Jeff Snider — Jeffrey Snider, Chief Investment Officer for Alhambra Investments (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices, episode 267, was recorded on April 15th, 2021. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better meet the needs of both market participants and society as a whole. Are you ready to hear from a serious deflationist? Jeff Snider has been one of our listeners' favorite guests over the years, and he's back this week with a pull-no-punches interview making the case for deflation rather than inflation, against consensus. Then be sure to stay tuned for Patrick's weekly chart deck about the 50-day moving average, which is titled this week About the 50-Day Moving Average.

Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude oil, gold, 10-year yield

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Erik, let's get to this S&P 500. I mean, it just hasn't quit. We continue to press up toward 4,200. We're at 4,158 on the futures at the time time of recording. What's your take on this?

Erik Townsend: Well, if you ever wondered what that word parabolic means, take a look at this chart. And, you know, we've seen only brief periods where we've managed to trade under the 5-day moving average for a few hours at a time. And this market just seems to know no limits. Even if you think, as I do, that we're in the middle of a big picture melt-up, a crack-up boom in Austrian economics parlance, still, this at this point feels to me Like it's just overdone and ready for a correction lower. Now, that doesn't mean it's gonna change the big trend. I think they're gonna buy the dip when we get that correction, but it sure does feel overdone. Let's come back to this, Patrick, in the postgame segment when we can take a look at the charts, see where the key technical levels are.

Patrick Ceresna: For sure. So let's move on to that US Dollar Index because we've now been pulling back for several weeks off of those highs. Do you think that was it for the dollar push, or you think the dollar can make another run on the upside?

Erik Townsend: I think we have to wait this out and see what happens. The way I'm looking at this, Patrick, is the breakthrough 92 on the upside was mostly about a big short squeeze. The, the short dollar trade had become far too crowded. It was that key technical level of 92 was the impetus for a lot of people to get out, and that bailout caused the chart pattern that we see. Now we're back down and below 92. Are we going to stay below 92? Are we going to edge back over it? That's the big question. That's the big question as far as I'm concerned in terms of the direction of the dollar from here. So far, all indications are that this breakout above 92 was really a fake breakout, which has now reversed to the downside based on a short squeeze. Question now is, is there momentum to move it back above 92?

Let's see what happens.

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's talk crude oil because Wednesday we had a big breakout, and I really wanted to pick your brain as to what's driving all this. Is that— was that it for the correction? Is this the, the big Is this the breakout we've been looking for, for another leg higher on oil?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as you know, any breakout always has the risk of being a fake breakout. So let's give this 24 to 48 hours to ratify itself, if you will. But so far, all indications are that the correction is over and that we're headed back to the upside in terms of the direction of crude oil prices. As far as what got us there, inventory helped. There was a big drawdown of 5.9 million barrels of crude. But this time, that drawdown in crude oil was not Not offset by big builds in finished products. In fact, we had a 2.1 million barrel drawdown in distillates, and gasoline only built 309,000 barrels. Cushing, Oklahoma drew down 346,000 barrels, and US production ticked back up to 11,000 barrels. Patrick, we really need to get Art Berman back on the show to tell us what the heck happened to his prediction about US production falling off a cliff this year.

In any event, I think it was a combination of inventory and Russian geopolitical risk.

Patrick Ceresna: Right.

Erik Townsend: That got this going. But frankly, as we discussed last week, this market was really coiled up. It needed to move one direction or the other. And normally I would have bet that down would be next because frankly, this wasn't that painful of a correction. But like everything else we've seen about this rally since November, it always seems to resolve taking less time and less downside price movement before the rally continues and we're back to the upside.

If you look at this big move, Patrick, as the big move that we had up from November until this recent top, and then you take where we are now and you do a measured move against that, it gets a projected top for this year sometime around August and about $90, $91 a barrel. And I think that's entirely realistic. We'll see what happens.

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's touch on gold because $30-plus up day today, breaking to a 1-month high. Do you think that that's the big turn up in gold?

Erik Townsend: Patrick, I cannot overstate how important today's technical action was. Gold did everything today that it possibly could do from a technical perspective, other than perhaps staying there for a few days, which is the next thing it has to do. But we've broken above the previous channel resistance line. We've broken above the 50 and 55-day moving averages, and we're seeing a pattern of higher highs and higher lows. Everything about this chart looks bullish, and it looks like we've finally crossed that key threshold that says, okay, looks like the price rout is over and maybe it's all upside from here on gold, exactly as you predicted in last week's Chart Deck. So, you know, we haven't quite had confirmation yet. We just broke above the 50-day moving average today. As you know, sometimes there are fake breakouts. We'll see what happens. But if the price stays up here above $1,765, let's say, for the next several days, it's a pretty strong confirmation that the trend has reversed and that we're heading Yeah, we could talk about that in the postgame with the chart deck, but let's move on to that 10-year Treasury yield.

Patrick Ceresna: A significant breakdown. I mean, we have 10-year yields now heading down to 1.53. We're down almost 10 basis points from yesterday. So what's your take here on yields?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I think the story on yields is really the whole story on all the other markets we just talked about turned on its head. Why did gold do what it did? Well, it's because Treasury yields took the dive that they took. I think the whole The whole market has been hung up with, okay, how far can it go? And it seems like now 1.75% is the line in the sand that the market perceives as a consensus. Okay, it's not going any higher than that, at least for now.

As long as that stays true, I think that the direction for gold is up. I think that we'll continue to see a lot of action going in the same direction in markets. The big question is gonna be if that 1.75% really is the high end of this range, or if we're just pulling back getting ready to challenge it again and move to 2%.

If we did get that move above 1.75%, I think it would change the direction of just about everything else. But until that happens, looks like we're in good shape.

Patrick Ceresna: This week's featured interview guest is Alhambra Investments CIO Jeffrey Snider. Now, Erik, why did we invite Jeff to the show this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff is one of the smartest guys we know in the whole world anywhere, and he's also one of our listeners' favorite guests. But I particularly wanted to get him on because Jeff has continued to hold a deflationary deflationary view, while almost everybody else that we have in terms of our regular MacroVoices guests, the smartest people we know, have mostly turned inflationist. And Jeff's not going to disappoint you in this interview. He lays out a really coherent, well-thought-out explanation for why he doesn't see the inflation that you and I and so many other people see on the horizon. So, I think it's a terrific interview. Thank you.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, Erik's interview with Jeffrey Snider is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right after this message from our sponsor.

Erik Townsend: This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by Abaxx Technologies, which also sponsors the new Smarter Markets podcast, which airs every Saturday morning and explores how the markets themselves could be redesigned to better serve market participants and society as a whole. Michelle Dennedy's inaugural episode of Smarter Markets is now live on smartermarketspod.com and features an interview with Jim Whitehurst, President of IBM. This Saturday, Michelle's guest will be Carolyn Wong, Chief Strategy Officer at Cobalt, for a discussion on who's responsible for protecting digital assets. Then I'll be back as host myself the following week on April 24th. But you won't get Smarter Markets on your MacroVoices feed. You have to separately subscribe to Smarter Markets in your podcast app to receive this free new podcast.

Guest intro: the last deflationists

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is our good friend Jeffrey Snider, Chief Investment Officer for Alhambra Investments.

Jeff Snider: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Famous for his slide decks. Listeners, you'll find the download link for Jeff's slide deck associated with today's interview in your Research Roundup email. Now, if you don't have a Research Roundup email, that means you're not yet registered at MacroVoices.com. Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, click the red button that says, Looking for the Downloads, just above Jeff's picture and just below the green Donate button.

Jeff, the big conversation we're having with all of our feature interview guests is inflation or deflation, and frankly, We've gotten to the point where it's hard to find any deflationists left. We had Steven Van Metre on a couple of weeks ago, as you know. We've got you, we've got David Rosenberg scheduled, we're trying to get Lacy Hunt. I think that's all the deflationists that there are at this point. Now, I saw the, the Finance Secretary of the Philippines was rushing a dollar bond sale because he wanted to get it done before interest rates skyrocket. That's exactly what he actually said. So it seems like there's nobody Yeah. There's nobody on the left almost who doesn't think that both inflation and bond rates are headed higher. Richard Nixon once said, we're all Keynesians now, butchering something that Milton Friedman had written a few years earlier. But in 2021, it really does seem like almost all of the macro gurus that we know that we invite on MacroVoices have turned into what Louis Vincent Gave called inflationistas.

Maybe you and Steven Van Metre and Brent Johnson But it's getting to be a pretty darn lonely place for you remaining deflationists.

Is this time different? QE, UBI and MMT

Jeff Snider: Yeah, I think when you think about it, Erik, that history has repeatedly warned against some of the things that we're seeing now, these excesses. And I think there's some intuitive sense behind why everybody's starting to think about inflation and only inflation. As you know very well, Erik, I personally don't equate to what governments and central banks are doing to that at all. I don't think I'm alone in that view though, and I think that's where I really object. But you're right in one sense.

In the media anyway, inflation seems it's written about as a foregone conclusion. The mainstream view is always the same that you know determined governments can and will create inflationary circumstances if they really want to. And even though governments have for you know more than a decade now really wanted some inflation, they haven't been able to get it. So I think that's what people are thinking is different now that governments have gone to a whole other level, and so it's just a matter of.

Erik Townsend: Okay, Jeff. So the question then is, is this time different? Of course, that's a cliché phrase. But look, you know, this is a secular thing. You go from deflation to inflation. There's gotta be inflation someday. The question is when. Every possible means has been ratcheted up to intentionally create inflation. And to me, I think the big difference now is, although it's true, and I will be the first to admit that a lot of people, myself included, misunderstood quantitative easing in the beginning. We thought it was going to be inflationary then. Well, it wasn't because it was creating bank reserves, not pumping money into the real economy. The thing is, what they're talking about this time around, Jeff, is different. They're talking about pumping money into the real economy through things like universal basic income and other transfer payments and, and various other things that they want to do with infrastructure spending and so forth.

It all sounds to me like a completely apples to oranges or apples to bananas comparison when you compare this to the first rounds of quantitative easing, which admittedly were not inflationary as many of us thought they would be.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, exactly. And I think, you know, when you see some of these things for the first time, universal basic income, for example, or MMT, some of the edges of MMT, you know, it sounds like, okay, this is something new. And I get, you know, These are intended to move around the banking system, to not do quantitative easing, to put money into the real economy. But you have to realize that even MMT is really just neo-Keynesian with the usual traditional boundaries removed, which is what I think everyone is up in arms about. That, okay, now we're going into a whole different thing. But here's the thing, we all know that officials are moving in that direction and have at least expanded the boundaries of deficits and QE bond buying heading that way.

Yet the inflation narrative is a hard sell anywhere outside of the mainstream media or maybe the stock market. The financial press is certainly sold on it. And the stories they write are practically uniform in declaring that this is absolutely going to happen. Inflation is going to happen because Uncle Sam and Jay Powell have done an extraordinary job to the point that the risks are now that they're gonna do too much.

But this is not the view of the marketplace, which means that there's far less agreement than it maybe otherwise seems. Even today, right now, the inflationists are the ones who are holding out because the entire bond market globally Remains firmly, and I mean firmly, in the nothing has changed camp. Despite trillions upon trillions in deficits and QEs worldwide, universal basic income and MMT lite that is now infecting official discussions and political considerations, there's actually very little so far as inflation expectation despite every one of those things.

Erik Townsend: Well, hang on a second, Jeff, because it sounds like you're saying that the whole inflation idea was just made up by the media, is their creation. Now, I know that I personally have been saying for more than a decade, I don't know when the inflation starts, but I do know that's where you get to an endgame situation. Because when you've got a deflationary backdrop, you can solve almost any problem by printing money off the printing press. But when you have an inflationary backdrop, now all of a sudden that money printing becomes even more inflationary and you've got a self-exacerbating problem.

Jeff Snider: Right.

Erik Townsend: So I think a lot of us, myself included, have known for years that someday there was gonna be a reckoning with inflation. It had to come someday. The media hasn't persuaded me that this is happening now. What's persuaded me that it's happening now is all of the politicians I see running around looking for new ways to print and spend money.

The 'historic' bond sell-off, M2 and bank reserves

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think the question you're asking is, is this today? Is today the day that we've changed from inflation to deflation? And here, look, we have the biggest, deepest, and most sophisticated markets in human history, all across the world, and each of them agree on this point. There's been a small but significant improvement in expectations over the past few months, but nothing, absolutely nothing more than that. And even that has been underwhelming, distinctly unimpressive. Furthermore, we've seen this very argument take shape time and time again, the last time just a couple years ago.

But that's not how this narrative, and it's really a narrative, and we're going to start on the slide deck on slide 3 here. That's not how this is, you know, the narrative is being presented in the actual marketplace. Going back to early January, the global bond market has indeed sold off, but now it's being pronounced as some kind of historic rout, which purportedly has unsettled every last deflationist on the planet. As you said at the introduction, Erik, you know, there's how many holdouts are there left? So you know, and then that's intentional to create the notion that this is some big change in the condition, the underlying condition, and the more likely the outlook, as you said, is the market starting to get the sense that politicians are getting the will and the desire to go beyond any kind of traditional boundaries.

You know, that was really the point of calling it a historic bond sell-off and playing up the rise in interest rates, particularly by claiming that this is something different. It already implies that there's more meaning to this one. Not only is the bond market selling off, this must be the sell-off that we've been hearing about for a long time, that this is the time when deflation has ended and the bond market is getting ready for the looming inflationary regime. And the reason is always, again, that governments and central banks have done such a good job That they've completely changed around the risk, which now, at least according to this conventional view, have swung all the way around to become firmly inflationary.

Erik Townsend: Okay, Jeff, at the very least, you stipulate yourself on the last line here on slide 3, you're saying governments want inflation and they're willing to do anything to get it. So you acknowledge that. Now, I would say that governments don't really understand what they're doing. And they're probably going to overshoot and create, essentially start a fire they won't be able to put out. That's the way inflations tend to happen, is the government gets too complacent, gets too carried away. Eventually, you get to the point where by the time they figure out that the inflation is really burning, it's too late to put the fire out. You're saying it's not happening.

Wait a minute, help me out here. Why is it not happening?

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I understand that view because it's almost like stretching a rubber band, right? Failure after failure, QE after QE didn't work. And so they keep pushing the boundaries, keep pushing the boundaries, they keep stretching the rubber band and eventually the rubber band fails and the whole system blows apart. And I get that.

There isn't any doubt that governments have expanded what they're doing because to me, it's based on, predicated on past failures. The fact that we're still stuck in a disinflationary route, what is it now? Almost 14 years after it began. You know, and there's any number of statistics or data points which demonstrate the fact that these are not normal times, that we're going through some ahistoric types of changes. But whether purely monetary or seemingly monetary, when you look at things like M2, for example, the M2 monetary statistic, which is on slide 4, that has been rising at historic rate, about 25% annual for about a year already. And related to it, through QE bond buying, the Fed's level of bank reserves has exploded upward to just about about $4 trillion, which is by far a record. And then on slide 5, you can see the combination of quantitative easing plus the latest round of Uncle Sam's helicopter in recent months.

The Treasury's TGA balance is being drawn down with these government payments into the real economy, which is the latest round of stimulus going out by the hundreds of billions. This then comes to the rest, goes into the commercial banking system as this rising systemic bank reserve. And it's a flood of at least central bank accounting to the tune of nearly 3 quarters of a trillion in bank reserves over just the past 9 weeks. And that represents the government moving money into the real economy through these government treasury payments and stimulus. But at the same time, or at least much the same time, fixed income markets globally have definitely pushed over into the reflationary trade. That's where you see selling in bonds, rates rising, et cetera, because it really might seem like everything, and I mean everything, has turned positive.

Whether it's vaccines, whether it's this flood of bank reserves, it's government payments. You know, we had the huge payroll report in the US for the month of March 2021. We've had record high PMIs, you know, especially the price components of the PMIs. You know, there's reasons behind the sell-off in the bond markets and the rise in interest rates. I think the problem is, or the issue is, is interpreting these market signals, putting them into relevant context, and then understanding how the vast majority of market participants must be seeing all of these same things.

What Eurodollar futures signal: 2018 and 2006 precedents

Erik Townsend: Jeff, you and I have talked about the Eurodollar system quite a bit over the years, but I want to talk about Eurodollar futures specifically, because you've got them on this slide. And I think this is an area where we have a lot of confusion as we talk about the Eurodollar system, but not as much about what the Eurodollar chart is actually telling you. As you see Eurodollars trading at a certain level, what signal is that giving you, or what does it tell you that policymakers are trying to achieve. So I'm looking at the December '22 contract on your chart, slide 6, at a contract price of somewhere around $99.50. And that looks like this particular contract is pricing maybe one rate hike before the end of next year. And then these other contracts further out have priced in quite a few more. Explain this slide in terms of how investors listen So, if you were to ask a layperson listening, can interpret this data, what information do they glean by looking at this graph?

Jeff Snider: I think that's commonly what people say when they talk about Eurodollar futures, but it's not quite what the market is actually indicating. Futures contracts, especially those further out into the future, are essentially embedded probability distributions. So, at a price of 99.50, which is the December '22 contract, there's an implicit probability distribution that says maybe a rate hike, maybe more than one rate hike, but most likely not any.

It's just that at 99.50, the probability isn't zero like it had been priced before January. So in the grand scheme of things, that's a very minor improvement in outlook. And it doesn't say the Fed's going to raise rates by 25 basis points before the end of next year. The market is saying there's still a good chance that LIBOR doesn't move at all by the end of next year. But now there's maybe a small chance that it could with an incrementally increasing opportunity the further you go out into the future, the further you go down the Eurodollar futures curve into the the far more distant contracts.

Erik Townsend: How much of that is just Powell and the Fed? If LIBOR is usually correlated pretty closely with the Fed funds market and the effective Fed funds rate, isn't that just an expectation or an indication of coming monetary policy? Powell and other FOMC members have said repeatedly that they're not in any hurry to raise rates, and they're anticipating sticking to the zero lower bound. Not just this month or this quarter, but for years. And they do have a tendency to be wrong a lot, especially where inflation has been concerned, quite frankly.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, but here's the thing. The Eurodollar futures market has led the Fed. It doesn't follow monetary policy. This market knows what Jay Powell's going to do before he knows what he's going to do. And that was absolutely the case the last time we went through this, Erik. You and I talked about this just a few years ago, quite a lot back in 2018.

Well, Powell back then was unusually hawkish. Think back to the middle of 2018, claiming his expectations were for an accelerated rate hike schedule well into 2019 and beyond, because he said inflationary pressures at that time were building, the unemployment rate, full employment, all that stuff. But here it was the Eurodollar futures contract all the way back in June of '18, which called him on it. When the curve inverted in that month, that was the market indicating that there was a growing and serious probability that the Fed would end up cutting rates, not hiking as it was doing at the time, as it was expecting to continue to do well beyond 2018. So, it was the Eurodollar futures that ended up being absolutely correct. Powell followed the market rather than the market following policy projections, the dot plots and all that other stuff.

So, in 2021, if these contracts are priced where the market believes there's a significant chance of continued zero or near-zero money market rates, that's because the market is pricing likely outcomes that will force Jay Powell over time time to acknowledge them regardless of what he thinks today. And it wasn't just 2018 when Eurodollar futures proved themselves, obviously. Go back to 2006, the Eurodollar futures curve inverted at that time, which was suggestive that things were going wrong many months before Bernanke confidently told Congress that subprime was contained.

The 2013 taper tantrum and the curve

Erik Townsend: Well, it was also true in 2013, wasn't it? The taper tantrum was really a reflation trend, but one that didn't last very Bernanke's Fed was turning optimistic and the market turned with him. But then even before the end of that year, it turned back against him again.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and that became the standard view of how the improving economy, or rapidly improving economy, at least according to the unemployment rate, that's how it was supposed to allow the Fed to taper first QE3 and QE4 before then kicking off rate hikes sometime following the end of those programs. That was the trigger for the global bond sell-off, including Eurodollar futures from May 2013 onwards.

But it hadn't been a negative reaction to fewer Fed purchases. It was the probability distribution I was just talking about in Eurodollar futures particularly that was shifting more optimistically on inflation and growth, which are the factors underlying real recovery and therefore get set into 3-month LIBOR and things like that. So translated into all the potential future paths for 3-month LIBOR, selling in Eurodollar futures had meant a higher probability of Bernanke's view paying off. So, if we go to slide 7, you can clearly see this in the way the Eurodollar futures curve shifted between May and September 2013. And then on slide 8, the curve in early May was pretty low and flat, which is not a very good, not a very optimistic type of curve. It's not the kind of thing that you associate with inflationary recovery. Instead, one that is perfectly consistent with the conditions of that time, which were not very good. Expectations, that low flat curve were basically expectations for continuing disinflation and the lack of robust economic growth.

But once Bernanke said the word taper early in May 2013, which was projecting unusual confidence— remember, Fed chairmen usually try not to say very much— that's when the Eurodollar futures curve sold off along with the US Treasury market and MBS and all sorts of fixed income. Which is to say that the Eurodollar futures curve steepened quite a lot, as you can see on slide 9.

What that meant was that the market was incorporating these more favorable probabilities of the future, particularly further down the road beyond the near and intermediate terms. The farther over the horizon you look, obviously there's greater— there's higher uncertainty. So on slide 10 and 11, Bernanke's sudden confidence jump-started some optimism about the longer run, at least until September of 2013. Now, this wasn't the market rushing to embrace the unemployment rate. We have to keep in mind that it was a relative shift in future expectations that were more favorable than the uniformly awful expectations that were priced in the May 2013 curve. In other words, from a high probability of really awful future to one that was perhaps a little less and a little less likely awful.

Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, what that meant looking down the road half a decade or more, at least if we go by the Eurodollar futures market and its forward curve, was the potential range for 3-month LIBOR that shifted to become somewhere Somewhat of a higher range than it was before. I think I've heard you say before, Jeff, that this is how you define reflation and how that is different from recovery.

Jeff Snider: Yeah. When the market, or even if the market shifts from a small probability of something like more normal LIBOR half a decade into the future to something that's more of a better probability for it, that's when you know recovery has a real chance. It just hasn't happened yet. And it's not even, it's never even been close. So if you go to slide 12, you can see why the probabilities for recovery always price very low. Time and time again, it just hasn't panned out. It always fails. It's always these false dawns. We keep hearing about promises for inflation. Governments do more, more, more QE, more fiscal spending, whatever it is. And as it always turns out, you know, as it would eventually turn out, the May 2013 Eurodollar futures curve was actually much, much closer to where 3-month LIBOR ended up being all the way in the distant future.

Not the more optimistic reflationary September 2013 curve. So what the 2013 reflationary shift or sell-off in global bonds that included eurodollar futures, what that had been was nothing more than a temporary, and I mean really temporary, slight improvement in outlook. Before too long, by the end of 2013 in eurodollar futures, as well as in the US Treasury market, the entire global bond market was already repricing probabilities back closer to what the curve had indicated.

At the same time, though, Bernanke's Fed was growing even more confident, even more optimistic. Recall that they didn't— they actually did taper QE in December of 2013, but then watched helplessly as global rates fell, not rose, and Eurodollar futures prices kept going higher, not lower. And as Bernanke handed off to Janet Yellen, you know, Yellen's Fed never did get around to those aggressive rate hikes that seemed at least somewhat plausible during that inappropriately named taper tantrum sell-off.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jeff Snider: So, the higher probabilities for potential recovery, which were never good, even in the reflationary curve of September 2013, those slowly, painfully disappeared throughout 2014 as the Eurodollar curve, like the yield curve, shriveled, shrank, and compressed all over again.

2021 curves vs 2013: an underwhelming reflation

Erik Townsend: Let's put this all into the current context, because what you're saying and what these markets appear to be doing is obviously similar. Using what you just said about the 2013 reflationary episode. What can you tell us about the market structure in 2021 and even beyond this year?

Jeff Snider: We'll start on slide 13, and that's where the curves had been last year at their worst, their lowest, their flattest, their most pessimistic point, which was on August 4th. So over the past 8 months, which is now 2/3 of a year, both Treasuries and Eurodollar futures have been selling off. That's reflation. And as we looked at that before, it picked up significantly earlier this year in January. And that's on slide 14.

But viewing these again as curves, visually you get the same impression as 2013. It starts out really flat on slide 15, which is a curve that indicates very little chance of substantially higher 3-month LIBOR rates in the future, and just overwhelming probabilities of really awful outcomes, which would leave 3-month LIBOR never getting that much higher than 0. For 4 or 5 years, long way into the future, by the middle of the current decade. And that's probably the best way to describe last year.

But after the latest acceleration of reflation between January and March of this year, the curve has steepened significantly, as you can see on slide 16. But what does that actually mean? Is this the historic sell-off that everybody's describing or that's been described in every, certainly every mainstream financial news Is this the market becoming more and more certain that inflation and even runaway inflation is a growing likelihood, that governments have finally gone too far, that they've stretched the inflationary rubber band too far and it's about to snap?

Well, all you have to do is compare the changes in the recent curve to those from 2013, as I did on slide 17.

Erik Townsend: This is what you'd meant earlier when you said the current reflationary sell-off is underwhelming, or what was the other word you used?

Jeff Snider: I believe I said it was unimpressive.

Erik Townsend: I think you said it was distinctly unimpressive.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think it's because it really is. I mean, you look at these charts on slide 17. I mean, the current Eurodollar futures curve, the one that's supposedly projecting all these quick-developing rate hikes as is commonly described, it's pretty much the same shape and nominal parameters as it had been in May 2013. And the May 2013 curve was essentially back then, that was the market's worst-case scenarios and probabilities.

So, if you go to slide 18 and 19, back to what those curves were projecting far into the future half a decade or so ahead, You know, the reflation curve was somewhat closer to normal, the one from September 2013, meaning higher short-term interest rates, while the May 2013 curve, the one remember that ended up coming close, really close to what actually happened in the longer-run future, that was for basically the same continued lack of inflation and growth despite Ben Bernanke and then Janet Yellen's expectations and assurances that these things really were picking up. And so, if we put the current curves into that context, you know, oh boy. I mean, look at slide 20. The best case today, the reflation case right now, is for a group of probability distributions that ended up looking like what had been the worst case 8 years ago.

Again, the distributions that actually came closer to the truth. So let me say this again. Even after the so-called historic reflationary sell-off, the Eurodollar futures curve is projecting an intermediate and longer-run future that's about the same as the awful projections were back at that time. Our current best case for growth and inflation, therefore higher rates in the futures, is right now after this reflationary sell-off about the same as past worst cases.

Erik Townsend: And this market is obviously pricing in and discounting all the factors you mentioned at the start. What seems like a bunch of good news in the vaccines and economic data improving, as well as the ridiculous excesses of the Fed, Fed or ECB, along with the US government and its counterparties all around the world.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, all those things are in there and the market is priced as if in all likelihood they won't make much difference at all, to the point that reflation in 2021 has been so thoroughly underwhelming given how everything, and I mean everything, is supposed to be going the right way now.

Erik Townsend: Jeff, why is that? How can this really important market discount all those different

Jeff Snider: Well, Erik, for one thing, the market, like anyone who's been paying attention, has seen this reflationary trade time and time and time again. This would actually be the 4th or 5th, depending on how you count. And you can go to slides 21 and 22 here. Contrary to how it's being written up, reflationary sell-offs like this are nothing new. There's nothing historic about what's going on right now. And what that means so far as the current curves indicate is that even though the numbers are bigger, government interventions, the idea of pushing the boundaries, all that stuff, stuff, the bond market remains completely unimpressed by them because in the end, they really are all the same things. I know they're being described and they look like something brand new, something very different, but the truth is they're just bigger numbers and bigger experimentation. Even MMT, like I've said before, that's just neo-Keynesianism with a little bit of a different spin to it.

And so contrary to popular belief, there's loads, there's gobs of history and scholarships on these things, which all come down as as practical experience. And all of these things come down on the same side as Eurodollar futures. No inflation. In fact, there's higher chances of continued disinflation and the occasional outright deflation, just as we've seen since 2007. And that's why in slide 23, you see how the market over these past 14 years keeps pricing its best-case reflationary curves lower and lower and lower over time. Occasionally, it might look like there's a chance things could end up going the right way.

But the market over time only discounts that probability more and more, even at its reflationary peaks or reflationary best.

The market's deflation consensus

Erik Townsend: Okay. So am I to take your statements to mean that the long-run flattening out of the Eurodollar futures curve is basically the majority case for the Eurodollar futures market becoming more certain about the financial system, and I guess the economy never being able to escape from its deflationary rut? Is that your argument?

Jeff Snider: That's it. And I think, you know, it's not just my argument, it's the market. The market is saying—

Erik Townsend: Never being able to escape.

Jeff Snider: Right. It's the market.

Erik Townsend: Never is a long time.

Jeff Snider: Well, never is, yeah, never is probably too strong a word, but at least in the foreseeable future, which again, in these Eurodollar futures curve extends well out over the visible horizon. It's the market saying despite everything that's going on right now, it is priced for an exceedingly small chance of even 2% LIBOR or 2% 3-month LIBOR by the middle of the current decade. That's somehow a smaller chance than the middle of the last decade, which as everyone knows did not turn out to be an inflationary outburst that had been uniformly promised by central bankers, economists, and the media and so forth. So you can see by these curves just how small the probabilities are reflected in the shriveling and shrinking of them. So even at their supposedly best, like right now, It gets smaller and smaller and smaller over time. Each and every time this inflation debate shows up, each and every time the government pushes the boundaries or says it's pushing the boundaries, nothing changes.

The market becomes instead more and more resolute, as you can see on slides 24 and 25. And you can see how it is, especially when you compare what's supposed to be, you know, this inflationary monster in 2021 against not just these post-2008 reflation curves, But even more so against the backdrop of the pre-crisis curves. There isn't even a touch of inflation right now, even after this so-called historic sell-off.

Erik Townsend: To be fair, the term historic has been used only in conjunction with the sell-off in US Treasuries. Treasury prices at the long end of the yield curve have fallen by a sizable chunk.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, absolutely. That's true. But it's really all the same thing. You know, it's the ubiquitous quote-unquote bond market, which includes all of these related pieces like Eurodollar futures. You know, there are no islands in fixed income. So while long-end US Treasuries have sold off in price, and I suppose that historic sell-off when you measure it only by calendar quarters, that still hasn't raised rates all that much in the exact same way and for the exact same reasons that Eurodollar futures haven't given up relatively that much ground either.

If you go to slides 26, 27, and 28, the history of the last 14 years in the US Treasury market is remarkably similar to the trends in Eurodollar futures that we just went through. You see, you know, repeated reflationary sell-offs, one every few years, but these get weaker and less impressive by the cycle. And that's the US Treasury yield curve pricing the same sets of probabilities that are getting priced into Eurodollar futures curves. That's why the trend in the yield curve over time, as you see in slide 30 and 31, it's the same as in Eurodollar futures. That curve, like the other one, it just shrivels and flattens down almost to nothing. Which is each of them pricing in such low probabilities for inflation and growth. In Eurodollar futures, that's in the form of future 3-month LIBOR, where in the US Treasury yield curve, it comes at it— the Treasury curve comes at it more directly from inflation expectations and growth projections.

TIPS breakevens and inversion

Erik Townsend: Jeff, haven't inflation expectations in the TIPS market jumped higher though? I mean, maybe Eurodollar futures or long-end Treasury yields aren't yet pricing in inflation. But TIPS inflation breakevens sure seem to be, don't they?

Jeff Snider: Yeah, in the short run, that's absolutely true. The 5-year TIPS breakeven, for example, is the highest it has been since 2008. But that doesn't even mean as much as it sounds or as much as it has been made of. And the key reason why is that inflation expectations further out on the curve into the longer term, they're not nearly so impressive sounding. The 10-year breakeven, for example, may be as high as it's been since 2013, But we just went through how impressive expectations in 2013 had been. So being compared to 2013 isn't as much as it sounds. And it's gotten to the point where that since January, this January reflation bonanza that kicked off these TIPS inflation expectations, the TIPS breakevens have become inverted, so to speak.

Erik Townsend: What do you mean by inverted?

Jeff Snider: Well, if you go to slide 32, normally short-term inflation expectations are those further out on the curve, the longer-term. expectations. We would expect to find that the 5-year inflation breakeven would be below the 10-year. Since January, however, it's been the other way around for the first time since 2006. The 5-year TIPS breakeven is now considerably more than the 10-year, which has been a record amount of inversion since 2021. And that's the TIPS market's way of pricing the curves of both Eurodollar futures and nominal Treasuries. It's its own way of saying that, yes, Yes, there may be some additions to the CPI in the short run, whether that's commodity prices working their way through or even the near-term impacts of all that monumental government stuff.

But the market does not believe it will last. That whatever it's going to do, if anything much at all in terms of economy inflation, there very isn't likely any lingering impact. And you can see on slides 33 and 34 how this could be when you take into account the Eurodollar futures and yield curves and what they say about longer-term prospects, which is nothing And then match those up with long-run inflation expectations, which have trended the same way over time as those curves. The 5-year, 5-year forward inflation rate, which is derived in part from that allegedly scorching hot 5-year TIPS breakeven, this hasn't changed much at all over the past year. Like Eurodollar futures or nominal Treasuries, this long-run measure of inflation expectations, it has improved from 2020's low. But again, that's such a low bar. It hasn't actually moved all that much, the same as each of those curves, and it remains substantially, even visibly depressed when compared to 2013 and before.

Again, another consistent view that the long-run decade of the 2020s is somehow going to be even worse than the 2010s had been.

So in short, yes, governments and central banks are working overtime, but anything they do, whether already announced or undertaken, as well as what maybe has been anticipated, like this infrastructure idea being given an entirely new definition, It's just not likely at all to change the underlying economic fundamentals, inflation most especially. The same fundamentals that all of these parts of the bond market have learned from repeated history, and not just Western history, by the way.

Why hasn't the bond market sold off more?

Erik Townsend: Okay, so in other words, you're saying that the global market is priced in such a way that there really is a consensus where inflation is concerned. You just don't think it's the consensus that everyone else seems to be

Jeff Snider: Yeah. And I think that's really the most frustrating, disappointing aspect of this. But this is nothing new either. Like the inflation argument, it happens every time there's a minor reflationary sell-off, no matter how increasingly minor each of them becomes. Inflation, it's made to sound like it's always guaranteed to be just around the corner and that there's no way anyone could possibly disagree with that, except the whole damn global bond market does. It's not just one person here or there, it's the entire marketplace.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Jeff Snider: And since that includes pretty much the entire financial system worldwide, I'd say the deflationary story has overwhelming support rather than the other way around. Look, go to slides 34, 35, and 36. The idea that this current sell-off is in any real sense historic and even unusual is just plain false. And anyone who's claiming otherwise is being intentional about it. There's even less here than a few years ago, which was less than 2013, and so on. It's even worse in bond curves and bond nominal yields and inflation expectations elsewhere around the world, where there's somehow even smaller probabilities of inflation in those curves. Because this isn't something totally new, it does not represent a categorical shift in outlook and acceptance of the mainstream narrative. Go to slides 37 and 38. Far from it. No matter what piece of the bond market you look at in any jurisdiction, you can use whatever form or from whatever curve or from whatever whichever location.

The probabilities embedded in those curves of things going right, even though they're better than they were last year, that doesn't mean as much as it might sound. On the contrary, you should be asking yourself why this reflationary trend hasn't been so much more than what we've already seen so far. And remember, this is eight months long now. It's not like this is a short-term thing. You know, given all of the all of the positives that seem to be happening, as you pointed out, vaccines, you know, end of the pandemic is finally in sight. There's trillions upon trillions of money going directly into the hands of consumers, or at least hundreds of billions. You know, the TGA, the flood of bank reserves, so on and so on and so on. Why hasn't the bond market sold off a hell of a lot more than it has?

And it's not, as I said, it's not like this is a relatively young trend. It's 8 months old now, which is already as old as the reflationary trend during 2013, which went much farther and faster, even though it amounted to very little, which is, which is really nothing by its end.

So if all of these things are enormous game-changing policies and programs, why has the bond market, which is an enormous thing including millions upon millions of the most sophisticated investors and traders, those inside the system itself, why has the global bond market been so unenthusiastic about any and all of them?

And part of the problem is simply that we're taught that governments are in control. Central banks especially, if they want inflation, they can get it. And as you pointed out, Erik, sometimes they don't even know they want it or know how to get it, and they just go too far. And that all it takes is for them to go too far, that they just take the wrong step on slides 39 and 40.

But it's just not true. The bond market absolutely knows this. As I've said, we have the last 14 years in the Western world, as well as the prior 30 years in Japan, is all the empirical evidence we need. It's all the evidence the global bond market needs, that's for sure.

Does QE hold down yields?

Erik Townsend: Okay, Jeff, it seems to me that your whole argument here is mostly about if there really was inflation, then the bond market would be selling off more than it has so far. Well, hang on a second. One of the reasons that— or the primary reason that those of us who are inflationists are inflationists is because we see the government's intentions. Is to basically throw an incredible amount of money at everything, trying to stimulate the economy.

One of the things we know they're gonna do is buy bonds. So it's naturally expected that one of the things that's happening here is the sell-off that might otherwise be occurring in the bond market is not occurring specifically and precisely because of expectations. of more quantitative easing and more central bank purchases of bonds offsetting that natural pressure that you would expect in inflation for the bond market to sell off. Doesn't that make sense?

Jeff Snider: It makes sense. It makes intuitive sense, right? The Federal Reserve is buying bonds and therefore they, you know, they can control the price of bonds. Except not even the Federal Reserve would agree with that. If you look at any of the mainstream scholarship or any scholarship over the last 20 years of quantitative easing, what you'll find is they uniformly say say 3 things. Quantitative easing doesn't impact inflation, which I think you agree with. It's bank reserves, it's not real money. Secondly, that it's supposed to perform in the portfolio rebalancing channel, and it doesn't really have much of an impact there either. And so all of the mainstream academic studies say, well, it must be it lowers interest rates, right? Because the central banks are buying bonds, and therefore they're projecting that bond buying into higher prices of the bonds being bought, because here you have a non-economic Agent in intruding itself upon the bond market, and yet all of the studies say the same thing there too.

There's only very limited evidence that quantitative easing lowers interest rates. I love how the Bank of New Zealand put it, and it's right there. You go to the website right now; you can see exactly what they think of quantitative easing. What they say is that if you do a large-scale asset purchase of 10% of GDP, 10% of GDP, you might be able to lower bond rates by about half a percent.

In other words, what they're saying is that the market reduces interest rates far, far, far more than quantitative easing ever has. The market is in charge of interest rates, not central banks. And again, this is central banks telling you this through all of these academic studies. And it's absolutely been the case in Japan. It's absolutely been the case in Europe and the United States.

The market sets the long-term interest rates, not central bank bond buying. In fact, there's very little correlation between bond buying programs and where interest rates are and have gone. Again, we just went through the 2013 episode, which proves beyond a shadow of a doubt that it's the market setting interest rates. Remember, Ben Bernanke's Fed, December of 2013, began tapering bond purchases. What happened to US Treasury prices? They didn't go down, they went up because the market was pricing probabilities that were different from Ben Bernanke, which were leading him into tapering.

So no, I don't believe at all that quantitative easing is the reason why the reflationary sell-off has been so minimal and underwhelming, as I said. And by the way, what does that have to do with 3-month LIBOR and Eurodollar futures? It doesn't have much to do with it. There's a close, consistent corroborating story across all of these global bond markets that say, we just don't see the inflation coming.

Money-financed fiscal expansion, MMT and Japan

Erik Townsend: Okay, Jeff, you're citing research about quantitative easing, and I think the point that you're making very persuasively, and I agree I agree completely, is quantitative easing, the stuff that Ben Bernanke started doing, isn't inflationary the way a lot of people like me thought it was in the beginning. I get it. I'm totally sold. I'm with you. But the point that I and other people are making, Jeff, is it really feels like the government is changing up its game dramatically. We're not talking about supporting financial markets with low interest rates, which was Ben Bernanke's goal. We're talking about politicians trying to figure out how to use this money printing ability of the Fed to essentially create transfer payments, to buy votes, to, to directly stimulate the economy by pumping money into people's checking accounts through things like universal basic income. It seems to me like that's a fundamental apples to orange is a different game than the 2009 through 2017 quantitative easing brought to you by Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen.

It seems like it's a totally different game that's on now.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I would, I would not agree with that. I would say that it's an escalating series that we've already seen happen in history, recent history.

Erik Townsend: So you think it's the same game?

Jeff Snider: Yeah, I think—

Erik Townsend: It's an escalation of the same game.

Jeff Snider: Not only that, I actually think it's done, it's been done before and proven to be Not inflationary. It's money finance fiscal expansion was practiced by the Japanese in the 1990s and into the 2000s, and it did not lead to an inflationary breakout either. Again, that's why I say when you look at MMT, MMT looks a lot like Japan, and because of the intrusive nature of the government, because of the wasteful nature of the government, it ends up being deflationary, not inflationary.

So to me, this does not represent anything that we haven't seen before, that we don't have empirical evidence. With. And by the way, the government of Japan used any number of ways to inject funds directly from postal savings, which was money. That was the money finance part of it through the Trust Fund Bureau and all of those. I think there's something like 30-some-odd government agencies where money was taken from the actual savers and repurposed and redistributed into the real economy, directly into the real economy off budget. It was second budget. They even called it the secondary budget. In Japan. And it didn't lead to an inflationary inferno. It didn't lead to inflationary excesses. It only led to more of the same, which was lack of growth, lack of inflation, which was exactly what the JGB market had been pricing the entire time, that this was not going to lead to anything different because it wasn't really anything different.

The problem is, the sickness is, it's in the real economy. And that's just not something that governments have the ability to fix. They can try to circumvent those problems, But all they do when they're trying to circumvent problems in the real economy, oftentimes they make those problems worse. They exacerbate the issues that are already existing. When you look at any of these DSGE models that assign positive or even greater than 1 multipliers to fiscal spending, they don't realistically equate to what may be negative multipliers from all of this fiscal stuff. So it may be that you get a short-term burst of activity, but actually doing more longer-term harm than you think. I mean, just universal basic income, for example, you're paying people to not work. That's gonna be deflationary over time, not inflationary, because you're ruining, you're making, not necessarily ruining, but you're exacerbating existing negative problems.

And I think that the marketplace understands this, having seen it happen up close and personal in Japan for a very long time, that it knows that, yeah, it sounds like this is something very new and different, But it's only very new and different to people here in the West.

Eurodollar University podcast and close

Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, I've got to hand it to you. We've been looking for months for the deflationist who could really articulate a compelling argument, and I think you've done exactly that. Before I let you go though, I want to bring our listeners up to speed. You know, a lot of people remember the Eurodollar University that you and I did as a podcast series a few years ago. You and our friend, Emil Kalinowski have taken that work to the next level. You're doing a regular podcast on the subject of Eurodollar University. Tell us a little bit more about that and what you do at Alhambra Partners.

Jeff Snider: Well, I do mostly research. I get the chance to dig into some of these details and try to present them in a way that makes sense, or at least has an intuitive framework behind it that people can then understand what's really going on in the monetary system. Why aren't bank reserves money and things like that?

And yeah, you're right, Erik. That's why I always love coming back on MacroVoices, because it was you and I who kicked this whole thing off, trying to really put together a comprehensive view of this Eurodollar system and put it out in a way that the public can relate to it. And it's really, it's a difficult chore. So I've had to bring in Emil Kalinowski and a few other people behind the scenes to try to do that. And so we've created this regular weekly podcast, Eurodollar University's Making Sense. where we try to look at some of these things like Eurodollar futures, for example. How can we explain them? How can we explain the reflationary sell-off in a Eurodollar framework? And that's really what we've been trying to do. And we're trying to expand it over time so that we can reach some more of the more esoteric and what I think are more of the fun stuff, like Eurodollar futures curves is a perfect example.

Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, we look forward to getting you back in a few months for another update. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back right after this message from our sponsor.

Erik Townsend: Well, finally, after months and months of being sold out of advertising space, we finally have a few open ad slots in Q2.

For anyone interested in advertising on MacroVoices, please contact us by email sponsorship@macrovoices.com. Let's leave it there and get right back to the program.

Postgame: reaction to Snider

Announcer: Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was great to have Jeff back on the show. You know, the one thing that I really took away from the interview was Like he was just reconfirming to me what something I intuitively felt, which was that even though the bond markets really did sell off and yields did go higher, it was mean reverting a very oversold state, or overbought if you want to look at it from a bonds perspective. And really, I don't think the bonds have started to freak out in regards to an inflation scare just yet. I mean, it could certainly get worse, but I have to agree with Jeff on a lot of the points he made.

Erik Townsend: What did you take away from Patrick, for me, the key distinction is what is the government going to do in terms of whether the effect is pump money into the financial system or pump money into the real economy.

It definitely is true that those of us who thought that the first round of quantitative easing was going to pump money into the real economy got that wrong. And when we thought it was going to be inflationary, we got that wrong too, because that's not how it worked. So I'm certainly ready to acknowledge my own mistake on that back in 2009. But even as I hear Jeff's arguments, I still think that we're in the middle of a societal change where we're going to see the political circumstances demand that there's more accommodation. for providing transfer payments, universal basic income, various other things that are effectively pumping money into the real economy. Maybe that's not happening yet, but I think it's coming. I'm convinced it's coming. I think we're in the middle of a major period of social change and political change where that is going to occur. And I predict still that that will be inflationary.

The way I interpret Jeff's comments is he's saying, well, The things that they're doing right now, this instant, are really not inflationary yet. Okay, fair enough. Jeff knows more about this than I do. But in the grand scheme of things, I still predict an inflationary outcome, and it's because of a major societal mood change and policy expectation difference, which I perceive has occurred and I think is gaining strength.

S&P 500 and the 50-day moving average

Erik Townsend: In any event, Patrick, let's move on to the postgame chart day. deck, we're back to the 50-day moving average, but unlike a couple weeks ago when we were flirting with it, the question this week seems to be how far away from the 50-day moving average can we get?

Patrick Ceresna: Exactly. So on page 2 of the chart deck, we just have that S&P futures chart, and throughout the entire month of March, we were either testing it or retesting that 50-day moving average, and we were just using it as a point of reference because if the average price of 50 days is a pretty good kind of level to always be eyeing in terms of where markets are normalizing or backfilling or retracing to for support. And certainly when we highlighted in late March, that ended up being a very compelling short-term buying opportunity and a core bottom in the S&P. But now we've broken out, and, uh, in the same manner of what we used it for support, when a market rallies away from the 50-day moving average. It is also a measure of the velocity of the rally in terms of the magnitude of the rise.

And, uh, what's interesting is, is that back in May through June, as well as in August of 2020 last year when we were coming off those COVID lows, because we were in such a heavy bear market prior to it, the velocity of the snapback rallies tends to be very strong.

In each of those cases The S&P 500 managed to get close to 300 points above its 50-day moving average before the mean reversion or correction had it go back and retest that moving average. And that's just a natural ebb and flow of the markets.

They advance and then they correct, and they advance and they correct. And so here we find ourselves in a situation where we're about 217 points above that 50-day moving average. And so we We've had this extraordinary move, and certainly if we have a move of the equal magnitude like we had in 2020, maybe there's another, you know, 100 points left in the S&P to the upside.

But really the big question now is, is this an asymmetric moment to chase the market? Because in the end, at some point, if we know that there's going to be some form of a mean reversion or correction, then trying to scalp 50 or 100 points to the upside—

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Patrick Ceresna: at the risk of getting caught in a couple hundred S&P point correction, it has a bad payoff profile. And so right now I'm sort of in the camp where the S&P is getting very extended to the upside. And certainly it doesn't mean that it all has to end today, but at this moment, I think waiting for corrections is tactically a good thing for putting on new positions in the S&P.

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I hereby give you my personal word. I will not be putting any new long positions on the S&P. S&P this week. Moving right along, let's take a look at the dollar index.

US Dollar Index around 92

Erik Townsend: Boy, we're back below 92. But, you know, I'm really looking at the blowout above 92 as probably the results of a short squeeze. What do you think?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know what, I think short squeezes are more violent than that. I mean, that was definitely just a— I mean, the US dollar has been in a very distinct downtrend for an entire year. And so for us to have some sort of a snapback, a bounce, was a given. The big question really now is that, is this the resumption of a new round of selling in the US dollar, or is this a buy on dip? And often with the first go-around on a test of this, you give the bulls the benefit of the doubt that they'll be able to give this another push. So it'll be really interesting to see whether this 91 to 92 zone acts as a short-term, uh, turn point for a retest of 93, or maybe even a test of the September-October highs of 94, 95. That would be really interesting to see if it's a turn. But if the bulls can't even muster up a bounce off this level, that may actually be a very clear testament that, uh, that the dollar bear market is quite intact.

And so I, I don't— I'm going to leave the jury out on this one still. I think I think that next week's price action on the dollar is going to be really critical, and we're right at a key pivot where we're going to get the tell as to what's next for the dollar.

Bitcoin at 52-week highs

Erik Townsend: What's next for Bitcoin? Are we going to see $100,000 next week?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know what, with it breaking to a higher high, I mean, there is always room for this to have another punch. Even there's a number of measured moves that go all the way up to about $70,000. But in a similar manner to what we were talking about the S&P, you can identify periods where the— you can measure just how far Bitcoin exceeds that average price before it mean reverts. It'll be interesting to see whether or not the break to 52-week highs can be held by the Bitcoin bulls and whether or not that leads to that follow-through on the upside. But the one thing that is for sure is that this uptrend above the 50-day moving average has been intact throughout the entire last 2 And I think it's gonna be critical, that one point when the bulls can't hold it anymore. But so far, the bulls have got this under control, and we don't— I don't think you wanna fight this yet until we see some more significant technical damage anyway.

Crude oil breakout and price targets

Erik Townsend: Patrick, let's move on to my favorite chart on page 5 and look at crude oil. Here's the thing that's bugging me. Frankly, this wasn't painful enough. You know, you and I both know how markets work. You have to shake out the weak hands. And in order for a healthy bull market to continue, you gotta have corrections. That didn't feel to me like— I mean, assuming that it's over, which is what the chart is appearing to tell us, that didn't— it wasn't painful enough as far as I'm concerned. I mean, I'm long. I was down as a result of this price action. I wasn't down hard enough to feel enough pain to really make me feel like the market's done its thing yet. But boy, this sure looks like it's reversing to the upside. What do you think? Is there room for this still to turn to the downside?

Patrick Ceresna: In the back of my mind, I'm looking at the bigger intermarket relationships and particularly even that breakdown in the dollar. Is there another reflation trade impulse coming in? I mean, this is something that Jeffrey was trying to touch on through his slide deck, A, what the market is pricing in, but really the question is, is that are Are we still in the midst of one, or has that already played out? And that's a, a really important question to ask. And at this stage, uh, if we see a situation where dollar weakness comes in and, and we have another breakout in the entire commodity complex, maybe this is only the midpoint small correction in oil.

But I think one day is, is insufficient of a breakout. You were suggesting that at the start of the show when you were talking about, you know, you need more than 24 hours to really confirm something like this. And I think this is a critical moment. Like, if we come back on the show next week and crude oil gave back this entire breakout and we're trading back at $60 on next week's show, then I would be in that camp that there's still room for one more correction.

Really, whenever you have a breakout like this, it's really up for the bulls to prove that they want to make it stick and follow through on it. And it'll be really important for us to see the bulls kind of progress this higher here and really turn the sentiment back bullish where people are chasing this on the upside. The support did come in pretty strong there. Every time they tried to break it down throughout, uh, late March and early April, the line was held very well. So, uh, let's, uh, let's see what happens.

Erik Townsend: But I mean, these breakouts usually start something, and, uh, it'll be interesting to see whether this makes that punch to 70-plus Patrick, do you think it makes sense to use a measured move using the November to late February vertical extent to project what's going to happen next, or how would you draw the next price target for this to play out long-term?

Patrick Ceresna: Obviously, that projects an incredibly bullish price to the upside. Even if you did do that measurement, I would be looking for shorter targets. The one thing that when you look at the average length length of a cycle. Sometimes oil cycles can be, you know, 8 to 10 months in duration, and that November to March push was only about 4 months. So if this correction was the midpoint of a bigger, you know, almost year-long cycle, then maybe it is the right measured move to go from November through March. You know what, I, I think that I'm not sure I want to stand too strong behind that, but if we really see that If bulls are busting this to fresh new highs in a couple weeks, maybe that is the realistic upside target, looking for something $80 to $90.

Erik Townsend: Well, the measured move targets $91 by my calculations. And although I'm not gonna make that prediction and say, oh, that's gonna happen this year, I think it's entirely plausible. I won't be at all surprised if we actually hit $90 crude oil before the year is out. But let's move to copper. You know, weren't we just saying We were saying a week ago, hey, it's looking like maybe this is that buy the

Copper breakout and the commodity theme

Erik Townsend: dip moment in copper. And look at it, look at it go.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah. And, and you know what, this comes back to that bigger intermarket theme, right? This isn't just about oil and this isn't just about the dollar. It's like, it seems like these are all making their move at the same time. And this is why watching how all of them follow through, I mean, there's a number of grains breaking out. There's a number of different commodities that are also starting to break out. It seems like if the dollar commits to the downside and all these commodities go, uh, maybe there's another full cycle in these cyclicals coming. And, uh, that's why, just, you know, again, one day doesn't make a new trend. I don't want to get overexcited about it, but this is how often how they begin. And therefore, you don't want to take your eyes off of this, this breakout to a 1-month high here on copper as it's approaching those, uh, late February highs.

It's going to be a real tell because, I mean, if, if If this commits, I mean, that could be a $4.75, $5 copper price that might be there by the summer if that follows through. And so, and, you know, after a 1, 2-month correction like this, that has unwound all of the overbought state. It'll be really interesting to see whether copper bulls are ready to go to take this to the next level.

Gold and $1,800 resistance

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to gold on page 7. Tell me if you feel differently, but as I see it, gold's done. Gold has done everything it needs to do except the one last thing, which is stay above that line. If it can do that, I just think we've got a bull market trend ahead of us.

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, gold is attempting to do its first close above the 50-day moving average basically since the Christmas holidays. But really, it's been a downtrend for 8-plus months on the downside of gold. Even though the 50-day moving average is something that a lot of traders watch, The real overhead resistance in my mind, using the techniques that I use, lies a little bit higher around $1,800. And then there's a 200-day moving average also that lies around that $1,800 price. So, you know, it is very constructive and positive the way over the last week gold held the line and turning up. So it is showing some accumulative price action, but I think there's some pretty big hurdles still ahead before we can start calling this a new bull leg in But it's certainly starting to do the right things.

Lumber and the Bloomberg Commodity Index

Erik Townsend: Let's take a look at lumber futures on page 8. Boy, you thought the S&P was showing you a parabolic rise chart. Look at this one.

Patrick Ceresna: That's right. Like, if everyone's thinking it's the cryptos that are going parabolic, they forgot to look at the lumber chart, right? Lumber has been so bullish in the last year and a half, 2 years. If you recall back that huge run we had back in the summer of 2020, 2020, where lumber went from like $250 up towards $900 on the upside. And here we are again making this huge push on the upside of lumber prices. And obviously home builders and even like the stocks like Home Depot and Lowe's, everything's just so hot in this environment. And really the question now is, is how far can this go?

I mean, with this type of an extension, we are in some pretty overbought conditions in this parabolic rise. This is typically an area where you would think that it would run out of momentum, but boy, is this just not quitting right now.

I think this is going to be really important because a lot of traders out there really use lumber as kind of a gauge as to how the economy is functioning, and right now things look pretty hot. So it'll be interesting to see whether lumber can keep plugging along here or whether we're going to put in some sort of a top here in the, in the coming weeks.

Erik Townsend: Patrick, I remember when we looked at the Bloomberg Commodity Index futures chart, oh boy, a few weeks ago, and, you know, it wasn't really telling us a clear message as to whether it was going to turn up. Well, okay, what a difference a couple weeks can make, huh?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, that's exactly it. And that's just a gauge as to what's really happening right across the board with all these commodities. I mean, we saw the grains breaking out, particularly corn And obviously we just talked lumber, but, but obviously it's the energies that are the largest component in this index. And so with oil having that big up day, it certainly was the catalyst that is driving this broader index higher. Whether this breaks to a higher high is something that I'm watching very closely.

10-year Treasury yield and the 1.75% level

Erik Townsend: That's going to be on the agenda for sure going into next week as to whether or not this commodity index starts pushing 52-week Now, as we move on to page 10 and the 10-year US government bond yield, is that the 50-day moving average of yields that we see below it? And if it hits that line, what do you expect to happen next?

Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, well, I don't think I would want to overread the 50-day moving average as somehow being overly important. It's more of a way of kind of gauging the overbought and oversold state of these impulses in Treasury yields. Bottom line is, is we have had a pretty solid push. And, you know, Jeffrey was putting a whole bunch of Eurodollar charts on, just kind of showing interest rate trends. But overall, this has been a pretty solid push in yields. But we did only make it to, you know, the 1.75 level on yields. I mean, prior to the whole COVID situation and going back a year or two, I mean, we were talking yields at 2.25% and 3%. I mean, this is a far cry from, from crazy interest rate levels yet. And it'll be really interesting because this is reversing at a time when naturally you would think that it would start pricing in some further inflation risks, especially with commodities on the short term rising.

And yet it doesn't seem like the bond market— at least it looks like the bond market has its own idea of what to do here with this pullback. Is that— was that the short-term high in yields? It's going to be a really interesting puzzle piece to solve here in the coming weeks.

Sign-off and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: Listeners, you can get Patrick's chart decks every day of the week if you sign up for a free trial at Big Picture Trading. The information is on page 11. Patrick, I know you've got a webinar coming up this weekend. If people miss that, will they be able to catch it after the fact?

Patrick Ceresna: Absolutely. So it is, uh, Friday morning that I'm doing that on April 16th, but anyone that misses the live webinar, the recording is going to be posted in the members section and the It's accessible by anyone that accesses the membership. So anyone's welcome to catch up on it if you missed it.

Erik Townsend: And information about the free 2-week membership trial is on page 11 of the chart deck, or you can just go to bigpicturetrading.com. We're going to leave it there for this week's episode. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better meet the needs of both market participants and society as a whole. Patrick, what can they expect to find in this week's Research Roundup?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to Jeff's slide deck, as well as the chart book we just discussed in this postgame. There's also a link to an oilprice.com article on lithium prices may double over the next 4 years, and a link to a Harley Bassman article, The Marshmallow Test. And so you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners. Listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we will consider it for our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. That's Erik spelled with a K, as well as myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

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