Lacy Hunt — Hoisington Asset Management Chief Economist (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Episode open and teasers

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 217 was recorded on April 30th, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers all over the world, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing, helping investors overcome behavioral biases. We've got I've got another terrific episode on deck for you this week. Hoisington Investment Management Chief Economist Dr. Lacy Hunt joins me for what has to be his best MacroVoices interview yet. We'll discuss why Dr. Hunt thinks deflation will be the name of the game in the immediate future and what it would take to cause him to change his deflationary views. We'll also discuss the critical question of whether the zero bound is really a boundary or if it's just another number along the way toward negative rates.

Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment when Patrick and I will have an extended conversation over charts about what we believe is the end of a bear market rally in the stock market. But we'll consider both sides of that argument. Is the top finally in, or are we headed back above 3,000?

Market wrap: S&P 500 bear market rally and the 2,930 Fibonacci level

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now listeners, we have a detailed update of the COVID-19 crisis in our postgame segment after the feature interview. Now Erik, let's dive right into the S&P 500. We got a little bit of a pop on the Fed, and then it's giving it all back. What's your take on all of this?

Erik Townsend: Well, I've been saying for weeks and weeks and weeks that I think it's a bear market rally, and my target for shorting it, if I was going to short it, would be the 61.8% Fibonacci retrace level, which is 2,930 I tweeted yesterday, okay folks, we hit it right here, right now. This is where I would short if I was going to short. And I think when I clicked the tweet button, the market was at about 2,952.

So that would have been my entry had I shorted it. I decided to pass on it. Several reasons. One is just that, you know, the stock market's been awfully erratic through this whole crisis, and my crude oil trades have been extremely predictable, doing exactly— well, today was an exception, but aside from the last couple of days, the oil market's been doing exactly what I expected, and I'm just kind of sticking to what I'm best at. I also think that we do have intervention risk here. You know, we already saw the Fed say that they could bail out HYG, junk bonds, bonds, and if I was going to trade it, I'd want to do it with puts rather than outright futures shorts. And, you know, the puts are expensive with the VIX still up where it is. So I decided to pass on trading it, but if I were going to trade it, I think the time to enter the short was yesterday. Maybe we got one more push up to 3,000 or above just to take out the stops up there, but it's hard for me to see it going a whole lot farther than that.

Let's save the rest for the postgame segment, though, because we're going to get into some charts and talk about the pro and con arguments for why this could or could not be a bull market rally, or maybe we're headed back to all-time highs.

Market wrap: Dollar index 99-101 range

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to that dollar index because we are certainly backing off from the 100 handle, and we're down to about 99 right now on the dollar index. What's your take on the dollar here?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're definitely backing off, but it's still a consolidation range. You know, the range we've been in is 99 to 101. We're at the bottom of that range this week. We were at the top of it last week. It's not until we break out below 99 on a closing basis or above 101 that we actually get a signal from it. So for now, just in a consolidation. As I've said before, the Fed seemingly being so quick to be ready to intervene in just about everything weakens my bullish conviction a little bit, makes me mostly think there's room for more downside in the near term. But I think this ultimately is going to resolve dollar positive. This, this crisis is causing so much trouble all over the world. I think there's going to be a lot of flight capital moving into dollar assets.

Market wrap: Crude oil, Cushing storage and time spreads

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil, 'cause we used to be able to track a continuous chart to just get a pulse on what's going on in crude. But now it's all about the time spreads and the rolls and which, you know, at least 4 front-month contracts on the term structure, just how they're all developing. What's your take on how this is all playing out?

Erik Townsend: Well, I wanna thank Jim Bianco because I wouldn't have been able to do the crude oil segment here in less than an hour. There's just so much to talk about. Jim Bianco and I did a great podcast on Sunday evening, kind of impromptu. And so, I strongly encourage people who've not listened to it, if you're interested in crude oil, we've got some really interesting ideas there about why there might be kind of a perfect storm setup for— I guess it's not a black swan if you can predict it. So, it's a white swan, it's a gray swan. I don't know what color swan it is, but we think there could be some real fireworks in the crude oil market ahead if our theory proves correct. that producers are going to be using the futures market to essentially take care of the problem that they don't have any storage by making storage somebody else's issue.

Now, I should point out, because we got a lot of criticism on Twitter and so forth, Jim and I certainly understand that the producers don't directly sell futures in the futures market. They would need to work with their bankers and other intermediaries to do that. But the basic thesis is we think that there could be a lot of selling, which is motivated by producers trying to deliver oil into the futures market. So, there could be stealth short positions where there's a higher percentage of short interest that intends physical delivery than anybody expects, and you don't find out until the contract's about to expire. So, we went into great detail on that subject. Then, what's changed since then, since we published that interview on Monday morning, there's been this whole rally this week. Big move up in crude oil prices. Frankly, it feels to me like this is the market badly misinterpreting the inventory data. Now, Patrick, I'm always circumspect, you know, when it feels to me like, okay, I'm smarter than the market.

I see what they should see and they're missing it. They're all a bunch of dummies. I try to be very, very careful not to get too cocky because, you know, sometimes it turns out the market's got it right and I'm the one who was missing the boat. So I definitely invite— I know we have many listeners who are professionals in the physical crude oil markets. Please tell me if you guys think I'm getting this wrong. But what happened this week was first API and then EIA confirmed smaller builds on inventory than we've seen in the last several weeks. Nationally, it was a 9 million barrel build, which by historical norms is still huge, but it's not 15 like we had last week. Cushing, Oklahoma, which is a critical number because that's where the WTI futures contract is settled, building 3.6 million barrels. Again, by historical norms, it's a very large build, but it's not the 5 million plus that we've been seeing in recent weeks.

Gasoline, a drawdown of 3.7 million barrels. Distillates building 5.1 million barrels. Now, what the market is interpreting here, or appears to be interpreting, is, okay, it's not as bad as we thought. That, that string of really big builds on inventory that was 5 million barrels a week going into Cushing. We were so afraid it was going to get filled up. Turns out it's not going to get filled up. The builds are not as big. It must be slowing down. Everything's getting better.

And I'm just pulling my hair out. I can't believe anybody is stupid enough to interpret it that way, but that's the way the press is reporting it and that's the way the market seems to be trading it. Look, just make this simple. Imagine You've got an empty water glass that you're filling with a pitcher. When it's half full, you can tip that pitcher and really put water in at a rapid rate, and the rapid rate of fill tells you that you're going to very quickly reach the top. Well, what happens when it's full? You can't add any more. What is the measurement of how much can be added in a given week? Zero, because it's already full. I think what's going on, Patrick, is people are looking at the published working capacity figures for the Cushing tank storage farm, and they're saying, wait a minute, we're not at that number yet, and the rate of increase is going down, so maybe we're not really going to hit the number after all.

I think that is badly flawed logic. The way I interpret this, and by the way, I did predict this a couple of weeks ago and tweeted about it, is—

Patrick Ceresna: Oh, really?

Erik Townsend: By next week, I predict we'll have a very small Cushing build, maybe even a small Cushing draw. What does it mean? It means there's no room to add any more oil into Cushing. Now, the number is still going to be less than the theoretical working capacity. It has to be that way because they always have to leave a couple of tanks empty to facilitate blending operations and various other logistical requirements. So there's no reason that anybody ever should have thought it was going to get to that theoretical working capacity. I think we've gotten to the point where Cushing is as full as it can possibly get. And the reason that we have a smaller build this week, and I expect an even smaller build next week, is because there's no room to add any more. But the market is interpreting these smaller builds as a bullish signal. Oh, we're not really running out of room after all.

Look, if we weren't running out of room after all, we wouldn't have all these guys still putting together new floating storage deals, leasing tanker ships, and going through all of the much higher expense of storing oil at sea. The next thing that seems to have helped this rally is Mnuchin's comment last night saying that the U.S. government is going to make available several hundred million barrels of storage and make it available to the commercial oil industry. Well, that would be just brilliant if the U.S. government had several hundred million barrels of storage capacity, which they don't. That statement should have been interpreted exactly like this statement: we're going to ship at least 1 million COVID-19 test kits by the end of this week. Remember that one? How did that work out? Same principle here. It's government nonsense. So there's in reality about 75 million barrels of spare capacity in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Furthermore, it would take many weeks because of the limited pipelines and so forth that provide access to it.

It would take many weeks to fill it. So yes, I think it is going to come into play at some point that we fill up the rest of the SPR. If not government buying the oil, then the oil companies leasing that storage space. But it's not several hundred million barrels. Some people have speculated, well, maybe what they're talking about is lifting the Jones Act, which would allow non-U.S.-flagged vessels to move oil from U.S. to other U.S. ports. If we were talking about needing to get finished products from Houston to New York Harbor or something, that would definitely make a big difference. But when you talk about these tanker storage trades, Patrick, the way those work is they're putting oil on a ship. If that ship is not a Jones Act vessel, if it's a foreign-flagged ship, It's not allowed to go to a different point in the United States, but it is allowed to go back to the exact same terminal that it picked the oil up from.

So you don't have to use Jones Act ships for these tanker trades as long as they go back to the same place that they came from. So I'm not really sure why that would be relevant. But between the inventory number and Mnuchin saying this, we're seeing not only the flat price, which might be, you know, retail speculative activity, but we saw a major, major rally in the last couple of days.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: In the time spreads. Now, the time spreads are really important. Usually, they send a purer signal because it's professional traders that are trading them. And a lot of times, the noise that you see in the front-month flat price kind of gets faded out. The time spreads are being traded by people who are smarter, usually. Well, the thing is, the time spreads are through the roof. I think probably that what I think is a misinterpretation of the inventory data got a rally going and it turned into a short squeeze. One of the most crowded trades that there is in this market is being short time spreads.

So if the misinterpretation, which is what I think it is, of the inventory data led to a rally in the time spreads, maybe it became a self-reinforcing short-covering rally, short squeeze. That's all I can come up with because it doesn't make That doesn't make sense to me based on what the actual news is. I think we should be interpreting this in a way that would send the time spreads in exactly the opposite direction, which is, holy cow, we're completely out of space. We're seeing smaller builds in Cushing. That means there's no room for there to be bigger builds in Cushing. That's not the way the market's interpreting it. Physical oil market professionals listening, I know there's a bunch of you. If I'm missing something, please email me, info@macrovoices.com. I'd love to hear from you if you think I'm missing the boat.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: But it seems to me that the market's misinterpreting this signal. I think the smaller builds mean that we're already out of space and Cushing is as full as it can get.

There's also a theory that there are some big players that are intentionally leaving some of the tanks empty in Cushing because they don't want to allow that EIA report to ever report Cushing as being full because they know the impact that that would have on price. I have no way of verifying that, but certainly it would be consistent with what we're seeing in terms of Cushing apparently running out of space, even though the actual number is still well below the theoretical working capacity. There's also maybe part of what's affecting this market, Patrick, is margin bias, I'm calling it. The CME Group has dramatically increased margins across the board on crude oil futures, and they've particularly focused on the front-month contract. It's now $10,000 margin, which when you think about it, you know, everybody talks about how much leverage there is in the futures market. At $10 a barrel, which is not today's price, but it was just a few days ago, that means that there really is no leverage.

The margin requirement of $10,000 is the full price of those 1,000 barrels at $10 a barrel. So they've really hiked the margins super high on the June contract, but not so much on the further contracts. And I think that that is causing a lot of speculators, a lot of people who were short June, are thinking, well, you know, I really like June, it's a place I want to be short, but boy, it's so much cheaper in terms of margin to be trading on July. As far as the time spreads are concerned, you know, on one hand I want to say, okay, this must have been a short squeeze, hopefully it's over. Now's the time to back up the leverage truck, double down on those short time spreads, because I think they got to go the other way before this is over. The thing is, Patrick, my own prediction is next week we'll probably have an even smaller Cushing build.

Patrick Ceresna: Oh, really?

Erik Townsend: If the market misinterpreted that signal this week and they think it's bullish, they'll probably misinterpret it again next week. So I'm not adding to my short positions here. I'm kind of waiting this out. I want to see what next week brings. I'm not sure that this short squeeze is over yet in time spreads, but I do predict that the time spreads will reverse direction eventually, and they've got a lot lower to go before this whole COVID-19 crisis is over.

Market wrap: Gold

Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to gold. We've obviously been bumping our heads along overhead resistance. Coming off the last, uh, last week or two has seen gold pull back. We're now just under $1,700. Are you still structurally bullish gold here? What's, what's in store in your mind?

Erik Townsend: Well, long term, I couldn't possibly be more bullish. I mean, over the next decade, I couldn't be more bullish. Here's the problem: it's too easy. Everybody can see that the fundamentals are so incredibly strong for gold because of all of the money printing and debasement of fiat currency, the, the actions of the Federal Reserve. It's so clear, everybody gets it. That means for the most part people are already all in. And you know, Patrick, that means there's always risk of a technical correction if you get too many people that have already expressed their long position.

Everybody's already all in. There's no money to propel the price higher. Now I'm not saying that's the case because frankly I've been wrong quite a few times thinking That we had to have a technical correction. And boy, these incredibly strong fundamentals just kept carrying us higher. My point is simply realize, okay, we're gonna get into more detail in the postgame segment, but you and I both think that the bear market rally in the stock market is over and has topped out, or is close to topping out if it hasn't yet.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Erik Townsend: Well, one of the things that I've said could pull gold down would be a crash in the stock market. So, just realize, if you're going to be long gold here, be ready to ride out some turbulence. I think that the long-term fundamentals couldn't possibly be better, but you don't want to be getting into gold here if you're going to get spooked out and sell if it goes back below $1,600. I still think that $1,350 is a possibility, probably less likely than I thought a few months ago, but it's still very possible, and it does seem like everybody's all in. You know, we got up here to $1,700 quite a few weeks ago, We haven't seen that next push higher, so maybe we're about to have a correction. We'll see what happens.

Market wrap: 10-year Treasury yields and the zero bound

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yields. I know we're gonna have Dr. Lacy Hunt on, which is gonna give us some amazing insights, but we have the Treasury yield trading around 0.63% right now on the yield. What's your take? I mean, it's been stuck down here for a while.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I really don't have any view short-term on Treasury yields. I think that now that we're flirting with the zero bound, it's kind of beyond my pay grade. What I'm trying to do is just ask as many of our feature interview guests as I can to comment on some of the secular issues. You know, the biggest enemy of the bond market is inflation. Seems like many of our guests agree some form of inflation is coming, but they also agree it's not coming anytime soon. So do we need to be worried about Treasury yields anticipating inflation expectations, or not until the inflation really happens? I'm not sure. Let's ask Dr. Lacy Hunt what he thinks. He's got a very deflationary view. Let's see what he thinks about where Treasury yields are here. And particularly, you know, what about this zero boundary thing? Can we really get negative 10-year yields?

Let's ask Dr. Hunt. He's definitely far more qualified than I am to comment.

Why Lacy Hunt is back

Patrick Ceresna: So like you were saying, this week's featured interview guest is Hoisington Investment Management Chief Economist, Dr. Lacy Hunt. Now, why did we invite Dr. Hunt back to the show this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I've really been looking forward to this one. And the reason is Lacy Hunt has just been brilliantly right and consistently right for a long time. And his argument has been, look, with the national debt and private debt for that matter, with so much debt in the system, we just can't support high interest rates. Treasury yields can only drift lower. Bond prices can only move higher. He's been making that same argument with the same fundamental basis for it for years. And he's been remarkably right. And he's been recognized as one of the most successful bond guys in the market. The thing is, a lot of his theory is very long-term. And it's like, well, we have to keep on moving lower and lower. Well, what happens when you get to zero? Is zero a barrier? Or is it just another number on the way to negative? And what happens if you look at what the Fed's doing now?

Doesn't that eventually have to be inflationary? Is that an view that the market won't be able to digest? What does it all mean? These are all things that I knew someday we would get to that would really put major challenges to Dr. Hunt's longstanding views. And he has adapted some of his views, as you'll hear in this interview. So I just wanted to find out, you know, what does he think about the zero boundary? What does he think about inflation risk and so forth? It's a fascinating interview.

Erik Townsend: I think you're really going to enjoy it.

This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by toptradersunplugged.com. In recent weeks, we've been reminded of the fragility of world financial markets and how quickly sentiment can shift from risk-on to risk-off. Once again, the mantra of buy the dip and the determination of central banks will be put to the test. But as Chris Cole recently told us, the best approach to investing in the long run is very different from what's worked best in recent decades. To help MacroVoices listeners navigate an uncertain future, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen, host of the Top Traders Unplugged podcast, has created a guide to the best investment books of all time. You can get a free copy at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide.

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Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Dr. Lacy Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, Here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Hunt: weak 2019 start and a deflationary 2020 recession

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Dr. Lacy Hunt, chief economist for Hoisington Investment Management Company. Dr. Hunt, I'm so looking forward to this interview. I've been thinking about you for weeks and weeks as we're navigating this very interesting time in markets. You've been just fantastically prescient and fantastically right. We've interviewed you several times over the last few years. You've always stuck to essentially the same core thesis, and it has proven correct. for all of this time. I strongly encourage any listeners, any newer listeners who didn't hear those prior interviews, to listen to those past interviews. Just type Lacy Hunt into the search box at MacroVoices.com, and you'll see the previous interviews. Dr. Hunt, for those newer listeners, please just briefly restate the core thesis of your view on interest rates and why we are where we are today.

Lacy Hunt: Well, we, we closed 2019 in very vulnerable condition, both domestically and globally. The United States and the world suffering from a massive debt overhang. Core discretionary spending had only risen by 1% annual rate since August of last year. There was no increase in capital spending last year. The global economy was even much weaker.

Germany, Italy, Japan, a number of other countries around the globe were either in recessions or quasi-recessions. Perhaps the best indicator is the— what happened to the volume of world trade last year. This is a very critical indicator. Typically, world trade grows about 5% per annum, or about double the rate of increase in GDP.

Last year, world trade volume declined by half a percent. That's only the third decline since since 1980. Another two were in the deep recessions of 1982 and 2009. So we came into the to 2020 in a very weak condition, and then we had the coronavirus, and we're now experiencing. A recession that has all the looks of being the worst one since 1945.

Assuming the virus is contained in time for a resumption of normal activities by the end of the year, there will be some recovery in GDP, but in the 4th quarter, perhaps, perhaps in the 2nd half of the 3rd quarter, But even, even under that assumption, we're going to close 2020 with a massive output gap. In fact, an unprecedented output gap.

And given the frailties of the economy, the inability to achieve much growth, we're going to stagger out of the recession. And it's going to take us 6 to 7 years, maybe even longer. to restore the output gap to where it was at the end of last year. And so this recession is actually going to produce deflation, and the net result is that we're going to press the interest rates down to the zero bound, and they're going to be stuck there for a considerable period of time.

That's sort of a thumbnail sketch of my current views.

Hunt: zero bound and the Fed's authority for negative rates

Erik Townsend: I wanna pick up on the last part of what you said, because you've been just remarkably accurate for as long as I've been interviewing you and saying, look, you know, some people were saying Treasury rates would never go below 3% and then 2% and then 1%. You've been very consistent saying, hey, they're going lower because of this debt overhang. The fundamentals are just too strong. Well, now we're at that zero bound. So to what extent is the zero lower limit really a limit? And to what extent is it just a number along the way to negative interest rates?

Lacy Hunt: Well, there is a constraint on the zero bound, and it's the overnight rate that the Fed has control over. As long as the Fed holds the federal funds rate at zero or slightly positive, which is what we currently are witnessing, then the rest of the curve will just pile into the zero bound. The curve will be very, very flat.

And it will remain mired there. Now, the issue of whether the Federal Reserve could take the overnight rate is, is in doubt. I'm somewhat familiar with the Federal Reserve Acts. I studied them as a graduate student. Monetary economics was one of my fields, and I've stayed abreast of the, of the laws and the Federal Reserve system as an economist in the early part of my career, back in the days when William McChesney Martin and Arthur Burns was chairman of the Fed.

And it's my view that it's not clear that the Fed has the authority to take the overnight rate into negative territory. And if you look at the statements that past chairman— past and current chairmen of the Fed have made, It's clear that there's a split opinion there. Chairman Bernanke thinks that the Fed does have that capability.

Janet Yellen and the current Chairman Powell do not believe the Fed has the authority. It's clearly a murky area. It might be possible for the Fed to claim the, uh, that there is a servicing cost for the deposits that the banks have at the Fed. Of course, these are electronic deposits, but they could perhaps claim that they need to allocate their overhead to these electronic deposits and charge the banks a servicing fee of 25 or 50 basis points.

The banks would probably contest that. I don't know how the courts would rule personally. That's a legal issue. The reason they would contest it is, first of all, the banks are not in good shape. And their capital position is going to be considerably eroded by the events, and they would have to pay that safekeeping fee or servicing fee to the Fed.

And so it's, it's not, it's not clear, but let's say that the Fed was able to take the, the federal funds rate to negative territory. Then I think you would see a good portion of the curve. Also into negative territory. And, and the main motivating factor here is the, is the key determinant of the, of the long Treasury yields, which is the Fisher equation, uh, pillar of macroeconomics, which says that the, the longer-term bond yields are equal to the real rate plus expected inflation.

The real rate has been dropping now for 20 years as growth has underperformed. It will continue to go lower. And since we're going into deflation, the inflationary expectations will also move lower. And so we're, we're going to experience a pileup along the— along or close to the zero bound, and we'll pierce the zero bound if the Federal Reserve is able to and decides that they're willing to engage in a dogfight with the bankers. over their ability to, to do that.

Hunt: long Treasuries, deflation and spread product

Erik Townsend: In our past interviews, we had significantly positive interest rates. You made a very strong and persuasive argument that they would be moving lower, and that led to a conclusion that duration risk was the trade. So a lot of people benefited from price appreciation in longer-dated Treasury securities as a result of following your advice. Now, it sounds like now we're not really saying the trend is to move to substantially lower rates. You're saying it's go to zero and stay there. So is that probably not an argument for duration risk? What do you do as an investor in this environment?

Lacy Hunt: Well, that's a very good question. So the long Treasuries are around the 1.25% level, fluctuating quite violently from day to day. I think that— I think we're going to go to something like a deflation rate of about 2%. Let me explain that. The 3 worst recessions of the post-war period reduced the inflation rate by about 430 basis points, but we're starting with an inflation rate of 1.7%.

So we're going to go into a deflation, mild deflation. And so the tendency will be to keep pressing the longer rates down. And of course, they're going to be interfering with the structural restraint of the Fed action there with regard to the overnight rate. But if we were to go down to 50 basis points from here in the long bond over the next several years, then that would be a capital gain in excess of 20%.

Plus you get the coupon. And in a deflationary environment, there's another kicker. If you invest a dollar today and the inflation rate falls 2%, then you're going to get paid back at the end of the year in purchasing power dollars that are worth $1.02.

Now, the Treasury rates will decline somewhat further, but in deflation, the critical private borrowing rates are probably not going to decline. In deflation, you'll see decline in wages, something we haven't experienced for a long time. The risk premium on mortgages and corporate bonds will go up, and so the Treasury yields are going to outperform the so-called spread product. The spread product will not do well. This is what happened in Japan in the last 30 years. This is what happened in the Great Depression.

It's very, very difficult for borrowers to maintain profitability and sustain margins when you have even a mild degree of deflation, such as we're looking at.

Hunt: stimulus, debt and diminishing returns

Erik Townsend: Now, Dr. Hunt, you've just made an excellent argument for deflation. I agree with you. I think the coronavirus recession is gonna last longer than some people are seemingly assuming. But at the same time, the government reaction to it has been just unprecedented, both monetary and fiscal stimulus. To the tune of literally, you know, it seems like for a while there, it was every week, it was another $2 trillion stimulus bill being contemplated. You know, a couple trillion here, a couple trillion there. Before you know it, you're talking about real money. At some point, does all of this government reaction overcome or change that deflation and create a stagflation? Or how do you see the results of the government's reaction to this affecting your thesis?

Lacy Hunt: Remember, debt is an increase in current spending in exchange for a decline in future spending, unless you generate an income stream to repay the principal and interest. And we're borrowing astronomical sums, but the funds are going to maintain daily living needs, allow people to put food on the table, pay their rent. A humane activity, politically popular. But it will not generate an income stream to repay principal and interest. And one of the key points that, that I've made for a long time is that when you, when you use the economy's production function, what the debt is doing is it's triggering diminishing returns.

And the production function GDP is determined by technology interacting with the 3 factors of production. Land, labor, and capital. And the production function states that if you begin to overuse one of the factors of production, let's say borrowed capital, initially the GDP will rise, but continue to make overuse of that same factor of production, the GDP levels out, and further overuse leads to a decline in GDP.

In other words, the The overuse of debt triggers a nonlinear reaction— up GDP first, flat, then down. And when the growth rate falls, then that pulls the inflation rate lower. This is what explains clearly what's been happening. At the end of last year, government debt was 107% of GDP, which was an all-time record.

The 3 bills that have just recently passed, The Family First Act, the CARES Act, and then the bill just passed yesterday that provides an additional $400 billion for the Payroll Protection Plan add about 16% or account for about 16% of GDP based on last year's GDP. But of course, the GDP is declining. And in addition to that, the Social Security payments are going up, the unemployment compensation payments likewise, and income tax collections are going down, both corporate and personal.

And so the government debt-to-GDP ratio within— by the end of the year, early next year, is going to be somewhere around 125% to 130%.

Now let me explain how diminishing returns is working. There's a large number of econometric studies that indicate that when government debt reaches about 50% of GDP, there is a deleterious effect on GDP. And when it goes to 60%, the effect is more intense. There's a greater loss in growth against trend at 70%. At 90% debt to GDP, an economy loses about a third of its growth rate against trend.

But we're going into territory that we've never been before. But diminishing returns are at work.

And so the programs, while they're popular and certainly understandable from a human standpoint, they're going to weigh the economy down. And the net result is that it's going to produce very poor economic growth going forward, and that's going to drive the inflation rate lower, not higher. This is, this is The path that Japan has taken in the last 30 years.

Government debt-to-GDP rate has risen from 60% to 225%, and it's been combined with all types of monetary policy manipulations as well. And the Japanese economy has become progressively weaker, and that's the path that we're following. So this is really not stimulus. It gets us by. Helps people out, probably necessary, absolutely necessary, but it's going to retard growth for a very, very long period of time.

Hunt: saving, demographics and David Hume on public debt

Erik Townsend: Let's talk a little more about the effects of national debt overhang. You just talked about Japan some. Something I've been perplexed by for as long as I've been interviewing you, you know, you've made this very, very clear argument and it's been proven right time and time again, which is, look, The, the problem here is we got too much debt, and as a result of having too much debt, interest rates have to stay super low because there's just no way for the system to service the debt at any higher interest rate. That makes logical sense. But, you know, at some point, when you get to a point where a borrower is insolvent, normally what happens is interest rates or yields go up dramatically because Because the market realizes it's mathematically impossible for that borrower to ever service the debt. So I have to believe if instead of talking about $25 trillion of national debt, if we were talking about $500 trillion of national debt at our current GDP, the market would conclude, okay, Treasury paper is worthless because there's no way to service it, and yields would go up.

So is there some threshold or event? How do you know when you get to the point—

Lacy Hunt: No, there's no threshold. In other words, you're going to continue to press down the right-hand side of the elliptical relationship that is the law of diminishing returns. More is not more, it's less, and economic activity will become progressively weaker.

And let me just make a couple of points here. One of the most important concepts in economics is the circular flow. which says that what we produce equals what we spend equals what we earn. Everyone accepts that. But out of the circular flow, there are certain platinum-solid propositions that hold.

And one of them is that physical investment must equal saving out of income. And saving out of income has, has 3 components: private, government, and foreign. Okay. So As we closed 2019, net national saving as a percent of net national income was just 2%. Historically, we've run 6.5%. Now, that 2% was comprised of private saving of 8.4% and government dissaving of 6.4%.

But the government dissaving— We're going to run a deficit in excess of $4 trillion versus a little bit more than a trillion last year. And so as a consequence, net national saving is going to go to -12% or -14%. Now, the private saving rate will probably go up. People will, I think, will conclude that they cannot operate as tightly as they have in the past, that they need to have rainy day funds.

We'll see some increase in the private saving rate, but we're going to have a net national dissaving of somewhere between 10% and 15%, which means there can be no physical investment. There are no resources. And without physical investment, you cannot increase GDP. You cannot increase the standard of living.

The debt will just make you weaker and weaker and weaker.

And one of the problems is that as Europe, the United States, China, Japan have pursued these debt policies over the last 30 years, One of the other elements in the production function has deteriorated, and that's the demographics. Last year, worldwide population growth was the slowest in about 3 quarters of a century at about 1.2%.

In the United States last year, population growth was 0.48, which ironically was the lowest since 1918. The year of the Spanish flu. But in Europe, population growth was only 0.2. Population was, we'll call it zero in China. It actually declined slightly. And in Japan, the decline was even greater.

But of course, this year the demographics are going to deteriorate further.

So when you look at the production function, because of the debt overhang, when we closed 2019, Public and private non-financial debt was— for every dollar of new public and private debt was generating only 40 cents of GDP growth. In Europe, it was in the high 30s. In China, it was in the low 30s.

In Japan, it was in the mid-20 cents range. By within 12 months, more or less, the United States number is going to be 25 cents. down from 40, but there are going to be even greater collapses in Europe, Japan, and China. The Chinese have undertaken a $5 trillion program this year, massive, and they're subject to diminishing returns. Everyone has a production function. It doesn't matter whether you're command and control or not.

You overuse that factor of production, you're dealing with a nonlinear relationship, and a lot of folks don't want to deal with that. They think that this is accounting. It's not. Economics is not accounting. And so we, we know 2 of the elements of the production function. The marginal revenue product of the debt is declining, is at low levels, and it's going lower.

And the demographics are at low levels and they're going lower. And so when we come out of this, there will be a pent-up demand recovery, but the major economies of the world are going to be very hard-pressed to generate even a 1% real growth rate in per capita terms.

And so the production function doesn't work for us, and the lack of saving to fund investment does not work for us.

And ironically, there have been some pretty smart minds over the years that have, have looked at the indebtedness problem. One of the first was by the great David Hume, writing in 1752. My professor, Ingrid Rima, said that the Enlightenment could not have occurred without David Hume. Adam Smith, who was mentored by Hume, said that he was the greatest intellect of the age. And Smith knew Voltaire, he knew Ben Franklin, and Hume was the greatest. Like Hume, in his Treatise on Human Nature, discussed the physics topic of time and space, to which Einstein attributed the inspiration for the theory of relativity.

In 1752, Hume wrote a paper called Of Public Finance, which I recommend you read. You can get it on the internet easily. It's only about 20 pages. It's not in modern English, but it's very, very understandable. And he looks at these cases that were available up until the time of 1752. He looks at at Mesopotamia and Rome and a number of lesser cases that have long since been forgotten.

And this is what he says. He says, when a state has mortgaged all of its future revenues, the state by necessity lapses into tranquility, languor, and impotence.

And today we know that it triggers diminishing returns and an insufficiency of saving to generate physical investment. So there's no level, in my opinion. And if the politicians pursue the idea that if $2 trillion doesn't work, we should try $4 trillion, and if $4 trillion doesn't work, we should try $8 trillion or $10 trillion or $12 trillion, then they're working in a linear world and they're trying to ignore the reality that we have nonlinear relationships coming through the production function.

More is not more. It is less, Erik.

Hunt: MMT, the Federal Reserve Act and the power to spend

Erik Townsend: I think that you are absolutely brilliant, Dr. Hunt, and I think that your reference to Hume is brilliant as well. The thing is, the politicians don't listen to the brilliant economists like yourself. They listen to whoever gives them something they can tell the voters that they want to hear. And it seems to me that at the moment, it seems like the resistance that existed toward modern monetary theory and simply monetizing a lot of government spending. That resistance, even from the political right, seems to be waning in this coronavirus crisis. We've gotten to the point— was it Nixon who said we're all Keynesians now? It seems like in this coronavirus crisis, we're all— not you and I, but the politicians certainly are all MMT-ers now.

Lacy Hunt: Well, we haven't adopted MMT yet. There are advocates who are raising their voice louder. We haven't done it. The Federal Reserve Act is very explicit. The writers of not only the 1913 Act, but the more critical legislation that was passed during the '30s, wanted to give the Federal Reserve broad powers to make loans and provide liquidity, but they did not give the Federal Reserve the ability to spend.

Today, when the Fed buys government and agency and other securities, When that transaction clears, the net result is that the sellers of the government debt give up a maturity of securities that have an average life of about 7 years. And at the end of the transaction, the banks then their holdings of overnight deposits at the Federal Reserve go up. In other words, it's just a reduction in in the average maturity of the government debt held by the private sector.

Now, the banks can make use of the reserves, and many people assume that they will, but that assumption is not valid because the banks, to make it— take advantage of the reserves, have to have the capital to put at risk, and they have to be able to make an assessment that they will cover the risk premium.

In other words, the likelihood of default. And the banks are very weakened. And moreover, this flat yield curve will further undermine the profitability of the banks. And moreover, not only do the banks have to find making loans attractive, the borrowers have to also be willing to put their capital at risk.

And they have to be able to make a calculation that the funds can be profitably used, which will be increasingly difficult if we go even into a mild deflationary environment.

Now, I would recommend that you listen to the webinar that Chairman Powell gave there in early April when they took the latest round of measures to facilitate on a lending basis various components of the fixed income market. And Powell made it very clear that the Federal Reserve has the authority to lend, but it does not have the power to spend.

Now, for them to do that, the Federal Reserve Act will have to be rewritten. Now, that could be done, and perhaps we will go in that direction.

And it's important to note that the Bank of England just recently this month has crossed the Rubicon. Or if they haven't crossed the Rubicon, they've certainly waded into the Rubicon. And the Bank of England made a direct advance to the British Treasury of approximately half a trillion dollars.

Now, they said it was temporary, and we certainly hope that it is, but the United States Federal Reserve does not have that authority, and it would require a change in the— the key writer of the revision to the Federal Reserve Act was a Virginia politician by the name of Carter Glass, and you may know that name.

He was also author of the Glass-Steagall Act, And he went to the 2 leading monetary theorists of the time, Irving Fisher of Yale and Charles Whittlesey of the Wharton School. And he said, how do we construct the Federal Reserve Act so that the Fed has liquidity powers, but not the power to spend? We don't want the Federal Reserve to turn the country into a banana republic.

And if you give the Federal Reserve that ability, then the inflation rate would take off. But unfortunately, what would happen is inflation rate would rise very rapidly and Gresham's Law would be triggered. The bad money chases out the good money. People would not want to hold paper assets.

They will try to convert their paper assets into commodities that either can be consumed or can be traded for other commodities that they might need. You'll force a return to barter, and in that case we would make everybody's lives miserable. In other words, you if to to go down the road of giving the Federal Reserve the ability to spend, you would basically destroy the system by trying to save the system.

Hunt: junk-bond SPV pushback, zombie firms and velocity

Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, you make excellent points, but I want to push back just a little bit because the Federal Reserve Act is very very clear in that it says that the Federal Reserve can only buy. debt securities, which are backed by the US government, agency securities. And very recently, they literally reinterpreted that to say, well, if we put this little special purpose vehicle in between and pretend that the Treasury is a party to this transaction, we can call junk bonds, literally junk bonds, the ETF full of junk bonds, sort of kind of a government security, and we'll use the Federal Reserve to literally bail out the junk bond market, which has happened.

So it seems to me like we're in a political climate where, I don't know what you want to call it, a loose interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act by regulators is being tolerated. Nobody's questioning that in court now. So, you know, isn't it true that they are effectively spending money to bail out the junk bond market and just kind of pretending that junk bonds are government bonds because they created this little special purpose vehicle mechanism, which to me seems like they're just trying to undermine the intention of the law.

Lacy Hunt: Well, they're providing liquidity financing to debt that has already been issued. They're not providing additional funds for new debt. Now, the fact of the matter that they're stretching the Federal Reserve law does not change the fact that this does not constitute money printing, but there is a major economic effect. The firms that are seeking the Fed's help are doing so because they weren't prepared for the shock to the system.

The corporate sector was massively overindebted. In fact, it was more overindebted at the end of last year than at any time in our history. And one of the reasons that they were so overindebted is that corporate profits, as we closed 2019, were basically unchanged from 2012 and down slightly from the peak in 2014. And those are after profits, which were benefited from a significant corporate tax cut.

And so the effect of helping these folks out over the near term It maintains their viability, but there's an economic offset. It means that scarce capital is absorbed to sustain zombie corporations, the term that's been used, or failing corporations. And this increases the malallocation of capital.

And in the final analysis, as I told you, to have physical investment, the Fed's role is irrelevant. You have to have saving out of income, and we don't have saving out of income.

We're going to have net negative saving. So the Fed's action is basically a standing-in-place motion. And the way that you will be able to verify this is that we will see massive declines in the velocity of money. The presumption that if the Fed is able to increase the money supply, that it will have important influences on economic activity and, and on the inflation rate.

But GDP is determined by money and velocity. Now, velocity is a very, very complex variable. There are a lot of things at work there, but the most important of which is the marginal revenue product of the debt. And as the marginal revenue product of the debt has come down since the late 1990s, The velocity of money has declined.

And at the end of last year, velocity was about 1.42, down from almost 2.2 in 1997, almost a straight line down. There were some— there were a few bouts upward. And when the data comes in for the first quarter, I think velocity will drop down to 1.32, and then we'll have another massive decline in the second quarter.

For the velocity of money to rise, the increase in the money that the Fed manages to engineer in the short run will only be viable if it generates an income stream to repay principal and interest. And this kind of lending will not do that on the grounds that I've just explained, and the velocity of money will fall.

And that will usher in weaker growth in economic activity in the midst of high money supply growth. And the inflation rate will also go into negative territory in spite of it.

Hunt: hyperinflation risk and historical debt crises

Erik Townsend: Let's talk more about how this plays out over the next several years, because it seems to me the coronavirus crisis is clearly going to lead to lots and lots of accommodation, both monetary policy and fiscal policy. spending, and so forth. Now, a lot of the critics have said they think that that's going to lead to runaway inflation. You're making a very good argument for why it will not lead to runaway inflation, because of the stronger dynamics that are in place. If you're right, I would say that that just gives more ammunition to the people who want to do much more of that— what you've described as counterproductive stimulus, stimulus that's not really stimulus.

Lacy Hunt: Right.

Erik Townsend: It seems to me that even though you and I agree it's a bad idea, what we're really talking about is a setup here, which is going to give the proponents of those policies ammunition. Look, it didn't lead to runaway inflation.

We should just keep doing more of it. We should, you know, provide much more, more, more, more, more, more. Would you agree that the politics are kind of set up that way? And if the more, more, more, more, more happens, what happens?

Lacy Hunt: The politics are set up that way. But unless the— I mean, the increasing in the debt will not itself produce better growth than inflation. If we give the Fed the ability to spend, which they do not have that authority now, that will generate inflation, but it will not generate growth, and it will make everyone's lives miserable.

And it is possible that we'll go in that direction. Not saying that we won't. But I'm telling you this, hyperinflation is going to make 99% of us terribly miserable. It will be a far worse outcome than mild deflation. There is no government lever that can solve this problem.

Now, we have some outstanding research that's been done on the matter by McKinsey Global Institute, which is the think tank of McKinsey and Associates. And it's a 2010 paper. And they looked at 24 advanced economies for the time in the period from 1900 through 2008 that became extremely overindebted. And they measured the buildup of debt to the panic year or multiple panic years, and then the ultimate solution. And they found in all 24 of these cases, that the indebtedness problem had to be solved by an extended period of austerity.

And they defined austerity as a significant rise in the saving rate. In other words, if you think of indebtedness as living beyond one's means, we have to— to solve an indebtedness problem, you have to live within one's means. Now, that's a very unappealing solution. And so in that regard, you're right.

Because people do not like the alternative, and that that does raise the risk. And you're correct to say so: that we change the Federal Reserve Act and we let the Federal Reserve print money. That's a real risk, and it's a risk that I am extremely cognizant of. But let me tell you this: we're going to make everyone extremely miserable in very short order.

There are numerous cases of this. This was tried by Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s, Germany in the 1920s. This was tried by Yugoslavia and Hungary at the end of World War II. There was a famous Bolivian case in the 20th century, and basically, it was the path that was taken by the Bourbons of France and the Romans and the Mesopotamians.

They built up huge debts, which they could not service. And so take the Bourbon case, which is perhaps the most well-documented. They took on a great deal of debt to finance the French and Indian Wars, which was really a world war. It was all in Europe. It was called the Seven Years' War.

Then they financed the American Revolution. Cost the French more for us to win the American Revolution It cost them more for us to win than it cost us. And then they went into high living and so forth. And so what was the solution of the Bourbons? Well, to issue a worthless metallic coin.

And eventually the inflation became extreme. And so going to money printing is an avenue, and it may be seized upon. But the result is social rupture and the collapse of the financial system. People will not want to hold financial assets. The whole world will be turned upside down, Erik.

And in other words, at that point in time, we'll make the United States the equivalent of a banana republic.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's talk in more precise detail about how we get there, because I think we're in agreement, first of all, that lots and lots of fiscal spending, so-called stimulus is not a good idea. But we also agree that the setup is for governments to do much more of it.

Lacy Hunt: Well, let me, let me just interject something there. The first-round effects may appear to be appealing. I mean, wanting to bail people out in a time of crisis, people get a check, they think that's good. The, the problem is in economics is that there are the unseen effects, the second, third, and fourth-round effects.

And I don't like to use the term good or bad, but there's a little exercise that folks can do. If you graph government debt to GDP on one axis and the long bond yield on the other axis, and you do that for the United States, what you'll see is that there is an inverse relationship, that as the government debt levels go higher, the bond yields decline.

And the logic here is that you are triggering the law of diminishing returns and you're reducing saving to weaker and weaker levels that precludes physical investment. And by the way, if you do that exercise for Europe, for Japan, and now China, you'll see that the inverse relationships hold.

And so what we're talking about is understanding the economics. And the economics suggest that if we pursue this policy, we're going to get weaker growth and lower inflation and a prolonged period of low interest rates. Unless, of course, the central bank, Federal Reserve, is allowed to print money. And in that case, we will not improve the growth rate one iota.

In fact, the growth rate will probably even get worse because we will have experienced a severe decline in productivity. In extremely high inflation, people do not hold financial assets. They spend time converting the financial assets as quickly as possible into commodities. And then they trade those commodities with other people who have things that they want. In other words, you have to have double coincidence of wants, which is extremely inefficient.

And so productivity will fall, and the economy will lapse into an even deeper morass than it is now. So the money printing is an absolutely horrendous option. It may be used though, and if it does, you'll see a change in my forecast. Absolutely.

Hunt: changing the Fed Act as the trigger; past fiscal stimulus

Erik Townsend: I want to make sure I understand where that distinction is, because what we've said so far is there's a setup for there to be a whole bunch more fiscal stimulus spending, infrastructure spending, whatever. You've made a very good argument that It feels good in the beginning, but in the end, it's not really stimulative. It just drags the economy further down, but it's deflationary in the way that it does that. It sounds like the key event, because as you said, hyperinflation is the really big risk. That's the one that there's no way you can fight it. The only way it sounds like you would see us getting to hyperinflation would be if they changed the Federal Reserve Act and allowed the Fed to spend money rather than just buying assets.

Lacy Hunt: That is correct. That is the key. You understand your macroeconomics. That is the critical key. Could I just go back to something? Okay. So let's just look at some fiscal actions that people are really familiar with. We had a $2 trillion stimulus in 2009 of shovel-ready projects. It was said that that was going to lead to accelerating growth and inflation and higher interest rates and a decline in the dollar.

And that was a very, very popular view. And moreover, the Fed was engaged in quantitative easing at the same time.

What we saw is maybe a couple of quarters of improved economic growth, and then the higher debt weighed on economic activity. In 2018, there was an important tax cut. It was a $3 trillion tax cut over 10 years financed with debt. Debt. In January of 2018, this law took effect, but by the end of January, there was also a bipartisan— I use that word bipartisan— increase in spending that added basically another $3 trillion in debt.

So you had the tax side and the spending side. So what happened? We experienced about one quarter of accelerating Maybe one and a half quarters, and then the growth rate turned down. There is a very fleeting transitory benefit, but the benefit fades very, very quickly. And and so these new programs that we're taking on right now, they they won't even be visible in my opinion. They'll be helpful, and they'll help us get us get us through.

They will help people that are in bad shape for a variety of reasons, but there is not going to be any income generation to repay the principal and interest. And so the economy is going to be much, much weaker as a result of these extremely politically popular and humane actions.

I'll just make one other point with you. In Hume's paper, he made a recommendation that the best fiscal policy is the one that always runs surpluses. And his argument was that you run surpluses so that when you have a national emergency— and he was mainly thinking about a war or some type of natural disaster— that you have the ready resources to handle the problem.

And as a matter of fact, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations followed Hume's advice. And generally speaking, the United States followed that policy until Keynesian economics took over. And if you think about the advice that Hume gave, this genius of a man, this towering figure, that's how successful people behave.

You don't run on the margin. You have a rainy-day fund. You're prepared for an emergency so that you do not have to rely on debt, which makes you weaker.

Hunt: political reflexivity, Powell and Stephanie Kelton

Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, you gave me a passing grade on macroeconomics, so I'm going to try my luck with reflexivity in politics. It seems to me that what you're saying here is right now, for humanitarian reasons, we've got to move forward with this stimulus, which is going to feel good to a lot of people. The people who oppose it are saying, but the risk is inflation. And what you're saying is they're going to be proven wrong on that. To my thinking, that just gives more ammunition to the people who want to get us eventually to change the Federal Reserve Act to allow the Fed to just literally print money and spend it.

So it seems to me like we're in a vicious cycle that takes us maybe by the 2024 presidential election when they're saying, okay, it's time to just let the Fed print money. And because, you know, we can't keep raising taxes when, you know, there's no way to serve all of this crazy debt that we have, the Fed's got to print money. And anybody who tries to express a voice of reason is going to get shut down and told, look, you people have been complaining about inflation for 25 years. Saying it was going to happen ever since we did the first round of quantitative easing back in 2009.

You've been wrong consistently. It's time to let the Fed print money. And that's where the event happens that eventually leads us to a hyperinflationary outcome and really bad consequences. How'd I do?

Lacy Hunt: You did very well. I will say that. I'll just make one—

Erik Townsend: I don't think it's very well. I think it's very bad.

Lacy Hunt: I think it's horrible. No, you did very well. No, you— no, it's not bad. Your explanation was excellent. The outcome is bad. For the Federal Reserve Act to be revised, the Federal Reserve will basically have to lead that role, in my opinion. In other words, the Federal Reserve would have to go to the Congress and the president and say that we need to, quote, modernize or whatever wonderful term you want to use.

Based upon the webinar that Chairman Powell gave this month, I would say that Powell would not lead that.

Now, his term will expire and we'll get a new Federal Reserve chairman. But one of the risks here is if you open the Federal Reserve Act up for revision, then we're going to have to deal with a myriad of alternatives ideas that people have, and some of them are really strange.

And so opening up the Federal Reserve Act for revision would open a whole can of worms, unknown can of worms. And where you go once that started is anybody's guess. It could be in the direction of money printing, and that's certainly a possibility that we have to be aware of. But I think the Federal Reserve area has to take the role and the leadership in pushing the change through. And I, I don't see the Powell Fed doing that.

I think he's aware of what the risks are. That would be my reading. I may be wrong on that, but that's my reading.

Erik Townsend: What happens when Stephanie Kelton is the Fed chair?

Lacy Hunt: Well, I'm not going to go there, but other Federal Reserve chairmen— I'm only just telling you that I don't think I think the Powell Fed would, would want to do that.

Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. Listeners, throughout this interview, Dr. Hunt has referenced several different written works, some of which are 100 years old. Our production staff has assembled links to as many of these as we could find and inserted them into your Research Roundup email. So I encourage everyone to check your Research Roundup email And you'll find links to all of the various different writings that were discussed in today's episode. Again, thanks so much, Dr. Hunt. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Postgame: takeaways from Hunt

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was so great to have Dr. Lacy Hunt back on the show. You know, there's so much fearmongering about Project Zimbabwe out on the markets, and really what it comes down to is that in order for us to see that kind of massive hyperinflation driven by monetary policy, there actually has to be a change in the Federal Reserve Act. It simply isn't enough the way it is written. And like Dr. Lacy Hunt was saying, it's not out of the realm of impossibility that they rewrite the act. But the thing is, anyone who's assuming that this is imminent is probably holding their breath unnecessarily. What's your take on all of that? What did you take away from the interview?

Erik Townsend: Well, what I'm really trying to do, Patrick, in the last few weeks is to ask all of our top macro and particularly the fixed income guys, how does this whole story play out? We've got a very strong deflationary macro backdrop. But we've also got policy actions that a lot of people think are eventually inflationary. You know, what's the roadmap look like? How do we get from here to there? So we heard David Rosenberg last week saying he thinks that stagflation is where you get to, but not for 3 years, and it's deflationary until then. We had Dr. Pippa Malmgren on All-Stars tell us she thinks inflation is coming much sooner than a lot of these other guests think. So I'm just trying to assimilate a lot of different worldviews and kind of plug them all together and make sense of them.

And I think Dr. Lacy Hunt basically said, look, his view, and I disagree with him slightly, is it has to stay deflationary because given the Federal Reserve Act, it really can't be anything else. Now, the reason I disagree is, look, they've pretty much ignored the law when it came to the junk bond market.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: They say they're willing to bail out junk bonds, even by using some kind of special purpose vehicle to pretend that junk bonds are somehow agency bonds. It seems that the government is very willing to work around the intention of its own laws. So it feels to me like the political environment is very ready to bend the rules. So I don't really worry too much about what the Federal Reserve Act says, but I do agree with him that it's got to be deflationary for a while until you really get to the point where you're not just talking about it, you're not just doing stimulus to buy bonds, but you're actually using the Fed's ability. And, you know, what he said is you'd have to change the rules so the Fed is allowed to spend money rather than just buy assets. I would say you have to get to the point where we're actually bending the rules Enough to go ahead and do that.

And, you know, they can play all kinds of games. You just do a lot of government spending, you issue new bonds, you let private holders hold them for a couple of weeks before the Fed buys them, and you've worked around the intention of the Federal Reserve Act, and you're supposedly not monetizing government spending, although effectively that's really what you're doing.

So, I think it's a question of when we actually see implementation of spending spending programs that pump money into the real economy that we need to watch and see what happens in terms of price inflation and wage inflation and so forth. I think stagflation is definitely the highest candidate for what we eventually get to. I just wonder about the path of how we get there. So I'm just trying to assimilate a worldview out of the feedback that we get from all of our guests. And I thought Dr. Hunt kind of rounded out the picture with some of the other people that we've talked to. I'll look for asking some of the same questions of other guests in coming weeks.

Postgame: bear market rally analogs, 1929, 1937, 1974

Erik Townsend: But what I want to do for the rest of today's Postgame, Patrick, is dive into the Postgame Chartbook that you prepared. And let's have a longer conversation than we had time for in the Market Wrap about this bear market rally. At least that's what you and I think it is. But there's a lot of people who are saying, no, no, no, it's over, baby. We, you know, We've passed peak infections, we're reopening the economy, this thing is ending, the market is anticipating a move back to all-time highs because the, the bad news, the worst of it, is behind us. Let's examine both sides of this argument. Listeners, you'll find the download link for the chartbook that is going to facilitate this conversation in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, it means you're not registered yet at MacroVoices.com.

Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, look for the red button that says looking for the downloads. Patrick, let's go ahead and dive in on page 2 here. You're showing kind of an analog of the S&P 500 to what typical bear markets look like. Give us the story here.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, actually, this isn't a typical one. I specifically overlaid what happened in 2008, and particularly deeper into the bear market when the Lehman event occurred. And then how the rest of the market played out afterwards. And and so far, the market is overshooting what certainly played out in 2008. And what I just wanted to do was take a moment to just go and actually then look back and let's analyze some of the past major bear markets and look at what bear market rallies look like in them. And I thought that that would be a great journey to go on. And so. What I did was I snagged a chart on page 3 of the 1929 bear market. The initial drop in 1929 saw close to a 50% wipeout in a span of 2 months, including a 3-week period that saw a very similar drop the way we had, about 30 to 35% in like 2, 3 weeks. It was just a nasty and very ugly drop. That happened in that October period.

But then after hitting a short-term low into the first quarter of 1930, we saw a 5-month bear market rally. Now this one did muster up a 50% retrace. Our current bear market rally, I'm still convinced it is, it has only been, is only like 1 or 2 months into that bounce. And it's already surpassed more than 50% and 61% on the short term. But back then anyway, it was a 5-month prolonged period where the market just crawled higher and higher and higher going until it reached about 50% of a retracement. Even though it took 5 months to really play out, it didn't change the inevitable, which is that the market then turned around and began selling.

And so I wanted to move on and go to page 4, where we've had Ray Dalio and others try to compare this far more to like a 1937 period than a 1929 period. And so I wanted to see how that one played out. And that was, you know, less than a decade later from the 1929 crash. And we can again see a period where the S&P 500 wiped out about 50%.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Patrick Ceresna: of its value in just months in a very rapid crash.

But subsequently, after, in the early part of 1938, when it established a short-term low, we saw a meaningful rally. It was about a 61.8% retracement, but a meaningful rally. It was like 50, 60% off of the lows. But again, it lasted something like 200-some-odd days. I mean, it was again a 6, 7-month bear market rally. That rebounded. But yet over several years afterwards, even though it was a lot of sideways price action, it did inevitably make lower lows in what is the typical fashion of a bear market, which is, is that it's just— it's not a screaming rally higher, it just rallies back towards the highs and fades again and over and over again in that kind of a distribution cycle. The last one I wanted to touch on, which was a slightly different one was the 1974 bear market drop. And in 1974, the part that makes this slightly different is that the initial drop from 1973 to the middle of 1973 was very mild.

We only saw like a 20% drop in the markets. And so the bear market rally that ensued on the other side simply didn't have that much to retrace from because the big sell-off didn't really kick in. And then, but it was once that bear market rally was over, that one took about 2 to 3 months of rallying and then it resumed.

And so the most important takeaway I think that I want to suggest there, Erik, is like these bear market rallies, they can take 2 to 5 months, 2 to 6 months. There's nothing saying that this has to be over 1 or 2 months after the bounce and that we should somehow already be dumping to the downside and next wave. These things can drag on. Like, what if this bear market rally lasts until June, July, and just kind of keeps crawling and muddling along here? And it's just everyone that's waiting for it to crash is burning theta as their put options are decaying. And then you turn around and you have all the bulls trying to go long, but the market can't get any traction to the upside. I, I really think it's going to play out a little differently than everyone is expecting because everyone thinks it's all going to happen right away, right?

Postgame: Fibonacci level, Fed intervention vs fundamentals

Erik Townsend: Well, I see this a little differently. It seems to me like you're looking for analogs to past events, past bear markets, and certainly that's a useful exercise to understand a range of possibilities. I think we're in completely unprecedented times, though. There's never been a time in history when we had this kind of monetary policy intervention participation in equity markets. So the way that I look at this is, if we're going to have normal market forces play out, clearly this should be a bear market rally. We hit the 61.8% Fibonacci retrace, which is a key level for bear market retracements. You know, that's kind of the number where the bear market rally ought to be done by there. And furthermore, Patrick, we hit it on the day of a Fed announcement, which oftentimes you get a blow-off, and that's kind of like the the turning point in the market, the sell-the-news event, so to speak. And we got above 2,930 which was that key Fibonacci level.

We traded there during the day, but we closed below it. So you never had a closing print above the 61.8% Fibonacci, which if there had been a closing print there, it would have been a signal that maybe there's further to go. But you did have a chance to sell it all the way up at at 2,960-something. So it so far feels like it's following all of the right recipe to be a bear market rally. And now we go down to new lows over the next several months. We get down to a number lower than 2,174, which was the low print so far on S&P futures. The thing is, Patrick, you know, I think I've made some pretty good arguments fundamentally over the years on MacroVoices when I've said, look, I think this market is way overvalued. I think it should go down, but I don't think it's going to go down because we've got so much intervention from the government. I think they're going to fuel the rally continuing.

And that's proven right. As much as I think I did make good bearish arguments on the fundamentals, the market kept on going higher. And I think we have a very, very bearish set of fundamentals right now. But I just don't know whether or not, you know, Fed money printing power is going to outweigh market fundamentals. It's really hard for me to decide. And the reason that I decided not to short this, even though I do think the most probable answer is this is the top of a bear market rally, is because it's so hard to say whether or not the Fed is going to print money to rescue the stock market. They can't print storage tanks. To rescue the super contango in the oil market, although today we had a big countertrend rally in those time spreads. So, you know, I just look at other markets as being a safer way to express this, but I think that's the question really is, will this unprecedented era of monetary stimulus intervention overwhelm the fundamentals?

And it seems like it's hard because the fundamentals are pretty darn bearish, But you never know.

Postgame: monetary stimulus, 1965-81 inflation and Abenomics

Patrick Ceresna: Right. And so what I wanted to do on page 6, for instance, you were saying that Pippa was suggesting that inflation would come a lot sooner, even though Dr. Lacy Hunt and David Rosenberg think that deflationary pressures are still the dominant force on the short term. But what I wanted to just kind of reflect upon is what are periods where inflation or massive of monetary stimulus or asset purchases, how did stock markets behave that way? Because there's a lot of people that just assume it's a given that if the Fed prints a whole bunch of money and buys assets, that somehow that in itself is almost a certain guarantee that the stock market's going higher. And while it is definitely possible, and I don't want to say that it's not, When you think back and look at different scenarios, like on page 6, I have the period from 1965 through 1981 where inflation ran very hot in the US. The US was just coming off the gold standard.

So just entering a period where money was decoupled from gold, inflation was running pretty hot. And yet the Dow Jones for pretty much 15+ years, could not make a higher high throughout that entire period. But more importantly, on a real purchasing power basis, you saw almost a 90% wipeout of the value of the Dow Jones on a real basis. And it was a very ugly time.

Skipping ahead very quickly to page 9, I just want to stay on this theme. I wanted to jump to Japanese Nikkei. A lot of people then reference the fact, well, look, when Shinzo Abe started Abenomics back in 2013, the Japanese Nikkei went roaring higher, did over 100% advance in a couple years just with this huge massive advance. And there's no denying that that was in fact what the Nikkei did. But there was an interesting circumstance there because no other central bank bank in the world at that time has actively adopted such a currency-destructive monetary policy like Japan did at the time.

And when you go to page 10, you can see that while the Nikkei had that huge rally from 2013 through 2015-16, uh, into— sorry, into 2015— you also, though, it came on the back of the US dollar rallying materially against the yen. I mean, we saw the yen lose 40% of its value. And so in the— one of the huge precipitating drivers, the tailwinds behind the Nikkei, was a huge devaluation of their currency. And while the rest of the world had very stable currency structure, the Japanese yen was devalued very aggressively, and that contributed massively to that And so I asked the question, and maybe you can give me your opinion on that. I mean, I sort of am thinking that, well, yeah, maybe that scenario can happen where the Fed just starts printing a lot of money and buying up tons of assets. But if the US dollar is not materially in a bear market and being driven much lower relative to others, I mean, without that tailwind, I mean, is that— can it do it alone on that?

I personally think we would need a US dollar bear market market really well underway for equities to be inflating higher. What's your take on that?

Erik Townsend: I don't know, Patrick. It seems to me that we've got unprecedented amounts of both fiscal and monetary stimulus, and the conversation is shifting. The political and policy narrative is shifting from what used to be entirely an asset purchase kind of discussion, which If they were going to do more of the old style of QE, and that's all they were going to do, that would be, I think, very much supportive of higher stock prices. But it seems like now the narrative is shifting to much more of a broader-based MMT, you know, support the Main Street economy as opposed to just the financial economy. So I think that there's a lot of moving parts here, and I really don't have any firm predictions. That's the reason I've preferred to trade the oil market instead of the stock market is I know they can't print storage tanks, but they can print more money and they can get that money into the hands either of the people, hardworking people that need it, or into the hands of bankers that buy stocks with it.

It remains to be seen how this plays out from here.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Postgame: Europe's QE and the Euro Stoxx 50

Patrick Ceresna: So what I also wanted to though touch on is a lot of people are worked up by this idea that the Fed is saying that they're gonna buy junk bonds and all of these other assets in order to, to continue to support the market and, and provide the stability that was really needed during that crisis.

But the interesting part was that there, there are 2 central banks in the world that did very large asset purchases over the last decade— Japan and Europe. And what I have is, well, we already showed that Japan chart, but when we look at that Euro Stoxx 50 and it kind of asks the question. I mean, if very large asset purchases by their respective central banks was that bullish, why have we not seen very bullish charts? I'm sure a lot of our listeners are thinking it's because a lot of it's been routed from Europe to other places in the world to be invested elsewhere, like in the U.S. markets or something like that. And it does make sense. But I mean, I just don't know whether it's easy to just make the assumption that just because these asset purchases are being made and this capital is being actually made available for reinvestment, there still has to be a risk taker that has to reallocate that liquidity back into risk assets.

I mean, is that a certainty? I don't think so.

Erik Townsend: Well, I think you hit the nail on the head a minute ago, Patrick. I think that as the ECB was going through all of their stimulus that weakened the euro, a lot of people saw the double opportunity to both diversify out of their own market, get into a stronger currency. So by investing in US stocks, you're in a dollar-denominated asset, which means you get the pickup on the foreign exchange benefit of the dollar appreciating, plus the stronger US stock market. And I think those foreign capital flows are a big part of the reason that the S&P chart looks so much different from the Euro Stoxx 50 chart that you have here on page 11. So I do think that that has played a really big role in it. What are we going to see going forward? Is it going to be a competition between the central banks as to who can print more money and what are they going to do with it and how's the policy going to evolve?

I think it's a moving target and I think we're in uncharted territory.

Postgame: dollar bear risk and mega-cap concentration

Patrick Ceresna: But even just to continue that, what What if the monetary policy that the Fed is implementing ultimately does become US dollar bearish? I know we've had Luke Gromen and all these others that are on there that are suggesting that inevitably that may happen. What if that reverses the money flow? What if the money flow is not coming into US equity because the currency tailwind is now a headwind? It's really one of those really interesting puzzle pieces that we have the privilege on MacroVoices for the next year or two to actually be trying to put that puzzle together as we get the new information coming in. Nonetheless, I wanted to go and just quickly end this chart book and just looking at both page 7 and 8. The 7 shows the bear market rally that's showing on the Dow Jones Industrial versus that of the S&P, which we typically show.

But what I wanted to really touch on on page 8 was the fact that now where is this bear market rally been driven from? And what this chart shows is that the market cap of the 5 largest companies in the S&P 500— so only 5 of 500 companies, so 495 companies excluded— now these 5 companies make up 20% of the market cap of the S&P. And obviously the rallies in the Apples, Googles, Amazons, the Microsofts, these stocks have truly been the ones that allowed this bear market rally to be as meaningful as it has. Because if you leave those 5 companies, I mean, you can add the recent advance in Tesla and Netflix to the mix. So let's say you say outside of those kind of 7 companies, you really have not seen any meaningful rallies in most of them.

And so if you're just looking at the S&P 500 on the surface, you're not getting a good pulse on what is really happening under the hood. You're just looking at the surface. And while certainly these 5 companies have been just ripping to the upside, I mean, does that mean that it's not a bear market just because Amazon is benefiting from all of this and doing this huge rally? I don't know. I just— to me, there's more to this. than, than just looking at the, the price of the S&P. And I'm still convinced it's a bear market rally. So that's where I'm standing anyway.

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm convinced it's a bear market rally too. The question is just whether the Fed can overcome gravity and cause the, the what should happen next not to happen. And I do feel like we're in unprecedented times. And listeners should be sure to check page 12 if you want to grab a free trial of Patrick's service, Big Picture Trading. You can get a dose of Patrick's perspective almost every single day, not just once a week on MacroVoices.

Postgame: COVID-19 update, plateau, second wave, remdesivir

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, before we wrap up, I always like to get a quick update on what's going on with the COVID-19. So how are things developing?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as I've said before, we do have great news, which is that phase that we were in where it was just an exponential acceleration, it was getting worse and worse That's behind us now, which is great. I hear a lot of people saying, well, now that new infections are on the decline, and I'm like, wait a minute, look at the data. It definitely— new infections have leveled off. We're on a plateau here. And just knowing a little bit about the way these things work, a decline should be expected. That was the logical thing that would come next. But we've been, you know, kind of cruising along at about 25,000 new infections per day in the United States.

Right. United States. And I wonder, frankly, I'm not an epidemiologist, I'm not expert at this, but I wonder if we've really flattened the curve enough and if opening the economy, which I think we have to do, you know, the economy, it's very clear that there have been impacts of keeping the economy closed which have caused loss of life in other ways. Suicide rates are up, people are in economic devastation, you know, we got to get the economy reopened.

But I think there's a very good, very strong chance of a second wave. And I'm not saying that means that we shouldn't reopen the economy. I'm just saying we've got to face the fact that we haven't actually seen a decline, a meaningful decline in new cases. We've seen a plateauing. We're already going to open the economy because we pretty much have to. It seems logical to me to think that it won't take very long at all before the next wave comes and we're back up to 30,000+ new infections per day. Again, this is not my field. Maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, but I think people are a little bit too complacent with how easily we can just reopen the economy without causing another wave. A lot of reaction— it seems like part of what pushed the stock market up yesterday to that above the 2,930 level, which I've been saying is is the key level to watch, was Dr.

Fauci talking about remdesivir, Gilead's drug, having a huge amount of promise. Chris Martenson did a little bit of a takedown on that, and he went through what Fauci said and what the clinical trials have actually revealed for remdesivir. Really, you know, it's funny, the press is all over remdesivir, rah, rah, rah, and chloroquine.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: Boo, boo, boo, Trump said it, so it can't be good. And, you know, frankly, from what Martenson says, really, the, the evidence is just as good for chloroquine plus zinc, as long as you give it early enough in the period, as remdesivir. So it's not really clear to me that there's any reason to think remdesivir is going to change the game in a material way.

So I feel like we're at the sell the news moment in the virus. And what I mean by that is, okay, we're reopening the economy. We're kind of ringing the bell saying it's time to reopen the economy. The guidelines have been issued. States are starting to reopen their beaches and reopen stores and so forth. It's the time when everybody says, okay, it's over, and they breathe a big sigh of relief. I don't think it's any coincidence that that's happening at the same time that we just hit what you and I think on a technical chart Looks like the top of a bear market rally. I think this is that sell-the-news moment. Now, I'm not saying that we haven't gotten past the worst of the crisis, but everybody's acting like, okay, it's ending now. It's not ending. It's going to be a long, long time before life is back to pre-crisis normal. We're at the point where that really difficult first wave is behind us, and now there's still a lot of challenges ahead.

And I don't think people are really looking at it that way.

Patrick Ceresna: Okay.

Postgame: reopening, travel boom or staycation

Erik Townsend: Anyway, big question on my mind, what I'm gonna be watching. I can make an argument that says, okay, what's gonna happen next is the following. Everybody's been cooped up in their house. They're sick of it. They're gonna say, okay, finally the restrictions have been lifted. Let's go on a vacation. Let's get on a plane. Let's go to a resort. Let's live our lives to the fullest because this crisis has taught us you never know what could go wrong. So baby, we're gonna go out. We're gonna travel. We're gonna party. We're gonna have fun. Because we can again.

The other side of it is people were really shaken by this and they feel like, boy, you know, okay, the airlines are flying again, but, you know, I'm not really interested in taking that risk. I think I'd rather skip going away from, you know, to another city on a vacation. I'd rather just have a staycation at home. Huge difference in the economic impact of those 2 scenarios in terms of how the economic recovery occurs.

Occurs. Which one's going to happen? Frankly, I have no clue. But my opinion is these things tend to be— it's like any fad in society. They're self-reinforcing. If what everybody around you seems to be doing is celebrating it's time to go travel again, you're probably going to do that too. If everybody else is scared to travel again, you're probably going to fall into that same thing. So I think it's going to be very interesting to see what the trend is in society as to whether people want to rush back to spending money traveling and doing things and being active and getting out in the world, or if people don't really want to go to the World Series because they're concerned about the risk associated with it and so forth. So we'll see what happens.

Matt Barrie's Freelancer.com COVID-19 business survey

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, we got an email from Matt Barrie, our good friend at Freelancer.com. What's that all about?

Erik Townsend: Matt's a super guy. He's the founder of Freelancer.com. He came to our MacroVoices live events. He's got the record for farthest farthest traveled to get to a MacroVoices live event. Matt has a really interesting customer base because Freelancer deals with people literally all over the world with businesses that hire freelancers to do all sorts of things. So he put a survey together about how businesses all over the world are responding to the COVID-19 crisis, whether they feel that there's one country that was at fault for this or they don't, whether they feel that their government has done a good job or a bad job and so forth. Fascinating, fascinating survey results. So let's try to get that full survey. I think it was just released to the public in the last 24 hours or so. Let's get it into the Research Roundup, Patrick, so that our listeners can peruse it. I went through it. He's got terrific graphs and charts.

I think you'll find it very definitely worth your while.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, the business survey thing at the end there was pretty interesting just to see the impact and how long they, people think it will take for the recovery to come in. It's, uh, really worth the read.

Sign-off and Research Roundup contents

Erik Townsend: And Patrick, we're going to need to leave it there. This episode was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at TopTradersUnplugged.com/MacroGuide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit MacroVoices.com/Sponsorship. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as well as, of course, our post-game chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the charts that we discussed in the post-game. There's also a link to an article by Jeffrey Snider titled, Can You Quota the World into Recovery? As well as a great Chris Somers interview discussing his days back at Greenlight Capital. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, Send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

Erik Townsend: Thank you.

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