Chris Cook — Former energy markets regulator (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Episode preview
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 125 was recorded on July 5th, 2018. I'm Erik Townsend. Former energy markets regulator Chris Cook is on deck as this week's feature interview guest. Chris is an expert on how cheaters cheat and manipulators manipulate, and he'll have plenty to say about how energy markets are being manipulated in multiple timeframes. We'll also discuss the current dislocation in the term structure of the WTI crude oil market. MacroVoices Live in Toronto has already sold out even faster than we anticipated, and we've been inundated with requests to make some sort of virtual pass or remote access available to listeners who could not travel to Toronto. We'll have an update after the market wrap, just before the feature interview with Chris Cook, on that subject. Be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview when Hedgeye's Josh Steiner, one of the speakers at MacroVoices Live, will be joining us for a quick update on the real estate market.
We'll also have more extended crude oil coverage in the postgame segment.
S&P 500: consolidation range and buying the dip
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, the S&P 500 had a little bit of volatility on the Fed minutes. We're just a couple hours after that Fed minute release. The market initially weakened a little bit, but we're now trading up around the 2736 as we record. What's your thinking here on the S&P 500?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, the way that I read this chart is that we kind of topped out, not in the market overall, but just in this bounce that we've seen. We topped out back in the middle of June and started selling off. Very nice rounded topping pattern. Then things started to accelerate on June 19th, but then bounced back. Then they really started to accelerate and move down substantially on June 25th.
And frankly, Patrick, since the 25th of June, I read this chart as a consolidation pattern that we've been locked into since that date. 2,700 is the bottom of But tops have been right about where that sell-off started on June 25th, which is right around $2,747 on the E-mini futures contract. So that's the range, $2,700 to $2,747. Which way do we break out of that consolidation?
Frankly, I don't have a strong opinion because I think it's going to depend on news flow. I would say, though, that probably so far every test of $2,700 has been the buy-the-dip opportunity. I know that you've been looking at this with your subscribers at Big Picture Trading, so I'd like to get I'd love to get your perspective on whether or not you're looking— if, say, there's another dip back down to $2,700 or even $2,695, would you consider that an opportune place to buy the dip? I'm guessing you would. But as far as where this market really goes in terms of the next big move, I think that trade war escalation or de-escalation is probably the biggest driver. There's so many other political things— situation in Italy, a lot of geopolitics, a lot of things going on here. So I think we're in this $2,700 to $2,747 consolidation zone. Okay. I think we're in a consolidation range until proven otherwise, and we'll see what happens after that.
What's your take though if we get a 2,700 test? Are you buying it?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, actually, I've already been buying 2,700 the last time we were there. You know, overall, a lot of the news flow that we're seeing, while it's certainly a little bit scary on the surface, especially on the emerging market side, what's happening in China and other areas like that, but really this market correction has played out pretty much technically the way it traditionally should have. I mean, so far I don't see any reason why my alarm Alarm bells should be ringing. Of course, I reserve the right to change my mind if the unfolding reality changes a bit. But right now, buying the dip with hedges is, is the approach we're taking here. I still think that there's room for that summer rally to still play out, especially if we get a buying surge after earnings driven by share buybacks that could, you know, push us into some highs toward August. But I still am bigger picture bearish. I still think this is a big topping formation. I just don't think it's all rolling over right now, right here.
But you know what, why don't we put the chartbook together for next week's show, and we can kind of talk about some of these scenarios next week.
Erik Townsend: Sounds good to me.
US Dollar Index at 95
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, so let's move on to that US Dollar Index, because the dollar, it was teasing for weeks now about this 95 breakout as to whether it was going to break out of these— this 1-year range and break to the upside. And every time the dollar has seemed to reject, and it's a lot being driven by the euro kind of finding a short-term support.
Do you think that the dollar here has got room to consolidate more, or Or what's your thinking here?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I may be coming around to the point where what I've been saying for the last few weeks is, hey, it looks to me like a healthy rally is intact. And the fact that we're getting a little bit of hesitation at $95, which is both a round number and also if you look at the chart, it's a logical resistance level. The fact that you get a little hesitation going through what is logically a resistance level, they're called resistance levels for a reason, Patrick. So it really came as no surprise. I'd say that we're getting to the point now where it's been long enough where Hmm, okay, we're not just taking an itsy-bitsy little pause at 95. We're really kind of struggling to stay up, and it looks like suddenly there's more magnetism, if you will, on the 94 handle pulling it down than there is pulling it up.
I don't think it's over yet. I think there's plenty of room for the rally to continue and to break to new highs, but I would say that I may be a little bit more persuaded as I look at the chart now that, okay, maybe this could be a topping pattern and maybe it is starting to roll over.
So it may Admittedly, that's starting to appear. I don't think you can really make the call on fundamentals because there's good arguments on both sides. I think that it's about timeframes. I'm absolutely convinced— I will make a call on fundamentals despite what I just said. It's up for sure in the very short term, which means it might already be over, and it's down in the very long term, which means it might not have started yet and might not start for a whole other year.
Okay, what about in between? The short term and the long term? I'm not sure. I don't know. I think there's plenty of room for this to go in either direction. And I'll comment on that too. We've gotten a couple of emails on equities mostly, people saying, hey, you know, your market wraps are not very definitive. You're couching everything with I don't knows and I'm not sures. You know, what's wrong with you? Listen, folks, this is not CNBC or Bloomberg. We don't have pretty girls who are hired to confidently and authoritatively say things that they have no clue about.
If I don't know, I'm gonna tell you that I don't know. And in this case, if you look at equities, you know, I'm not sure if there's another wave higher here. I agree with you, Patrick, that we're in some kind of topping pattern. How it plays out exactly, I'm not sure. It's not game on to the downside yet. And whether or not there's more room to the upside, I don't know. In the case of the dollar, I'm sure that it was a short-term story about dollar up and a long-term story about dollar down. Is the short-term story already over? I doubt it, but it could be. And that's about as much as I've got.
Patrick Ceresna: All right.
Crude oil: time-spread dislocation and EIA inventories
Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's move on to crude oil then, because before we get to inventory numbers, what a move. What's your high-level picture here of what's going on with this dislocation in the time spreads? I was looking at a chart and we're just seeing that curve blowing out. What are we looking at here, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, I want to save some of this for Chris Cook because he's got some excellent views. And frankly, we're not going to be able to fit all of it into the market wrap here. We're going to have to go to our postgame segment for some extended coverage. But let's Let's just start with the basics. I think there's an optical illusion in this market. It appears that WTI has moved back up to $74, briefly over $75. Now, of course, we're back below $73 late on Thursday afternoon. That was a reaction to inventory and then The Wall Street Journal doing a story saying that they think that the IPO from Saudi Aramco is definitely not happening. Before that, though, it looked like, OK, $74, $75 on WTI. We're back up to highs. Right. That's an optical illusion. The way I want you to think about it is WTI moved back up from $64 or wherever it bottomed. It only moved up to about $68.
And then on top of that, there's about a $6 surcharge if you want to take delivery of oil in the next 2 months.
If you want to buy, as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon, the December contract, if you can wait until December to take delivery of your oil, you can get that for less than $68 a barrel, even though the front month is trading at $73. Well, what's going on there? We're going to get into a whole lot of discussion about exactly what's going on and what it means and what its implications are. That's going to take more time than we have in the market wrap, so we're going to save that explanation of the time spreads for our postgame segment after the feature interview.
Before we wrap up here, though, What I will say, if you want an unqualified call from me, it is that this story that people are telling about how Syncrude going offline with 360,000 barrels per day is responsible for this big dislocation in the market, that is baloney. The people who are saying that have no friggin clue what they're talking about. We'll get as close as we can to making progress on it, but I'll warn you, we're not going to get to the bottom of it because I haven't figured it out yet.
I can tell you that there's more to this picture than meets the eye, and it's definitely more than the trade press is talking about. We'll save the rest for Chris Cook and then the postgame segment after the feature interview.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay. Well, let's take a look at those inventory numbers. How did they all come in this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, it was a real surprise on crude oil national inventory because there was expectations among analysts of a drawdown. API reported a drawdown on Tuesday, and there was a huge drawdown last week. So everybody was expecting a drawdown. Then we got a build of 1.2 million barrels. That sent the market straight down because it was very much unexpected.
Cushing, Oklahoma, though, still drawing down 2.1 million barrels. In my opinion, the drawdown in Cushing is more important and more relevant to what's going on in this market than the national draw number. Normally that's not true, but this week I think it is, and we'll explain why in the postgame segment. Gasoline drawing down 1.5 million barrels, distillates building 134,000 barrels. My take in general is that this big move up in WTI Everybody thinks it's about Iran news or it's about Saudi Arabia or it's about whatever. It's mostly about some bizarre physical market dislocation that nobody understands. It's bigger than Syncrude and Venezuela, which is where a lot of analysts are ascribing the cause of this. That just doesn't make sense. We'll go in our postgame segment into detail on why it doesn't make sense.
For now, though, I'll say my final comment on today's market. The sell-off Thursday afternoon that looks like it was driven by inventory, the unexpected build, is probably more about this Saudi Arabia story out of the Wall Street Journal saying that the Saudi Aramco is probably on hold, if not scrubbed, indefinitely to forever. And I think that has helped to move the prices down. I don't know if that will last. What is going to be very important is what's going on with the term structure. Why are the time spreads blowing out? We'll come back to that subject in the postgame segment.
Gold: waiting on the dollar
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to gold because there seems to have been some sort of short-term low that happened a few days ago. I mean, we hit that key $1,240 level and are reversing here. Do you think that that's it for gold here?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as you say, we went down to $1,240, nice 2-day bounce, but then that bounce is starting to falter a little bit in the last couple of days. So I think the real question you have to ask yourself about gold is really about the dollar. If you think that the dollar is done here, if you think this is a topping pattern and we're about to see a big reversal to the downside on the dollar. Well, you just missed your opportunity to buy $1,240. You better buy $1,257 or whatever we're at right now while you still can. Because if the dollar actually started to crash, I think it's all upside for gold from here.
The thing is, we don't know that. And frankly, calling bottoms and tops in markets is usually tricky business, and you're better off to wait till the trend is established. I am not at all persuaded that the uptrend is over in the dollar, and I don't think that the weakness in gold is over until we know for sure that the uptrend in the dollar is over. So I'm waiting this one out.
Patrick Ceresna: All right.
10-year Treasury yield consolidation
Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's finally look at the 10-year Treasury yields, which are still hovering on the bottom end of the range at around this 2.84 level. And but what's interesting to me is, is it just is very, very weak. The yields don't seem to have any response to the upside. What's your thinking here on where interest rates are heading?
Erik Townsend: Well, as you say, we're back down to at least the narrow range. We're back to the, the bottom end of it. I'm looking at 2.83 as we're speaking. Thursday afternoon on the 10-year. You know, the strong opinion that I have is that we are in the consolidation, not just a consolidation, but the big consolidation before we find out what the big move is. Is this going to be the big move that so many people have anticipated, that we're going to break past that critical resistance at 3.05 on the 10-year yield, and it's all going to be downhill for prices and uphill for yields from there, as so many people have predicted? Or is this that moment where Lacy Hunt is about to be proven right and we're actually headed towards much lower Treasury yields, surprising most people? I don't know which one it is, Patrick. I don't think anybody does. But I feel like we're in the big, wide consolidation, and I think it's probably going to last for a bit longer.
When we break decisively below 2.60 or above 3.10, that's what says to me we're really into game on and the next big move is upon us. Until then, I think it's a consolidation range. Right now, if you're a shorter-term swing trader, you know, we're at the bottom of the short-term range right here. It's probably an opportunity to be selling bonds, which is effectively going long the yield, short the price, till we get another move up to the 2-spot 90s, approaching 3% again. I don't trade this market that way. I'm not a swing trader in, in most markets, and especially not this one. I'm watching to see where the next big move is, and I won't be surprised if it's a while before that actually plays out.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
MacroVoices Live Toronto sold out; video for donors
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Now, before we move on to our featured interview, MacroVoices Live in Toronto on August 10th is sold out. All I have to say is, wow. We both had a pretty good feeling we were going to sell out, but selling out in the 2 weeks before the early bird is even closed was really surprising to me. Nonetheless, Erik, why don't you tell our listeners a quick update on what we're working on?
Erik Townsend: Well, as you say, Patrick, we sold out completely in what, 2 weeks after announcing this thing? Even I didn't expect it to go that quickly. And we did warn you folks. that we thought it was gonna sell out. So don't blame us if you missed your ticket. It's funny, a lot of people are trolling us on Twitter saying, oh, you guys screwed up, you underpriced it, you should have gotten a bigger venue. No, we didn't. We did exactly what we intended to do for a reason.
This is our first live event. We decided that we would much rather not worry about making a profit. We wanted to do a good job. So we designed it to be small and intimate enough that we would have time to get to meet our listeners personally, find out what you think about the the show, give you the opportunity to meet us and meet the speakers personally. We've designed the event that way with a meet and greet afterwards, so there's plenty of time for us to get to meet the attendees and for them to get an opportunity to meet all of the speakers. And all we set out to do was to break even, and we're going to do that, so it's fine. We're not trying to make a killer profit. What we're trying to do is have a really fabulous, amazing event for our first live experience with our listeners, and I couldn't be happier about how this is coming together.
I think the venue, the speakers, everything Everything about it is just great.
What's happening, though, is we are being inundated with something that we probably should have anticipated better, which is requests to either livestream this event so that you could participate in it from afar, or do some kind of virtual pass where you get videos after the fact so that you can watch all of the presentations on video if you were unable to travel to Toronto to attend the event in person.
Frankly, we didn't really think about that when we first planned this. It's a good idea. Livestreaming is completely, totally out That's out of the question. We do not have the resources to try to organize something like that at this late stage.
We don't have a budget to produce a video version of this either, so what we're gonna do is this. We're gonna commit to at least making some kind of video of this event. We're going to send the videos first and foremost to anyone who has donated at least $50 in 2018 to MacroVoices. So if you're a MacroVoices donor, you've already made your $100 donation, don't worry, If you've already donated, you're covered. You're gonna get an email that provides you with information on how to get the videos.
If you haven't, make your donations early, folks, because frankly, we don't have a budget yet to produce videos. Whether this is a quick and dirty, somebody sits in the audience with a camcorder and we get something for those of you who couldn't make it, versus something that's really professionally edited and looks good and we, you know, use professional sound and video equipment, it's gonna depend on how many donations we get and what kind of budget we can put together for doing something like that.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: So we'll see how we do in donations. We will make some video form of this available to people who donate at least $50. Don't be afraid to donate more than $50 if you want to. That will certainly help us to do a better job with producing whatever it is that we produce.
At some point, we may use those videos for something else, so it won't be exclusively for that audience. We may give them away for free someday, I don't know, but the first use of them will be for the donors who are making them possible. We can't include you in the meet and greet and the opportunity to hang out with the speakers and all that, but we'll do the best we can based on the donations we receive to put some kind of video product together for those of you who could not attend in person. It's a formative process. We don't really have a plan yet. We'll let you know in future shows how it's coming together.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks, Erik. Now, this week's featured interview guest is Chris Cook, former director of the International Petroleum Exchange and now a senior research fellow at the Institute for Strategy, Resilience, and Security at the University Erik's interview with Chris Cook is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Chris Cook's regulatory background: micro and macro manipulation
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Chris Cook, former director of the International Petroleum Exchange and now a senior research fellow at the Institute for Strategy, Resilience, and Security at University College London, as well as an independent energy consultant. Chris, the reason that I've been keen to get you on the show is that you come from a very different perspective than most of our guests who approach the finance industry from a background of knowledge of economics. As a former regulator, you are an expert on how cheaters cheat and how manipulators manipulate. And with that background and a particular focus on those kinds of things going on in energy markets, you're able to draw from that experience as regulator of one of the biggest energy markets in the world when you were with IPE.
So I'd like to dive into the current situation in WTI as well as the much bigger picture of what's going on with oil markets. But before we do, since your background is so interesting, please give us a little bit of color on what you learned about markets from your experience as a regulator and how that experience colors the way that you think about markets today.
Chris Cook: Thanks very much, Erik. Yeah, my experience at IPE was based on a futures market. Market, which had 2 principal contracts. One was cash settled, the Brent contract, but based on the North Sea physical market. And the other, which was, in my view, much more interesting, was the gasoil contract, which was deliverable into Northwest Europe.
And I found that there were essentially 2 types of market games I was looking out for, if you like. One was what I call micro, short-term, which was on the trading floor, which in those days was a floor before the electronic trading came along. We got high-frequency trading and things like that. And I found that there were a couple of many, many things that went on, all sorts of things like front-running and manipulation of the market on the close and all the trading games that go on spoofing the market. And I think of that as micro, but short-term.
But then when you get into the physical market and the games that the big players play in the physical market, which of course I got exposure to with the gas oil contract, then I realized that again, you get very interesting games and some of them are short-term and some are medium-term. And some are long-term. You would get squeezes, which could be relatively short-term.
You would get— I found very big plays. I remember Metallgesellschaft and what was going— what went on with that. That was a very, very big international play that was going on.
When I talk about the really macro picture, then we are looking into what we're going to be talking about today, which is, well, sometimes manipulation of markets can go on not just for months, but years, as long as 30 years in the case of the tin crisis, which happened just before I started regulation. Or there was Hamanaka in the copper market, which was a 10-year manipulation. So what I will be talking about is the games that can be played at the macro level, and also I think at the, the sort of market squeezes that you can get to.
WTI time spreads and why Syncrude cannot explain them
Erik Townsend: So that's a bit of context in terms of the regulatory side of the work that Well, I definitely want to come back to that macro picture of manipulation in the long term, but before we go there, let's briefly touch on a subject that's on everyone's mind, which is suddenly over the last couple of weeks, time spreads in West Texas Intermediate, the US contract, have utterly exploded at the front of the curve. Normally that would be associated with a supply disruption. Now the thing is, Chris, the press is telling us that Syncrude, Syncrude, 360,000 barrels per day. That's it. Going offline until the end of July is the explanation for why all of a sudden things have been going crazy. But we've gotten to the point where August futures are trading at a $7 premium above the December delivery contract. Just the first 2 months have peaked out.
We saw more than $3 on September, October.
Chris Cook: Wow.
Erik Townsend: October, and almost $3 on August, September.
So there's this massive blowout, and I think something you and I agree on is this is probably bigger than just Syncrude. Syncrude by itself doesn't really explain this. So if that's not the full explanation, what the heck is going on here?
Chris Cook: Yes, indeed. We— I think we are very much agreed on that, that Syncrude does not produce enough, maybe 11,000 contracts, To back these market moves. It's something much, much bigger than that, as you say, Erik. In my view, and this ties in with what I was just saying, there is an underlying market cause.
I've seen many, many spikes like this in the markets over the years, these spikes. We saw a beauty in 2008 when the price just peaked to $147 out of virtually nowhere. And, you know, these things, in my view, are always down to trading games. And the question is just, you know, what is that trading game? Now, my thesis, which is part of, again, where we're going with this, is that this has been a new kind of squeeze, essentially, that the oil which appears to be out there and available is not actually available. And in my view, the reason for this is that the oil, the economic interest in the oil, shall we say, is not with the people that the market thinks it is.
Okay, that's what I think has happened here. People are being squeezed, and that's why the market is spiking. This is absolutely typical behavior of a squeeze, but it's not the classical sort of squeeze, otherwise the traders would have worked it out. It's based on something which is opaque to the market.
Erik Townsend: So if we look at the reported Cushing, Oklahoma inventory levels, which are still above 35%, you'd think that would be enough What you're saying is that oil is all there, but what's gone on is a bunch of private deals have been put together where somebody owns it and controls it. And the people that you would normally expect to step up and say, hey, there's this huge spread in the first few months, I can arbitrage that spread by delivering my oil into the front month and buying it back a few months later and pocketing a big profit— the people that we assume ought to be doing that, that everybody's baffled, why are they not doing it? The answer is those people already sold the rights to that oil to somebody else in some deal that the market doesn't know about. And of course, everybody knows that such deals go on, but nobody ever envisioned that all of the storage that exists is perhaps already tied up and already been promised to somebody for something in some deal that has not been publicly disclosed.
Is that the essence of it?
Chris Cook: Yes, with a slight wrinkle, I think, Erik, and that is this: that it's possible, it doesn't really matter who owns or has the rights to the tanker storage, okay, to the oil tank storage, it is still possible to, if you like, sell and repurchase the economic interest of oil in tank, okay? And in a private deal, as you say, outside of the market, you know, you and I could agree that, you know, we will buy and sell the economic interest of X thousand barrels. It's just a transfer of title title of oil in tank. That's what we're looking at.
The owner of the storage is just a custodian. It doesn't actually matter to him at all. I remember IPE could make delivery back in the day, probably still can, of transfer of title in tank. You get similar things going on in the LME with metal moving across the line and things like that.
My thesis The problem is that the economic interest is passing backwards and forwards between people, but not visibly to the market.
Erik Townsend: Chris, before we move on, you made reference to 11,000 futures contracts, and I knew exactly what you meant because you explained it to me off the air. But just for our listeners' benefit, what that refers to is we're talking about 360,000 barrels per day of production from Syncrude in Canada. Now, if there's 30 days in a month, you multiply 30 or 31, say 30.5, times 360,000 barrels, you get approximately 11 million barrels of crude oil, or 11,000 futures contracts in total for the entire outage period. And the point here is simply that 11,000 contracts is not very much. It's not enough to have anything close to this degree of dislocation on the market if we're going to lose 11,000 contracts over the course of more than And I think the other thing that's important for people to understand is the way that the trade press has reported this is, okay, look, you got 360,000 barrels of oil coming offline in northern Canada, and this is a really big deal.
It's going to screw up the delivery into Cushing, Oklahoma.
Well, wait a minute. The Cushing, Oklahoma supply from Canada comes through the Keystone Pipeline. Keystone is running at capacity. If Syncrude goes offline and that oil is not available to put into the pipeline, There's plenty of Western Canadian Select to, I would think, make up at least for a month. I don't know exactly what the number is, but they didn't stop filling the Keystone Pipeline to capacity with Canadian oil just because Syncrude went offline. They used other Canadian oil. They're still sending oil from Canada to Cushing at full speed. That hasn't changed. And Syncrude could stay offline for a long time before Canada ran out of oil to keep the Keystone Pipeline running. pipeline going at full capacity. So this whole, you know, Syncrude explains the whole thing, it just doesn't add up. It doesn't make sense. Let's move on though. You know, in the field of physics, the researchers are always looking for the so-called unified theory
The Big Long: financialization and managed-money open interest
Erik Townsend: that pulls together everything and solves all the problems.
You've kind of got a unified theory of market manipulation, for lack of a better term. Let's consider a few thoughts here. According to widely accepted theory, the super contango that occurred in Shouldn't really have been possible. That's not supposed to happen. It's kind of an unexplained anomaly. We hear so much from the trade press about what hedge funds are supposedly doing, and what exactly does that mean? Who are these hedge funds? And particularly, it doesn't seem like the things that we hear that they're doing match the advertised strategy that most of the actual hedge funds and commodity pools that are operating in this market have told their investors they're.
So, you know, I'll give you an example of that is WTI futures that are being sold about 2 years down the curve by hedgers. Okay, well, the media tells us and the Commitment of Traders reports tell us, well, hedge funds are buying those contracts. Well, really? I've yet to see a hedge fund pitch book that describes a strategy for why they would want to buy oil futures 2 years out in a very thinly traded market where there's no liquidity.
Chris Cook: Right.
Erik Townsend: So there's a lot of these mysteries. Another one, the EIA inventory swings that are so erratic, the gyrations that we see in the Brent-WTI spread that don't seem to be explained by the obvious analysis of supply and demand in the market. It would seem in a lot of ways like you would think there would be some parity between gas and oil pricing if they are each capable of producing a certain amount of BTUs of energy, which is what they get used for.
Chris Cook: Right.
Erik Townsend: You'd think that the gas and the oil would be priced in a way which is so much per BTU, but it doesn't work that way in the real market. You have this unifying theory of what explains all of these things. You call it the Big Long. Now, I've got several questions to ask you, but why don't we start with the high-level overview? What's the Big Long? Why do you call it that?
And what does it predict?
Chris Cook: Yes, indeed. The Big Long is basically a damn big position in the futures market, a huge position in the futures market. It's not always as big as it gets. It's probably as big as it's ever got right now, well over the million barrel open interest or million contract open interest.
Over many, many years since 2004, '05 at least, we've seen massive, massive open interest build and occasionally fall off in the futures complexes. It was mainly in Brent because for the most part until the last year or This has been primarily a Brent phenomenon, and we'll come back to that.
For me, the big long is if you look at the open interest and the way that it's broken down between the different classes and the COT reports and whatnot, you'll actually see colossal open interest in managed funds for years on end. Yeah, I'm sorry, but who is it? This is what's fascinated me through all this time. I've got a theory about who it is and who it's been, which has changed over the time as well.
And it's not what people think it is. So that's why I called it the big long, Erik. And it has developed over time. Over the first few years, I think it was essentially a private sector phenomenon, if you like, till about 2008. What we saw was a flood of money, essentially fund money came into the market. In those days, it was passive funds. You know, it was GSCI, it was ETFs, it was ETPs, huge amounts of financial buying in the futures market, not just in the futures market, markets. But also, this is my theory, it was being done using the financial techniques that Enron made popular, which was prepay. This is opaque to the market.
And then subsequently, we've gone through further sort of iterations of the market behavior and who's been responsible for it. And we don't have time to go into all of it, but what I'm saying is that we have a form of participation in the which I call the big long, which is the market has become financialized. And the oil market has parted company— the financial oil market has parted company from the reality of supply and demand. And I'll just give you a brief statistic which just demonstrates this. Between mid-2007 and mid-2009, the oil price went— or the benchmark went from $80 to $147. To $35, back to $80. And in all that time, the actual supply and demand in physical quantity changed by less than 3%.
Now, in my view, that has got literally nothing to do with the actual physical market. It's financial participation in the market which has caused this problem. And what I call the big long has been instrumental in this.
Who buys the back of the curve: T-bills, prepay and Saudi support
Erik Townsend: Chris, let's explore a little bit further some of these things that are supposedly ascribed to hedge funds, what the press tells us that hedge funds are doing. Now, something that's very well understood in the market is that the US shale producers have to hedge their forward production, and they can't get financing to drill more wells if they don't do that. So it absolutely has to happen. They make that deal with an investment bank. It's usually a cashless collar that's negotiated at the wellhead.
Chris Cook: Right.
Erik Townsend: But then the investment banker has to lay off some of that risk that he's just taken on. They do that by selling futures in the futures market about 2 years out on the curve. Now, if you look at what the press tells us, well, what's going on is hedge funds— I put hedge funds in air quotes, of course what they're really talking about is the managed money column of the Commitment of Traders reports that the exchanges give us— they're saying, okay, well, hedge funds are buying these contracts that are being sold by the shale guys that are hedging.
Chris Cook: Right.
Erik Townsend: hedging, or actually by the bankers of the shale guys.
Well, hang on a second, Chris. I've watched a lot of pitch meetings for hedge funds that trade oil. They're all trading the front of the curve, the first few months. A few of them have strategies across the curve, but even those are sticking to the liquid months. The ETFs are generally exposed in the first year, the first strip.
Even people that are trading entire 1-year strips are generally trading the first year against the second As we get to 2 or 3 years out, I've never seen anybody present a strategy that says, well, we buy futures contracts 2.5 years out because the buying's good there in an extremely thinly traded market where there's no liquidity to get out if you ever had to. I've never seen anybody describe that.
So, if it's not hedge funds the way everybody wants to believe, and this is something, it blows my mind, you know, on Twitter, usually if you ask a question, Yeah. Somebody shows up who's smarter than you because they've just got to be in your face about how they're smarter than you and show you up. You've asked the same question over and over and over and over again, about once a week on Twitter, which is, okay, if these hedge guys— if these hedgers are selling contracts 2, 2.5 years out on the curve, who's buying them and what's their motive? And have you ever gotten a straight answer to that?
Chris Cook: No, absolutely not, Erik. You put it so beautifully just then. It is a big question, isn't it? My theory is that we've actually recently seen that the entire curve has lifted at the same time, hasn't it? We've actually seen the entire curve lift. It wasn't as though just the front month went up and the backwardation got bigger, although that was the case and is the case, but at times, we've actually seen— and I think it's particularly the case in Brent that the entire curve lifted I mean, who's doing that and why?
In my view, what it's to do with is that there are people in the market who are supporting the market price. There's a big raft of capital in there, and it's all basically T-bills going out, maybe one, in this case, it would be 2 years. Somebody out there is essentially borrowing oil and lending money via via T-bills. Okay. Somebody out there who actually has a motive in supporting the price. Well, no prizes for who that's likely to be, really. In my view, it actually has to be Saudis who are doing this, or the GCC, or people very close to them. And if it's not the Saudis deliberately, it's Wall Street using Saudi money to do it. I mean, I'm not saying precisely what the geopolitical motivation of this is, I do know that producers, if they can, will always support prices.
Historically, they've done it with derivatives. That's what happened with the LME and tin, or they've done it with debt. People have borrowed money. It's all about funding inventory, Erik. That's what it's all about. If you're going to manipulate the market, you've got to be able to fund inventory, and prepayment, TGA, as Enron demonstrated, is a means of funding inventory which is not visible to the market, because that's the way they've actually arranged it. 70% of Enron's revenues never existed. So I believe that's what's been going on here in a very sophisticated way, and that the way it's actually operated has changed in the last year or so. But again, we'll come on to that.
Erik Townsend: Well, let me just probe a little bit deeper on this issue of Saudi being responsible for it, Because here's what I'm missing. If we were talking about the front month price, certainly Saudi has a clear motive to pump up the price.
But when we talk about buying 2 or 3 years out on the curve, what that does, buying that far out, is it stops the backwardation from getting too deep. Now, if you're Saudi Arabia, you love backwardation because the effect of backwardation, if nobody was buying those contracts out there, it means the shale guys can't hedge and they can't drill more wells, and that gives you more market share. So if you're Saudi Arabia, I would contend you want high front-month prices, but you want low back-month prices in the hedging window. So if anything, you, you know, you'd be selling in that area in order to make life harder for the, the shale guys. What am I missing in this equation?
Chris Cook: Well, I think what you're missing is that it's what they actually have is the T-bills. They're holding T-bills, and that essentially what a T-bill or a whole sequence of T-bills is. For instance, if you look at USO, you'll actually see in their holdings a whole strip of T-bills, which underpins the market position that they're taking. And there's an interesting sideline there, which Izabella Kaminska and Olivier Jakob at Petromatrix, they did a couple of pieces a few years ago on what happened to the market when USO took these positions in the first place.
Very interesting background for those who are interested.
So I believe that what we're seeing is it's essentially lending money over time, which is what T-bills are, against borrowing oil over time, which is what prepay is. And essentially what I think we see is it's the use of the dollar on one hand and the use of oil on another. It's a swap of oil for dollars in a sense on a macro scale. Now, the motivation of Saudi, of course, is they're not that bothered about losing money on backwardation or stuff like that.
Josh Steiner: That.
Chris Cook: What matters is that the price has gone up from $45 to $80, whatever it is now, and they're making an additional however many, you know, $300 million a day. So it's, for them, it's a sprat to catch a mackerel, isn't it? They'll lose something on the shape of the curve, but they're making it however many times multiple on actually having the price high, because the T-bills are essentially underpinning the— it's the capital in the market. That's what they're doing, in my And the actual benchmark that is being used has been Brent historically. But again, there's been a change in the way that works as well, I think.
Dark inventory
Erik Townsend: You mentioned Izzy Kaminska a minute ago, who's absolutely brilliant, by the way. I think she was the one who coined the phrase dark inventory. What does that phrase mean? And how does it play into the rest of this story?
Chris Cook: Well, we've already touched upon it. We just didn't name it. Dark inventory is a term for inventory that is— the economic interest is not with the people you think it is. So it's not out there in the open. In other words, it's hidden. It's like an iceberg sitting under the market water, if you like. And it's there to trap the unwary of people, which I think is what's happened, Erik, right now in the market, is that people have actually stumbled across this hidden iceberg under the water of dark inventory, whether it's in Texas or— which is probably where it is. I think it has to be at Cushing. Or, or close by.
And that's what dark inventory is.
Energy dominance, ICE history and the end of BWAVE
Erik Townsend: Chris, you have a theory about the true meaning of the phrase energy dominance, which of course has been used in policy statements by President Trump. Specifically, you think Gary Cohn and Rex Tillerson were on a very specific mission that not everyone understands while they were in the White House. So please give us the overview. What does energy dominance really mean to you, and what did Gary Cohn and Rex Tillerson Tillerson and their role in the White House have to do with this? How does it all come together?
Chris Cook: I see energy dominance as basically the US taking back control of the energy market. I remember when I was at the International Petroleum Exchange, the US WTI benchmark was preeminent. But over the period after I left, by about 2001, the market had very much got into the North Sea Brent contract, became preeminent.
What we then saw was the Intercontinental Exchange came along in about 2001. One of the key architects of that was Gary Cohn, and also John Shapiro at Morgan Stanley. Their strategy to create the Intercontinental Exchange was very smart. They got the big players on board into, if you like, liquidity for equity, and they had a great strategy, which created what we know as the Intercontinental Exchange.
ICE Europe, Europe is what International Petroleum Exchange used to be.
So over many, many years, we saw the market became financialized. It was essentially a creature of the Wall Street banks, or they— should we say they were very much in control of it? But the actual pricing was European and was based on North Sea oil. So the US was not actually in control, direct control of the market, although Wall Street had a lot to do with it.
Now, that energy dominance has seen the US taking back control of pricing. It was announced on the 29th of June last year.
On the 1st of July, we actually saw the Saudi pricing reference, which had been for the last 15 years, 20 years, back to the start of ICE, the Saudi price reference had been a weighted average of trading on the ICE Europe exchange. That's what B wave, B W A V E, was. It's Brent weighted average, and what that enabled was high frequency trading and whatnot backed by you know particularly by funds. It enabled the price to be supported if the capital was there to to back it. But what changed on the first of July was it went from being B wave to a window basically a physical you know something closer to the physical market. Market.
And through the arb, in my view, it meant that WTI was now in a position to have a lot more influence, if not lead price formation in the global market.
And I think that is what is now happening. Now, what we also saw from that point of 29th of June, that is when a flow of money, of funds— if you look at the charts, you'll see from that point onwards, anything up to 1.4 million contracts of oil and products across WTI and Brent, and then NYC. It flowed onto the market and the price went up over that period. And in my view, that energy dominance and the reinflation of the price went together.
And that was part of a policy which was sold to the president. But I believe underpinning it was a separate financial motive, which we'll get Energy dominance is about control of oil market pricing.
The oil standard and the petrodollar
Erik Townsend: Chris, you have a theory that a lot of what's really going on here in energy markets is about something you call the oil standard. What do you mean by that phrase and how does it relate to the petrodollar system, which a lot of analysts think is in a slow-motion self-destruct mode right now?
Chris Cook: Well, I think the analysts are right, because what's happening is— I think what I call the oil standard— you recall the gold standard, which was the dollar was linked to gold. I believe that in the last 6 weeks or so, well, maybe a couple of months it is now, that oil has been effectively linked to oil through a very, very large position that has been taken on the market. This accounts for the moves that we're seeing. We're seeing the tail end of a transition from the, let's call it the petrodollar system, system, which was about T-bills. Basically, the Saudis or anybody who actually, you know, sold oil— this was the deal— put their, you know, put their dollars into the US.
That was the deal that they did, and they did that by buying T-bills. Now, I believe that what's happened is that we're now seeing direct prepay. Prepay has, if you like, moved on. Where the prepay used to involve the investment banks as middlemen between the Fed and the markets, I think we're now seeing funding flowing more directly in that it's, if you like, an intergovernmental flow.
It's difficult to go into detail on this, but I think that what we have seen since mid-April— and you yourself started me down this thinking process, Erik, by some of the anomalies that you've spotted from that point onwards. Words, I think that oil is now directly linked to the dollar. The dollar is now actually on what I call the oil standard. It's literally based on oil. And if the oil price goes up, then the dollar is going up with it.
That's what we're actually seeing. And that means that the relationships that we've seen historically between currencies are breaking down. And I think that's visible. Look at the changes that have taken place in emerging markets against the— against the dollar. And we're talking virtually all of them. Look at the changes that have taken place against the Chinese currency, the yuan, you know, in recent weeks since that particular date. I think a fundamental change in relationships has taken place. And the reason for that, I believe, is that the dollar has been put on the oil standard. And I don't think the president is necessarily aware of this.
Petroyuan contract and China's buyers club and stockpile
Erik Townsend: I definitely want to come back to that and what's happened since April 13th and what some of the things are that may be driving this. Because as you say, the breakdown in that traditional inverse correlation between the dollar and oil has been very apparent and has perplexed a number of people. But before we go there, this conversation wouldn't be complete without covering China and the so-called petroyuan contract, which we've heard so much about, so many different views from different guests on this program. What do you think the real impetus for this contract's introduction was? Why did they do this? Why did they do it now, and how do you interpret the activity to date? It's gotten more trading volume than most of us thought it would.
Chris Cook: Well, I mean, the Chinese started the process to go to this exchange a few years ago, you know, when the price was really, really high. But when the price fell, the impetus behind it fell away. And the reason is, it's basically energy dominance. You see, as I said, the market is a sell-side It's always been a sell-side market.
And the $300 million a day, or whatever the Saudis are making because of the higher oil price since the 1st of July last year, is mirrored by $300 million a day more money that the Chinese are having to find to actually fund their purchases.
Now, for me, the reason the Chinese have done this, and it's a matter of market design, This isn't a cash-settled contract. This is a physically deliverable contract. It reminds me of the LME market in that respect. We're talking about a contract, the purpose of which is to create a benchmark. I think the currency is a red herring, quite frankly. I think, yes, it suits people who are selling into China to hedge yuan if you want to.
But you can buy and sell currencies, dollar-yuan. You can actually agree that. You can agree a forward rate at the time you're doing the physical trade, because people forget that there is a a big lag between doing a transaction and actually performing the transaction, maybe weeks or months later, the actual settlement of the contract.
I think gold— people again raise gold in this context— I think gold potentially is useful as collateral for guaranteeing the credit of the teapots, because I think one of the, again, rationales for this contract is that you've got all these flaky teapots teapot, you know, refiners, independent refiners in China. And this is a good way of actually dealing with them at arm's length.
Okay, you can guarantee the credit by trading with them and delivering to them through this contract. That's what Dubai historically is. A great deal of use of the Dubai contract has been essentially to guarantee the credit of dodgy counterparties.
So the key point, Erik, is geopolitical critical in my view. The Chinese are now talking to the Indians. They're talking to all the Asian buyers. They're looking to put together a buyers club. Okay. So imagine an OPEC, but on the other side of the coin. Not just that, they've actually stashed away 700 million barrels of crude oil in the last 3 years, including at the rate of 1.5 million barrels a day in the first 6 months of last year.
And they've done this, in my view, this is what I would do in their shoes, as a war chest.
What it means is they're now able to back off in the market, basically something like a buyer's strike if they wanted to. And what then happens to the price? Well, I think there could be a meltdown, quite frankly. That's what would happen if they made a big thing of it. I think that's not the Chinese way. I think the Chinese quietly will proceed proceed to actually withdraw from the market. And I think what we could see— and I said this in an article a couple of years ago— we had a super contango in a rising market back in 2009.
I think if there is a fall, we will see a super backwardation for the same reason, because what we'll be seeing is false positions, dark inventory flowing out into the market, and that would create a super backwardation in So, the Chinese, in my view, are doing this for geopolitical reasons, for market power. They are now the biggest buyer in the world. They overtook the US. Not all of that buying is for use. In fact, I would say that's one of the things that has clouded the market price, has been the fact that they were stashing away 1.5 million barrels a day. You know, it wasn't being used.
US crude exports, Brent-WTI spread and the Saudi fund book
Erik Townsend: Chris, there's another aspect of all of this that I've been pondering a lot lately, and that is the legalization of US exports. Now, on the surface, what the legalization of export does is it makes it possible to arbitrage that spread. So, if the WTI contract is at a dramatic discount to the Brent contract for some reason, it may not be directly possible to actually buy WTI, put it on a ship, and sell it in the Brent market. But certainly, deliveries that would've gone into the WTI market can be diverted into the Brent market. And you effectively, you know, by being able to export the lighter grades of US crude, that changes dynamics where we're buying blend stock, heavy oil from Venezuela. Well, not so much Venezuela anymore, but Canada and Iraq. And we're exporting the lighter oil that goes to other places. There's the obvious aspects of this. But frankly, as I look at how much has changed in the time that exports have been allowed.
And if I look at VLCC exports now from the, from the LOOP in Louisiana, they are sending massive, massive ships of US oil overseas, which maybe there is a fundamental economic justification for, but frankly, it feels to me like there's more than meets the eye to this picture of US exports.
And particularly, I wonder if somebody is gaming the system system trying to get, you know, the US system is the one that is most visible in terms of its reporting. A lot of people gauge the overall health of the global market by what US inventories look like. It makes me wonder, is someone trying to game the Brent-WTI spread in a way that incents exports because their real agenda is to get those EIA inventory numbers down in order to achieve some other You know, I don't claim to know the answers, but it feels to me like there's more than meets the eye. What's your take on US exports?
Chris Cook: Yeah, well, I think it flows from the fact that Brent is being manipulated, that Brent is much higher than it should be. And if, if you actually have the spread that high, well, it incentivizes exports, doesn't it, of US oil? If in fact oil in the Far East is set against Brent, but you've actually got a big Brent-WTI spread, spread, well, where else is US oil going to go? Because basically, the spread is going to finance it.
That ties into something that— another anomaly, if you go back to— you remember in 2011, '12, when you had like a $20-plus Brent-WTI, and yet we actually saw fleets of Saudi oil coming to the US? What was that about? That was another— I've forgotten that as an anomaly, but what was that about?
Josh Steiner: About.
Chris Cook: Why didn't they just dispatch their fleet to the east and get $20 over? But they didn't. They delivered essentially into Motiva, which there was back then. So there have been some— in my view, this completely smacks of massive positions, geopolitical positions, if you like, in the market, massive manipulation that the market is not aware of.
And I think that essentially what exists, if I can put it this way, is a really, really, really big fund book. There's a fund book in both products and in oil. I believe it's the Saudi fund book. They actually have Motiva, and Motiva has a physical position, which is Saudi oil coming and going.
And what we're seeing in the US markets, unannounced, I think, in the futures markets, is a massive Saudi book, and it's sitting there like an iceberg in the market, and it's causing all sorts of collisions and damage.
The 13 April time-spread anomaly: a financial, not physical, squeeze
Erik Townsend: Finally, let's try to bring all of these concepts together and tie them into current markets. Now, as you know, Chris, I have been tweeting like crazy since April that something changed dramatically around the 13th of April. And my own lens of looking at this market is very much through time spreads in WTI futures, just because That's what I trade, and that's what I've been studying for years. And all of a sudden, around the 13th of April, things that were totally unprecedented started to happen. And let me describe exactly what I mean by unprecedented. Certainly, we've seen past occasions where the value of these time spreads has moved in a bigger way than it has recently.
But normally, there's a correlation. Time spreads that are, you know, chronologically next to other time spreads tend to move in the same direction. And we'd see a cluster of four months in a row going straight up, while the next four months go straight down, and the four months after that are going sideways. It's never worked that way before. Something new is affecting this market, and it's almost as if the market sees certain dates on the horizon. Up until this time, there's a reason for things to go this way. From this time to that time, there's a reason. Reason for these time spreads to go the other way is if there are events that are being charted out several months in advance that nobody's telling anybody what they are or what they mean, but the market knows that they're there.
I haven't been able to figure out exactly what's going on, but around the 13th of April, time spreads in WTI just started doing crazy things that I've never seen them do before. And I've gone and purchased the market data going back 20 years to analyze These spreads. They're doing things I never thought possible. What the heck is going on? And by the way, I don't think it's at all limited to time spreads in WTI. That's where I happen to have my eye focused. That's what I see.
But we're seeing a lot of other crazy things going on. And certainly this, this dislocation in WTI, you and I both know this is not about 360,000 barrels a day in Fort McMurray in Canada coming offline from Syncrude.
Patrick Ceresna: No.
Erik Townsend: Syncrude. Something more is going on in the market. It smacks of being a massive, massive shortage of physical oil in Cushing. But nobody in the industry knows about any shortage of oil in Cushing. If you say, why is there a shortage? They say, what shortage? But if you look at what the time spreads are doing, they're telling you there's a massive shortage. This stuff only happens when wars are starting, usually. I mean, if you want to know about what can A $6 spread on the first 2 months that are approaching expiry.
Normally that happens when a war breaks out unexpectedly. That's the size of event it takes to do that. It's happening right now, and nobody can come up with a better explanation than 360,000 barrels a day and maybe a little bit of impact from Venezuela and Libya. There's got to be more to this. Do you have any ideas as to what else is going on here?
Chris Cook: My thesis is is it's a financial thing. Obviously, it's a financial thing. It's not a physical thing. It's about financial oil. And my take is there are financial positions in the market which were not conventional financial positions in the market, which are visible to the market. It's outside agreements, which I believe are prepay agreements. And these prepay agreements are basically disrupting— they've created now— as you rightly say, your focus is on oil. Mine is on everything, and there are other traders who take a similar macro view, there are similar disruptions in everything that we see.
All the old relationships, so many changes which no longer— which have broken down at that point. And my fundamental point is that I believe this is because oil and the dollar are now linked. And this is by deliberate policy of someone out there. Somebody has done this, and I don't believe it's the government either. This isn't a conspiracy This is a fact. Changes have taken place that are not explainable conventionally. This is my thesis, that actually oil has been deliberately linked to the dollar.
Oil linked to the dollar: GAGFO and a central bank of oil
Erik Townsend: Well, that ties very much into some theories that I've seen in the past. We're definitely channeling Izzy Kaminska here with, uh, with Dark Inventory Theory. We've got to get her on the program. She's absolutely brilliant. I'll have to reach out to her. But, you know, a few years ago, a guy named Erik Brent Johnson was writing about a concept he called GAGFO, good as gold for oil. And he was saying the future of the dollar really hangs on what is the market going to think if it in the past has valued the US dollar as being good as gold for oil.
It's just as good as gold to pay for oil with the dollar. And a lot of people have predicted the breakdown of the petrodollar system would change that. Luke Gromen has talked about good as gold for oil. So it seems like what's going on is you think that maybe as the petrodollar system is breaking down, which clearly we're seeing, somebody, invisible hand of we're not sure who, has decided that there needs to be a stronger link between the US dollar and the value of oil so that dollars are always good for buying oil.
And they are somehow prosecuting that agenda in a way which has changed the historical inverse relationship between the dollar index and oil and is changing a whole lot of other things. This is— I hate to get into conspiracy theory stuff, but at the same time, it feels like something really big is changing. Whether it's a secret conspiracy or just a natural outcome of changes in the global marketplace, I don't know, but something really, really big is going on here in terms of disturbance in the force. Luke, do you have any parting thoughts on this before we
Chris Cook: Yeah, I mean, at the end of the day, Federal Reserve Bank maintains reserves. I believe that what we're seeing is something more like a central bank of oil, that the reserves against which the dollar is now repoed— you know how the Fed works with open market operations. What we're seeing is closed market operations.
What is going on in this central bank of oil? And we're talking about not just SPR here, we're talking about the Texas and all the oil in it is essentially potentially monetizable. And that is what is going— and that has to be— the market price needs to be supported, Erik, in order for that to be viable. So, you know, the US needs a high price in order to keep this reserve liquid, if you like.
So they have an interest in high oil prices, despite, again, what the president is saying. The US, which is producing, I don't know, 10 million barrels a day, Russia, 10 million barrels a Saudi, 10 million barrels a day, all have an interest in high oil prices. The other side of the market is not keen at all on this level of prices. And believe you me, I think there's going to be some action within 6 months to a year. You know, I really do think there's going to be some buy-side action.
Erik Townsend: Well, of course, we have President Trump tweeting on weekends about oil prices and what Saudi should do next, but we'll have to leave that for the next interview. in the interest of time. Chris, before we close, please tell our listeners, first of all, you are very prolific on Twitter, a must-follow in the oil market for anybody interested in this market. But also, you've written quite a bit of longer articles. Is there a website? Is there a place to go? Where can people who want more Chris Cook find that content?
Chris Cook: Well, I did write a whole series of articles, for instance, on the Seeking Alpha site. I'm a fan of Seeking Alpha. If you Google Big Long, you'll find on Seeking Alpha a whole series of articles that I wrote, but I haven't actually written anything there for a year or so, because I was trying to work out what the hell was going on. I just could not work out, Erik, what's going on. I believe I've got there now, and I am planning to write a serious article on Seeking Alpha on this. I've written in other places as well, but there are other places where I've written a great I think it's fair to say, and this is a subject we've not covered here, energy fintech is— I'm hugely interested in what is the next generation of financing of the— what's the energy market of the future going to look like is something I work on at University College London, for instance.
But my Twitter handle is @CJensCook, C-J-E-N-S-C-O-O-K, and anybody who wants to get in touch can do so with my not particularly secret email, cojoc@haleu.com. I have other emails, but that's the best one to reach me on.
Erik Townsend: Well, Chris, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Postgame: Josh Steiner on Australian housing
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview with Chris. Now, I wanted to get back to oil in a We'll few minutes, but I want to start with a question that came in get from a listener. to that in a few minutes, but we wanted to start today's postgame by bringing back Josh Steiner to the show. Hi, Josh.
Josh Steiner: Hey, guys.
Erik Townsend: Josh, it's great to have you back on the program. We're really looking forward to seeing you at MacroVoices Live. We're not going to promote that, though, because it's already sold out. So let's move on to last time we had you on the show. You did an excellent presentation on US real estate, also Canadian real estate, which I know you're going to be talking about in Toronto. On the US picture, though, how about giving us an update on what's changed
Josh Steiner: Sure, yeah. The 3 markets we talked about when we last spoke in January were Canada, Australia, and the U.S. And, you know, obviously, we'll, we'll talk more about Canada at the events. But with respect to the U.S. and also to Australia, I'll give you my, my current thinking relative to where we were 6 months ago.
So, with respect to Australia, I think that the Australia, not much has changed with respect to how we're thinking about the market. I guess what has changed is that the fundamentals of the market continue to deteriorate. So, you know, on a number of different fronts, whether we're thinking about prices, clearance rates, credit growth, the sale of new homes, all of those metrics are getting worse. So if we take Sydney as an example, The clearance rates in Sydney now are down to around 52%, and that's a number that was at 72% a year earlier. If we look at prices, and particularly in the high end, we're starting to see prices roll over in the double-digit range at the higher end of the market. And I think a lot of this is sort of self-inflicted, meaning that the Australian government Has really begun to crack down. There have been limits imposed on the interest-only mortgage lending from— that's come from the regulatory group, APRA. Those go back all the way to March of 2017.
But more recently, there are APRA guidance that curb lending to highly indebted and high LTI, or loan-to-income borrowers. So So you're seeing on a number of different fronts a cooling off in the rate of credit growth that's been there to its— actually, its slowest rates in a long, long time.
And you're finally getting sort of this behavioral psychology shift, which is what we had sort of thought about a long time ago, which is essentially the market is basically transitioning from this sort of mentality of fear of missing out into a much more conservative mindset, where people are pausing and contemplating what the future direction of the market might be.
This is a big problem for Australia, because you have an incredibly overlevered situation at the household level. Obviously, the big banks are incredibly dependent on the mortgage side of the lending equation. And so, you know, you really have a backdrop here, which is starting to get worse and at a slightly accelerating rate. So, you know, since we talked 6 months ago, I think the thesis in Australia is definitely playing out and starting to pick up some steam. And most of the big Australian bank stocks now are down about 10% to 20% from where they were in the late spring of last year. So, you know, this isn't just sort of happening in isolation at the fundamental level. You're seeing it manifest on the equity side as well.
Josh Steiner: US housing supply and homebuilder stocks
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Josh, back in January when we had you on the show, you were far more optimistic about US housing markets. How have things been developing on the US front?
Josh Steiner: So the US housing market is almost the exact opposite of what's going on in Australia. Unlike Australia, where there's essentially too much supply and not enough demand and falling prices, in the US, you have the exact opposite situation. You have record low levels of supply of homes for sale in the US, down around 4 months of supply.
You have steady levels of demand, even in the face of what have been rising rates.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Josh Steiner: And slightly reduced affordability. But the problem is that the supply just isn't there to meet the demand. In fact, the supply continues to compress on a year-over-year basis. And so what you get as a result of that, not surprisingly, is a continued and ongoing acceleration in home prices at the national level. And that's been the trend now for quite a while, well over 2 years.
But, you know, since the start of the year, that's picked up a bit. And so, you know, I think fundamentally, you know, the positive favorable backdrop for housing and home prices in the US is very similar today to where it was 6 months ago.
I think what has changed is that the prices of the publicly traded homebuilders and a lot of the, you know, broader components of the building subindices in the US have gotten a lot cheaper, and they've gotten cheaper really for a confluence of reasons, foremost of which is the rise in rates. And this is not at all surprising. If you go back through the long history of these publicly traded builders and you look at how they have responded in the past to expedited periods of rate increase, it's always been this incredibly difficult environment to navigate as an investor in homebuilder stocks.
Basically, homebuilders become the worst-performing relative categories, and so not surprisingly, since the start of the year, they've struggled. Then on top of that, you've had these concerns that have been out there for a long time, which ebb and flow, namely around the lack of availability of lots to build on, a difficulty in sourcing the supply of skilled labor. Labor, people like carpenters and plumbers and electricians. And on top of that, you know, some of the raw material input costs, obviously lumber and steel and aluminum. And, you know, the sort of escalating trade tensions, trade war that's sort of been going on now for a while under the Trump administration, but obviously has been heating up of All those things have sort of conspired into this, you know, we'll call it a negative factor cocktail, to put a lot of downward pressure on the group from an equity performance standpoint.
But what's interesting is that, you know, from our macro team at least, we think that a lot of the pressures that have been there from a growth and inflation standpoint in the US are essentially at or just now passing peak. Which should start to put us on the other side from an inflation pressure standpoint. And we think that is going to take a little bit of the upward pressure from rates out of the equation. And so, you know, our backdrop for thinking about the equity price performance as we look ahead through the balance of the year is actually a lot more favorable, particularly when you take into consideration the fact that homebuilding stocks, at least historically, have tended to put in essentially all of their positive performance in the 4th and 1st quarters of every year. 2nd quarter and 3rd quarters tend to be periods during which those stocks lag, but, you know, they normally do well. There's sort of this recurrent hope trade, if you will, that sort of kicks into, into high gear late in the year and really sort of runs through the February-March timeframe.
So the fundamental backdrop for US housing remains very good. The equities have been weak year to date, but I think the outlook over the course of 2018 is a lot better.
Josh Steiner: US banks, junk bonds and the loan officer survey
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, Josh, you know, you also do analysis on the financials, and at least the US banks have materially underperformed year to date. What's your take on the health of the financial system in the US when talking about banking, and what's your thinking there?
Josh Steiner: Yeah. So if we're thinking sort of bigger picture about, you know, the US, Yes. Where the cycle sits, where, you know, the bank stocks are, recent performance, and so forth. You know, what I would say is this. I think if you go back and look over the last few years at the performance of US bank stocks, the single strongest corollary has been the long end of the curve, and then more recently, the 2/10 spread. And so as that's compressed down and people have sort of been, you know, growing increasingly concerned about what all this means, i.e., the trade wars and so forth, for future US growth, I think people have begun to essentially take some gains with respect to the bank group. As we see it fundamentally, the backdrop is still pretty healthy, unlike the last go-around when the weakness was obviously concentrated on the household side, namely through the mortgage channel. This time around, I think the household sector is likely to do relatively well, certainly much better than the last go-around.
I think where there will be a lot of weakness, however, is really on the corporate side and junk bonds. So, you know, if you think about things like corporate debt levels relative to GDP, those are at records. If you think about what most businesses and CEOs have been doing, with tax cut benefits. They've been buying back stock. They've also been funding M&A.
Nobody's really focused on paying down debt, certainly not at this point in the cycle. There's a lot of floating rate debt that's out there. I think as we move forward, that's going to be probably the big area of concern.
At least the way I've always thought about this and looked at it and trying to think about, you know, the real sort of rate risk versus the perceived risk is in looking through the quarterly senior loan officer survey data from the US. And historically, every recessionary period in the US has been preceded by 2 out of 3 questions around the C&I lending environment rolling over. So the 3 questions that are asked each quarter of loan officers are, Are you tightening loan standards? Are you increasing loan spreads? And are you seeing increased or reduced borrower demand? And if you go back since the inception of that survey, whenever 2 of those 3 indicators have rolled over negative, you've had a recession anywhere from 9 to 12 months later. And so that's one of the things that we keep an eye on.
And as of the most recent survey data, data, we're not in that environment, i.e., 2 of those 3 questions are not in negative territory. So, you know, I think for the short to intermediate term, things are still generally favorable. I do have sort of one eye pinned to the high-yield market. I think that's going to be sort of ground zero this next go-around. And the thing we sort of watch for the canary in the coal mine on that is this quarterly loan officer survey.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Josh Steiner: So we'll keep watching that, but for now, it remains benign.
Erik Townsend: Well, Josh, we can't thank you enough for coming back and giving us an update. We'll look forward to seeing you on August 10th in Toronto for MacroVoices Live.
Josh Steiner: Great. Thanks, guys. Thanks for having me back on the show.
Chartbook 1: WTI forward strip and why Syncrude cannot explain it
Patrick Ceresna: Well, Josh, we look forward to seeing you out in Toronto. Now, Erik, you put together a quick little chartbook showing the term structure of oil. What are we looking at here on the first chart?
Erik Townsend: Well, the first chart is a graph showing the term structure of WTI crude oil. We call that the forward strip. Each one of those little yellow dots represents the price as of Thursday morning. Of course, it's gone down over the course of the day on Thursday, but it's showing you the price of each delivery contract. So that dot at the very top that's above $74, that is the August delivery contract, which is currently the front month. The July contract already expired.
The next one down from there is the September contract. The next one down from there is October, and then they get much closer together— October, November, December, January, February, and so forth, going all the way out to 2026 at the very extreme right end of the chart here. Now, it almost looks like the chart program is broken or something. There's this string of dots all close together, and those top 2 are just way away from the pack. The vertical space between them is a couple of dollars wide, almost $3 wide in some places. What the heck is going on there? Well, this is an unprecedented situation. It's an all-time record, as far as I can tell. I will have a chart for you in just a minute that will show you with at least 25 years of data that this is at least a record in that timeframe, and I think it's probably an all-time record, although I can't say that definitively without having all-time data in front of me to support it with, but I'm pretty sure that it is.
Why the heck is this happening? What does it mean when the price of the immediate delivery contracts is elevated way above the later ones? Well, normally, the reason that this happens would be— an example would be, say, something like Hurricane Katrina, which knocked out most of the production in the Gulf of Mexico, and it wasn't actually knocked out. But it had to be shut down as a precaution because the storm was coming. So you've got a whole bunch of offline production that is dramatically affecting the supply and demand balance in the market. And all of a sudden, people are worried about the storage tanks running empty. And that puts a tremendous premium on the immediate delivery contract. If you want your oil in August instead of September, you got to pay— at one point, it It was almost $3 extra for that. Now it's a little more than $2 extra for that as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon.
If you can wait until October instead of August or September, you can get— at one point it was almost $6 discount if you could just wait 2 months to take delivery of that oil.
Another way to look at it, as I described in the market wrap, is the real price of oil is the, the lower numbers down around around $67, $68. And there's a special surtax, a premium for taking delivery in the next couple of months, which is dramatically higher. Well, it's easy to understand when you have a Hurricane Katrina type of situation that dramatically affects oil production. And, you know, Houston's underwater and, you know, there's a crisis everywhere. It's no surprise that things go crazy. The thing is, we don't have a hurricane. We don't have a war breaking out, which is the other type of situation. Right. Which has historically produced front end of the curve backwardation in the market. None of those things happened.
Now, people will tell you this is all about Syncrude, a producer in Canada of tar sands. That's oil that comes from the tar sands as opposed to conventional production. It's a type of non-conventional oil production. And they're saying because Syncrude went offline, and that means that 300,000 360,000 barrels of oil that was being produced by Syncrude is not being produced anymore. Well, that explains all of this.
Patrick, that's absolute nonsense. It doesn't explain all of this. A true statement is nobody can think of anything else to explain what's going on, and that's what they're hanging their hat on because they can't figure it out. The other things that have been cited as possibilities is reports that Venezuela will reduce its production in coming weeks and also a small dislocation in Libya. None of these things explain, you know, if you had a terrorist attack that blew up some of the tanks in Cushing, Oklahoma, that would explain a move of this proportion. We don't have anything like that. So what the heck is causing this?
Chris Cook had one idea in the interview where he described dark inventory, the possibility that the market was assuming, since those tanks in Cushing, Oklahoma are more than 35% of their capacity is full of oil, well, it seems like there's plenty of oil. If we suddenly figured out that that oil was all spoken for, somebody owned it, and it was not really available to deliver into the market when this price dislocation happened, that might start to explain some of this. Now, normally, when you get a price dislocation like this. What it does is it creates an incentive for anybody who has physical oil on storage in Cushing, Oklahoma. All they have to do, if they've got physical oil, is sell the August futures contract if they're not shorted already. A lot of them are already balancing as a hedge. They're short the August contract in order to take market risk out of their long position in crude oil.
They deliver into the August contract and And then just buy, say, the September, the October, even the December contract. December contract at one point was trading at almost a $7 discount to the August contract. You are locking in that difference in price as a profit for basically renting your oil out for a few months. And if you looked at just the 2-month arbitrage, when we got to a high point of $5.90 on the, the first 2 months, a couple of days ago, the arbitrage there would have produced a rate of return that annualizes to north of 60% for a risk-free arbitrage.
The fact that people were not taking that and therefore bringing that price back down— there weren't enough people taking the deal in order to bring the price back to a normal level— that means there are not enough people that have oil. That They can put into that deal, that they can arbitrage that way. Why is it that if Cushing is at 35% of capacity, there's nobody taking the deal? Apparently, the oil is spoken for for other reasons. That was Chris Cook's thesis. I don't know exactly what's going on. I do know that Syncrude is just not big enough to explain this. What I do know, Patrick, is that Syncrude by itself, or even Syncrude, Venezuela, and Libya, absolutely are not big enough to explain this.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: enough in terms of the amount of production coming offline to even begin to explain this dramatic, dramatic dislocation that you see represented by all that vertical space between the top 3 dots on the first chart here.
Chartbook 2 and 3: record WTI backwardation and the Motiva idea
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, that's really interesting, that perspective on why it's so steep there. But now on chart number 2, you're showing something else here. What are we looking at when we're looking at chart 2?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, Chart 2 is showing us the difference between the first and third futures contract prices on a daily basis, and it goes back through 25 years of data. Now, you do see a massive down spike. It's actually on September 22nd, 2008, that red line that goes straight down about 2/3 of the way across the page. That's an anomaly on the data. September 22nd was a contract expiration date, and what you're seeing there is that after all the liquidity dries up in the expiring front-month contract and nobody's trading it anymore, and then the next contract moves down in price, it creates this artificial effect. If you look at the day before and the day after, the backwardation was less than $2 the day before and the day after. So what you see that appears to be be a spike down to $12 of backwardation. That didn't really happen. It shows up on the chart that way.
We decided to leave it in the chart. These charts, by the way, are courtesy of one of our listeners who asked to remain anonymous, but we very much appreciate his contribution.
If you look at excluding that spike down, which again was an anomaly in the data, you can see that the current event is a more extreme backwardation. And this is— we got to $5.90 on an intraday basis of difference between the 1st and 3rd futures contract. That's the difference between August and October. Why did we get to $5.90? Well, the other times that we've had lows have been hurricanes, wars breaking out, major disruptions that directly affected the physical flow of oil into Cushing, Oklahoma. If you have a— let's say the Keystone Pipe Pipeline had been blown up by terrorists. That would explain something like this. We don't have anything close to that, Patrick. And even if you look at the supply of oil coming from Canada into Cushing, Oklahoma, the major source is the Keystone Pipeline. That thing is running at capacity. And yes, they were getting some of that oil from Syncrude. Well, guess what?
There's a huge amount of Western Canadian Select oil in storage, in tanks, that can keep the Keystone Pipeline going at its nameplate capacity for quite a while. So the flow of oil, the rate that oil is leaving Canada and coming to Cushing, is not going downhill here. But what is going on is the price is dislocating as if a pipeline had been blown up or something.
Why is that happening? It's not just Syncrude. It's more to it than that. One possibility that I talked to Anas Alhajji about is a lot of people in the market have always assumed that the Saudi-owned refineries in the United States— why does Saudi Arabia own refineries in the United States? Anas has always said, well, because they're diversifying and they're thinking about being more in the downstream business and not just being producers of oil. What a lot of people have assumed in the market is, oh, they're trying to, you know, basically create a refinery that will only use Saudi oil. Well, if Motiva, for example, Saudi-owned, started to just buy US shale oil and process that oil rather than preferring Saudi oil or other Arab oil, that might catch everybody off guard. And I asked Anas about this and he said, yeah, that's a possibility. He says, I can't think of anything else to explain what's going on here. here.
But at the same time, we're seeing just a profound dislocation. Even something like a Saudi refinery buying US oil instead of favoring Saudi oil, that would catch everybody off guard. But, you know, as soon as the prices naturally moved around and changed, you would think that they would go back to buying the other oil. So nobody can explain to me, to my satisfaction, what is causing us to now hit a record To put this in a little bit better perspective, if you look at page number 3, what we've done is our listener has basically taken out everything but summer months. So we're looking at June, July, and August data only for that same thing, the 3rd minus the 1st futures contract. What is the difference or the backwardation between them? More backwardation is down on this chart. Okay. Chart, contango is up. So you see that we are at an all-time low in 25 years of data.
The September is not on this chart, so that's why you don't see that anomaly. But again, that was an anomaly in the data. It wasn't real data that we saw on the previous chart. So why is it that Hurricane Rita, Hurricane Katrina, all of the natural disasters that have happened in the last 25 years did not create anything close close to, barely even half of as much backwardation as we have at the front of the WTI strip right now.
Nobody that I've talked to or read about anywhere has a credible answer. Everybody's saying it's Syncrude, and I think they're just saying that because they can't figure out what else to say. So this is a real mystery, Patrick, and I am very passionately trying to get to the bottom of it. I can't figure it out.
Closing comments and Research Roundup
Patrick Ceresna: Well, Erik, thanks for sharing those thoughts with us. It's going to be really interesting to see how this plays out. Nonetheless, any closing comments that you have?
Erik Townsend: Well, the show wouldn't be complete without— you know, you've heard it before, folks— you got to help us out by telling your friends about MacroVoices. The way that we bring you really fantastic interview guests is the more registered users we have at MacroVoices.com, the more able Patrick is to negotiate to get the very best guests in the program. So please, if you haven't already, go to MacroVoices.com, register your free account. The benefit to you is you'll receive our free Research Roundup email, which never contains advertising or marketing. It is just links to all of the coolest stuff, such as this chartbook that we just talked about, as well as other content we could find on the internet. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Chris Cook, as well as the chartbook that Erik and I referenced during the postgame. There's also a link to a great article from Jeffrey Snider Snider, titled The Dreaded Vote of Confidence. There's also an interesting article from oilprice.com titled The New Oil Cartel Threatening OPEC. There's also a link to the CNBC article titled China's Big Bond Experiment Is About to Go Through a Rough Patch. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions.
If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. And myself at Patrick Ceresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com, the internet's premier source of online education for traders. Please visit BigPictureTrading.com for more information. Please register your free account at MacroVoices.com.
Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week. You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we'll be able to recruit high-quality guests. Profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions.
The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com and by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management, LLC. For more information, Visit MacroVoices.com.
MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.
Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.
