him, gold is 50% a commodity and 50% a currency. Well, if you really actually look at the charts over the last couple years, and I would argue that it's behaving almost perfectly like a cross-currency to the dollar. The question, of course, and we've had many guests come on that have suggested that this correlation may break and that somehow we may at some point see a period even where the US dollar could rally at the same time as gold I thought it was interesting to observe that right now there is no evidence that that correlation or inverse correlation has been broken.
Erik Townsend: Well, I agree, Patrick, and certainly the scenario that I've talked to Raoul Pal about in past interviews, it has existed in the past where gold breaks away from that usual inverse correlation to the dollar and both move up at the same time. That's not happening, at least not right now. We need to look at till we see signs of change, an expectation at least that I hold is that the dollar and gold will continue to move in opposite directions.
Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely. And so this is where on that 3rd chart, I did a little digging to see when was the last time we saw a period where gold broke away from the US in that natural inverse correlation. And you really have to go back to 2010 for a 6-month period where they kind of diverged. And really at that time, that was just when quantitative easing was firing up. And so it's interesting to observe that it took something like QE to really break this correlation. And it asked, maybe that offers a speculation that we can kind of think about and ask is, will it take another new QE program to kind of break this correlation? I mean, that's pure speculation, but it is a, it's just interesting to observe how it played out like that.
Erik Townsend: Well, and to be sure, the message that we're getting now, the messaging from the Fed is the opposite of that. They're not talking about another round of QE. Powell is taking a fairly hawkish stance, saying that we need more rate hikes, that the Fed's job is not to try to protect stock market investors. That's not what they're there for. The messaging we're getting from the Fed is anything but, here comes the next round of QE.
Postgame: thorium and China
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, we had a lot of tweets out there on the thorium at MacroVoices over the last week. What are your thoughts here on thorium?
Erik Townsend: Well, of course, Patrick, for context, we're talking about a follow-up to a conversation I had in the feature interview last week with Rick Rule from Sprott Global, where we talked about thorium-fired nuclear reactors. And the view that Rick expressed is slightly different from my own. I agree with Rick very much in the thrust of what he said, Which is, they're not spending money and investment on thorium reactors. Nobody is doing that. Therefore, as an investment play, looking at thorium mines or something as an investment play, expecting demand to exist for thorium reactors, is not at all something that makes sense to consider right now. The place where I would view this a little bit differently from what Rick said is, Rick's description was, he's not a nuclear engineer and neither am But obviously, there's a lot of people who are in the world, and they are evaluating thorium versus uranium. And for some reason, beyond our pay grade, they're choosing uranium.
And I have a different understanding of this. It may be biased. I'm not an expert on reactor technology by any stretch, but my understanding from the thorium crowd is that the story goes a little bit differently.
Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely.
Erik Townsend: And it basically is that in order to build nuclear reactors, this is just a massive, massive undertaking that requires a huge amount of government approval and red tape and so forth. A decision had to be made back 50, 60 years ago when they were first introducing commercial nuclear reactors as to what fuel to use, and they chose uranium. Why did they choose use uranium? Because a byproduct of a uranium reactor power plant is that it produces plutonium that can be used in making nuclear weapons. If you're going back to the 1940s and early '50s, a very high priority was to source that material that was needed to support the Cold War. So they chose the civilian power generation technology of uranium-fired nuclear reactors because it was the best way to meet the civilian need to produce energy while at the same time supplying the military-industrial complex with the plutonium needed to create nuclear weapons. And that probably made sense at the time.
The argument is it doesn't make any sense anymore. But the problem is the entire industry and the entire regulatory agency knowledge base is entirely on uranium. It's impossible for the nuclear regulatory agency to regulate thorium reactors because their scientists don't know anything about it. What it would require for thorium to become a viable fuel would be leadership from the government to say, hey, we made these decisions around uranium reactors for a set of reasons that made sense in the 1940s and '50s. Doesn't make sense anymore. These thorium reactors are apparently way, way, way safer. And by the way, these days, it's a big plus that they do Not create plutonium as a side effect of their operation.
What it would take would be leadership in government to say, strategically for the country, we need nuclear energy. We don't want to be producing weapons-grade plutonium that could get into the wrong hands along the way. And we do want something that is orders of magnitude safer than these boiling water uranium-fired reactors of the Westinghouse variety that melt
Patrick Ceresna: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: Melted down in the case of Fukushima. So I really do think that there's a story here that would make sense, but it's not something that anybody in the present military-industrial complex benefits from. If somebody were to greenlight thorium reactors right now, the existing power and energy industry doesn't know how to build them. It's a specialized knowledge base. This guy Kirk Sorensen, Sorensen seems to be the NASA engineer who knows all about it and is championing this case. And what I find to be a very sad story, frankly, Patrick, you can look in your Research Roundup email, and you'll find it's now a fairly old TED Talk link from 2011 of Kirk Sorensen explaining thorium reactors, why they're a good idea, why they're much safer than uranium reactors, and so forth.
My understanding is that this idea of thorium reactors has been completely, totally shut down in the United States by regulators because it's trapped in bureaucracy. There is no reason for the bureaucracy to change. It only knows how to regulate uranium. Meanwhile, China has apparently taken this technology that was US-invented. They're running with it. They're putting a lot of research, from what I'm I'm told, into thorium, and they may be in the process of engineering thorium reactors that will work. I'll tell you, it's a sad story, Patrick, but I see a scenario here that makes perfect sense to me, which is, if China is smart, and I think they are pretty smart, what they will do is they will perfect this technology, and specifically, they'll also combine it with the distribution technology that Rick talked about last week.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: Idea of building these nuclear reactors, not on-site the way the old big clunky nuclear reactors were, but imagine something that's the size of a 40-foot shipping container, and the entire nuclear reactor is built and manufactured in a factory in China.
They're mass-produced, they're very carefully safety-checked, and they are sent on a container ship to wherever they're needed. The fuel is sent separately. They send an engineer over to get the thing checked out, make sure it wasn't damaged in shipping, and set up. And imagine the sales pitch if you're the salesman from China going to all the countries around the world saying, look, you don't want a nuclear waste problem. You want safer, much better than uranium-fired reactor. You want a liquid fluoride thorium reactor that comes in a shipping container, gets set up by us. We provide the fuel. We set you up. We get Get it running, and we come back and take it out of your country and take it back to China at the end of its design service life, when we replace it with a new one, and we do the overhaul and the refueling and all that stuff in China, off of your turf.
That's a sales pitch that any country that has a problem with an anti-nuclear public sentiment can say, okay, we need nuclear energy.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: Badly, but we don't want to build these big dangerous uranium reactors. This is a perfect way to let China take the messy dangerous parts of this and do it in their country, not in our country. We can sell that to our people. And I think that the politics are certainly there in China to develop and be a leader in that industry. They have the technology, and apparently the US has just given them all of the thorium reactor knowledge base that existed there. Now again, I am not an expert on But if I had to guess where it's going, it's going nowhere in the United States, and the reason is entirely because it's stuck in government bureaucracy. If anything's gonna happen, it's gonna happen in China, and if it's gonna happen not just for generating energy in China, but elsewhere in the world, I suspect it will come in the form of modular nuclear reactors that are engineered, designed, and built in China, and then delivered on a container ship anywhere in the world, set up and fired up, and then taken back.
And that's the future of nuclear. Fueled and serviced and perhaps even operated by Chinese contractors. I think that could be the direction. I don't know the status of that. I'm told that something was in the works a few years ago, and honestly, I don't have an update on it.
Sign-off and Research Roundup
Erik Townsend: But with that, we are out of time, Patrick. So once again, folks, we really need your help promoting MacroVoices. Please tell your friends and colleagues, forward your Research Roundup emails, and most importantly, register your free account if you've not done so already at MacroVoices.com. Only takes a few minutes. We're not going to try to spam you or sell you anything, and the benefit to you is that you'll receive our free weekly Research Roundup email, which never contains any advertising or marketing. It's just a compendium of links to all of the coolest free content that we could find on the internet, both in support of our own feature interviews as well as other interesting research on the internet. Patrick, tell them what they can expect to find in this week's Research
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Jeff as well. You're going to find the chart book for Jeffrey Snider's presentation and the charts we also discussed in the postgame. There's also that link to the Kirk Sorensen TED Talk video you mentioned just a second ago on thorium as well. There's a really interesting article from oilprice.com which talks about the EIA's shocking US oil production predictions. You'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup.
Thank you. Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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