Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Episode preview: Steve Keen and the bond postgame

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 275 was recorded on June 10th, 2021. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better meet the needs of both market participants and society as a whole, and by FarmTogether.com, bringing farmland, a new trillion-dollar investment opportunity, within reach of all accredited investors.

Professor Steve Keen returns as this week's feature interview guest. We'll discuss why Steve says inflation is definitely coming, but it won't be the runaway inflation feared by many people, myself included, nor will it be the hyperinflation that some folks fear, myself not included. Steve says the inflation is inevitable, but it doesn't pose a great threat, and he rejects my own suggestion that an Austrian crack-up boom has already begun. Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview, Patrick and I will take a quick look at yields in the bond market.

Market wrap: S&P 500, dollar, crude, gold, 10-year

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's talk S&P 500. I mean, just keeps crawling higher, but it's been so trade range-bound. I mean, we had almost 3 or 4 closes in a row that were within a point of each other. It doesn't seem like the market has any momentum to wanna go anywhere. What's your take on all of this?

Erik Townsend: Well, honestly, Patrick, the notion that the market has no momentum to go anywhere because we haven't had a new all-time high in like almost 3 weeks now, I think means that we've gotten to the point where this market I think the market is pretty darn complacent. I think the arguments that this market is just so overvalued and this has to end badly are very well placed. But, you know, I figured out that end badly doesn't have to mean down. It can mean an Austrian crack-up boom. And that's exactly what I think is happening.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's move on to the US Dollar Index, which again has been pinned along that 5-year low, trading in that 89 to 90 range on the dollar index. What's your view on the dollar? Has it changed much from last week?

Erik Townsend: Patrick, no real change. We're in a situation where until we get a close below 89, there's really no bearish indication. And frankly, it would take a lot to get a solid bullish indication here. No, no real change. And frankly, no conviction as to where it's headed next.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, let's talk crude oil, because obviously over the last couple of weeks, crude oil has been incredibly strong. Then we saw a quick nosedive this morning on the downside of oil. And just as quickly, it reversed and is back up toward the 52-week high.

Erik Townsend: What the heck Well, this was another case of Twitter having more influence on the price of financial assets than actual reality. What really happened is the United States relaxed sanctions on one individual in Iran, an oil-related official. It had nothing to do with the negotiations or any of that stuff. It was just a kind of a matter of fact that, you know, the The thing had expired or something. It was time to take the sanctions off of one person whose sanctions were expiring. And that tweet got misinterpreted because of the way somebody worded it as the United States has lifted all sanctions on Iranian oil, which is not what happened. So the market started to crash and then it retraced very quickly. I think today was a gift to oil traders, Patrick, because frankly, in reality, the fact that the Iranian sanctions are Going to be lifted is already priced into the long-term futures.

It's already there. Everybody knows it's coming. What the market taught us today though is that when that real announcement happens, and it really is the sanctions have been lifted because the Biden administration is going to undo everything it possibly can that the Trump administration did, well, what's the result going to be?

We saw it today. The market's going to crash and that's gonna be an incredible buyable dip opportunity. So I am waiting for that one with Bated breath, Patrick. When Iran sanctions are lifted, which I do think is coming, it's gonna be a huge panic and it's gonna be over nothing. It doesn't mean anything as far as I'm concerned in the overall course of this bull market, but it will be a buying opportunity.

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, how did the inventory numbers come in this week?

Erik Townsend: Crude oil drew down 5.2 million barrels or 6.6 million if you include the SPR. Now, that would normally be a pretty significant drawdown for crude oil. The thing is, there were much larger builds in finished products, gasoline building 7 million Distillates building 4.4 million barrels. So you got, you know, almost a 5 million barrel net build on petroleum products, both crude oil and finished products. Cushing, Oklahoma building 165,000 barrels. US production 11,000 even. That's back up 200,000 barrels from last week.

Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold because gold has over the last 2 weeks had 2 quick little dips, each time reversing pretty quickly right back toward the highs. We're trading right near $1,900 at the time of recording. What's your take on gold here?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, we got the test of the 200-day moving average that we predicted last week. Happened, I think, in the overnight right after our show went live last week. And it's recovered back up above the short-term moving averages. So we've got the completion almost of this technical pattern. We got a nice breakout above the 200-day. We got up to, what was it, $1,918, just almost $1,920. And then we went back down and tested that 200-day as support. Check. That's the next thing. Now there's only one more hurdle to clear, and that's a daily close above the previous high at $1,920, and we're only about $20 away from it. I definitely think there's lots more upside to come in this gold market, and we've just seen, so far at least, what I think is kind of a perfect completion of that technical pattern. You know, breakout, drift down perfectly, almost to the tick, testing that 200-day simple moving average, and then rallying off of it.

You're the technician in the house, Patrick. How do you see this market?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, I mean, gold has continued to be well accumulated. All dips are being bought very quickly. The price action remains structurally bullish, and and we're seeing both real and and nominal yields backing off, which is acting a bit as a tailwind. So right now, gold continues to behave very well. Now, but let's move to that ten-year Treasury yield because just like I was saying there, we have quite the break on the downside of rates as we're now trading around the one spot four six five level on the ten. 10-year Treasury yield. I have some charts I want to talk about this in the postgame, but what's your take on this?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I think it is significant that we're back below 1.5% on the 10-year. Let's wait for the postgame chart deck where we can take a look and discuss this in more detail.

Why Steve Keen: Erik on the secular inflation question

Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week's feature interview guest is Professor Steve Keen. Erik, it's been a while. Why did we get Steve back on the show?

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as you know, the big question that's really on my mind is, are we on the cusp or perhaps already beyond the beginning Of a shift to a new secular inflation, like in 1960, late '60s, 1970s kind of inflation, really big one? I think we are. And the thing is, I've heard people who agree with me. I've heard people who disagree with me, who kind of hold my same mindset that that inflation would be a horrible thing. So I wanted to talk to someone on the opposite side of this ideological divide in terms of what the role of central banks should be and what monetary policy should be and so forth. I think we're headed toward a political regime where people like Steve Keen and people who have Steve's political ideology are going to be in charge of making the decisions for the major institutions. So even though I don't happen to personally agree, I don't wanna know what people like I think.

I wanna know what the people who are gonna be in charge of pulling the levers think. And I think it's guys that think more like Steve than think like me who are coming into power. So I wanted to get Steve's perspective just for that reason. Yeah.

Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Professor Steve Keen is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right after this message from our sponsor.

Erik Townsend: This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by Abaxx Technologies. In addition to sponsoring MacroVoices, Abaxx also produces Smarter Markets, a weekly podcast that airs every Saturday morning on all the major podcast platforms. Smarter Markets brings together the leading minds in macroeconomics, technology, and commodities to explore how capital markets can be redesigned to better serve market participants and society as a whole.

Michelle Dennedy's 5-part series about the role of digital innovation in advancing the ESG economy is live now at smartermarketspod.com, and you can look for another terrific interview every Saturday morning. But you won't get Smarter Markets on your MacroVoices feed. You have to subscribe separately to Smarter Markets in your podcast app in order to listen to this free podcast.

Keen: supply shock, but not 1970s inflation

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Professor Steve Keen, formerly a professor from a university in London, now professor at large teaching economics on the internet via Patreon. Steve, it's been way too long. It's great to have you back on the show. But, you know, you have been one of the most outspoken guys talking about why too much debt really leads to a macroeconomic prognostication or diagnosis or forecast, whatever you want to call it, of ongoing deflation. My big question to you is, boy, it seems to me like the politics have changed and we maybe are back to the late 1960s and facing an incipient, not just a little whiff of inflation, But I think secular shift to a really big inflation, that's going to be a big deal.

Am I crazy? What do you think?

Steve Keen: Well, we've certainly got a shock coming through from the supply side of things. I mean, COVID's obviously disturbed global production chains around the planet. We're seeing signs of that as well with climate change, with Taiwan running out of water and therefore not being able to supply the chips to the world. So you've got an increase in essential goods. Highly transformed manufacturing input. And you have a range of other commodities. I believe copper and nickel are 2 that are showing signs of supply disruptions. So all this stuff is meaning you're going to get a supply kick, a cost of production kick coming through, which you could actually liken to what happened back in 1973, '74 with the Yom Kippur War, the OPEC blockade, and the increase in oil prices from $2.50 a barrel to $10. And then the same in 1979, '80 when they went from $10 to $40. So that's the— Definitely, there's a price hit coming through from the supply side of the economy.

But what is different this time around is that when that happened in the '70s, you had an absolute mother of all booms on, which was credit financed. And you also had unemployment so low. I mean, it was, in terms of recorded level in America, it was running at about of the order of 4%, 3% to 4%, which is comparable to what they're calling the unemployment levels these days. But frankly, The numbers were more honest back then. There's been so much hiding of unemployment in the not looking for work section of the statistics that I don't try— I think you've pretty much got to double the unemployment rate there to make it comparable to what was actually being properly recorded back in the '70s.

But with the very tight labor market and the booming credit conditions in the '70s, that meant that that supply shock was passed on to prices. So you had— and this is where endogenous money thinking comes in— you had a huge increase in the price of particularly, obviously, oil. That was then covered by firms accessing their lines of credit to pay for it, which gave a stimulus courtesy of the cost boost into the economy as well. Workers, particularly when you had trade unions, which had been decimated in the last 40 years, 40 to 50 years, they could bargain for higher wages as well. So you got a flow-on from the supply shock of the increase in the oil prices to an increase in wages. And you then had this income distributional battle, the wage-price supply spiral, which went on for a while until it was crushed by the massive increase in interest rates under Volcker. Now, you don't have anything like the credit demand anymore, nor do you have the bargaining power of the working class.

They've been destroyed. They were bad enough in the '70s in terms of political power in America. They've been crushed in the last 40 years. So I don't think you're going to see the aggregate demand follow through to that supply shock. So I expect an increase in prices, quite a sharp one, particularly in raw material prices and also CPUs.

But then that will peter out because the demand won't be there. So I see the price hit leading to a decline in the numbers being sold rather than an increase in the money being borrowed to purchase those and keeping the price momentum going. So if you look back at the 19— '70s and take a look at what the unemployment rate was before the crunch began in the oil price rise. In 1972, you had an unemployment rate of 6%, which fell to 4.6%. And that's a genuine recording of the unemployment rate. And at the same time, credit was running at about 11.5%, 12% of GDP.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Steve Keen: Which is quite high. It's only been higher 3 times, 4 times, pardon me. The 4th time being the beginning of the 2007 crash. Now, when you think of it from the point of view of capitalists and investors, when you have a huge increase in wage costs and raw materials, you have a drop in your profit margin.

So the credit demand plunged from that point. It went from 12% of GDP down to 5.5%. And that's when you had the huge rise in unemployment. At that stage, and you had inflation and unemployment. I think you're going to have not a large downturn, but I just don't think the kick to inflation is going to be there.

Inflation, bond yields and the central bank's short rate

Erik Townsend: Steve, talk to me about the relationship between inflation and bond rates, because I'm noticing a lot of investors acting as if inflation caused bond rates to increase. And I would argue it doesn't work that way. Inflation sometimes inspires central bankers to take actions, which Which cause bond yields to increase. But I don't think the inflation is causing it. I think it's the inflation is inspiring the central bankers to make policy actions that do it. How is this relationship? How does it really work between inflation and bond yields?

Steve Keen: Well, the point which endogenous money theory and modern monetary theory as well, and this is stuff which you find central banks confirming these days rather than denying, points out is that the central bank can set any rate of interest it likes fundamentally. It's the controller of the base rate of interest. It can't control the far end. It can't control long rates, but at the short rate end, it basically sets the price. And therefore, it's determining— it's not a market-driven system. It's the decisions of the central bank as to what that short-term rate could be. And we saw Volcker putting it up from what, 8% to 17% as a policy move to try to suppress the inflation back in the late '70s, early '80s. So it's a policy instrument at the short end. It's more market-driven at the long end. But overall, in terms of certainly short-term bond yields, if the central bank doesn't think the inflation that they're seeing is sustained, then they won't be putting up their short-term rates, and you won't see a follow-through from inflation to interest rates.

Erik Townsend: How would you interpret what's happened so far to the US 10-year Treasury yield? Because it seemed at first like people were really freaking out and afraid that it was running away. And somehow we hit about 1.75%, and all of a sudden, it seems to have just settled down. Are we done, or are we just pausing before moving higher?

Steve Keen: I just can't see it moving higher because, I mean, the bond rates, if you're talking government bonds, then government can pay effectively any rate it wants to pay on the bonds. If it issues its own currency, it's, you know, in effect, the Treasury can borrow from the central bank and pay zero interest on that borrowing to pay the interest they then pass on to bondholders. So there's no mechanism to force the government's hand in that sense. And when you look at the level of ...of debt that the private sector is carrying, there's no way I think the private sector can handle an interest rate even 1% higher than things are right now. Because the corporate sector in America right now is carrying the highest level of private debt compared to GDP in its history.

That's been driven by COVID, of course, a giant spike in the level of private debt for corporations, which I think I would expect it was being caused by having to Access lines of credit and overdrafts to cope with the cut of cash flow from COVID So just to give you those numbers, the corporate sector's private debt to GDP ratio when 2020 began was 75% of GDP. By September, it was 84% of GDP. That's almost a 10% jump in 9 months. So that is not a corporate sector that can handle a large cost increase in its interest rate costs. So I just don't think we've got momentum for interest rates to go much higher.

MMT accounting: how deficits create money

Erik Townsend: Steve, let's come to the subject of modern monetary theory. You have expressed what I would describe as a proponent position. You like this idea of MMT. I personally have concerns with it, but I'll tell you, I'm convinced of one thing, which is whether I like it or not, it's happening. You've been following this for quite a while. How do you see what I think is really a political power change? All of a sudden, the people who are in power are very friendly to what I would describe as maybe your monetary politics as opposed to my monetary politics. Now that your team's kind of got the power, how do you see this going down? What happens in terms of how these MMT concepts are adopted now that the people who have been supporting them seem to be in power?

Steve Keen: Well, it's not so much people who support a policy as saying that what MMT shows is simply using accounting to say, what are the consequences of government debt? What are the consequences of government spending and borrowing and so on? And it's realism about that versus, you know, we're all going to be ruined stuff. If you read the macro textbooks of the mainstream, people like Gregory Mankiw will argue that government First of all, if the government borrows money, if the government increases its issues of bonds, which is what it actually does, then that is going to take money out of the private sector. So more government borrowing reduces the amount of money for private investment. That's literally out of Mankiw's textbook. And I think most a lot of people listening to what we're talking about now would say, "Yeah, that's what I learned. That's that's true." And then also saying that it's this this spending, a large amount of spending and a high level of government debt puts an unconscionable burden on future generations, which you'll also find in. Mankiw and all the usual neoclassical textbooks.

Now, from an accounting point of view, that is just wrong. Okay? I've forgotten Paul Krugman's usual favorite way of putting it, but it is just simply a fallacy when you look at the accounting. And that's what MMT is based upon. It's saying, let's look at the actual cash flows that are involved. Where does the money come from and where does the money go to when the government borrows? And what actually happens when a deficit is run? Now, you read the economic textbooks, the deficit takes loanable funds away from the private sector and therefore reduces the rate of investment of the private sector and causes the economy to slow down, while government spending boosts other parts of the economy. That's the way that the textbooks talk about it. But if you look at what actually is involved in banking, and of course, the last people you should ask about what banks do are conventional economists, because they haven't got a bloody clue.

They've lived with a set of models, the money multiplier.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: Fractional reserve banking and loanable funds, all of which are fallacies. And finally, I think I've said this numerous times, the Bank of England and the Bundesbank have both come out and said, these are simply fallacies. That is not how banks operate.

The banking sector, the point of view of what the banks do is rather than banks lending out deposits, bank lending creates deposits. So that's a complete change in how we think about the private credit system.

Now, what MMT is doing, and it's complementary to what I do in terms of analyzing credit, is saying, well, let's do the same thing with looking at what the government does. So what happens when the government runs a deficit? Is it borrowing money from the private sector that the private sector would otherwise spend, which is what neoclassical economics teaches you? No, it's not. When the government spends more than it taxes, it increases the amount of money in private bank accounts. To do that, it also has to increase the amount of money in bank accounts, private bank accounts at the central bank. So the act of putting money in your deposit account, if you got a COVID check from the Biden Administration or even the Trump Administration, When it existed, that, you know, say $600 check to you would be matched by a $600 increase in the reserves of the private banks that you bank with. Otherwise, their assets and liabilities would be unbalanced.

So that's simply accounting. Now, when you look at that, you see, okay, the deficit has created money. So you, as a private banking account holder and the private banking system in general, you have more money in your bank account when the government runs a deficit.

Now, how are the bonds bought? What happens with the bond buying? Well, just because the increase in deposits of the banks caused by deficit spending is matched by an increase in the reserves of the banks, the private banks at the central bank by the same act, those private central private banks now have excess reserves, which normally earn them no interest. So when the government, the Treasury then says, we're going to issue bonds or sell bonds to the private banking sector to cover the size of the deficit. Those bonds are purchased using the excess reserves created by the deficit. Now, there's all sorts of timing issues involved, and the government can be estimating ahead of schedule what it expects to do and sell the bonds before it does the spending and so on. Yada, yada, yada. But fundamentally, the deficit creates the money in the private bank accounts, and it creates the excess reserves that are used to purchase those bonds by the banking sector.

Erik Townsend: So...

Steve Keen: So there is no problem. First of all, there's no problem about burdening future generations. In fact, you're enriching current ones, at least monetarily, because they're going to have more money in their bank accounts. And the debt that is created, which is bonds, is simply changing non-income-earning reserves for the banking sector to income-earning bonds for the banking sector. So all the scare stories that are a common part of saying we've got to control the deficit, et cetera, et cetera, are simply scare stories. They're not accurate as an accounting vision of a monetary economy.

MMT and private debt: Wray, Henwood and Kelton

Erik Townsend: Steve, you've emphasized very strongly over the years that the number one biggest problem we face is too much private debt. I wonder, obviously, MMT by its definition involves more public debt, because that's kind of what it is, is a prescription of using public debt in order to accomplish public spending more effectively. It seems to me that there is an extension of that that MMT policies really tend to also encourage more private borrowing and more private debt accumulation, which seems to me adds to the problems you're talking about. Would you disagree with that, or is it just a question of needing to separate those? That yeah, we do need MMT, we just need to be careful.

Steve Keen: Yeah, I think we need to separate them because— and this is like MMT is a— as I said, they call it Modern Monetary Theory because it's a modern development. You can trace it back to the 1990s. Initially with Warren Mosler, talking about how governments don't tax to spend, they spend to tax. And equally, my work on credit is a modern innovation. I began doing that in the '90s with my models of Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. And I've only recently built a sort of general theoretical explanation for how credit adds to aggregate demand. So they are 2 new elements. Now, MMT, from what I can see of what most of the authors have written on MMT, haven't yet got their heads around the role of credit properly.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Steve Keen: That doesn't apply to, say, Stephanie Kelton, for example. Stephanie's— I mean, if you read between the lines in her book, The Deficit Myth, you can see awareness of the role of credit there, but the focus is still on government spending. But there was a debate, not a debate, a slanging match really, between Randy Wray and Doug— I think it's Doug Henwood. Doug Henwood put out an attack on elements of MMT.

And as part of that, he said that the strange thing to him was that there's no role for credit in what he sees in MMT. Right. And Randy Wray's reply said that, well, overall, he regarded the endogenous money revolution, where people like myself developed an analysis of the role of credit, how banks create money by lending rather than banks lending out deposits. He said the impact of that was trivial, because all it did was say that rather than the government controlling the quantity of money, it controls the price of money, and the market sets the quantity. That is incomplete.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Steve Keen: When you have a new set of ideas like MMT on one hand and my analysis of credit on the other, it takes time for people to put them together. So I believe that they are compatible. And then when they are compatible, it means you have to worry about there being too much private debt. If MMT, you should be focusing on reducing the level of private debt, as well as saying there should be more fiat money creation and less credit money creation. So it's possible to combine the two together, but that hasn't actually intellectually happened yet. I hope it'll happen in the next couple of years. So they're not incompatible per se. They're not like Austrian versus post-Keynesian economics or anything like that, or Austrian versus Marxian, heaven forbid.

They're compatible, but they haven't yet been combined.

Private debt, point of no return and debt jubilee

Erik Townsend: Steve, when we've spoken in the past, at least in my perception, I would summarize what you've said as, look, we've got such a problem with private debt that if this goes too much farther, we're eventually going to get to the point where it's not just that maybe we might have to go to a debt jubilee someday, but eventually you get to the point where there's kind of a point of no return where there's no other option. Are we there yet? Or is this a zombie economy that is facing a debt jubilee someday that's unavoidable? Or is there still a way to avoid that?

Steve Keen: The way to avoid it is by continuing being stupid. And Einstein used to say that the 2 things that are limitless, the universe and human stupidity. He wasn't sure about the universe, but he was sure about human stupidity. I've got to agree with him, I'm afraid, on that front.

Yes, I do think that we've reached a point of no return because again, if I look at this just in terms of the history of America and say, what's the level of private debt now versus its previous peaks? The current level of private debt, again courtesy of COVID is about 160% of GDP. It peaked at 170% back in the financial crisis in 2009. The highest before that was 130% during the Great Depression. And then you go back to 70% in the 1910s.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Steve Keen: America is at its absolute ceiling in terms of its capacity to carry private debt, given the other dynamics of the economy. Other countries have had higher levels, but they're all carrying peak debt, certainly in comparison to any time since the end of the Second World War.

So what that means is with so much private debt accumulated, the potential for any credit-driven demand is minor. But a healthy capitalist economy does function better if you have credit demand, particularly if it goes to entrepreneurs to enable innovation to take place. So you have something which is cutting off the potential for innovation, which is the thing which gives capitalism a reason to crow about itself as a social system versus any other. So we have so much private debt accumulated, so much inability of both banks to extend further credit and borrowers and individuals to take on that credit. credit, that you have credit stagnation. And also, it means people spend the money they have in their pockets more slowly. You have a lower velocity of money because you want to hang onto the money you've got to pay the debt you've got. But by hanging onto the money, you don't spend it, and therefore the turnover is lower, and you get very low bang for your buck out of the greenback in your pocket.

So there's all sorts of reasons why we face permanent stagnation unless we reduce the level of private debt. And COVID has come through on top of that. And I think climate change will come on later and just mean that unless you reduce the level of private debt, you're going to have mass bankruptcies.

Next crisis: runaway inflation or stock-market crash?

Erik Townsend: Steve, a few years ago, you wrote a book called Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? And when we talked about that at the time, I was thinking financial crisis, that means stock market crash. I'm starting to think the next financial crisis that the economy faces is more likely to be an inflation, a runaway inflation, where if anything, what you're worried about is upside risk to the stock market as opposed to a downside risk. And the risks that you get concerned with are not stock market crash. They're completely different.

That probably is very much at odds with the deflationary conclusion that you, at least in the past, have drawn from this excessive overhang of debt. So how does this work? Do we need to be worried about a financial crisis that's more of like a crack Or runaway inflation? Or is that not really in the cards?

Steve Keen: I can't see runaway inflation just because I can't see runaway aggregate demand. And that's what you need to have a supply shock like we've got coming through because of the COVID supply chain disruptions and mineral shortages as well coming out. And I like even hardwood in America, apparently there's a shortage there at the moment. But to have that turn into sustained inflation, you've got to have it being Something that then leads to wage rises, which then lead back to more price increases and more wage rises and so on. And you simply don't have the bargaining capacity in the working class in America anymore to enable that to happen. Nor do you have the credit-based demand that used to exist, which could mean that companies would absorb a price rise by borrowing, extending their lines of credit and their overdrafts, and therefore keep the momentum going of the price. Cost increase through the price system. So I can't see that happening.

What I can see are massively overvalued stock markets courtesy of Federal Reserve intervention. And to me, that's given you a fragility in the financial sector, which just basically requires good news to happen all the time to avoid a downturn. Now, of course, the Fed can dive back in and rescue those markets anytime it likes, so long as those crises don't look like they're— They're existential. But I overall just can't see stagflation. I can see a stock market crash and the Fed diving back in to rescue the markets again, which is what it's been doing ever since 2010. But it's not something I'd be trying to explain in the 1960s and '70s inflationary surge ways.

ESG as greenwashing

Erik Townsend: Steve, I've been particularly looking forward to talking to you about ESG, environmental, societal, and And corporate governance, cognizant investing is the theme. Frankly, I don't think on one hand that I've ever heard a more valiant, more legitimate, more honorable concept than for owners of capital to exercise their social responsibility to be responsible with it. So in principle, I love the idea. And I know as kind of a left-leaning political guy, I've gotta believe you I do like it too. But you know what? I think ESG is a scam. I think that most of what's going on is a bunch of Wall Street guys ripping off people who wanna be responsible by selling them greenwashed nonsense that has nothing to do with solving climate change and everything to do with separating rich people from their money. That's pretty cynical. You are a guy who follows this climate change stuff pretty darn carefully.

Am I right to be that cynical about the way the investment industry has addressed this problem of climate change?

Steve Keen: Yeah. Yeah, absolutely. I mean, I'm involved with a group called the Biophysical Economics Institute that's trying to bring a bit of realism to ESG and to tie it into as well into energy return on energy invested and point out the importance of that. And we want to have some validity coming out of the ESG. But fundamentally, anything like this is another reason for the wolves of Wall Street to start prowling Main Street. And that's how it's being bundled and packaged, just like carbon offsets have, as if we can fix up climate change by paying an extra $20 on our airfare from New York to London? No, we can't. But it works out nicely for the companies marketing those offsets.

Erik Townsend: It certainly does. And it's on a much bigger scale than that. I've been reading these stories about people who were buying carbon offsets from people who didn't do anything. And the people that didn't do anything are polluting in a way that just doesn't happen to be being counted within that particular jurisdiction against them, even though it should be. And, you know, this, this ESG thing, it, as far as I can tell, it is really mostly about Wall Street scamming investors into thinking that they're being responsible. The good news is investors want to go to sleep at night feeling like they've been responsible and not just greedy with their money. That's got to be an advance for society. Unfortunately, Wall Street is in between those well-meaning investors and actual do-gooding. And unfortunately, I don't think that is going to change. How do we eventually get past this, Steve? Because you and I both, I think, agree that climate is super important. We only got one planet.

We got to take care of it. But frankly, I don't think that the people that are on the crusades on either side are really dealing with the straight facts. I think this is a very politicized thing, and the economics of it, I think, are making a mess. And the investments that supposedly fix it, I don't think fix it. Are there investments that really do help? Are there things, without going through ESG funds, that investors should be thinking about just how to be responsible investors and do good things with their money?

Steve Keen: Even on that front, I mean, most investors are buying shares of other investors. You're driving up the price of the share. You're not giving any money to the company involved in Whatever green technology you are allegedly supporting. So to me, I think we really need a wake-up call about just how serious climate change is, because I don't think it can be done. I don't think it'd be handled by a profit-oriented private sector. I think the scale of this is so great that we're going to be forced into going backwards in size of the economy, and firms are going to need cash support from a government to be able to stay solvent.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: Relevant in the whole process. And one of the major reasons why we haven't taken it seriously is economists like William Nordhaus, who have completely and utterly distorted the dangers we face with climate change by the shoddiest work I have ever seen.

I published a paper on that in a magazine— a journal called Globalizations last year. And the title of it was The Appallingly Bad Neoclassical Economics of Climate Change. Bottom line is anybody who's taking the numbers that economists have pumped out about what climate change means to the economy are deluding themselves by an order of 1 or 2 magnitudes as to how serious climate change is going to be. So all this ESG stuff is just more greenwashing.

Nordhaus and the economics of climate damage

Erik Townsend: Steve, I'm not going to let you pick on Nordhaus without substantiating your argument. What specifically did Nordhaus get wrong that would cause you to make such a scathing statement on a public podcast?

Steve Keen: 2 things in particular, like an overall orientation, which is just believing that climate change can't be bad because capitalism can handle anything. Therefore, climate change can't be too serious. I'm not joking. That seems to be his mental processes.

But in terms of trying to add up what the damages to climate change will be, he assumed that 87% of American economy would be unaffected by climate change because it happens in what he called carefully controlled environments. Now, the industries he said were not going to be affected were all manufacturing, all services, all government activity. He even included overseas GDP as part of the— Trade-exposed sectors of the American economy as unaffected by climate change. And that's become a common assumption for all the economists working in this field. Now, that is basically saying that climate is weather. And so if you're not exposed to the weather, you're not exposed to climate change. That is nonsense. That is garbage. The simple reason being, and we can see this with the example of Taiwan right now, one of the examples he gave of a carefully controlled environment was microprocessor manufacturing. Why are we finding the microprocessors becoming more expensive right now?

It's because there's a climate change-related drought in Taiwan that means these enormous factories can't get enough water to do the processing. So the cost of microchip processors is going through the roof, as well as the disruptions from COVID So literally mistaking climate for weather and doing that in 2 ways. Also arguing, and I've seen one of his fellow travelers on this front, a guy called Richard make this argument that you can use as a proxy for what's going to happen to climate change. You can use the current relationship between income as a gross— let's say gross state product in America and temperature. So if you look at Maryland, for example, and find that Maryland is 10 degrees colder than Florida, and that Florida has got a 20% lower GDP than Maryland, therefore you can say that a 10-degree increase in temperature would reduce the GDP of Maryland by 20%.

Now, a 10-degree increase in global temperature would drive the human species extinct, period. And there's plenty of scientific papers to give reasons to believe that. The simplest one being, for example, that one reason we have the temperate zone where most of the agriculture occurs these days is because there are 3 circulation systems in each hemisphere. You have what's called the Hadley cell, which is the circulation of air between Between 0 and 30 degrees, from the equator to 30 degrees north. You then have 30 to 60 where there's what they call the temperate zone. And then you have the polar, 60 to 90 degrees.

If we increase the global temperature by 10 degrees, which is seriously what was considered by one of his acolytes, that according to physicists and atmospheric physicists is twice the level of temperature increase that would put enough energy into the atmosphere to mean we went from 3 cells to 1. It's like turning up the oven Turn on the temperature on your stove on a bowl of soup, and you've got these little bubbles, they're called Bernoulli cells, circulating and you can see them. Increase the temperature and the whole thing bubbles, and all the Bernoulli structure breaks down. Well, imagine that happening and what happens to Western agriculture. What it would mean is all the rain would be occurring around the equator and around the pole. The pole would be 22 degrees Celsius. In the middle, you'd have pretty much an extremely hot, dry area.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: ...drought-stricken part of the planet. You simply can't use those assumptions to make up the data for climate change.

And yet that's what they've done to argue, as Nordhaus does, that a 6-degree increase in temperature on the globe would reduce GDP by 8.1%.

Now that is nonsense, absolute nonsense. And it only got through to be published because economists fundamentally are climate change deniers, most of them. And they don't think you can criticize You can't criticize a theory because of its assumptions, which is crap methodology. So we have got nonsense numbers being used to give corporations the apparent guidance that there's only going to be a minor impact from climate change. It's all stuff economists have made up talking through their asses.

The New Economics: A Manifesto

Erik Townsend: Well, I would say that that succinctly addresses my request that you clarify why you would make such a critical statement, Steve. Let's move on from there. I got to tell you, I really enjoy your perspective on economics, listening to you speak, and also And also reading your books. It's been a few years though since, I think it was 2017 that you published Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? My Amazon is spying on you. I've got a secret message here.

Steve Keen: Oh yeah.

Erik Townsend: It says there's a new one. It's called The New Economics: A Manifesto by Professor Steve Keen, available for preorder, but there's no look inside, so I can't see what's in there.

Steve Keen: It's really saying that neoclassical economics is the phlogiston Of the modern era. It's the Ptolemaic astronomy in the time of moonshots. It's a theory which is neat, plausible, and utterly wrong, which shapes how we think about how capitalism functions and is actually making capitalism dysfunctional. So we need a new economics that is not obsessed with equilibrium thinking. So we understand complex systems that doesn't pretend that we're a barter economy, which have never existed in the first place. It's a monetary system where you have to look at money.

And it's one where energy is absolutely essential to production, whereas mainstream economics leaves energy out and it's sinking completely, and imagines you can have an economy with no energy input, which is total nonsense. And all this has come out of a methodology which ran into all sorts of problems, mathematical problems, where various things that neoclassicals would like to have concluded were proven to be mathematically false. And their answer was, let's make a simplifying assumption.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: And jump over the problem. So for example, one of my favorite simplifying assumptions by Paul Samuelson to try to explain how you can take the theory of an individual having a downward sloping individual demand curve to get a market downward sloping demand curve. He literally assumed that America is one big happy family.

One big happy family that allocates income before trade so that everybody's happy with the distribution of income before trade goes ahead.

Erik Townsend: Literally.

Steve Keen: I've got that. That's what I quote in the book.

So we have a moribund failed paradigm still dominating how we think, and it's time we got a new one. And what I explain in that book is how you can have a new approach to economics based around complex systems, monetary analysis, and being realistic about the role of energy in enabling production to occur in the first place. And then of course that ties up climate change as well. So it's a pretty heavy read. Mind you, I do use the word bullshit at one point inside the book. So not as heavy as you might think.

Erik Townsend: I can't imagine that coming from you, Steve.

Steve Keen: Of course not.

Teaching economics via Patreon; Erik's closing view

Erik Townsend: Of course not. Well, it is available for preorder right now on Amazon, so I am clicking as we speak. Steve, before I let you go, I want to bring our listeners up to speed, and frankly, it's a story I don't even understand completely myself. When I first met you, you were a university professor. That means guy gets up in the morning, goes to a university, stands in front of a bunch of people in a room and gives a lecture.

You changed all that. Basically, you were one of the first guys to call the 2008 financial crisis, got kind of famous because of that, got a big following. Now you've kind of basically changed the rules to where you're still a professor of economics, but you don't work for a university. You kind of do it freelance. How is that even possible? What's going on? And who are the students? Are we talking about student-aged, you know, kids that want to learn economics from somebody other than a university? Or are we talking about middle-aged people who are investing? Who signs up to say, Steve Keen, I want you to be my university-less professor?

Steve Keen: Good question. It's an interesting combination because it's all through Patreon. So without Patreon, I couldn't do what I'm doing now. And I've got about roughly 1,500 subscribers on Patreon. And there are people paying everywhere from $1 a month, which would mainly be the student end of the spectrum, to $1,000 a month. And if I look at the $1 end and the students, They're people who want an alternative perspective of what they're getting in the textbooks and what they're getting at university. So that's students getting an alternative education.

I actually had a marvelous conversation, by the way, just to mention this, which is on my YouTube channel, where a group of school students got in touch, a brilliantly informed group with a little website called Politics with Nick. And I had a conversation with these, even including a 13-year-old who had his head around Sraffa and all sorts of advanced critiques of mainstream economics.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Steve Keen: That I didn't get my head around until I was in my 20s.

So that's the student end of things. And I think a lot of the others are people who would like to be doing what I'm doing, but are caught in jobs where they can't. So they're providing me with more than they need to give me to enable me to continue doing my work. So most of the stuff I put up on Patreon, I make freely available. So you don't have to pay my Patreon to read what I'm writing there. And that was with the agreement of my patrons that I do it that way. But there are some things that I give to people who pay the $1 and above. Like for example, I've given a copy of the manuscript of The New Economics to all my subscribers. Then there's a $10 a month podcast with a great mate of mine and great radio guy, Phil Dobbie, as well. But I've got people paying $30, $100, $300, and $1,000.

And they're not doing it because they have to. They're doing it because they want to. And my interpretation there is that they would like to be doing what I'm doing. They can't manage to do it themselves because of their own commitments or their own industry. So helping me do it is their way of, you know, doing one for the team.

And I completely and utterly applaud them and thank them for their support because without it, I'd be stuck back at home living on my retirement earnings and, you know, scabbing out what I could manage to do. And do this work, I can be full-time productive and it's been far, far better than being stuck at a university where I've got to answer to bureaucrats all the time.

Erik Townsend: Now, if you want my prediction, the unexpected positive consequence of the COVID crisis is the whole world is going to change with more people like you abandoning the structures like universities and saying, hey, I can do it all on the internet and I don't need all of that bureaucracy and all of that nonsense. And I think that makes the world a better place. Steve, we're going to have to leave it there in the interest of time.

Erik Townsend: Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right after this message from our sponsor. Farmland investing has been a popular macro trend among billionaires and big institutions for the last decade, but the high cost of buying an entire farm puts this asset class out of reach to all but big institutions and the ultra-rich. FarmTogether.com allows any accredited investor. investor to invest in fractional ownership of several different categories of farmland. I recently did an interview with FarmTogether founder and CEO Artem Milinchuk.

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Announcer: Now back to your host, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Takeaways from the Keen interview

Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was great to have Steve back on the show. It's always interesting to hear the different perspectives on how the monetary system works and debt is considered on the balance sheet. What did you take away from the interview?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think Steve is one of the smartest guys, and in fact, I'll say he's the smartest guy I know of whose views I respect, despite the fact that he is very much on the opposite Opposite side of an ideological belief system about the role of government in managing money systems and so forth. So I really wanted to hear that view, and I think that the MMT crowd is definitely coming into power, and I think it's gonna be very interesting. The inflation will be good for markets and feel good to the economy in the beginning, no question about that. It's a few years into it that it starts to get scary.

S&P 500: quad-witching and gamma pinning

Erik Townsend: In any event, Patrick, I want to move on to our postgame chartbook, which is titled Looking at Bonds and Yields. What's going on here on page 2 as we look at the S&P 500?

That's not bonds and yields.

Patrick Ceresna: Oh, well, just wanted to do a quick update going into next week on the S&P 500. I mean, we have the big quarterly quad witching OPEX roll-off coming up next week. And like we've heard from Charlie McElligott many times when he's been on the show, So this is a period where there tends to be a lot of gamma pinning by dealers. And it's— you can really see how the daily ranges have completely tightened up on the S&P. And barring some big catalyst, it's probably going to be a little bit more of the same going into next week's option expiration. And so it'll be interesting to see. But this level right in this zone, 4,200 to 4,250, is going to be an area that the market is likely to bounce around within in the coming week.

Bond yields break down; 2s10s curve

Patrick Ceresna: Nonetheless, I wanted to go and actually talk about these bond yields because obviously Steve was— gave us a great interview and had the perspective that he didn't think yields were going to go too much higher than where they currently were.

And I thought it was really interesting because some people in the past have made the correlation that higher inflation typically would manifest with higher nominal yields. But really, we've seen that ever since these high inflation numbers, including the one that came out earlier, another monthly— month-over-month high print on the CPI, and the bonds don't seem to be reacting to it. In fact, they are outright breaking down. And it's interesting, it looks like some sort of a bond bottom may very well be in, and it'll be interesting to see how low yields go in this impulse.

Erik Townsend: Patrick, we've got the 2s-10s spread on page 4, and it looks to me like the same kind of breakdown. Down?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, really, uh, we've seen the, um, the bear steepening and the bull flattener, uh, really kicking in. Obviously, the front of the curve is pinned by the, the Fed, and so really this is now just a mirror image of, of the 10-year nominal yield as, uh, as we're moving. And so it's interesting that the steepener trade, which has worked so well for almost, um, a year going into March, has really now seemed to have run out of upside momentum and continues to be reversing very much in line with that 10-year yield.

Long bond, corporates and Erik's view on the Treasury scare

Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, we're looking almost at the same chart upside down on page 5, aren't we?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, this is exactly it. And so I wanted to just flip it over and really ask that question. I mean, most people have been generally avoiding the long bond and obviously with the risk that we could have much higher yields. And there was the fear that we were gonna go well north of 2% on the 10-year yield. And that's kept most people sidelined on this bond. Now, after seeing several months of consolidation, we're seeing an attempt for the long bond, in this case the TLT chart that we're showing here for the 20-plus-year Treasury bonds, really reversing up. And that asks the question as to whether or not we're going to see a little bit of a bond rally. Nonetheless, that breakout has also happened if you look on page 6 on corporate bonds. And so we saw We saw the lows on investment-grade corporate bonds on the— using the LQD happen in March. And we're really seeing an attempt to break out on the upside.

It looks like at this stage, these corporate bonds could easily head up towards the 135 level and test all of those September, October, November consolidation lows in this push.

Erik Townsend: Patrick, I'm tentatively starting to come around to the view that the scare that we saw in Treasury yields was just that, a scare, that it's over, that it's behind us, and we really are gonna find out Just as I expected, that the reasons that all of the spending that the Biden Administration wants to do might have caused yields to move higher are going to be offset by policy actions to keep them lower. And that's what we predicted here on MacroVoices months ago, and that's exactly what seems to be happening now. Patrick, let's take a look at the BBBs. That's the high-grade credit spreads.

Credit spreads and complacency

Patrick Ceresna: Normally, we would always show the junk bond credit spread. Just wanted to really touch on both of them, including the investment grade and the junk, we continue to see multi-year lows in terms of those credit spreads. Now, there's, by part, it's a function of the fact that interest rates are so low that it's very easy for the spreads to be more narrow. So I don't wanna overread too much into that alone, but we have entered a real period where there's a lot of complacency towards the credit risks associated with corporate bonds versus that of US Treasuries. And so it'll be, it's interesting to watch and see whether or not at some point something spooks the market and actually forces the market to start pricing in some additional risks in these credit spreads. It's worth noting that the bond market has really calmed down in general, and a lot of that fearful selling that we really saw taking place since November through March, really everything has calmed down, and the entire bond market has really started to turn up a little It'll

be interesting to see how long that lasts.

Sign-off, sponsors and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: And folks, if you enjoy Patrick's chart decks, be sure to check out a free 14-day trial of Big Picture Trading. You can find the information on page 8 or at bigpicturetrading.com. We're going to keep it tight this week and leave it there for this week's show. This episode is brought to you by Abaxx Technologies, pioneering the design of smarter markets that better meet the needs of both market participants and society as a whole, and by FarmTogether.com, making farmland investing a trillion-dollar asset class available to all accredited investors. Patrick, tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview as well as the chartbook we just discussed in the postgame. There's also a link to a great interview with Options Positioning Godfather, Cem Karsan, as well as a link to the Jeffrey Snider article titled The inflation emotions. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter. Twitter, and we will consider it for our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.

You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend. That's Erik spelt with a K, and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.

Announcer closing and disclaimer

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is made possible by sponsorship from BigPictureTrading.com, the internet's premier source of online education for traders. Please visit BigPictureTrading.com for more information. Please register your free account.

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