Neil Howe — Demographer and Fourth Turning author (as introduced on the show)

Announcer opening and episode teaser

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 161 was recorded on April 4th, 2019. I'm Erik Townsend. Demographer and Fourth Turning author Neil Howe joins me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll get an update on how the present Fourth Turning is unfolding, and then take a look at the demographic data and the long-term trends, which Neil says will spell trouble for the United States during the 2020s, as entitlement payments mushroom while the size of the working population, which funds those entitlements, continues to decline.

Market wrap: S&P 500 and calendar straddle

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's get right to the S&P 500. What's on your mind?

Erik Townsend: Well, stocks have moved sharply higher. Bonds still don't agree. We'll come back to the bond market in a minute, although they are bouncing back up in yield at least a bit. History informs us that usually when the bond market and the stock market don't agree, Bonds are usually right. Now, 2776, which was the level on the S&P before the VIX blew up, that would be the left shoulder if you want to look at this as a head and shoulders pattern. We're back above that level now. So in my mind, that is pretty much the last line in the sand that there is. If this level is not a reversal point, if we don't pivot down from where we are right now as we're speaking before the close a little bit early today on Thursday afternoon, we're at about 2880, just above that key level. If we continue to move higher from here, I think we're headed toward new all-time highs, or at least a retest of the previous all-time high.

David Rosenberg suggested that this was a head and shoulders pattern. That would suggest that we could be seeing a top here at $2,776.

But you know what? I'm not shorting it here, Patrick, and the reason is, if you go back to Charlie McElligott's thesis, he described reasons why he thought there would be at least some moderate headwinds for the market in the second half of March into early April, and he described how if we got below key levels during that risk period, it could accelerate a move to the downside. But even back when Charlie first told us that prognostication in the beginning of March, he was very clear in saying, look, guys, that's where I think the risk is. But frankly, by the middle of April, those headwinds are going to shift around to tailwinds as we come out of the corporate buyback blackout window after earnings season. And we could easily see a melt-up beginning in the middle of April if we don't get that big downdraft that Charlie was concerned might occur.

Well, it didn't occur, and Charlie told us last week in one of his daily notes, look, I'm giving my own thesis a week to make or break, but if we haven't moved down in the next week, it ain't gonna happen, guys.

Well, it didn't happen, and we're going sharply to the upside. So I think there's plenty of room for this market to continue to move higher. Now, that's very much at odds with my fundamental view. I think it's already moved too high, frankly. And I, you know, I've got the bond market on my side, so maybe that's a little bit of comfort. But in any case, stocks are continuing We're continuing to charge higher, or at least that's been the trend. So the only trade that I would consider, Patrick, in this market is your calendar straddle trade on the S&P 500.

I've got to believe, from what I understand of that strategy, now that we're up here at 2880, which is clearly a key level, I'm guessing that you and your Big Picture Trading members have probably rolled your strikes up to the current market. And I'm certainly considering putting that trade on myself at this level. And frankly, it's worked better for you than my put spread worked as I had entered that down here. down at 2812. So needless to say, I'm envious of your Big Picture Trading members. I think you've got the right strategy. I want to hear your update though before I consider putting it on myself.

Patrick Ceresna: Right, Erik. So we, we did get into the trade at the time the SPY was down in the 280, 282 levels. So when the S&P 500 shot up to, uh, this 2880 level and this corresponding SPY was trading around 287, we proceeded to close out the original calendar straddle and reopen at new higher strikes. Anyone still interested in learning more on what we're doing with these straddles, the recorded video and the trial to Big Picture Trading is still available for all of you to learn more about the strategy. But we definitely continue to roll with this. I still think the S&P 500 has room to potentially still advance toward the previous highs, but we want to make sure we're staying with this trade because I, I do think that this

Market wrap: US dollar

Patrick Ceresna: is late in this advance. Anyway, let's move on to the US dollar. What's your thinking here?

Erik Townsend: Well, we're flirting with 97 again, which has been a key resistance level. I don't see any reason in the chart or in the fundamentals to think that this rally is not going to continue. Clearly, we've been consolidating a bit here below 97. I'm watching for that breakout above 97, and particularly 97.50. And I think that probably we're going to consolidate until we get that breakout, and then we'll move pretty quickly a bit higher, probably just shy of 100 before we get to the next consolidation point. Of course, anything is possible, but, you know, all of the bearish arguments have been made, and the rally continues to look strong on the chart to me. So I'm sticking to my bullish view, and I think that we are headed higher.

Market wrap: crude oil and inventories

Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, moving on to crude oil, what's going on here?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I have been extremely consistent in my calls on this program with respect to crude oil, and as our more astute regular listeners know, to be more specific about that statement, I have been consistently wrong. Well, why is that? I'm not always right, but I'm usually pretty good at admitting when I'm wrong. And in this case, I think the mistake The mistake that I've made is that my whole thesis for why I thought we would enter a consolidation range between, let's say, $45 and $55, is that I really think that we are in an economic deterioration that heads us toward a recession.

Now, the bond market agrees with me, but crude oil has been taking its cues from stocks, not bonds, and the stock market has been extremely strong. Moving to inventory. Now, this is really important this week. Crude oil building unexpectedly a massive 7.2 million barrels. That's an extremely, extremely bearish number, an unexpected, really big build. Cushing, Oklahoma, meanwhile, building 201,000 barrels. Gasoline drawing down 1.8 million barrels. Distillates drawing down 2 million barrels. Remember last week's ship channel disruption though. So wow, how do we get this 7.2 million barrel build? Well, some of that was oil that was anchored outside of Houston that couldn't get in because of the ship channel. So it's not quite as big of a distortion as it probably seems like. Meanwhile, though, we do have production ticking up to another all-time record of 12.2 million barrels, exports holding fairly steady at 2.7 million barrels, or 19 million barrels on the week.

Reading between the lines of this inventory report, though, the headlines are telling us that supposedly this move up in crude oil prices is all about tightening supply. That's the problem, tightening supply. But then we get a massive build in inventory. The market drops like a rock, but it retraces within just a few minutes, and then it starts to sell off a little bit more. But that big retrace doesn't add up. Now, reading between the lines, it feels to me like that down was the immediate reaction to the number. The up, the retrace that happened within five minutes after that very bearish inventory number, says to me that somebody knew something or thought they knew something. Now, it might just be the insight about the Houston Ship Channel. And that being the reason.

But I almost wonder if what's going on is someone has information that they know Saudi Arabia really intends to stand up to President Trump and not cave to his demands with respect to Saudi production, because it seems like the mood of the market has shifted from, boy, we're not sure where Saudi Arabia stands, to, oh no, they're back to their old stance. Perhaps the Jamal Khashoggi murder situation has blown over to the point that they're no longer worried about saving face from that.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: Perhaps Russia and Saudi Arabia are working together and trying to push prices up. I don't know. But it seems like the market very, very quickly just dismissed what should have been a very bearish inventory number. So I'm done trying to call the top here, Patrick.

The trend is up. The trend is strong. The trend is at odds with my fundamental views for sure. I have a little bit of company in my views in the sense that the bond market agrees with me on the economy. But the oil market and the stock market are definitely moving higher.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And I'm not going long here explicitly, but I'm not going to short this or try to time the top anymore.

We're gonna have to see what happens as this inconsistency between bonds and stocks resolves itself. Patrick, I know that you've been watching this approximate area between 61 and 64 from a measured move standpoint. Certainly, you know, it feels to me like we ought to have already topped, but frankly, the trend is up and it's strong, and I'm getting out of the way.

Market wrap: gold

Patrick Ceresna: So let's move on to gold. What's your thinking here? What comes next in gold?

Erik Townsend: Well, the price has stabilized below $1,300. So, you know, a lot of people were thinking, oh, it dipped below $1,300, buying opportunity, buy the dip. Well, it hasn't really moved sharply lower yet, but it hasn't moved back up either. I think what's going on here is that the gold market is ready to move lower when the dollar index breaks out above 97.5. And until then, I think we're going to hover down here around $1,300 or just below. I'm definitely not in any hurry to buy here. I think that if the dollar breaks out, which I think is likely, that gold has plenty of room to move lower, creating better buying opportunities. But it's buying opportunities that I'm looking for.

I am absolutely committed to my view, longer-term, that gold is going to be the asset to own when things finally come unraveled. I just don't think we're there yet, and I think that it's very likely that there will be better buying opportunities than we see right here. If we get a move above $1,350, that would change my view. I'd say, okay, I was late, I missed it, but it's time to jump on here. Barring that, I'm waiting for lower prices.

Market wrap: 10-year Treasury yield

Patrick Ceresna: All right, let's move on to that 10-year Treasury yield because we dipped below the 2.4 level on the yield. So what comes next here?

Erik Townsend: Well, we dipped below 2.4 and back above 2.5 today. So nice, healthy bounce in yields. Could mean that the bond market and I both got the economy wrong, and now the bond market is reversing to follow the stock market, which perhaps was right all along. Frankly, I doubt that. I think David Rosenberg is right. I think that the bond market has been right, and I think the stock market is full of irrational exuberance. So, I guess you could say this may be a buying opportunity for bonds. That is a spike up in yields that I think is probably going to retrace back lower. So, if you wanted to be long bonds, this is certainly your buying opportunity, if you agree with the duration argument that David Rosenberg and others have cited on this program recently.

Why Neil Howe: The Fourth Turning and today's politics

Patrick Ceresna: This week's featured interview guest is demographer Neil Howe. Erik, why did we invite Neil back as this week's featured interview guest?

Erik Townsend: Well, the man who called all of this, and what I mean by all of this is if you consider so many people in society saying, wow, what's happened to the country? I mean, look at the divisiveness that we have in society. Look at how we've chosen what clearly is an extremely polarized presidential leadership. Now, I'm sure we have plenty of fans as well as not fans of President Trump in our audience, but I don't think anybody can argue that he is an unconventional and very strongly opinionated leader. We have a lot of division in society where political rifts are tearing apart friendships and so forth, and there's more opposition and divisiveness in society than we can remember. Well, Neil Howe predicted every bit of that back in 1998 when he wrote The Fourth Turning.

That book is my absolute favorite book of all time. It has informed transformed my life, not just in, in business and investing, but my understanding of the world around me. I am such a huge fan of Neil Howe that I literally named my asset management company Fourth Turning Capital Management after Neil's work, because my whole thesis is investing with a cognizance of the fact that we're in the middle of a Fourth Turning.

Now, for anyone who's not familiar with this terminology, go back to Neil's earlier interviews on MacroVoices where we went through the Fourth Turning concept in detail. In this interview, we're gonna assume you already know what it is. We'll do a real quick review at the beginning, but we're gonna get into what Neil sees now in the economy and how he relates that to the concepts that he introduced in The Fourth Turning. And again, be sure to use the search box to type in Neil Howe to find his previous interviews if you want to get more context.

Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with demographer and author Neil Howe is coming up. up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Where the Fourth Turning stands: global populism and the 2020 election

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Neil Howe, co-author of my favorite book of all time, business or otherwise, The Fourth Turning. Neil, thanks so much for making the time to join us today.

Neil Howe: Great to be here, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Now, for our listeners who may not be familiar with The Fourth Turning, I just implore you, read the book. This is the most important book of our time, in my opinion, and that's no exaggeration. Likewise, I strongly encourage you to listen to Neil's earlier interview on MacroVoices. You can find that by just typing Neil Howe into the search box at MacroVoices.com. For anyone who's not familiar, the basic thesis of The Fourth Turning is is that we are all familiar with the business cycle, 4 to 7 year cycles in the economy.

There's also a long-wave business cycle, 80 to 100 years, that you can think of like seasons or turnings, which really define important times in history. Fourth Turnings are when major things change. The last Fourth Turning before this one, of course, was the Great Depression and World War II. The one before that was the Civil War. The one before that was the American Revolution, and so forth. A number of predictions that Neil made in the book were things like, during this time, and this book was written way back in 1998, he predicted that during the present moment in history, we would be prone to electing extreme leaders and that there would be a lot of division in society as more and more people lost faith in longstanding institutions in society.

Neil, you're batting 1,000 to be sure with all of these predictions, but as the man who made those predictions, I have to believe that as this Fourth Turning is unraveling before our eyes, you must have a lot more insights in terms of how it's going and maybe things beyond what you predicted in the book. So, tell us a little more about what we're seeing as this Fourth Turning unfolds.

Neil Howe: Well, thank you. You know, it's— you see the future through a glass darkly, you know, from a distance. And as it gets closer in view, you can kind of focus and see a little bit more of the granularity, the details. You see the outlines better. We wrote our first book on this back in 1991 called Generations. That's actually, by the way, a book that I'm redoing. Doing now, because it's sort of, it's a whole account of American history told from a generational perspective since the beginning of the 17th century.

And we retell that story. But when we first got at this back in 1991, we saw this as an era beginning around, you know, 2005, 2006, something like that. I think, you know, now we would date it 2008 with the GFC. You know, the election of Barack Obama, and particularly the incredible financial crisis and recession that we all experienced. And not just in America, but, but frankly, around much of the world. I think that really is where we talk about moving into another season of history, what we call a Fourth Turning.

But originally, you know, we saw this as a movement toward community, toward national solidarity. In other words, the trends you're talking about, about polarization and fragmentation, suddenly reach a breaking point, and then we begin to elect, well, what we're seeing today, populist and authoritarian leaders, and the whole societies begin to lurch in one direction or another.

We're seeing that around much of the world today. It's hardly just in the United States. In fact, it's not even mainly in the United States. We're seeing it in the UK, we're seeing it in much of Europe, and we're seeing it throughout Southeast Asia. In fact, as you go from country to country, From India to Burma to China to Japan to the Philippines, we're all seeing the rise of charismatic populist leaders born after World War II, who are asking more sacrifice and more nationalism for their citizens. And they're more favored by the young than the old. That's fascinating to me. We're seeing that in Japan. Look at Uncle Xi in China. You see the resurgence of the popularity now of the Communist Party, which which was actually going out of favor back at the time of Tiananmen Square.

So, we're seeing this mood again. And where have we seen this before? A decade played out in the shadow of a global financial crash, tepid investment, deflation fears, falling rate of return, steepening income and wealth bias toward older age brackets, and the rise of right-wing populism. The waning influence of great power alliances or agreements Falling rates of fertility and homeownership, multigenerational households. I mean, you could go down a long list. And we saw it in the '30s, right? Not just, you know, we're talking about cultural mood, we're talking about politics, we're talking about the international scene and geopolitics. Ray Dalio has been making this point, I think, very vocally, very emphatically in the last several months about what so much of what he's seen now. Right. Reminds him in this broader cyclical sense of the 1930s. And that's what I think we are seeing.

And people forget that populism and authoritarianism are not contrary trends. Historically, they come together. They're joined at the hip. And we're seeing them today in the United States. And I think now, looking forward to the election of 2020, I think the writing is on the wall, right? I think you can see what's happening.

We saw the rise of populism first on the right with Trump's sort of takeover of the GOP, the Republican Party, and now we're seeing it arise on the left, right? What do you think the odds are what's gonna happen, Erik, when the 2020 election— I mean, you have to admit it looks like a big deal now, doesn't it?

Climax and second half of the Fourth Turning

Erik Townsend: Well, Neil, you know, the thing that really has been on my mind as I've watched this and think about what I read in the book In the book, you talk about how these Fourth Turnings start with a defining event, but that's not usually the big event of the Fourth Turning. And you described how, you know, in the last Fourth Turning before this one, it seemed to everybody like the Great Depression was the big event. But of course, they didn't know yet that World War II was going to be the defining event of that Fourth Turning. We think of the Great Financial Crisis as the big event of this current Fourth Turning. But does history teach us that maybe there's an even bigger event that's still yet to come?

Neil Howe: Yes, it climaxes near the end of the Fourth Turning, and this is a pattern we've seen repeatedly. Society breaks to pieces, and then someone puts together— there's, you know, what we call a kind of a civic rebirth. Someone puts together the pieces in a new way, kind of elicits a new sense of community, and then society starts to behave in ways that kind of run roughshod over the individualism that people used to take for granted. And it's a tumultuous era. It's an era of creative destruction of public institutions, the tearing down in order to, you know, create something new.

And what comes out of that is a new sense of community, conformity, a much— suddenly a much more forceful role of public life and government in society.

It's surprising to a lot of people, for instance, the new popularity of socialism right on the left. I mean, people saw this just coming completely out of the blue. I mean, where in the world did that come from? We have been predicting that for a while now. And even on the Trump side, you know, the Trump populist side, it leans much more toward kind of corporatism and a certain kind of communitarianism. than the traditional GOP line, which was all, you know, and don't forget, I mean, 15 years ago, the GOP, you know, favored huge immigration, and they basically figured free movement of people and capital all over the world, and basically the Washington Consensus, right? Neocapitalism rules, deregulate whatever you see that's regulated.

Well, we've moved way away from that And I think even the Republican Party has moved away from that. And clearly, the Democrats have certainly moved away from the party of, you know, Bill Clinton and Al Gore when they came into the White House.

Erik Townsend: By my reckoning, we should be about halfway through this Fourth Turning at this point. And as I understood the book, it probably would end around 2030. Number one, is that right? And number two, what would you expect to see for the second half of this Fourth Turning?

Neil Howe: Yeah, I think well, I think things are going to warm up, and I think you know you have the growth of this of these movements all around the world. It's going to increase nationalist hostility between countries. It's going to lead to some unholy alliances between countries. Possibly there could be a new authoritarian bond or alliance that we could see emerging. You know, bringing together certain countries like. Well, they're already beginning to merge, but, you know, the Turkey and Iran and Russia and China and so on, sort of saying, well, they have their own answer, you know, to questions about censorship and individual rights. They sort of have a different answer from the West, and the West is kind of decadent, and maybe this is a better path to the future. And given this poor state of Western democracies, you know, a lot of people Maybe even some in the Western democracies may be agreeing with them. That's exactly what happened in the '30s. And I see this happening.

I think also it's worth pointing out how many of these problems we're seeing now is going to be aggravated by stuff that we've just inherited, a massive public sector that we already can't afford, right? I mean, think of that. We didn't have that going into the 1930s. We have a demographic crunch that's much more severe than anything we faced in the 1930s. And we have problems even controlling our macroeconomy, you know, going down into the zero bound when it comes to interest rates that we didn't face in the 1930s. We have some big baggage that we've inherited that actually in some ways makes our problem worse.

Just the unfunded liabilities alone. I'm going to be talking about the formal debt, but all the informal debt, right? Right. You go through, you know, state and local and private pension plans together with all of our unfunded liabilities on your pay as you go social insurance. So, we have big issues going into this decade.

Working-age population slowdown and late-cycle indicators

Erik Townsend: Neil, I wanted to start there with this high-level overview. So, we're halfway through a Fourth Turning. And obviously, the question now is to zoom in a little bit where we are at this moment. Let's talk about demography. And what this means. You've prepared a fantastic slide deck for our audience. Listeners, you'll find the slide deck linked in your Research Roundup email. If you're not registered for Research Roundup yet, just go to our homepage at MacroVoices.com and look for the red button that says, Looking for the Downloads, next to Neil's picture on the homepage. Let's go ahead and get into this slide deck where you start to look at maybe a more current perspective in terms of what these these demographic issues are going to mean to markets moving ahead?

Neil Howe: Well, the first thing to point out— I'll start short-term and then we'll go longer-term. The first thing, and I think there's very little realized, is over the past 21 years, about the length of a generation, we've been experiencing this tremendous deceleration in the growth rate of the working-age population. Back in the late 1990s, we were growing at about 1.5% per By the year 2021, that's going to go down to almost all absolute zero. That's going to go down to about 0.1. Why? Well, because boomers are retiring, and a very small generation of late-wave millennials are kind of coming into the workforce.

So that's never happened before in American history, nothing even close to that. This is much worse than kind of, you know, baby buster Generation X coming into the workforce in the 1990s, earlier 1990s. Okay. So this is a big problem because that is 1.5 percentage points of new able-bodied people in the workplace who are no longer going to be contributing to annual real GDP growth. And that means, amazingly enough, in the early 2020s, practically the entire increase in real GDP is going to depend entirely on productivity.

And people are absolutely not talking about that. I'm amazed. I mean, you can listen to people Instead of, you know, you look at Trump's OMB, you can look at Congress, you can look at Democrats, Republicans, you can even look at people on Wall Street, not sufficiently focused on this. The 2020s in the United States is what we see. We have another chart in this later on in that deck, but you can see that this is an epic kind of super trough of working-age population growth. Right. And it's going to stay low throughout most of the 2020s.

There's going to be enormous drag on real GDP growth. Now, why does that matter? Because as of late last year, the employment-to-population ratio adjusted for age, adjusted for age brackets, reached the point at which we were at the peak of the last business cycle. In other words, reached the point at where we were in 2007. So we have run out of room to grow. By, you know, simply adding more people in the population of the workforce.

The only way we're going to get more growth is by a larger population. That's just— we don't have that now. So these new signs about employment growth beginning to slow are new signs that are going to grow in magnitude. We're going to be very disappointed with real GDP growth in the coming quarters because we can't get more out of employment-to-population growth. growth, and we're not going to get more out of total working-age population growth.

Now, that, of course, puts all the weight on productivity, right? Well, as you may know, and as some of the listeners may know, and we have some charts on that, just showing, you know, productivity is way down. We seem to have a big rise in the late 1990s, early '00s, due to the kind of implementation of ICT and the kind of digital revolution into a lot of companies, particularly with personal computers and so on. That has hugely slowed down. And since 2008, 2009, we have had historically very low productivity growth. And we all thought, okay, well, this GFC was terrible. You know, maybe in 2012, 2013, you're saying, just give us a few more years. No, it hasn't revived. It's revived slightly in the last year, year and a half, but it remains way below what it has been in the early post-war era. So, here's the problem.

Very low productivity growth, almost no working-age population growth. You know, what does that imply for GDP? And we have some estimates in the back of that deck where you can see kind of a first-run approximation. We also no longer have an increasing share of women joining the workforce. I mean, there's some other things that are involved too that we can talk about. But basically, this is going to be a very grim period for total GDP growth.

And it's not just the United States. We're going to see this same kind of population crunch begin to hit Europe, as well as Asia.

As many of the listeners know, these last 2 years have been huge birth deficits for China. And so, at their last, you know, national congress in China just earlier this year, there's a huge hue and cry about how to introduce pro-natalist measures. This is the country, of course, That celebrated for 35 years the one-child policy. Now they're suddenly trying to turn about face. Well, China faces an enormous problem as well. And God knows we could go and talk about Russia and Eastern Europe and some of the other countries.

So what this does is increases strain on all these countries, increases strain to maintain living standards, increases strain to increase revenues for individual companies. I believe that increases the probability that companies will engage in cartels, market-sharing agreements. I think no question that antitrust is going to be a much bigger problem going ahead. I mean, it already is. And here's another populist issue, isn't it, Erik? Antitrust, right? Market concentration.

That's being talked about again in America, not just on the left, but also on the right.

Erik Townsend: Neil, to pull these ideas together, why don't you talk us through these slides in the deck and how they relate to this conversation?

Neil Howe: Okay, well, take a look on this deck. Slide 2 is the point I started with, which is this huge slowdown in the growth of the working-age population. Slide 3 is really interesting. I think it may introduce some viewers to what I call our Wile E. Coyote moment of sort of, you know, running off a cliff and then suddenly seeing there's nothing but space under It really compares the actual year-over-year growth in employment with the underlying— these are the blue bars at the bottom— this is the underlying growth in the working-age population. And as you can see, ever since 2011, we've had growth in the, in the actual employment that's been vastly faster than the growth in the underlying working-age population. Where does that come from? Well, more and more of the population are working.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: Well, the question is, how long can you keep that up? And you can see historically what happens is we don't have a soft landing, right? We don't have those year-over-year lines suddenly sort of merging with the tops of those blue bars.

What happens is that population growth suddenly goes steeply negative, right? We enter the next recession.

So, my point is simply that we've gone a long time with employment growth growing much faster than our demography should allow. And in fact, in the next chart, in chart 4, Or we make the point that when you adjust for the population, the age composition of the population, we're actually over where we were in 2007. And the next 2 charts, 5 and 6, kind of make that clear. You can see that the only age brackets where we are currently below where we were in 2007 in employment-to-population ratio is basically very young people, people in their teens and early 20s. Right. That's not coming back for a lot of reasons. Parents and teachers and public servants are protecting kids a lot more. They don't want them in the workforce. They all think they should be studying and going to school, and more of them are now in college. And also, some of the biggest employers of young people are, you know, in famously poor shape.

I'm thinking particularly of retail, right? The only other cell which is beneath trend is millennial men, basically men aged 25 to 34. That's about maybe, you know, a percentage point and a half below where it was in 2007. Maybe that explains about 400,000 men. Everything else is above where we were. Millennial women are hugely above where young women were in 2007. You can just see for older age brackets, they all either match or way over. And needless to say, everyone over age 55 is working much more today than working back in 2007.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Neil Howe: Now, in kind of further, Erik, on this whole question of sort of what we call late-cycle dynamics, and people ask me, what does that mean? And I said, well, look, that means like, at the end of every business cycle, right? What happens? You run out of new workers, right? I mean, you basically, you know, reach the saturation point. You've sort of basically taken everyone out of the woodwork, and they're all working. And you can see where we are in the business cycle in chart 7.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: The unemployment rate is extremely low. The year-over-year change in average hourly earnings is steepening again. That you can just see here in this chart. That happens at the end of every business cycle. What else happens? Well, in chart 8, you can see that we— real GDP growth moves above its potential. We've been there since Q2 of 2018. That happens, you can see on this chart, that happens right before a recession, right?

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: That every time, that's, that's what we do. You know, that's the CBO calculates this number.

That means we're kind of— the economy's growing faster than its potential.

Another great late-cycle indicator, kind of going down some of these, is the 10-year 90-day. That's been in the news a lot. That's the yield curve. The yield curve now is actually worse than I show it in this chart because it's actually inverted since last Friday to the Friday before last weekend. And it has been inverted. And we can talk about how the incredible track record of that as a recession forecaster somewhere within the next 9 to 16 months. The other line you see here is the consumer confidence spread. And interestingly, that absolutely mirrors the yield inversion, right? In other words, you ask consumers, what do you think about the economy right now? And what do you think about the economy in the future? Right after recession, everyone thinks the future is going to be much better than the present, right? Everyone looks forward to the future.

About halfway through the recovery, begins to switch the other way, right? Turns negative. Everyone thinks that the present is actually much better than the future, right? That's exactly what you're seeing in the current recovery. And you can just see how that— it's almost logically how that would echo the business cycle kind of rhythm.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: of the yield curve itself. I mean, that is, after all, what the yield curve is measuring, right? How much return today versus how much return locked in in the future. I have a couple of other interesting charts here on 10 and 11. 10, actually, if you've ever played Chutes and Ladders as a kid, where you kind of have these little interesting roundabout loop-de-loops, here's a couple of interesting charts that you'll enjoy. One actually plots the term spread against the From 2006 to 2020 on a kind of 2-year lag. And you can see that this makes a huge loop around, and we're right back now where we were back at the end of 2006. It's really amazing. And here's another one on chart 11, where you see another big loop. This one charts the term spread against the credit spread instead of the term spread against the VIX, and you see the same gigantic loop.

The 2020s super trough and why markets ignore demography

Neil Howe: Chart 12, Erik, we start talking about some of our long-term charts. And the first one there, we talk about this, uh, we outline this super trough of working-age population growth in the 2020s, which is, you know, truly amazing.

Erik Townsend: Wow. Now, I just have to interject a question here. I look at this, this is not just a little short-term thing. You're talking about this decade-long super trough, which nowhere going back to 1952 on this chart on page 12, Oh, there is nothing, believe me.

Neil Howe: 1952 was actually understandably a very small rate because that was the Silent Generation born in the middle of the 1930s, right? They were a small generation. You know, that was a tough decade. We weren't having many kids then. Again, and we're talking about how decades rhyme, right? So, that was actually a very low rate, an abnormally low rate. And it It reached its low in 1955 at 0.6% growth per year.

In the 2020s, we won't be even getting near as high as 0.6%. I mean, you see the difference?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's really profound, but the thing that I just can't get my head around is you look at this chart, it is so compelling, as are all of your other charts. But also on my screen, I've got my stock market chart. We are racing on the day that we're speaking on Wednesday afternoon. to another breakout high on the S&P 500. It looks to me like we're past most of the resistance levels before we get back to new all-time highs. The new all-time high would be the next logical target if I look at a technical analysis standpoint. If I look at your charts, we ought to be, you know, preparing for a depression. So is it just that the market doesn't consider these demographic prognostications, or what?

Neil Howe: No, all this stuff is too long-term for the market. And, you know, that's why they don't care about valuation either, right? Everything's momentum. Everything is what we can squeeze out the next few weeks until the end of the quarter. I mean, Erik, you're familiar with how the Street and the market generally think about things.

It's interesting because I did a big session recently, a podcast on the inverted yield curve, and kind of walked readers through the whole history of the inverted yield curve and kind of What the research was and kind of how that's been built up. And it's fascinating to me that a lot of the responses I get is, yeah, you're right, but you can still squeeze some out of what the time that's left, right? It's a little bit of the, you know, picking up pennies in front of the steamroller kind of thing.

And so people are saying, yeah, but you know, you're talking maybe 9 months. Well, that still gives us time, right? So, you know, now, Now, look, I mean, if you're really into market timing and you really think you can do a good job with that, maybe that'll work for you. I'm just saying the problem with that is that when it's unambiguously time to sell, a lot of people are going to find they can't sell, right? I mean, that's an old story. It's called liquidity, and sometimes it's no longer there when you need it.

Erik Townsend: Well, Neil, I guess if the market doesn't pay attention to this, maybe some people would contend that demography doesn't really tell us that much or doesn't tell us reliably. about things like GDP growth and what we can expect in the economy. So, what does history actually teach us about the reliability of demography for use in this kind of analysis?

Neil Howe: Well, that's great you asked that question, because actually the next 3 charts, 13, 14, and 15, exactly address that. Chart 13 basically takes you through— we did something very simple here. We created what we call a fundamental GDP growth trend analysis, where we basically said, could you accurately predict a 10-year growth trend of GDP by only looking at the trailing productivity performance and the change in the growth rate of the employed population as just projected by demographers? And you can see here a very tight fit. Either you're looking at actual GDP growth or potential GDP growth, it's a very tight fit. And it absolutely tracks this huge decline we've seen since the GFC. And it's just obvious from this chart.

The next chart on 14 gives you historical color to that, and it basically shows how that fundamental GDP formulation can be separated out into 3 different drivers: the productivity contribution, the employment-to-population contribution, the growth in the working-age population, and then finally, There's some green parts of these bars here, which just indicate the changing share of population that's employed, mainly due to the entry of women into the workforce. You can see grew a lot during the 1970s and '80s, and has since pretty much disappeared altogether, and actually turned quite a bit negative early in the post Great Recession period. You see here there's a there's a whole story in here about you know high productivity during.

the early to mid-'60s. You see the huge impact of boomers during the '70s. Now, the '70s are kind of a miserable decade because although boomers gave a big boost to GDP growth, productivity absolutely tanked. And then you begin to see how productivity revived in the— anyway, it's a great story. We look at that chart, there's actually quite a bit you can see behind what's going on there.

And then finally, what we did is we basically said, well, okay, let's take a look at that and let's Let's just extend that the next, you know, 20 or 30 years. We'll just say, well, we already know what demography is going to do. I mean, for the next 25 years or so, practically everyone who's going to work has already been born. So, we can project that. And let's just assume we're just stuck at the productivity level we are today. And not just today, but, you know, an average of the last 10 years. And that's what we do on Chart 15. And you can see this is a pretty grim prognosis of future productivity. It's a wavy line a little bit, mainly following demographics.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Neil Howe: And we project, we're sitting here at, you know, 1.3% real GDP growth by 2027. By the way, the IMF projects 1.4%. The CBO is a little bit higher at 1.8%. But then the CBO projects a revival in productivity growth. So, they're actually projecting that productivity is going to kind of, you know, regress toward mean in a positive way, right?

We all think about regression toward mean as being a negative thing. Well, for the CBO, it's a positive thing. for productivity. And the Fed also predicts about 1.8. But all of these are really low. But it makes you understand why they're low, right? Everyone knows that these institutions are, are forecasting very low rates of real GDP growth. What I'm trying to do is explain why, why that makes sense, given our demography and given the recent trends in productivity.

Country demographic quadrants: the US best placed long term

Erik Townsend: Neil, moving on to page 16, says long-term future. It seems like that's kind of the punchline. What are you showing

Neil Howe: Well, this is interesting. You know, Keith McCullough at Hedgeye, he has his quads, right? He's always talking about Quad 1, Quad 2. So, I said, Keith, I got my own quads. Okay? So, what I did is I divided— I basically show where every country is basically between now and the year 2045. And I basically plot every country in 2 dimensions. One is How wealthy they are today, and that's kind of the, the x-axis, and the y-axis is how much are they going to grow or how much are they going to shrink demographically.

And it's interesting that in the wealthier half of countries and those countries that are going to grow, the United States is actually the best situated. I mean, we are the only really major substantial economic which is certainly much more affluent than average, that is actually expected to grow. I mean, look at Russia, China, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, India. I mean, all of these things are— will eventually— are either negative or are definitely poorer than the middle-income ceiling of $15,000 per head. A lot of the other affluent countries you see around, from France and Germany and Japan and South Korea and all the rest, I mean, these are affluent countries, but they're shrinking.

So it's interesting, and it shows that the United States has a lot going for it. We are not badly situated in the long run, but we have a lot of challenges we have to face. The rest of the world is also going to be facing challenges again, a little bit like the 1930s.

I'm very bullish long term on the United States, but it's got. big problems between now and then.

Why demography is ignored: Social Security, China and pronatalism

Erik Townsend: You know, this is just such a fascinating aspect of human behavior to me, Neil. If you look at the data you present very persuasively on '13, '14, and '15, clearly the demographic signal is working. It's very reliable. I've heard our mutual friend Grant Williams talk about this. You know, he worked in Japan in the '80s, and people he describes would go to investment meetings and say, look, look at this demographic issue and this demographic cliff that Japan faces. This is going to be a big deal. And you'd get shut down in meetings and people would just say, oh, come on, demographics? Are you kidding? You think we haven't heard that one before? That's so just, you know, old. Come up with something new, buddy.

And of course, then it happened at the end of the '80s that Japan fell apart. The demographic prediction came true. And Grant describes how he would say, you know, do you remember when I was saying about the demographic overhang? They'd say, well, yeah, but everybody knew about that.

Neil Howe: Right.

Erik Townsend: Well, yeah, everybody knew it, but nobody paid attention to it.

It's amazing to me that something so reliable nobody pays attention to, and it really speaks to where we are in this Fourth Turning cycle So, I want to make sure I'm not reading too much into this. Would you agree with me that as we look at the stock market maybe starting to break out in this, what I thought was a bear market rally, maybe we're headed even toward new all-time highs in the stock market?

It seems to me like they're not paying attention to the demographic signal and that This Fourth Turning ain't over, baby. We got another 10 years of serious turbulence ahead of us, and we should expect some real problems. Am I reading anything I shouldn't into your message here?

Neil Howe: Well, Erik, I would just distinguish between, you know, near, medium, and long term. I mean, the demography is a long-term challenge. It's a long-term challenge for a lot of the world today, which is why so many countries have just within the last few years been switching to You know, pronatalist array of policy incentives.

So, this has not happened for very long. People are finally waking up to it. And you're right, people have been very slow to wake up to something that was absolutely inevitable. But I've just seen that throughout my lifetime.

I was writing books with Pete Peterson back in the late 1980s about Social Security. I mean, we could see what was happening on that. Got a huge generation of baby boomers paying their FICA taxes into it, a small generation of Silent Generation retirees retiring.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: We said, yeah, it's gonna look really good in the '90s.

And you remember when George W. Bush became president, we actually had a surplus. And we said, yeah, that's fine. That's exactly right. But look what's coming, right? Well, we had a few other things. You know, we had a war in the Middle East and a few other things. But the most important thing that happened was demography, right? Everything began to tip the other way between FICA revenue coming in.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: in and benefits payments coming out, right? And now we see it. We see exactly what we saw back in the 1980s. People just didn't believe it. We saw the same thing in China. I was over in Beijing and Shanghai back about, you know, 10, 15 years ago, talked to demographers there, and all the Chinese demographers are saying, absolutely, this is coming. Our one-child policy is insane. You look at other countries around China, Confucian societies much like China without a one-child policy, and they're already falling into the super low fertility range. You know, we're down around 1.2, 1.3, 1.4 children per woman per lifetime.

They said this, we should be preparing for this, we should be moving in the opposite direction. No one listened to them. And part of the reason they didn't listen to them, because in China, the monitoring of family fertility is a huge way that government intervenes and supervises the everyday lives of most Chinese. So they were very reluctant to let that system go. It's kind of a form of social control, sort of, you know, one way of— you might even say a precursor to the whole social credit system, which is sort of the digital version of this.

I do believe that China is going to go without giving up social control to a very strongly pronatalist policy. We're seeing it in Russia. Vladimir Putin now has just recently unveiled a new award. It's called the— I can't remember what he called it. It's something like the Golden Medal of Patriotism to any parents who raise 7 or more children. You know, they get to get walked down the main street in Moscow or something, never pay any taxes for the rest of their life. You see Hungary, the government there is beginning to, you know, Viktor Orbán, they're beginning to offer the same thing. This is becoming an authoritarian staple. And many, obviously, of the other liberal democratic developed countries have long done the same thing, probably most notably France, who have had a very strongly pronatalist policy. But we're going to see much of the world moving in this direction. And a lot of it is going to be driven by concerns of national dominance.

And isn't nationalism another kind of trend we're seeing today, Erik, come back into the news and beginning to drive

Erik Townsend: It sure is.

Entitlements, generational conflict and faith in democracy

Erik Townsend: I want to come back though just for a minute because you really piqued my interest with what you said a minute ago about Social Security and other entitlements. As you said, you were in the '80s, you were spending your time writing books about the fact that Social Security was not adequately funded to really prepare for anything and that other entitlements were unsustainable. A lot of people took interest. It was on 60 Minutes, it was covered in the news and so forth. We didn't do anything about it. We didn't fix it.

Neil Howe: I know.

Erik Townsend: I would go so far as to summarize the perspective of the baby boom generation is, okay, so we got Social Security, which is kind of broke, and we've got all these other entitlements that have not been funded and that are unsustainable. And the thing is, that's an old story. We've been hearing that story ever since Neil Howe was writing about it back in the '80s. And you know what? It's still going along. And hey, it's by law, I'm entitled to these benefits. I've worked my whole life and I expect to receive all of my benefits through my retirement because Damn it, I deserve it, and I won't accept anything less. And certainly that is the message of the baby boomers with respect to their voting policy.

How long does it take, Neil, before younger generations start to have a different idea and maybe say, wait a minute, you guys never planned for this. Neil Howe warned you in the '80s that your entitlement systems were not funded and not sustainable. No, we're not going to pay into this Ponzi scheme and finance your Social Security payments and your other entitlements. You guys You guys didn't, didn't plan for this. It's your problem. We don't want to pay for it. What happens then? And do we get to a generational divide in the United States that pits the generations against one another?

Neil Howe: Well, you know, I, I think you're already seeing it. Millennials, uh, starting to come of age and actually to run for political office. Generation X sought, but they were not a politically engaged generation. I mean, the Generation X motto was, you get where you're going to get in life through your own personal talents, just through thick of individualism. Their only hope for government was just, I hope I stay off their radar screen.

But Gen Xers also had a very negative view of the future of Social Security. A lot of them would just say, you know, just give me my FICA money back, just cash me out, and I'll be good, you know. But of course, that's not going to happen. Their money is needed For all these boomer retirees. But now what's happening with millennials, you're seeing a much more aggressive attitude.

It's like, are you kidding? I mean, you guys got all your college paid for. Look at me, I'm in debt. I'm gonna have this stuff paid back. What are you doing? What have you done to America? We have the lowest savings rate in the world. We got all these unfunded liabilities.

And it comes back to a point I raised earlier about— I know this is a delicate subject to bring up, up, but that is the declining faith among millennials in democracy itself.

This is a fascinating subject. Yascha Mounk, who's a professor at Harvard, actually has some great surveys he's done recently on this, basically showing not only in America but in Western Europe, your belief in democracy is directly related to when you were born. The later you were born, the less you think it's important. And millennials are the least likely to actually think that democracy is important.

I mean, a lot of millennials look at liberal democracies today and they say these are governments which seem to be perennially dysfunctional. All they do is borrow from our future. They do nothing to invest in our future. And then people sometimes look at some of these other authoritarian regimes. I mean, look at China. I mean, they're saving, investing 40, 50% of their GDP. I mean, they're creating all these things and they And they said, yeah, I get it, no human rights, but hey, it works.

Remember, this was a tension that beset the West in the 1930s. We had the same tension between a new rising authoritarian paradigm. Didn't convince anyone, but both on the left and the right, it sure convinced a lot of people, including Americans. There was maybe 10 or 15% of the best and the brightest in America during the 1930s that joined the Communist Party, the Comintern.

I mean, they took orders directly from Moscow. We forget that now because, you know, after World War II, they sort of, oh, let's forget about that. You know, that kind of fed into the McCarthy era in the early '50s.

But my point is we forget what those tensions really involve when people think their futures are being jeopardized by societies which no longer superintend their future, which no longer take care or plan for the next generation.

Neil Howe's Hedgeye demography service

Erik Townsend: Neil, this conversation is just so fascinating to me. I want to shift gears a little bit because working with our friends at Hedgeye, you are introducing a new demography service for investors. And I'm kind of curious to know what it is. I listened to the first podcast, actually kind of a funny story. I told Matt Moran at Hedgeye, I said, sign me up for this new thing with Neil Howe. And he said, Erik, you're interviewing Neil later this week. Don't you want to wait and find out what it is before you sign up? I said, no, it's Neil Howe. It's demography. I want it. So I listened to the first podcast, and I think we're going to be able to share— that podcast is intended for paying subscribers. We're going to share the first episode with our listeners this week. So you'll find a link to the inaugural episode of Neil's own podcast in your Research Roundup email this week, folks.

Be sure to tune in for that. But, you know, I was thinking that I was going to get kind of more of the same of what I read in The Fourth Turning of these very long-term trends. And I was very interested that that first podcast is really looking much more at maybe a demographer's perspective on things like the current yield curve inversion, which is much more short-term. So give me some perspective, Neil, since I didn't listen to Matt, who said find out what this thing is before you sign up for it, and I'm already signed up. Well, I've signed up for it, what I can expect, because is it going to be long-term stuff, short-term stuff, a combination? What are you intending with this new product that you're launching?

Yield-curve inversion, recession timing and the 2020 election

Neil Howe: It's going to be a combination of short-term and long-term. We sort of mix it up. I mean, basically what we do is we look behind the week's headlines and I issue something called a Newswire, which is basically looking at stuff that comes out this year, either talking about marketing trends, generational trends, politics, just findings of demographers, you know, what's happening demographically. Some of this is, is pointing toward very long-term concerns. Some of it is relatively short-term. And the podcast itself will take various issues that are just current, and some of them I think are very relevant in the relatively near term.

The inverted yield curve is, is definitely one where, again, as we were saying earlier in this interview, If you go all the way back to the recessions of the late 1950s, we're really talking between the inception of a genuinely inverted yield curve, which is probably around, you know, 6 or 7 consecutive days of inversion, 30-day, 10-year, that it's basically around 9 months to 16 months. The longest lag was 2006, when we had to wait about 16 months. Well, that is really interesting, right? Because if we have an inversion, And we'll have to see, you know, we had 6 market days in a row, and then we had a couple days when it went out of inversion.

But if we're talking about a genuine inversion, which I think is likely by the end of this month, then we're looking ahead to what? Sometime between January and August of 2020 for the beginning of the recession. Now, that just doesn't have implications, obviously, for our economy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Neil Howe: In terms of bear markets, and, you know, or 2 or 3 or 4, you know, negative GDP quarters and all the rest, depending on how severe the recession is. But it has obvious political implications, right? And I think that this is one area where I think if you're interested in politics and how 2020 is going to go I think you have to be interested in whether or not we're going to be in a recession. I mean, already futures markets are predicting Democrats are going to take the White House by about, you know, nearly 60% odds with unemployment under 4%.

Well, what are they going to be? What are those odds going to be if the unemployment rate is up between, you know, 8% and 10%? I think that question sort of answers itself, right?

And this plays into this, this notion of extremism, which I find so just poignant in America today. Each side believes the other is utterly benighted, utterly, you know, beyond redemption. Each side is awakened, you know, is woke, or is red-pilled, or whatever, to the truth, and the other side is walking in complete darkness. This is a fraught moment for America. And we're reaching the point in the Fourth Turning where the country either goes all in one direction, or all in the other. And again, this comes back to parallels we've had had in earlier decades, like the 1930s or 1850s. You went, you went through, right, in your introduction, some of those examples. But this happens historically. People have the erroneous impression that history is, you know, kind of long-term and continuous and always moves at the same speed. It doesn't.

History goes through breaks. It goes through what the ancients called ekpyrosis, you know, these sudden breaks when Those are whole institutions are killed and new institutions are born overnight. And this is an idea that's often been expressed. Vladimir Lenin, and he should know this, he once said, there are decades when nothing happens, and then there are months in which decades happen.

And we have forgotten that in looking at history, particularly political history, public history. There are times in which we rewrite rewrite the rules of the game very quickly. And there are also long decades in which practically nothing happens of any real public significance. So that is really, I think, the importance of keeping a long-term historical view in mind. And that's really why I wrote Generations and why I wrote The Fourth Turning.

Demography Unplugged subscription and listener discount

Erik Townsend: So if you don't want to wait for Neil's next appearance on MacroVoices, which I hope will be sooner rather than later, It's every week a podcast. Now, is the podcast the principal paid subscription product that you're offering, or is there more to this new subscription?

Neil Howe: There's a whole bunch of things people get. We come out with a newswire every week. I do a podcast every week, and we do at least one major report that they get every week. And in addition, we do at least one video, either myself or an interview with a guest. guests that I think all the viewers will find interesting. So there's a kind of a bunch of things people get.

Erik Townsend: Well, I already signed up myself, and again, I cannot possibly be more emphatic in recommending to our listeners first reading The Fourth Turning, following your work. And for those who are interested, I strongly encourage you to listen to the inaugural episode of the podcast, which is only a part of this new product that you're launching. It's Neil Howe's Demography Unplugged. It's offered by Hedgeye, not through us. Boy, if there's one that I, I love to support our buddies at Hedgeye, but I wish we could have hooked you up with the podcast on MacroVoices doing this, Neil.

Neil Howe: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: And again, folks, the product offered by our friends at Hedgeye is Neil Howe's Demography Unplugged. You can listen to the first podcast, which is normally for paid subscribers only, for free by following the link in your Research Roundup email. If you want to sign Sign up for this product. It is a 60% discount to MacroVoices listeners only. You can find that link also in your Research Roundup email, or it's www.hedgeye.com/macrovoicesdu for Demography Unplugged. Neil, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. I really look forward, as one of the very first subscribers to your new service, to listening to your podcast every week and following all of the other excellent content that you're going to We're going to have to leave it there in the interest of time. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to Send your questions to the mailbag at MacroVoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Postgame: population growth as a driver of the business cycle

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was great to have Neil on the show. He's by far one of my favorites. What I really took away from the entire interview— I'm a huge fan of understanding the business cycles and credit cycles that we're running in. But to me, whenever I look at employment and the trends in employment, I look at whether or not it's like a leading indicator or confirming indicator to where we are in the business cycle. But what I really took away was this idea that the population growth and the way that the amount of the population that is employed is actually a driver of the business cycle. I thought it was really amazing, the connection that he made What did you think of that?

Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with you, Patrick, and I think a really important point there is, you know, the way that we measure these statistics. We look at unemployment claims. How many people that were looking for work couldn't find work and had to go on unemployment? Well, wait a minute, that's just assuming— it's almost as if we were analyzing this system assuming that the number of people that want work is remaining consistent, and it's not. What we're seeing is this major trend that there is a shrinkage of the working-age population in the United States. Neil made extremely compelling arguments for why that's going to continue for the next several years. And, you know, as I said in this interview with Neil, I remember Grant Williams talking about this because he was working in investment banking in Japan when Japan faced a lot of these same issues. And he'd try to bring it up in a meeting and people would dismiss him.

And then when it happened exactly as he called it, they didn't take it seriously. It's so easy to see that there are major trends that are affected by these things.

And the way that we track unemployment and the way the market reacts to unemployment reports doesn't really reflect the bigger picture of the demographic impact of a smaller workforce and a much larger number of retirement-age citizens that we have to take care of by paying out entitlements that we never funded properly, can't afford. And now we're calling on younger generations to pay into that Ponzi scheme. In order to cover the distributions that need to be made to aging baby boomers. This is a ticking time bomb. And the crazy thing is, Neil's been writing about this stuff since the '80s. It's not like a brand new idea. But I think it's, it's so clear, and it's so indisputable. There's nothing new about it. It's not some brand new idea. And therefore, people don't take it seriously for some reason. In reality, they should be looking at it and saying, yeah, this is immutably true. There's nothing that can be done to change this.

We need to really look at what the consequences will be economically. And it's amazing to me that people don't do it.

Postgame: 2030, the dollar and the 2020 election

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, Erik, I have to ask you, what else did you take away from the overall interview? Is there something that stuck out for you?

Erik Townsend: Patrick, the one moment in that interview that really stuck out for me was when Neil said that he is super duper bullish on the United States starting in 2030. And until then, he has some pretty significant concerns. Frankly, I know a lot of people think I'm a perma bear and a doomsayer and so Call me names on Twitter if that's what makes you happy. But look, this demographic data is really compelling. And what it tells us is that in this Fourth Turning— and the history of Fourth Turnings, if you've read the book, tells you that it's the second half of the Fourth Turning where things really tend to get dicey.

That means the ride we've had since 2008 was the easy part. Now we're coming into the second half of the Fourth Turning where it starts to get really harder. And if you look at the demographic trends that Neil has pointed out in the 2020 report, I think that we're going to have to face major, major reconciliations of reality versus things that politicians have just tried to kick the can down the road for years and years and years. Of course, we've understood that there was going to be an entitlement problem. Neil was writing about it in the '80s. But the thing is, even Neil predicted it wasn't going to come to a head yet. Politicians got away with ignoring it. Well, it's going to come to a head in the next several years. Years. We're not going to get from here to 2030 without facing these problems. And at the same time, I think we're going to face at least a serious challenge to the dollar's role in the global financial system.

If we suddenly had to finance our own deficits and didn't have the artificial demand for dollars from the reserve currency status helping us, that would dramatically change things. So we're going to face some really, really serious challenges. And I think if you look at what's going on socially, And eventually, we're going to have a very different mindset in terms of what people expect from government and what they feel is fair and reasonable. As Luke Gromen said on this program a year or two ago, hey, if you don't like President Trump, just wait till you see the next guy they elect. That's what I'm most interested in. And I'll make a prediction right now, Patrick.

I think that the 2020 election is going to be more contentious than almost anyone is predicting. And what I mean by that is in the 2016 election, the people on both sides of the fence, the notion of the person that they did not want to see elected getting elected, it was so unfathomable to people that they didn't really take the risk seriously. There's no way Donald Trump would ever get elected president because it's impossible. There's no way Hillary's gonna win because it's impossible. And I don't think that it really matters which one won. If President Trump had not won and Hillary Clinton had won, one, it would be a different group of people that would be extremely upset and in utter disbelief.

Next time around, everybody's going to have a sense of really knowing what's at stake and feeling like the future of the country depends on their view being carried out in the polls. And I think we're going to see more divisiveness, where I think we're going to see more confrontation, more unrest, and more violence going into the 2020 election as more and more people have very polarized views in disagreement with their friends and neighbors that caused them to alienate those friends and neighbors. And I think we're headed into the beginning of some really tumultuous times. And, you know, again, if you want to call me a naysayer and a perma-bear and so forth, do that if it floats your boat. But how about offering some logical or rational counterargument to the things that Neil is saying? Because I think this all leads us to a conclusion. that the next decade is going to be a really, really challenging time in history.

But on that cheery note, Patrick, we're going to have to call it a day here in the interest of

Research Roundup and outro

Erik Townsend: time. So listeners, we do need your help promoting MacroVoices. Please tell your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices, forward your Research Roundup emails. Most importantly, register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Doesn't cost you anything, and the benefit to you is that you'll receive our free Research Roundup email each week, which never contains any advertising or marketing. It's just a compendium of links to all of the best free content we could find on the internet each week. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview. You're also going to find the link to the chartbook for Neil Howe's presentation. There's also an article from Jeffrey Snider titled The Transparent Automotives, as well as a great article from Variant Perception titled Hints of Eurozone Reintegration. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

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Announcer closing and disclaimer

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