Jeff Snider — Alhambra Investments Chief Investment Officer (as introduced on the show)

Announcer intro

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Episode 163 opening and abbreviated-wrap notice

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 163 was recorded on April 18th, 2019. I'm Erik Townsend. Alhambra Investment Partners Chief Investment Officer Jeffrey Snider joins me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll be taking a fresh look at the offshore Eurodollar system and discussing what it means to global US dollar liquidity and why Jeff thinks the dollar rally is set to continue considerably higher from where it is now.

I feel obliged to disclose that due to a personal family emergency, I personally have been mostly out of touch with the markets this week and therefore won't have as much depth and perspective to offer as usual on this week's market action. Accordingly, we'll have an abbreviated market wrap this week and then dive right into the feature interview with Jeff Snider, which I think you're really going to enjoy.

Abbreviated market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude, gold, Treasury yields

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's jump right into the S&P 500. We're still pinned more or less around 2,900 here. What's your thinking?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, in terms of big picture, I think there's 3 scenarios that could play out, and it's going to be very important from a technical standpoint. They each have very different meaning in terms of future expectations. We'll know within a month or so that one of 3 things has happened. Either we get a failed rally short of the previous highs and we get a significant reversal in direction downside, let's say below 2,800. We know that the turn is in. It didn't make it as high as the previous high.

That would be the most bearish signal that we would receive. The next bearish signal would be if we got a retest approximately even within 10 or 15 points on either side of the previous all-time high for a double top pattern. That's not nearly as bearish. That actually potentially could be a reversal, but it could also very easily just be the market simply bumping its head on that previous all-time high resistance level and eventually breaking out to a new all-time high. And then of course the third signal would be if If we break through that resistance quickly, go directly to new all-time highs, and the market gains momentum to the upside at that point. So those are the 3 scenarios, big picture, that we need to look for. Now, as much as my personal fundamental view is this thing should have been over already— in fact, I'm surprised that it got this high— if I look at the tape, Patrick, if I look at the chart, if it's gone this far, I don't really see any reason for it not to keep going further.

Market action looked a little bit fishy, almost looked like a futures ramp into the cash open. On Wednesday and maybe a failed one on Thursday. The action just before, you know, reversals that happened right around the market open always raise an eyebrow for me. But frankly, if that was going to be the beginning, Wednesday's sudden reversal of some massive sell-off, we didn't see the follow-through. We're bouncing back today. So I don't see any reason looking at the tape that we're not headed back toward all-time highs, even as much as that is at odds with my fundamental view, which says it should have been over long ago.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, when I look at that S&P 500 and I see at the last few days of March when we had that big launch higher in the S&P, it built a lot of momentum. But really, if you kind of look at the last 10 trading sessions, even though they've been somewhat in the upwards trajectory, the S&P is struggling to gain any further momentum. It's very exhausted. This rally has lasted now almost 4 months. And so really, to me, we're long overdue for a throwback. What I'm going to be curious about is whether or not that throwback back, steamrolls, or begins to become a liquidity event that could drive a very, very sharp drop.

But at minimum, we need the market to pause here. I think that overhead resistance, at least on the first go, has a very good chance of rejecting the first go-around. Doesn't mean that we can't still have a break to higher high, but I think that the juice in the market is running pretty low here. Anyway, let's move on to the dollar. What's your thinking here on the US dollar? Is this breakout going to be for real?

Erik Townsend: I sure hope so. It's past time as far as I'm concerned. We've been flirting with resistance around 97, and we broke through it today, at least on an intraday level. Will that be sustained? We're taping the show a bit early today, folks, because of travel schedules, so we've only got the 2 PM news, and it'll be interesting to see what happens. What I'm really looking for, though, is the daily close above 97.50. That's where I would really get bullish and say, okay, the breakout is upon us. We're moving out of this consolidation range. But in any event, it feels to me like, you know, we're We're getting there. Maybe we'll see the break in the next few days, maybe not, but I certainly don't see any reason in this chart to be bearish.

Patrick Ceresna: I couldn't agree more. What's interesting to me though is that we've spent 6 months pretty much consolidating sideways in the dollar, and it's just so painful and boring to be talking about the dollar just in that same range. But what's amazing is if you go back and look through the last couple decades of charts, whenever we've had these periods where currency consolidates for like a half a year to a year in a range, When the breakout finally occurs, it usually ushers in an extraordinary move. And we have not yet broken out. But what I'm pretty confident in, that when we finally get some new trend in motion, it's likely to be a big one. So this is why I'm watching this very closely to see whether this really develops into something bigger.

Anyway, let's move on to crude oil because finally we seem to have hit an overhead resistance level. For the last week, we've been more or less range-bound with this kind of in the $64 range on oil. What's your thinking here?

Erik Townsend: Well, it felt like the market was really starting to top out and, as you say, reach an exhaustion level. Then yesterday we had a 1.4 million barrel drawdown in crude oil inventory. That helped to, you know, as a bullish signal, not a hugely bullish signal, but it is a bullish signal. It helped to recover prices a bit. We are still technically in an uptrend. We're above the short-term moving averages, at least early on Thursday afternoon. And we'll see what happens. I want to say, you know, it's feeling like this market's tired.

Maybe we're topping out. But if I look at the pattern in the chart for the last few months, and our regular listeners certainly remember me getting this wrong a few times, there have been a few what to me looked like bear traps. It really looked like the market was rolling over. We got at least an intraday, and in a couple of cases we got closing prints below the 13-day moving average and the 5 and the 8-day moving average. When you're below all 3 of those, oftentimes that's a trend reversal, and if you're going to follow the trend, it's time to sell. And sure enough, it recovered within a couple of days. So we've had a few of those traps. I'm not I'm not gonna chase this one until I'm really sure that I see a signal that is confirmed, but I feel like the bullish arguments are wearing thin.

It's very much, though, dependent on the equity market, Patrick. If we see a substantial move to the downside, it's because I think economic conditions are deteriorating and the market is gonna perceive that. Right now, so far, stock market, as you say, it's feeling tired, but it has not rolled over yet.

Patrick Ceresna: Right, no, and that's certainly the case with oil. One of the interesting things for me, at least where crude oil is right here, Is, is that when you look at the huge drop we had at the late part of 2018, you know, and when we had Art Berman on the show and we were talking about all of these levels, just the fact that it was a big fundamental repricing of oil.

If this entire rally in oil was just retracing an incredibly oversold oil price, then this is a level where it should run out of steam and peter out. I mean, if oil kept ripping here back to $70 to $75 on the upside, To me, that would really be an indication that the entire prior drop was just not supposed to have happened in the first place.

I mean, it's crazy to me that in a 6-month span, we wipe out 50% of the value in oil and then suddenly rally 100% off of the low in the subsequent 4 or 5 months. It's crazy to me seeing this price action.

That's why it's going to be very curious what happens here. Anyway, let's move on to gold. What's your thinking here on gold?

Erik Townsend: Well, in the past, I've pointed out when gold had surprised me by being strong even in the face of dollar strength. But, Patrick, what we're seeing this week is the weakness in gold came before the strength in the dollar showed up. So, it feels a little bit like the tail wagging the dog with gold moving before the dollar moved, but it didn't really accelerate to the downside. Still, you know, as I've been predicting on the show, we couldn't hold $1,300. We saw a very firm rejection of $1,350. Now, the question is, do we Yeah. We've got to get down into a couple of more support levels. Unfortunately, I don't have the chart in front of me this week, but there's a $1,220-ish level, there's a $1,200-ish level, there's an $1,180-ish level.

Those are not accurate technical levels this week, but there's a few layers of support to get through. And I won't be surprised if we eventually— if the dollar strengthens, as I expect it to, be sure to listen to Jeff Snider's comments on that. If we get that breakout north of $97.50, I won't be surprised if gold really takes a dive at that point.

to gold investors, but I really, really hope it does because I would love to buy some $1,000 gold. I think it's a bargain down there. For now, I'm going to wait and see.

Patrick Ceresna: Right. You know, the one interesting thing for me about gold is the fact that, well, I've been looking for a pullback to buy on dip, but what's amazing to me is that gold has been in a sustained distribution for several months and it's making lower lows on a week-over-week basis. But yet it's not being confirmed by, or being at least fed by, a currency move yet. It seems like gold is doing this on its own, and it's not being fueled by a huge dollar advance. The thing that I'm watching— what if, what if the dollar breaks? It hasn't broken out yet, but what if? Then gold could weaken still considerably more because it's just— it hasn't had that natural intermarket correlation fueling it yet for further weakness. So we'll see how that develops.

Anyway, let's look at the Treasury yields. Now, Treasury yields are hovering around just over 2.5% here. I mean, we hit 2.35% down before there in late March, and since has been retracing that huge drop. Do you think we're still heading lower here on yields?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's definitely got my attention. I'm looking at 2.56% on the 10-year as of 2 PM on Thursday. I think last week we were at 2.49% or something. So, yeah, Notably back higher. Now, what I've emphasized so strongly is, look, we're getting opposite signals from stocks and bonds. They can't both be right. And more often than not, the bond market ends up being proven wrong. Now, for the moment, it appears that the bond market is retreating and following stocks. And perhaps it was the bond market that had it wrong in the short term.

I think eventually, though, that the bond market and the stock market are both gonna figure out that we really do have deteriorating conditions. And I think it will mean lower yields. So I look at this as a pretty good buy-the-dip opportunity if your view is toward lower bond yields, higher bond prices. I just wonder if it's quite over yet, because as I look at the S&P tape, as much as I want to agree with your sort of losing momentum, you know, running out of steam view, it so much jibes with my fundamental view, but I've been caught I bought thinking that this tape was done and still seen more upside.

And I think if we get a couple of little news events, a few Trump tweets that supposedly everything's better with China, maybe we'll get back to 2.60 on the Treasury yield. That's a buy for me. And maybe that takes us to a final high on the stock market. Be very interesting to see if it's above or below the previous high.

Feature preview: reorganizing Eurodollar University

Patrick Ceresna: This week's feature interview guest is Alhambra Investment Partners CIO Jeffrey Snider. Now, Erik, why did we invite Jeff back as this week's featured interview guest?

Erik Townsend: Well, this one is kind of a special one for me, folks, and I hope you'll enjoy this interview as much as I did. Our longtime listeners will remember that a couple of years ago, Jeff and I produced a series— it was actually 2 seasons worth of Eurodollar University, about 8 hours of podcast audio going deep on the history and chronological background of the global Eurodollar system. Now, the feedback was really interesting, Patrick. We had a small percentage of the audience tell us, oh my goodness, This is just the most amazing content I've ever encountered anywhere. That was some really, really advanced, mostly finance professionals who really just couldn't believe the depth that Jeff gets to. Frankly, the rest of the audience, and to some extent myself included, had the reaction of, boy, I definitely get it that this guy's smart, but frankly, I'm not exactly sure why this is important to me or what the point is, and it's all very complicated.

Now, at the time, Patrick, I just wanted to let Jeff do his thing, and I never I never would have pushed back. Jeff actually approached me in Vancouver at our MacroVoices Live event. He said, Erik, you're the only guy who— it seems like nobody understands me. When I do an interview with you, people seem to get it. I'm really asking for your help here. Is there anything we can do to make this more understandable? And it's interesting, you know, I'm almost intimidated by how intelligent Jeff is, but I realized he just needs help organizing his material. And he asked me very directly, he said, look, I did it chronologically because I didn't know how to organize the material. And I said, wow.

Okay, we need to start with, why do I care about this? What's important? Why is this even interesting? And then focus on the significance to investors in terms of how they understand the system. So, we did this for the first time at Harvard Business School a couple of weeks ago, and we're gonna repeat that same presentation in today's interview.

I'm really gonna ask our longtime listeners particularly— what we're trying to do here is I'm trying to help Jeff reorganize his Eurodollar University message to make it a little more understandable. everybody understands the significance of what it is and what it's about. We're going to stay at an overview level. This would be the new introduction to what might be— and I'll tell you a little bit more in postgame about our plans— what might be a re-engineering of the Eurodollar University offering itself, which Jeff has asked me to help him with. So, this is the first installment. We're really looking forward to hearing what you think about it.

Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, Erik's interview with Jeffrey Snider is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Setup: is the Fed really in charge of the dollar?

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Alhambra Investment Partners Chief Investment Officer Jeff Snider. Jeff, thanks so much for joining us on the program. It's great to have you back.

Jeff Snider: Thanks, Erik. Always a pleasure to be back with you.

Erik Townsend: Listeners, we got a real treat for you. As many of you know, Jeff and I did a series called Eurodollar University, which was a chronological introduction to the Eurodollar system. We got from our most astute listeners who really dug into the material a lot of really positive feedback that it was some of the best content that we'd ever done. But we also got a little bit of feedback from people who just said, look, I can tell that Jeff's a really smart guy, but this was a little over my head, and I'm not I'm not really sure what the heck he's talking about. So, what we've been trying to do— Jeff approached me about this in Vancouver, and we've been working together to try to recraft Eurodollar University, not from a chronological standpoint, but more from a topical organization perspective.

So, Jeff, I want to start with what I think are some of your biggest and most bold contentions, and ask you to address them in today's interview. We've been taught that the way the international monetary system works is the US dollar is the center of It's the world's reserve currency. And that means the US dollar is used for international trade settlement, and its central bank reserve assets are denominated primarily in US dollars. And that puts the dollar at the center of the whole system. And what most people assume is that means the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, is in charge of the whole system. They're the ones that oversee and regulate it. And everything that goes on with respect to the creation of US dollar money supply is regulated and managed and overseen by the Federal Reserve. And that's not what's happening.

seen by the US Federal Reserve. You make some really bold contentions, Jeff.

You would argue that really the US dollar is not the global reserve currency, that the Eurodollar system, which allows international banks operating outside the supervision of the Federal Reserve to create US dollar currency, that that is the real reserve currency. And you contend that the Fed itself doesn't really fully understand how the system works. You think that very powerful international bankers have one up on the Fed, and they are actually in control of creating US dollar money supply on international markets through this Eurodollar system. You contend that there is massive amounts of US dollar money supply being created outside of the banking system, and therefore outside of oversight and regulation by the Federal Reserve.

So, Jeff, as we get into this, you have prepared a fantastic slide deck that will guide our listeners through this discussion.

Listeners, I strongly encourage you to download the slide deck. You can find the link in your Research Roundup email. If you're not registered for Research Roundup yet, just go to our homepage at MacroVoices.com. Look for the red button that says, Looking for the Downloads, next to Jeff's picture on the homepage. Jeff Snider.

Origins of the Eurodollar system, 1950s-1960s

Erik Townsend: Jeff, referring to the slide deck, what the heck are you talking about here when you say that the US dollar is not the global reserve currency, but the Eurodollar system is actually the world's global reserve currency?

Jeff Snider: Well, let's start on slide 2 and go over, you know, the basic overview of the things we're contending and what is widely perceived by most people. As you noted, Erik, or as you said before, you're taught basically from Economics 101, even before then, that the central bank is central. And what it is in the center of is a money multiplier deposit-based banking system. Underlying that system is a traditional reserve pyramid, which fills out the liquidity function for it.

Not only that, we're also taught that individual economies are mostly closed systems. There's very little linkages between, say, the US economy and foreign economies overseas, and between other economies and each other. And that the Bretton Woods gold exchange system ended in August of 1971 when President Nixon closed the gold window. And that is what ushered in this age of the US dollar as sole reserve currency. British pound sterling had already faded into the background by then.

But when we look at the data and analyze a lot of the things, the history, the way things work in the modern age, especially in the 21st century, what we find instead is this credit-based offshore system that is reserveless, currencyless forms of ledger money. The liquidity function for it is dominated by what are wholesale interbank markets of dynamic bank liabilities.

Because of this system, the economy globally is intricately linked. These aren't closed systems with small links between them. And that what replaced gold exchange in 1971, or actually had begun to replace gold exchange under Bretton Woods long before 1971, was this Eurodollar system.

Now, if we go over to slide 3, you know, from the very beginning, this Eurodollar thing has been misunderstood and misconceived. By 1969, the market was already huge, and practically nobody knew anything about it. It was economist Milton Friedman who, in 1969, wrote a very detailed essay about the Eurodollar system, and he begins that essay by relating the story of how what he called one high official of an international financial organization couldn't come up with any legitimate answer for it. What Friedman would go on to show was how Eurodollars were served by their own money multiplier, discussion you and I, Erik, had during Eurodollar University, that it was more or less a contained system.

And so the net result for a given domestic money supply in dollars, there would be an increase in global money supply or Eurodollars that was predicated solely on banking factors. Now, there was some regulation, you know, a myriad of incentives for why the banking system globally would turn in this direction, including some regulations, things like Regulation Q that was left over from the Great Depression, No longer really suitable for the domestic system as it headed toward the Great Inflation. There were capital controls that were imposed throughout the 1960s, ironically, to try and rescue what was left of the Bretton Woods system, or, you know, to solve what was called Triffin's paradox.

In other words, there was a tremendous number of incentives throughout the '50s and '60s that favored this system increasingly going offshore.

If you go to slide 4, it was William Clark of the London Times who coined the term term Eurodollar in 1960, but the first international economist, or, you know, Paul Einzig was called the dean of writers of international finance. He was the first one to really write about it in any kind of widespread fashion. And what he said was he stumbled upon this Eurodollar system almost by accident in October of 1959. And when he told some bankers that he was going to write about it, they emphatically asked him, hey, don't do this. They didn't want any kind of public scrutiny or official remarks, anything to interfere with this offshore dollar system as it was becoming a major thing.

You know, we don't really know where the Eurodollar came from. This is under-the-radar, clandestine system that started somewhere around the mid-'50s. There's all sorts of origin stories for it, you know, whether it was Soviet or Eastern Bloc countries who became increasingly wary of holding their dollar balances in American banks, fearing Political confiscation, so they started holding more dollars in European banks. There's a story of a company called Midland Bank, which is a British mercantile bank, which began experimenting with dollar forwards and what really was a very primitive form of cross-currency basis swap arbitrage. There was the entire British mercantile system that before the middle of the 1950s had financed global trade under the sterling bloc, and by the Suez Crisis decided that they would switch more and more to dollar settlement. However, this Eurodollar system began. What emerged were these dollar money centers in Zurich, Munich, Montreal, Tokyo, and most of all London.

If we go to slide five, we see is it wasn't until 1964 until anyone in any kind of official capacity finally got around to investigating this thing, even even though it was almost a decade old by then. For Bank for International Settlements finally published the first study on the subject of eurodollars. Now U.S. officials. Were preoccupied by Triffin's paradox. And so they were, they were unable to really appreciate what this Eurodollar system represented. As the BIS said in its study, it held exceptional potential for expansion.

But yet on the chart that I'm showing you here, there's very little to no mention of the Eurodollar market by the FOMC in the early 1960s. But by the end of the 1960s, by the end of that decade, they couldn't stop talking about it because it had worked its way into everything.

If you go to slide six, you know what they were specifically talking about in 1969 was havoc in currency markets, especially the Deutsche Mark. That was arising from U.S. banks suddenly borrowing heavily from European banks in dollars offshore, and these were interbank transactions. So they weren't the movement of physical Federal Reserve notes in things like armored cars or heavily guarded airplanes.

The European central banks in particular had become apoplectic about how U.S. banks were suddenly intruding into this. Eurodollar market, because prior to 1968, 1967, these Eurodollars were largely a European affair where merchant banks, again, were using this market to achieve global trade settlement.

Slide 7. What we see is that as this Eurodollar system grew in size and importance, as US banks started to participate into it, and more than just US system, it had begun replacing, and it had already replaced, a lot of the traditional roles of global reserve currency that had previously been performed by gold under Bretton Woods. And it was distorting not just the global monetary picture, but also the domestic monetary picture. It had forced officials in the late '60s, and as I'm showing you here, in the early '70s, to really to begin reckoning their entire monetary understanding. And the reason was because banks were using different sources of funding outside of both the US boundary, as well as traditional definitions of money. And this would define the dominant trends over the next few decades, because the door was left wide open for further evolution in money itself, and then obviously further evolution in banking and banking archetypes.

What 'Eurodollar' means: missing money and Greenspan

Erik Townsend: Okay, so to summarize, what this story is really all about is the party line that the US government believes itself and would like the rest of the world to believe is, look, the Federal Reserve is in charge of the US dollar. It's the US— it's our dollar. We're in charge of that currency.

What you're really saying is some of the most important functions of managing and overseeing the US dollar as a currency system That the Fed thinks it's in charge of. In reality, the international bankers have their own agenda, and they've figured out a way that they can literally operate in the shadows outside of the US banking system. But by creating these liabilities, these essentially paper obligations on balance sheets that are on banks outside of US regulators' view, they have the ability to manipulate the system, create money supply, do things that only the central bank is supposed to be allowed to do. allowed to do.

And you're saying that they literally— it's almost a conspiracy. They're asking people not to write about it, not to tell about it. And this is not some crackpot conspiracy theory. You've got people like Milton Friedman and Paul Einzig very highly respected people in finance that no one questions the credibility of, who are attesting that this was actually going on as long ago as the 1960s, that these international bankers are kind of running the US dollar money supply, almost running their own monetary policy over the US dollar supply globally by operating in the shadows outside of the US banking system. Now, before we go on, Jeff, I want to clarify something, because if I were just to look up the definition of Eurodollar on Wikipedia, all it says is a US dollar that's on deposit somewhere outside of the US. So, I go to an ATM in New York City, I withdraw $100, I hop on a plane to London, I use that $100 to open a Denominated checking account in London.

And of course, dollar-denominated bank accounts are very common in other countries outside of the United States. That's a Eurodollar. Clearly, you're not talking about that. You're talking about something much bigger and much more interesting. So, how specifically are you defining this word Eurodollar for our purposes today?

Jeff Snider: Yeah, you're right, Erik. We need to be very careful here and emphasize repeatedly that our use of the term Eurodollar is much, much broader than the standard definition, the one that you found on Wikipedia. You know, a eurodollar, as you said, used to be an account convertible into physical US dollars that were on deposit outside the United States. Now, the term euro long predates the European common currency and our use here. In front of the word dollar simply conveys the notion of offshore.

And there are other markets. There's a euro currency market. For example, offshore yen is called euroyen. Or— and there's even something since the introduction of the European Monetary Union where there's offshore euro, which is called eurodollar. But over time, the term eurodollar more and more represented the system of interbank liabilities that real economy participants were using once they connected to it in order to accomplish real-world activities.

As I'm showing here on slide 8, Stephen Goldfeld, who was a Princeton University economist in 1976, he wrote this paper where he set out to find missing money, what he called missing money, because he had realized how, you know, banks and their customers had come to create and utilize different monetary forms to accomplish real-world transactions. These are things like repurchase agreements, repo markets, along with these Eurodollar liabilities.

The money wasn't missing. It was these liabilities and wholesale funding techniques that just didn't fall under official definitions. So, there is no real Eurodollar. It's not a thing like there is a dollar bill. It is a system of financing and accomplishing monetary and financial ends that was just very different from how it had ever been done in the past.

If you go to slide number 9, in the 1970s, authorities at the Fed and elsewhere had simply made a choice, decided that they were gonna view this Eurodollar system as nothing other than an investment option for domestic banks. Despite the urging of several officials, many prominent former high-level government people, people like Robert Triffin himself, Robert Roosa, who was the former Treasury Undersecretary for Monetary Affairs, in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. These people were urging Federal Reserve officials and central bankers or whoever, current contemporary officials, to really appreciate that these, what Robert Roosa called new networks of interbank relations, they needed to be incorporated into the monetary picture, but their warnings were never heeded. The official doctrine that was written in the late '70s were how Eurodollars again must be treated exclusively investments.

It was thought that because they were primarily, at the time, using secured certificates of deposit, That these eurodollars were mostly store of value function of money and not acting as a medium of exchange.

Going into slide number ten, you know we have to ask what if that wasn't ever the case? What if this eurodollar stuff was actually actually was a medium of exchange? You know monetary evolution that was unleashed during the '50s, '60s, and '70s. You know Stephen Goldfeld's missing money. It kept evolving once it was let loose into its own ecosystem offshore. There was as much qualitative expansion as there was quantitative expansion. Expansion. Throughout the 1990s, for example, Alan Greenspan would lament often in his speeches how money was no longer a simple topic. Everybody around my age remembers his 1996 Irrational Exuberance speech, but nobody really heard anything outside of those 2 words. I guess it was the dot-com bubble we were all preoccupied with. But what Alan Greenspan was really saying was money supply trends had veered off path so many years How would we even know if it was rational or irrational? And he wasn't just talking about, you know, asset bubbles in the stock market or dot-coms or anything like, you know, we have to— the much broader question about the economy itself.

By June of 2000, which is the quote I'm showing you here on slide 10, Greenspan would privately admit that this, quote, proliferation of products that was being used as money had made a definition of it effectively impossible. And so the missing money of the '70s was never really found.

Instead, it was encouraged by these shadows, and therefore, in them, it had grown stranger and more exotic still. And that's the Eurodollar that I refer to. It's a currency-like system based around the banks scattered all throughout the world who participate in it.

Why it matters: Citibank vs offshore chains of liabilities

Erik Townsend: Okay, so when we talk about Eurodollars, we're not really talking about something different from the US dollar. We're talking about US dollars, but what we're referring to is a system that operates in the shadows and creates supply of US dollars and creates It's all kinds of complex transactions in US dollars that the US central bank, the Federal Reserve, doesn't really know about because it's outside of their regulatory purview and doesn't really understand exactly what's going on and how it really works and what these bankers are up to. But I could imagine, Jeff, some of our listeners saying, wait a minute, why is this even that important? Because people who understand this concept of the money multiplier effect already know that a commercial bank like Citibank can create US dollar money If Citibank makes a $100 million loan to Caterpillar to build new plants and equipment, they're creating US dollar money supply by lending it into existence.

And it sounds like maybe all you're saying is, okay, it's also possible for a French bank like Société Générale to make a loan to, let's say, Unilever, so they can build plants and equipment. And if they make that loan in US dollars, Okay, the Fed doesn't really see that in their reporting because that loan is being made outside of the banking system, but it really is effectively creating US dollars. Okay, big deal. It's the same thing as Citibank loaning to Caterpillar. Why should we care that SocGen loans to Unilever? How is that any different or significant than Citibank creating US dollar money supply when it makes a loan to Caterpillar?

Jeff Snider: Right. Well, Erik, let's, let's go back to Milton Friedman in 1969, which I'm showing on slide 11 here. As Friedman showed half a century ago, the use of these, these Eurodollars is theoretically unlimited, as given by what Robert Roosa in 1984 called new networks of interbank relations. Now, originally, these were largely time deposits, and they were held largely by corporate non-bank accounts. But around 1967, 1968, they started shifting sting and played a very large role in provoking and amplifying the global currency crisis we talked about before. Now, what large banks in New York did in response to losing what were primarily CDs was bidding for those dollars back from the Eurodollar market and booking those liabilities instead as borrowing from the foreign subsidiaries that they began operating out there in the offshore places. Now, Milton Friedman showed how this actually worked, something we talked about in Eurodollar It was again an increase in dollar supply outside the U.S., but what also amounted to an unappreciated transformation.

Again, in its earliest form, this interbank offshore accounting system transformed what used to be deposit liabilities into interbank borrowings.

Now you add to that the communications technology revolution, you have financial innovation in the form of you know standardized derivative contracts in the 1980s, things like interest rate swaps and eurodollar futures, and even the term interbank borrowing itself becomes exponentially more complex. Complex. So, you have this flexible, creative vacuum upon which globally connected financial institutions can all on their own choose how to participate in what is filling, or how to fill in what is a vitally important role of global reserve currency, like I'm showing on slide 12. Unlike the gold exchange system under Bretton Woods, this Eurodollar system could supply what was needed, how it was needed, and it could do so largely without politics and official interference or even public scrutiny. It was economist Paul Samuelson who in the early '70s called this the doctrine of benign neglect. You know, it was almost like the banking system wanted to do this, the official sector wanted them to do it because they didn't want anything to do with figuring out how to replace the Bretton Woods system.

So, that's what defined benign neglect.

And the reason was because Triffin's paradox had been that gold was never conceived to be a solution for a globalizing world because it lacked, as Robert Solomon, who was another one of these high officials, Robert Solomon was the international monetary expert for the Federal Reserve throughout the '60s and '70s. What he pointed out over and over was the gold exchange system under Bretton Woods lacked both liquidity and adjustment functions to maintain under this kind of demand.

So what all Bretton Woods had going for it was only confidence that US dollars were backed by gold. But even that was more and more challenged throughout the 1960s. Again, Triffin's What the Eurodollar offered was liquidity and adjustment to demand, but paired in denomination with US dollars, it also gave it the confidence that this shadow money would easily supply financing for a globalizing world.

So, Erik, slide 13. We're not talking about Citibank creating a loan for Caterpillar to build something in Illinois or whatever. We're really talking about, for example, Deutsche Bank creating US dollar liabilities by offering currency swaps on a market in Hong Kong, which HSBC then relends to Mitsubishi and Mitsubishi Heavy Industries. Tokyo that then get repoed out to the Agricultural Bank of China so that some Chinese corporate can purchase raw materials on global markets.

Not only do we have to be aware of all of the liabilities in that chain in terms of risk and potential bottlenecks, and these are liquidity and monetary risk, we also have to understand and appreciate what that does to the local system where that output comes out.

Offshore buildup, the dollar short and Bernanke's savings glut

Erik Townsend: Okay, now we're getting somewhere. So, when we talk about these Eurodollar transactions, we're not just talking— when we say that they create US dollar money supply. We're not just talking about a commercial bank making a loan, like SocGen making a loan to Unilever to buy plants and equipment. We're talking about major international capital flows between countries, which potentially have geopolitical ramifications and so forth. Presumably, if we were talking about US banks making loans to China, to Japan, and so forth, presumably people in the US government would want to be involved in that process and deciding whether or not it is in the US national interest interest for US banks to be making loans to, you know, China, to Japan, and so forth. You're saying that effectively the US dollar, although it's regulated by the Federal Reserve, it's only regulated by the Federal Reserve in the United States. And a huge amount of this overall global US dollar system operates in the shadows outside of anyone's regulation, and it's all controlled by international bankers.

So now we're really We're getting somewhere, but I think it's important, Jeff, that we focus on the systemic dependencies that this creates, because in a few minutes, we're going to get to how this Eurodollar system broke down in 2009. Before we go there, I want to make sure our listeners understand how does the global economy and the global financial system depend on this Eurodollar system? And we can't obviously understand what the consequences of a breakdown would be until we understand how it supports the global

Jeff Snider: You're right, Erik. And Alan Greenspan said the words proliferation of products in June of 2000. So, already we know there was massive qualitative expansion throughout the 1990s. As I'm showing you on slide 14, when it reached its zenith was in the first decade of the 21st century. Now, because this is all shadow money, we have to be careful. Any kind of statistics or estimates that we have, they all come with caveats attached to them. These are, at best, rough estimates simply because going back to Stephen Goldfeld's Missing Money of the '70s, officials decided this Eurodollar system was just an odd investment choice rather than some reserveless global currency design, and therefore, nobody kept track of what was really going on in these offshore places.

However, in the aftermath of 2008, some people decided, maybe we should go back and look at this thing. Maybe we should start to piece some of these things together and match up some of these, some quantities for all of these offshore qualities that we were observing throughout the period. Now, the Bank for International Settlements in October 2009 noted that there was suddenly, in the decade of the 2000s, banks, especially in Europe, had binged on what they called international assets. By the end of 2007, these had ballooned to, again according to the BIS estimates, a mind-boggling $34 trillion.

You have to ask, you know, how was all that offshore credit creation On slide 15, you know, obviously it wasn't Alan Greenspan and Ben Bernanke, because the Fed throughout this missing money period had produced little to no bank reserves. Most Alan Greenspan or Ben Bernanke ever done— had done was move the federal funds target around a quarter point here or there, maybe 50 basis points every once in a while.

And so, you know, I'm oversimplifying a little bit, but quite literally, this Eurodollar system created its own forms of liquidity, its own forms of reserves.

Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.

Jeff Snider: That were again these long chains of interbank liabilities that stretch all the way around the world and back. In the same BIS study from 2009, again keeping in mind this is pretty primitive data, its researchers figured that the world was short, or what they called a funding gap, anywhere between $2 and $6.5 trillion on the eve of panic.

And what I mean by short is not short like shorting a stock. You know, a dollar short is not betting that the dollar goes down in price. A dollar short. What I mean by that is it's a material mismatch between several credit dimensions, including maturity as well as geography, whereby you know some bank in Europe, for example, who has been repoing its holdings of structured U.S. mortgage obligations or emerging market eurobonds, suddenly has very limited monetary recourse when the global repo market suddenly rejects its collateral. And if you're a European bank, what do you do then to go find U.S. dollars? funding.

On slide 16, what we see— this massive offshore buildup was not unnoticed by the official sector.

US policymakers like Ben Bernanke, for example, had great trouble reconciling this Eurodollar system with this orthodox convention, which again, as we said in the beginning, was that the US economy was a closed system, therefore the dollar system should have been closed as well. In 2005, what Bernanke would propose was what he called a global savings glut. In other words, from his perspective, he saw that there was something, something going on out there in the world. And it was distorting the US dollar system, including what seemed to be a perpetual bid for US government bonds, US Treasuries, including GSE paper. But to Bernanke, this all had to be global savings because his convention left him no other option than the— than, for example, foreign baby boomers suddenly getting ready for their retirement by increasing their savings and allocating their savings to US dollar assets for non-specified unknown reasons.

But, you know, we flip to slide 17, we see that, you know, that's really not what was— what had been going on during the time. Again, you know, noting the BIS study, that there's no way this was a global savings system.

Especially after 1995, the Eurodollar system really hit its stride. It was the marriage of all its defining characteristics, which could then spread unfettered all over the world. And in fact, it was, it was welcomed by most people, because what they saw were only the benefits of globalization, you know, the growth in the whole worldwide economy, emerging market economic miracles, and global trade, which seemed to be at the center of it.

And all of it seemed to enhance all of these economic systems, as they were becoming more closely tied together by this global monetary arrangement. Now, the Eurodollar system had, in fact, just overdone Which is one thing that you and I, Erik, spend a lot of time discussing in Eurodollar University. Even as the crude BIS numbers suggest, it got way out of hand.

The 2008 crisis as a Eurodollar breakdown on August 9, 2007

Erik Townsend: Okay, so the essence of all this: everybody understands that the most important currency system in the entire universe, on the, on the planet, is the US dollar. Most people assume that, well, since the US dollar comes from the US, most of the really big transactions, the international capital flows in dollars, those must all originate in the US because that's, you know, that's where the system is headquartered.

What you're saying is, nah, it doesn't work that way. The bankers are a little bit smarter than that. The bankers have figured out that if they originate major transactions in the US, they're under regulatory scrutiny in the US, but they actually have the ability to create these massive, massive loans and structured products and swaps and all kinds of elaborate derivatives.

Jeff Snider: Right.

Erik Townsend: Derivatives in the shadows outside of the US banking system, where they're essentially unregulated and can get away with doing whatever they want. And you're saying that they do these things to the point that they literally don't want anybody to know about it. And we've got people as credible as Paul Einzig and Milton Friedman coming out and saying, hey, you know, they're— I try to find out about this stuff and the bankers ask me not to write about it because they're trying to keep it secret.

So, we've got an entire global economy which the bankers are running in the shadows, outside of the view of regulators. Now, as we discussed in Eurodollar University Season 2— So, Jeff, you're saying that the entire system broke down August 9th, 2007, almost without explanation. And what I think is even more important Almost everybody assumes that the catalyst that got the whole great financial crisis going was subprime mortgages. You think it's not really subprime mortgages. Maybe that was a catalyst that kind of got things rolling, but you think the real problem was the breakdown of the offshore Eurodollar system, which nobody's talking about. You think that was the primary cause of the great financial crisis. So, you're actually saying not only is there this sort of clandestine Eurodollar system that the bankers are running in the shadows outside of regulation. But the breakdown of that system, you think, is the real cause of the Great Financial Crisis.

Certainly, the Financial Crisis Inquiry Committee, they didn't conclude, hey, this is all about Eurodollars. What are you talking about? How did it break down? Did it really cause or contribute to the Great Financial Crisis? And is it fixed now, or is it still

Jeff Snider: Yeah, well, Erik, I think that's a good place to start. You know, let's, let's start with the conventional explanation for the Panic of 2008. You know, slide 18 here. Everybody has heard, everybody, you know, the official government response was that it was a bunch of greedy Wall Street bankers who were taking on ridiculously absurd risks in the form of these subprime mortgages. As you mentioned, the FCIC, which was the official government report, they interviewed something like 700 witnesses. They examined millions upon millions of documents.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jeff Snider: Document. And the majority's lengthy final report that they published in 2010 mentions the word Lehman 556 times, which is something that you would expect given the way things had unfolded. The name Bear Stearns is in there in 218 instances, for example, and it also says the word subprime 784 times. So yeah, I think they were trying to emphasize something in their report. But yet, as I'm showing here on slide 18, even Ben Bernanke had to testify before that very commission that something else was going on.

For all the focus on subprime, it wasn't subprime which actually imperiled Lehman Brothers, or Bear Stearns, or AIG, or any of the somehow nationalized banks that were scattered all throughout Europe and elsewhere, not just Europe.

On slide 19, the minority dissent from the FCIC report doesn't begin very strongly either, but setting politics aside, at least the dissenters note that this wasn't an American failure alone. However you want to call it, the Great Financial Crisis, whatever, it might more aptly be renamed the Great Global Monetary Crisis, because there were variations in financial systems all across the globe, some of which didn't rely on securitization, and therefore weren't heavily exposed to US subprime mortgages at all. But more than that, these were large, complex financial firms that had failed or nearly failed in many different countries around the world. As Bernanke said, subprime didn't do that.

Now, it didn't apparently dawn on anybody in the FCIC to ask why, during the worst of that period, as I'm showing here on slide 20, why was the Federal Reserve's largest contributions to the systems lacking rescue in the form of US dollar swaps with foreign central banks? You know, during 2008, the Fed's balance sheet swelled not because of specific bailouts or domestic liquidity auctions. By far, the most that was added was through these foreign currency swaps. Now ask yourself, why was it that the US Central Bank had been handing out, you know, more than half a trillion in US dollar funding to overseas entities during the worst part of the worst banking panic in 4 generations?

Now the better question approaches it from the other side. Why were foreign banks domiciled elsewhere so desperate for US dollar funding that they were begging, knocking down the doors of their local central banks and demanding that their local officials bail them out in US dollar terms? The answer is this offshore US dollar short, or the funding gap, as BIS called it.

Even when the Fed finally stepped in with their swaps, it was a poor and ineffective substitute for these dynamic networks of Eurodollar relations. Ironically, I think that's why there's so much focus on subprime mortgages, because it's much easier to understand, especially for the public to understand, and blame greedy Wall Street bankers than it is to get into into these deep and overwhelming shadows.

Now, Erik, slide 21, you and I spent a lot of time in Eurodollar University going over the panic itself. We talked about it at length, how it was multidimensional, how we could observe its cross-border nature. So, we'll just briefly summarize what went on here. Beginning on August 9th, LIBOR and federal funds uncharacteristically jumped. On August 10th, we saw why.

LIBOR went higher while federal funds plunged below the target. And for much of the crisis, that's the way it stayed, especially during the worst parts of it. Higher LIBOR rates were signaling offshore US dollar distress, while federal funds that was often considered below the Fed's target was telling us that banks were hoarding liquidity in domestic terms. Milton Friedman's 1969 interbank pathways had broken down starting on August 9th.

Slide 22. You know, the other parts of the Eurodollar system, this wholesale system They followed in much the same pattern, much the same way. ABS commercial paper, we spent a lot of time on that at Eurodollar University. It was one of the primary innovations of this Eurodollar system and is also therefore one of the primary points of contagion as it spread across the globe. It utterly collapsed in the wake of August 9th, and nothing the Federal Reserve did, which would include, you know, reducing the federal funds rate, there were TAF liquidity auctions, there were collateral swaps. There were those dollar swaps. There was even a commercial paper funding program, a money market commercial paper funding program. You know, nothing that the Fed did, which was considerable, nothing the Fed did would rescue these shadow markets.

And even the more real esoteric stuff, the derivative stuff, uh, slide 23, credit default swap markets, which were hugely important, not because of subprime mortgages, but because of something called regulatory capital relief. Another thing we spent a lot of time on Eurodollar University. These credit default swaps and other derivative markets were shut down, and they could not have been restarted no matter what the Federal Reserve, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, etc., etc.

None of the central banks nor their coordinated responses could get this Humpty Dumpty Eurodollar piece back together again. And we could go, you know, on and on and on and on with essential market indications, things like interest rate swaps, which to me are huge, important part of the— especially balance sheet capacity and these dynamic bank liabilities.

But, you know, all of them, they all recognize the same factor. The system that broke down on August 9th, 2007, was very, very different, because it had focused on bank capacities and bank liabilities.

Consequences: no growth since 2007, Eurodollar squeezes, low rates

Erik Townsend: Okay, I really want to focus now on bringing this down to the consequences and implications that this has. You've made a very good argument, and shown us very clearly with data. August 9th, 2007, it all falls apart, it breaks down. I can observe, just from knowing you for a few years, that you get a lot of very useful insight out of this. And I think back to our US Dollar End Game series, where Luke Gromen made some incredibly compelling, very well-founded arguments. He was bearish the US dollar at that time. And you actually agreed with a lot of his structural arguments about where the US was headed, but you had a bullish view on the US dollar.

Jeff Snider: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Because of your understanding of this Eurodollar system and the dollar short that exists. And needless to say, the dollar index was in the 80s when we taped that. It's in the high 90s now. So you've been proven right.

And I know Luke Gromen even is tactically bullish at this point on the US dollar. So you've got the ability to translate this understanding that you have of the Eurodollar system into practical tradable themes. So what are the consequences and implications As we look forward, you know, it's still broken as you've described it. What are the consequences and implications of that, and how does it play out in markets, and what do investors need to be thinking about as a result of that understanding?

Jeff Snider: If we go back, you know, 2008, if it was about subprime mortgages, then everything is forgiven and forgotten. The world doesn't have a subprime mortgage problem anymore, and it's probably never going to have a subprime mortgage problem again, certainly not in our lifetimes.

But if 2008 was instead a Eurodollar panic, a global monetary system system panic, then perhaps money still lurking in the shadows might still be a problem even 10-plus years later. Now, there's a story behind each and every one of the charts that we're going to include here, as well as the dozens more, Erik, that you've talked me out of including into the slide deck. But all of these speak to a unique angle as to what's going on in certain parts or areas of the Eurodollar system. And we could talk at length about each and every one of them, because there's a lot of incredibly important detail and nuance that's worth mentioning and diagramming, but that's not our point here. That's not what we're trying to do here. We're just gonna give an overview and summation.

So, what I hope people will notice, and what they'll really comprehend from the few that we've added here, is the consistency, and therefore the overriding message in each.

Before 2008, which was really August 9th, 2007, the system grew. It often grew very rapidly, very quickly. I mean, in fact, it got Ben Bernanke's attention to call it a global savings glut After that point, after that break, however, there's been no growth at all, including plenty to indicate that it's shrinking. Now, this has been accomplished by what amount to, uh, very clear further episodes which pertain to the dollar short or funding gap and what amount to intermittent dollar shortages. Now, I call them Eurodollar squeezes because of the effect that they have on the global system.

Now, the chart I'm showing you on, on slide 24, as well as the one on 25, These were drawn from the US Treasury Department's TIC data. The one before on slide 24 was derived from statistics about US banks and their various cross-border dollar activity. And therefore, that's a proxy for what they might be doing in concert with these unseen foreign counterparties related to this Eurodollar activity, or lack of activity. The one on slide 25, that's the headline data, so to speak, or how foreigners, not just foreign banks, but all foreigners respond to the conditions in this Eurodollar space. Okay. System. Now, as you might imagine, given a dollar shortage and a predetermined funding gap, if you can sell US dollar assets in lieu of Eurodollar-based funding, that's what you do. So unsurprisingly, foreigners tend to sell a whole lot of US dollar assets during these periods of global financial strain, or what I call these Eurodollar squeezes.

Now, over the last 5 years in particular, it has been the official sector— foreign governments and central banks, especially in Asia, especially in China, who tend to sell when their connections to the Eurodollar system find themselves desperately in need of dollars. Again, notice the overall general pattern: massive growth before the summer of 2007, and nothing but periodic trouble since then. And that includes, I should point out, the last year or year and a quarter or so, which is an emerging or actually pretty well established fourth Eurodollar problem, which you've probably noticed in market behavior over the last couple. of months.

Slide 26, you know, we could, we could go on and on and on. Here we see the big money dealer banks and the guts of the Eurodollar system, which is their derivative books. These domestic banks, as well as their foreign counterparts, were all about getting bigger before 2008, and now their main thing is only shrinking. So, a system that once worked, or at least appeared to work, now it's only one that goes the other way. Slide 27. Now, these further Eurodollar problems, which, you know, number 2, 3, and 4, we talked a lot about that in Toronto.

These aren't just something that we know from statistical artifacts. We can observe them in real-time market data. Basic money market hierarchy breaks down during these very periods. You know, an unsecured interbank rate like federal funds should not trade consistently below a secured interbank rate like repo. Yet we see that there are times when this upside-down condition not only does it happen, it persists.

And these times when it persists, not coincidentally do they match up with reduced U.S. cross-border bank activity. Also, the heaviest dollar selling by foreign counterparts, and all sorts of other indications of what just you know a couple years ago the Yellen Fed tried to call overseas turmoil. It's not really overseas, but it's offshore.

You know you mentioned the U.S. dollar index, slide 28. This includes the tendency of the dollar's exchange value to rise during these periods where everyone is convinced it should be falling. These eurodollar squeezes and again we can see in 2018 and so far in 2019. The eurodollar number four falls into each one of these categories. It does seem to be another squeeze that's developing.

Slide twenty-nine. Okay, unfortunately, a permanent breakdown in the function of what is a global monetary system results in the same thing for the global economic system.

Before 2008, again the pattern: there was growth. After, now GDP might be positive and persistently positive too, but it clearly isn't the same thing as growth. As of Q4 2018. Real GDP in the US is more than $4.7 trillion less than what it should have been had the Great Recession actually been a recession. So, something is keeping economic growth under wraps, dating back specifically to Eurodollar number 1.

And as you can see on slide 30, you know, since this is a global currency system, it's not just the US economy which is falling further and further behind, as if it's being dragged down by some unseen shadow Slide 31.

Even the heretofore invincible Asian miracle economies, those which emerged from the Great Financial Crisis or Eurodollar number 1 largely unscathed, or seemingly unscathed, they've been dragged down into more and more of the same problems, the same rot, whatever you want to call it, following especially Eurodollar number 2 in 2011. The more these overseas economies are forced to sell their US dollar assets, again, referring to the TIC, the more they're forced to sell their data, US dollar assets, again, referring to the TIC, the less economic growth which seems to result.

Slide 32. One of the most dominant features of the last decade has been persistently low interest rates. All across the world, these are described as a puzzle, or they're attributed to quantitative easing. They're not a puzzle, and neither are they attributable to quantitative easing. Low bond rates are telling us exactly what is wrong. You know, if we go back one last time to Milton Friedman, persistently low interest rates on the whole signal tight money in the real economy, but which type money. Recall Alan Greenspan's proliferation of products. The official sector can't define money, therefore how would they know otherwise? Meanwhile, the real economy doesn't care about the definition. Instead, it has to perform based on what's really going on, whether it shows up in the textbook or not.

Dollar outlook, Eurodollar number 4 and the limits of data

Erik Townsend: Jeff, I know that many of our listeners are going to want to focus on how to translate these very fascinating ideas to Actionable trades that they can profit from. So certainly one that jumps off the page to me is you were very prescient when we did the Dollar Endgame series. Even though you agreed with much of what Luke Gromen had to say about the reasons that the US is gonna face a lot of problems going forward with de-dollarization and so forth, you still, being informed by an understanding of this Eurodollar system, understood these Eurodollar squeezes that occur, and you still felt You've been proven right in that. So you just mentioned a few minutes ago, and I'm sure many of our listeners noticed it, that another number 4 Eurodollar squeeze has begun in the last couple of months. Is that likely to continue from what you're seeing? And am I correct to assume that that means Dollar should outperform other currencies, Dollar Index should move up?

It's time to be long Dollar Index futures if you're inclined to speculate on such things. Well, I think it's time to be long the US dollar relative to other currencies. things? And how long do you think it would last? Is there a price target? And what are the factors that might cause it to reverse?

Jeff Snider: Well, you know, one of the things I hate most is they say that you're bullish on the dollar, or you're bullish on it. You know, it's not really bullish, because what we're talking about— and I think that's the thing that we all agreed on, on the dollar podcast that we had way back in 2017— was that this is a dysfunctional system. So, we're not really positive about any of this stuff. And so, the rising dollar value during these Eurodollar squeezes is another negative indication. So, it's not really something that you're bullish about, except that it happens to work out into higher exchange value of the US dollar against various other foreign currencies.

The data that I see, I expect that that would continue, though, you know, it is hard to say about how much higher the dollar might go. Regardless, what we're seeing is that these squeezes tend to take on multi-year dimensions. These are not short-term things. You know, it's almost like trying to turn around a large ship. Once it gets going in a certain direction, it's going to keep going in that direction. And everything that we've seen from real-time market data to these esoteric cross-border banking statistics, bond rates, economic data from all these various countries, all of it tells us that this— yes, there's Eurodollar number 4 that's going on right now.

And I think it's just now getting started. It's been going on for the last year, year and a quarter or so already. Again, these are long-term processes that take time to play out. We're just to see really the meat of it emerge in a lot of different places, and that creates a lot of different opportunities.

But I, I just hate using the word bullish because bullish connotates, you know, a positive view of something when, when it's really a negative view of pretty much everything.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so the expectation is for a secular short squeeze in the US dollar to continue to move the US dollar higher against other currencies. If anyone is inclined to trade that by being long the dollar index, what would the risk factors be that they watch for that would tell you, hey, this thing's about to change directions and go the other way?

Jeff Snider: Well, it's not so easy to tell these inflection points either up or down. In fact, it takes a lot of study of a lot of different— a very broad cross-section, a very deep survey of what you think is going on in this offshore US dollar Again, that goes back to our difficulty in defining a Eurodollar is that there aren't any direct statistics for the Eurodollar system. What we're really doing is trying to piece together what may be going on into these offshore shadow money spaces based on the effects that we're seeing in all of these different things. It's almost like in physics, we talk about this in Toronto, nobody's ever observed a quark, but it's a fundamental property of matter, but yet we know it's there.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jeff Snider: It's there, but we only know it's there because of indirect indications of how it makes other things move and the effects it has on things around it. So, we're essentially trying to do the same thing.

That presents a number of difficulties in terms of turning this into an investment strategy, because we can't directly observe the Eurodollar system. And so, it takes a lot of study, very broad surveys, as I mentioned, to try to figure out what's going on today, and then try to piece together some kind of forecast about how that might change in the future. And so, right from the very start, you start from acknowledging the fact that it's a very difficult thing because, you know, we're not directly observing. There's no data. There's no direct data for what's actually going on in the Eurodollar system. Therefore, it leaves a lot of subjective interpretation.

Summary, listener feedback request and call for a counterargument

Erik Townsend: So, to summarize the whole discussion, the US dollar is still the most important currency on the entire planet, and its functions and operations are not as governed by the Federal Reserve as everybody thinks. The international bankers, including US banks that have international subsidiaries, have figured out how to do some of their most complex and sophisticated financing transactions in the shadows, outside of regulatory oversight and control. Nobody really knows— well, at least most of us, other than the most privileged bankers don't really fully understand exactly how the details of this work. But the analysis that Jeff has done tells us that it appears we are at the beginning of another major dollar squeeze event, which could push the US dollar higher relative to other currencies, with the caveat that Jeff does not see that as bullish for the US dollar or the US economy. It's an indication of a problem which is going to manifest itself in the form of a dollar short squeeze.

I'd like to shift gears now and switch to what we would like from you, our audience, because the way that today's podcast came about is Jeff approached me in Vancouver at MacroVoices Live and said, look, Erik, the feedback that I'm getting and that you're getting is a lot of people seem to think there was some value in Eurodollar University, but not everybody understood it.

We need to make it so that more people understand it. And I've been working with Jeff behind the scenes to try to make that happen. So, if you're one of those people who kind of tried to listen to Eurodollar University and it didn't all make sense to you and you weren't really sure what the point was, we're hoping that today's podcast sheds some more light on it. And we very much want your feedback because I'm trying to work with Jeff to reorganize Eurodollar University away from the straight chronological format into something that's more topically oriented, and we could really use some feedback. We did the first presentation of this slide deck at the end of March at Harvard Business School, got some really great feedback there, and we'd like your feedback as well. Best place to do that is on Twitter. If you're not on Twitter, you can also email us, info@macrovoices.com. We do read all of the emails.

We can't reply to all of them because we just don't have enough time, but we do read them all with interest, and we're trying to do our best to take this very, very complex puzzle of how the international US dollar liquidity system really works— not the way the Fed thinks it works, but how it really works— and distill it into something that's more understandable. And we would very much appreciate your feedback. The other thing that I'd like to mention here publicly, and I asked for the same thing at Harvard University, because that certainly is a very esteemed audience.

I don't know how I could possibly tell if Jeff were wrong about all this stuff. I certainly am not qualified to know that. If there's anyone who knows anyone who knows as much about Eurodollars as Jeff does, and thinks that Jeff has it all wrong, and has botched the analysis, and is missing the real point of what's going on here, we'd absolutely love to hear from you. I would love to have a counterargument from Someone who knows just as much about Eurodollars as Jeff does. I've reached out to my network. I've talked to several other people in financial media and said, hey, who could we tap to do the opposing op-ed against Jeff Snider? And they just laugh at me and say, nobody knows what Jeff Snider's talking about, never mind how to form an opposing opinion. I would be very interested to discover if there's someone out there who really has a contrasting view what Jeff has said and is able to back it with all of the data and graphs and charts that Jeff has backed his arguments with.

It would be fascinating to hear another side of this story. We're going to leave it there in the interest of time. Jeff, I can't thank you enough for coming and joining us on the program. But before I let you go, why don't you tell our listeners what you do there at Alhambra Investment Partners

Jeff Snider: Well, I'm the head of global research at Alhambra. We're a registered investment advisor based out of Florida. So we do portfolio management services. And you can find me at alhambrapartners.com. I publish quite a bit there, and as well as different places around the internet. And thank you very much, Erik, for having me and taking the time to try to put this Eurodollar University stuff into better focus and much more accessible terms.

Erik Townsend: Well, it's my pleasure, Jeff, and I really hope that our listeners will give us their feedback and help us to craft a new Eurodollar University, which is a little better organized and hopefully makes this very complex message more understandable to a broader audience, which is what our goal is. We have already gone well beyond our usual time limit, so we're going to leave it there. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break: guest requests and mailbag addresses

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Patrick on money supply and what is not measured

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was so great to have Jeffrey back on the show. You know, I listened to all of the original Eurodollar University series and found it fascinating, but it's amazing when we rehash and put it together how interesting it is the second go-around with so many new little angles on it. I thought it was great. But you know, one of the things that I took away, right? When you think macro, when at least the average person thinks macro. The focus often lies into analyzing inflation, jobs, the credit markets, uh, you know, the growth in corporate credit and all these variables. To me, I personally have a strong weighting to the study of money supply and the influences of money growth. But even when you take something like the study of money supply, M2, that is the money that's within the Federal Reserve System in a US banking system.

But what I find fascinating is that when we have Jeff come on the show, he introduces us to this idea that there's an entire money market system out there that isn't properly being accounted for, and no one really knows how to even properly measure it. I find that fascinating, and it really shows that there's a lot of things that we are not accounting for that can happen, and, and a lot of people don't know how to size that risk. What did you take away from this?

Erik's quantum-physics analogy for Eurodollar University

Erik Townsend: Well, I think you hit the nail on the head, Patrick. And the analogy that I've become fond of when I think about Eurodollar University is the story of the introduction of quantum physics in the mid-1920s. Classical physics is the foundation of science. It's what we've used to design mechanisms and machines and things for hundreds of years, and it's at the foundation of all science. And then there was just this little wrinkle where some really smart guys, Niels Bohr in particular, in 1925, I believe, published a paper that basically proved in academically defensible terms that classical physics is completely wrong and the universe doesn't actually work that way. And there's a whole different set of rules that nobody understands, which is really governing. And if you could get your head around those, you would understand things orders of magnitude better than anybody else. And the history, of course, of what's happened since is quantum physics has become this thing that it's sort of the aura.

Wow, if you're super smart, you can understand quantum physics, and everybody pretends they do, whether they do or they don't. Most of them don't. And in reality, when you're designing widgets and figuring out how to make a new hinge for a cabinet door, you're better off to stick with the classical physics, because that stuff seems to work, even if it's proven to be incomplete in some way. So, I think of the most important thing, as you just said, is understanding, okay, how much money is there and, you know, who's got it and what's the money supply measurement of the economy. The way we understand money supply is the same as the way we understand classical physics. We have a working model that seems to be accurate when in reality it can be proven that it's completely wrong and there's a much bigger picture that's harder to understand. Jeff Snider is the guy who gets, you know, he's the Niels Bohr of money supply. He's the guy who understands that the understanding that the Federal Reserve itself has of the global US dollar liquidity system is wrong.

It doesn't really work that way. It works according to a much more complex system that appears to have at its center not the Federal Reserve, but rather a bunch of very, very smart and probably self-serving commercial bankers who know how to really run and oversee this system. And, you know, it sounds conspiratorial, but Jeff proven that there's a system that's much bigger than most people understand there.

And where it leaves me, I think, frankly, we're making progress, but I still don't think we've nailed it yet with getting Eurodollar University to really deliver a message of, this is why you should care. These are the most significant things you need to understand about the money universe, that it doesn't work the way you thought it did. And particularly how to apply it, how to translate it to something that can, you know, actually help your trading performance. So I really want to call on our listeners to give us feedback.

The next leg of Eurodollar University and what feedback is wanted

Patrick Ceresna: So Erik, how can all of our listeners help Jeff out in terms of putting together the next leg of this?

Erik Townsend: Well, we're really trying to figure out what that next leg has to be because sort of like quantum physics, you know, for people who are intellectually curious, it's absolutely Fascinating. But where's the practical application of Eurodollar University? And, you know, one of the things that I talked to Jeff about is I said, should we be thinking about, here's how to understand it in a way that enables you to trade it so that you have a leg up and people who want to make money will be inclined to want to come and maybe, you know, pay money to take a class with Jeff Snider about how to trade based on understanding the Eurodollar system. And he laughed and he said, I said, yes, it's definitely possible to really study this and get to the point of making trades based on signals that come from Eurodollar futures markets. But he laughed and he said, you know, it's a lot easier to learn how to trade on moving averages.

This is really, really complex stuff. This is something that boggles your mind like quantum physics does. And if you can get your head around it, you have a better understanding of the global liquidity system than anybody else. And it could be a huge advantage. Huge leg up for some really sophisticated macro fund managers. For most of us mortals, just getting your head around what Jeff's talking about is a big challenge. I'm trying to help Jeff figure out how to package something that would be more appealing and to help him to structure it better. So, we'd love listener feedback on, did this resonate or make sense more than Eurodollar University the first go-around? And what else could we do if we were going to try to restructure structure all of Eurodollar University and do it over, if you will, in order to make it more appealing and more digestible, frankly. I still feel like after relistening to Eurodollar University and research just for doing today's interview, I still only get 75 to 80% of what Jeff's talking about.

And I'm trying to figure out what we do to distill it and make it easier for listeners to process it. So, I welcome all of your feedback. We're not gonna be able to reply to every email because we get so many, but I promise we're reading every single one.

Patrick Ceresna: Now, those of our listeners that want to give us that feedback, make sure you email us at info@macrovoices.com, and, and we'll make sure we review all of that.

Research Roundup preview and sign-off

Erik Townsend: And on that note, we're gonna have to leave it there in the interest of time. Folks, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Doesn't cost you a penny, and the benefit to you is you'll receive our free Research Roundup email each week. Never contains any advertising or marketing. The benefit to you is that you receive links to all of the best free content we could find on the internet each week. Patrick, tell them what to expect in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: This week, you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, so you can read that while going through Jeffrey Snider's slide deck. There's also an interesting Bloomberg article asking the question, is Spain about to become the next Italy? As well, there's a great video link to Steve Eisman explaining his thesis behind the Canadian bank short. And so you'll find that and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com. Or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

Announcer close and disclaimer

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com, the internet's premier source of online education for traders. Please visit BigPictureTrading.com for more information. Please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly Research Roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week. You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library, and the more registered users we have, the more we'll be able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already.

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