Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen from Kingston University (feature); Charlie McElligott, head of cross-asset strategy at Nomura (postgame) (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Episode preview: Steve Keen and Charlie McElligott
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 136 was recorded on October 11th, 2018. I'm Erik Townsend. It's been a hell of a week in the market, and we've got a hell of a show lined up for you in response. Professor Steve Keen will join me as this week's first feature interview guest. As regular listeners know, Steve predicted the 2008 financial crisis and has been one of our most popular show guests to date. Steve gave us a fantastic interview, and I'm sure you're really going to to enjoy it. But we had to tape this interview last week due to travel schedules, so unfortunately my discussion with Steve won't take into account Wednesday and Thursday's bloodbath in markets. But don't worry, we know you want an update on the market, so we tapped our friend Charlie McElligott from Nomura for a post-game interview to discuss this week's market carnage and more importantly what comes next. All of that plus a post-game chart book from our own Patrick Ceresna is coming up.
It'll be a long show this week, folks, but it should be a good one.
Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude, gold, 10-year
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, the S&P 500 truly had a liquidity event here. The S&P 500 wiping out pretty much 100 S&P points in 24 hours. We're currently trading around 2,750 at the time of recording. What's your first impression on what just happened?
Erik Townsend: Well, October has arrived, that's for sure. Needless to say, you know, it's been quite interesting. What we've been saying for several weeks is we're in a topping pattern. We don't know exactly when the top is gonna come, but until now, it really had looked like, hey, maybe there was room for one final push higher. You're never really sure what's going to happen. Really, I think even the sell-off that you saw through Monday was still leaving room for the dip buyers to come in. That 2,865 level that we sold off to on Monday was right on a long-term trend line. It was a perfect test, and it really looked like maybe the dip buyers were showing up. At that point, 2,865 became the must-hold number. And Patrick, I am so frustrated with myself because I started to put on a stop order to sell short on another break below 2860, and I didn't get to it till the next morning, and by the time I did, it was already all over.
So I ended up missing a 150-point move on what would have been a fantastic short trade. At this point, I think it's definitely too late to get into the short. There's some kind of bounce coming. The question is going to be bigger picture. Is the high in for the year and for the entire bull market? At this point, I'm leaning much much more toward that case. I'm going to say maybe there's still room considering all of this happened with a major hurricane hitting the US. It kind of puts people in a panicky mindset. If we really started to see aggressive buying start right away, maybe there's still room to get a recovery back to a new all-time high. But I really doubt it at this point. It looks to me like the market broke finally, something we've been expecting and anticipating for many months on this program. We just didn't know when it was going to come.
The question now is what happens next, and I think it's going to be very interesting. Patrick, I've got to hand it to you though, because I know that Big Picture Trading clients rode this thing long right up to— I think you called not only the recent top but the recent 2 tops almost perfectly, using an option strategy that allowed you to capture both the upside and the downside. I want to come back to that in our postgame segment. I know you've got a chart book, and I particularly want to address the option strategy and how that plays into this. Meanwhile, we've also got Charlie McElligott, who of course heads up cross-asset strategy for Nomura. He'll be joining us for extended equity coverage in postgame as well, because needless to say, what's going on right now is really big and we need to focus on what might happen next.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to that US dollar index, because the one instinct that I'd have is that with a market panic like we've seen, I would have thought the US dollar would have actually instinctively been going higher and that we should have been catching a bid. But yet actually the last few days, the dollar's been giving back some of its gains that it had from last week. What's your thinking here on the dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm thinking that what's going on is that we've seen some relief in the selling of Treasuries and that some of the move higher in the dollar was probably about higher Treasury yields. I mean, it's funny, we're now talking about how Treasury yields are down to 3.20% on the 10-year, as if that's a low number, but it's lower than it was. So I think that maybe the reason we're seeing a little bit of weakness is there. I'm not really sure of that, frankly. I agree with you that it would logically make sense in a sense sell-off in the equity market, that you might see more strength in the dollar. We're not seeing it, but at the same time, it's not like the dollar's crashing either. We saw several strong days there. We're seeing a little pullback. I think it's a little bit too early to call it. In any event, the real question, I think, is going to be what happens next.
Are we seeing the beginning of a really major move down in stock prices, and is the driver going to be the stock market? Or I'm actually thinking the more likely case is that the driver is the bond market, and it's going to be higher It's the higher yields, if they occur, that are the shock that results in the next move in the stock market. So, we'll see what happens. But so far, the dollar has been weaker than I expected, but not weak enough to really cause me to panic.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to crude oil because we're back to the $70 handle in a very deep throwback in crude oil from its highs. First of all, how did the numbers come in? And do you think that this is a major turn in oil?
Erik Townsend: I think that it probably is a major turn, but it depends mostly on whether it's a major turn in other things. There was a perfect storm of factors here. One of them was the storm itself. As Hurricane Michael was approaching the Gulf, you know, you've got all the panic and fear of what could happen that's pushing the price higher. But as it's passed the producing assets and started, you know, even though it was carnage for Florida, didn't take out any oil rigs in the Gulf of Mexico. You know, everything continues. Life is on. The production that was shut down in the Gulf of Mexico will be restarted. So that uncertainty comes out of the market. That allowed the price to come down. That was one factor. Of course, Well, first, the equity market selling off so dramatically starts to signal potential recession coming, fears about the economy. That's helping crude oil prices come down. And then whammo, 6 million barrel build on inventory. And we'd already seen API— everything was delayed by a day this week because of the Columbus Day holiday.
But we had seen API predicting a 9.8 million barrel build on inventory. So it was only 6 million barrels when we got the EIA data on Thursday, but that still Still was more than double analysts' expectations of about a 2.5 million barrel build. So massive build there. Cushing, Oklahoma building 2.4 million barrels. Gasoline building almost a million barrels at 951,000 barrels. Distillates building 2.7 million barrels. So we got really big builds across the board. US production ticking up another 100,000 barrels to 11.2 million barrels. Remember, they only move the number 100,000 barrels at a time, so it's not particularly accurate.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: In general, I think all of these factors come together to say, hey, it really looks like there's a lot of reasons to be bearish in oil. Now, I don't think that necessarily means that we're seeing the beginning of some price crash. It could go that way. It's always possible if this is an actual stock market crash that's beginning that, you know, everything just goes down from here and oil goes with it. I don't think that that's the most likely case. I think we're more likely to get a bounce here in stocks. And if we do, it's going to be very interesting to see whether oil bounces with it or not.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold because, wow, what a big breakout day, breaking out of a several-month range. Is this for real?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, something is up here. And the thing I think is most interesting is it's not explained by the weakness in the dollar. Yes, the dollar was weak. That should mean gold is up. But this amount of weakness in the dollar should have put gold up $5, not $30.
So we saw this Very decisive breakout today. The, the gold bugs, I'm sure, would say, hey, it's the safety trade is finally happening. One day doesn't make a trend, so I'm not quite ready to say that, but something is going on here because it's not explained by the move in the dollar index. And also, we saw a break in the correlation with the Chinese yuan, which has been very tightly coordinated with gold. So something's up. It is the beginning of something. I want to ask Charlie McElligott, because he is so good at knowing, you know, that gold is traded by CTAs, among other people. Charlie is extremely good at looking at and analyzing the levels at which the CTAs are going to change their conviction and change their trading positions. And I don't know if it was a move through one of those levels that triggered today, but I want to know from Charlie what the levels are to watch for above the current market that might accelerate this move, because it feels to me like something's up here.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yield because we obviously had that explosion in yields to 3.25% on the 10-year. And then now that the markets were kind of roiled up, you basically had a throwback to about 3.15%, still above that 3.10% level that we've been talking about for months and months. Obviously, this seems like people are finding a little safe haven in the Treasury bonds, at least temporarily. Do you think this is a key turning point or is this just a pause?
Erik Townsend: I think it's more likely to be a pause, but I think the really interesting question is going to be what I What I believe is going on now is, okay, stock market is selling off dramatically. Everybody knows, and that's the everybody knows in air quotes, the kind of everybody knows that might turn into everybody's wrong.
Everybody knows that when the stock market sells off, that money goes into the bond market, up in price on bonds and down in yields. So yields are coming down on the 10-year because that's what happens when the stock market sells off. Now, I think, Patrick, it makes perfect sense on this first couple of days of selling that since that's That's what everybody expects. There's kind of a self-fulfilling prophecy there. The big question in my mind is, do we have the ingredients— and I think it's very likely that we do— for stocks and bonds both to sell off at the same time together, which would mean stock market accelerating to the downside even as bond yields continue to accelerate to the upside? That's not a prediction yet, but my point is, most everybody assumes, no, it doesn't work that way. They're inversely correlated. They're inversely correlated until they're not, and it's going to be very interesting to see
Patrick Ceresna: Thanks for the market update, Erik. Now, this week's featured interview guest is Professor Steve Keen. Erik's interview with Professor Keen is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Steve Keen: sovereign vs private debt
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Professor Steve Keen from Kingston University. Steve, it's so good to have you back on the program. It's been way too long. I want to start with a topic that you and I have talked about a lot before, which is the massive overhang of sovereign debt around the world. And the view that I've been coming around more and more to is, you know, I'm convinced that we're headed towards some kind of a financial crisis as a result of all of this excessive Massive debt in the system. The thing is, everybody seems to assume automatically, okay, financial crisis, stock market's gonna crash. And what I'm starting to realize is, boy, you know, I think the driver is going to be bond markets, sovereign bond markets that are, in some cases, negative yielding. I mean, this is crazy. Eventually, it all has to come falling down. And I'm starting to wonder, is it necessarily the case that that means there's a stock market crash?
Or could it be that if the bond market is distressed and Treasuries are no longer a safety trade, That the stock market is actually supported by that, or maybe if it's not supported, doesn't get taken down as much. So the next financial crisis, which of course is the topic of a book that you wrote recently and has been extremely popular, we know there's a financial crisis coming. Is it mostly about the bond market or is it mostly about the stock market? What's the driver and how's it going to play out?
Steve Keen: We're going to have a good old argument here, mate, because I'm actually of the opinion that it's— except in the case of the Eurozone, It's not sovereign debt that matters. It's private debt. And there will be issues of private debt with countries running trade deficits. And so that includes potentially a country like Australia, for example, but it doesn't include countries like China or let's say South Korea that have substantial foreign trade excess trade surpluses and so aren't beholden to whether they can finance their debt in their own currency or not. So let's say— let's go back to basics. Where do we start on that one? Because I, I do see a rise in bond prices, in bond rates, and therefore a fall in bond prices because there is a sense of normalization going on right now with global interest rates. A false sense, but I think it'll last for about between 1 and 3 years. And as that does happen, of course, you know, with interest rates going up, bond prices go down.
But I think the governments that have issued bonds in their own currency still have the backstop of their central banks. And this is the thing that people who are expecting a bond market apocalypse aren't taking into account properly.
Erik Townsend: So you think that the bond market crisis, if it's a bond market crisis, is driven by corporates? Does that mean that sovereigns are still a safety trade and they're supported to some extent, and what we're looking at is really a change in spreads between corporates and sovereigns, or does everything fall together?
Steve Keen: No, I think a change in spreads is more likely. You've probably heard of modern monetary theory. Have you heard of that new non-orthodox approach to economics?
Erik Townsend: I have, but for any of our listeners who haven't, why don't you give us a quick overview?
Steve Keen: Okay. Well, I'm generally inconsistent with it, but I've criticized parts of its arguments on international trade, which I think are frankly bonkers. So I'm not an MMT fanboy, in case anybody's worried about that. In fact, I get criticized by a lot of MMT fanboys. So let's just go back to see what I see them saying, which is completely correct in an accounting sense. That first of all, if you think about the financial world, you have to divide to understand your own financial position, regardless of how many physical things you own. When you look at the financial value of what you've got, you work out your net equity by subtracting your liabilities from your assets. And the classic law of accounting that assets minus liabilities equals equity. And that's— we all, of course, strive to have positive equity.
Now, what we don't do, and this is, I think, I'm obviously the leading person on the planet about doing it, is seeing what does that mean at the macroeconomic level? Because individually, everybody has assets minus liabilities equal equity, and we all are striving to get positive equity.
Now, you look at the global economy, forget about national borders now, and imagine we've got an overall global economy. Then for every asset, there's a liability. What is an asset for one person is a liability for another. That therefore means that if there's one person whose assets minus liabilities gives them positive equity, and you take that person out of the equation and say, what's the rest of the world look like? The rest of the world has to have negative equity precisely equal to that person's positive equity. And that applies no matter who you're talking about, whether you're talking about a person or a sector or a country.
If assets minus liabilities leads to positive equity for sector X, Then sector everything except sector X has got negative equity. That's just a simple mathematical rule. In that sense, there's a conservation law applying. And what I'm doing is looking at the implications of that.
Now, modern monetary theory has done the same thing and have argued that if you look at a national economy, then because one person's asset is another liability, a person's liability, one sector's assets, another sector's liability, if the government is trying to achieve positive equity, So it's trying to make sure that what it gets in taxes is greater than what it pays out in services.
Its change in equity is going to be the opposite of the change in equity of the people it's taxing. So if the government pushes itself more towards its flow of expenditure such that its taxes are greater than its spending, it means it's reduced the equity of the rest of the economy by that much. So the government is tempted to say, if you get back to a budget balance, for example, or even running a budget surplus, means by definition the rest of the world with which it's interacting goes negative equity.
And they therefore say, that's not a good idea.
Because in fact, if the government runs a negative equity— or if you and I run negative equity, we get caught in that situation, then several possibilities exist. One is if we're a bank, we're bankrupt, period. Banks have to have positive equity. Secondly, if we're a company, we can handle having aggregate negative equity so long as we're getting enough turnover to service our debts as and when they fall due out of the profit we're making.
will often end up selling assets in that situation or trying to speculate on assets to get ahead. So when you look at the aggregate level, you can't say we should all strive to get positive equity. But that's like saying, you know, we should all strive to be on the upside of a seesaw. I'm sorry, there is no such possibility. If one side's up, the other side's down. So the question is, who can sustain negative equity? Can banks? Definition by definition, no. If they're negative equity, they go bankrupt. Can firms? Yes, if they've got enough cash flow coming in. But of course, if cash flow diminishes, they can go bankrupt as well. Households will feel distressed in the case of negative equity. The only institution which can sustain negative equity indefinitely is an institution which owns its own bank, and banks' liabilities are accepted as payment by everybody else in that particular society.
By definition, that's the government. The government, which issues its own currency, has a bank which effectively underwrites any bonds that it sells. And if it can't sell those bonds, to the private sector, if there's a shortfall, then the central bank can buy them. And what actually happens through open market operations is a convoluted way of doing that. So, so long as you're able to issue bonds in your own currency as a national government, you can then back them up with your central bank effectively operating as an underwriter that you own and that returns any profits it makes back to you. So in that accounting sense, it's foolish to worry about whether a national country government issuing bonds in its own currency can run out of money to pay— buy those bonds in the first place or to service the interest rate. It can do both.
Junk bonds, QE and QT
Erik Townsend: Let's focus on the corporate side of that because, as you say, and I think you make an excellent argument, if you're the government, you can get away with a lot. What you're saying is that corporations can get away with things as long as they're positive cash flow, even if it takes them into negative equity. But Steve, we've been over the last 10 years through this cycle where what's happened is so many corporations have seen the opportunity to finance share buybacks using, in a lot of cases, junk debt. They're issuing all kinds of junk bonds, and they're massively, massively indebted.
And everybody's assuming that, well, you know, in this Fed-created economy that we have, thanks to quantitative easing, everything is going to continue to be hunky-dory. At some point, if the cash flow is not there, as I think you're alluding, it would seem that the huge risk is to corporations not being able to service those debts anymore. And you would think that markets would see this coming and we'd be seeing high yield spreads blowing out to extreme proportions. But in actuality, we've seen the opposite over the last 6 months or so, where high yield spreads over sovereign yields have tightened. And, you know, we've, we've got junk bond indices making new all-time highs in the last few months. How is that possible? I mean, or I guess what I should say is why isn't the market seeing what you're describing coming? Because it seems to me that you make a perfectly persuasive argument, but I sure don't see the market fearing that we're about to have a junk bond blowup.
If anything, there seems to be increasing complacency around the security of this, this very, I think, excessive corporate debt that's been built up to fund all of these share purchases.
Steve Keen: I think that's a very good analysis. And that's, that's what worries me, because I think it is the spreads that are going to matter. And the reason is, if you think about the issues of junk bonds and all this stuff that's been happening, it has been— the share buybacks in particular— it's been enabled by the Federal Reserve running quantitative easing for the last— what are we talking— over a decade.
And now they're going towards quantitative tightening. Now, while they were doing quantitative easing, what it meant was that, first of all, they were— So take the Federal Reserve, the US case, which is the clearest case. The Federal Reserve committed itself to buying $80 billion worth worth of bonds per month, which is roughly $1 trillion per year. What they were effectively saying is, is the open market operations, which they engage in all the time to try to keep the interest rate within the target band they've set, they were saying, we're going to be on the buy side, net $80 billion per month indefinitely.
And they weren't just buying government bonds, they were buying high— supposedly high-ranked corporate bonds and so on. What that meant was effectively Basically, the financial sector was handing over $1 trillion worth of bonds every year to the Fed Reserve in return for $1 trillion worth of cash. Now, you don't want cash. You want something that's going to be an interest rate returning object. You've sold what could have been junk to the Fed Reserve at a nice price, thanks very much. But you now want to— with the money you've got back, you now want to use that money to buy something else. Now, you can't buy bonds. In the sense that you can't buy government bonds because the government said we're going to be on the buy side that substantially. You can't buy high-rated corporates because again, that's what the Federal Reserve is buying.
What can you buy? You can buy shares or you can buy low-rated corporates. And I think that's what's going on. A large part of the demand we've seen for the low-rated corporates and for shares, and particularly financing share buybacks, has been an impact of this massive creation of not of creation of money in the real economy, but creation of money in the financial sector by the government running quantitative easing to the tune of $1 trillion a year.
Now, what they're doing now is they've started to feel confident. First of all, that's, that's given you a background of people who've taken that as that's the scenery that's been happening for a decade. That's therefore the scenery. That's the context in which they're trying to interpret the current arrangements.
Of course, at the moment, we know the Fed is trying to switch from quantitative easing towards quantitative tightening and to go from buying $80 billion to the— at the moment, They're selling between $30 and $50 billion per month back to the private sector. And of course, when they sell it, they put all those processes into reverse.
Erik Townsend: So let's discuss how this plays out. For anyone who's not aware, you've written a book called Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? The book has been extremely well received. But for anyone who wants the executive summary, no, we can't avoid another financial crisis. So how does this play out? Because it sounds like you're saying the real problem is private debt and the excessive amount of corporate credit, including these low-rated corporate credits. And I couldn't possibly agree more with you, Steve, that it makes brilliant sense, everything that you're saying, except for one thing, which is the market keeps paying more and more and more for, you know, European junk bonds that are actually yielding lower, lower than US 10-year Treasuries for European junk-rated corporate debt. And, uh, you know, obviously this is a result of governments monkeying with the economy. But if the expectation is, okay, at some point there's going to be an aha moment, the market is going to recognize that this junk debt is overpriced, people are going to short it aggressively, and there's going to be a crash— well, I agree completely with the logic, but it seems like there's plenty of signals in the system right now that things are starting to get dicey, yet we haven't seen any real dislocation in all of these low-rated credit markets.
Steve Keen: Right.
Erik Townsend: corporate fixed income issues. So are people just afraid to short it because they don't want to pay the carry on it? What's going on here?
Steve Keen: Well, that could be the case. I mean, it's also— shorting is always dangerous, as you know. Getting it— you can be right and get your timing wrong and go bankrupt because you're right at the wrong time. So shorting is always a dangerous pastime for most people. And I think what that means is that we don't actually see the turnaround until after the panic point hits. You'll get individuals who either set themselves up well or who've got deep pockets and can handle a bit of a loss for an extended period. But the majority wait until the turn occurs. And then it's everybody for the doorways at once. And that's when you see the crunch. So if you're talking about low-rated European corporates being overvalued right now, I think that's a classic case of the market reacting too slowly and then overreacting when it does because the European corporates are much more exposed exposed to the dangers of bad government policy than the US corporates are because they've got the European Central Bank and they only have the euro.
And with only the euro, of course, you have 18 countries effectively that don't have their own central bank backing themselves in their own currency. And therefore, if they start running trade deficits or if they start getting the insanity of the Maastricht Treaty imposed upon relatively trivial government deficits at the moment, then those economies could have a crunch. And of course, it will feed through to the corporates who won't be able to service their bonds. So I think that's an obvious play coming up right now, exploiting both misunderstandings people have about the actual thing where they tend to worry too much about sovereign debt issued by nations with their own currency. And at the same time, those nations, and particularly the ECB now, which manages a disaster called the euro, they are likely to trying to return to what they think is normal without understanding where the first crisis came from.
And I think they're going to trigger recession in their own economies over the next couple of years by trying to return to what they think is normal with the central bank interest rates rising up towards 3% and 4% again.
Where the next crisis starts: France, Australia, Canada, China
Erik Townsend: Steve, as we look at how another financial crisis might occur, and, you know, let's start with the last one. It started in the United States really because of this securitization phenomenon where there was just so much fraud Frankly, that had occurred in issuance of subprime mortgages, that it created a credit crisis in the United States and the contagion spread around the world.
I think a lot of people make the assumption that it has to work the same way next time. How would you see, since you wrote the book on the subject of the next global financial crisis, where would you see it starting? Does it start in the United States the way the last one did, or does it start somewhere else? And if somewhere else, where else and why?
Why? And how does it proceed from there? And what is the mechanism of transmission? And how does it eventually grow in scope to reach the global economy?
Steve Keen: Well, the starting point is what actually caused the last crisis. It wasn't so much that the securitization caused the last crisis, it's that it let the last crisis— delayed it so that it became bigger when it finally occurred. Because what drove the last crisis is what's driven every financial crisis in history, and that's too much private debt growing too rapidly. Because when it does grow too rapidly, what's actually happening is credit is too high. So if I take the United States data series for private debt, which you can find at the Bank for International Settlements, for example, and take it right back to 1950— back in 1952 or '53, the level of private debt in America was roughly 50% of GDP, and credit was running at about 5% or 6% of GDP. Fast forward to 2005, and the level of private debt had risen to 160% of GDP, so more than trebling. And credit was running at about 5%. Credit was approaching 15% of GDP.
Now, credit, which is the annual change in debt— and the reason I define credit as the change in debt is when you take out— when you get a new loan from the bank, that's the change in debt. That you accept that new loan for $1 million, the debt that gives you, because the bank's put $1 million in your bank account. They're precisely equal. You would not accept the bank saying, here's $1 million of credit, and we're recording $1.1 million of debt against you. You'd say, hang on a second. Wait a second. You're going to record $1.1 million? You give me $1.1 million. So the credit, which is your spending power, borrowed spending power, is precisely equal to the change in debt.
Now, conventional economists ignore this because they have this mythical view of banking that said banks are like introduction agencies for mature people who want to cheat on their spouses, who don't actually— they don't provide the service you're looking for, but they introduce you to somebody else who who'll give you that service. I call it the Ashley Madison theory of banking. What banks actually do is originate loans and originate money at the same time. And then the borrower doesn't borrow— pardon me— for the sheer pleasure of being in debt. You borrow because you want to spend the money. So that change in— that increase in debt, which is credit, is spent into the economy and becomes a significant part of aggregate demand.
Now, a crisis occurs when the borrowing money leads to ventures that fail and people can't pay their debt back, when people get too worried about the leverage of assets they've bought and they stop borrowing for that reason, when banks get scared about the level of leverage they've got themselves into and they stop lending as well, all those things bring it to a crunch and you go from positive credit to negative credit. And when you have negative credit, that's actually taking money out of the economy and directly subtracting demand. But that's what caused the crisis back in 2007, 2008. And I look at the data, I see that credit, which was between 1950 and 2007, was 100% of GDP.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Steve Keen: Maximum level was 2007 when it hit 15% of GDP. And by 2010, it was down to -5% of GDP or -6%. So that's what actually caused the crisis, a 20% of GDP turnaround in credit from positive to negative.
Now, that also happened in the UK on a larger scale there. It was bigger still in Spain, gigantic in Ireland. These are all the countries that had an obvious financial crisis during the GFC, Iceland as well.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Steve Keen: Well, all those countries that had a huge— a lot of it was driven by housing booms, of course.
Countries that avoided the crisis, ones that continued to borrow through the crisis or even started their borrowing after, like China.
And they're the ones where I think they're going to have a crisis because the solution was to have more of the problem. And to give you my favorite example on that front, which is actually a country most people wouldn't expect, it's France. Because if I take a look at France, And say, what was France's level of private debt when the global financial crisis hit? The answer is 150% of GDP. What is its current level of debt? 192% of GDP.
So in America's crisis, had private debt rising from 50% of GDP back in the 1950s to 166% when the global financial crisis hit, and topping out at 170% and then falling from there. Okay. There to 150% now. On the other hand, France just sailed straight through the crisis with borrowing rising. So its debt level back in the 1970s, about as far as I can go back, is about 80% of GDP. It flatlined at about 100% of GDP till the middle of the 1980s. Then when the euro was formed, it took off from of the order of 130% of GDP to 180% 150% by the time the global financial crisis hit, well below America's level at that time.
It is now 192% of GDP. So France has avoided the crisis by continuing to borrow money. Now what it means is when they flatline, they're going to have a gigantic fall in their level of demand. So I expect France to be one of the next major centers to have a financial crisis.
And the other countries I include in that list are Australia, Australia, Canada, China, and South Korea. But I distinguish between the first 2 and the last 2 because Australia and Canada are both running trade deficits. And that makes them, in my opinion, very exposed to a failure to have credit continuing. Whereas China and South Korea are running large trade surpluses. And with that trade surplus, they can mask the problems because the trade surplus creates money, making up for the money which gets destroyed when credit runs out. France is actually in a similar situation. It's pretty much running a balanced— a balance of trade.
It's relying on a large amount of credit. It's got a huge amount of accumulated debt that has to stop growing. And when it does, they'll either have a serious crisis or a serious slowdown.
And my money's actually on more of a slowdown than a crisis because even though they've got this huge level of private debt, they haven't reached the levels of the borrowing that America did. So at the moment, the level of credit in France is running at roughly 9% of GDP versus 15% for America when its crisis hit. But it's got a high level of leverage. As I said, it's got 192% 42% of debt as private debt as it's debtable right now versus America when the crisis hit at about 30% of GDP lower.
Erik Townsend: So if I'm assimilating all of this correctly, it sounds like countries like France and Canada and Australia, to a lesser extent China, because even though their debt problem is just as big, they have the cushion of a trade surplus to help them service that debt. You're saying that those would be the places where the You've talked about where you think the next global financial crisis might start to occur.
How would that happen? What's the transmission mechanism? What are the signs? Does this happen primarily in credit markets, or does it happen in equity markets? And if it starts in those countries, how long does it take, and what does it look like as it starts to go through the process of contagion into the rest of the global economy?
Steve Keen: The contagion won't have the same impact that contagion had from the States because, again, And then what happened when the States fell over, talking the world's biggest economy at the time, and in the UK, which is one of the world's top 10 economies, also having the same sort of credit crunch, and then Spain and Ireland, and a global tendency for credit to slow down. The countries where it turned negative are the ones that had the crisis. That's definitely UK, USA, Spain, and Ireland. Credit went from massively positive to massively negative, and the same thing was transpiring. Yeah. Transmitted throughout Europe by the euro and by the Maastricht Treaty. So like in the case of Spain, for example, negative credit went from +40% of GDP to -20% over the crisis. In Greece, it was about +15% to -20%. So in Italy, about +10% to -5%, something of that nature. So large turnarounds. I don't see the same large turnarounds being triggered by this happening.
But what I see happening at the same time is the countries that managed to avoid the crisis— and not avoid, they managed— the countries that experienced the crisis and then have slowly navigated their way out of it through quantitative easing and through, to some extent, government stimulus spending, those countries are now thinking, oh, the crisis is behind us. Of course, we know that it wasn't caused by credit because we're listening to conventional economists here and they tell us to ignore credit. So let's get interest rates back up to normal levels again, which means about 4% for For the central banks, they'd like— the Federal Reserve's favorite rate of interest rate is 4%.
And as they get back to that level, what they don't realize, they're making corporate rates at least 6%, probably 7% on mortgages. And with, let's say, the average rate of private interest on private, that then hits about 6% of GDP.
That means that because America's carrying a debt level of 1.5 times GDP, pretty much 10% of GDP has to be used to service existing debt. Now that is big enough to mean that corporates and certainly a lot of households are going to say, we can't afford this anymore. Bang, we cut back on spending. But that's the voluntary decision. But we might also have to declare bankruptcy. That's the enforced decision. And that'll happen to a lot of corporates, I think. And what you'll see as a result is a substantial fall in credit in America as well, not on the scale of what happened back in 2008, but more like what happened back in the 1930s and what's known as the Roosevelt And what happened then was Roosevelt was persuaded by his advisors that the worst was over. By this stage, unemployment had fallen from the peak of 25% in 1932-33 down to 11%. And he said, get the budget back into balance again.
He tried to get balance back into the budget. I think there were some rate rises as well. And the private sector started to delever again. And unemployment, having fallen from 25% to 11%, blew out to 20%.
Erik Townsend: Wow. Steve, let me interrupt you there because we've had several guests on this program tell us, look, if you want to know where the just huge credit expansion has occurred since 2009, China, baby, that's where it's at. If you want to know where the credit crisis that's going to take down the global economy is going to start from, it's going to be China. And it sounds like what you're saying is, yeah, maybe the numbers are there in terms of credit expansion in China, China, but China runs a trade surplus, and that's going to help them with cushioning the blow. And I guess I don't quite follow the logic, because it seems to me like if there is contagion to the rest of the global economy, then the demand for Chinese exports is going to go down, and that's going to impair their ability to use that trade surplus to service that debt.
What am I missing here?
Steve Keen: Not a lot. I think I agree with that generally, but I want to put some background on it again for For a start, China has its own currency, and they're trying to make that currency a global player as well. France does not. So, in terms of the government's capacity to counter what goes wrong, France hasn't got the capacity. China does. And that means that you can expect the Chinese government to be pumping large amounts of government fiat money into the economy at the same time as credit money is running out.
Now, to give you an idea of some of the numbers here, I'm looking at the data from the Bank for International Settlements now. So if you look at the level of private debt in China when the global financial crisis hit, it was about 120% of GDP, which is below my absolute danger line of 150%, but still high. But it was trending down because with the scale of trade surpluses China was running with government spending as well, that enabled the private sector in China to continue deleveraging. The crisis hit. And of course, when the global financial crisis hit, exports by China to America plunged by something like 40%. You had a massive Massive emigration of people out of the coastal cities and the factories there back to the rural counties where they were registered because they think there's no unemployment for you except where you're registered in China. So they had to leave. Huge political challenge to the Communist Party at that stage.
The response was to tell basically their banks, which of course are mainly state-owned or state-controlled, to lend with anybody with a pulse. And the biggest property bubble in history began in China.
If you go to 2009, 2009, the level of credit in that year started jumping. It went from, at that stage, 16% of GDP, and it blasted up to 39% of GDP by 2010. Now, it's been running lower than— not those high levels, but certainly, if I go to say 2012, it was running at 22% of GDP. By 2013, it's 30% of GDP. We're talking substantial numbers, twice the scale of what I was talking about for America. By 2016, still 28% of GDP. Now it's trending down now. It's still huge, but it's kind of— it's pretty well about 20%, maybe 19% of GDP.
So of course, a turnaround from that point towards negative credit with nothing else to counteract it would be a major crisis and feed through to the rest of the world. But at the same time, China is spending massively on what they're What they call the Silk Road project, the One Belt Road, the massive attempts to decarbonize the economy, which of course at the same time, there are other parts of the government pumping out coal-powered power stations, but lots of the attempts to put solar and wind power into China, the high-speed rail, all that expenditure, according to some sources I've seen, is totaling excess government spending over government taxation in China of about 15% of GDP.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Steve Keen: Now, to put that in context, that's 3 times the size of the New Deal and 1.5 times the size of the stimulus under Obama in 2009. So if that much is coming in from the government while the credit's going negative at the same time and the country is running a trade surplus, that buffers the extent of the downturn. So I do think there's a credit crunch happening in China. I do think it'll be big, but the Chinese have got a capacity to mask it by the level of government spending. And at the same time, time, because banking is basically double-entry bookkeeping and people can cheat at double-entry bookkeeping. I expect the Chinese government to tell its banks to cheat and continue operating if they are in negative equity. So you won't see the same impact on the downturn there that you saw in America where that sort of thing can't be done.
De-dollarization and the Bancor
Erik Townsend: I want to pick up on something you said a minute ago about China trying to make the RMB, its currency, into a global currency. And, you know, this really brings back to my
Steve Keen: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: In my mind, the subject of de-dollarization, Sergey Glazyev in Russia trying to persuade other countries to stop using the dollar for international trade settlement, for purchase of oil in particular. Now we've seen China with this yuan-denominated crude oil contract on the Shanghai Futures Exchange. But in the past, you know, this has been China and Russia complaining that they don't like the hegemony the dollar has over the global financial system. No surprise that China and Russia don't like what the United States are doing. But what we've seen, Steve, just in recent weeks is, to my thinking, is a fairly dramatic change in that the German foreign minister made a public statement with just so much frustration over President Trump's very aggressive use of withholding access to the SWIFT payment system as a way to impose sanctions, not only on on Iran, but on any country that's doing business with Iran, including countries that have not sanctioned Iran.
So what we saw was first Germany in August making this public statement that really surprised me, because it seemed like for the first time that I can remember, Germany is publicly taking, you know, Russia and China's side of this argument in not supporting the United States as their long-term ally. But in late September, about a month Later, we saw the European Union's foreign policy chief stand shoulder to shoulder with the Iranian foreign minister and announce that the European Union was committed to creating a mechanism to bypass the SWIFT payment network to allow European corporations to continue to do lawful business with Iranian corporations and with the Iranian government, intentionally working against US sanctions because those US sanctions had been imposed unilaterally.
Steve Keen: Right.
Erik Townsend: Unilaterally and did not carry the weight of a United Nations blessing. So, all of a sudden, the European Union standing shoulder to shoulder with the Iranian foreign policy minister saying the United States is wrong and we're committed to building a workaround to the SWIFT system, it gets me thinking.
And it clearly hasn't happened yet, Steve, but if Russia and China can somehow win over Europe and get them on their side of this de-dollarization,
Steve Keen: Right.
Erik Townsend: thing. That to me really brings serious question to the dollar's certainty of maintaining its reserve currency status in the long run. Am I crazy to think that?
Steve Keen: No, I don't think you're crazy. I think it's been crazy to use the American dollar for that length of time anyway. Donald Trump is very happy to talk about how he's great making deals and, you know, these are these bad deals to reverse. Well, there's one bad deal he should reverse straight away, and that's using the United States dollar as the reserve currency. Because that was Harry Dexter White at the 1944 Bretton Woods Conference rolling over Keynes, who wanted to bring an international payment system based on a non-national currency that he called the Bancor, which was to be issued by a body which was International Clearing Union, which was in some ways it's similar would be the International Monetary Fund today. But that currency would have been issued proportional to the size of each national economy. So America would have got the biggest number of Bancor, obviously. And then you were trading, you'd have to convert your national currency into Bancor to buy something off anybody else.
And there were controls to stop deficits and surpluses exceeding— and wait for it— 1% of GDP. Now we have got Germany running a surplus of 9% of GDP. China is fairly similar. And these surpluses, of course, necessarily mean deficits elsewhere in the world. One of those places being America, which is normally running a trade deficit of about 5% of GDP. And indeed, it has to maintain a trade a trade deficit in that sense, because since it's the reserve currency, other countries and corporations and people around the world have a demand for US dollars over and above their desire to buy US goods, which means, of course, that US industry is handicapped by an overvalued dollar. I'd just go with a rough ballpark at saying it's got to be at least 30% overvalued. I've seen people claim it's twice the value it should be. So in that situation, the only benefit America gets out of it is a big benefit.
It's got the financial muscle to push the rest of the world around. We've normally seen that in terms of American corporations being able to buy assets in the rest of the world with US dollars. But it also means things like the SWIFT payment system uses the American dollar. And if the Americans say, we're not going to let Iranians use SWIFT, then bang, Iran can't trade with anywhere in the world. And we get political blackmail on top of a stupid bloody system in the first place. So I think, you know, I've been making the case myself as an academic for 30-something years that we should go to what Keynes originally wanted, which was the Bancor for international trade, not the American dollar.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Steve Keen: And have controls to stop the deficits and surpluses getting out of hand. The myth that the market would do it itself is obviously wrong, given the sustained surpluses we've seen for countries like Japan and Germany, or Japan in particular, for 30 or 40 years.
We have to have another system. Now, it may be that the biggest gift Donald Trump is giving to the world is he's making it so intolerable to use the US system that we might finally see countries like Germany, as you say, Iran, Russia, and China coming together and saying, let's devise a different system. And I'm— I know that the Chinese central bank has been talking about a Bancor. So I hope this is what's going to happen.
Erik Townsend: Well, Steve, great minds think alike. I happen to be writing a book about this very subject, and my hypothesis is as follows. I think that China and Russia have already figured out that digital currency technology invented by the cryptocurrency crowd gives them exactly the leverage that they need to create effectively the Bancor, and it will come in the form of a global currency, a global digital currency, which is designed for the express purpose of upstaging the US dollar and replacing it as the world's global reserve currency. And I'm not talking about cryptocurrency. I'm not a cryptocurrency believer. I don't think that that movement has a whole lot of steam left in it, but the technology invention of distributed ledger and double-spend-proof digital cash are exactly what you need to build a global digital currency system, which I think has the opportunity to upstage the dollar. And I'm convinced that China and Russia are already working on it, which is the subject of my book.
I'm very curious, do you think I'm, I'm nuts to think that that's a possibility? And what do you think the odds are of someone such as China and Russia Russia asserting a potentially gold-backed digital currency, which is designed to replace the US dollar as the world's global reserve currency.
Steve Keen: I don't know about the gold-backed side, but you know, I'm a gold skeptic because I think the whole idea that people believe currencies need to have backing in terms of a commodity or anything of that nature is nonsense. The backing of a state apparatus or an agreed system between states, that is all you need. Now, if you have China and Russia and Europe and Iran saying, okay, we're going to invent an electronic trading system where we'll pay in Bancors to buy Iranian oil, to buy European goods in return, and so on. And we recognize that and accept it. That's enough for it to work. And of course, the distributed ledger side of blockchain, I think, is a disaster because of the enormous amount of processing time that gets wasted with millions of people maintaining the same ledger and all the time delays built into the system as well.
But if you're talking to a number of central banks just maintaining a copy of a ledger so that they know that the transactions are verified and accepted, and it's a reproduction of the multiple accounting system at the level of central banks, that works perfectly well.
So you're quite right. I think that's actually a very sensible speculation.
Erik Townsend: Well, I'll send you a draft of the book. I agree with you completely that blockchain is for the birds. I think blockchain's going nowhere. I'm talking about a permissioned distributed ledger, which is thousands of times faster than blockchain and eliminates its dependence on the proof-of-work algorithm, which is the whole problem with the performance that you're talking about. Anyway, let's save my book for a different day. I want to come back to your book, which is Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? For anyone who's not familiar with it, give us just a real quick rundown of that, and then I want to move on to your work on Patreon.
Steve Keen: Okay, well, the basic thesis of Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis, of course, is what caused the last one. And as one of the handful of people who saw the crisis coming, the reason I did was I focus upon private debt and credit. And what I saw in the case of the last crisis was private debt in my home country of Australia and in America as well growing too rapidly, meaning we're too dependent on credit, and meaning that when debt stopped growing, total demand would fall and it would hit asset markets first and then pass through to the real economy.
That's what happened in America on a grand scale. My country, home country of Australia, avoided it because the government then encouraged the housing bubble that was starting to burst at the time to restart by doubling and trebling the amount of money they gave to first-time buyers to get into the market. And that credit boost followed by what China did with its gigantic internal stimulus as well put Australia into one of the survivor categories that didn't have a crisis back in 2008. So to me, it's a debt-driven, credit-driven crisis. America, the UK, Spain, and Ireland in particular had that crisis. Europe made it worse with the euro, but that's the basic crisis back in 2008. Now looking forward, what— from that point of time, I'd say the countries that had a crisis then are now what I call the walking dead. of debt. They're carrying such a level of private debt, any boost they get out of credit will be short-lived.
And looking at America in that case, for example, credit debt peaked at 170% of GDP in 2009, 2010. It fell to slightly below 150% by 2012. It's now rising again, but the rate of change of debt, which is what creates credit, is much lower than it was before the crisis. It's flatlined running at about 6% or 7% of GDP. So you don't get much of a boost out of the economy.
And when the authorities, who don't understand this at all, I'm afraid to say, when the authorities like the Federal Reserve decide to stabilize the economy by putting up interest rates to fight inflation, they will trigger another downturn with the private sector going back into deleveraging again. And that's what hit Japan for the last 25 years. So I call these the walking dead of debt, and they're never going to quite get out of it.
The zombies-to-be are the countries that managed to avoid a crisis by continuing to borrow money through the crisis back in 2008, keeping credit demand positive, but of course accumulating more private debt in the process. The primary country that did that is China, but China, as I've mentioned, has the fallback of enormous government spending as well. The countries that don't have that fallback and that have had the same credit-driven avoidance of the financial crisis back in 2008, they're the ones that are going to have a crisis in the near future. And that in particular involves Canada and Australia, which are the most obvious examples. It also involves France, which is the next biggest economy that has also relied upon credit to get through the crisis. And then of course you have a number of smaller countries, some of which are running trade surpluses. They may manage to, to buffet themselves from the crisis.
But fundamentally, all crises are caused by excessive private debt. All crises come to an end when private debt stops rising, and you then find yourself in the aftermath. And we are now carrying an aftermath of private debt, which is so great that I think the global economy is caught in credit stagnation rather than secular stagnation, and will stay there until we reduce the level of private debt. And we won't do it deliberately, we'll most likely do it by fighting climate change.
Keen's Patreon experiment
Erik Townsend: Steve, last time we had you on the program, you were exploring something new, and I thought very exciting, because you have for a long time had the reputation of being the A guy who, despite having a PhD in economics, still speaks and writes in plain English and is very good explaining economics in plain English.
In addition to your work as a university professor, you were undertaking something to create essentially a program on Patreon to get people who wanted to learn about economics to support you through the Patreon funding mechanism, and you were basically—
Steve Keen: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: going to supply a flow of writing and other services. It was a brand new idea that you were just experimenting last we spoke to you. How has that gone? How many followers have you managed to get on Patreon? Is it going well, and is it something that you're going to continue to do?
Steve Keen: Oh yeah, it's going very well. These things always grow more slowly than you expect, and then of course they have growth spurts when you, when you think they're going to go backwards. But when I started Patreon, in the first month I got to about 300 subscribers. Subscribers and $2,800 in revenue. I'm now running at about just under 1,000 subscribers, and the revenue is running at about $6,700 a month. And that's not quite as much as I was earning as an academic, but it's enough to mean I can continue being a rabble-rouser and not have to worry about all the nonsense that dominates universities these days.
And I've got quite a lively community of supporters there. And what, of course, what I'm going to be doing from now on is most of what I post goes out publicly. I use YouTube for my videos and I put my posts up for free after maybe a short delay for my patrons to see them first. But as I start writing the next couple of books, then all the draft chapters are going to turn up and I'm going to get feedback from my audience as I write them. So the main benefit is that feedback learning process. And what I'm going to consider doing as well when I cease working at the university sector, and at the moment it looks like being September of next year, I'll being employed at the university. I'll just be— I'll still be a professor, but I won't have a teaching role.
Then I'm going to start developing online courses using Patreon.
Erik Townsend: Well, that's fantastic news. I think that to give the world at large the opportunity to learn from someone with your perspective, and needless to say, having called the 2008 financial crisis in advance and having explained publicly why and how it was going to happen, you have a lot of credibility. For people who want to pursue this and find out more, where do they sign up or where do they find more information about what you offer on Patreon?
Steve Keen: Just go to patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen and they'll find me. So Prof Steve Keen is the handle. And of course, if they follow me on Twitter, you can't avoid seeing it there. I whack it in most of my Twitter posts. So it's quite easy to find. And the lowest level is $1 $1 a month, and the highest level anybody's actually putting money into is $100 a month. And there are various benefits for that, that I've, you know, I give various goodies out, maybe signed copies of books and stuff like that.
But the main reason people are there, and this is why I appreciate it so much, is they, they know we need a new economics, and they regard me as the leading person developing that. And they want to do their bit to try to bring about a realistic economics, because we can see the damage that unrealistic economics has done to the global economy and to human society, and it's about time we stopped it.
You can't— it won't happen at the universities. It'll only be rebels like myself, and maybe institutions like the OECD that are doing some work to try to bring about an alternative approach to economics that'll get us away from the religion we call economics as it is at the moment, get us something realistic. Forget ideology. Let's just understand capitalism before it— before we destroy it.
Erik Townsend: Well, I could not possibly endorse that view any more strongly. So amen to that, and I encourage all of our listeners to check out Steve's work. You'll find a link in your Research Roundup email to Steve's Patreon page at patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen. Steve, thanks so much for a fantastic interview. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven podcast. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Postgame: reaction to Keen
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview with Professor Keen. As a Canadian, I guess I always am interested to hear what his opinions are because he's always been talking about the huge credit problems that are developing in Australia and Canada. And now obviously in this interview, he throws France into that mix.
You know, the Canadian situation is very interesting. It continues to be under a lot of stress. And I shared recently stories about how the carry on homes is coming to multi-decade highs and, and how the debt situation is becoming stressed with higher interest rates. It certainly is going to be very interesting to see whether in the next few years bring about that kind of crack that causes the final turn in this debt bubble that's developing in these periphery countries. What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: You know, Steve Keen never stops impressing me. The guy is just like a fire hose of macroeconomic information. What fascinates me, and I want to talk to him again about this sometime, is we have very different views. Steve actually thinks I'm not one of those people who thinks that the reserve currency status that the US dollar holds— I started to say enjoys, 'cause I think it enjoys it— is a negative for the US. I see the loss of US dollar reserve currency as a major threat to the US economy. And the reason is, at least according to me, and I should be careful who I compete with here, according to me, the whole value is there's so much artificial demand for dollars. And Luke Gromen has described this on the program. That what results is both for Treasury debt and for dollars themselves. The dollar is stronger than it would be if not for reserve currency status, and there is so much debt that we get away with deficit spending.
This whole idea that politicians have that deficits don't matter is nonsense. The reality of the situation is that deficits matter a whole lot, but you get away with deficit spending without immediately feeling the consequences when you are the world's global reserve currency. And I think loss of that status really puts the US ability to borrow and spend beyond its means without paying the penalty in the form of higher borrowing costs at serious risk. Steve sees it differently, and I'd love to do an interview with him just on that subject. We'll have to get him back on the program for that topic at some point.
Charlie McElligott: CTA deleveraging, dealer gamma and the outlook
Erik Townsend: But Patrick, I want to bring in Charlie McElligott, who of course heads up cross-asset macro strategy for Nomura. Nomura. Charlie, thanks so much for joining us again. Last time we had you on the program, I think your sentiment was very similar to my own, which is, you know, we're in some kind of topping process here, but maybe there's still room for another high.
Maybe we haven't seen the high yet. I don't know about you. I'm kind of thinking at this point that maybe the high is in. What do you see and what's the big picture and what should we make of the carnage in markets this week?
Charlie McElligott: Sure. So I do think we're Very much still on the same page there. I know that the last time we spoke, I was touching on that concept of mine, the 2-speed year, with the second phase being the tighter financial conditions tantrum phase, which is effectively the endgame as we transition from late cycle into pre-recession. And certainly the very acute nature of what some people would say looks to be an equities-centric deleveraging of the past 2 days to a week and a half actually has a deeper macro origin in my mind, which again, if I'm really stepping back and talking almost more philosophically, it's the bigger picture here is that a higher real interest rate environment is resetting term premium. And with that, the cost of Leverage.
With that, cross-asset correlations, asset price valuation, all of these constructs built in the post-crisis quantitative easing era are now ripe to tip over. And we're seeing these rolling Minsky moments as the pseudo-stability of lower interest rates, flatter curves, and suppressed volatility breeds instability through the leverage that's had to have been deployed. on strategies over the past few years as yield was chased. And that's what we're coming out of right now.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Charlie, this is Patrick here. And I just wanted to elaborate. I really love your work when it comes to the quantitative analysis of the cumulative flows and the way the liquidity is driving triggers in the markets. Right now, you were talking about some of these key levels where these CTAs were all 100% max long a week ago, and suddenly they're flipping and having to unwind their long positions. I remember you saying a number, something in the vicinity of like $88 billion on the— to sell on just the other day. And you were talking about some very key technical levels. So the one was that the 2,719 level on the S&P, where there's a potential another wave of CTA selling potentially triggered. And as well, you were also talking about all of the gamma influences on the option dealer books.
Charlie McElligott: Yeah.
Patrick Ceresna: Why don't you elaborate on what you're seeing and where the kind of liquidity levels are right now and what you're seeing here, the risks in the next couple days?
Charlie McElligott: Sure. So I know that various negative convexity strategies, which have proliferated in the prior quantitative easing era, those lower yields, flatter curves, suppressed volatility, have led to the growth in systematic trend, risk control, risk parity, vol-targeting annuities, leveraged VIX ETNs. That's all part of the market structure that we deal with. And to my prior point, as we've transition from QE to QT, quantitative tightening, we are now going to be forced to see structural unwinds of some of these forces. So as it pertains particularly to the systematic community and the role that they play in the market, the highest impact of unemotional selling in the most violent fashion typically occurs through the CTA universe, the trend universe, one, because it's so structurally leveraged. And most importantly though, it's a shorter-term vehicle, shorter-term signals. So our model looks at windows from 2 weeks to 1 month to 3 months to 6 months to 1 year.
And we see the different transitions and the different signals generated across those buckets for various asset classes. But when the bond-equities correlation breaks down, as it is currently right now, people will jump to the risk parity side of the equation, which per our construct is a much slower moving vehicle. Ours particularly uses a 2-year window so that there is a little bit of false attribution in my mind currently within the institutional marketplace, as far as trying to pin responsibility on the risk parity community, when in my mind, the much more powerful short-term force in the market are CTAs. With that, that 2,719 level that you spoke about was the next deleveraging point per our projections in the S&P for the futures to close below that level. It's not a one-touch, but to close below that level would see our current S&P position break down from what went into the day as a 43% long. And as of one week ago, that was 100% max If
we were to have closed below 2,719 today, that would've then taken us down to just 9% net long and would've triggered an additional selling of 57 billion S&P futures. This is on top of the number that you mentioned, which was a one-day, just an incredible one-day move yesterday in S&P. We went through so many triggers.
We started the day at 97% net long. We went through 76% net long, 57% net long, 55% net long. Wow. 50% net long down to 43% net long, various triggers over 2-week, 1-month, and 3-month buckets that flipped from long to short. And over the course of yesterday, our model estimates projected nearly $88 billion of S&P selling. So just absolutely spectacular flows going through yesterday. I think then to take a step back, today is Today is the day that discretionary managers had to figure out what they were doing. Yesterday's flows were so heavy, systematic funds, unemotional, as I always tell you, price insensitive. Today, this was much more about discretionary active managers sizing their portfolios for the rest of the year, which is probably a function of how badly their performance has come unglued over the last few weeks.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Charlie, like I was suggesting earlier, you also like to reference a lot about the dealer exposure in terms of options the SPX and, and where the dealers are and how much gamma exposure there is. Obviously, with such a huge move, this throws a lot of dealers into a situation where they have to, to hedge into the futures market. What is the current situation? How much gamma exposure is there still in the options market?
Charlie McElligott: For sure. So we saw an enormous jump day over day with the S&P futures options and SPY ETF options cumulative, both delta and gamma on the day. So SPX net delta moved down $460 billion. That's a 0.1 percentile move since 2013. So the day prior, that net delta was negative $55 billion.
So just an impossible, almost 9 times growth over the course of the day with regards to how much delta was kicked off for sale from the options community yesterday. In just SPX and SPY. And what that means from the delta side of things is that, and this is as of yesterday's numbers, but S&P gamma is now $24 billion per 1% move, plus or minus. And those big strikes there are 2,800 and 2,750. And I think judging by today's spasms where it looked like we were going to break out and then it looked like we were going to break down, and it looked like we were going to break out, and it looked like we were going to break down.
Those levels kept us pretty well pinned. But the danger here is that on a close below that pretty heavy open interest line of 2,750, the more we start slipping below, the further out of position the short gamma is. And the more it slips, the more you have to sell to stay hedged. And that's always the danger of the options market, I think the one good thing going for us, it's all in context because there's not a lot of good out there right now, but is the fact that, and the point that I made earlier, that today was the discretionary community, the active fundamental managers' day to trade and make determinations on what they want to do with the rest of their years. Because I think the good news is that the last week, week and a half has seen a massive netting down of their exposure. So their net length is as low, net long, as it's been all year.
We're at the lows there as people of power sold their longs and pressed their shorts to some extent. But today, I think you saw some pretty gross down type of behavior. And that, to me, is a good thing with regards to the Greek implications, because I think it's possible that even though some people have been rolling out their hedges, now that I think the overall overall books have been shrunk down to such an extent that we might slowly begin to bleed out some of these delta and gamma positions, which could, of course, and will eventually further exacerbate any of these moves. Just at the end of the day, you have a smaller underlying book. You don't need your hedges at some point here. So it's gotten so massive and the overhedging had become so massive, and we are all aware of the very extreme skews, the skew in the Over the last month.
Now, some of those hedges have paid, and they hopefully, as you've taken down your longs and maybe covered some of your shorts, now you don't have so much to hedge, which could help minimize some of those really wild swings that we've been seeing in the market.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, I want to leave you with one question. Is there a real risk here that there's going to be one more downdraft, or is it likely here that as the selling, if they can defend the here that we suddenly have the buy-on-dip traders come in here and really rebound this? Do you have a bias here? Is the risk really still real for another liquidity drop?
Charlie McElligott: I want to be as black and white on this as possible and totally clear that if there was going to be a period of pullback with this tape, it was going to come in this 2-week window where we are at peak buyback. Back blackout. And that is absolutely where we are right now. The vast majority of S&P sub-industry levels are at effectively 100% blackout as of this week. Now, 10b5-1 plans allow corporates to buy outside of the blackouts, but with a number of limiting factors there. So we're not seeing— the bottom line, there still is a reduction in that corporate flow.
That is a critical facilitator allowing this risk-off trade to really proliferate. And just like February 5th, this move was precipitated for macro purposes, right? This isn't purely a sentiment trade. This certainly is negligibly about trade wars. This is really about the Fed and tighter financial conditions and higher real interest rates.
And there have been a number of developments over the last month that saw anywhere from the positive growth shock of last week's data and Fed speakers talking about higher neutral rates and hawkish Fed rhetoric thereafter, and most specifically, Chair Powell talking about running a deeply restrictive Fed policy and stating that we're a long way away from neutral on interest rates, implying more hikes that you've had this massive and violent, as far as the rate of change goes, sell-off in rates, sell-off in US Treasuries, and this power move in yields with an enormous bear steepening in the curve. And that bear steepening is a huge part of this underlying equities violence because that bear steepening has allowed for Value, which is all the stuff that's been left behind, the cyclical stuff over the last 5 years, to massively outperform growth. And growth is FAANG tech stuff that people have been parked in, the secular growth stuff.
It didn't need a cycle, a hot economy, a geared economy to work. And now those longs are really coming off. So there's a macro catalyst to this. The good news is that there's a tremendous October and frankly into year-end seasonal that The buyback will begin to start coming back online in the next 2 weeks.
And I do believe, as we talked about today, we're in a much cleaner positioning level, certainly both with the discretionary guys that I just talked about have really either netted or grossed down their positions, as well as these systematic funds where I just told you that CTAs in and of themselves are down to 43% long from a max 100% long one week ago. And that's S&P. The NASDAQ has been massively reduced to the 30s. The Russell is down to 9% long. The point is much cleaner positioning, meaning much less to delever.
Now, the market can go 2 ways. If people are really getting nervous with regards to another October volatility shock, and people start taking chips off the table, table because these stocks that have been most affected, all these momentum longs, all these growth tech stocks, if that starts bleeding into retail, then yes, this could very well perpetuate. I do think the other angle here too is that there has been a massive seller of the US long bond contract in the market the past few weeks.
And there are a number of folks fearing that it could be somebody, an entity overseas that would really cause the fixed income world to further wobble. If we see the long end continue to sell off and the curve continue to bear steepen, I think all bets are off and equities could absolutely continue trading lower.
I personally though believe that we are seeing de-risking now, and the de-risking is actually seeing money flow back into Treasuries. Especially as they've repriced attractively. To that final point that I'm making about the importance of the long bond, you had a huge 30-year auction today that was really taken down because buyers stepped up at these more attractive yield levels. So to me, as long as interest rates are stabilized, I think too equities will stabilize. And I think over the course of the next 2 weeks, the buyback begins to show back up and that too stabilizes. And I do think that then there still can be an element of performance-type chasing, much cleaner positioning, all of these things that set up positively into the year-end, certainly from this much more attractive valuation level.
McElligott: gold CTA trigger levels
Erik Townsend: Charlie, one more question. Gold got my attention today. Yeah, okay, the dollar's down a little, gold should be up a little, but gold's not up a little, gold's up a What's going on?
Charlie McElligott: I think gold is now getting more interesting for folks with what a lot of people would consider its core value, which is that break glass in case of emergency between— and it hasn't traded like that for so long. It hasn't traded as a risk-off flight-to-quality asset for a long time. Frankly, for the last year or so, it's traded almost exclusively like an emerging markets currency that yields nothing. But that's what's so interesting about today's move. And on top of this, it's getting really interesting because gold has been a max short per our systematic model for over a year now.
And we have, on today's kind of break out move. And of course, there's other strategies out there with similar triggers that might not necessarily be exactly our own that indicate to me that this thing might be turning. In particular, our model is now telling us that at the 1,245 level, we would see that 100% max short turn to just 12% short. And in In theory, if that were to trigger, meaning close above $1,245, you could see upwards of $46 billion of gold to buy.
And that's before it even turns long. That's purely on a cover. Either way, something is brewing within gold and you're getting nearer to that breakpoint. And I think it has a lot to do with this end-of-the-cycle debate that's being processed in the market real time that is effectively something to the effect of, are we tightening ourselves into a slowdown? And I think people are getting increasingly nervous that the vapor trails that the fiscal stimulus, the dual fiscal stimulus provided us so late in the cycle is maybe pulling forward the end of the cycle. And with that end of the cycle, what are central banks going to be able to do next as we see what's happening currently, as they've tightened policy and they've shrunk balance sheets, these rolling volatility events that we've seen over the last year. So, I think gold is starting to show up on people's radars again, and it's getting pretty interesting, certainly as some of the systematic positioning looks to be pivoting as well.
Erik Townsend: So, the trigger event is a daily close above $1,245, an intraday doesn't count. If we see that and it triggers $46 billion, with a B, dollars of gold buying, do you have a model for what that does to the price?
Charlie McElligott: I would need to run some projections, but I would say that at that point, the amount of new interest, new velocity, new momentum that that would bring in, especially from, you know, kind of off the radar from a lot of the, a lot of the macro set, just hasn't been a particularly interesting asset to trade It's been stuck at the $1,200 level forever, it seems. If this thing started picking up steam and brought in some new interest, a move up to that $1,299 level from there then sees it pivot 66% long. And after that, you could be off to the races, a real land grab.
Erik Townsend: Charlie, before we go, I am looking at a fantastic chart from your daily note, Which is really just fantastic content every day, and you've got all of these key levels clearly spelled out. Now, that is only available to your institutional clients. For our institutional audience, what do they need to do in order to get your daily letter if they don't receive it already?
Charlie McElligott: So, if you are facing off with, with Nomura Global Markets and you have an existing trading relationship with us, it's as simple as reaching out to your sales coverage and we can facilitate, certainly have the conversation with regards to making sure that you're able to, to access the content, and, and we'll take it from there.
Erik Townsend: And we should probably just mention, for the benefit of our retail audience, folks like Charlie are restricted by securities regulations. As much as he'd like to share the content with you, they're not allowed to do that. So please, only institutional inquiries in order to keep Charlie out of trouble with the regulators. Charlie, we can't thank you enough for joining us. We look forward to having you back on the program again soon.
Chartbook: calendar straddles, S&P 500 and gold
Erik Townsend: Patrick, I want to jump over to our postgame chartbook. Listeners, you'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. It says postgame chartbook. Patrick, as I look at page 2 here, this is obviously the before picture. We're showing that nice rally of the S&P up into that blue target zone from your measured move targets. Sure enough, we hit it exactly where you called You called it. I know that you guys really nailed it with your Big Picture Trading clients. And Patrick, page 3 clearly is the after picture showing with the result of this week's carnage what happened.
But I want to do a little bit of a review here because you had been long with your Big Picture Trading clients right up to almost exactly the top. You called both of these recent tops and traded them. I think we've got to say to some extent there There was clearly some skill involved because you nailed both of those tops, so congratulations, and congratulations to all of the Big Picture Trading clients that are in the audience. I know you guys made some money on that. But let's face it, there is always the possibility that you could have been wrong or you could have just gotten lucky with those calls. You also not just got the levels right, but you used options in a way that limited your downside and maximized Talk us through not only what drove this price action on the way up and then the way down, but also how you approach it from an option trading standpoint.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, just to review, like, we were basically bullish the market all the way from April, and when we caught that breakout, we've been basically bullying the market saying that we're going to go and see measured moves to the upside and a potential rally into towards the year end. But as we entered the target zones above. There wasn't actually a lot of technical signals alone saying that we should be short the market. We only knew from a price level perspective that the— A, that this was overbought. It was already overextended. There was already a risk-reward proposition diminishing, which is that there's a marginal further upside and there's a growing potential of a big profit to the downside if you can catch the turn. And so the question is, how do you put on an option strategy that kind of allows you to game the scenario. One, a scenario where on the very short term the market can keep plugging higher and still make higher highs, but yet you're properly short if the whole market reverses.
And this is where we were using a strategy known as, uh, calendar straddles, where, uh, we were using short-dated calls against long-dated puts, and we were rolling with the market move to catch the top. And so it was a great strategy we executed, and it's one that I want to talk about in
Erik Townsend: Patrick, I want to pick up on what you just said,
Patrick Ceresna: webinar.
Erik Townsend: What are you planning? Is this a free one or do people have to pay for it? And what are you talking about?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, listen, I mean, this is a podcast, so here we're just describing things verbally. And really, I would love to show all of our listeners how this strategy is implemented and why it worked so well for us to catch both of the last 2 market tops and allow our members to profit really well from this. And so the whole point of a webinar webinars, I can share the screens, I can show different concepts, show the different way the option strategies work, so how the gamma works on the, on the 2 different duration options. And so I want to share all of that in the webinar. The webinar is completely free, it's available to all our members, and it's going to be on Sunday, October 14th. The link is in the Research Roundup email as well as at the end of this chart book. So anyone that wants to join me for that webinar on Sunday Please do. If you can't make the webinar, the recording is going to be made available afterwards.
So just register for the webinar and we'll make sure we send out the recording link to everyone that registered afterwards.
Erik Townsend: Okay, Patrick. So just to recap, it's a free webinar and free really means free. No have to put in your credit card or any of that nonsense. It's really free. And it is on Sunday, this coming Sunday, and I definitely recommend it, folks. The part to really pay attention to. It's not just that Patrick got lucky and called the top and made money. It's that he knew how to apply a strategy where it almost didn't matter exactly where the top came. He knew one was coming, and he set up a strategy that allowed him to capture the downside as soon as the market turned. And it's really a fascinating strategy, so I recommend people check it out. Meanwhile, we got to keep the show rolling, so let's move on to slide 4 here. This S&P chart showed one pattern that might have played out. Well, guess what? It didn't go exactly the way that next green line thought it might go to show new highs.
What do you think, Patrick? Are we looking still at a possibility of still seeing a new high, or is it pretty much jury's in after today's action that the high is in for the year?
Patrick Ceresna: The breakdown that we saw in the S&P 500 was some serious technical damage, and like Charlie was suggesting, there is definitely room for there to be a snapback season. Seasonal rally after the selling subsides here. But there, in my mind, with this type of a nasty break, the likelihood that we see still yet a higher high, that diminishes considerably. Now, while I don't think that this is a straight line down from here, we're already covering a lot of our shorts. The, the thing to me though is it's— if we have a rally and that rally does not make a higher high into that seasonally year-end, then that may already have marked a very key high for the whole bull market, the longest bull market in history.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, moving on to slide number 5. This gold breakout really had my attention before Charlie started talking about it, and now I'm even more interested. I have thought, and I still think, the dollar may have more upside, and that should have meant more downside for gold. But this move up is not explained by the weakness in the dollar. Something more is going on here. Do you think it's what Charlie described? Do you think there's something else driving it? What's your take?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, one day to me does not make a new trend. So, uh, what's really important on this chart when we're showing that big huge breakout in gold is really what it does here in the next week. A lot of times these markets will break out this way, and if it's not the real deal, the sellers will hammer it all the way back down into range changes and it was just a complete false start. But what's going to be the most valuable bit of information is throughout the next week is that do the bulls come in and support this breakout? And is every dip starting to get bought? And is, is gold working its way higher to, you know, $1,240, $1,245? Because then you, then you have a lot of those bull cases really start to develop. And it'll be interesting if there's a huge sentiment shift in this space.
You know, Charlie really nailed it, and I, I think this is something that has to be on our Yeah, I'm definitely going to be watching those levels that Charlie mentioned.
Erik Townsend: And, you know, it's something I've been saying, gold is going to have its day in the sun and it's going to be a big one. I thought we still had more downside to go, but, you know, even before this week, Patrick, in the last few weeks, we've seen reason that there should have been a breakdown lower in gold and it didn't happen. We talked about that in, I think it was last week, last week's show. And so, you know, we saw resilience where it wasn't expected. Now we're seeing strength where it wasn't expected. So it almost feels like this thing's turning. But as you say, one day does not make a trend. We'll see what happens. Moving on to slide 6, of course, we've got the link here for everyone to register for the free webinar on Sunday, which I highly recommend.
Sign-off
Erik Townsend: With that, we need to leave this show. We hope that we've covered everything that you wanted to hear, folks. It's been a hell of a week.
Thank you, Jeff. week in the markets. Definitely stay tuned for us next week. In the meantime, please help us to promote the show. Tell your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices, and most importantly, register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Only takes a couple minutes. We're not going to spam you. We're not going to sell you anything. We just want to send you our free Research Roundup email each week, which gives you the download links both for this program and for all the best content that we could find on the internet. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview with Steve. As well, you're going to find the link to the chartbook that we discussed here in the postgame. There's also an article titled A Roadmap to the Upcoming US Treasury Bond Bull Market. And another interesting Morgan Stanley article about this dynamic is The Ultimate Bear Case for Risky Assets. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback. And support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make this program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share their content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.
You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
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