James Grant — founder and publisher of Grant's Interest Rate Observer (as introduced on the show)

Announcer intro and episode preview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 108 was recorded March 8th, 2018. I'm Erik Townsend. Regular listeners will remember that I called on Patrick last week to find us a real heavyweight interest rate expert to help us navigate the developing situation in Treasury yields and the US dollar. And boy, did he deliver. Wall Street legend Jim Grant, founder and publisher of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, will join me as today's feature interview guest. We'll discuss everything from Treasury yields to the dollar to inflation to gold and even junk bonds. Be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview when Patrick and I will build on some of Jim Grant's economic outlook and look at charts and graphs for specific ETFs and tradable instruments that relate to the various trends that we see developing in fixed income markets as well as elsewhere.

Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude oil, gold

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, the S&P 500 really has just been hovering here. It doesn't really seem to get any traction. We're seeing some traction to the upside. I think we're about 2,740 as the time we're recording. What's your thinking here on the markets?

Erik Townsend: Well, it looked like it was rolling over in the short term, and I thought that we were headed down. It seems right now that the market is rallying late Thursday afternoon on news that President Trump will exempt 2 countries, Mexico and Canada, and is only declaring a trade war against the other 206 countries on the face of the earth. That's good news at the moment, I think, because of the Canada exemption. I wouldn't be surprised if that wears off as the message really sinks in that we are still talking about an announcement that is fundamentally about imposing tariffs on imports of steel and other commodities. I don't think this is a good story for the market, but right now, the exemption, the carve-out, as it's been called, for Canada particularly, and also Mexico, seems to be pushing a bump higher. I wouldn't be surprised if it doesn't last. I do think that, for the most part, the top of the bounce is in.

I expect that we'll see below 2,500.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: on the S&P before we see higher than 2,800. Now, that doesn't mean that I don't expect to eventually see higher than 2,800. I am still favoring the scenario that this is a market correction that is not the beginning of the end, so to speak. I think that that market correction, once it plays out, may still lead to higher all-time highs. On the other hand, it certainly is possible that we're at the beginning of a new bear market. It bears watching carefully. But for the moment, Patrick, my expectation is that we're going to retest the lows, maybe a little bit of a lower low somewhere in the 2,400 to 2,500 range, and we'll see how things develop after that.

Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to that US Dollar Index because while everyone's focused on Trump and these tariffs, it looks like it was Mario Draghi and his a little bit more hawkish stance that seemed to have turned down the euro and pushed the US dollar higher here. What's your thinking here on the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, as far as I'm concerned, Patrick, this chart is still indeterminate on the dollar index. As you know, Juliette Declercq has my utmost respect. She's been saying, hey, when we hit 121 and whatever it was on the dollar-euro, that was buy the euro, sell the dollar there, and we're headed much, much higher on the euro, lower on the dollar. A lot of people, though, thought that when we broke 123, which was kind of a key technical level on the euro, that it was really gonna accelerate from there. And in fact, it looks like we kind of had a false breakout. And it's rolled back over now. If I look at the chart, Patrick, to me, you know, we've had a higher high now. We have not yet had a lower low. So, I think where this next short-term low comes in on the chart is really going to tell us what's next. I don't think that we have a determinant pattern yet.

I'll certainly ask Jim Grant, but as far as I'm concerned, the jury is still out. And I'm honestly very much conflicted because in my own analysis, as I look at this, I'm not sure, but I lean a little bit more towards a dollar bullish view. At the same time, I have a huge amount of respect for Juliette Declercq. She tells me that she is still recommending a dollar bearish view. So, we'll see what happens.

Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to crude oil because it seems to be weakening since that inventory number. You got to tell me what's happening here. We're almost down at the $60 level here. What's your thinking?

Erik Townsend: Well, my view is and has been that what should happen is West Texas Intermediate should continue to move down over the next several weeks and eventually get to, let's say, at least a $50 to $55 price target in coming weeks. That could be considerably lower if there were a speculative unwind where everybody is panicking and selling out, where so much positioning is all on one side of the boat with more than $1 billion still of speculative longs in the oil market between both Brent and WTI combined. There are several caveats though to my bearish view. This market has shown us just amazing amount of resilience. It seems to want to shrug off bad news and really embrace good news. The other thing is that if Juliette is right about the US dollar and we're about to see the dollar really move further down, that's got to be oil bullish. So far, what we're seeing has been consistent with my expectations, but it's been delayed.

I thought we were moving down sooner, and I didn't think it was going to take this long, and I thought we would already be lower by now. I could be proven wrong again, but what we've seen in the last couple of days are some really strong technical indicators— closes well below All of the short-term moving averages, daily and weekly stochastics turning negative on not just WTI but the other energy contracts, whether it be heating oil, gas oil, gasoline, and so forth. So we're really seeing a lot. I have said before, it's really going to be in the fundamentals that drives this. What we got this week was very interesting action around inventory. API—that's American Petroleum Institute—the private service that forecasts inventory on Tuesday afternoons—they said they expected. Almost a 6 million barrel build on national crude oil inventory. So when the actual EIA number came in at 2.4 million barrels built, now that's still a pretty significant build, but it is so much smaller than what had been anticipated by EIA.

The market took that initially as a very bullish sign with crude oil prices moving dramatically higher just as the news came out. Cushing, Oklahoma drew down 605,000 barrels. That's still a pretty hefty drawdown for Cushing, Oklahoma. But compared to the 2 million barrel plus weekly drawdown figures that have become commonplace in the last several weeks, this is a little more than half a million barrels drawdown. It's not nearly as bad as it's been. Gasoline drawing down 788,000 barrels, much, much smaller than API had expected of a much larger gasoline drawdown. Distillates drawing down 559,000 barrels. Now, production was up 86,000 barrels. That should be bearish for oil prices. I think the market didn't notice that right away because prices did go shooting to the upside on inventory news. But you know what? It only lasted for about 30 minutes or so. We did not get higher than the previous day's high price. And sure enough, about half an hour after inventory was in, just as I was beginning to tape our interview with Jim Grant, holy cow, the bottom fell out.

We were down $2 on crude oil prices in The matter of just a few minutes. And I think this is the sign of more to come. I think that we finally broke out of an indecisive, indeterminate status in the market. But it's going to depend again on what we see in the fundamental data from EIA. If we get big drawdowns in crude oil inventory next week, then that will change everything. Right now, though, what we're seeing is pretty significant. Keep in mind, we also had 1.5 million barrels per day of exports. That translates to 10.5 million barrels on the week. So if you If we were to go back to the previous regime where it was illegal to export oil, that 2.4 million barrel build on inventory might have been 12-point-something million barrels. I think that we're going to finally be able to say that the downtrend has thoroughly locked in, but I will qualify that to say there was a key technical level right around $59.96 or so that we need to close below, and we were

just below it about 30 seconds before the close today on Thursday.

Patrick Ceresna: Wow.

Erik Townsend: And we bounced up above it, Patrick. So, we still need to get down to a solid $59 handle before I really feel like the downtrend is locked in. But at this point, I think we're headed lower in price. And again, if that speculative unwind were to occur in a panic type of situation, we could easily get into the mid-$40s or even lower. I think that would be short-lived. We'd eventually stabilize around $50 or so.

Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to gold because as soon as the US dollar had a little bit of a pop this morning, we see gold coming right off of the top end of the range back to about $1,321. What's your thinking here on gold?

Erik Townsend: Well, it goes all back to the dollar. I think that what you can say is gold is performing in strong inverse correlation to the US dollar. The scenario of both of them moving together that we've talked about with different guests in the past is not happening. So you've really got to have a strong view on where the dollar is headed before it makes any sense to have a strong short-term view on where gold is headed. And I don't have that yet. We'll see what happens. As I said before, Patrick, I think that the The dollar chart, in my eye, is still indeterminate. As I mentioned, Juliette Declercq is no slouch. She has said it's time to buy gold here. So that's certainly one indication in one direction. I'm definitely going to ask Jim Grant about this. He is very well known as a big fan of gold.

So I'm sure he'll have plenty to say about it as well.

Erik's big picture: the wind has changed

Patrick Ceresna: And finally, Erik, what's your thinking on Treasury yields?

Erik Townsend: Well, I want to save the bulk of that for Jim Grant, because obviously this is his specialty. And I can't hold a torch to Jim Grant when it comes to interest rates. He is the man. What I'm going to do is use this time for a different purpose, which is just to kind of go to the big picture of where we're headed with MacroVoices in the next several months.

As a pilot and sailor, Patrick, people sometimes ask me, you must know a lot about weather. How do you tell when the weather's going to change? Do you look for a certain pattern in the sky, or what is it? Most people would never guess. It's actually a change in wind direction is the telltale sign that always means the weather is going to change, especially if there's an abrupt change in wind And the reason I invoke that analogy right now, you know, I think in the grand scheme of history, if we look back 5 years from now on the last 6 to 12 months, as we've seen a 50 basis point backing up of Treasury yields from 2.35 up to 2.85, that 50 basis points, some people made money on it, some people lost money on it. It won't matter in the end. Nobody will care. It will be forgotten. On the other hand, I think the end of 2017 coming into the beginning of 2018 will probably be remembered for a long time as when the wind changed.

Now, when the wind changes, it doesn't necessarily mean bad weather is coming. It might mean that the weather is improving, but it always means the weather is going to change. And my own talent, I would say, I don't claim to know all the answers. It's one of the reasons we produce this podcast. I am much better at knowing what the important question to focus on is than knowing the answer myself. And I'll tell you, Patrick, if you want me to make a bold statement in terms of my own predictions,

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Interest rates, particularly what's going on with the Treasuries, what's driving it, and where are we headed? How far can it go before something breaks? That's topic number 1. Topic number 2 that's going to be critically important is the US dollar. Are we really in a secular downtrend, or is this going to reverse? Topic number 3 is inflation or deflation. Are we about to see a resurgence of inflation or not?

Those are the key questions. I am absolutely convinced, and I think even, you know, if you're If you're primarily a stock investor, still, those are the things you want to focus on because of the signals that they will tell us about the macroeconomy and where markets, including equities, are headed. So, what we're going to try to do is focus on getting as many really solid experts in these areas. Interest rates, number one, that's why we've got Jim Grant for you this week. We're going to focus on getting inflation experts, dollar and currency experts, and we're going to try to focus on those areas. So, that's what you can look forward to, and I'm not going to try to tell you what to do.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: you this week what's going on with Treasury yields. Let's save that for the expert.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks for the summary, Erik. Now, this week's featured interview guest is Jim Grant, editor of the Grant's Interest Rate Observer. Erik's interview with Jim is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Jim Grant: Jay Powell, economists and the Fed

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, Here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Jim Grant, famously the editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, one of the best-known publications on Wall Street. Jim, I have so much been looking forward ever since we launched this podcast 2 years ago with Jim Rogers actually as our first guest. I've been looking forward to getting you on the program, and frankly, I'm glad it took this long because I don't think there's ever been a more important time in the last 10 years to be very closely observing interest Before we get to interest rates, though, I want to start with a higher-level question. New Fed Chair Jay Powell running the show. What is your expectation? Is Jay Powell a good pick to replace Janet Yellen? Do you think that we're going to see a change in policy from the Powell Fed as opposed to the Yellen Fed? And what's your overall reaction to the state of the Fed, so to speak?

James Grant: All right. Well, Jay Powell has one commanding credential. And that credential is the absence of a PhD in economics on his resume. I say this because we have been under the thumb of the doctors of economics who have conducted a policy of kind of academic improv. They have set rates according to models which have been all too fallible. They lack historical knowledge and indeed they lack the humility that comes from having been in markets and having been knocked around by Mr. Market, who, you know, is a very tough hombre.

Jay Powell, at least, has worked in private equity. He knows a little bit about the business of buying low and selling high. So I think it's— also, he's an English speaker, a native English speaker. If you listen to him, he speaks in everyday colloquial American English, unlike some of his predecessors. So I'm hopeful, but not so hopeful as to expect a radical departure from the policies we have seen.

Bond bear market, risk parity and rates versus the dollar

Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and carry that forward to Treasury yields then, because obviously this is the topic on everybody's mind. We've seen this backing up in rates, and there's every imaginable theory from this means inflation coming to this is a reflection of Powell being more hawkish and it's all about Powell to this is about President Trump's policies and deficit spending. What do you think is driving this backing up of interest rates? And where do you see it going from here?

James Grant: Erik, I'm a little bit more fatalistic. You know, we have come to accept that financial markets are driven by people and policies and by personalities. You know, what is Chairman Powell going to do? What will President Trump tweet next? As if they were in charge. Well, perhaps sometimes they are not in charge.

I observed over the years that the bond markets have tended to, to move in generation-length cycles. Anywhere from 20 years to 35 years. This is not an iron law of physics, but it is an observation from the middle of the 19th century forward. So we have concluded perhaps the bull market in bonds that began in 1981 and that maybe ended in the early days of July 2016, I think. So it might just be that interest rates are going up because they are going up.

It sounds a little bit mysterious and indeed fatalistic, but I'm a little bit less inclined than others to assign causation to people and policies.

Erik Townsend: Now, last time that we were at a secular low in yields, that was in the 1940s, and it took a full decade.

James Grant: I remember it very well, Erik. I was there. Well, I was there— I was born in July of 1946, so I missed the first 3 months of the bear market, but my mother told me about it. She said it was fabulous.

Erik Townsend: But it took, you know, even though you were born only 3 months into that, it took 10 years before there was a meaningful rise in interest rates. Does that mean that it's going to take 10 years before we see a meaningful rise, or is the meaningful rise already upon us? And how far can it go? What stops it? What breaks if things get too far?

James Grant: 1946 to '56, 10 years, rates went up about 10 basis points a year, 1/10 of a percentage point a year. Very, very slow, deliberate. Now, I think, and not know, mind you, I think the tempo will be rather more brisk. I say this because there's more leverage in the system, because there's more debt around, although one could argue that the debt is going to constitute a damper on things. I happen to think that the debt will, in fact, become a problem that will lead to higher rates. That is another guess rather than a piece of knowledge. So I'm looking I'm looking for a bear market in bonds having begun, having begun in July of 2016.

I think it's upon us, and I think the tempo will be brisk enough to notice.

Erik Townsend: Jim, you were on the cable networks last week and mentioned that the timetable could probably be different because risk parity might speed things up. What's the mechanism of operation there? How does it come into play? And I guess the other part of the question is, what would be the limits of how far this can go? Some people have said rates can only go so far before the stock market crashes, or something. Do you think there's a limit as to how far rates can back up, and what would that limit be?

James Grant: Well, first, as to risk parity, as you know, it is based upon the proposition that bonds are inherently less risk-fraught and less volatile than equities. To someone who was around in the '60s and '70s and '80s, that proposition is somewhat contestable. But that's the idea. So if stocks are inherently riskier, what you want is to equilibrate risk. That's what they say. You want to have a parity of risk in the portfolio. And to do this, you lever up the bonds. You get more bonds, having financed the increment with borrowed money. And that increment of bonds is going to equilibrate risk with equities, the stocks. All right, that's the theory.

Now, that may work in a gently trending market. It has not worked at certain times and junctures in which both stocks and bonds decline together. So my sense is that there's a lot of money in risk parity, and that a forceful rise in interest rates, a steep decline in bond prices, is going to force liquidation of some part of the risk parity portfolios.

Now, Erik, you wonder how far it can go. People, I think, are arguing that it would be inexpedient if rates went a lot higher. They say impossible. What they actually mean is inconvenient. I forget now exactly what the size of the interest expense on the public debt is, about a $400 billion number. The government is paying 2.2 or something on its debt.

So doubling of yields to 4-something and doubling of gross interest expense to $800 billion or so would certainly be an inconvenience. It would require very painful political choices, but note, it is not impossible. So I think that, yeah, the stock market's gonna run into trouble. It's, it's, it's richly valued. But I don't look for Armageddon. I look for higher rates. I look for appropriately lower price-earnings multiples. And I look for a much higher interest bill on the part of the US Treasury.

Erik Townsend: Now, one of the staple theories of macroeconomics is that supposedly, as Treasury yields go up, especially relative to what some sovereigns in other countries are offering, that attracts international capital and the currency appreciates at the same time. We're seeing this backing up in rates coincident with weakness in the US Dollar Index. Normally, that's emerging market stuff. It's not supposed to happen in developed economies. What's the explanation for that, and can it continue?

James Grant: Well, it can certainly continue. Things do. I don't know. I guess that people would perhaps be looking at real rates of interest rather than nominal ones. They would be saying, Perhaps the learned people in the bond market are saying that, let's see, over the past 50 years, the average real interest rate, average real yield on the 10-year US Treasury is on the order of what, 2-point-something or other, say 2.1% or so, I think.

Nowadays, if the rate of inflation is 2, call it, and the yield on the 10-year is what, approximately 2.9%, that's less than 1 percentage point.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

James Grant: of real yield. Now that, that's before tax. It's not exactly a king's ransom. So perhaps people are saying, yes, nominal rates have risen, they may rise some more, but it's not such a great bargain.

On the contrary, one might say, well, to be sure it's not a bargain, but look in Europe where rates are considerably lower and the creditworthiness of some of the sovereign issues is considerably more dubious. So, Erik, I do not have an explanation why the Treasury is out of favor with the world's bond speculators.

It has happened before. Perhaps they— perhaps they read Twitter. All sorts of reasons.

The case for inflation and the 1960s lesson

Erik Townsend: One of the things that your answer brought to mind, you mentioned, you know, this might be about real rates versus nominal rates. For several years now, deflation has been the backdrop, and everybody says, you know, nothing else is possible. It's almost as if people have forgotten that inflation is a real phenomenon.

Is it coming back? Is it on the horizon? Is it nearby? Or are we still likely to see continuing deflationary pressure in the economy for the next, you know, year or two?

James Grant: Well, Erik, I happen to be in the inflation camp. I'm most humbly placed there. There are powerful arguments on both sides of the question. But, you know, something to bear in mind is that nobody issues a press release at the start of an inflationary cycle. It kind of creeps in on little cat's feet.

1960s are a case in point. In the early '60s, there were like 4 consecutive years, 1961 to '62, '63, early '64. In those years, the measured rate of inflation in the CPI was, if memory serves, less than 2%. In fact, in some years, it was less than 1%. Parenthetically, nobody thought that was a problem. That seemed like a good thing.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

James Grant: But it was the high noon of Keynesian fine-tuning, and the economists thought they had the system figured out. There was a great sense of triumphalism in the councils of the president's economic advisory committees. But then lo and behold comes what? Comes the Vietnam War, comes the demographic, comes the coming of age of the baby boomers, comes all sorts of things which in retrospect appear to have been instigators of price inflation, but they were not in so regard at the time.

But what had been a period of utter quiescence in prices suddenly became a period of creeping inflation. In fact, that creeping inflation had crept in the '50s and early '60s. Some people decried even a 1 or 2% inflation rate, but by the mid-'60s, inflation was running at 3 and 4%. And we were launched on the '70s.

What relevance does this have today? Well, the relevance is that you really don't know.

So when I think about inflation, I think mostly about the risk-reward proposition in the bond market. You know, we can't really predict these great cosmic cycles. We can observe what is in front of us and how people are positioning themselves. And what I observe is a lot of muscle memory, a lot of looking backwards, a lot of—

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

James Grant: Of fitting the present-day news into the template of the Irving Fisher debt deflation model, of the fussing over the weight of encumbrance on the world's economies.

I'm in the inflation camp. I think it's coming. I have thought this for a while. People have looked all over for it as if you're looking for a lost sock or a hairpin. Okay, where did it go? Where is that thing? But I do believe that the central bankers who have been kind of begging for inflation will be surprised at the generosity of the inflation gods, what they'll ultimately be handed.

Gold as the beneficiary of monetary experimentation

Erik Townsend: Now, you are in the inflation camp, which under normal circumstances would probably make you bullish on gold. But at the same time, you've said that this dollar weakness trend could easily continue, which would normally be bearish gold. Where does that leave you? Is it time to wait for the dollar to play out, or is this a good time to be buying gold?

James Grant: Well, by way of confession and truth to podcasts, I would say I confessed I was born in 1946. That makes me what, like 37, right? Okay, I was born in 1946. And I was bullish on gold in 1945. I hope that puts my view on this into context.

Chronically, sometimes profitably, but certainly very nearly continuously Well-disposed to the legacy monetary asset. I think that so many arrows point to it in the present day. I think it is the beneficiary, will become the beneficiary, as I'm talking about gold now, gold will become the beneficiary of so many trends from the tinkering and the unprecedented experimentation of our central bankers, fiscal profligacy.

Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.

James Grant: I'm starting to sound moralistic, but I think that paper money is in a secular bear market, and that the institution of managed currencies will be seen to be a species of pretense, if not outright intellectual fraud.

I use that word advisedly. And I think come the dropping of the scales from the eyes of the money holders of the world, gold will do better against almost every currency.

Debt, monetization, Treasuries and what money is

Erik Townsend: I want to come back to something you said earlier where you described if Treasury yields were to double, that would obviously double the government's cost of debt service. And, you know, the cost of debt service was about the same as it is now 10 years ago, but there was half as much debt. So, with twice as much debt, if we go back to 10-year-ago Treasury yields, we double the cost. It surprises me, Jim. I get a lot of guests on this program who just say, oh, don't worry about it. You know, they can always print more money. The US The government borrows in its own currency, so it's not a problem.

I just don't understand that view, because it seems to me if that were to happen, sure, they could go to outright monetization, fire up the printing presses and use it to service the debt. That presumably would have an effect on markets that would be reflexive and cause people to maybe panic. So what do you think it would look like? Let's suppose that rates continue to back up and we move toward that doubling over the next few years of Treasury rates.

That presumably creates a budget crisis for the US government. What options do they have in order to respond to something like that, and how would you see it playing out?

James Grant: It's one of these problems that will confront us when it confronts us. I'm not spending much time thinking about that now. You know, I would contest a little bit, Erik, the idea that we have not been monetizing the debt. The Fed, of course, has been monetizing it. Federal securities with credit that did not exist before the Fed tapped the relevant numbers on its computer keypad.

The Fed has come to own substantial portions both of mortgage-backed securities and of Treasury securities outstanding. So, that is, by definition, that is monetization. It has turned those pieces of paper or those digital images into That brings me to another question, which is—

Erik Townsend: I've thought quite a lot about this. You know, people don't seem to question that US Treasuries are just always the safest possible investment on earth. Why they've always thought that and favored them over gold has always been a mystery to me. But frankly, it seems to me like at some point— I don't know what the point is— but you have to reach a level of debt where at some point it becomes impossible to ever repay That debt in real terms. You could always repay it in nominal terms because you can print more money. But if you get to the point where it cannot be repaid in real terms, where it becomes a guarantee when you buy a US Treasury bond that you'll never get your purchasing power back, you may get positive yield in nominal terms, but you're always gonna get a negative yield in real terms because the debt has gotten to such a level that they can't possibly service it in real Doesn't that eventually lead to some aha moment where the market says, hey, wait a minute, the whole argument against gold and in favor of Treasuries was gold doesn't return anything.

Gold doesn't lose anything either. It doesn't have a negative real yield.

James Grant: Erik, you have just described the '60s and the '70s and the early '80s. A moment ago, you observed that some people feel that Treasuries are inherently safe. I would say that there ain't no inherent in any asset class. It's all a question of price and value. If you go back to the late '60s into the '70s into the '80s, ending in about 1985, '86, what you find is the very commonly held view that treasuries are inherently unsafe. Leon Kupferman, I think, was the fellow who coined the slogan that treasuries are certificates of confiscation. That is to say, they guaranteed you a loss.

Now, this was at a time when the inflation rate was running close to double digits and treasury yields were not so So much higher than those double digits.

So everything you asked about with respect to a crisis of the future has, in fact, occurred in the past, and it was resolved— were these difficulties, they were resolved by a fellow named Paul Adolph Volcker, who, by constricting the growth in bank reserves of bonds, which ended on the 30th day of September, 1981.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

James Grant: when the Treasury 30-year bond touched intraday 15%. That was how that cycle ended. It didn't end all at once.

There were retests of those lows in prices and highs in yield, but we got through it surprisingly well. So, you know, this next cycle is not going to be identical to the last.

I don't think that there is anything like Armageddon ahead of us. I think there is a realization that the monetary regime of the past 4 or 5 decades decades is wanting both an intellectual rigor, and it will be seen it's lacking in operational success. It's not seen now. So I think that yes, there will be an aha moment. People say, can't we do better? And I think we will do better. But for now, people are mainly unquestioning about our system of currencies.

They mainly don't think to ask what money is. Bond is a promise to pay money, right? And what is money? Money. What is money? Years ago, when QE just started, there was a letter to the editor of the Financial Times, and the author of this letter said, at long last, I have now understood the meaning of the term quantitative easing. I now understand that. What I no longer understand is the meaning of the word money. And I so love that letter.

And I so have been waiting for others to raise that very question. But the question still is, is mostly tabled. It is unasked. And I think that what you are asking, Erik, is when will a proper quorum of investors ask the question, what is money? And to that question, I say, I haven't got a clue.

China's credit bubble and the dollar's reserve status

Erik Townsend: Now, this massive, massive accumulation of debt in the United States— people like you and I can say this is crazy, the rate that it's happening at. But holy cow, look at China. I mean, they're in a whole different category of rate of accumulation of national debt. It seems to me like they're trying to almost race the United States to who can get more overindebted faster.

James Grant: No, they've won. They've won. They've won. There's no contest.

Erik Townsend: What can be the outcome of this massive credit expansion?

James Grant: I'm gonna describe it not in terms of national debt, but I'm gonna describe it in terms of bank credit. So, as of the end of 2017, Chinese commercial banks showed assets of $40 trillion. That's with Atias and Tom, $40 trillion. And that works out to about 50%, a little more than 50% of total world GDP. Now, for this, there is no precedent on Earth.

More perspective, at the end of last year, US commercial banking assets were about $17 trillion. In the context of a $19 trillion US economy. That's $17 trillion in commercial bank assets in a $19 trillion economy. Let's go back to China. $40 trillion on the bank's balance sheet, and the economy, what is it, something like $13 trillion in China?

So this is a stupefying, an astonishing, literally a fantastic state of affairs. They have reinvented the sense of what's possible. I think it was 2016, maybe, the Chinese expanded banking assets by 16.5%. Now, if a single bank was expanding at that rate, you'd fear for its solvency, because you would have a proper suspicion of the credit protocols, the lending officers. How could they lend that fast, and to whom, and to what But the Chinese have been growing at such breakneck speeds, so this debt has been in the service of all manner of infrastructure and real estate, and so the asset bubbles have been equally stupendous.

In the current issue of Grant's, we have the headline is on the front page is Xi Jinping's Poisoned Chalice. This is Xi Jinping, whose name I think I am Butchering in pronunciation, is of course the new president for life. And our sense is that one-term presidencies in China are better than 2 terms, and that better than either would be emigration.

So we think that Xi Jinping is the president for life in the wrong country. So it's just amazing what is happening in China, and I think that it represents a clear and present danger to everyone with money at risk. Not just the Chinese, not just the real estate markets in favored countries that are favored by the Chinese, such as Australia, not just in the industrial metals markets. China has been 100% of the demand for the margin for steel and the like.

But this debt thing is a very, very important, low-hanging dark cloud over the world, and we've all gotten used to it. God, we have— at Grant's, we've been decrying this The Chinese lending and borrowing practices for years with no real payoff yet, but we think now is not the time to accept it as normal. It ain't normal.

Erik Townsend: Jim, nothing lasts forever. 100 years ago, if you'd asked somebody, they would have said the British pound sterling is the world's reserve currency forever because it can never change. And of course, now they say it's the dollar forever. It will never change. It can't possibly be forever. Some people think that maybe the end of the dollar's regime as world reserve currency and having hegemony over the global financial system might maybe be starting to come to an end. China, of course, with their petroyuan oil contract, seems to be trying to encourage oil trade to occur not in US dollars. We see the petrodollar system in general starting to break down as Iran has outlawed clawed US dollars for exchange of their oil. Venezuela trying to move away from the dollar. Are these things really starting to point to maybe the end is close for the US dollar?

And if so, what would the consequences and knock-on effects be that investors should be thinking about?

James Grant: Yeah, the dollar. Let us say, Erik, the dollar is the Coca-Cola of world monetary brands. And in its day, the British pound was the, I don't know, the Earl Grey of monetary brands, well entrenched. And there was no reason to suspect it would not be a perpetual favorite, the perpetual favorite.

Lo and behold, the British Empire came into its sunset years, but observe that the pound remained an important reserve currency into the 1950s, notwithstanding loss of British financial and military power. The US dollar, it was on the outs in the '70s. And I remember people, including myself, speculating that the world was tiring of this reserve currency, and that the dollar would be supplanted by something like gold. It was not supplanted.

There perhaps ought not to be a reserve currency, but we do have one. It's the dollar. And I don't look for any quick change in that fact.

European junk bonds and Mario Draghi

Erik Townsend: Jim, let's move on to junk bonds. Forgive my ignorance. Seems to me like the whole theory is junk bonds are worth less because you might not get paid back, yet European junk bond indices actually yielding less than US Treasuries at one point. And I think you recently had written something about particular issues in Europe. How is this even possible that junk bonds are being bid up in price to be supposedly safer than US Treasuries? How could that be?

James Grant: Well, I think the answer to that question takes the form of 2 words, Mario Draghi. There is a very strong bid in Europe from the European Central Bank for securities of all kinds. We at Grant's have made a major, a major financial discovery. We have discovered a junk bond in Europe, denominated in euros, of course, that has a zero handle.

You've heard of junk bonds beginning with the number 2 and 3, those seem very low-end. Indeed. But we have found one that begins with the number 0, and that is in a Telecom Italia. I think it's a 5.25 of 2022, but the yield to maturity, which is the same as the yield to worst, is like 0.8. Now that, that is not a high-yield security. It's a strong junk rating, but still it's speculative grade, and it is priced to yield less than 1%.

Now, that is the ocular evidence, that is the visual manifestation of the destruction of price discovery in Europe. That is on the European Central Bank. I think it is one of the great scandals of the present day. Now, in response, I think that Mr. Draghi would say that he had to do this because it was that or The end of the euro. But my goodness, interest rates are the most— I say, as the editor of Grant's Interest Rate Observer, interest rates are the most important prices of capitalism. And prices are better discovered than administered, certainly better discovered than repressed. And the incidence of these abnormal, aberrant, and even CNY yields in Europe is evidence of something gone very wrong indeed.

Erik Townsend: That begs a very important question in my mind, which is really what you're telling us is these yields are being repressed by a man who has a printing press and therefore is not subject to the limitations of normal mortals like you and me. Does that mean it's not time to short this stuff yet because, you know, the bid could get even stronger? I can't imagine you're European junk bonds going negative yield.

When do you think those—

James Grant: Hey, hey, wait, wait, wait, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Is now?

James Grant: Why not? One is 80 basis points away from it. A lot of corporate debt, maybe I'm— my information is not up to the minute, but a considerable segment of the corporate debt in Mario Draghi's portfolio was yielding just about nothing or less than nothing in nominal terms. So anything is possible in this regime of financial Repression, repression, or depression, whatever it is.

Erik Townsend: Does that mean the opportunity is ripe to short these things now, or does it mean that we need to wait until there is a change of policy in the ECB before it—

James Grant: Oh, this is not my topic. I write about this stuff for a living. I am— I've become quite reluctant to advise the professionals in speculation what they ought to do. It would seem as if the risk-reward proposition in front of a potential short seller of some euro-denominated securities is very favorable.

The risk to the upside in price of a speculative-grade security quoted at less than 1%, that risk would seem to be minimal. But I leave it to those who do it for a living to decide whether it's time.

The 2016 low in yields and where to look as rates rise

Erik Townsend: Jim, I want to move back to what probably is the biggest question on everybody's mind, which is the really big cycles. You know, as you said, maybe we're at the end of a 35-year bull market. bond bull market. What are the drivers of these long-term cycles? And what controls when you spend 10 years at one extreme or another before the rates start to move again? And what should we expect to see next?

James Grant: Well, Erik, on historical form, when one of these bond cycles gets started, it just keeps going. And the rhyme and reason for this is apparent mostly in retrospect. It might help to anchor one's perceptions of current-day interest rates with a little bit of historical perspective. So there is a page-turner of a book called The History of Interest Rates, and no doubt you have one by your bedside. And I called up the still-living co-author of it, Dick Sylla, who was a professor of financial history at NYU, and I said, Richard, I have read many but not every page of your magnificent narrative. Tell me, in the 5,000-year recorded history of interest rates, have there ever before been Substantially negative nominal bond yields, not Treasury bill yields, mind you, but bond yields.

And Dick thought for a second, he said, no. So, 5,000-year first.

This was as of what, July of 2016? I think there was something like $11 trillion worth of sovereign debt priced to yield less than nothing. All right, so there was a paper that came out of the Bank of England a couple of months ago, And very important, to me at least, observation, which was that as of early July 2016, the 10-year Treasury quoted as it was at, what, 1.36 or something at the low.

This was the lowest reading ever recorded on a global benchmark sovereign 10-ish yield curve. Wow. That goes back to the 1300s. So we are looking at a truly epochal low in the summer of 2016. This is not to say that it definitively will prove to be the low. I think it will be, but we are looking at coming off a low that was literally unprecedented, and perhaps that extreme will help to set expectations for what may follow.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

James Grant: And the reciprocal extreme in the previous bear market was likewise just so off the charts. I mean, 15% on a 30-year, 25-year non-call security. It was 14%, I guess, as recently as 1984. Those were such extreme yields to the upside. They, you know, you— so we can look and say, yeah, they're going to They're going to be— they are going to be followed by reciprocally ridiculous low yields to the downside. And so they were. But we have never seen the likes of what we saw in the summer of 2016.

And I think, again, one thinks, one doesn't know, but I think this will be the backdrop for a very long cycle in rates to the upside.

Erik Townsend: Jim, as you think about potentially that big trend that is moving in the other direction from than what we're used to. Where are the opportunities, or where are the places that investors and speculators should be looking? Is it at the outright trades, shorting bonds, or is it more opportune to be looking at spreads, curve flatteners and steepeners, and that sort of thing? Is it outright trades? Is it pairs trades, looking at one bond class relative to another, say junk versus Treasury, or where do you think the people should be looking in order to identify trades?

James Grant: Erik, so what do you do when rates rise? Well, there are money market instruments, the humblest of the humble. Warren Buffett seems to be a reluctant participant in the Treasury bill market to the tune of, what, $100 billion or so? You can do even better than Treasury bills if you're willing to take some credit risk. And we at Grant's have written about so-called cushion bonds, which are relatively high-yielding corporate securities trading near their call- prices, offering yields of 3.5%, 4%, 5%, and up.

The trade-off is some, we think, manageable credit risk in return for an increment of interest income. And for some people who need that extra income, we have been looking at these corporate cushion bonds. But perhaps, perhaps, Erik, another good place to look is in the alternative legacy monetary asset, gold, which is utterly in the shade owing to the popularity of Cryptocurrencies owing to the popularity of stocks and bonds.

Mining stocks are orphaned. Gold itself is very much a laggard. You'd expect that with the dollar weakening and with the world giving the stink eye to the US Treasury, that maybe, just maybe, they would be looking for a monetary substitute for the dollar. They have not yet. We think they will.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

James Grant: Will. So, you know, I'm playing what I suspect the readers of Grant's have come to see as my monetary trombone, talking once again about gold mining shares and gold. I am discouraged but determined in my bullishness. I believe that gold will carve out a place for itself in the monetary realm once people begin to question the doctrines and the competence and the judgment of our central central bankers, which I expect to happen about 15 years ago.

So, but they ought to question it, and I expect they will.

The Forgotten Depression and a policy prescription

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to ask you about what should be done as opposed to what is being done in terms of government policy. But before we get to that question, I want to touch on a book that you wrote called The Forgotten Depression regarding the Depression of 1920-21. The Fed at that point was about 7 years Newsflash, they did not conjure $4 trillion out of thin air. In fact, they did almost nothing. How did that work out?

James Grant: Well, the Depression of 1920-21 was a brutal one. Macroeconomic data were not so available then, so we can't exactly measure it as we do measure things now, but unemployment was certainly in the teens. There was a vicious liquidation of stocks and bonds. Bond prices fell. As stock prices fell, the real rate of interest on money market instruments was certainly in the teens.

What the Fed did, as you say, was approximately nothing. It indeed was a willing accomplice to this liquidation, to the deflation of those 2 or 3 years. Treasury, for its part, ran a budget surplus. The consequence of these policies was to, I think, to foreshorten the Depression rather than to extend it.

In any case, what was a very, very difficult period came to an end, unlike the Depression of the '30s, which lingered really into the Second World War.

And the conclusion of the book is I described this Depression as the final governmentally unmedicated business cycle downturn of our times. It was the last one which government did not actively intervene to suppress interest rates to do what they have now customarily done. And you know, I think the evidence is in the historical record. The Depression was tough. It was, for many people, devastating, but it ended in a timely fashion, and the recovery took the form of the proverbially roaring I wrote it to— as kind of an advertisement for the price mechanism, for which I have the highest regard.

And I'm sad to say that the price mechanism is rather on its back foot these days. But certainly, it has served us well throughout, really throughout history.

Erik Townsend: And so the effective conclusion is that the price we've paid for intervention is that, you know, it's 10 years later, And it's still not clear that we've really recovered from anything. I want to consider though, obviously, you've explained in this interview and in much more detail in the book, which I highly recommend, The Forgotten Depression.

You've explained that you think it might've been better had the Fed not gotten itself into the business of fixing the price of the world's most important commodity, which is money itself, through interest rates. I want to frame the question differently.

Considering that what has happened has happened, here we are, $4 trillion Fed balance sheet. Now that we're here and the mistakes that have been made have been made, I know you've said you don't want the job that Jay Powell has, but if you were forced into it, if you had to do it, what would you prescribe?

James Grant: What should the government be doing to get us out of the pickle that they've gotten us Well, if the stipulation is that you have to work within the system as it has come to be, which is a fair thing to propose to somebody, if you had to manage the system we have rather than to conceive and to implement a new one, how would you do it?

And what I would try to do is I would say, look, the government is no more in the business of rigging markets. We're out of that business. As of now. If the stock market wants to go down, it shall go down. We're not in the business of stimulating asset prices to goose consumption. We are no longer in the business, by the way, of propping up banks. We are going to try to give you a currency that is stable in its purchasing power, and we are not going to implement a 2% rate of rise in inflation.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

James Grant: We are believers in no inflation. So what you will hear from us from now on is less, less. We are not in the micromanagement business. We are not in, indeed, the macroeconomic management business. We are about a stable dollar. That's it.

The Big Short, Grant's and the listener offer

Erik Townsend: Jim, before we close, my favorite scene in the movie The Big Short is where they have this very elaborate, made-for-Hollywood scene. These guys are supposedly in the waiting room of a bank, and they find some somebody else's pitch book and discover the opportunity to short subprime. The end of the scene, the actor looks in the camera and says, okay, we did this for the movie, guys. If you want to know the real truth, I learned about this opportunity by reading Grant's Interest Rate Observer. And I cracked up.

James Grant: That was my favorite part of the movie too. It's amazing. What a coincidence.

Erik Townsend: I thought it was great. Needless to say, I think almost all of our listeners are already familiar For those of you who aren't familiar with the publication, it's one of the most famous publications on Wall Street. You had Jim Rogers as your first subscriber.

James Grant: He was your first podcast guest too, right?

Erik Townsend: He was my first podcast guest and your first newsletter subscriber. We share that in common. I hope Jim is listening. Jeff Gundlach has described it— of course, Jeff is the head of DoubleLine, one of the biggest bond guys in the country, in the world— has described it as the only investment research that he actually pays for. Before we move on, because we have to pay for it too, but Patrick's actually worked out an incredible deal with your office. Tell us a little bit about the publication, what it's about, for anybody who may actually not be familiar with it already.

James Grant: Grant's is a twice-monthly publication. It deals with a whole variety of things. It's quite opportunistic in its journalism, as a good hedge fund is opportunistic in seeking We look for the best and the worst. We look for the best values on the long side, and we look for the worst candidates when we're pitching a short. We are about stocks and bonds and gold and good writing. That's what we're about. And we've been doing this for not quite, but almost 35 years. And you got to read it, Erik. I appreciate that question. It's a great question to be asked, of course. And I appreciate the great question.

And I am grateful indeed for the time you have given me to talk about my favorite things, which are the financial markets.

Erik Townsend: Well, Jim, I have to tell you, Patrick Ceresna, my producer, really put a fantastic deal together with your staff. You have a policy there of not giving anybody a discount, so if Jeff Gundlach has to pay full price, listeners, unfortunately, so do you. But we actually were able to negotiate on that a little bit. Patrick got us 20 cents 26 issues for the price of 24. That's 2 extra free issues. That effectively equates to about an 8.5% or 9% discount. But the real benefit— and Jim, I can't thank you enough for throwing this in— is an autographed, personally signed by Jim, copy of the book, The Forgotten Depression, which we just discussed.

So I definitely encourage listeners to check it out. Again, in your Research Roundup email, we do have a sample issue. Issue to give you a sense of the format of the publication. It is an old one from June because we can't send you a new one out of respect for current subscribers, but that gives you a sense of it.

And at $1,295, it's dirt cheap as an institutional product. That's why almost everybody has it. For a retail investor, needless to say, it's a significant investment, but it's one of the most respected publications on the street. There's also a prorated money-back guarantee. If you don't like it, you can cancel within 30 There's a no-questions-asked money-back refund. That is, however, subject to being prorated for any issues that you actually received. They will charge you for it. And again, it is one of the most respected publications on Wall Street, the only research that Jeff Gundlach pays for. It's hard to beat that endorsement. Jim, we're going to have to leave it there in the interest of time. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Thank you, Jim.

Postgame: chartbook, US yields versus Japan and Germany

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for future guests. And please send us your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Patrick Ceresna: What a great interview with Jim. You know, he is so eloquent when he talks about the markets that it's almost hard to disagree with him. It's really just amazing how he comes across with his views on the markets. But now you told every one of our listeners about this bonus deal that, that our listeners can get, but you didn't tell them how to get it. Uh, I think we can, uh, go ahead and, uh, let them know about it.

Erik Townsend: Oh boy. Well, I make my mistakes from time to time. In your Research Roundup email, folks, there is a link to a landing page with Grant's Interest Rate Observer where you can get the MacroVoices listener discount, which again, it's 2 extra episodes if you purchase a subscription to Grant's Interest Rate Observer, which costs $1,295 a year, and you get 2 extra issues. A personally autographed and signed copy of Jim's book. So that link is in your Research Roundup email. If you didn't get the Research Roundup, if you are a registered user at MacroVoices.com, just log in and in the members area you can find the link to the landing page there as well. Meanwhile, Patrick, let's take this to the next level. Jim gave us some fantastic food for thought on a number of subjects from treasuries around the to junk bonds. Let's take those forward. I know you put a chartbook together. Again, listeners, you can find a separate link in your Research Roundup email to download our postgame chartbook called Yields Around the World, prepared by Patrick.

Patrick, talk us through it. What is in this book?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, I broke it down into a couple sections. First thing, we wanted to kind of just have a look at where US Treasury yields are relative to other countries. But then after After that, I have a second section where we wanted to talk about the yield curve in the US as well, take a look at junk bonds and all sorts of other really interesting things about the bond markets.

And so if we go to page 2 of the chartbook, the first thing I just wanted to identify to our listeners, what's happened with yields. It's showing the 2-year, the 10-year, and the 30-year yields in the US. And what we saw since basically the summer, the 2-year yields skyrocket from trading under the 1.3% level to trading to about 2.3 at its peak. So we saw about a 1% full increase in interest rates at the 2-year level. That sort of corresponded with a similar low on the 10-year around the 2% level going up to about 2.95 at its peak. And as well, the 30-year, which bottomed around 2.65, going all the way to 3.25 on the upside.

We saw a structural rise in yields right across the board. But while everyone seems to be, you know, trying to blame Donald Trump and what's going on in the US, but it's really interesting to put this into perspective where US Treasury yields are relative to the rest of the world. So when you look on page 3, what I did was I put in a table showing some of the different perspectives on where the rest of the major countries in the world are. And so what we have in the very first line is the United States, and what we have there is showing the national debt of near $21 trillion of the US, but we are comparing it to its GDP. And so when you look at the GDP of the United States, very close to $20 trillion, that's a national debt-to-GDP ratio near 105%.

And at the same time, we have the 10-year yield yielding about 2.86%. Now, what I wanted to do is just simply compare that to a country like Japan.

Japan has a national debt of $12 trillion, and at the same time has only a GDP near $5 trillion. So its national debt-to-GDP ratio is about 250%. So when we put that into perspective, their national debt-to-GDP is more than 100% higher than the US. And yet, are they being punished for that? No, they are able to manage their interest rates down down to near zero as they have yield curve controls and other things in place.

We haven't seen a situation where US is anywhere near those types of numbers.

Erik Townsend: Yeah. As I digest the whole interview with Jim Grant and look at this chart, it really brings a lot of thoughts to my mind, Patrick, because after talking to Jim, of course, we never know. There's always room that Jim could be wrong, but I think that we've seen a lot of really smart people, including Jim, say the 35-year bond bull market is probably And it's probably going to be a bear market in bonds from here.

And it really gets me thinking, Patrick, as I look at a chart like this, just about how you think internationally, think as a global investor. You're gonna wanna be short something. You know, it makes sense to expect that interest rates are going up, prices are gonna be going down, and some kind of exposure to profit from that somewhere in the world is gonna make sense.

At the same time, you've gotta think about the fact that We've had a really good run here in rates up to a very psychologically important barrier level of 3% that we're starting to pull back from. Might not be time to short US sovereign debt.

On the other hand, as I look at some of these other countries, their dynamics are different. So it makes me think, boy, you've got to think not only in terms of the timing of the US market, but also the US market's already at 2.86. If I can look at Germany at 62 basis Well, that's maybe a much more attractive sovereign treasury market to be shorting, because number one, I'm shorting from a much more opportunistic entry level. But also, when you're short, you've got to pay the service on paying the coupons. If it's only yielding 62 basis points, that carry cost is going to be less. On the other hand, from the things that Jim Grant said in this interview, it may be that Mario Draghi's policies are going to continue to support Germany's 10-year yield where it is for a longer period. So, there's so many different things to balance and compare here. When I think about what do I want to be short?

Is it sovereigns? Is it junk? Is it US? Is it Germany? Is it Japan? Well, Japan's only 5 basis points, but then on the other hand, Japan's got a very long history of maintaining that, and it looks like their policies will continue to maintain it for a while. So where are the opportunities when you think globally? It's a really big, complicated problem.

Italy, ECB tapering and where to short sovereigns

Patrick Ceresna: Well, just to reference your perspective on Germany, I mean, take it one step farther, take Italy. And I put Italy on this table over here and you can see that its national debt is about $2.5 trillion and its GDP is about $1.8 trillion, which basically makes its national debt-to-GDP ratio about 136%, which is 30% higher than what it is in the US on a relative scale.

And yet the 10-year yield in Italy is 1.9%, which is literally 1% lower than where the United States is. Now, of course, why is that happening? Mario Draghi, right? But what was just announced today, the ECB is phasing out QE at $10 billion a month. And by the end of 2018, it's going to have unwound and tapered off all of its QE.

I mean, can we see the yields stay this low without the support of the ECB's buying? To me, I think there are bonds out in the world that are far more attractive to short than to be focusing on US Treasuries.

Erik Townsend: Oh, I couldn't agree more. And the thing that's so complex to try to figure out, fixed income in general is presenting some shorting opportunities somewhere. Is it in the junk? We'll get to that a few slides further in. But as I just look at the sovereign opportunities, you've got to understand the politics and the economic cycles globally, not just focused on the US. And I look at something like what you're showing me here in Italy or Germany, and I just think, yeah, it's a different game over there. And at the same time, I also think, you know, we're probably very, very long in the tooth in this economic cycle. There's got to be some kind of recession coming. And as that comes, is the flight to safety trade going to be into local sovereigns? Is it going to be into US Treasuries or someplace else? Because Boy, the place that you could really make a killing is if you can figure out where there is some immunity.

In other words, something that you can short as a sovereign credit, which is not going to be the target of a safety trade when there's a recession. In other words, the money that's coming out of equities in that country is not going into its own sovereign debt market, but it's going someplace else, and that means that that risk gets taken out of the short seller's equation. I think in the US market in particular, As tempting as it is to be short Treasuries with the trend that we're seeing, boy, if there's a recession globally, you know there's going to be a huge capital flow into US Treasuries as a safety trade, and that's going to hurt you. I think it's probably someplace else.

Yield curve flattening: 2s-5s, 2s-10s and 10s-30s

Patrick Ceresna: Well, absolutely. That really comes to the question is, look, we're in the late business cycle. It is pretty much consensus on the street that over the next, let's say, 2 or 3 years, that a recession will eventually Eventually rear itself. I mean, some people try to make the argument that it's coming sooner. You know, we may have our opinions on that, but there's no denying that at some point the business cycle will turn. And traditionally, that actually creates some form of deflationary pressures coming in on the other side as the economy contracts, right?

And that's where I think the next chart on page 4 is really interesting. We have, uh, on page 4, I showed the actual US yield curve with the 30-day shadow. And what was very interesting to observe is that while we had this big bond sell-off over the last half year, what's interesting is when you look at the yield curve, we didn't have any steepeners. This looks like it's sort of like the tide rose and the whole yield curve just shifted up, but it didn't steepen.

And to me, that's an interesting observation because again, one of the signposts that so many of these analysts are looking for, for for us to get a clue that a recession is going to rear its head is the inversion of this curve. And I think that that's where we can segue into the next few charts where we actually talk about where the yield curve is flattening and how far those spreads are for the flattener to actually occur.

Erik Townsend: So as we move on to slide 5 here, for anyone who's not familiar with the terminology, the 2s-5s curve means the difference between the yield on the 2-year Treasury and the 5-year Treasury. And it's usually written this way, 2s-5s. Bessent pronounced 2s, 5s. Tell us what the chart means, Patrick.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, what it means? Well, I'd love to know now. All right. One thing that we'd really just want to point out, I mean, let's be observers of this. What we can identify is that we just haven't had a steepening. We're still at the 40 basis point spread level, not much different than where we were over the last year. Like we suggested earlier, bonds having sold off and interest rates having risen, but it hasn't led to steepening. And what's interesting is the 2s and 5s are where traditionally inversion occurs because 2s reflect the interest rate impact of central bank policy. The 2s and 5s tend to be where people are looking for the impact of the Fed to really show. And because the 5s start to have more inflationary influences while the 2s are much more driven by central bank policy. And so, you know, in this Imagine we just get 2 more rate hikes from Powell, and wouldn't it be interesting for us to observe and come back to this chart to see when we get a few more rate hikes whether this continues to actually show inversion?

Erik Townsend: Well, and I think also we should point out this is a very clear, from a technical analysis standpoint, descending triangle type of scenario, meaning that you could draw a baseline there at about, it looks like, what is it, 32 basis points or so, just barely positive. And we're not too far from that now. And then there's that very visibly clear descending line. That means typically that we are very close to the resolution of this descending triangle, and it's going to break in one direction or the other, probably significantly. And if that's to the downside, it really could mean that we are very close to the beginning of a recession cycle. If it is to break to the downside and accelerate to the downside, and we get into an inversion here, that definitely would be a recession signal.

Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, when we look at the next 2 pages, on pages 6 and 7, I have the 2s and 10s as well as the 10s and 30s. And very similar, we haven't seen any steepening. We got about a 60 basis point spread between the 2s and 10s. And what's amazing is that the spread between the 10s and 30s is still well under 30 basis points, about 25 basis points. So there just is no sign of a steepening of this curve. at all. Wouldn't it be interesting if, as the Fed starts raising rates here, again, as Powell puts in another rate hike, whether or not this continues to flatten? It would be very interesting nonetheless.

Erik Townsend: And as I look at the 2s-10s, this time it's not a descending triangle, but it sure looks like a wedge pattern here. And if I look at the 10s-30s, it's not as clear, but again, it looks like this could be a pretty bearish chart. And we don't have a lot of room to go before we get into inversion

Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely.

Credit spreads and short junk bonds

Patrick Ceresna: What I want to do is move on now to charts 8 and 9. I want to go away from Treasuries and move now to the corporates and to the junk bonds. On page 8, we're looking at the spread of investment-grade corporate bonds over Treasury. And what we can see is we still are hovering pretty much right near 10-year lows in terms of a spread of about just over 1%.

And so even though corporate bonds have sold off, they've really only sold off to maintain their spread over Treasury.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I would argue that it's exactly what you said, but in a certain respect, it's even more pronounced than what you're describing. Because if you go back a couple of years, say, and you look at the Treasuries were at only 1.3%, and if you had a spread of 1.3%, well, what that meant is that effectively your corporate bonds are yielding twice what the Treasuries are. That's a pretty big difference, even though it's only 1-point-something percent. Now, at 1.05% here, as we're getting to 3%, it's only 1/3 more. So instead of 100% increase in yield by going from sovereign to corporate, you're getting only about a 35% increase in yield going from sovereign to corporate. That's a big difference.

Patrick Ceresna: And it's worthy for our listeners that don't have the chart in front of them just to reflect back at what kind of a spread there was on these during the 2008 crisis. At one point, they were trading at a 6.5% spread over Treasury. And so, you know, when we end up turning the business cycle and we end up seeing some form of a recession, there has to be some sort of a yield pickup on these corporates because there's just more

Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more.

Patrick Ceresna: Now, if we go to page 9 where we have the junk bonds though, this is also fascinating to me. Now, when we later on show the actual charts of junk bonds, which are already rolled over, it's still amazing to me that we are once again trading right near 10-year lows on the spread between high-yield junk bonds and Treasury, about 3.5%.

I mean, just reflecting on what happened during the oil crisis, right? When oil was doing this big massive nosedive And many of these energy companies were at risk of default. These junk bonds skyrocketed to trading an 8%, 9% premium over that of Treasury. And yet we are sitting here at 3.5%, like the junk bond market's not worried about anything.

Erik Townsend: Well, this chart really speaks to me, Patrick, because something that you'll hear and see a lot in the financial press lately is, hey, high yield junk bonds are starting to sell off, baby. They're losing it. Well, if you look at it in terms of the spread over Treasuries, what this chart is showing us is that really, junk bonds haven't even started to sell off on their own. All that's happened is junk bond prices are coming down because Treasury prices are coming down. That's not an indication that there's an increased concern about creditworthiness of the junk rating. It's just an adjustment because the underlying Treasury rate— The price of the Treasuries is coming down as their yield increases. So this says to me, we haven't even seen the beginning of where suddenly we reprice that junk rating really is a junk rating, and there's a chance of not getting paid back, and that paper's not worth as much as a lot of people have paid for it.

So it just— I'm short junk bonds right now, in the interest of full disclosure. To me, it reinforces that—

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: not too late for that trade.

Bond ETFs and junk liquidity risk

Patrick Ceresna: So what I wanted to spend the last few minutes of our session here talking about is how do average retail investors access these bond markets? Because a lot of bonds are OTC and harder to access. So I wanted to go through all of the different ETFs of how you can approach these bonds. And so starting on page 11, I started off by just showing a quick chart of the IEF, which is the iShares 7 to 10 Year Treasury bond ETF, and on page 12, the TLT, which is the iShares 20+ Year Treasury ETF. And we can see the selling that has been all over the media, right? As we've seen Treasury bonds selling, that's been what everybody's been highlighting along the way. But again, the question that you asked earlier, and which I continue to ask, is the Treasury bonds where the short opportunity really is?

I would argue while, you know, you could be very bearish bonds, there are so many more interesting places in the bond markets to be short.

Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and move on to that. What's the next slide telling us?

Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely. On page 13, I have the ETF LQD, which is the iShares Investment Grade Corporates. And what we can identify here is exactly like we alluded to earlier, is that all these junk bonds that even though it's a downtrend and it dropped from $122 to 116. While we've seen this drop, that has only been a drop in reaction to the drop in Treasuries, right? We have not yet seen those yields picking up. And so even though it looks like this has started to sell on a relative basis, we're not nowhere near beginning to sell off in a greater way in these investment-grade bonds.

But the real interesting chart is on page 14 where we get to the high-yield corporate bonds. And I absolutely am fascinated by this chart. Like you're suggesting there, you're short. Actually, in full disclosure, I'm short as well. And what's really interesting about this chart is that if you go back, any, uh, analyst will tell you is that there's a very strong correlation between high-yield corporates and the stock market. There's sometimes a correlation as much as 80%.

And really, the most interesting thing about this chart is that 2007 can be defined by nothing more than a sideways topping formation in high-yield corporate bonds while the stock market was roaring higher in this amazing bull market. And there's this beautiful divergence occurring, which is demonstrating that now the high-yield bonds have really reached as high as they can go relative to Treasuries. And so now that spread between Treasuries is now dragging corporates rather than them trading in line with the stock market.

Erik Townsend: And as we look at the chart on page 14 here, it's tempting to think, boy, I wish I had sold it at 88, but now I've already missed the first part of the move. Maybe I'm too late to the trade. As you've said, everything that brought us down from 88 to 85 and change was just the action in Treasuries. The real repricing of that junk rating hasn't even It hasn't even started.

Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely. What's interesting as well about junk bonds is on page 15, I actually did a little flashback because it was during 2015 where Carl Icahn and company were parading around Wall Street, kind of this idea of discussing how illiquid the junk bond market really was. And he's absolutely right. And what's interesting is that this headline from Barron's was from back in 2015.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Patrick Ceresna: Was really demonstrating that very problem. It was— the headline is Third Avenue locks up the junk fund assets for up to a year, citing thin bond liquidity. And what's really interesting is, is that we now today have a very large participation in junk bonds through these ETFs, through this trend of passive investing.

And most people today are buying these junk bonds and moving out the risk spectrum is seeking the yield enhancement. But what will be very interesting to see is that when things start getting risky and when the economy starts to show signs of turning toward a recession and these junk bonds start to lose money, what happens when all these passive ETF investors start trying to sell? I'm very curious as to what will play out there.

Erik Townsend: Well, and of course, if you are an investor and you're concerned about that, where you want to be is on the other side the trade. If you are short, and that means that to cover your short, eventually you have to buy, exactly what you want to see is some kind of lockup that creates a distressed situation that artificially depresses the price of those ETFs as everybody is trying to sell them and get out at once, so that you have the opportunity to cover your short on a low.

But as I think about this whole thing, Patrick, I think that the mistake that you could easily make if you're not careful is being Too US chauvinistic, thinking too much about the US. Because it's true that I think junk bonds, and I'm already short them, as I said, that's an opportune trade, but it's not as opportune as shorting some of the credit around the world that is yielding even less and is maybe even lower quality, like the European junk that Jim Grant was talking about. It just blows my mind that there's this telecom company with a zero handle on a junk bond.

Patrick Ceresna: That's crazy.

Erik Townsend: It's crazy.

EMB, IHY and the timing of a global bond bear market

Patrick Ceresna: It is crazy. And so that's what brings us to 2 of the last 3 slides, 16 and 17, where we talk about the EMB. And the EMB is the Emerging Market Bonds ETF from JP Morgan and iShares. And essentially, this EMB is an ETF that you can approach sovereign emerging market debt. And so you're getting exposure to everything from Brazil, Russia, and all of the— what the market defines as emerging markets. sovereign debt. And it's interesting because it also looks like through 2017, it went through an extensive topping formation and it's only beginning to break down. And what's interesting is, is this going to be a global bond bear market or is this going to be just a US bond bear market? Because if it's a global bond bear market, you'd have to imagine that emerging markets are gonna have a big swing in this.

Erik Townsend: Well, and it also sets up all kinds of questions and feedback loops around the timing. Let's assume that although it may not be just a US bond bear market, the timing of when the bond bear move starts in the US and when it starts in other parts of the world will be different because of different policy, whether you've got the Fed versus ECB or various other factors that are affecting this. And it potentially means that that sets up knock-on effects. In other words, if what's happening is because the bond bear market is occurring first in the US Or first in some other country. Well then, which country is going to be most opportune for the flight-to-safety trade? Maybe people are not favoring US Treasuries if they're already selling off and they're looking for something that's not selling off. And suddenly German bunds go the other way because now it's not Mario Draghi buying them, but it's people that would normally be moving into US Treasuries that don't want to move into US Treasuries because they're selling off too quickly.

I made that up off the top of my head. I haven't thought it through, so don't hold me to the specifics of the example I just cited. My point is more a matter of principle that there are all kinds of things that could happen as the timing in different geographies creates these knock-on effects that changes investors' behavior.

Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely. In spirit of the Jim Grant interview and him touching on these European junk bonds, I wanted to highlight the ETF, which is IHY, which is the International High Yield Corporate Bonds. While it is an international high-yield junk bond ETF. It does have a 40% weighting to the European countries, including the UK. And so you have German, Italian, Spanish junk bonds all inside this, but it is a global international high-yield corporate bond ETF. But it— what's particularly interesting when you look at this chart is it hasn't even begun to sell off. I mean, it is still trading at the same levels it's at its peaks through 2017. And so even though we have this big bond sell-off going across the world, we're not seeing the responsiveness yet from international high yield.

Erik Townsend: Well, and as Jim Grant said, we've got to be careful there because maybe it's changing now, but until now at least, Mario Draghi has been there to buy. And I think the reason that you haven't seen it selling off more than it already has is Mario was there to say, save the day. You got to decide first whether that's changing before you can decide how opportunistic a short is potentially on IHY.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, I think Mario has slowly already announced, uh, the tapering process. So I mean, the question becomes, how fast will traders front-run the tapering, right? Nonetheless, I wanted to move on finally to the last chart, which is I wanted to just show the

HYG versus Treasuries and negative carry

Patrick Ceresna: relative performance of the Treasury bonds. I did the 7 to 10-year ETF and I compared the performance to the corporate bonds using the LQD and junk bonds using the HYG. And isn't it amazing when you look at this chart that, for instance, on a 2-year performance basis, the junk bonds are up 6.5% while corporate bonds are near 0%?

And yet Treasuries are down close to 6.5%. And so when we're looking and we're seeing this very heavy selling coming in Treasury, it's very interesting to see that we have not really seen that response very broadly amongst the bond market yet.

Erik Townsend: Yeah. And it sets up, it's clearly the question here. You've got to decide, does that mean that something like HYG, the blue line here is an incredibly ripe short because it's due to follow and converge back down to where Treasuries are? Or is it the case that there are factors in the market that are going to stay in the market that are causing it to stay up there, and it's not such a ripe short? So you've really got to figure out what's been driving that difference in order to decide how opportune it is. But my feeling is sooner or later, the blue line and the orange are going to take a turn to the downside.

Patrick Ceresna: If I was to offer my speculation on that, I think what's holding up the junk bond market is the stock market and its correlation to that. And so once we see the cracks in the armor of the stock market, I think it will start translating to the junk bond markets afterwards.

Erik Townsend: And that also brings up though, the corollary to that is if we are right, you and I both think that we don't know the outcome of this current event in equity markets, but we're leaning towards a retest of the the lows, then a recovery. That recovery, you wouldn't want to wait for the low in the stock market and short your junk bonds then. You'd be better off to wait until you think the stock market has topped out again.

Patrick Ceresna: This is definitely not a short-term trade. You're trading this through the turn of the business cycle. You have to have a little bit of a longer time horizon. That really begs the question, and me and you talk about it all the time, as to whether It's right to pair this trade and whether it should be a long-short combination. But one of the hardest parts is to kind of pair a trade and have the negative carry because we're shorting the higher yielding instrument. And if we're early and even a year or more early, the question is how much does it damper your performance to have that negative carry?

Sign-off and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, we could probably go back and forth for another hour with hypothetical questions for things to consider. But hopefully what we've already shared with our listeners is some good food Food for thought.

We're gonna need to leave it there, folks, but before we go, we sure do appreciate and need your continued help promoting the show because the more registered users we have at MacroVoices.com, the more able Patrick is to negotiate to get the very best feature interview guests on the program. So please, if you haven't already, go to MacroVoices.com, register your free account. It's completely free. We're not gonna sell you anything, spam you with anything. You will get as a benefit our free Research Roundup email every week, which never contains any advertising It's just a compendium of download links to all the coolest stuff that we can find on the internet, starting with the content that our own featured guests provide, and then also including all sorts of other interesting content that our volunteer research team has uncovered on the net each week. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, first off, you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Jim, which I think is a great piece for everyone to go back and read to catch some of the really neat things Jim was saying. There's also that link to the MacroVoices special offer for the Grant's Interest Rate Observer. You'll also find the link to the chartbook that me and you just discussed here in the postgame discussing bonds. There's also some interesting other bond articles I wanted to highlight. One article from Kevin Muir, the Macro Tourist, titled That's Not a Bond Bear Market, as well as an interesting article from the Heisenberg titled The High-Yield ETF Shell Game Is on Full Display. You'll find this and so much more in this week's research So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners and are always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better.

For those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

Erik Townsend: Thank you.

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