Grant Williams — Grant Williams from the Things That Make You Go Hmmm blog and Real Vision Television (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 5 was recorded on March 10th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. By popular request from our listeners, Grant Williams will be joining me as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Grant about his forecast of an oncoming US recession, how economic conditions like those that we're seeing right now cause Grant to be concerned about a military conflict our future, and of course, Grant's work with Real Vision Television.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. We've got a lot to talk about this week, Erik, so let's get to it. We saw a lot of sideways chop in the stock markets this week with the S&P trading in a narrow 30-point range, probably in anticipation of this ECB meeting. And today that meeting happened. So why don't you bring us up to speed on equities?
Erik Townsend: Well, this was the big one. This was the big central bank meeting that everybody was looking forward to with great anticipation. And this is the one that we were told was going to make or break markets. If the ECB was accommodative, the market should go straight up. If the ECB was not accommodative, maybe not. What happened? The ECB was not only accommodative, they went far beyond the call of duty in being over-accommodated. And stock prices instantly went straight up where they stayed for all of about an hour. And then immediately began to correct sharply to the downside. So what this says to me is the market was waiting for this, maybe hoping for some kind of miracle to happen. You actually got a little bit of a miracle out of the ECB this morning. It was a pretty accommodative announcement in terms of what they're going to do. Yet we still can't get through the 200-day moving average on equities, and it looks like we're going to continue what I think is a bear market from here.
So I think that this has been a short squeeze and a bear market rally. I think it's over. Admittedly, I said that a couple of weeks ago at the 50-day moving average. Then I said it last week at the 100-day moving average. And here we are this week at the 200-day moving average. I do think that it's finally ending, though. And I'd say the caveat is if something unexpectedly happens and oil prices continue to move higher, that could pull equities higher as well. But I don't think that's going to happen.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, let's cover crude oil next. The OPEC spin doctors have been in the driver's seat for the last few weeks. And last week you warned that If they could manage to jawbone the WTI market above $36, we could see that ignite some upside momentum, induce a short squeeze, and become self-reinforcing purely on the technical factors. And that appears to be exactly what happened. Good call, Erik. I'm sure you're very excited about this.
Erik Townsend: Well, I got stopped out of my short position in the process, so I don't know how excited I am, but it was pretty easy to read the handwriting on the wall here. What's going on is the market has become obsessed obsessed with this idea that a production freeze is a near certainty. Now, on the very first day that this production freeze discussion came up, it was debunked by all the bona fide experts who said this has no meaning. It's like saying we're going to freeze the Earth's oxygen content at no more than 21% of the atmosphere. Well, okay, it would be impossible with any known technology to change that number, so to say we're going to freeze it is a little bit It's silly, but that's what's going on here. It is ruling the market. My theory here is that in the old days, it used to be that oil was traded by oil traders.
These days, with the ETFs, retail investors and small hedge funds are all over trading oil, and there's a lot of people who don't know as much about it who are actively trading this market. A lot of people are assuming that production freeze somehow has some meaningfulness to supply and demand, which it doesn't.
So my fundamental view is as bearish as ever, no change there. I also want to emphasize, you know, my track record here. Last year, I was early twice. I had called both of the 2 major sell-offs in crude oil, but I was, at least in the second one, a couple months early. So maybe I'm a couple months early again. We could see this hope-driven rally, which is what I think it is, continue. I don't think that's going to happen now. And the reason I say that is if I look at the technicals, I think that the stock market is done. It's rolling over. I think that we've pretty much tested as much as we can in this crazy move.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Unless we get an actual production cut, which would be completely, totally different, then I think probably the market is ready to roll over here. But I've been saying that for a couple of weeks. One possible scenario is we might have to wait for March 20th, which is the date that's been thrown around for this production freeze meeting. This morning I saw a headline that that date's off again. So maybe it'll be next week, the headline will be that that date is on. I don't know. We're going to have to wait until the market eventually figures out that production freeze doesn't mean anything and the market is still being oversupplied.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: All right.
Nathan Egger: I want to stay on crude oil because 2 weeks ago, you and Art Berman agreed emphatically on a very bearish outlook for oil prices. You still maintain that view. But oil prices went straight up for the 2 weeks since that show. So, at first glance, it looks like you guys got the call wrong. So, with all due respect, Erik, what would you say to that?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the question that you really have to ask yourself is, what would it take to prove that Art and I got the call right? That we were right in our fundamental view? And my contention is the answer is the last 2 weeks' DOE inventory reports. Art and I predicted that inventory would build and storage would be consumed. Not only did both of those things happen, but the March 2nd inventory build of 10.5 million barrels was just epic in proportion. This week's 3.9 million barrel build wasn't quite as huge, but it's still a very large build in inventory. Cushing was up 1.2 million barrels last week, another 693,000 300,000 barrels this week. So almost 1 million barrels a week on average that we're adding to Cushing inventory. We don't have 100 million barrels to spare. We only have 7 or 8 million barrels of spare capacity left in Cushing, and we're using it up at 1 million barrels a week.
So the bottom line here is that what Art and I actually predicted is already coming true. And we are being proven right in our call that oversupply would swamp available storage capacity. We're not wrong about that. What we also observed is that this cannot continue much longer because a storage crisis is on the horizon. So far, the market is ignoring that risk. But unless the supply is reduced dramatically, then inventory builds are going to continue and storage will eventually be depleted. That's an immutable fact, not an opinion. But oil prices are going up anyway.
So how is that possible? And I think the answer is very simple. Those of you who actually trade these markets actively know as well as as I do. Sometimes the market runs on fundamental data. Sometimes the market runs on human emotion. This is one of those times when it's running on human emotion. A whole bunch of people are really excited. Production freeze is imminent. Any day now, this is going to be over. It's been a couple of years. It's really frustrating people. They're ready for it to be over. They're psychologically and emotionally ready for it to be over. And that's all very fine and well, but it's not over. It's not anywhere close to over. We're still oversupplying the market by a couple million barrels a day.
So what is it going to take to resolve this? What are the risks in either direction? The answer is complicated, but primarily it comes down to understanding storage capacity and supply destruction risk. Now, obviously, you talk about supply, you got to talk about demand. Demand is obviously a consideration here, but I don't think it's going to be the driving factor of change in the price trend. I think this is mostly going to be about supply and storage capacity.
Nathan Egger: This is really important to today's market. So, yeah, I want to come back to storage capacity and talk about supply destruction risk. But since you said it's going to be a complicated answer, let's save it until after the Grant Williams interview.
Nathan Egger: And let's talk gold. We saw it make a new cycle high at the end of last week, briefly popping its head above $1,280. But the metal appeared to be unable to sustain that momentum this week. Where do we stand now?
Erik Townsend: Well, we definitely got a huge bounce out of the ECB decision this morning. Before that, though, before the ECB decision came out Thursday morning, we were looking at gold prices trading below $1,240. So, as I look at this, what we've been talking about for the last couple weeks is what I'd really like to see is that $1,260 number exceeded and the market stays there. The definition of a breakout is when the market moves above a key level and stays there. When it pokes its head above a level for a couple of
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And then goes back down, that doesn't really count. It was looking to me seriously like it just doesn't really count, like we're not really seeing the follow-through. Maybe this market is about to roll over, maybe it's a little bit ahead of itself. Certainly in terms of the breakout from the 200-day moving average, it's been very impressive. Maybe the market's gotten a little bit ahead of itself and needs to pull back, was my thinking.
Now, the picture has changed as a result of ECB. But that was obviously a dramatically more accommodative than expected announcement that we got from the ECB this morning. And what did we get out of it? You know, from $1,240 to $1,272, as I'm looking at the screen right now, that's $32.
That's pretty good. But that's all you can get out of an epically accommodative ECB announcement? I would have expected more, and I would certainly expect a retest of a higher high, higher than we managed to get to last week in gold.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: We didn't manage to do that on an announcement that was profound in terms of how accommodative it was.
Nathan Egger: Okay. And what effect, if any, is all of this having on the bond market?
Erik Townsend: Well, what we're seeing— and of course, it's very unusual to see bonds and stocks trading in the same direction. They both sold off hard after the ECB announcement. Stocks recovering Thursday afternoon while bonds are still subdued. I think, though, in the big picture of things, what we're seeing here is we were pushing to lower and lower yields. We've had this rally for the last several weeks in the stock market. And of course, that's undone that. I'm really curious to see, are we going to get to still lower yields? Are we eventually going to retest that 1.36 yield on the 10-year from 2012? Are we going to see another, another opportunity like that? I think we probably will. Right now, we're going the other direction. Stock market has been going up. Bond market has been going down in price, up in yield. I think those Those two things are both about to reverse.
Oil is going to be the key if something were to happen, geopolitical upset. Based on what we, we look at the technicals now, oil could easily move to $40, $41 from here. But I'm hoping that this is over, that the market is going to wake up to the fundamentals and recognize we're still being oversupplied by 2 million barrels a day.
Nathan Egger: Thank you, Erik. We're going to come back and revisit the markets in more detail, including the European Central Bank announcement that we had today and more later on in today's show. But now This week's feature interview with Grant Williams right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Grant Williams from the Things That Make You Go Hmmm blog and Real Vision Television. Grant, I want to start with a presentation that you gave recently, which you called the duck test. Why don't you explain what's a duck test? Why are you using this metaphor for talking about the economy in terms of what we're looking at in the macro picture right now?
Grant Williams: Hey, Erik. Thanks for having me on. Yeah, look, the duck test, I mean, look, it's an old test that many people do. And it's quite a simple one. It goes along the lines of if it walks like a duck, and it swims like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, it's probably a duck. And to me, it was really just an attempt to take a step back and amidst all the noise, and the differing opinions that we get, around the state of the economy at the moment, whether it be on a domestic level or a global level, just take a look at some of the top-line facts and strip out the noise and see what we get when we look at it.
And the point I was making was that we are heading for a recession in the US, and you're going to see an awful lot of people arguing both sides of that. And the economists will tell you that according to their forecasts, it's not going to happen. And one of the charts in the Duck Test, which was perhaps my favorite was from the St. Louis Fed website when they went through and they showed the probabilities of recession as measured by the St. Louis Fed going all the way back to 1970. And what fascinated me was that at no point in the last 45 years has that indicator hit 100%. So, even in the depths of 2008, there was only a 99% chance that we were going to hit a recession. So, clearly, there's something amiss here. And when you look at the various manufacturing numbers, you look at You look at what the equity markets are doing, you look at global trade, there are all kinds of high-level data points that suggest that this thing is looking, walking, and quacking like a duck.
So, rather than wait for it to be confirmed, which is always backward-looking, and rather than rely on the opinions of economists, my point was simply just take a look at the big data and see what your gut tells you. And to me, it's screaming recession.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the presentation that you gave is extremely compelling. And, you know, the very first chart that you put up, I thought was fascinating just in terms of total US GDP versus total credit instruments.
Grant Williams: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And even finance professionals, people who do this stuff for a living, if you talk to 80% of them, what they'll tell you is, oh yeah, we had a big credit crisis back in 2008, too much credit in the system, and we've been deleveraging ever since. And it blows my mind. People really believe this. What's the reality of the situation?
Grant Williams: Well, it's funny that you picked that chart, because to me, I've called that chart in previous presentations the one chart to rule them all. I think that is the key chart that people need to look at to understand the big picture of what's been going on and what's happening here. And the chart— I don't know if we'll be able to put it up in the podcast, but just to walk people through it if they can't, it just shows the 2 lines of total credit instruments and US GDP. It goes all the way back to 1950. So, we've got a really good sample size.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Grant Williams: If you look at the chart, both lines grow in lockstep until 1971, which is when obviously Nixon closed the gold window, when they start diverging and the credit line starts to climb at a much steeper rate than GDP growth. And then you get to 1980, where we had peak interest rates. And from that point on, we've been in a declining interest rate environment. And the trajectory picks up. And so, what you see are these 2 charts. Just separating from one another to the point where you've got $60— $55, I think $55 trillion in credit instruments against the $15,000, $20,000, $15,000, $17,000 US GDP, which is obviously completely out of whack and just shows the level and the degree to which that expansion has been built on credit.
And at the very top of the credit instrument charts, you'll see this tiny little dip, which really, in the scheme of things, is nothing. And which is what 2008 looked like on this chart. And it just brings home the degree of pain felt in 2008 versus the total lack of any real deleveraging that we saw there. And obviously, since then, the chart has picked up the pace again and screamed higher because it has to. That credit has to keep expanding, or we're going to see some very, very bad things happen.
So I think everybody should familiarize themselves with that chart, if only to really get that slap-in-the-face moment where you realize that this entire edifice has been built on credit.
Erik Townsend: I want to encourage our listeners to open the presentation, which they can get from the website at MacroVoices.com. Next to Grant's picture and the description of this interview, you'll see a link there for download supplemental information from Grant Williams. And that includes this presentation. It's just shocking to me, you know, if you were to look at how adults would look at the situation in 2008,
Grant Williams: Right.
Erik Townsend: We had this really, really big lesson, which was there was way too much credit in the system. There was way too much debt outstanding, and a lot of it was low quality. And if there was a lesson to learn, it was it's time to curb our appetite for debt, stop living beyond our means on borrowed money, and get our finances in order. And if you look at this chart, it literally is— it looks like noise. The 2008 deleveraging for however long it lasted, was a tiny little wiggle in what is really just a straight-up expansion of credit.
And it's nonstop.
I want to move into where does this take us, Grant? Because it seems that all what you and I might think of as common sense, looking at this problem, realizing that we have an out-of-control debt situation, that the entire Western financial world is potentially at risk long-term if we don't do something about it. It seems like other than a few crazy guys like you and me, nobody really takes this seriously. It looks to me like what's going to happen is we're going to continue to grow credit and expand credit, borrowing and spending and borrowing and spending until something breaks. So, what do you think is going to break first? What's it going to look like?
Grant Williams: Well, you're absolutely right. That's what we have to do because human beings have a big problem and a blind spot. In looking at really big issues. Demographics is a perfect example. People can see demographic change coming from decades out. We can project decades into the future demographic trends. And people can see them coming. They know they're inevitable. But they're just too big to deal with. It's too big to think about what are the implications for my portfolio of the Japanese population starting to shrink in 25 years' time, which is a problem that we faced in 1989. We all knew it was going to happen. But how do you do anything about that? So, you tend to ignore it. And that's what happens. And the ramifications of this situation correcting are way bigger than that, because it's going to require events of a magnitude far more severe than we saw in 2008.
The problem many people have is that they think 2008 was the event, and that it cleared the brush, and we're back to a sustainable path. Nothing could be further from the truth. But it's such a big concept. That people struggle to get their heads around it. And they assume, based on 40-odd years of bull markets and credit expansion, that they won't have to worry about it anyway. When it happens, and it will happen, you can go back as far as you like in history, and you see these cycles roll over.
When it happens, it's going to be very, very bad indeed.
What triggers it? The problem to me is that the thing that's now the glue that binds all this together still unfortunately for everybody, is faith in the ability of central bankers to keep this thing together, because they have done that. And the politicians have promised us things are getting better, and the central banks have thrown everything in their arsenal and more at it. And it's that confidence that is essential for this recovery, such as it is, to continue.
And I think when you look at it, and you look at the chances of these guys being able to fix this, they're very slim indeed. And if people start to believe that they can't fix this, then they have to act accordingly. And that means facing some hard realities. And it means divesting yourself of an awful lot of assets, at which point, it's out of the central bank's hands anyway. So, to have something as ephemeral as confidence in a group of academics holding the world financial system up is a terrifying prospect to me, because we don't know when it will evaporate or what might trigger it. But it could be tomorrow. It could be in 3 years. It's impossible to figure out what it will be. I think we're starting to see it.
I think if you look closely at things like the reaction in Japan when Kuroda, the Bank of Japan governor, after 2 weeks after saying that he wasn't even considering negative rates, moved to negative rates, you saw the immediate action of the market was to fall very, very hard, very, very fast, and the currency to go in the absolute wrong direction for the BOJ. And it turned around intraday, and it bounced and went up again. But it's those knee-jerk reactions, those instant moves without any commentary, without any spin from governors. When you look at where those want to go, which is lower, it gives you the direction that the market naturally wants to take. And I think people should be very, very aware of that.
Erik Townsend: Grant, this brings up a really interesting question in my mind, because the way I look at this is I think if you wanted to solve our problems, our economic problems back in the '90s, when, say, Ross Perot first started complaining about the national debt, it was doable then. But in democracy, I think you would impose too much pain if you were to try to really fix it now, not paper over our problems by printing more money, but really address the problem systemically of too much debt and too much reliance on deficit spending and so forth and all these bad habits of government. You would inflict so much pain that Any politician attempting that would get booted out of office. So I think we've reached a point of no return where in democracy, you can't fix the problems. All you can do is extend and pretend and keep hoping that we can stave off these problems a little bit longer.
But basically, we're waiting for things to blow up, and there's no other choice. Do you see it that way? Am I crazy to think that?
Grant Williams: No, I think it's incredibly unfortunate. But I think that's exactly where we are. I think you're right that the problem with Western democracies is they've all as they've developed and matured, they've all promised way too much to their citizenry, which they have to deliver. And there's just no way they can do it. And so, at this point, as you said, going back to that very first chart we talked about, that little blip, we saw what that looked like from the ground up in 2008.
And in order to bring those 2 lines and converge them again, the lines of credit and GDP, the pain is unimaginable. And so, of course, no elected body is ever going to willingly Is it going to willingly inflict that inflict that pain upon people? So yeah, look, I think their hands are tied. They have to keep doing this. They can try to make adjustments at the margin, but we all know that if you want to get elected, you need to promise people stuff. So you know, unfortunately, this is going to come to a natural end rather than an imposed end by an elected body. And and unfortunately, you would then end up running into the laws of nature, and the laws of nature dictate that that this will end.
Very badly, but end it will. In the meantime, you extend and pretend. And I think what people— again, I get back to this point I was making about these big concepts being tough for people to get their heads around and hard to imagine, so they tend to consciously ignore them.
We haven't seen anything like this in living memory. Realistically, there's nobody around now that remembers the Great Depression clearly, which was a similar type of credit purge. And we can extrapolate the last 40 years, which have been a massive credit binge. But because we haven't seen anything of this nature during that time, people assume they don't happen or assume that this time is different and assume that those problems have all been fixed in the past. So, we're never going to see that event again.
But we will. And my worry is that we're going to see it sooner rather than later. And as you said, there's really nothing that can stop it now.
Erik Townsend: Well, and what concerns me the most, I talked to Jim Rogers about this in the first show that we did. If I look at history, Grant, what it tells me is that when governments screw up as bad as they have here, inevitably what they end up doing next is starting a war, because that shields the elected officials from responsibility. When you have a war, you almost always get complete blind patriotic faith in the government by the people, and people stop questioning their leaders. When I said that to Jim Rogers, he was careful to say, well, you know, you have to be careful.
You can't
Grant Williams: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Now, you can't say conclusively that the government does it on purpose. It may be that the circumstances just forced it upon them. But the reality of the situation is, every time we've had these circumstances, these kinds of economic circumstances where governments have borrowed and spent beyond their means to the point where there's no plausible recovery, it always, 100% of the time, leads to a major global-scale military conflict.
And what scares the heck out of me, Grant, is we don't know how to do this anymore. The world after the Cold War, you know, we sort of got to the point where we said, okay, nuclear war is such an unimaginably horrible thing, we can't let it come to that, so we just won't go there. Well, I'm really getting worried that if you look at the escalation of tension between Obama and the Russians and so forth, you know, we're not talking about Iraq and Afghanistan anymore. We're talking about very well-armed—
Grant Williams: Right.
Erik Townsend: industrialized nations that are getting very upset with us. And I'm really concerned that this economic situation is going to lead us into a major global war conflict. Am I crazy to think that? What do you think?
Grant Williams: Well, you know, again, this is— war is another one of those, of those big concepts that it's, that it's hard, you know, it's unimaginable in, in the literal sense of the word. And people just can't get their heads around the idea that they figure that's all done. But you're right. History is very, very clear, and it's a great teacher. And if you study it, you'll see that at these points in time, there is always a conflict somewhere between 2 global powers. And we're seeing the embers of that, I think, and we've seen them over the last few years.
What's interesting is I gave a presentation about this time last year called The Consequences of the Economic Peace, where I was talking about the path of the world since this peace that was broken after World War II and the Bretton Woods Agreement. And I was talking about big cycles, Kondratiev waves, natural cycles, and the war cycle. And as you said, it's a subject that when you talk about it, people instantly assume that you're crazy. And my belief is that these are all potential outcomes. As we've seen, they are potential outcomes regularly throughout history. So, you have to at least do the thinking about them and how they might come about and what you would do if they did.
And I gave this presentation first in December of 2014. And the room— I could feel the people in the room saying, what the hell is this guy talking about? There's not going to be a war. And the first question I got at the end of the presentation— and it was really based around the parallels between 1914 and the lead-up to World War I and the current state of the world, which if you look at those parallels, are absolutely uncannily similar.
And the first question I got was a guy put his hand up and said, so, are you saying there's going to be a war? And I said to him, no. I said, that's not what I'm saying at all. But what I'm very definitely saying is that there's not not going to be a war. And I wasn't trying to be cute. I think it's an important distinction to make. I'm saying that you cannot rule out the possibility of a war. And in fact, as always, there is a probability that we're going to have a war. And sometimes the probability may be fractions of a percent. But I think it's more than that right now. And it's something people need to be very much aware of.
And the more the economic pressure ratchets up on these governments, as you quite rightly pointed out, Erik, the more there is a need for a solution. And wars are, unfortunately, a very convenient solution to a lot of the economic problems that governments face. So, yes, I don't think it's It's a 70% chance we're going to have a war. I don't think that at all. But I think as the pressure increases, that level of probability increases significantly. And the possibility for a miscalculation ratchets up every single day. So, I think these outcomes are very much within the parameters of acceptable tail risk. And people need to at least do the thinking about what they might entail.
Erik Townsend: I know that we're up against a little bit of a time limit with your schedule today, so I want to keep moving. But I've got to tell you, we're up against a conundrum now, Grant, because the tradition is to give the guest an opportunity to plug whatever they want to promote at the end of the interview. But I'm so excited about Real Vision Television that I want to tell them about it, even though it's your business.
Can I tell them, Grant? Please, pretty please, can I tell them?
Grant Williams: I would be far more comfortable if you told them anyway. Thanks, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Well, I really— and I think it's an interesting story. It's not just a matter of promotional consideration for what you guys are doing. You guys, you and Raoul Pal, are very accomplished in the industry. You have very, very complete networks of people, fat Rolodexes. There are a lot of things that you guys could do.
But instead of launching a hedge fund or doing something, any one of a number of things that would have been more financially lucrative for you, You and Raoul Pal launched Real Vision Television. So why don't you— I'm going to tell our listeners, first of all, it is the only thing in the world of financial reporting that I consider to be what we aspire to become. What we're doing at MacroVoices, what Nathan and I are doing, we're extremely proud of. I think that we're doing a lot better of a job, at least for the audience that we're targeting, which is sophisticated, high net worth, professional finance, more sophisticated investors.
We're doing a better job than everybody except you guys.
And Real Vision Television is who we want to aspire to be. You are doing amazing work. But I want to hit this from the human interest angle. What would cause 2 guys who have much more lucrative opportunities ahead of them to focus so much energy on creating Real Vision Television? What's it about for you guys?
Grant Williams: Well, look, I mean, that's incredibly kind of you to say so, Erik. And you guys are doing a great job here at MacroVoices. Look, Raoul and I, this all started over a dinner we had a couple of years ago, 3 years ago now, I think. And we were just talking about the fact that so many people— I mean, the general narrative around 2008 was nobody saw it coming. And it came out of the clear blue sky. And people were unprepared. And that's why it was so bad.
And Raoul and I said this thing. This is nonsense. So many people saw it coming. The stories of The Big Short and the stories of guys like Kyle Bass, fantastically smart investor and a great guy, making a lot of money out of being on the right side of that trade.
You don't need much more evidence than that. Of course, there were people that saw this coming, but the coverage in the mainstream media leading up to it was just very poor, and it served the public very poorly. People on the street were not prepared for it. And even within the industry, there's such a bias towards the bullish. There's such a bias towards a positive story and things going up because it makes everybody's business better. It makes everybody— it's easy to sell stocks to people. This is a business that's there to make money. It's the absolute ground zero of capitalism.
And so, people tuned out the bad stuff and focused on the good stuff, and that hurt the public. And so Raoul and I, as you said, we've put our time in.
We've both got— well, I've got the gray hair to prove it. Raoul doesn't. I don't know what the hell he does, but he doesn't have any gray hair. But we've been around a long time, and we do have decent networks of people. We've worked all around the world. And we know that hidden away in all the corners of finance, everywhere you look, there are brilliant minds doing fantastic jobs and really understanding what's going on. But they're never going to be put in front of the public.
They either don't want to be on TV, they don't want to go on to CNBC or Bloomberg, or CNBC and Bloomberg won't make the extra 3 or 4 calls it takes to find these people. We just thought, well, why don't we try and give the public access to a much broader array of financial minds who have nothing to gain from telling a bullish story, just want to talk about what they do in the world and how they see it.
And let people make up their minds. We don't want to sell advertising. We don't want to— it's not an exercise in dollar revenue maximization. This is an exercise in trying to bring some truth back to finance and give the public, and obviously amongst public, sophisticated investors, access to the pure thoughts of these guys, just the way you're doing. Let's sit down and have a conversation. There's no angle here. I'm not bringing you on for you to sell a product or raise money.
People listen to you, think you're a really smart guy and want to find out more, that's fantastic. But the idea of this is not to sell anything, is not to try and generate revenue for the people that come on, but just to spark an honest discourse about what's happening and just try and open people's eyes.
And so far, the response, I've got to say, has been incredible, both from the standpoint of the people we've asked to be involved and we've asked to interview, who've been incredibly gracious with their time and their thoughts, and the public who have embraced this project with something bordering on evangelical fervor. I think it's great to get this dialogue, this really open, honest dialogue going amongst engaged people to try and help everybody understand what's going on, and perhaps more importantly, what they can can do about it to position themselves for the next few years. So that's what we've tried to do. And we've been delighted with the response. And we've seen acceptance of the idea that we put together really start to pick up in the last few months as the visibility has increased. And 2016 looks like it's going to be a very, very exciting year for us.
So we're delighted.
Erik Townsend: I think that it's going to be an incredible year for you. And I guess we should probably take a step back here and just explain to our listeners, if there's anybody out there who hasn't heard about Real Vision Television yet, what it is, is essentially the antithesis of Bloomberg and CNBC. It is long-form, thoughtful interviews without interrupting the guest, very similar to what we do here on MacroVoices. But it is video and you get to see the person, you get to see a live interview. And what's your average interview, 45 minutes or so? It's definitely not the 3-minute soundbite.
Grant Williams: No, it's not. We did— we deliberately didn't want to do 3-minute soundbites. We We wanted to give people the time to talk and really explore their thinking and explain their views clearly. So, I mean, look, they range. We have some on there that are 5 minutes long. And we've done several interviews that in total ran to a couple of hours, but we spread those over a couple of weeks. So, the longest you'll find on there is about an hour, and the shortest you'll find is about 5 minutes. But they all average around, I guess, about 20 to 30 minutes.
Erik Townsend: But as you say, what I find fascinating about it is It is not marketing glitz and razzle-dazzle the way the cable networks do. You've got an unbiased, level-headed, bullish and bearish, both cases being told evenly. I'm just so impressed with everything that I've seen there. Myself, I have a fully paid subscription to Real Vision. I was able to negotiate with your partner Raoul to get our listeners an opportunity. So listeners, if you would like a a free subscription to Real Vision Television, go to realvisiontv.com/discounts/macrovoices, and you will find there an opportunity to sign up for a free trial. And I cannot recommend it highly enough. It is a subscription service. You have to pay for it, which certainly makes sense. You can't produce video for free.
And I think it's very attractively It's what, $400 a year?
Grant Williams: Yeah, $365, I think now, just $1 a day. So, we think it's great value. And we would urge people to give it a try. And as I say, if it's not for them, that's fine. We'll refund people's money, and we can all move on. But I think you'll find that if you are interested, and certainly, I know your listeners are very engaged, insightful people, I think they'll find an awful lot of really smart guys there that they can learn a lot
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I definitely would say that for anyone who finds an appeal to this podcast, you like our format, you're going to love Real Vision. Whether or not it's worth it to you to pay for a subscription, you need to make that decision yourself. But you're crazy not to take advantage of the free trial. It really is an awesome service. We're going to start there. And the other thing that we're going to do is we're going to get some of your classic interviews from a couple of years ago, and we're going to start playing them as a Sunday matinee. So in our MacroVoices iTunes feed, And at MacroVoices.com. Starting this weekend on Sundays, you'll find an additional program, not from us at MacroVoices. It'll be a rebroadcast of something from Real Vision Television. And we're going to run that for a month and see how it goes, see if that additional content is of interest to our listeners.
And if so, we'll continue it.
Erik Townsend: Anything else at all, Grant, that you'd like to add? I know that you're on a very tight schedule today. We'd love to have you back on the program when you have more time to talk. Anything else you want to add to wrap it
Grant Williams: Erik, I'd be delighted to come back on anytime. But I just think the stuff you're talking about here, they're all extremely big concepts. And I think people really need to understand right now that it's a time to sit down and think about potential outcomes that you really don't want to think about. Let's face it, we don't want to think about deflation. We don't want to think about another credit crisis. We don't want to think about war.
But these are all possible outcomes right now. They're all in the mix, and you need to assign your own probability to them and understand, okay, what do I need to do to prepare for this?
I think if you do that, just going through the exercise will help you really get your head around a much broader range of outcomes. Listen to MacroVoices, watch Real Vision. The thing these 2 services have in common are just very smart people talking honestly, and you can't help but help shape your own investment strategies by listening to people who have been successful and are willing to give up their time and explain to you the lessons they've learned and the mistakes they've made, and what they think is going to happen. I just think you cannot have enough knowledge right now to inform your own decisions. Be curious.
Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more. It's something I've said before, and I really think that these are challenging times, if you are a little bit smart about macroeconomics, you put 2 and 2 together and you say, boy, I can use this knowledge of macroeconomics that I have and I can make a bet in the market and I can make a few bucks on a trade.
If you are really smart and know a lot about macroeconomics, I think you look at the picture now and you say, wow, this is bigger than making money and losing money. We're coming into a period in our lives which is going to be pivotal in history. Where our governments have screwed up pretty darn badly. And it's going to be a macroeconomic story that's probably going to be punctuated by horrible things, wars and so forth. And I just look at Real Vision and what we're trying to do here is helping people to understand the big picture of the world. And yeah, of course, there's application of that for those of us that make our living in finance, running money for a living. But I think it's more interesting just from the human interest aspect of where we are in history.
We're coming into an incredibly important time. And understanding the macroeconomic backdrop is going to be the most important thing, I think, in understanding the political, you know, the geopolitical near-term future of the world. It's scary, scary stuff.
Grant Williams: That's where we are. That's where we are, I'm afraid, whether people like it or not. There are a lot of scary outcomes. But, you know, I don't think you and I are having this conversation to try and scare people, just to try and make them aware of potential outcomes. I mean, the world carries on, the world gets through these periods, and we will get through this period. I don't think it's going to be without significant pain. So, it's really just a question of everybody trying to plot their own course through this as best they can. And services like yours, and hopefully what we're doing with Real Vision, I genuinely believe are ways for people to try and improve their possibilities of navigating these times successfully.
Erik Townsend: Well, Grant, I cannot thank you enough for joining us. Please feel free to come back anytime. We look forward to a continuing Partnership between MacroVoices and Real Vision, and Nathan Egger will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your host. Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Before we go any further, Erik, let's clarify that free trial subscription offer from Real Vision. What exactly is on offer, and where can our listeners sign up?
Erik Townsend: My apologies, folks. I think at one point that I said a free subscription to Real Vision was on offer. Obviously, that's not what I meant. What I meant to say was Real Vision is offering MacroVoices subscribers a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television. I also misread the URL for where to sign up, so let's just do this a simpler way. Just go to MacroVoices.com, and on the homepage, in the description to the left of Grant Williams' picture, you'll find a link where you can sign up for a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television.
Now, if you're a real glutton for punishment and you prefer the direct URL, it's https://www.realvisiontv.com/realvision. And again, the easy way is just go to MacroVoices.com, look for Grant Williams' picture, just to the left of that, you will find a link where you can get a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television.
Nathan Egger: So, Erik explained to you the Real Vision Television offer, but we've got some more stuff for you. There were 2 presentations mentioned by Grant in that interview. The first is the Duck Test presentation, and we've got a download link for you on the MacroVoices homepage. There, you will also find a link to the second of Grant's presentations that he referred to. And I highly recommend checking out this piece in its entirety. It is called The Consequences of Economic Peace.
And while that presentation was originally delivered late 2014, its subject matter is truly timeless. And while the subject matter, which is to say war, is a little uncomfortable, it would serve us all to know our history a little better. And Grant does a fantastic job of putting history into perspective and parsing out relevant information so that we can make better decisions in the present and prepare ourselves better for the future.
I'm a huge Real Vision fan, as I know you are, Erik, but let's take a minute to share with the listeners why we're partnering with Real Vision to get our listeners both a new weekly audio interview from their rerun library and a free trial subscription to the full-service video product.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, Nathan, as I hear you talking, it almost sounds like we're in commercial mode, like we're trying to sell something for these guys. And I suppose in a way we are. I'd like to help them out because I really believe in what Grant and Raoul are doing at Real Vision. But we're not making anything out of this. We're not being commissioned. We're not trying to make money for these guys.
The thing is that these 2 people just resonate so closely with what Nathan and I are trying to do here at MacroVoices.
We want to focus not on yet another retail podcast that explains the difference between stocks and a bond to some brand new retail investor. We're trying to focus on professional finance, net worth, serious, sophisticated investors. And that's exactly the market that Grant and Raoul are focusing on with Real Vision Television.
The thing is, I just have so much disdain for the mainstream financial press and what Grant and Raoul are doing. And they're the only people out there, as I said in the interview, who are doing an even better job of it than I think you and I are doing, Nathan, is we're really trying to bring substantive content.
These guys are passionate about the content and they're bringing you a full whole hour interview with somebody like Kyle Bass talking about details of sizing positions in a macro strategy. Absolutely fascinating stuff. And if you look at this market, you know, CNBC and Bloomberg have already saturated the biggest segment of the market, and that is people who work in finance who don't have a need to actually know anything but need sound bites that they can repeat. They want something that somebody smarter than them said so that they can say it again in a meeting and sound like they know what talking about. CNBC and Bloomberg perfectly fill that need. If you want to actually have deep, meaningful, thorough conversation about macroeconomics and how the course of the world history is likely to change because of current events in financial markets, Bloomberg and CNBC, they completely ignore that. That level of content doesn't exist. Grant and Raoul are doing that and they're doing a fantastic job and my hat is off to them.
And I told
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And I told them when we invited Grant on the interview, I just said, anything we can do for you guys, I'm happy to do it. We're not trying to make a buck. I just believe in the work that you're doing.
And the other thing I would say is these guys are the adults in the room. It is so refreshing to deal with people that don't think this financial podcasting thing as competitive. You know, I talked to Grant and Raoul and they're always happy to collaborate on ideas of what we're doing on MacroVoices, what they're doing there, because we're all passionate about the content. We want to deliver really great content. The world of financial podcasting, listeners, you wouldn't believe some of the nonsense that goes on. A couple years ago, we actually had one financial podcast host threatening his guests, saying, if you go on that other guy's financial podcast, my arch rival, I'll never invite you back on my show again. You know, this is just utterly childish nonsense. And Grant and Raoul are doing financial reporting for grownups, and that's what we're trying to do here. And my hat's off to them. I just think it's awesome stuff.
So basically, the reason that we're promoting them is because we believe in what they're doing, and I hope it brings them some revenue.
They obviously can't do this for free the way we can. They're producing full television with— you need studio equipment and lighting and all that stuff. They can't possibly do it for free. I think it's a very cost-effective product. I didn't get a comp subscription. I didn't ask for one.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: I was happy to pay for a full-price subscription, and I think it's a fantastic product.
So basically, I just love these guys, and we're trying to help them because we really believe in what they're doing.
Nathan Egger: All right.
Nathan Egger: Well, when we discussed oil in the first segment of today's show, you said there was more to understanding the fundamental picture, particularly relative to supply destruction risk and to storage capacity. I know we've spent way more time on oil in the last few weeks than normal, but frankly, I think the equity market and Just about everything else probably hinges on whether oil can really stage a recovery from here, as many are hoping for, or not. So it's super important to understand this. So let's go a little deeper, Erik, first on storage capacity.
Erik Townsend: Well, Nathan, storage is kind of a moving target, because in the United States, the tank farms are pretty well inventoried. We know how much oil is in those tanks. You get to non-US tank farms, and the governments in other countries are not as complete in their record-keeping So we don't really know how much available storage capacity exists in tank farms outside the United States. The ones that are in the United States are inventoried, but even that data can be a little bit misleading because when you know there's a certain percentage of capacity has been consumed, okay, but you don't know what the effective capacity is. In other words, if you always have to have a couple of empty tanks to To pump things into after you mix them from 2 other tanks. Well, that's an extra tank you have to keep sort of set aside. We don't know how big that set aside is. Is the last 10% of the theoretical capacity of Cushing all available to store oil, or was it something where it falls over and breaks when we get to 95%?
We don't know for sure. The other thing we don't know for sure is when you run out of those tanks that are reliably inventoried in the tank farm.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: The next choice is floating storage. That's chartering a crude oil carrier ship in order to use it as a floating gas tank. How many ships are available for charter? That number is not reflected in any total capacity figure. So, how much left is a relative concept. You can measure how much capacity is left in terms of empty space in US tank farms. But anything other than a US tank farm, whether it's tanks outside the US or floating storage or anything else, You don't really know how much is there.
Depending on who you listen to, there are a lot of estimates. They're kind of rough estimates. Right now, what we do know for sure is that Cushing, Oklahoma is more than 90% full. This is a really big deal because Cushing, I contend, is what really counts. Cushing is the settlement point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract.
What that means is— it's really important for people to understand the mechanism.
Nathan Egger: Right. Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: Of how the market works here. What happens when a futures contract is about to expire and there's not enough buyers? Well, the price goes down. What stops the price from just falling out completely to where it goes to zero? The answer is normally there's always a buyer of last resort, and that buyer of last resort is the storage arbitrageur, the guy who says, wait a minute, this month's futures contract is expiring
Nathan Egger: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: $2 lower than next month's futures contract. I can buy the oil now, store it for a month, and sell it into next month's contract, and I'll pocket that $2 as guaranteed profit. It's that guy, that storage arbitrageur, being able to step in. He's providing that buyer of last resort that stops the market price from crashing completely. If there's no storage, there's no buyer of last resort, and all of a sudden, And then the price can go completely to zero.
So, it is an inherently fuzzy number, especially when you consider floating storage.
But as far as on-land storage is concerned, I think that we have at most 2 to 4 months before it tops out. I think probably less than that. If you look at the last 2 inventory builds in Cushing alone, it's been running about 900,000 barrels per week on average for the last 2 weeks. If you kept up that rate, which I don't expect we will,
Nathan Egger: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: You'd have less than 10 weeks of storage left before we run out completely in Cushing. Of course, there's other factors. Some of the oil that's in Cushing will be moved out of Cushing, pipelined down to Houston, where there might be more capacity available. There's a lot of moving parts. It's very hard to tell. But in general, I think we've got a couple of months at most before this thing really blows up.
Now, if something happened in the meantime, if there was an OPEC production cut, if the If the oversupply were somehow eliminated by some other means, then that would change everything. But failing that happening, I think within the next couple months, we're going to be up against a storage crisis.
Nathan Egger: So that's storage capacity, Erik. What about potential risk to the supply?
Erik Townsend: Well, if we reach the point of a storage crisis, oil prices will crash until production is abruptly cut off. And that would probably mean prices in the teens. So, it's all about understanding what could happen to reduce supply before we get to that point. In other words, if we have the market oversupplied by 2 million barrels a day, as it is now, we're going to have a real problem, Houston, unless something happens. So, what are the things that could happen that would change the whole picture? And if those things don't happen, we got a real problem.
Well, the first thing— there's really 4 big risks that come to mind in terms of upside risk to oil prices. If OPEC and Russia and other large producers were to actually make a deal on a production cut, that would totally, completely change everything. Price could go anywhere from there. I want to emphasize again, that's OPEC and Russia agreeing on a production cut. Production freeze is meaningless. A production cut of 5%, both OPEC and Russia cutting 5%, would completely eliminate the oversupply. That's what we need to see happen here. I don't think it's in the cards anytime soon. I think that OPEC will hold out for several more months.
I think that OPEC— I say that, I really mean to say Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, which are the 3 countries that are acting together and really in charge of OPEC. I think that if those 3 countries hold out for several more months because they want to see the washout in US shale, they want to see the junk bonds collapse in the US so that there will never in the future be a source of funding for more shale wells in the US.
Their incentive is to not cut production. If I'm wrong about that, if they do cut production, everything totally changes because that could eliminate the oversupply before we get to a storage crisis.
The next one, production freeze. I put that on the list just to reemphasize. It is completely, totally meaningless in terms of effect on supply and demand. There's a caveat though, which is it has been a tremendous influencer of price. And these guys in the Middle East, you know, the Russians and the Saudis and the Venezuelans and Nigerians, they've heard of technical analysis. They know that there are key points where the market reaches a certain level, and if it gets some kind of catalyst that'll pull it up to the next level, usually it stays at that next level.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: These guys have gotten into the catalyst delivery business in the last month or so. Usually just a couple of minutes after the US inventory data comes out at 10:30 on Wednesday mornings, some oil minister from someplace has got some nonsensical rhetoric about how the production freeze is a near certainty, and it causes prices to rally. So these guys can influence price. I don't know how long they can keep it going. I think eventually—
Nathan Egger: They can't.
Erik Townsend: Eventually, the production freeze will be forgotten about when people wise up to the fact that it didn't mean anything. How long does it take? Well, how long does it take for the mainstream media to wake up to the fact that they're not reporting the news very accurately? At the end of the day, the point is that this production freeze thing is affecting emotions. As long as it continues to affect emotions, it will be meaningful, and then at some point it will be forgotten.
Nathan Egger: Geopolitical upset.
Erik Townsend: That's it. What if a new war broke out that takes 2 million barrels a day of oil production offline because somebody's oil field just got blown up with a bomb? That would certainly do it. And you might think, well, yeah, there's really not a whole lot of geopolitical risks other than the ones we already know and understand pretty well in Syria and Iraq and so forth. Well, wait a minute. Look at what's on the cards here. Don't rule out the possibility of one of these countries that's trying to support the price recognizing, okay, Okay. If we take one of our competitors, and remember that with the whole Sunni-Shia backdrop that you have in the Middle East, it's very easy to find a competitor who's also an arch rival, religiously, culturally, everything else. Let's take one of these guys and let's go bomb their stuff, their oil-producing assets, so that our oil will be worth more money.
That's an entirely plausible thing that could happen before this is over.
Finally, the last upside risk, US production decrease. Clearly, it's coming. No doubt. There has been a total collapse in drilling rigs, in the rig count in the United States, drilling new oil wells. And we've already seen that production has begun to decrease. It will continue to decrease, and it will accelerate its pace of decrease. But it's not going to be enough. We're not going to see the degree of supply destruction that we need to rebalance the market.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: just coming out of the US as a result of what's already happened. We need to see a profound reduction in US production in order to balance this market. And that's not going to come just from the fact that we've been drilling less wells. The price is going to have to collapse in order to force that to happen.
Nathan Egger: Well, an excellent point was made by one of our listeners and forum users. The forum user's name is GHF6. And he pointed out the demand side of oil. The discussion with Art got us well-versed in the supply and storage side of the equation, and we just recapped and updated our listeners on that. But we haven't really touched on the demand side. Can you explain why you didn't put more emphasis on the demand side of this picture?
Erik Townsend: Really excellent question. And I'm sorry, I can't repeat the gentleman's username from—
Nathan Egger: there was too many letters and numbers. GHF6.
Erik Townsend: I was just gonna say that. Hi, GHF6, whoever you are. Thank you for the question. It's a fantastic question, and there is a good answer to this. Normally, obviously, supply and demand go hand in hand. You can't talk about one without talking about the other.
In this case, I really believe that this situation in oil is a man-made problem. It is a man-made problem on the supply side. If you wanted to ask a question like, hey, does this How does this slowdown that we're seeing in the economy jibe with the oil price? And could it be that the oil price being so low is causing the economy to slow down? If you wanted to look at a question like that, then certainly you've got to get into demand on oil. But if you're just trying to understand what's happening here with respect to oil price, first you had this— First exogenous condition was central bank liquidity. A wall of money coming out of the Central Reserve. A lot of it went into malinvestment in the shale patch.
Then you've got the next man-made event, which is the Saudi decision not to cut production. I say Saudi position; in theory, it's an OPEC position. As far as I'm concerned, it's really a Saudi decision not to cut production in order to support the price, but instead to try to defend market share.
So these are all things that have had a profound effect on supply, and I'm convinced that they are the factors that are driving the market.
In a normal market, I would want to know about demand if I were concerned about a question like, what does the price of oil mean to the economic outlook for— is there a recession coming? Then you've got to dive into demand. If you're looking at what's happening with the oil price, I think this is all about a supply-side disruption, a disruption in the supply side of the supply-demand curve. And I think that's where the action is, and that's why we've been focusing on it.
Nathan Egger: All right. I'm pretty certain that we've used up this week's time budget for crude oil. If anything else remains unclear, please ask us in the forums, you guys. So moving on, the ECB meeting today, it's a big deal. It's been widely anticipated. And markets didn't move in either direction. Well, they moved in both directions before moving in no direction, really.
What do you make of all this? What have we heard from the ECB today, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, ECB was way more accommodative than anybody expected, and it still didn't move markets higher. And what it says to me is that the markets were kind of waiting for a miracle that was not really possible. And when the impossible didn't come to fruition, the market started to roll over.
I suspect that we're going to still have some hanging on of people thinking, well, we've got a Fed meeting next week. So before the bottom falls out of oil prices and the stock market and we're headed down into the 20s in oil prices and below 1,800 in stock prices, when does all that start? I don't think it probably starts till after the Fed meeting next week. We'll see.
Nathan Egger: So we're looking for a Fed response to the ECB action today or the ECB announcement today. And how is this— how is this going to affect the US dollar rally that we've been seeing for years now?
Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think it's necessarily the Fed reacting to the ECB. It's a question of what's the Fed's policy statement going to be? And particularly, are they going to hike interest rates again? Almost everybody is assuming that an interest rate hike is off the table because it's completely crazy. They got to support the market with all the negative, you know, bad problems in the They can't do that. Well, hang on, look at the stock market. It's all the way back up as we're speaking now, just about 1990, 10 points shy of 2,000. It's not so bad right now. If you are trying to justify your decision and you are the Fed, the Federal Open Market Committee, next week, it's hard to say that we have to be accommodative in order to arrest a stock market crash.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: The stock market has been rallying enthusiastically for the last 3 weeks. So I think that most likely they do nothing. It is possible— Jim Rickards in particular has been outspoken in saying that he thinks the Fed is going to hike rates again, hike rates next week. So if we just saw the ECB be profoundly accommodative and the Fed responded and was not at all accommodative, and—
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: surprise the market by being tighter than anybody expects, that could really be fireworks. I'm a little bit skeptical. I think that Jim Rickards' idea of a hike coming next week is maybe a little bit too pessimistic, but it's possible.
Nathan Egger: So we didn't see a lot of action in the stock market in response to the ECB announcement today. But we have seen, at least since the middle of 2015, a pretty strong correlation between the stock market And the crude oil market, is that something that you expect to continue beyond this ECB meeting and, and further beyond the Fed meeting of next week?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's been uncanny how strong the correlation between the S&P and crude oil has been. And I think it's a matter more of crude oil pulling the S&P down. I think that most likely what will happen is that regime of strong correlation between S&P and crude will resume. That's my expectation. I have to point out, though, that today, in the wake of this morning's ECB announcement, it's the first time in weeks that I've seen, you know, crude and stocks and bonds all moving independently. You know, for a while, we just had stocks moving opposite of bonds and stocks and crude were moving in lockstep. Now they're moving all in their own independent directions today. It'll be very interesting to see if we come back into that strong correlation regime between S&P and crude oil that we've had for the last couple months. I think we will.
Nathan Egger: So if you're bearish on stocks and commodities, crude in particular, and you expect them both to roll over, where do you hide right now if you're, if you're an investor?
Erik Townsend: I think if I'm looking for new things to invest in, the bottom in crude oil is by far my favorite. I think I think that's the opportunity, certainly, of the last several years, if not of a lifetime. I do think it's early to get into the long side of that trade. So I think it's a wait for that. But I would be mostly waiting to make my move in crude oil.
Gold, I have mixed feelings about. And it's funny, I have a really hard time. I've been thinking about gold for the last few weeks because we bring it up on the show every week. I can't put my finger on why I'm just not buying this rally. If I look at the chart, very, very, very strong momentum above key technical levels. This is a classic breakout, has all the signs on the chart of looking like it's going much, much higher. For some reason, I can't put my finger on it, I'm just having a hard time believing in this gold rally. If you feel differently, though, in general, it looks like, at least on the charts, I don't know why I'm And I'm feeling this, this spidey sense is telling me something's wrong with the gold rally. But if I look at the chart, it really does look like a strong breakout. If you're a gold bull, buying precious metals here is certainly an opportunity.
And finally, I think cash is an attractive place to be. You mentioned the US dollar rally. I want to come back to that point. US dollar rally, I expect, will probably continue. It stalled out here at about 100. I wouldn't be surprised I'm surprised, especially if the stock market rout continues, to see the dollar rally continue as well. And so, you know, being in cash and US dollars is really not a bad place to be. I don't think you need to be fully invested in a market that's as crazy as this one.
Nathan Egger: I think we've just about covered everything that we need to this week, Erik. And listeners out there, know that we're working on another fantastic show next week featuring Axel Merk. And as many of you know, Axel is a currencies guy. So, I'm sure he'll have plenty to say in the wake of the ECB and Fed meetings. I'm really looking forward to that.
In the meantime, your subscriptions, your ratings, and your reviews on iTunes have been incredibly helpful and overwhelmingly positive. Thank you very much for all of them. If you haven't done so yet, we could really use your help. You can follow us on Twitter, @MacroVoices.
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Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome to MacroVoices, episode 4, recorded March 3rd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. This week we're bringing you part 2 of our special on trading the coming bottom in oil prices. Last week, Art Berman and I took a deep dive into the fundamentals affecting the oil market, and this week Nathan and I will be examining trading strategies for the coming bottom and from a number of different perspectives.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, let's run down this week's markets. We'll start with equities again.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, I had thought last week that this rally in equity markets was going to be over at the 50-day moving average. That didn't work out. We have advanced all the way to the 100-day moving average. It looks like we're stalling out here. I do think a lot of this has to do with oil markets and the tendency for equities and oil to trade in sympathy with one another.
I am hoping that both oil and equities are done here and we're about to see the market roll over to the downside. Then again, I said that last week and it wasn't quite time yet. So we've yet to see what's going to happen here.
Nathan Egger: We led with equities, but clearly crude is leading the markets. Let's cover that next. Now, last week you said the spin doctors were winning out over the economic fundamentals, which you continue to see as bearish. How's this week looking?
Erik Townsend: Nathan, it's absolutely shocking this week what's been going on. It's more spin doctors, it's more propaganda. It doesn't have anything to do with economic fundamentals. But here's the thing I want you to hear: it's working. What's happened is we've had first the Russians and then the Venezuelan oil minister this week, or today on Thursday at least. It was Nigeria yesterday, it was Venezuela. These guys are succeeding at talking the market higher on nonsense, and it's utter nonsense. It has nothing to do with reality. But we're getting to the point now, just teetering on $35 oil prices. We start getting north of $36, Nathan, that's where you get to the point where you're outside of the consolidation range that has been prevailing for the last month or so. That upside breakout would probably trigger a bunch of stops, and I wouldn't be surprised if—
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If we saw a stop clearing run targeting those stops in the area just above $36.
So this could become a self-fulfilling prophecy if we got a rally going here above $36. Before you know it, we could be into the $40s. I do not think that anything has changed in terms of the fundamentals that we talked last week. But there are people with a vested interest in jawboning this market higher, and they are being astonishingly successful despite the fact that they're working from the weakest of arguments. They're talking about a production freeze, which is categorically irrelevant. It doesn't mean anything. There's no reason to take it seriously. But we got a $1.50 rally today out of the Nigerian oil minister saying, hey, we're still looking at a March 20th meeting. Even that date was later refuted as being made up. But these guys are lying through their teeth. It's working and they're succeeding at jawboning the market higher. I think it's as high as it can go. We're right at the top of our trading range.
I would like to see both equities and crude oil roll over and move lower from here, dramatically lower. think crude oil has $10 lower to go than it is right now. But for the moment, what we're seeing is all the rhetoric and propaganda from various different small OPEC countries is working and it's driving the market higher.
Nathan Egger: Well, there's a common theme that we're seeing here across all of these markets, and that's that they're all at critical points from a technical analysis standpoint. And gold is no different. We've been watching gold's breakout above its 200-day moving average with bated breath for the last few weeks to see if it could sustain a move above $1,260. And as we're talking here late session on Thursday, we're at $1,260. How is this looking for you? Where do you think gold is headed next?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, what I was looking for was for gold to break out and close above its previous intraday high, which is right around $1,260. As you said, the market is still trading as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon. We're at $1,260 even right now as we're speaking. Looks to me like this rally does have legs. I was very skeptical initially. I'm still I'm still concerned long-term or even intermediate-term that if the downside rout in equities resumes, which I think it will, I think that there's a possibility that gold will end up selling off along with equities and everything else if we get into a really heated sell-off. So far that hasn't happened. And I think we just today— I saw something on Twitter that Louise Yamada, very famous technician who's been around Wall Street for decades and decades, came out as expressing a bullish call on gold. And I think that's the first time since 2011 that Louise has been bullish on gold.
So things do appear to be turning. I still have some skepticism about this rally because there are some fundamentals in terms of the US dollar rally, which I don't think is over, that would govern an upside move in gold. But you can't argue with the chart. And right now what I'm seeing is the breakout is continuing to the upside.
Nathan Egger: All right. Finally, let's touch on bonds really quick. How are bonds looking to you this week? How do they relate to what we're seeing in oil and the stock market?
Erik Townsend: Well, we've seen bonds trade off in price, up in yield in reaction to the stock market rallying. I think that that is a reverse safety trade as we're seeing a little bit of confidence in stocks. Some of that panic money that was flowing into the bond market is coming back out into the stock market. I don't think it's going to last a whole lot longer. I said that last week at the 50-day moving average. Now here we are quite a few points higher at Almost 1990 on the S&P, just flirting with the 100-day moving average, at least on the futures chart. So I don't know where it's headed, but I think that lower is likely. And if it's going higher from here, I don't think it's going to go too much higher.
Nathan Egger: All right, Erik, thanks as always for the market perspective. We're going to go ahead and move on now to part 2 of our special in the coming bottom in oil prices right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now as this week's special guest is— oh wait, it's me, folks. The way things worked out when we decided at the 11th hour to split this topic up into 2 shows, there wasn't time to recruit another guest to help with this week's analysis. So Nathan and I are going to cover this week's show. Nathan will be interviewing me, and of course, the The subject is trading strategies for the coming bottom in oil prices, which I discussed with Art Berman last week.
Nathan Egger: And Erik, probably it's just as well, because this is a subject you're as expert on as anyone we could have hoped to recruit. I'm sure there's somebody better than you out there, but we don't know them. So, this week, I'm going to interview Erik, and we'll be coming at the question of how to trade the coming bottom in oil prices from several different angles. So, first, we're going to consider how the big boys are playing this, and then we'll come at it from the perspective of a discretionary commodity trading advisor looking to use the futures and options markets to play this coming bottom.
And then we'll look at it from the perspective of both the fixed income and equity fund managers, how those 2 different strategies might differentiate. And finally, we'll look at the question from a retail investor's perspective. So, Erik, let's start off by summarizing the fundamental view that you and Art both agreed upon in last week's show.
Erik Townsend: Sure. The view that Art and I agree on is that we're in the 9th inning here. This thing is almost over, but it's not over yet. And that's a really important point. Both Art and I think that there is another leg down coming in crude oil prices. We both think it's a big one and it's not here yet. Much to my surprise, even though this week on Wednesday we got a 10.4 million barrel build in inventories nationwide, 1.2 million of that was Cushing, Oklahoma build. Now we've got less than 10 million barrels available in Cushing, Oklahoma that can That are still remaining capacity. So we used up more than 10% of it this week alone, and the oil market still closed higher. It just blew my mind that that could happen. There was a slight decrease in U.S. production. I imagine that had something to do with it. But I think mostly it's the propaganda.
The Nigerian oil minister, you know, the market was starting to crash on that news. And 3 minutes later, the Nigerian minister is out saying we're going to have a meeting in March and we're going to have a production freeze and the price is going to move sharply after that. Frankly, I think if it were to move sharply, it would be sharply to the downside. But that's not what he meant. So Art and I both think that it's not over, that there is another really big move down. But we're almost to that washout point. And when we do get to that point, I wouldn't be surprised to see front-month crude oil futures trading below $20 a barrel.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And it will be an opportunity of a lifetime. I think both Art and I agree that although we're still bearish, we see that it's not quite over yet. The light's at the end of the tunnel. And when this thing is over, it's going to be the bull market trading opportunity of a lifetime.
Nathan Egger: Okay, so we know that you and Art both agree, you both, you both share, at least at current, a similar fundamental view. But is there an argument that would contradict that of you and Art?
Erik Townsend: Well, the contradictory argument that I've become quite concerned about this week is the one that says that the spin doctors might succeed at getting the oil market to recover before the fundamentals dictate that. It's very hard for me to see how they could actually keep prices elevated in the face of these really huge inventory builds. But we saw that here on Wednesday of this week. 10.5 million barrel build, 3 times bigger than any analyst had expected. And the price of oil still closes higher on the day. Just blows my mind. So if these guys continue to fabricate this story, particularly if they can manage to jawbone the market above $36, $36.50 or so, that's where I think a lot of people's stops will be set because the previous high in this cycle was right at $36. So there's probably a bunch of stops just above $36. Somebody's going to be gunning for them. If they manage to take them out, they could ignite a short squeeze that could carry the market into the $40s.
And if they really played the propaganda correctly, they might be able to keep the price up on this idea that supposedly a production cut is coming any day now. There's going to be a meeting. They're confusing, I think intentionally, the phrase production freeze with production cut, trying to make them sound synonymous when they're actually Completely opposite, different things.
The risk that I see here is that the market could persuade itself that the bottom is already in even before the fundamentals call for that. We could get a short squeeze and a rally up into the 40s, and eventually we will get that production cut. Eventually Saudi Arabia will capitulate and there will be a production cut. I don't think it's coming for several months. Could the market somehow keep itself elevated for all that time? I don't think so. I'm still short here. I still expect a big move to the downside in crude oil prices. But if something's going to go wrong, it would be the technical breakout above $36 gaining momentum and that becoming a self-fulfilling prophecy where a short squeeze carries the market higher on short squeeze internals completely independent of fundamentals. That's the what could go wrong for my view. And in that case, what we'd be looking at is it's not the coming bottom. in oil prices, but rather the bottom is already in and it's all uphill from here.
I don't think it's going to go that way, but if there's something that Art and I could have wrong, I think that would be it.
Nathan Egger: All right, well, with that summary of the backdrop of the oil market fundamentals, let's move on to how to trade this. And we're going to start with how the really smart money is playing this. What are the really big players going to do here, Erik? And I think it might also be wise to explain what we mean by really big players. Who are they?
Why are we calling them the big guys?
Erik Townsend: When you talk about really big players, what comes to my mind is the biggest hedge funds, the ones that have complete discretion to do whatever they want, who are looking at this situation. And the really smart guys are not looking to take market risk. They're not looking to speculate. What they want to do is lock in a sure thing. A truly risk-free arbitrage very rarely presents itself in financial markets, because if it's truly risk-free, obviously, Obviously, everybody would be jumping on it. You've got a trade here which is staring the biggest players in the market in the face. And what's so cool about it, if you're the big boys, is that the little guys like me can't touch it. The way this works is, let's suppose that in the next month we see the crash in oil prices that both Art Berman and I think is very possible.
We see oil prices on the April delivery contract trading all the way down at $16.50.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Which Art said would be the inflation-adjusted equivalent of an all-time low. So we see that happening. Meanwhile, a year later, the price of the delivery contract for April of 2017 is, say, $10 higher than that at $27. Well, what the biggest players are going to do is they're going to arbitrage that difference. They're going to say, we're going to buy $16 oil.
And at the very same instant, without ever taking any market risk, they're going to sell the $27 oil a year later. Now, that presents a problem, which is, what are you going to do with the oil that you have to buy and take delivery of this April? And you've got to do something with it to store it until next April. Well, what they'll do is they'll charter a very large crude carrier tanker ship, great big ship that normally is designed to carry oil from the Middle East to the Western world where it's consumed.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: They'll fill it up with oil in Houston, Texas, take it out and anchor it in the bay off of Houston, and it'll sit there for a year basically serving as a floating gas tank. And they can charter— they have to take the cost of chartering the ship out of their expenses, but after they've done that and paid for some insurance, they pocket the difference. And it's very, very important because this gets misinterpreted and misreported. You'll hear the Wall Street Journal or the cable channels reporting this as these really big players are buying this cheap oil, putting it in container ships, speculating, hoping that they'll be able to sell it for much more later down the road. That's really not how this trade works. They're selling it the very same day that they bought the oil on the immediate market in the front-month contract. They're locking their price in for delivering it a year later, and it's a done deal. They're going to make a fortune on this.
All they have to do is have the wherewithal to be able to charter a ship and use it as a gas tank and so on and so forth. Most people can't do that. So the people who really are going to make a killing here are the people that have locked this market up. They knew this was coming. They've spent the last 6 months making deals with shipping companies, getting options on the biggest, best ships that could be used for this purpose. And they're going to be ready to go when market prices crash and we get to the teens. If that really happens, they're going to be ready to fill up several crude oil carrier ships With crude oil, and they're going to make a fortune, and they're not going to take any risk whatsoever in doing it. All you have to do in order to get in on that deal is have the resources to be able to just charter a crude oil carrier ship, fill it up with oil, and park it for a year.
Not everybody can do that. It's really only the biggest hedge funds that have the wherewithal to put on a trade like that.
Nathan Egger: Well, maybe we don't have the resources to afford to charter a tanker, but We didn't use your swimming pool this entire winter. What if we just drain that puppy and fill it up with crude?
Erik Townsend: Well, Nathan, I don't know about the swimming pool, but I do actually have a friend of mine who is working on a poor man's version of this tanker trade, which he calls the container trade. And basically, the way it works is you take a shipping container— those are the 40-foot-long steel containers that are normally loaded onto the back of container ships— you fill it up with drums of crude oil and store it in your backyard. And there's some legal issues with that with respect to hazardous materials and whether or not you can store oil without having a permit to be in that business and so forth. But there are people who are actually enterprising enough to look at storing oil on their own property by getting a rented storage container and filling it up with drums of oil. I'm not ready to put that one on myself, but it's possible.
Nathan Egger: All right. So, let's look at this from a commodity trader's perspective, or more precisely, from the perspective of a commodity trader who doesn't have the resources to put on the tanker trade, or the shipping container trade, or even the swimming pool trade. Is this just a matter of waiting for front-month WTI futures to bottom in the upper teens, and then you back the leveraged truck up and you buy that contract there in the teens?
Erik Townsend: No. And I think that's exactly the mistake that a whole lot of people are getting ready to make. I've heard so many people talking about, boy, when, when we get oil prices in the teens— and I think it's coming— when we get that, I'm just going to pile in. I'm going to, I'm going to I'm gonna pile in, I'm gonna go crazy. Well, pile into what?
Let's take the April delivery contract as an example. Let's suppose that Art and I are proven right and that contract just crashes. And by the time we get to, let's say, 2 weeks from now in the middle of March, that April contract is trading all the way down at $17.
How could that be possible? Well, the only way it could be possible, as far as I can tell, would be if there is a storage crisis where there's no place to put the oil and the price is just being forced drastically lower. If that were happening, that means that that front-month contract's price would be dramatically lower than the next subsequent contract. So let's say April is trading at $17, May is trading at $23.
Okay. So it's $6 higher to buy the May contract. Well, if you bought the April contract, come March 21st, that contract expires. You have to roll it forward into the May contract. So what happens if there's a $6 difference in price is you're effectively adjusting your entry cost. Now it's not $17 anymore. It's $23 is your new adjusted cost of entry. You wait another month. Let's say that May contract sells off. off to the point where there's a $5 spread in that May to June timeframe. Now, when you roll May forward into June, it's another $5 and your price has gone up to $28.
If it's another $5 the month after that, you're going to be up to $32. So you're going to keep paying more and more because each time you have to roll that front month contract forward, you're increasing your effective cost of acquisition by whatever that difference is, whatever the contango is between those 2 contracts.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: So, I don't think you'd want to buy the front-month contract, even though that's the one that has the lowest price, because that's also the one that has the highest premium for rolling it forward to the next month. So, contract selection is going to be just super-duper important here.
And I think that when the front-month bottoms, it's likely to happen with record contango. So, you're going to want to look at where is the upside? Where's the potential? What contract do I want to trade?
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: I would say you want to go at least a year or 2 out in the term structure. Why do I say that? Because I want to pick a contract that I expect the market will have recovered by the time that thing comes to maturity. So I'm not going to have to deal with it falling into this deep contango situation at the last minute. Well, most people think this thing ought to be ending by the end of this year.
Let's just assume everything takes longer than you think it will. So add a year to that. By the end of '17, I think that this current action should be over. We ought to have an OPEC price cut by then. There ought to be a whole new regime in play.
So if I look at the December '17 contract, I kind of like that one as a place to play this, at least initially. Now, once you get to the point where there is a clear upside trend, the price is recovering. Let's say OPEC has announced a price cut and all of a sudden prices are really starting to recover. At that point, I think you would want to back roll out of that longer-dated contract into the front month because the front month will be transitioning from deep state of contango back towards a backwardation condition. That means the front month is going to perform best. But you don't want to be there and just sitting on it as it rolls at what could be an enduring prolonged period of low prices. So you want to wait till the, the trend is in play before you move back into front month futures.
And until then, I think you want to be So, you want to be probably looking at later-dated contracts, at least December of '17, because you're going to avoid the big contango drop between— from one month to the next that would exist if you were holding the front-month contract.
Nathan Egger: So, when we're talking about trading the futures outright here, this is a little difficult because first, we're talking about calling a bottom in anything, notoriously difficult. And second, we're talking about contract selection, a hyperfocus on the contract selection, which— where are you going to put your money? Where's the value there?
What about other options, specifically option, you know, as opposed to going outright long using the futures market? What about calls on the longer-dated futures?
Erik Townsend: Well, that's definitely a big part of this play. And I spend a lot of time thinking about the tradeoff between outright futures, you know, long outright futures versus buying calls on futures. Now, the problem is, obviously, the upside to calls is you are limiting your loss. You can't possibly lose more than 100% of the call premium. So once you bought that call option— and there's some pretty decent-looking call options already if you start looking at 2018 December at, say, a 50 strike or so. I believe it's got to be above 50 by then, so that ought to be in the money by then.
And, you know, those options are reasonably priced now. But the thing is, you're paying through the nose for volatility because what determines The price of an option, more than anything else, is volatility in the market. The longer dated that option is, the longer its duration, the more expensive that volatility cost is. So let's suppose that prices are going to go down to $18. I'm just pulling this number randomly out of a hat, and stay there for a year. They're just not going to move; they're going to stay flat at $18.
Well, what would happen would be. The call options would continue to decay dramatically in value, and the reason that would happen is because the market is losing its volatility.
The implied volatility that exists at the time that the market bottoms will be much higher than it will be several months later. Now, will the price also have gone up during that time, suggesting you wanted to jump on that option right when you had the chance at the lowest price? Or are you better off to maybe wait out the market in order to wait for that volatility to come out, which affects the cost of those calls? Maybe the underlying price is edging up slightly, but the cost of the call that you want to buy is still coming down because volatility is coming out of the market.
So if you're going to look at calls on futures contracts, I think it's a very smart way to play this. But you've got to look at a little bit of time lag. I would be looking initially when I think the market has bottomed. at whatever I'm going to do in outright futures, I would do that first and give it a little bit of time, see if some of the volatility coming out of the market improves the price of those call options, even as the underlying stays constant.
Nathan Egger: So given the current volatility that we're seeing in the oil market, it might not be the best time to be playing the options. You might get a cheaper price at a later date, basically.
Erik Townsend: Exactly, especially if you think, as I do, that prices are going to move much lower. I don't think there's going to be an instantaneous V-shaped recovery. Now, certainly at some point when we get an OPEC production cut— not freeze, but production cut— when that deal really and truly is made, and I think it's still a long ways off, that's when prices start going straight up, and that's when you want to get out of those long-dated contracts.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: into the front month, which is going to benefit the most from the market sort of celebrating a hallelujah moment that the oil rout is over.
I don't think we're there yet. And if your expectation, as mine is, is that prices are going to go down, find a bottom, and kind of stay there without really recovering very quickly, that suggests that if I'm right about that, you could wait it out and get a better price on those options after the price has been lingering at $18.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: for a month than you would have gotten the first day that it fell to that level.
Nathan Egger: Okay. Now, let's say that I'm not eligible to trade futures or options. Let's say I'm running an institutional fixed income book and I want some exposure to this bottoming of oil prices, you know, but I can't trade the futures, only bonds. How am I going to play this?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the first question I would ask in that scenario is how broad is your investment mandate? Are you allowed to be both long and short fixed income instruments, or are you long only, because if you can be short, then I think you're late to the table. You should have been playing this already by buying credit default swaps on shale-issued junk bonds months ago, because that play has performed extremely well.
And you really want to have gotten into that already. It's a little bit late, but there may still be more to play on the downside there.
Nathan Egger: Erik, can I just stop you really quick and explain— have you explain to everybody what a credit default swap is and why you'd want that as a way of expressing your short position?
Erik Townsend: Sure. A credit default swap is basically an insurance policy. If the bond that you hold doesn't pay off, if the people that owe you money, that is, who issued the bond, default on it and never pay you back, a credit default swap is an insurance policy that makes sure you get paid back anyway. The way that it works, that's a little bit different from a regular insurance policy. If I'm talking about fire insurance, I can buy fire insurance on my house and I'm covered.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: I can't buy fire insurance on your house because I'm speculating. I think you're a reckless guy. You're the kind of guy who I think is going to burn his house down. So I'm going to buy, you know, fire insurance on Nate's house. I can't do that. You can do that in fixed income markets. You can buy credit default swaps on bonds that you don't own. So it's a good way. Now, it's possible to short those bonds, but the credit default swap is, in my opinion, a better, more efficient way.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: way of essentially betting against a bond, betting that it's going to fail. Because if there's a credit event, if there's a default, you end up getting paid as a result of that. And it's as soon as a determination is made by ISDA, the organization that oversees all this stuff, that the credit event happened, you're basically assured of getting paid at that point.
So I like credit default swaps as a way of playing the short side. What I would be doing if I was a fixed income guy here is I would already be playing the CDS
Nathan Egger: Yes.
Erik Townsend: On the worst of the junk bonds that I could find. And what I would do is hire a guy like Art Berman to look at it from an oil standpoint, which is to say, how much revenue is really going to be there behind a certain batch of bonds? You know, what are the wells that are behind them? You know, what are their production rates? Do all the geology analysis of how much oil is really going to get produced by what's backing these bonds. And then I would do some financial analysis. I'd probably use another consultant on it, and I would be building a short book, which I would express through credit default swaps.
But you know what's going to happen, just as happened during the 2009 event with mortgages. All of a sudden, mortgage-backed security is a 4-letter word, and it doesn't matter what the fundamentals are. Nobody wants anything to do with it. I expect the same thing is going to happen with shale-issued junk bonds. And there will be some good ones. There will be guys that have no risk of going out of business, that actually manage their businesses intelligently and have strong balance sheets and are not going to default on anything. And those bonds are still going to get dragged down with everybody else because most of the market is just selling with the broad brush shotgun approach of, we know there's a lot of risk there, we don't know where it is, just sell everything.
So I think that when you could start to find those jewels in the rough, now you're building a long-short strategy where you have both shorts and longs. And eventually you transition into a pure long position where you've gotten rid of all your shorts. You've hopefully profited from some of those credit default swaps. They've hedged your downside risk and you've chosen the best of those credits and bought them on the cheap when the carnage is over. I don't think the carnage has really started yet. So the buying on the cheap, I don't think we're there. I think it's late to the game at this point to start building a short book and start building CDS or buying CDS on energy-related junk bond issues. But I think that that opportunity still exists. It's not time yet to play the other side of this, the long side of it.
At least I don't think it is.
Nathan Egger: So given that, what else could potentially affect credit markets? Do you see any other risks out there to the banking system that might spur these banks to make premature cash calls for these shale-issued junk bonds and this sort Well, so far we're seeing the opposite.
Erik Townsend: I think everybody wants for there not to be a subprime-like blowup in the shale space. We've heard rumors that regulators are kind of telling the banks to do what they can to give the shale guys a break, not to, not to enforce too harshly on them. I don't think any of that's going to matter. I think we're headed towards a massive wave of defaults.
That massive wave of defaults will come after Art and I are proven right about another large move down in oil prices. So far, we're losing that battle. The spin doctors are winning. I don't think that the arguments they're making about a production freeze make any sense whatsoever. But they're holding oil prices high, and we, we need to wait and see what happens.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, now let's suppose for a moment that I'm an equity portfolio manager, and I can only trade stocks. Again, I can't trade the commodity itself. How am I going to play this?
Erik Townsend: Well, in this case, we've got a little bit of a conundrum because history teaches us that normally the stocks tend to smell out problems and lead the fixed income markets. So you would expect to see the turnaround happen, you know, the bottoming should happen first in stocks and the turnaround should happen first in stocks.
I don't think it's going to play out that way this time. And the reason I say that is I think that the trouble that I see coming in credit markets. Most people are underestimating how bad it's going to be.
I think that when the wave of defaults hits, all of a sudden there's going to be a real panic, and that's where you're going to get your capitulation low in stocks. So I think the energy stocks are going to first get nailed with the next move down in oil prices. Everybody's going to say, oh my God, that's it. This is the bottom in oil prices. This has to the bottom in oil stocks. And I think that's the false buy moment where people are going to go piling in. There's going to be a bounce off of that level, whatever it is. But then I think the wave of credit defaults is going to come back to haunt the equity market and that those credit defaults are going to result in a lower low. Now, I'm lining up a lot of dominoes there, Nathan. I don't know if it's really going to play out that way. You'd have to keep a close eye on on it and see how the market develops.
But that's kind of the way that I see things developing.
So if I were an equity manager, similar to what I said for fixed income, first of all, if I had the mandate flexibility to be short, then I'd already be massively short energy stocks. Shale drillers that have no way of servicing their debt is exactly who I would be shorting here. And then I would look to turn that into a long-short strategy.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: And eventually transition all the way to an outright long position after the carnage. And I don't think the carnage has even really begun yet. I think we're going to have a really big shakeup in the shale patch. And everybody knows it's coming, but I think most of them are underestimating how bad it's going to be.
Nathan Egger: So, this is a capital story. This is about who has the capital and will be able to acquire distressed assets on the cheap. who can acquire their competitors and who will have no choice but to be acquired once they run out of money and they run out of funding.
Erik Townsend: That is exactly right. And if I had to say anything about 2016 in the energy market, it would be it is the year of capital. It is going to be about who's got the money and the knowledge to step in and say, okay, that distressed asset right there that this bankrupt company doesn't know what to do with, I want it and I know what it's worth. And I was waiting for it and I was ready to play vulture and make my move and get it on the cheap. That's who's really going to win here are the people who are well-capitalized and know the business well enough to know what's worth buying on the cheap and what isn't.
It's going to be a major year of acquisitions and mergers. And I think that from an equity standpoint, if you have the wherewithal, if you're big enough that you can hire a team of consultants, guys like Art, to do the oil side of this, balance sheet guys to really dig into the various shale operators who are going to be the survivors that carry this industry forward into its second coming, which definitely is coming someday. It's still a few years down the road. Those guys are going to be super big wins. The problem is you're talking about betting on the winners, the survivors of the coming carnage. You don't know who survived until the carnage is over.
And the way that I look at this is kind of hurry up and wait. Let's see what happens in this space. People who are smarter than I am that are taking this, who have more resources than I am, are trying to figure that out ahead of time. Who's going to fail? Who's not going to fail? Putting their bets on early. I would be looking at it from an equity standpoint. More from the standpoint of we've still got a ways here. The price has got to bottom, which I don't think has happened.
Then the credit markets have got to experience their default wave, which I think will be worse than most people think is coming. Then equities are going to bottom. So we've still got a ways, and I think that if you want to try to play the short side of it, you're a little bit late getting to the table now, but there's still room to do that.
The long side of it, I think it's not till after credit bottoms that we see equities bottom. That is a little bit backwards from what you would normally expect in terms of how equities tend to lead other markets. I think in this particular case, it might go a different way, but that's just my guess.
Nathan Egger: All right. So in your discussion with Art Berman, Art suggested that these shale operators do not have cash. They have massive amounts of debt. And what they do have in the way of assets assets is their equity. And if that equity price starts to decline, what is that going to mean for the, for the associated bonds?
Erik Townsend: Well, and you also have to consider that if the bonds default, the equity is going to be wiped out. So what I think these guys are doing is they're playing an interesting game. They don't have the money to pay back the principal on that they borrowed with these bonds. It ain't going to happen.
It is unlikely that they will be able to get another round of financing and just roll that over and roll it forward. So what they're doing is they're all acting like, oh, servicing my debt is no problem. I can make my payments with the revenue that I'm making on oil. It's all fine.
They're all in this extend and pretend game where they're acting as if there's nothing really wrong. The reality is when they get to the point of having to repay the principal on those bonds, they're not going to be able to do it, and they'll be forced to do something else. Either be acquired by somebody who's got more cash flow and the ability to, you know, the creditworthiness to roll forward that debt into a new set of bonds, or they've got to see some recovery. I think a lot of these guys are hoping that the market is going to magically recover and their cash flow will be enough that they will be able to service their debt. I think I think that's unrealistic wishful thinking.
So at some point we get to the point where not only is the credit market figuring out that these guys can't service their debt, but the equity market is figuring out that they can't service their debt. And presumably if the equity is subordinate to the interests of the bondholders, that means the equity is in lots of trouble. I think it's only when the true extent of how big these credit problems problems, has really learned that that's the point where equity collapses and you get a true bottom.
Nathan Egger: And we're seeing massive new issuance of shares from these shale operators. So it's, it's all not painting a pretty picture for these companies. But I know that a lot of our listeners are retail investors, and they're looking for ways that they can play this. And maybe they're not interested at all in the commodity futures Maybe they're only interested in equities. I don't know. But there are so many energy-related ETFs to choose from that it can be a little daunting to understand all of the options. Can you help us sift through some of them, please?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Coming at this from a retail investor's perspective, my first advice is don't be in a rush. This thing isn't over yet. I don't think you want to rush off to buy XLE or OIH, or especially not something like USO, which is The ETF that directly invests in commodity futures.
It's not over yet. Listen again to last week's show with Art. We think we've got a couple of months and at least $10 of downside before the market has really reached a bottom. When it gets there, don't buy an ETF like USO. It has exactly the same contango roll problem that we talked about in why you shouldn't buy the front-month futures contract.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If that seems a little bit complicated or hard to follow, summarize it to say when the price of oil goes up, the USO ETF doesn't go up as much because of this roll-forward problem of the price changing every month. So you don't really want to look only at something like USO. I would look at USO after a clear uptrend is in play where the contango is coming out of the market and we're shifting back into a backwardation. Term structure, that's where you want to be long the front month.
And that's where the USO ETF would give you the right kind of exposure as a retail investor. So I would be taking the strategy of make sure that you wait until the bottom is really in. I don't think we're there yet.
I would start looking at ideally, if you have the resources and the time, maybe investing in a newsletter or something so you can start to form your own list of companies that you think are going to be the winners and start buying those individual stocks. If you don't want to take that approach and you want to go with just an ETF like XLE, which gives you a simple one-stop shopping way to buy energy stocks all in one place, now you're getting the good, bad, and the ugly all in one package. You would be better off if you could discriminate and make up your own shortlist of stocks that you want to buy. But an ETF like XLE is probably a good second choice.
Another good choice would be OIH, which is an ETF which is not oil companies, but oil service companies. That's like Halliburton and the companies that do the fracking and put the casings on deepwater offshore wells and all this high-tech stuff. We're going to need, as we move further into this era of peak cheap oil, we're going to need more and more of these high-tech fancy services that make it possible to produce oil in all these newfangled ways. These guys have just taken an absolute killing. Their stocks have been beaten up, and they're companies that have a very, very sound future. We're going to need their services. So OIH is definitely an appealing one. But again, Wait until the bottom is in. I think we've got a ways to go until we get there.
And I would consider both equity and fixed income exposures that match your investment goals. There are likely to be some shakeouts in the high-yield fixed income space, including a bunch of defaults. If you can find the quality list of shale-issued debt that didn't default, that's going to be just fine. You're probably going to be able to get it at a very attractive yield because those bonds sold off along with a whole bushel full of bad apples. Then everything sells off at once. If there were a couple of good apples in the bushel, you're going to be able to get them at a distressed price by taking advantage of understanding the mechanism of what's going on.
So my biggest advice to retail investors is don't be in a rush. I don't think it's over yet. I don't think the big, you know, oh my gosh, the bottom is in, it's time to buy moment has happened.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: I could be wrong about that. If I'm wrong, it will be because the spin doctors have succeeded at overcoming the fundamentals and talking the market higher, which this week they've certainly been very successful at. I don't know if that's going to continue or not, but it might. And I would say just remember that this is a very volatile environment. When you think the bottom is in, especially in terms of the oil price, you know, because it dropped to $16, it doesn't mean it can't go to $8.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: It won't stay there very long. These are unsustainable prices already at the level that we're at. But I think they're going to continue to move lower until the oversupply is eliminated. When that is eliminated, we're looking at the buying opportunity of a lifetime. And I think it's going to be an incredible opportunity for a lot of people to make a lot of money.
Nathan Egger: So just to clarify, I know that ETFs are a popular product for the retail investor. You don't have to do a lot of work. It appears to be a simple and easy option to get exposure. To various market movements. And USO has been one of those that has been very popular. This entire downside move that we've seen in oil has been bought at various stages by retail investors using USO, saying this is the bottom right here. I've got to get in right here for sure. It's going to go above $50.
You know, it's not going to go below $50. It's not going to go below $40. It's not going to go below $30. We've seen all that play out. But I just want to summarize the difficulties with having long exposure to the futures market, whether using an ETF like USO USO, or you've got direct exposure by buying the futures outright. In a contango market is that roll-forward premia. So if we were shorting USO on the way down in this market that had the same contango conditions, that would be beneficial for us, correct?
Erik Townsend: That's right. Contango is a short seller's best friend. When the market is in contango, a short seller is automatically getting a free bump, whatever that difference is between the price You're making that as a free profit every month. The other guy, the long in the contango case or the short in the backwardation case, the other side of the trade is going to be the opposite of that. So you're going to be losing money every month if you're long in a contango market or short in a backwardation market.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, as we wrap up this analysis of the trading strategies for the coming low in oil prices, is there anything Anything else that you want to add, Erik?
Erik Townsend: No, I think that, you know, the overall advice is just be careful. Remember that it is the OPEC production cut that changes everything. It is coming. Saudi Arabia cannot go forever without caving into this. They, they have to eventually agree to it, and it will change everything almost overnight.
What we're seeing right now is a huge bump up in prices. That bump up in prices is based on people thinking that we're coming into that moment of the OPEC production cut. I think they're going to be proven wrong, but it might take until the 20th of March when we have this silly meeting about production freezes before people figure out that production freeze and production cut are not the same thing. So you don't know how long it's going to go. There's plenty of people with very strong agendas to try to manipulate the market and cause an outcome to happen. here. It's just a question of understanding where we are. And I think that investors stand to do very well when you make your long play.
Be ready to ride out some volatility. You're catching a falling knife here. You're trying to buy the bottom of an extremely volatile market. You might be off by a little bit and have to ride a J-curve, as they call it. You know, price goes down before it goes up. But in general, you're looking at oil prices, as Art said, the The all-time low, if you do it on an inflation-adjusted basis, is about $16.50. Right now we're at $35. We've been as low as $26 and change. I think we're going to get down to low 20s, if not teens, before this is over. And when we do, the opportunities are going to be tremendous.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, on that note, let's go ahead and wrap up our coverage of the trading strategies on how to play this coming bottom. oil prices. But please stay with us, listeners, as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for future show topics or interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can also send our hosts your questions and suggestions for the program by emailing mailbag@macrovoices.com. Now, with this week's mailbag, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: All right, Erik. Forum user D. Gilmart sent us one mailbag question for this week, and he writes, for quite some time, the oil prices and the stock market have been almost perfectly correlated. Commentators have even begun assigning causation, saying things like the Dow was down a lot today because of another drop in oil prices. Prices.
Indeed, it seems psychologically to drive the market lower when oil drops. This makes no sense whatsoever to D. Gilmart. Unless you're in an energy firm with exposure to oil prices, dropping oil prices seem to be good news. How could lower oil not be good news, both to companies with energy as a major cost, but also to any company benefiting from extra dollars in consumer pockets? Have you been able to make any sense of this correlation? Is there a reason, or do we just give up thinking about fundamentals in the stock altogether?
Erik Townsend: Well, hi Doug. This is a question that I think about a lot, and I don't think it has a good answer. And the reason I haven't addressed it on the show previously is because I'm guessing. I don't know what the answer is, but here's my guess.
I think what's going on here is that for reasons that our listeners now understand after last week's show with Art Berman, the oil market is is being pushed down to extraordinarily low numbers as a result of crazy circumstances. We had a malinvestment in the shale patch resulting from Fed easy money policy. We had an unexpected decision from Saudi Arabia not to cut production, but to instead focus on preserving market share.
That has led us into this oversupply situation that's going to force oil prices down to Just incredible low numbers. That's what we understand, you and I, Nathan, and now our listeners after these last couple weeks of shows. Most people don't know that though. The average investor is just looking at the big picture and they say low oil prices and low Treasury yields are signs of an oncoming recession or depression.
And I think that what's happening is the market is looking at low oil prices and saying, boy, that is signaling a coming depression or recession. I don't think they're right about that. I think that the situation in the oil market is kind of unique and special, and it's really about the crazy circumstance that we got ourselves into with too much overinvestment in the shale patch and a number of factors that we've talked about for the last couple of weeks. So I think that what's going on is the broader market is incorrectly assuming that low oil prices are a signal of general macroeconomic disease.
And I think that the combination of low oil prices and low Treasury yields is panicking the market into surely this must mean that there's a recession coming.
Now, I don't think that's what it means. I do think there's a recession coming anyway. So, you know, they'll be proven right even if they were wrong. But I think that's what's going on here. And it doesn't make sense to me. I don't think it should be going on. I think that the equity market is misinterpreting what the crude oil market is telling it.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, thank you for that question, Doug. And our second question comes from forum user and listener V. Soares, which I'm going to paraphrase here in the interest of time. V. Soares heard you and Art Berman talking about a coming wave of defaults on the junk bonds issued by shale producers. And Art even went so far as to say it will be a bloodbath.
And if this is the case, speaking in nominal terms, how does the total size of shale-issued junk bond debt compare to the size of the pool of mortgage-backed securities largely responsible for the crisis of '08-'09? And in the event of a shale-triggered credit event, should we expect a similar effect on equity markets?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's an excellent question, first of all, and I actually read an interesting piece of trivia on this. Believe it or not, Believe it or not, the shale-issued junk bond market is bigger already than the subprime mortgage-backed security market was in 2008.
Now, there's an important caveat to that, Nathan, which is that everybody thinks about subprime as where all the problems were in 2008. In reality, subprime was only part of it. There were several other tiers of mortgages that defaulted.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And when we say subprime, those were the worst of the mortgages. The subprime tier, the worst ones, was actually smaller than the junk bond tier that we have in the shale patch. I think it's a little bit different in terms of who the holders are. There were a lot of holders of those mortgage-backed securities all over the world—pension funds, so forth. I think it's a little bit more concentrated in institutional holders. I think that a lot of banks are really screwed. The the banking banking industry's exposure to risk from the shale patch is very high here.
So, it is big. I don't have a number in terms of how many billion dollars it is. I'm sorry, I wish I had that data for you. But it is big. It's a lot. And I think it's going to be mostly unserviceable. And the question is, how does it get worked out? Do we have outright bankruptcies with auctions for oil wells, or does this look more like the industry recognizes the problem and the banking industry works it out and all of these things get renegotiated on more favorable terms or something like that going forward? We don't know yet. We'll see what happens.
Nathan Egger: Hopefully, all parties involved have learned a lot from '08-'09 in terms of how to handle this credit event should it unfold the way that You and Art and a lot of analysts are expecting. That's all we have for questions for this week. But if you guys like this segment being included in the program, if you guys have more questions, let us know.
Nathan Egger: And just a reminder, send your questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com. Erik, I think that's a wrap on this week's show. I really hope our listeners enjoyed this 2-part series on trading the coming bottom in oil prices.
Erik Townsend: Thank you, Patrick. I hope so too, and thanks everybody for your understanding. When we broke this topic up into 2 shows at the last minute, we just didn't know what hit us, and it was not possible to get another guest on this week. I think that worked out really to everyone's advantage. I wanted to talk about my strategy here.
I would love to do a part 3 of this series at some point. I'd like to get somebody really big, an Andy Hall, who's a very highly respected oil trader with a very bullish outlook. I'd love to get somebody with an opposite side of mine and Art's view, but somebody with some credentials in the industry. We're going to keep working on that as a maybe, but in the meantime, we're going to get back to our normal program of bringing you interesting guests every week. So we've got Grant Williams coming for you next week by popular request, and we're really excited about the direction that MacroVoices is going. Thank you.
Nathan Egger: Definitely really excited to talk to Grant next week. And we've got a bunch of other big names lined up for you guys over the next couple of months. So please stay tuned. I think that's going to do it for this week, folks. We'll see you again next week, of course. And meanwhile, don't forget to subscribe, rate, and review us on iTunes. This really helps us make it possible to recruit the best names in the business as future MacroVoices guests. Please follow us on Twitter. Twitter @MacroVoices. And take care of yourselves, everybody. We'll see you next week.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices is produced by Bloomberg Television and is available on Bloomberg TV and radio. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC.
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Art Berman — Energy industry consultant (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome to MacroVoices, episode 3, recorded February 25th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We have another great show lined up for you. Energy industry consultant Art Berman joins me as today's featured guest. We offered you a choice of a conventional interview or a special format more akin to listening in on a meeting between 2 finance professionals, and you, our listeners, chose the latter. I think you're really going to enjoy the result.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, continued wild swings in equities. We saw an impressive rally in the S&P early in the week, and then yesterday, Wednesday, February 24th, we saw the benchmark index swan dive and briefly dip below 1,887 before a bounce in the banks led a nearly 50-point intraday recovery.
Meanwhile, we're still seeing a strong correlation with crude. Help us make sense of all of this.
Erik Townsend: Well, I thought that this move in the rally in equities, which I'm convinced is a combination of a short squeeze and a relief rally, I thought it was going to be over when it hit the 50-day moving average. And that's exactly where it stopped on Wednesday. Thursday, we traded below the 50-day moving average. We only just peeked our head above it. As news hit the oil market, which I think will be temporary. So I still think that even though we have moved above the 50-day moving average, the equity rally is probably just about over here. Obviously, it's impossible to call these things exactly, but I think this rally has pretty much run out of steam, and I'm waiting for it to reverse back to the downside.
Nathan Egger: All right, well, let's cover the crude oil next. Obviously, your discussion with this week's featured guest, Art Berman, is going to take us deep into the fundamentals of the oil market. But let's just get a quick market update now. You said last week that oil prices should turn lower, but that another rumor out of Russia could cause another price spike. Who's winning this week, the supply-demand fundamentals or the spin doctors?
Erik Townsend: The spin doctors are winning, especially as we're recording now. We've seen a $2 move in the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures in the last hour. And that's as of just coming into the pit close now on Thursday afternoon as we're taping this interview. It's amazing, Nathan. You know, as I've described before, we had supposedly a meeting that was to talk about a production cut. That led nowhere. Saudi Arabia laughed the other countries out of the room and said, we're not going to cut production. That's ridiculous. They said that they would agree to freeze production at January levels. That's record January levels. It's a meaningless statement, because to freeze production at a level which you are incapable of increasing beyond anyway, Doesn't mean anything.
So I thought this was dying out. Then what we got early Monday morning was an announcement from Russia that they think these discussions about a freeze could be wrapped up as early as March. Well, it's no surprise that those conversations could be wrapped up as early as March because there's nothing to converse about. There is no production cut that's imminently going to happen. I think that this process might eventually lead to that. in several months' time, but it's not happening now.
On Tuesday— and we have CERA this week. CERA is a big oil industry event in Houston, Texas. All of the bigwigs, everybody from the Saudi oil minister, all the big players in the oil industry are in Houston. So the Iranian minister gets up, and I'm so proud of the guy.
Art Berman: He—
Erik Townsend: to borrow momentarily from the Boston vernacular, where I'm from originally, What he said to his colleagues with respect to a production cut that Iran would participate in was essentially, what are you guys, retarded? He said, this is ridiculous, utterly ridiculous. Iran is in the process— sanctions have just been lifted. They want to aggressively ramp up to their former production highs. And I think they have indicated a little bit of willingness if they were allowed to get to their target first, they might be open to discussing a joint production cut at that point.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: But they have used the word ridiculous to describe this entire conversation.
Then on Wednesday, Saudi Saudi Arabia dismissed the chance of a production cut, saying no way, not going to happen. Looked like finally fundamentals gravity was going to set in and we were going to have correction to the downside, which I think is long overdue. Then conveniently, not during. business hours over in the Middle East or anything that would make sense when these people ought to be awake, but rather just an hour before the close of pit trading in New York, the Venezuelan oil minister announces that he's going to have a meeting in mid-March with Saudi Arabia, Russia, and other oil producers. Instantly we got a $2 screaming rally out of that statement. I ask a few rhetorical questions. A meeting about what? To discuss what? It is brutally clear that nobody is ready to talk about a production cut. The production freeze is inane nonsense that doesn't mean anything.
So at this stage in the game, we've seen Russia successfully elevate the oil price by about $6 or $7 on average from its January 20th low to where it is today. And that $7 times a month times 10 million barrels per day is a lot of money for Russia. So my hat is off to the Russians for doing an astonishingly effective job at confusing this market with abject nonsense that has nothing to do with anything. And it's working. And so oil prices are still about $10 higher than I think they should be. They're going to stay there until the fundamentals kick back in. And we get out of this silly talk that we're having about production cuts.
Nathan Egger: Are you telling me that the Russians are good at propaganda?
Erik Townsend: They are rather accomplished at that.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, more on crude later. Moving on to gold. 2 weeks ago, you and Jim Rogers both expressed concern that we may have been seeing a false breakout and/or blow-off top in the gold market. You told us to watch to see whether the market could break out to yet another high above $1,260. How are things looking now?
Erik Townsend: Well, we've definitely seen some strength in gold in the last day or two. Still, though, at $1,235 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon, I want to see this breakout continue above the previous high. I think there's still a good chance that that will happen.
My skepticism, again, as I've said in the past, is that in the beginning of the 2008 crisis, gold was up, but then gold sold off hard with everything else. And if, as I believe, we're at the beginning of what could be a very deep and uncomfortable rout in equity markets, I think there's a good chance that once it really gets going, gold is going to get taken with it, even though it doesn't make sense on a fundamental level. That's what happened last time. And it's basically just a matter of when things really get tough, people start selling everything that isn't tied down so they can meet their margin calls, whether it logically makes sense or not.
Nathan Egger: All right. And finally, in the fixed income space, I saw Treasury yields backed up a little in sympathy with the earlier week rally in the stock market that we discussed, rallied back to the 50-day moving average. If we're to expect the stock market to roll over from here, does that mean we should also expect even lower Treasury yields in the coming months?
Erik Townsend: I think it does mean precisely that, Nathan. I think that we're likely to see a continued safety trade, both domestically as the stock market rolls over, which, of course, I could be wrong about that. If the stock market goes straight up from here, then presumably Treasury yields are going to reflect that also. But I think the most likely scenario is the rally in the equity market is done or almost done. It's going to roll over soon, and when it does, I think that bond prices are headed higher and therefore bond yields headed lower. I wouldn't be at all surprised before this year is out if we retest that 2010 2012 low of 1.36% on the 10-year yield.
Nathan Egger: Well, thank you, as always, for the market perspective, Erik. I've been waiting for weeks to hear your discussion with Art Berman, and I know from feedback in our discussion forums that quite a few listeners are excited about this new fly-on-the-wall format that we're experimenting with. But first, we need to explain to our listeners why we've decided to change the format slightly and make this week's show part 1 of 2.
Erik Townsend: Well, we originally conceived today's interview with Art in 2 parts, both of which would air today. Part 1 would be a deep dive into the fundamental factors that are driving the crude oil market. And Part 2 was to be an analysis of strategies for trading the coming bottom from several different perspectives. We planned to first cover the commodity futures trading opportunity, then look at this from a fixed income manager's standpoint, looking at the junk bond implications, and then come back at it from an equity manager's standpoint, looking at when does the oil price bottom versus when do the oil-related stocks bottom. And then finally, we were going to discuss this from a retail investment perspective. What would a retail investor do in order to play this market?
2 things went wrong. First, we ran out of time. Art is such a wealth of information that we wound up putting an entire hour into just talking about market fundamentals. The second issue is that Art is a petroleum guy at heart, not a trader, and his comment to me off the air was that he really feels like the fundamentals conversation that we had today is where he's comfortable. He'd rather leave it to oil traders like myself to talk about specific trading strategies. He doesn't really feel that he has anything to add to that particular conversation. All these factors forced us to make a last-minute decision to break this topic up into 2 shows.
So today's show is going to be the interview with Art entirely about what are the fundamentals driving the oil market, why do both Art and I see it going lower from here before this is over, where are we headed. Part 2 will be a completely separate conversation about designing trading strategies for the upcoming bottom in crude prices. And I'm just going to be honest with our listeners, these changes have all happened in the last few hours. We're still trying to sort out when we're going to air the part 2 episode, but we'll get it to you soon.
Nathan Egger: Well, hey, it's hard to complain about too much of a good thing. So part 1, Erik's discussion with Art Berman about oil market fundamentals, coming up right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is my all-time favorite oil and gas industry consultant, Art Berman. Art, thanks so much for joining us today.
Art Berman: Thanks for inviting me, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Instead of a traditional interview, our audience has asked for a different format that amounts to listening in on a professional money manager meeting with an energy industry consultant to discuss trading strategies for the coming bottom in oil prices. This introduces some challenges. Do we stop and explain everything that we discuss in gory detail to make sure that everyone can follow along? Or do we just speak on a professional level and cross our fingers and hope that we don't lose too many listeners?
We've given this a lot of thought and we have a solution that I think will work very well. In this interview, I'm going to be speaking to Art on a professional level. We'll try to define the terminology that we're using, but we're not going to stop and explain conceptual material. So, for example, we're not going to stop to explain the difference between contango and backwardation in commodity futures markets, because explaining all these things would take too long and it would disrupt the flow of the conversation. But coming up next, right after my discussion with Art, Nathan Egger will join me again. Nathan will have listened to the discussion with Art and he'll have a long list of questions and subjects that need explanation. Nathan and I will then go through things like what's the difference between contango and backwardation. That's one example, but it's just one of many.
So the idea here is that even a professional oil trader will hopefully find this conversation with Art to be interesting and worthwhile. Pro-commodity traders probably are safe skipping our post-game show with Nathan and me, where we'll be explaining some of the underlying concepts and terminology and so forth. Investors who are not familiar with these concepts are advised to first listen to this conversation with Art, then listen to the post-game show with Nathan, and then consider coming back and listening to the conversation with Art again. Your newfound knowledge from the segment with Nathan just might help you get a whole lot more out of the second listen than the first one.
So, Art, before we dive into the markets, I think it's important to make sure that we're both on the same page in terms of the backstory. So what I'd like to do is run very quickly through my high-level macro view of how we got here, why oil prices are already so low. What I would like you to do is to interrupt and tell me if you disagree, because it's perfectly fine to disagree. It's good if you disagree, but I need to know that you do.
Art Berman: Okay.
Erik Townsend: disagree and why you disagree, because it may affect how I interpret your advice. Does that make sense?
Art Berman: Sure, go ahead.
Erik Townsend: Okay, perfect. Basically, prior to 2014, I think we had a reasonably balanced oil market. Prices were definitely high in the $90 to $110 range. That was due to peak cheap oil, the fact that we are expecting very significant declines in the future and that oil is getting more expensive to produce.
What happened was this flood of easy money from central banks, primarily Fed monetary easing policy, led to an overinvestment. Austrian economists would say even a malinvestment in the shale patch that pushed prices down to about $90 or so.
Everybody assumed that at that level, OPEC, which really means Saudi Arabia, would cut production in order to balance the market. They did the exact opposite. They said we're not going to be the ones. To take the burden of this anymore. We're not going to cut until the non-OPEC producers cut first. Now a lot of people think that Saudi Arabia is trying to punish the US shale operators. I don't agree with that at all. I think what they want is the US shale operators to lose their funding. I think that what Saudi Arabia wants to do is punish the people that spent all that money on junk bonds in the shale patch and get them to not do that again. I also think that to an equal extent, Saudi Arabia is just as interested in regaining its former cartel status. They want to coerce Russia and other large producers to play ball with them, to either join OPEC or to participate in production cuts.
That leaves us with an environment where the market is oversupplied. By how much, we'll talk about. I'm not exactly sure. I'm hoping you can help refine my views on that.
That oversupply means that the oil has to be stored someplace. When we had a whole lot of empty storage, it didn't matter that much. But now, as we're starting to run out of storage, the potential risk of a storage crisis could easily force West Texas Intermediate crude oil prices down into the teens or even lower. So I don't think there is any bottom to how far prices can go if we get into a storage crisis. Prices can keep going lower until that oversupply is eliminated, period. What changes everything, what would completely, totally change the face of the oil market, would be if Saudi Arabia actually made a deal for a production cut with Russia and other non-OPEC producers. If they actually made that deal and they only cut by 5%, it would be more than enough to rebalance the market. So this is a man-made problem. It could be solved by a negotiation. But I don't think that we're there yet.
I don't think it's possible for that deal to come together, at least for a few more months.
The idea that US tight oil production could be shut in is something that I think about a lot, and I'd really like to talk more about it in this interview, because when we first started looking at this situation and prices were in the $80s, everybody was saying if the price gets below $35, they'll be forced to shut in because it's below the cash cost. Now the number's $20. When we get to $20, what's the number going to be? So I think there's a very interesting question of it. At what point do the shale operators basically have to fold their cards and give up?
So as I see things, it really gives us basically 5 issues to look at. How big is this global oversupply really is number one. Number 2, how long will it take for US production to naturally decline as a result of the decline in drilling rigs that are operating in order to rebalance the market? But that has to be tempered, number 3, by how long will it take for Iran to make up. Iran is increasing while US is decreasing. When do we get to the point where we're actually rebalancing the market if you have these 2 factors in play at the same time? Number 4, storage crisis. Is that really an imminent risk or is it just something that people talk about? Number 5, what would it take to bring about an OPEC, Russia, other producer production cut? To me, those are the 5 key issues.
I want to make sure, though, that we don't just do this on my views. How do you feel about the way I've framed the problem, Art? Am I missing anything? Do we need to add anything to the conversation?
Art Berman: Erik, I think you've got a really good framework for the conversation. There are just a couple of points that, before we move on, I want to not dispute but clarify. First of all, Erik, let's talk about OPEC for a second, because I agree with you that, first of all, I think that OPEC will cut. production in 2016.
We can discuss why I think that, but I believe they will. I don't think that it's imminent, but I think that they're going to have to. But let's talk about OPEC for just a minute. OPEC is not a bloc. Okay? The bloc in OPEC, you said Saudi Arabia, let's add Kuwait and United Arab Emirates. Between Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and UAE, that's half of OPEC production. And those guys are pretty much on the same page and, you know, all working in unison.
The other thing that I completely agree with is that the target of the OPEC doing nothing policy is to kill the capital providers or the capital enablers. The other point that I want to add in here is that OPEC is a microcosm of the Middle East macrocosm. And so we have Sunni versus Shia, the idea that Iran Iran and Iraq are going to in any way acquiesce to what Saudi Arabia and its Gulf state Sunni partners want is laughable.
So, I mean, these guys are involved in a proxy war in Syria and Russia is on the side of Iran and Iraq. And for anyone to think that OPEC is going to come into a room and they're going to walk out with their arms around each other and all agreeing, I think that needs to be looked at. But I'm with you. The role of Russia is a critical issue.
The other thing is the notion What's the definition of a balanced market before 2014? Well, prices were pretty stable, average Brent, you know, $111. But the reason that the price was there was because we had a lot of supply interruptions, mostly from Libya and Iran, leaving the world in a supply deficit. That changed in 2014 because mainly North American tight oil production caught up with with the deficits mainly from those 2 countries. That's the issue we've been trying to work our way through. And then the final point is, what is the shut-in price for tight oil in the United States?
And you're right, Erik, it's a bit of a moving target. And the reason it's a moving target is because oilfield service prices have come down proportional to oil prices. Now, they can't keep going down or else those companies go bankrupt. So I think we now know kind of what the cost floor is. And, and believe me when I say that everybody's losing big time at $30 oil, especially since the wellhead price that they're actually getting for the oil in the field, for instance, in, in the Bakken, they're getting $16.50. So WTI is not the number that people get paid. And so I'm, I'm comfortable if oil prices don't go any lower than $30, although I agree with you, Erik, and I think that they will. So with that, with those kind of, uh, Clarifications, let's move on.
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, let's start then with what clearly is the central issue here, which is the market is oversupplied. And I think it's pretty clear how we got here. The overinvestment in the US shale just led to more production than we needed. It was brought online a little bit too quickly. What I am having a hard time getting my head around is what the trend is, because I felt like, okay, maybe the spring Late spring of 2015 is where that oversupply peaked, and it's been getting better since then. The number's not as big anymore. IEA just came out last week and said the number has increased from 1.6 to 2.24 million barrels per day of oversupply. So IEA is saying that the problem is getting worse. Would you agree with that? Is it possible that their numbers are wrong? It doesn't add up to me. It doesn't.
feel like the problem's getting worse than it was a year ago?
Art Berman: Well, you bring up a good point, and that is how reliable are the numbers? What those numbers represent, whether it's EIA or IEA, or whoever we're talking about, those are estimates. Nobody knows what production is in the month we just finished, which was January. Nobody knows what that number is. In the United States and Canada, where where production reporting is about as reliable as, as it is anywhere in the world, more reliable in fact. We don't really know what production was any better than about 3 months back.
And even then, that's subject to a lot of revisions. So point number one is whatever comes out of EIA, IEA in the current month, it's a guess. It's based on a formula. It's wrong. Okay? It's the best thing we've got, but we know it's wrong.
Second point is that the number we're talking about, which is the relative oversupply or deficit, it's got 2 components. One is production and the other is demand or consumption. And this particular month, the reason that the the net number went up is because consumption went way down. So supply or production didn't change very much, hardly at all. But in the EIA view of the world, consumption took a tremendous drop, which frankly, I don't believe. I mean, I just don't believe that global consumption fell a million barrels a day in a month. That's, that's what they're saying. But, you know, I'm not in a position to to explain why they're wrong. And my view is wait another month. I mean, that's not a very satisfying explanation, but these things will get worked out in the short term.
But the basic point, Erik, is things are not getting better. At best, we're moving sideways. And so something has to give. And I think we agree that what really has to give is US production has to drop in a, in a much more meaningful way than 50,000 barrels per month, 50,000 barrels per day per month, which is kind of what it's been since the spring of last year.
And it needs to get to 100,000 or 150,000 barrels a day per month before OPEC is going to be in any position to start talking seriously about a cut.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, it's interesting. I think there's a point that most people miss in this equation, which is when you think about how bad is it, most people think in terms of, well, how big is that oversupply? Is it 1.6 or is it 2.2 million barrels per day? How bad it is is not really a function of how big the oversupply is. It's a question of how much of a problem that's going to cause. And I would argue that how much available storage capacity remains is probably a bigger issue than what the size of the oversupply is on a daily basis, because it's a question of having someplace to put that extra oil.
Let's focus though on US production, as you said. I think that's the key. Traders tend to get obsessed with the Baker Hughes rig count, and it seems like everybody just freaks out on Fridays at 1 PM Eastern time when that number comes out. It just doesn't make sense to me, Art, because— and we should sort of explain here that the way a shale well gets drilled, you start by drilling a hole in the ground. You're not done yet. The next step is to fracture, hydraulic fracture that well and complete it, put the well casing in and so forth. There were at one point more than 3,000 drilled but not yet completed wells, what people in the industry call DUCs.
So I don't understand why the Baker Hughes rig count is even relevant if you've got 3,000 already drilled wells that are awaiting fracking completion. And it just seems like nobody tracks what's the fracking rig count. I don't care what the Baker Hughes rotary drilling count is. I want to know how many fracking rigs are operating because that's how many completed wells are actually going to come online and start producing oil.
Am I missing something? Is this just a question of the people following the wrong data or the right data is not available? Why is everybody obsessed with Baker Hughes when there's this huge inventory of uncompleted shale wells?
Art Berman: Right. The reason is because the Baker Hughes data is available. It's a predictable event, as you say, every Friday around noon or so. Traders have always focused on Baker Hughes rig count, and they probably always will. But as we understand, The advent of pad drilling, which is to say you drill from a single surface location many, many wells, you know, maybe as many as 10 before you actually have to physically rig down, move the rig, and rig up again. That's changed the arithmetic of rig count. And so to your very relevant question is, well, why don't we follow the number of wells waiting on completion or drilled and uncompleted? The simple answer is, is because we don't know what the I don't know what that number is.
It's a number that is knowable. It's not knowable by anyone other than state agencies who can keep track of that. Now, the North Dakota agency that follows that, the Department of Mineral Resources, comes out and tells you exactly how many wells are waiting on completion. If Texas did that as well, or the 2 other big plays, the Permian Basin and the Eagle Ford Shale, we would be able to do exactly what you're talking about, Erik. And that's what I would like to do, but it isn't happening.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Okay, so what I do and what I think is relevant, I don't frankly care how many rigs are operating. And I, I think that the EIA's focus on drilling productivity is one of the silliest statistics that's ever come out. I mean, a rig doesn't produce oil, a well produces oil.
So what I pay attention to are the number of producing wells that are added every month. And that's something that can be known from the state reporting agencies. Again, there's, there's some, you know, there's a lag to that data. And the reason that US production has not declined more than it has is that regardless of what the rig count is doing, and regardless of what people think, the number of producing wells has continued to increase. in all of the main plays that are responsible for the overproduction until about September, October of 2015.
Follow the money, follow the wells that are being completed. And, and so the, you know, the, the discussion that goes on is, oh, well, these operators are getting so much more efficient. You know, they're driving down the cost because of, you know, the rigs and et cetera, et cetera. That's the wrong way to think about it.
Each one of these wells costs between $6 and $8 million a copy. And all you need to do is look at the number of wells that are brought on production every month and multiply, let's say, by $7 million, and you know what the cost of this production is. And I promise you, it's not going down.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: You know, there is a lot of signal-to-noise interference in the, in the opinion and therefore in the marketplace of oil and gas. And the illusion that somehow these producers are figuring out how to produce oil for less and less money is simply untrue. It's just untrue. Are there efficiency gains? Well, yeah. I mean, you know, we're smart people and the people that run these companies are smart people, but The efficiency gains are— it's the wrong thing to focus on. It's a relatively small number.
Erik Townsend: On that same point of signal-to-noise ratio in the marketplace, I'd like to come back. Just last week, I think, Genscape came out with some US production estimates, and they are projecting a decline from 9 million barrels per day to 7.8 million barrels per day, or about a 1.2 million barrel decline in US production over the next year. People are cheering in the streets, yay, this solves the problem. And I'm just sitting here like, wait a minute, isn't Iran in the headlines with a plan to increase by more than 1.5 million barrels in the next year? Isn't 1.5 a bigger number than 1.2? Wouldn't that increase the total overproduction by 0.3 million barrels if US were to decrease by 1.2 while Iran increases by 1.5. But it seems like everybody just focuses on the US number. Am I missing something here?
Art Berman: Well, no, you're not missing anything. But, but here's the, here's the framework, Erik, and that is that US production is not necessarily in direct competition with, say, Iranian production or Saudi Arabian production. And this is a function of the kind of oil that's being produced in these tight oil plays, which is simply— a lot of it is just not available for refining because US refineries and global refineries are not engineered to take this very light, sweet crude.
So the problem is, is that most of the oil that's produced in the United States from this tight oil ends up in storage because we don't have the refineries to process it. And even though we've now lifted the crude oil export ban, guess what? The rest of the world has about the same refinery specs that we do in the United States. And, you know, okay, so we've been 2 months without a ban on crude oil exports, and crude oil exports haven't done a thing.
You know, it's not like we've opened the floodgates and we're exporting a lot of oil. So basically all the oil, or most Most of the oil that gets produced in the United States, a heck of a lot of it finds its way into storage.
That's the focal point, I think, and I think you agree, Erik. That's the critical measure of understanding where price is going. As long as capacity at Cushing and the Gulf Coast, the PADD 3, as it's known, those are the two— I don't remember the percentage, but it's Something like 80% of US storage, and those combined numbers are at 85% of storage capacity. As long as storage capacity is 80% or greater, prices are going to be crushed. And until that number drops below 80%, they're going to stay crushed. I don't care what the global balance is. I don't care what OPEC does. I mean, I do care, don't get me wrong. I'm just trying— I meant, I'm being— I'm using hyperbole to make a point.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Art Berman: The issue is that WTI and the US market still pretty much controls the price of oil in the world, and the price of WTI isn't going anywhere until we start to deflate the bottleneck at Cushing and the associated Gulf Coast. And the only way to do that is to reduce US production.
Erik Townsend: I want to pick up on that specific scenario, because you and I both agree that what has to happen here Is oil prices have to fall to what people sometimes call the shut-in cost, the level at which it makes more sense for the shale operators to just close their wells in, lay off their staff, and wait.
Here's the problem I'm having with this. My understanding of what's really going on in the shale patch these days is these guys know perfectly well that their debt is unserviceable. They know they can't pay the money back. But they don't have to pay the money back. They don't have to pay the principal back. All they have to do is make the interest payments in order to avoid falling into what technically would be a default condition.
So if their mindset is entirely cash flow based, we're just going to make the interest payments. We're going to cross our fingers and pray that someday the price of oil recovers before we have to make a principal payment at some point when these things come due. We're just going to somehow squeak by. It's it's it's like the guy who's. Running out of, you know, about to go bankrupt, and he's got 12 credit cards that he's using to take a cash advance from one in order to pay the minimum payment on the next one.
If they're in that mentality, it seems to me that we could get below what logically should be a shut-in cost, and these guys that are in survival mode are just going to keep pumping oil to make revenue to try to not default on their bonds. At some point, they get to the point where they do default on their bonds, and there's just no point, and they shut everything down.
Art Berman: Right.
Erik Townsend: So, it seems to me like you could kind of get to an overshoot where the price goes well below what we think it should be, and eventually everybody capitulates and shuts in. But I could see that being delayed. Does that make sense?
Art Berman: Perfect sense, and you're absolutely right. So, the truth of the matter is, forget about all the nonsense that you read in The Telegraph or The Guardian or The Wall Street Journal. Street Journal about, or Bloomberg, about the, you know, the true breakeven price of all of these plays. The true breakeven price for the best operators, which is to say the people who have the core area positions in the 3 main tight oil plays, is $60 to $70 a barrel. Now, how do I know that? Because I do the work. I do the reserve forecasts. And the costs. And those are the 2 components you got to have right. Now, the costs are relatively easy to determine. They just mean plowing through a bunch of SEC filings. And the harder part, or the trickier part, is actually knowing the per-well average reserves for each one of these companies. And that means going through an analysis that, as a geologist and an engineer, my colleague and I can do.
Now, I don't know where the people who say that we're making money at $30 a barrel, where they get their reserve numbers. was from, but I promise you they're completely wrong.
The truth is that you're 100% right, Erik, that the true breakeven price for the tight oil plays, let's just say the floor for the company or 2 in each one of the plays that is in the best position, is somewhere around $50 or $55.
Erik Townsend: We know that they're already operating way below their costs. And that says to me that really shut-in cost, it's not a cost where somebody makes an intelligent decision that it makes more sense to shut in. It's a question of when do they default on their bonds and give up? And it seems like they're just going to keep on pumping until they get to that point.
Art Berman: No, that's exactly right. And so the credit card analogy is correct. And in fact, the preference if you will, let's say for the Permian Basin, has nothing to do with economics. It has to do with initial rate. Okay? The Permian wells come on at a higher rate than the Eagle Ford or the Bakken. Now, their reserves are much smaller and their decline rates are much higher, but if your objective is cash flow in the moment, you can make your biggest credit card withdrawal on the Permian. And so that's where you're going to go. And that's the reason for the preference.
The geology, believe me, the Permian Basin is a largely depleted basin. Okay. What's going on out there is a big secondary recover— oil recovery project using horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. I don't mean to say anything bad about the Permian. That's just, that's just reality.
And so the bond defaults are an issue, Erik, but you know, there's this, there's this other, uh, small matter. Yeah. Of supporting your stock price, which, you know, they haven't been doing very well on recently.
But these companies have no money. I mean, you know, they have assets in the ground whose value is being degraded every time the price goes down, and they have credit, and they have the value of their stock, which accounts for most of their asset value. And if they— if their production drops, then investors abandon their Their net asset value drops, and that should trigger you know loan covenant problems. You know the kind of thing that happened to Bear Stearns, where you know the bank actually makes a cash call on the loan. That's a real immediate kind of a problem. Now that hasn't happened yet because the banks have basically given them a pass, but that that's a very real concern. Stock prices are a concern.
Loan covenants are a concern, and bond. defaults are also a big concern, and they're all 3 coalescing right now.
Erik Townsend: And what that says to me is that we're really set up for a big bang moment. In other words, everybody just keeps pumping, and eventually it becomes clear that all of this shale-issued junk bond paper is nearly worthless. And all of a sudden, similar to the housing crisis, it really was obvious to a lot of people for years that this was an unsustainable situation. Finally, the mainstream wakes up and says, uh-oh, subprime, those mortgage-backed securities are worthless.
Art Berman: Oopsie. It is. It's exactly that. And, and, um, you know, you can, you can read the comments that people make on my Forbes blog, and, and there are people every time that say, oh, you know, Art Berman has been, you know, saying this is going to happen for the last 6 years and he's always wrong. Well, you know, if you go back to the subprime crisis, the people who ended up making billions of dollars on shorting the US market were in the same position. I'm not comparing myself to them. It's all I'm saying is that for those who actually understand the way the business works, and I am a working petroleum geologist, I'm not an analyst, I'm not a pundit, uh, it's pretty obvious to everybody who knows And has been for many years that this situation's going to crash in a big way. It's really just a question of when. So go out and see The Big Short if you haven't already, and then think about the shale plays in the United States.
It's a very similar scenario.
Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and move on to storage, because I think we both agree that that is absolutely critical. Before we move on, I just want to take a minute for our listeners' benefit and explain why Cushing has such special importance.
Cushing, Oklahoma is the home of a very large tank farm. More importantly, it is the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. So what happens just before a futures contract expires if there's not enough buyers? What happens is the price goes down. Well, when the price goes down to the point where this month, let's say the March delivery is selling for more than $2 less than the April delivery contract, what happens is these storage guys jump in and they say, hey, I'll take that profit. I will buy the March oil, I'll immediately sell it into the April delivery, so I just have to find a place to store that oil for a month, and I'll pocket that $2 of profit. On an annualized basis, they're making a fortune, and that's really That's really what makes the whole oil market work, is when there's too much oil, it gets stored forward in Cushing, Oklahoma, because that's where the contract is settled.
If there is no available storage in Cushing, Oklahoma, those guys can't do business anymore, and that means that there is no limit to how low the price can go. If there's not enough buyers, that contract has 1 day left until it expires, the price could go to $5 unless somebody can step in and say, hey, I've got a plan. I'll buy that oil and I'll sell it next month and I'll make a little bit of profit on the difference. You can only do that if there's a place to store the oil. Right now we're already at, I think, 89% of the capacity of Cushing.
It's important to understand, though, that it's not just like you get to go all the way to 99 and you don't have a problem yet. They're already having blending operations being affected. And what that means is, let's Say you've got light sweet oil in one tank, heavy sour oil in another tank. You're going to blend the two together at some ratio in order to create something that matches the West Texas Intermediate delivery standards because you've got to deliver against that futures contract. You blend those two tanks and you pump the resulting oil into a third tank. Well, if you don't have a third tank to pump into, you can't blend those two different grades of oil together. Because there's no way to do that. And there's already companies that are turning down blending operations because they don't have the resources for it.
So it feels to me like we're getting pretty darn close to a real live storage crisis where we actually get to the point where futures contracts can't settle because the people that would normally step in and arbitrage that storage cost between two months and put it in. A tank. There's no tank for them to put it in. So I think what we really have to get down to is how much storage is available both inside Cushing that can be used for this purpose.
As Cushing starts to fill up, there's pipelines in and out of Cushing. So you can say, well, there's a pipeline from Cushing to Houston, so it's not really a problem. We'll just pump our oil from Cushing to Houston and store it there. Well, to do that, you've got to know what the availability is of storage in Houston. And also, once it's time to deliver that oil back into the market, you're going to have to get it back to Cushing. So do you have pipeline capacity in both directions? What does it cost in both directions? And so forth.
What do you think in terms of— you understand all of the details of the pipelines and everything much better than I do. Cushing can't run out of storage or we have a problem, Houston. What are the factors that will prevent Cushing from actually running out of oil, and how close are we to exhausting those other options?
Art Berman: Yeah, I don't think, I don't think we have a lot of options beyond increasing storage capacity, which happens, you know, once a year or so. They actually build more tanks. I don't see that as being helpful. There is a certain release valve that, you know, that a certain amount of that oil can get offloaded to other tank farms farther south. But, but there are 2 really important developments that have surfaced in the last 24 hours that I need to interject into our conversation. The first is that Whiting Petroleum, which is the 2nd largest producer in the Bakken shale play, announced yesterday that they're going to suspend all drilling and fracking operations. Okay? So here's a company that produces a couple of hundred thousand barrels a day. They're not shutting in, Erik, but they're not drilling anything more.
Continental, who is the biggest producer in that basin, and Hess have said they're pretty much going to do the same. Okay? So that's the beginning, I think. Hang on.
Erik Townsend: Before you move on from that point, Art, what you just said, they've announced that they're going to stop Drilling and fracking operations. I could interpret that one of two ways. I could think of really smart people in a room sitting around and thinking, "Hmm, it would be smarter for us to wait for more favorable market conditions." This is the best thing for our shareholders. I've got that image in my mind, but frankly, it's being crowded out by another image, which is a bunch of guys saying, "Oh crap! We're out of money. We can't afford to do any more operations. Let's make it look like." this was a conscious decision because we're screwed. Which is it? What's going on here?
Art Berman: It's clearly the latter, Erik. These guys made a terrible acquisition in December of 2014 as oil was cratering. They spent $5 billion or something to buy another producer in the Bakken. Terrible timing. No, they're clear. I mean, this is a company that I mean, they tried to sell themselves for a while in 2015 unsuccessfully.
So this is an act of desperation. And none of these— I mean, I don't want to imply anything about the character of these executives in these companies, but they really could care less about the shareholder because the shareholder doesn't appear to care. I mean, Devon went out and issued a whole bunch of new shares. You know, that brought in a couple of billion dollars, diluted their existing shareholders by 13%. Was there a shareholder uprising? No, there was no reaction at all. So as long as shareholders don't seem to care, then the companies will act with, with relative impunity. So you're right, the Whiting deal is these guys are out of money and they got no choice but to do what they're doing. And, and, and their stock price actually went up a couple of dollars that, you know, at least temporarily, the investors said, yeah, that's, that's a smart move.
So now the other issue, the other story that came out in this morning's Wall Street Journal, but it's even, I think, more critical, is headline is Big New Threat to Oil Prices: A Flood of Gasoline.
And what's happening here is that a bunch of Midwestern refineries have said we're going to cut back on buying crude oil. Because we don't think there's a market for the refined product in the United States. So there are, you know, there are the class of people that are speculating on barrels at Cushing that have no intention of taking possession of a physical barrel.
And then there are the buyers like the refineries that actually bid on contracts and do plan to take possession of the oil, which actually has the potential to reduce the volume at Cushing. And so what we read this morning is that, that, that amount of physical oil that's going to move out of Cushing is going to be lower going forward, which is a very bad thing for storage and capacity. And so then the flip side is, well, OK, we also heard a bit of news that a big producer in the Bakken is going to reduce the amount of oil that it's moving into Cushing.
Maybe the two counterbalance and reciprocate. I don't know. What it says more than anything else is that this market is a moving target, and we just don't know what shoe is going to drop tomorrow, and we got to watch it very carefully.
Erik Townsend: A lot of people would say floating storage is the answer here. And for anyone who's unfamiliar with that, it just means chartering a very large crude carrier ship, using it as a floating gas tank. It's hard to tell in terms of, you know, how much capacity is available in Cushing. That's reported every week by the government. How many ships are available to charter and who already has them locked up with contracts? These are things that are private matters that are not publicly reported. So it's very hard. Do you Do you have any metrics or any index that you follow that tells you how much floating storage capacity might still exist other than, say, charter rates?
Art Berman: I don't. The reason I don't is because I think if it gets to that, we're talking about oil prices that are going to go down to their 1998 level of $16.50. I think we're going to get there. I don't know if $16.50 is the right number. Don't quote me on that.
But that gives you a— and $16.50, by the way, is in 2015 dollars. So, if anybody wants to know, well, what's the lowest price that oil has ever gotten to in our careers or lifetimes, that's what it was. So, that doesn't mean it couldn't go lower, and it doesn't mean that it'll get that low, but it gives you a benchmark.
Erik Townsend: And it's so important for people to understand that what's going on here is all about an oversupply that already exists. Things like what is the cost of production, what is the sustainable long-term cost—all of those things are not really relevant right now. They matter in the long run, but as far as how low the price can go in the short run, as long as the oversupply is there, there's no limit to how low it can go.
And it's especially exacerbated when we run out of storage.
And when you get to something like floating storage, I make the argument. You know, hey, I'm a pretty smart guy, but I don't have nearly enough assets under management to go and charter a crude oil ship. There's only a handful of players in the market that are big enough and talented enough and have the in-house skills to really do that tanker trade.
Little guys like me can't even think about it. So I would argue when we get to the point where floating storage is the only alternative, the people The people that are able to control that trade and lock up most of the ships, they're going to make a fortune, and the price of oil, I think, is unfortunately going to suffer very dramatically. I think we've covered storage.
I hope everybody understands why this is such a critical issue.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to what really ultimately ends this whole story, and that is a reversal of strategy from OPEC. And as you said, really, United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia are the big players there. What does it take? What do you think the factors are that will eventually lead up? What is Saudi Arabia waiting for that they're not getting yet? Why have they not seemed like they want to make a deal?
Art Berman: I think they're waiting for some combination of capital providers clearly pulling back. From investing in mostly US tight oil. I think have pulled back from, from the oil sands in Canada. That was arguably maybe, maybe a bigger long-term, long-range target for Saudi Arabia because it's a much bigger reserve and a much longer-lived reserve. But, you know, future investments in the oil sands are dead. At least for now. Now we keep seeing, you know, just when we think it's over, Pioneer and Diamondback were able to raise a couple of billion dollars in January.
And I already mentioned Devon raised a billion or so just a week or so ago. And so there are people that say, see, the money's still out there. It's still coming. I say, well, you know, there, there are always people whose timing is, is completely off. But so, so the answer to your question, Erik, is Saudi Arabia needs to see 2 related things. One is that the capital providers have completely pulled back from providing extra enabling capacity for the US shale drillers. Number 2, and very much related, the production has to drop significantly. When all— when those 2 things come together, I think then they will be motivated to talk about a cut. So what has to happen is waiting in the wings. And what's happening, what's going to happen sometime in the next— well, certainly in the first half of 2016— is there's going to be a wave of bankruptcies, defaults on bond payments, a collapse in the high-yield bond market that could spill over potentially into other markets.
And some real distress, which we've already seen signs of in the banking industry, which is exposed to oil and gas loans. And that is going to be a bloodbath, I believe.
I'm not an expert on many of the topics I just discussed, but I was on an energy panel last week up at the University of Texas at Austin, which included some very heavy hitters in in energy economics, hedge fund management, and E&P and banking finance. And those guys were unanimous in saying that a 30% bankruptcy of US E&P companies would be a relatively small number. It could be 50% in 2016.
Erik Townsend: It's amazing how much we think alike, Art, because I'm very much on the same page with you. The one thing I see a little bit differently, I see 2 things that has to happen here. One is shale-issued junk bonds have to take on the same reputation that subprime mortgages had in 2009. It's got to be nobody will touch it. I think that's what Saudi Arabia is working for.
The other thing is I think Saudi Arabia has a shortlist that I know Russia is on, and I'm not sure if there's other countries on it or not, but there's some minimum number of players that I think Saudi Arabia feels like we've got to get Russia playing ball with OPEC. Are other big producers like Mexico on that list? I'm not sure, but I'm convinced OPEC has a list and they're going to say, we're not cutting anything until 2 things happen. One, we've destroyed the source of funding for US shale. 2, we have our minimum list of who we think needs to be participating with us in any production cuts agreeing to do so. And for whatever reason, I think Saudi Arabia is not showing its cards about who's on that list.
Art Berman: Well, I think Russia is the prime candidate on the list. And of course, it doesn't help that Russia is currently on the opposite side of the Middle East and therefore OPEC dispute, that they're on the side of the Shia Iran and Iraq and Syria. And so, yeah, there's a real conflict there.
And we didn't really talk about Iran before. But let's do for a second here, because it's relevant to all the topics that were discussed. The fear, of course, is that Iran says that they're going to bring on millions of barrels of production. They're going to get back to pre-1970 levels. And I don't think anybody believes that. The reality is that Iran probably will deliver something like 300,000 barrels of crude oil on average in 2016. And if you add in the liquids, that could easily be 500,000 barrels a day.
And so you're absolutely right, that's a counterbalance to US production cuts or drops so far.
Now, the key to understanding how those two work is that if If you dig into the EIA's model, which says that US production is going to reach minimum sometime in, I think it's September of 2016, it'll go down a total of about 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day from its high in April. The Achilles heel in that model is their price deck.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Their price deck says that WTI PPI a linear fashion from $30 a barrel in January to $58 a barrel in December of 2018, and that ain't going to happen. What that tells me is that the— and the EIA model is as good as any that we have, at least as a point of departure. What it says is that the decline is going to be faster because The assumption of prices is completely incorrect. So the first thing, Iran is going to deliver a bunch of oil to the market. It isn't as much as some people fear.
Second, US production is going to decline a lot faster and a lot sooner than most people assume.
The wildcard that I worry about, Erik, is not Iran, it's Libya.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Syria has the potential, if they ever get their civil unrest situation under control, they have the potential to very quickly add 1.5 million barrels of crude oil per day to the market. And that would be a disaster. Now, you hate to talk about these things in the way that I'm about to, but there's very little likelihood that Syria is going to end its It's painful unrest in 2016 because ISIS is right in the middle. So assuming that their rival factions can get together, and you'll see headlines every day that they're talking, and that's great, but they're not going to. But that's a wild card that we don't really even want to imagine happening. Iran is going to happen, and there's nothing we can do about it.
For right now, though, I go back to the fact that the US Still controls world oil price, not intentionally and not by conspiracy or fiat. And therefore, the most important controlling element on oil price has got to be storage in Cushing and to a secondary but important source in, in the Gulf Coast PADD 3. And if that overcapacity drops below 80, uh, and appears to be— 80%, that is— and appears to be If we have some momentum, we're going to see a $10 or $15 bump in WTI price, and that's where the profits are when that happens.
Whoever's astute enough to figure that out is going to do awfully well.
My own guess here is I worry about what happens if you overfill capacity, but the OPEC+ I think it's going to— I'm not an eternal optimist, but I think that all of these moving parts are going to move in such a way that US production is going to start declining in a serious way.
We've all cried wolf about that, but I think that really is going to happen. OPEC is going to cut 2 million barrels a day along with Russia, maybe at their June meeting. It doesn't serve OPEC to have oil prices go to $16.50 or $5 or zero. I mean, you know, that is their only source of revenue.
And, you know, they're not going to stubbornly just say, well, you know, it's the will of Allah. It may be the will of Allah, but it's also the will of those that, you know, are in charge of pricing for OPEC.
So I think that the ideal scenario is that we do start to see a big drop in US production, that, as you say, Erik, the energy junk bonds become untouchable, and we see an OPEC cut that more or less coincides with that sometime in the middle of the year.
Erik Townsend: You know, Art, I could go on for 3 more hours talking about the fundamentals here. And originally, we had conceived this interview to talk first about fundamentals and then move into a whole bunch of different trading strategies for different classes of investors. We've used up almost all of our time on fundamentals, and I didn't want to cut you off because this is just so fascinating. What we're going to do is save the discussion of how to trade this from several different investment perspectives— from the commodity perspective, from the fixed income perspective, from the equity perspective. I'm going to save that for another show. Because I think that we've done a really great job. Art and I have not rehearsed or practiced this. The fact that we agree so much on the fundamentals is really shocking.
Before we close, Art, is there anything else that we haven't discussed that you think might be relevant in terms of our listeners understanding the fundamentals of what's going on in this market right now?
Art Berman: Well, only to say that you're going to hear a lot of, you know, very pessimistic, gloomy forecasts Every day when you pick up the paper or turn on cable TV, and you know there's truth in that. But I think that when these prices, these prices are going to turn a lot sooner and a lot harder than most of the so-called experts imagine. If I knew when that was going to be, then you know we'd have a whole different conversation here. I don't, but I think that the you know that the forecast. Of low oil prices for 10 years or 5 years, I think they're way wrong.
And I think that they ignore the fact that there's a depletion issue in the world, that in a matter of a year or 2, we're going to be in a deficit because we're not investing. We have deferred oil investments in 2015, and it's going to be an even bigger number in 2016.
And even though it, you know, the— it's the darkest hours before the dawn, oil is not a, you know, it's not a cornucopia. There's a limited amount of it that's available as supply, and we're going to bump up against that limit. And it's going to be— it's going to be a hard awakening no matter what happens between now and then. So, you know, what we're going to see, I think, is amazing volatility in oil prices. Going forward regardless of how this topic we've been discussing resolves itself.
We're not going back to anything. Normal's over, and, and there isn't a new normal yet. So this requires, you know, great focus and great attention by people who really understand the oil business and the oil markets, and that, that's where I would leave it.
Erik Townsend: Okay, super. Such a So, to summarize, we both agree that absent the possibility of a surprise production cut from OPEC, which we both think is unlikely, you and I both agree that this market is at extreme risk of a precipitous and sharp drop to the downside. That would be the market clearing move that forces the shale operators to either shut in or stop or do something and forces a US production decline. From there, we both disagree with a lot of the long-term prognosticators who say this could last for 10 years or something.
What's going to happen is in the short run, we're going to have potentially a crash, and that's going to result in something happening. Some kind of OPEC deal or something comes to fruition, and we end up with a whole new regime that nobody is smart enough to really be able to identify and articulate yet, but it's going to look very different than what we're used to.
Art Berman: I agree.
Erik Townsend: I think we're on the same page. Listeners, we originally conceived today's interview as starting with this discussion of fundamentals and then moving into how to trade this upcoming bottom in oil prices from several different perspectives, from the commodity futures perspective, from a fixed income manager's perspective, from an equity manager's perspective and from a retail investor's perspective.
We're not going to do that today because we've used up all of our time with this excellent conversation. Art, thank you so much for joining us and for all of the wonderful information that you have shared with our listeners. We're going to cover the rest of that, though, on a separate show, and we'll have an announcement later on in this show as to when you can expect that. Art, thanks so much for joining me again on the program. Thank you, Jeff. We really appreciate your time.
Art Berman: It's been a pleasure, Erik. Thank you.
Erik Townsend: As we close, I just want to make a point that in addition to everything we've discussed, there's actually quite a bit more in the fundamental analysis area in this oil market. Art has an amazing website at artberman.com. It's, in my opinion, the best oil analyst blog anywhere on the internet. We're working with Art to get a presentation with a whole bunch of graphs and charts. that support the conversation and go beyond the conversation that we've just had. When Nathan joins me after the break, we'll come back and tell you more about where to find that information, as well as when we're going to reschedule the rest of what was originally planned as how-to-trade perspective on all of the information that I've discussed with Art today. Nathan will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nate.
Nathan Egger: Well, what a fascinating conversation that was. I've known that this was coming for a long time, and it was well worth the wait. Art really is a wealth of information.
Erik Townsend: He is amazing. And believe it or not, what you heard in this interview was only scratching on the surface. We had a, a little chat after we got off the air, and Art has agreed to give me a copy of a proprietary presentation that he normally reserves for his paying consulting clients, goes much deeper with incredibly detailed graphs and charts into everything that we talked about today. There's more substance to it. I can't read you the URL for it right now because frankly, we're in a scramble today and we don't have it. But by the time that you hear this, if you go to MacroVoices.com, MacroVoices.com to our homepage, read the description of this interview with Art Berman. In that description, there will be a link to where you can find Art's presentation. And believe me, folks, you really want to take a minute to download this one.
Fantastic graphs and charts, and it goes into considerably more depth than what we've just discussed with Art today.
Nathan Egger: Well, as much as I enjoyed that conversation, thanks to the magic of podcast recording, I had a few hours to really absorb it, and I have some questions for you I would love to have clarified. As we discussed doing so earlier, I thought we could run down some of the terminology that might not be clear to me, and it might not be clear to a lot of our listeners. So Art ended that conversation, starting from the end here, uh, saying that normal is over. This sounds pretty dire, and it sounds to me like Art is referring to peak oil, which Almost a taboo topic for many pundits these days. So let's again explain to listeners what peak oil means, and as well the difference between peak oil and peak cheap oil.
Erik Townsend: OK. All the way back in 1957, a Shell Oil geologist named Marion King Hubbert came up with what is now called peak oil. At the time, it was just known as a peak. And what he said is, Any collection of oil fields, whether it's one oil play or one company's plays or an entire country, has a certain profile where basically what's going to happen is as you put more investment into it, it's going to produce more and more oil. But eventually you get to the point where you've used up the highest reservoir pressures and so forth, and now it gets harder to extract the oil, and you start declining from that peak, and you're producing It's producing less and less oil. And the more money you put into it, there's a diminishing return.
So that was the concept of peak oil, conceived in 1957.
And Hubbert had 2 predictions. One was that around 1970 or so, US domestic production would peak. And he's talking about conventional oil production, because that's the only kind of oil production that we knew about back in those days. He was exactly right. That peak of US production around the early '70s led, of course, to the Arab oil embargo and the energy crisis. And, you know, if you were old enough to remember the gasoline lines of 1973, I still remember as a kid waiting for hours in line to buy gasoline at the local gas station. It was a really big deal.
So he got the call right. He said around 2000 or so would be the peak in global oil production. Again, he's talking about conventional oil production, where you just drill a hole in the ground and oil comes out. He was pretty close. Conventional oil production peaked in May of 2005. Depending on whose data you use, it may have actually exceeded that in 2011, but not by very much. So we did see a peak in conventional oil production.
The peak oil thesis, as it was originally conceived, was kind of like, oh boy, Boy, this is a real problem. When we hit the peak, there's no more oil to be discovered. We're in big trouble. I think that some of the people in the peak oil camp got a little bit carried away, just as some environmentalists get a little bit carried away with a belief that they feel strongly about. And it was a lot of gloom and doom stuff.
Peak cheap oil is a phrase that I use to contrast this and say, look, I don't predict that the world is running out of oil. There's always going to be plenty of oil. We'll find more and we'll find new innovative ways to produce it. But the point is, the cheap, easy stuff where you just drill a hole in the ground and oil comes gushing out, that's all been found and developed. There's no more of that.
And that's what I really think Art meant with that comment where he said the old normal is over and we don't know what the new normal is like. The old normal of being able to just get all the energy that we need by drilling a hole in the ground and oil comes out. That's long gone. We're into the age of peak cheap oil, which means that, yeah, there's going to be more oil, but it comes from expensive technologies like hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, which are the 2 big technologies that are the biggest enablers of the rapid growth that we've seen in oil production in recent years.
Someday, the shale, the tight oil plays will be used up and that won't be the play anymore. We'll have to come up with some new technology, and that technology will come too, but it'll come at ever-increasing cost. So the point is, we're never going back to the days of being able to sustain oil prices at $20 a barrel, say, as we used to be able to do. Now, I won't be surprised if they dip below $20 before this is over, as I discussed with Art, but that's a temporary situation that happens in a It's not something that can be sustained long-term. So peak cheap oil means we've reached the point where all the cheap and easy oil is gone. We're in a new era where it's going to become more and more expensive over time to produce oil. And therefore, over time, the cost of oil will increase, and the amount of excess energy capacity that we have to grow the economy will decrease.
Nathan Egger: You just used a term there, tight oil, and I heard it in your conversation with Art Berman. Can you clarify for us what tight oil means?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Back in the old— well, first of all, people usually imagine, the average layperson imagines an oil well, and they kind of have this idea in their head that there is an underground river or lake full of oil, and we're going to drill a hole down to where we can tap into that lake of oil, that reservoir. It doesn't really work that way. Anyway, what's down there is mostly just rock.
The thing is, a lot of the rock— and it's very, very deep, thousands and thousands of feet below the surface of the earth— a lot of that rock is very porous.
So similar to a sponge, it can soak up a whole bunch of crude oil. And that crude oil, if you drill a hole deep enough into that rock, what happens is the oil just comes seeping out through the rock into the hole, and then of course the hole is the bottom of the well. It can be pumped up to the surface and used to refine that oil into finished products. So the way it used to work is you could only drill oil wells in porous rock, because if the rock was not porous, then the oil couldn't flow through the rock into the well, and there's no way to get the oil out. So in the old days, when they found oil, And there was oil there, but the rock was not porous enough for the oil to ooze out into the well. You couldn't develop that. It was not an economic or developable well at that point.
You had to abandon it.
What we've done in the last few years is to take a technology that's actually not new— hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling have both been around for decades, they just weren't effective and economic when they were first invented. We got to the point where oil prices were high enough, over $100 a barrel, that it made sense to look for new ways to produce oil. So people said, wait, if we went back to those oil wells where the rock is not porous, what if we went back— there's no oil flowing out into the well because the rock is not porous— what if we were to put super duper high energy, high pressure Hydraulic fluid, water essentially, into the well, and then shock it with just super duper high pressure shock waves that would literally fracture the the the rock below the Earth's surface.
So now there's great big cracks in it, and of course those cracks provide the conduit through which the oil can flow from the rock into the oil well. And that's what we accomplish with horizontal. Horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. These things together, why is it called a tight oil play? Tight oil means oil that's locked inside the rock. It is tightly contained inside the rock, and it doesn't come out on its own until you fracture it with this very expensive, high-tech process called multistage hydraulic fracturing.
Nathan Egger: OK, with regards to these tight oil plays, you used another term, shut-in. You and Art both used that term. this quite a few times. Can you explain what shut-in means to us, or the shut-in cost?
Erik Townsend: Sure. I want to cover shut-in, shut-in cost, and also the difference between shut-in and laying down of drilling rigs, because these are very different concepts and a lot of people confuse them. What shutting in a well means is you've got a producing well. This thing is actually producing oil that can be used by a refinery.
But for whatever reason, we've decided that we don't want to continue producing oil.
In the context that Art used it, it was when the price reaches a level where the operator is losing so much money that they can't even pay their direct operating cost of getting their staff to come in and you know pay the electric bill and so forth. What they might do at that point is shut in their well, stop. Producing oil from a well that's up and running and functioning normally, turn the thing off, put it in storage, come back to it a year or 2 later when prices are better. That's what's meant by shutting in of an oil well.
What's amazing to me is all through 2015, we had all this conversation in the media about the declining Baker Hughes rig count. Now, the rig count measures how many drilling rigs are in operation. When the rig count was going down, all the Bloomberg and CNBC anchors were saying, well, they're shutting in oil wells, they're capping wells. Nobody was capping anything. Nobody shut in any wells. They stopped drilling new ones. That's a very, very different statement. But a lot of people got really confused about this. So far, there hasn't been any shutting in of oil wells, because once they're operating and producing, they're making money. They might be not making enough money, but they're making enough money to at least pay the cost of paying the electric bills, running the pumps, paying the staff, and so forth.
What Art was talking about is if the price gets so low that they can't even pay the electric bill anymore, that's what he calls the shut-in cost, the price at which the operator throws up their hands and says, At these oil prices, we're better off just closing in our well, leaving it shut down, and coming back in a year or 2 when the price is better.
Nathan Egger: OK, well, that does well to explain what my next question would have been regarding the Baker Hughes rig count. Now, Art said— well, clarified for all of us that the WTI crude oil price, or the CL contract that you're seeing in the futures market, is not the number— is not the price that people are getting paid.
Erik Townsend: No, the way to think about this is imagine you're buying meat at the grocery store. What price do you pay? Well, you're paying a retail price. There's also a wholesale price, which is what the grocery store paid to their distributor, their wholesaler. That's going to be less than the retail price. The wholesale price is the equivalent of the WTI futures price. Okay. What's trading in the futures market is the wholesale price. That is basically for delivery in Cushing, Oklahoma, where there's a big oil storage tank farm.
If you want to buy a futures contract and accept oil delivery in Cushing, Oklahoma, that's the price you pay.
The grocery store paid their distributor the wholesale price. The distributor didn't pay the farmer the wholesale price. The distributor had to, first of all, make a profit for himself. But he also had to pay transportation and storage costs. Presumably he went to the farmer and, you know, the farmer sold him a cow and there was a butcher that was involved someplace that had to cut it into finished products. All these guys have to make money along the way. What the farmer actually got for his cow is much less than what the supermarket is paying as a wholesale price for beef. Same thing is true in crude oil.
What the guy that owns the oil well gets is whatever somebody is willing to pay him at the wellhead. That middleman has to figure out how to transport the oil from the wellhead to Cushing, Oklahoma, how to store it there, pay storage costs, pay insurance costs, so on and so forth, and all this stuff costs money.
So the cost of what they're getting— Art was talking about a very remote area where there are no pipelines and there probably is not easy rail access. They might have to, you know, be moving oil by truck and then rail in order to get it to Cushing, Oklahoma. That all costs money. And so the guys that are in those remote areas are getting in the teens already for their oil. Begin— you know, imagine what happens when the WTI price goes below $20 if that happens.
Nathan Egger: Terrifying thought. A couple of acronyms, EIA and IEA. Who And what are these organizations, and why do they matter, despite the fact that they're essentially estimating— in Art's words, they're essentially wrong?
Erik Townsend: I agree with Art. I think they are wrong. Part of the reasons that they're wrong may have to do with their mandate for how they do things. But let's start with who they are. EIA is the Energy Information Agency of the United States Department of Energy. When oil Traders all get excited on a Wednesday morning at 10:30 a.m. Eastern time to see what the latest inventory and production reports are going to be. Those reports are coming from the EIA, from the U.S. government's Energy Information Agency, and that agency's job is to provide the official government information to the industry, to everybody who needs to have it for whatever purpose.
There's also the American Petroleum Petroleum Institute, which is a private entity that makes projections of consumption and storage data available. For some reason, I think it's just convention that markets always trust the government data the most. The government data is the official data. Frankly, I think in a lot of cases, the private data may be higher quality, but the market tends to accept that whatever the government data is, is fact.
And that's what we tend to go by. So EIA is the god of energy information in the United States.
But it's a United States government agency, so therefore, it only deals with the US. To understand the global oil market, you've got to understand the global picture. The IEA is the International Energy Agency. It is a quasi-official agency. It's an international organization, so it's not It's not really part of any government, but it is accepted as effectively the international equivalent of EIA. It is the international organization which is taken most seriously and whose predictions are taken most seriously, although Art and I seriously question why people even put any faith in some of the things that they say.
Nathan Egger: Wait, so if, as you just said, the oil market is indeed a global one, Why did Art say that the US is not in competition with, say, Iran?
Erik Townsend: Well, because they're addressing different markets. And it is very much a global market. And the US and Iran are very central to the overall supply-demand picture. But if you've got an oil well in North Dakota, your oil is probably headed towards Cushing, Oklahoma, and either to to the Midwest refiners or through a pipeline down to Houston where the Gulf Coast refiners are going to use it. If you're in Iran, you're probably better off selling to China, you know, other parts of Asia, than you are trying to export to the United States right now, just because the transportation costs and so forth. It makes more sense to do that.
So I don't think Art meant to say that US and Iran don't both play play an important part in the overall global supply-demand picture. His point was, in terms of where that oil is going, I think the Iranian oil is going to end up in a different market.
Nathan Egger: All right. The rotary drilling rig count— I know we touched on the Baker Hughes rig count. Are these 2 different things that I'm conflating here?
Erik Townsend: No, it's the same thing. The full name of that index is the Baker Hughes Rotary Rotary drill rig count. And what it measures is how many rotary drilling rigs— that's great big machines that spin a drill bit to cut a hole in the ground, to dig a hole in the ground in order to make an oil well— how many of these things are out in the field and actually up and running and drilling holes that become oil wells.
That's the Baker Hughes Rotary Rig Count. It has It's been a mainstay of the industry for decades, and I think that's the reason people continue to put so much blind faith in it. Back in the old days, it made perfect sense, because what does it mean to create a new oil well? You drill a hole in the ground.
That's— the rotary rig count is needed to do that. Then you put a casing on it, put a valve at the top of it, install a pump, and you're done. The big The big job was drilling the hole. That was most of the work. So how many drilling rigs are in operation tells you how many new oil wells are coming into operation. And that's very useful for prognosticating what's going to happen in the next 6 to 12 months in terms of production levels.
That's in the old days.
The way that you make the newfangled kind of oil well that is really what this whole expansion of US capacity has been entirely about, is not a conventional oil well. It is a horizontally drilled well. Once you're drilling the hole with that rotary rig that goes into the Baker Hughes rig count, you're not done yet. You're less than halfway done. The much larger part of the job is the completion of the well, the hydraulic fracturing that has to be accomplished in order to complete the well.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Some of these wells are very, very sophisticated. They have heater wells in addition to the actual producing wells, where there are heating elements that literally warm up the rock and allow the oil to flow more effectively.
As you're doing all of these things, it's not the rotary rig count or the rotary drilling rig that is installing heater wells or fracturing or doing any of these things, but everybody used to thinking about that. So the reason that both Art and I agree that the Baker Hughes rig count is not really all that relevant is people act like it still has the meaning that it used to, which is, well, we— this drill is operating, therefore it's making a new oil well.
Now, it's not making a new oil well in a lot of cases. What happened in the last couple of years is those rigs were drilling holes that created what we call a DUC. Drilled but uncompleted oil well. It hasn't been fracked yet. It means half of the work is left to be done. If you're going to just have an inventory sitting around of all of these wells that are drilled but are not producing oil, it really, to me, undermines the meaningfulness and the relevance of that rotary drill count.
What would be much more useful is a count of how many fracking rigs are in operation, because that would tell us after After they're fracked, we know the well is likely to go into production. As Art described, you can get some of the data from some of the places and just look at how many wells actually go into production, but different states vary in terms of what data they require the operator to provide to the government. So you're looking at kind of an apples-to-oranges comparison from one state to the next of what data you're looking at.
Nathan Egger: Okay. I think that's why the cost is so elevated for these tight oil plays. You've got a multistage process. You've got different guys who operate the different rigs, different experts you've got to bring on. It all sounds very expensive. Another acronym was PADD 3 which was entirely new to me. Can you explain that for me?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Back around World War II, the US government recognized something, which is that That the amount of petroleum that we have in storage, our ability to deliver petroleum, this is a national defense issue. It is something that the government needs to take an interest in, because if there was a shortage of oil, it could cripple the country's ability to produce weapons and defend us from the Nazis and so forth. So, back around World War II era, they created this idea called Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, or PADD.
At the time, it was primarily motivated by managing the country around its national defense resources pertaining to oil.
These days, it really just means the US government divides the country into 5 regions, and for historical reasons, they're called PADDs. So PADD 2 is where Cushing, Oklahoma is. In the Mid-States area. PADD 3 is the Gulf Coast, Houston, Texas. The various different parts of the country are all divided into separate Petroleum Administration for Defense Districts, hence the acronym PADD.
Nathan Egger: And this is different than pad drilling?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, that's a completely different idea. So PADD, P-A-D-D, was Petroleum Administration for Defense District. Completely different idea is the way you used to drill oil oil wells is you would go someplace where you thought you could have an oil well, and you'd set your drilling rig up there, and you'd drill one well with it. And then you'd have to break down your drilling rig and take it someplace else, and you've got your oil well.
What they realized as we went from vertical wells, the old technology, to horizontal wells, you could set up like a— imagine a concrete pad. You've got a spot where you set up your drilling rig, but it's going to drill one horizontal well to the north Another one to the south, another one to the east, another one to the west. Maybe it's going to go down deeper and then drill another one to the north that's deeper down, another one to the west, east, south.
You could have a spider web of potentially quite a few horizontal wells all drilled from one rig that got set up once in one spot, and it drilled all those wells. The time and energy that it takes The cost to break down these drilling rigs, move them from one location to the next, set them up and get ready to do the next drilling operation is enormous. So if you can economize by having a single drilling rig in one spot go and drill 5 or 6 different wells before it has to be broken down and moved to another spot, there's a tremendous efficiency of scale there. And that's called pad drilling.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Just having a drill in one place drill several oil wells in different directions.
Nathan Egger: OK. So this really does clarify for me that the EIA focus on drilling productivity, or the market's focus on the Baker Hughes rig count, is really quite silly. We've got wells producing the oil. It's not rigs.
Erik Townsend: Exactly. And even more importantly, suppose that the rig count goes up by 1 next week. That tells us there's one more rotary drilling rig that's in production. Somebody has deployed it someplace. Did they deploy it? Maybe it was one of the older rigs that doesn't have the ability to do pad drilling. Did they deploy that rig just to drill one oil well, or did they deploy that rig to drill 10 oil wells from a pad?
Huge difference in terms of how many oil wells are coming into production, but it's still one rotary, you know, one. And the one on the Baker Hughes rig count. It doesn't make sense for people to focus as much as they do on this silly Baker Hughes rig count. Yeah, it's got some relevance, but not nearly as much as people think.
Nathan Egger: All right. So we've drilled, we've fracked, we've got our oil. Why is most of this tight oil, at least in the US, ending up in storage? Why can't it be refined into gasoline or some other finished product?
Erik Townsend: Well, because there's not enough demand for it. And a related question, Is, wait a minute, if we're producing all of this oil in the United States, why are we importing any Middle Eastern oil if we've got too much US oil that's just going into storage?
The answer to that question is the US oil is light sweet, which is actually the highest quality grade that there is. It's better than heavy sour. We have very light, very sweet oil in the US shale patch. And we're getting this super high-quality oil. It sounds like a good thing. Just one problem: for the last several decades, all of the U.S. refining capacity has been designed around refining what? Middle Eastern oil, which is not the high-grade stuff. It's a lower grade. They actually have more expensive, more complicated processes for handling the heavy sour oil.
That's what we're set up for. So believe it or not, what we get in the US is really good light sweet, which is easiest to refine with a cheap refinery. We don't have cheap refineries. We have expensive high-tech American refineries that were designed to process Middle Eastern oil.
What we end up doing is buying heavy sour oil from the Middle East, blending it with the light sweet that's produced in the United States, and that blend then approximates something that the refinery is set up to deal with. In many ways, it would make sense to say, well, if we're producing all of this light sweet and that's the good stuff, why wouldn't we just set the refineries up to process the light sweet? We wouldn't have to buy any of the heavy oil from the Arabs anymore. Wouldn't that be better?
The thing is, it takes decades to build out the entire refining industry. It's not like you just flip a switch. You know, people kind of imagine a little toggle switch on a control panel that says, you know, push up for light sweet and push down for heavy sour.
It doesn't work that way. If you want to change your refinery, you literally have construction crews working for years reconfiguring all the valves and pipes and so forth that are in the equipment that is involved in the refining process in order to tune it for a different kind of oil. So it's not a decision that can be made lightly, and it's It's not one that can be implemented quickly.
Nathan Egger: So given the duration that these projects— the amount of time that these projects would require to either create new refineries or modify the current refineries, and the rapid decline rates that are associated with the tight oil plays in the United States, is there any chance at all that we're going to see increased refining capacity for this light sweet crude product that we have coming on market in the United States?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think we are seeing that already. refineries are tuning their equipment to be more capable of dealing with that. But again, it's a long process that happens over time. And I think if I were the refinery at this point in the story with what's happening, I think everybody sees that we've got a big shakeout in shale happening.
Would you really want to reconfigure your refinery so it can only process US oil and can't process the imported stuff? Unless you've got something to mix it with in this environment where Saudi Arabia is working so hard to push these shale guys out of business? Or would you kind of keep your options open? I think they're keeping their options open.
Nathan Egger: So that given, why is the return on investment quicker in the Permian Basin, as Art suggested?
Erik Townsend: The reason is that as you deal with different geology, it requires a different amount of investment. It's a huge investment to get the same amount of oil. Back in the old days, all you did was drill a hole in the ground and oil comes gushing out. You don't even need a pump for it. Those days are gone. We can't do that anymore.
We moved to more sophisticated oil wells, but it was still basic, simple technology. Now, in order to get any oil out of it, you've got to use hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling.
It costs more to do that. In a given shale play, in some areas, areas, you just drill your horizontals— laterals, they're called— and, you know, you can start to frack them and you can start producing oil. In other places, you need longer laterals. You might need something like a heater well, which actually warms up the rock that surrounds the oil well and allows the oil to flow more quickly. All these things cost money. So depending on the geology of the rock formation, each different Every different play is going to have different economics in terms of how much money you have to spend on investment in order to get the same resulting oil flow from the producing well.
Nathan Egger: OK. And the associated junk bonds with these shale oil plays, Art described them as worthless. Is this true? And if it is true, then why isn't shorting a JNK or HYG, these ETFs for high-yield debt, Why is this not the modern-day equivalent to printing money?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's— first of all, the junk bonds that are issued by shale drillers, there are some shale drillers that probably have a lot better economics than others. So I wouldn't quite say they're all worthless. I think that similar to subprime mortgage bonds back in 2008, 2009, They're going to become a very unfavored asset class.
And that also will mean, as it meant in 2009, there will be a bunch of perfectly good shale-issued bonds that are not going to default that will be negatively affected. And that will be a buying opportunity. But for the most part, I think that the bonds issued by shale drillers are in big trouble.
Why does that not translate to JNK and HYG being just the short of the century. Those 2 big ETFs are for junk bonds in general, not energy-related junk bonds. Now, a fairly significant percentage of the junk bonds that they own are issued by shale drillers. So a lot of them are that. If you really want to make the pure play that you're talking about, you have to short the individual issues of shale driller-issued bonds individually in the bond market. That really is something that only larger institutional traders have the sophistication to do.
If you want to play this from a retail standpoint or even a smaller hedge fund, JNK and HYG are the obvious targets. The other one is SJB, Sierra Juliet Bravo That's one that you buy as a long, and it's basically an inverse ETF on those same bonds. I'm not aware, though, of any product in the ETF space which is unique to energy-related bonds. Those are just junk bonds in general.
Nathan Egger: That'd probably be a popular one if it did exist, but we're going to cover a lot more about the trading strategies associated with these junk We'll talk about the Trump bonds and all of that in part 2 of this discussion. Art discussed a couple of headlines that we saw this week about refiners not wanting to buy more crude or not wanting to buy as much crude that they would turn into gasoline. And despite recently hearing that there's a surprise uptick in the amount of miles that Americans are driving, the refiners still don't want to buy as much crude. What gives?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that what's going on in part is The other thing is that there's a storage problem everywhere. There have been in recent weeks crude oil inventories building up, finished product inventories building up, everything is building up. The system is backing up. If you're talking about storing crude oil, you can store it pretty much indefinitely. It was sitting underground for thousands of years before it came out. It's not going to go bad. It has an indefinite shelf life. If you Refine that crude oil into gasoline, it has a shelf life of several months after. I don't know the exact number, but less than a year after it's been refined, you can't really sell it as gasoline anymore because it starts to break down and it doesn't have the chemical properties that are needed to use it as a fuel and so forth.
So I think that what you're seeing is refiners are starting to favor if they're going to potentially run into bottleneck situations. With a lot of stuff sitting around in inventory. They want to have the crude oil in inventory rather than finished product in inventory. And I think you're also seeing storage issues. We didn't used to have a situation where the finished product, the gasoline, could not be produced because the tanks for storing it were already full and there was no place to put it. We're starting to run into those problems now, and I think that's causing the refiners to take a step back and slow down a little bit.
Nathan Egger: All right, well, before we close this wrap-up segment, there were a couple of other terms that I think would be unclear to many. Front spread, contango, salsa dance, alpha-bravo, roll forward. What was going on there?
Erik Townsend: I don't know about the salsa dance. I'll try to address the rest of it. I think that a lot of our listeners are probably familiar with the concept of the yield curve in fixed income markets. In other words, if you want to borrow money for one year versus borrow money for five years versus borrow money for ten years, the rate of interest that you're going to pay is going to be different based on how long the term of the loan is.
Another way to think about that is the commodity that is being purchased there is money itself. The interest that you're paying to borrow money is the price of that money. What is What determines the price? Well, it depends on the delivery date. When is the money going to be paid back? Generally speaking, the longer the delivery date is, the longer the duration of the loan, the higher the interest rate tends to be, but there are some economic conditions when the reverse is true. Well, what we're talking about when we talk about the yield curve is the cost of money over time at various different maturities, different repayment periods.
What does it cost to borrow money? Take that same concept and extend it to commodities.
If I want to buy crude oil, well, wait a minute. Crude oil when? I have to answer that question. Crude oil to be delivered next month, that has a price, what we call the front month price, $33.08 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon. Looks like this crazy spike that happened is a result result of the Venezuelan energy minister's statement, is starting to retrace at least partially. So that's the price for now. But what if I want to know what the price is in order to have oil delivered in, say, the end of 2018, December— or let's say December of 2019? That price is $45.20 as we speak. So the price is different depending on when the oil is going to be delivered.
Contango and backwardation are just relative terms. If the price is going up over time, so next month costs more than this month, that's called contango. If next month costs less than this month, that's called backwardation. The reason that we said that the likely bottom in oil prices will come with record contango is what is going to cause oil prices to trade all the way down into the teens. I'm not promising that's going to happen, don't quote me on that, but I think it's very possible.
How could that possibly come about when everybody knows perfectly well that the long-term sustainable cost of production is more like $50, not $20? Well, the answer is because that oil is piling up and it has an expiration date. If we're talking about, as an example, the April delivery contract for West Texas Intermediate crude, it has an expiration date of March 21st. After March 21st, everybody's got to close their contracts or take delivery, one or the other. If you don't have a tank to store it in, you're going to sell it, and you're going to sell it at any price because you don't have a place to put it.
So it's when you run out of storage that what would happen is the front-month price would probably be deeply, deeply discounted to the next month, because everybody's crossing their fingers and hoping that by that next monthly deadline that some storage space will open up. But until then, this contract that's about to expire in the next few days, what are we going to do? We're going to let it trade lower and lower until eventually somebody who has the wherewithal to take the oil away from Cushing, Oklahoma buys that contract.
So Art and I both see this the same way, that when we hit If we do hit a bottom, it will likely be a panic bottom, and it will likely come— when we talked about front spread contango, what we mean is the difference between the front month and the next month. We are predicting that the very low price, let's say it's $17 a barrel, sounds like, wow, buy all you can get at $17. Wait a minute, if you're buying the April contract at $17, but in order to roll it forward into the May contract, which you have to do, that or liquidate it, then you're going to end up with paying whatever that contango difference is. So let's say that April was trading at $17, May was trading at $22, $5 higher.
Really, it feels like you're buying it for $17, but as soon as you roll it forward, your effective cost is $22. That's that problem of being bitten by that front-month contango being so steep, it dramatically increases your cost above the level at which you originally bought it.
Another catchphrase that you'll hear is roll-forward premia. That means as you roll the contract from one month to the next, the price is going up, and therefore your acquisition cost is going up.
Nathan Egger: Okay, this makes a lot of sense, and, and, and we could go on, but, but I feel like we're, we're treading into part 2 territory here. So I'm going to let that be it for my questions right now. Listeners, I know that was a lot, and we've gone a bit long here, but I hope this follow-up has been helpful and sets us up for part 2, when we're going to discuss trading strategies related to all this part 1 discussion that we've had today. I know that a lot has been clarified in my own mind. And as soon as I'm done taping this segment, I'm going to go back and listen to Erik's discussion with Art again with this information fresh in my mind, and I encourage you guys to consider doing the same if you have the time. But I'm afraid after all of that, we've run out of time for this week.
Erik, is there anything else before we wrap it up?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're going to do our best. Obviously scheduling is an issue. We've already got a guest booked for next week, so we're probably not going to do book part 2 next week. As soon as we can, we'll bring you part 2 of this show. Undecided at this point, and we would welcome your feedback, listeners. Should we do part 2 by trying to rush out and recruit another guest, because Art says part 2 is really not up his alley? Or should Nathan and I just do this? Because frankly, this trading strategy is what I've spent the last 6 months of my life focusing on. I think we're leaning a little bit towards just doing it in-house, which means there would be no special guest for that show. It's kind of a break from our general format, but I think it may be the best way to deliver the content. The other option is we could try to find a trader.
I'd love to find someone with different views than mine who doesn't think that the outcome that Art and I see is going to happen, just as contrasting views.
Nathan and I are hard at work. We're going to put together a part 2 of this that gets into the trading strategies. We're going to bring that to you in Meanwhile, we still need everybody's help, so please subscribe, rate, and review us on iTunes. It only takes a few seconds to open iTunes, right-click on MacroVoices, choose View in iTunes Store, and then when the store window pops up, click on Ratings and Reviews. And then where it says Click to Rate, just click on 5 stars. Actually, you can click— 5 stars. Click on whatever you feel is appropriate. We hope to inspire you to click on 5 stars if you're feeling good about the direction that we're taking this program so far. And better yet, write a review.
These little things make a huge difference in our ratings. I know it sounds like that's just for us folks, but it's really for you too. The more that we increase our ratings, that translates directly into Nathan being able to bring you even bigger, better guest names. A lot of you guys want to hear Kyle Bass. Nathan is working hard to get Kyle Bass. He's not responding because we're nobody on their radar screen right now. It is your help in terms of ratings and reviews that is going to help us get the notoriety that we need to bring you the guests that we most want to bring you.
Nathan Egger: So we really appreciate your help, everybody. You've been great so far. Don't forget to follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices. We're still out of time for now. So until next week, take care, everyone.
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Marc Faber — Dr. Marc Faber, editor of the Gloom, Boom and Doom Report (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome to MacroVoices, episode 2, recorded February 17th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We have another fantastic show lined up for you with Dr. Marc Faber joining me later as today's special interview guest. I'll be talking to Dr. Faber about investing in Asia, US monetary policy, Chinese credit growth, and much, much more.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. We're going to dive right into this week's markets. Let's again lead with the equities, Erik, because clearly the theme this week is volatility. Erik, we're speaking here mid-session on Thursday. We haven't seen a lot of action today, but the S&P 500 has shown an impressive rally so far this week. Where are we headed from here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's almost done. I think that what you're seeing is the S&P is actually rallying partly on short covering. There's a bit of a short squeeze in play, but mostly in sympathy with the oil market. And we'll talk about that in more detail when we get to oil. I don't think that the bump that we're seeing in oil is going to last. I think it's headed back down to the downside. I think equities are going to turn and follow oil down. But that doesn't happen until the oil market turns back to the downside a little bit more decisively than it did this afternoon on Thursday.
Nathan Egger: All right, let's go ahead and cover crude oil next. The buzz right now is that a deal has been made around a production freeze. Does this mean anything? And if so, what does it mean? What's coming next for us in the oil market?
Erik Townsend: Well, it means a whole lot in terms of perceptions. I don't think it means anything in terms of a change in fundamentals, but it definitely has affected the market quite dramatically. This occurred literally minutes after we went to press with last week's episode of MacroVoices. And what happened was the UAE's oil minister reiterated that OPEC was And they were ready to talk about production cuts. And eventually, they brokered a couple of meetings, one over the weekend and another one on Tuesday.
And I think that what was going on here is previously you had Russia trying to jawbone the market, as we talked about on last week's program.
That was going on. Saudi Arabia was initially denying things when Russia was making statements about discussions with OPEC, because Saudi Arabia was able to deny that. When the Russians started saying, we're going to meet with Venezuela and we're going to meet with other OPEC producers, Saudi Arabia was not in a position to deny anything.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And I think Saudis got involved in the discussion in part because they wanted to have the control of being able to deny things when they want to deny things, but also to send a message, which is that they are still ready to discuss the possibility of a production cut.
Now, as we talked about on the program last week, Nathan, I don't think that a production cut is possible. I don't think it is technically possible for Russia to implement a production cut. I don't think that even the agreement that was made Tuesday, supposedly around a production freeze, was contingent only on if— Russia agrees to cut. If Iran and other countries were to participate in it. Iran, of course, said today very clearly there's no way they can participate in that. They need to ramp their production up to pre-sanction levels. And they said they would never consider participating in anything like this unless it had some loophole or provision that allowed them to first get back to where they feel they should be at pre-sanctions production levels.
None of these things are going to happen. But what has happened is we have the symbolic message from Saudi Arabia saying that they're willing to come to the negotiating table. And at least have a conversation about these things. I think that the market has gone pretty much crazy on speculation and hype and sentiment. I don't think it's going to lead anywhere. I think that we're going to soon realize that the oversupply is still an oversupply, that we are running out of storage capacity.
We're already at operational capacity of about 80% of total capacity in Cushing, Oklahoma. So this is a very problematic situation, and I don't think that this buzz about a production cut is headed anywhere, but it definitely has taken the market up to above its channel resistance line. So we're teetering with a breakout that could accelerate a short squeeze further if another rumor were to take us even further to the upside. But I'm hoping that common sense is going to kick in and people are going to realize that you really can't have a production cut with the current political backdrop that exists between OPEC members.
Nathan Egger: This is something that investors need to clearly understand about these headlines about a production freeze. A production freeze at record high January production levels is a long way off from a production cut. 2 very different things. Now, on last week's show, both you and Jim Rogers expressed your doubts about gold having raced all the way up to more than $1,260 per ounce. You described the move as parabolic, and Mr. Rogers You guys outright said it looked like a blow-off top. Since then, gold, we've seen it tumble back below $1,200. You guys seem to have called that one.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it was very easy to call the parabolic move likely leading to some kind of retracement. It did tumble below $1,200. But as we're speaking, late session on Thursday afternoon, we're looking at $1,231 again. So it's halfway back up to that $1,260 that it touched. The question is whether it can sustain this breakout. If we move back above $1,230,
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: If you break through $1,260 to new highs and the move continues, I think at some point you just have to throw the towel in and say this move has legs to it. It's headed higher. But again, keep in mind the analogy to 2008.
We had a move higher in gold. Then when everything started selling off aggressively, gold sold off with everything else. So I think you've got to be agile here. It does look like this breakout maybe has legs, but you've got to be careful and look for the possibility of a reversal, especially if the dollar-strengthening rally continues.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, finally, let's move on to fixed income. We've been seeing Treasury yields falling across the board. How much further can they fall, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, I wouldn't be surprised if we eventually see a retest of the 1.36% low yield on the 10-year Treasury. I think that was back in 2012. We're not seeing anything close to that yet. But I think that the current equity sell-off is just getting started. I also think that it's entirely possible that This equity sell-off could turn into something pretty dramatic before eventually central bankers step to the rescue. If I'm correct about that, we could see a safety trade globally into US Treasuries that could perpetuate the dollar rally, could potentially be negative for gold, negative for oil.
We'll see what happens.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, thank you for the market perspective, Erik. Now we're going to give our listeners what they're waiting for. Erik's interview with Dr. Marc Faber is coming up right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is the one and only Dr. Marc Faber, editor of the Gloom, Boom and Doom Report. Marc, you have been quite outspoken in your views about the American stock market since 2009. You said that if central banks print money out of thin air, it has to go someplace, and a lot of it would end up in asset markets. And you were absolutely correct about that. But you've also been quick to note that when central banks eventually take the punchbowl away, markets will plummet. But then you went on to say that even if that happens, at some point when things get really bad, central bankers are going to come back and print more money.
So let's get an update on your view in where we stand in this story. You've clearly gotten this right so far. Are we at the point where central banks are running out of bullets? Are asset markets headed lower? And at some point, do you think they're going to come to the rescue with QE4 or some other negative interest rates or some other kind of stimulus?
Marc Faber: Well, basically, thank you for the introduction, and I'm very happy to talk to you. I think that it's important to understand the government, the Treasury Department, and the Fed is one and the same. They can manipulate markets, and they've taken measures after December 2008 and kept interest rates artificially low for a very long period of time.
And then last December, December 2015, they increased the Fed funds rate to a quarter of a percent, probably precisely at the wrong time. But that aside, my view is that if the stock market drops by, say, 20% off the peak, in May 2015, that's soon one year, by more than 20%, they'll take additional measures.
Now, in many countries we have already negative interest rates. The Fed can do the same. I'm not sure about the Constitution, whether it would be constitutional to introduce negative interest rate. But there is not many people care about the Constitution anymore, so it's a possibility.
The second possibility that is coming up now more and more by some economists is helicopter money. Helicopter money would be instead of just launching QE4 to actually send each household say a check for $1,000 or a check for $10,000 or whatever it is. Now, I'm not sure again if Congress would agree to such a measure because the Congress at the present time is to a large extent— or the Senate is controlled by the Republicans, and whether they would agree to that measure is questionable, but it's a possibility.
And what they also, I think, can do is essentially to abolish paper money. If you abolish paper money, you can introduce less than zero interest rates, and that would obviously hurt savers, but it may not boost consumption and the economy because in countries like Sweden, Denmark, Finland, Switzerland, We already have negative interest rates, also Japan now, and it doesn't boost the economy because people feel insecure.
They feel worried about it. Their savings are no longer giving them any return. So the reaction in most countries has actually been that the savings rate goes up. And that is basically near-term negative for the economy. I think it would be good for the economy in the US to have a higher saving rate in the long run, but near-term it has a negative impact.
So my view is yes, I think, uh, you understand, the government and the Fed and the Treasury And also the academia at universities is essentially controlled to a large extent by neo-Keynesian interventionists. They think they're smarter than you and me, that they need to intervene into the economy, intervene into the free market.
And we've seen what a disastrous result that has. It had the consequences of the NASDAQ bubble, then the housing bubble, and then the financial bubble in 2007-2008, the subsequent greatest recession since the Great Depression in the '30s. So their interventions have largely failed, and I think that will continue to be the case.
But you understand, people who are so arrogant and conceited as the academics at central banks and so forth, they will not shy away from increasing the dosage. In other words, like you give to a patient antibiotics and they are useless, they don't achieve the desired results. So you double up and the doubling up will not help at all. But that's what the central banks, in my view, will do.
Erik Townsend: Well, you make an excellent point about helicopter money. It's something that I think a lot about. You know, the whole market just assumes that the Fed is going to be there to rescue the market. And I think politically it's very possible that the people will stand up, especially in an election year, and the next round of quantitative easing will be helicopter money, QE for the people, not for the bankers. And it won't—
Marc Faber: Helicopter money is basically a combination of fiscal policies and monetary policies. Basically, if the Treasury sends a check, or the Fed, to every household of $1,000, say, it can boost economic activity for a month or two, you understand, then people can go out and drink more in a bar, spend more in McDonald's or restaurants, go on a holiday and so forth.
But in my view, the impact on the US economy will be very small because if people buy goods, most of the goods are imported anyway. So it's not going to boost the US economy much. And once you have launched helicopter money 1, you may have soon to launch helicopter money 2 to sustain the spending.
So all these measures, they are quick fixes. Like if you have a house and the cracks in the walls, you just put some paint on top of it. It looks nice for a little while and then it gets worse and worse again. It's a typical helicopter money, is a typical measure that occurs in Botox economies.
You just fix, but you don't improve it in the long run.
Erik Townsend: An act of desperation to cover over the symptoms. Let's move on now to Asia and emerging markets versus developed markets. Most Westerners are used to thinking of Asia as a place whose economies are almost entirely dependent on manufacturing exports to the West. Most Westerners continue to assume that Asia doesn't really have any middle class to speak of and that its economies are completely dependent on exports. Those are all old stereotypes, though. In your January Gloom Boom Doom report, you had an excellent piece on the growing and advancing economies of Asia and South Korea in particular. So please give our listeners kind of a high-level perspective. What's going on in Asia in terms of high-level trends and what will this mean for emerging markets investors in coming years?
Marc Faber: Well, first of all, I think Westerners don't quite understand that in Asia, if you start Asia from the Middle East up to Far East Russia and in the south from Australia, New Zealand, to the north, Mongolia, Kazakhstan, Russia, that there are roughly 4 billion people in Asia. So it's a much larger population than what we have in the Western world.
China alone has 4 times as many people as the US and the EU combined. And when I came to Asia in 1973, Asia was very poor.
And even in the 1980s, I had a wealthy client from Chicago. He asked me in the early '80s, Marc, how is it that Asia is so poor? But that is no longer the case. We have some very rich countries measured by GDP per capita. The first one to really develop was Japan after the war until 1990, and then South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong, Singapore followed.
And then after 1978, China began, began to open up, but it was a very slow process. But after 1990, it took off.
And so when people talk about Asia, they don't realize the largest beer brand in the world is not Bud Light, but Snow. It's from China. And the second largest is Tsingtao, also from China. Among the 10 largest beer brands, 4 are Chinese. There are 120 million Chinese that travel outside China every year, much more than Germans or US traveling overseas.
And they are not poor people. On a per capita basis, the Chinese in Thailand are the largest spender according to the Tourism Authority of Thailand.
So we have already a big middle class, and it's a myth to think that Asians don't consume. They consume a lot. They are the biggest internet users in the world, and then, then Anyway, the point is China is now slowing down, and massively so. And maybe they have a financial crisis, or already are in a financial crisis mode, which is unlikely to end well.
But equally, there are areas in Asia like Indochina that still have a large potential. Indochina being defined as in the east Vietnam, northwest Laos, southwest Cambodia, Thailand, Myanmar, in other words the old Burma, India, Bangladesh, and in the north Yunnan province of China, and in the south Malaysia, Singapore.
That region receives at the present time huge foreign investments, also for political reasons, because the Chinese are investing a lot of money in these countries. And so the Japanese, the South Korean, the Taiwanese, under American influence, are also doing it to counterbalance the Chinese influence. And so we have, although growth in Asia is at the present time practically nonexistent, But in these countries, there's still strong growth in terms of exports, industrial production, and per capita incomes.
Erik Townsend: I'd like to move on to a listener question that was posed in our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. Diego in Mexico described his fascination reading your article about South Korea in the January Gloom Boom Doom report because he saw so many parallels between his own country of Mexico and South Korea going back to the '70s in terms of low GDP and a lot of the things that you described. Described in that article.
Diego can't help but wonder, though, what went wrong for his country, because it seems that Mexico has not had anywhere close to the success of South Korea despite having started from some of the same fundamentals in terms of GDP per capita and so forth. So what did Mexico get wrong that South Korea got so right?
Marc Faber: I think that's a very good question, and I think that We have to look to a large extent at the mentality of people. Arnold Toynbee already, the historians, pointed out that some people in cold climates, they are more thrifty and have higher savings rates and have higher work ethics than people in warmer climates.
And I believe that the Koreans, they did what the Chinese do today. When Japan was already quite rich in the '70s and very successful in terms of eroding the lead of US carmakers, Korea was nothing. Taiwan was nothing. But they copied the Japanese. They copied the— and the Taiwanese did the same. And the same happened in Singapore.
And these are people who have a hardworking mentality. I mean, I don't want to sound racist, but how many semiconductor plants are there in Africa?
I think a lot has to do with a— there is corruption in Asia, but less so probably than in other countries. And these countries like Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, Hong Kong, they didn't have any agriculture. So people either had to work or starve. There was no going back to the countryside and enjoying The fruits of the earth.
Like, I live in Thailand. In Thailand, the curse is that there is an abundance of food, so people don't really have to work very hard if they don't feel like coming to their jobs in the morning or suddenly have a different view. They go home to the families in the countryside.
And there they have enough to eat. They don't live in luxury, but they have enough to eat.
And I think very few countries in the world will achieve the success of, say, the European countries in terms of having risen to relatively high wealth in the last 200 years through the Industrial Revolution. Very few countries will achieved the success of the US until the 1950s, 1960s. Since then, it hasn't been all that great.
And so I believe really successful economies are more the exception than the rule. But I have sympathy for Mexico. I go to Mexico quite frequently. And I think actually that it has quite a good potential. But exactly why it hasn't been able to capitalize on its potential, I'm not so sure.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to another high-potential country, India. Most Westerners don't think much about India as an investment target, but I know that you not only invest in India yourself, But you also serve as the chairman of India Investment Fund. So India is clearly a market that has your attention. Please give our listeners the elevator pitch on India. Why would people care about investing in India? What's the case for India?
Marc Faber: Well, basically, the case for India is that it has been cursed by socialism and policies of isolation until, say, 15, 20 years ago. And then it began to open up, but it still had a horrible bureaucracy and laws and regulations that are very unfavorable to growth. Now, it doesn't mean that some companies didn't grow a lot.
We have— 30 years ago, there was no IT industry in India. And today it's the center of the IT industry and of the outsourcing of software programs and so forth. So they've done relatively well despite of the government.
To move really ahead, they need a strongman that can override the different factions. And can reduce the bureaucracy meaningfully. Now we have Modi. He is the Prime Minister of India. He's a reformer. He'd like to do that, but it's very difficult for him to do it. You understand? In China, Xi Jinping, he can take any measure he likes. He has the power.
But Modi doesn't have the same power in India.
And so the potential for India is, of course, huge, because in about 10 years' time, India will have a larger population than China. And whereas, say, China consumes more than 10 million barrels a day of oil, India consumes less than 4 million. In other words, The GDP per capita is much lower in India, and the potential is there. Whether it will be able to capitalize on its potential, that is not entirely clear.
But equally, I think you know someone who manages a fund in India, and that applies to all emerging markets. There will be a lot of consolidation. In other words, companies taking over smaller players. So I think a stock picker probably can do quite well in India and, by the way, throughout the emerging world.
Erik Townsend: Okay, let's move on to real estate next. Most Americans have either never heard of China Beach or they know it only as an old TV show about American soldiers that were stationed on some beach someplace in Asia. Let's fast forward to 2016, bring our listeners up to date, Marc. Where is China Beach?
What's going on there today and why have some international real estate investors recently taken an interest in buying properties there?
Marc Faber: Well, basically, when I was young in the '50s and '60s, we went to Spain and there were lots of resorts that just started. I mean, Torremolinos was a very, very small village. Benidorm had a few hotels and that's it. And these became eventually huge resort areas, huge developments for tourism took place and so forth.
When we first went to Vietnam in '89, there was nothing at all. And we then built a hotel and the hotel is still there and it's successful. But because of some, uh, not dispute, but some problems among the partners, we sold it then, I think in '95 or '96.
And then we developed another hotel, the Nam Hai, is a 5-star hotel which is very successful.
But that whole coast, if you visualize Vietnam as a snake, In the north you have Hanoi, at the north, and in the south Ho Chi Minh. And on the coast facing China, in the middle you have Da Nang. North of Da Nang is Hue, the old capital, and south of Da Nang, about 30 kilometers or 30 miles from Da Nang, is Hoi An, is a UNESCO-protected city.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Marc Faber: And that whole beach will become a huge thing. We have now a hotel, I think it's called the Crowne Plaza, and it's, uh, it receives 15 charter flights of Chinese a week that go there gambling. The gaming money there. The gross gaming revenues monthly are $3 billion. Just one casino. It's a lot of money for one casino.
And the attraction of China Beach is it's relatively close to southern China. In other words, the whole of Guangdong Province, Hong Kong, relatively close to Taiwan. Relatively close to South Korea because the Koreans, they like to go there for golf. And the Koreans, because of their climate, they don't mind that the coast is a little bit on the cool side in wintertime.
So there's lots of Koreans going there.
And there are, I think, 3 flights every day from Japan into Da Nang. It's also becoming an industrial city. So that region is becoming very big as well as, by the way, Cambodia. Cambodian exports late last year were up 20% year on year. Not many countries have exports that go up by 20% year on year, certainly not the Japanese. And in the US in December, Exports were down 6% year on year. So it's a boomtown.
And Laos is still the Asia that existed, say, 40, 50 years ago, is also being developed. And Myanmar as well.
So all these countries in this Indo-Chinese region, which I described before, are going to grow a lot. But the problem for foreign investors, unless they go there themselves— Vietnam has a stock market, people can buy Vietnamese stocks, but there's no, essentially no active stock market in Cambodia and in Laos and in Myanmar.
So people have to invest through direct investments. And then there is a relatively high execution risk.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so definitely a sophisticated investor's market, but a lot of opportunity.
Marc Faber: Like the early investors in America, the ones that really made money is the ones that went to America and lived in America. Foreign investors in America, they lost money in the 19th century in railroad bonds, in canal shares, They lost a ton of money.
Erik Townsend: So it sounds like Vietnamese beach real estate is a boots-on-the-ground investment for people who have the resources to be there and monitor their investment.
Marc Faber: Yes, I think— I mean, you see, Asia is still early days. In Asia, very few people have second homes. There are some people in Hong Kong that have second homes. In Phuket, in the south of Thailand. And some Chinese may have a second home in Hainan Island and so forth. But by and large, it's early days also in India.
And because of cheap flights nowadays, people can actually travel without incurring huge expenses. So tourism, in my view, is a high-growth area going forward.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Erik Townsend: We've talked a lot about the good news stories in Asia. I want to move on to some of the not-so-good news stories, specifically China and their predicament.
Marc Faber: That's my specialty.
Erik Townsend: A lot of people are focused on the Shanghai Composite Index right now. In other words, they're looking at stock prices. But I think a lot of Western journalists fail to really understand the credit growth story in China. So I'd like to start with, you know, the 2008 credit crisis in the United States was caused by too much debt. Much of which was undercollateralized or unserviceable due to expiring teaser rates.
Please contrast China's credit picture in 2007 with what it looks like today and explain what the implications could be for markets and investors going forward.
Marc Faber: Well, basically what happened after 2008, the recession in the US officially ended June 2009. But already in December 2008, the Fed slashed interest rates, turned the Fed funds rate to zero, basically. And that combined in China with very expansionary fiscal policies. In other words, as a percent of the economy, they had an even larger fiscal deficit than the US.
And they also printed a lot of money. Led to a colossal investment boom. And by the way, not just in China, but in other emerging economies. If you look at capital spending in emerging economies as a percent of the global economy between 2005 and 2014, it doubled.
Now it's no longer growing and it's going to contract. But what happened is, uh, in China there was a huge credit bubble that financed this capacity expansion.
And now, not only in China but in other emerging economies as well, they have these huge overcapacities. And so when you think about what the Fed's policy did. The central banks and the Fed basically wanted to create inflation. First of all, it's very questionable whether to have inflation is good or bad.
But let's not talk about this now because it takes a while to explain. So in the 19th century, the US had deflation and strong economic growth. So it's wrong to say that deflation is bad and inflation is good. But basically, the Fed wanted to create inflation. But with these artificially low interest rates, they created a huge credit bubble in lower credits. In other words, practically every company could just borrow money because if I, as an investor, can't get any money on my deposits, I'm tempted to buy the bonds of a company. That, say, has a yield of 6%.
And so there was a huge growth in lower quality bonds, so-called junk bonds. And we have this huge credit bubble building up in China where credit as a percent of the economy over the last 6 years went up by 50%, according to the Bank for International Settlements. No country in the age of capitalism has experienced this kind of credit growth in such a short period of time.
So we have this credit bubble and it will have to be deflated one way or the other. But, but you understand, we can have a crisis in China
If you look at the US, 1800 to today, we had in the 19th century already more than 15 economic and financial crises. The canal boom and bust, the railroad boom and bust, the California boom and bust, the Chicago boom and bust, and so forth. And then we had the Civil War.
And we had World War I, and then we had the Great Depression and World War II. But despite of all these things, the economy continued to grow in the long run. So I think that China has a problem at the present time and that it will be bad for a while, but that in the long run China still has a good potential.
With one proviso. We need peace in the world, and that is not guaranteed.
Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, I couldn't agree with you more on that one. I'm curious, going back to China, Kyle Bass has been very outspoken about his decision to commit more than half of the billion dollars of assets that he has under management to a short play on the Chinese yuan. Basically, the bet is that China will have no choice but to continue to devalue dramatically from where they are already. Would you agree with that view? Do you think Mr. Bass is on to something, or do you think he's overreacting to the situation there?
Marc Faber: Well, yes and no. Basically, the difference between some other countries that had to devalue significantly and China is that China is not less competitive. It is more competitive than before. The trade surplus in China is going up not down. Now they have a large capital flight, but in my view, if the Chinese really want, and maybe they have an agenda for having this large outflow of capital, who knows?
And some of it is direct foreign investments, like they bought a Swiss— or they're buying a Swiss agricultural company that is similar to Monsanto. They're paying over $30 billion US. So some of the capital, outgoing capital, is actually not capital flight per se, but investing overseas.
And number 2, the Chinese are not so— not totally stupid. They know what Kyle Bass' position is, and they also know what George Soros' positions are. Every Chinese anywhere in the world is a potential spy for China. And so they're very well informed about everything that is happening. And the bets on a lower Chinese currency depends to a larger extent on US dollar strength.
Now, in my view, And I cannot say I know for sure, but say put yourself in the position of the Chinese. They see the Chinese, the one thing they don't want to do is to lose face. So when they see some hedge fund managers that could essentially make money from shorting their currency, they will do everything that these hedge funds don't make the money.
That I can assure you. So what in my opinion happened is the people that were short the RMB or the yuan were also short the yen and the euro. And so the Chinese with their reserves, what is it for them to shift, say, $100 billion Or even $500 billion out of US dollars into euros and yen.
So they pushed up the yen and the euro and they weakened the US dollar. And so some of the pressure on the yuan has gone away. Now, I'm— you understand, all central banks are manipulators.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Marc Faber: In a free market, manipulators, they go to jail. It's a crime. But central bankers is like some pigs are better, are better than other pigs.
And the central bankers, they can manipulate everything and they don't go to jail. So in my view, the Chinese They still have some ammunition. I'm not sure it will be successful, but I can tell you that for China, there is zilch advantage to devalue. There's no need.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's move on to precious metals next, particularly gold. You had an excellent article in the January Gloom, Boom, Doom report from one of the NovaGold executives. They have a very bullish picture. I can't help but remember 2008, though, when gold initially popped, and then as everyone started to panic, gold sold off with everything else.
And I look at the continuing strong dollar story and a lot of fundamentals that suggest to me that maybe gold is not done with its correction. What do you think? Is it time to buy gold here? Does it still have more downside? Are you putting faith in this breakout that we've seen in the last few weeks?
Marc Faber: Well, you know, I kind of indicated before that we have this manipulation in markets. And I think it's very difficult to make any prediction because, like, if tomorrow the Fed announces QE4 and not just $85 billion a month, but say $200 billion a month or anything, you can move markets. So we don't know.
But the one thing my sense tells me is that when you have negative interest rates, and now there are $7— no, $8 billion worth of bonds, of sovereign bonds that trade at the negative yield. When you have that, the holding cost of gold is relatively low. Gold you can't print. There is some mining supply and And I agree with that. There's some central banks selling and some manipulation, probably.
Basically, you can't print it as easily as paper money.
And in view of the fact that the academics, in their desperation, and have— after having essentially largely failed to boost economic activity that they may move to electronic money. In other words, you abolish banknotes. In view of that, I think that every investor should hold some precious metals. Now, someone may say, oh, I will only hold 5% of my assets in precious metals, and somebody will say, I want to have 50% of my money in precious metals.
I tell everybody my, say, simpleton asset allocation is roughly 25% real estate, 25% equities, 25% bonds and cash, and 25% precious metals.
Erik Townsend: Okay. And what about the question of precious metals versus mining stocks? It sounds like your view is, uh, Because of the potential of some extreme risk, you really favor physical precious metals over the stocks. Is that right?
Marc Faber: Yes. But I've written about this. The mining stocks worldwide, as of, say, the 3rd quarter of last year, became incredibly depressed. You know, you had American Barrick, at $5.50. Now, yet the day before yesterday, it went to over $12. You know, sometimes when it's worthwhile to buy the miners because they're so incredibly depressed, equally there's sometimes when it's the time to sell the miners because they've been driven up by enthusiasm and excessive bullish sentiment. So I would say right now, if someone has a higher risk appetite and he wants to make money, the gold miners are probably more interesting. The bulk of my precious metal exposure is in physical gold, not miners. But I've bought some miners. Actually, I sold some the other day, but I may buy them back or will buy them back.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Before we close, I want to take a moment to compliment you, Marc, on the Gloom, Boom and Doom Report. I've noticed that a lot of—
Marc Faber: Thank you very much.
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, it's— you deserve it. And it's amazing. The newsletter guys, most of them are all telling the same story. One of them writes a good article about something, then all of the others are writing an article about the same subject. You're in a completely different category. Every issue is completely new content. It's always full of graphs and charts, and it's always interesting. So, I really want to compliment you on that.
An original, thoughtful, and very interesting, uh, uh, thing. So tell our listeners, please, where they can find out how to subscribe.
Marc Faber: Well, the best is probably to go to the website, uh, www.gloomboomdoom.com.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so once again, folks, you can learn more about Dr. Faber's excellent newsletter at www.gloomboomdoom.com. Nathan Egger and I will be back with more commentary as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend. Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Helicopter money. That sounds like it could be kind of fun. We heard you and Dr. Faber here discussing how helicopter money, this idea of some combination of fiscal and monetary policy being aimed directly at spenders, directly at Main Street, rather than the forms of quantitative easing that we've seen in the past. Now, we saw Ray Dalio come out and echo Dr. Faber's sentiments today. He was talking about how another round of quantitative easing Certainly will push asset prices somewhat higher, but investors and savers are still going to want to save. Lenders are still going to be cautious, and borrowers are going to remain cautious as well. So what it's all going to amount to is, quote unquote, pushing on a string. So any further monetary stimulus that we might see from central bankers, probably going to be directed more at spenders rather than at investors, savers, and Wall Street.
Erik Townsend: And I think, Nathan, that this is probably the biggest macro risk tail risk to equity investments that most market participants are just not paying attention to. And what I'm talking about is everybody assumes that the Fed put is still there, that if things really get bad, if the stock market starts to really crash the way it did in 2008, everybody assumes that the Fed is going to be there. The Fed's got our back. The Fed's going to bail us out with more stimulus money, and it's going to flow into asset markets like it did last time.
I think it's very, very likely that parts of that story will play out.
I think that the stock market's gonna get really ugly. I think the Fed is gonna wanna come to the rescue and print more money. But I think that there will be a public outcry and a lot of political pressure from Congress and from the public to say, if you're gonna print more money, it should be for the benefit of Main Street, not for Wall Street. And we might find that the support to asset markets that everybody equates with QE might not be there in the next round of QE.
Nathan Egger: Okay. Well, you know, if the central bankers are running out of bad ideas, of which they've had so, so many, they could always look to Twitter for inspiration. I saw a Twitter user today suggesting that maybe we could just, that maybe we could just fly helicopters and throw gift certificates out the window with a 30-day expiration.
Erik Townsend: Well, let's do our part then, Nathan, to help save the global economy. Listeners, starting right now, for the next 30 minutes, you can get a free lifetime subscription to MacroVoices just by clicking on the subscribe button. Oh, wait, it was already free. Okay, I guess we can't do that one.
Nathan Egger: So no cash needed here. And we're starting to see headlines every day about this war on cash and why we don't really need it. And that combined with negative interest rates that we're starting to see around the globe are creating a feeling of insecurity. And this is actually having the opposite of its intended effect. And we're seeing increased savings rates around the globe. as Dr. Faber was talking about.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's really sad too that most people don't seem to understand the connection between negative interest rates and the war on cash. If you look at what's going on, you would assume— it would seem natural to assume anyway— that the government ought to be promoting the sound principles that you and I grew up with of saving and investing for the future, being conservative, being responsible. That's not the government agenda. What they want to do is they want to promote spending in the economy, even if it means reckless spending that is spending borrowed money. They want to stimulate the economy by getting consumer spending, and they're not really concerned about the long-term implications of what it means to savers and investors. So what they want to do is impose negative interest rates to intentionally penalize savers and investors for saving their money rather than spending it right here and now. So they want to literally undermine the good advice that you and I grew up with to save and invest for the future.
The problem is that as they try to do that, if negative interest rates prevailed, so you had to pay money to keep your assets in a bank account, all the smart people who had a lot of money would take it all out of the banking system. They would withdraw all of it in cash and put it in a vault or a safe deposit box or a safe or something in order to keep it safe so they don't have to pay negative interest rates to let the bank store it for them.
The only way the government can impose negative interest rates is if they literally take away your right as a citizen to take your wealth out of the banking system and store it in cash. If they make it illegal for you to hold cash, then you have to keep your assets in the banking system, and they can get away with imposing negative interest rates. It is just ridiculous in terms of how— what a fundamental human right of being able to take your own assets out of the banking system is being taken away. But nobody sees it that way because it's being sold to the public under this false pretense of a war on terror.
Nathan Egger: Right. And on top of that, we're hearing this narrative about how, yeah, eliminating cash is all about public safety. and security and protection from the proverbial criminals, the terrorists, the cartels, what have you. Is there any truth to this dominant mainstream narrative?
Erik Townsend: No. I mean, certainly it's true that terrorists, if they can do their banking in cash, can buy arms and so forth and not have traceable transactions. I'm sure that they could do their, their business in gold coins if they needed to. What this is about, negative interest rates, is it is about a government policy of intentionally punishing the most responsible members of society, the savers and investors, in order to bail out the least responsible members of society and to encourage their continuing reckless behavior of borrowing and spending beyond their means. Because if they can borrow and spend beyond their means in the short run, that supports the economy. Now, of course, it fundamentally undermines the long-term prospects for the economy if we're teaching people not to invest and save for the future and instead to spend all of their money in the, in the immediate present tense.
But that's what they're trying to do. And in order to do it, they've got to get rid of cash in order to make possible negative interest rates.
Nathan Egger: Well, speaking of cash and currencies, we just heard you and Dr. Faber touch on hedge fund manager Kyle Bass's highly publicized and outsized bet against the Chinese yuan. Now, Dr. Faber seemed to hint that Mr. Bass Bass should tread carefully and not underestimate the People's Bank of China and their commitment to proving hedge fund managers like him wrong when it comes to betting against them. Now, Kyle Bass has gotten plenty of flak over the years and has even been accused of being a one-trick pony, referring to his wildly successful subprime mortgage trade. But just today, Bass was again proven right when the Texas-based REIT UDF was raided by the FBI.
What do you think Kyle Bass's chances are in his battle against the Chinese central bankers and their currency?
Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, since you mentioned Kyle Bass, I just want to reassure our listeners, we heard you loud and clear in the listener forums about how much you want Kyle Bass interviewed on the show. We want that too. Mr. Bass is a little bit harder to get than some of the other interviewers that you have heard on the program and elsewhere. If anyone in our audience knows Mr. Bass and has his ear, Please tell him MacroVoices is worth his time. Meanwhile, we will continue to do everything that we can to hit his radar screen and get you an interview with Mr. Bass coming up sometime in the future.
Until we do that, though, I think what Marc Faber said was spot on, which is the PBOC does not like what Mr. Bass has had to say about their currency. They're going to do everything that they possibly can to discredit him, punish him, hurt him, whatever. The question is, in the long run, are the fundamentals so strong, as Kyle Bass says they are, that the PBOC will ultimately fail and he will win and he will be proven right, even if he had to endure some volatility along the way, and make a fortune by betting on a dramatic further devaluation of the Chinese currency?
You know, he certainly did nail the subprime thing. Everybody laughed at him then. I'm not about to laugh at him now. I would say that Marc Faber is right, that the PBOC is going to create as many obstacles as they can figure out how to make. It is a battle between these guys, and ultimately economic fundamentals will win. But there can be a lot of scars along the way on a battle like this.
Nathan Egger: And as always, we can expect to see absolutely no ego influencing how this all plays out.
Erik Townsend: No, especially not here on this show.
Nathan Egger: So I want to move on now. Let's give our listeners, Erik, an update on an idea that we discussed last week for our show with energy consultant Art Berman. We have him booked for February 26th. Now, we asked you last week whether you'd rather have Erik do a traditional interview with Art, or us do an alternative scenario where we're recording a conversation between a hedge fund manager and his industry consultant. So that we could all listen in on that conversation.
You, our listeners, responded overwhelmingly that you'd much rather just listen in.
Erik Townsend: Yes, and my attorney responded as well. So I need to clarify what we can actually do on the air. I am not at liberty to make representations about the hedge fund that I manage or the positions that it contains. So for regulatory compliance reasons, I cannot represent the fund that I manage in an on-the-air interview with What I can do is basically to role-play the, the role of a hypothetical institutional investor who sees a bottom coming in the crude oil market, which I very definitely see, and is evaluating different ways to play it.
And this format will actually work better because instead of just representing the types of instruments that my fund is able to trade, I'll be able to play this role of coming at this from a fixed income guy's perspective, Looking at the junk bond trades, coming at it from a commodity futures trader's perspective, coming at it from an equity trader's perspective, looking at all of the different angles of how it might make sense to express an investment view that the crude oil market is about to bottom and will have a very substantial upside in the next several years.
Nathan Egger: So we also got some good suggestions and discussion about the actual format of such an interview. So Let's tell everyone our latest thinking on that, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Well, we've considered several possible formats, and I'm just going to be honest and say we haven't figured it out yet. Art and I could just stop and explain the background of what we're talking about so it makes sense to listeners. We also considered a format where Art and I might just dive in and go deep on the terminology. Then we would edit the interview after the fact. So you'd hear Nathan's voice interjecting explanations in between exchanges between me and Art. Say, explaining what the technical jargon means and so forth. At this point, I think we've decided that wouldn't be practical. We're still in our infancy for this podcast project, and just the editing challenge of that scenario is a little bit more than we can bite off right now.
So we're going to take some kind of approach of me role-playing the part of a speculative institutional investor trying to look at all of the different angles of how to play the coming bottom in oil prices. Art will provide the industry perspective, and we'll figure out somehow how to explain it so that it is something that everybody can follow.
Nathan Egger: Bottom line, folks, we're still brainstorming on this end about the best way to present this, but I think either way, it promises to be an excellent show. Erik, before we close, I want to express our thanks publicly to Grant Williams of Real Vision Television and the wildly popular Things That Make You Go Hmmm blog. Grant went out of his way to tell his subscribers about our new podcast when we launched last week, and we really appreciated the gesture. It means a lot. Thank you, Grant.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, Grant is a super guy. We really appreciate his support, and I, I can't say enough for how much we need everyone's support. So listeners, please tell all your friends about MacroVoices, post a link to it on social media, do whatever you can do to get the word out. We really need your help.
Nathan Egger: And before you guys ask, yes, of course we know that you want to see Grant Williams on the As do we. So, we've already booked him for April. We've got that base covered. I'm also working on some of the other excellent suggestions posted on the listener discussion forums at www.MacroVoices.com/forums.
So, we're working on Martin Armstrong. He's been a very common request from our listeners.
Nathan Egger: And there's several other names. We're doing what we can to recruit everybody that you guys have suggested that we get on the show.
And Erik, before we close, I want to address a couple questions that came up from your interview with Jim Rogers on last week's show. You and Jim both said you're short junk bonds in the US. And we had some of the forum users who were inquiring as to how exactly a mere mortal like us would go about shorting the junk bond market in the US. Can you help us out with that?
Erik Townsend: Sure. It's actually gotten a heck of a lot easier than it used to be. In the old days, if you wanted to be short junk bonds, you'd have to pick a list of individual issues and then actually short them as individual trades. These days, there's an ETF for everything. So the 2 most popular junk bond ETFs are JNK, that's Juliet November Kilo, and HYG, Hotel Yankee Golf. Both of those are long junk bond funds. So if your view, as mine and Jim Rogers', is that junk bonds are in trouble and likely to trade higher in yield, lower in price, You would want to be short those ETFs. Selling short is something that you need a margin account for. Not everybody is comfortable being short. So there is another option, which is another ETF, is an inverse junk bond ETF. That's Sierra Juliet Bravo, SJB.
That's a case of you buy it, hold it as a long position, and it benefits when the price of junk bonds goes down.
Nathan Egger: Can we also share our plans for our listener discussion forums with the listeners before we close?
Erik Townsend: Sure. You know, this is something that I really hope that we'll find a groundswell of support from our listeners for. I have felt for a long time like there's really no good place to go on the internet for an online discussion forum to— for grown-ups to talk about finance and investing topics. I would love to create a network of private investors, high-net-worth individuals, family offices, sophisticated investors that all share investing ideas in a polite, grown-up, adult discussion forum.
And you know, you look at the stuff, Nathan, that's on the internet, you look at something like ZeroHedge is a very popular investing site— if you've ever looked at the comment threads on ZeroHedge posts I don't think any of these people have graduated from junior high school yet. It is just so sophomoric and name-calling and so forth. It's no wonder that there's very little substantive content in terms of discussion there.
So I have a vision of creating a free online discussion forum. In order for this to work, we would have to recruit a small army of volunteer moderators to help us keep the name-calling and the childishness that has destroyed so many other investing forums on the network out. But I think it would be really great to create a an online community for private investors, sophisticated investors to network with one another, communicate with one another, and so forth. So that's kind of my vision for what I would like to see our forums eventually become.
Whether or not we get there is entirely up to the listeners. Can we get that critical mass of participation? We're going to do everything we can to make the forums a place that feel like it's for grown-ups, where we have adult conversation, where there's no name-calling, And we don't tolerate the sophomoric behavior that you see on other websites. You've got to do the rest, listeners. You've got to come show up and participate and create that interesting conversation that creates the critical mass that we need to attract more people. And I think we'll have something really exciting. At least that's what we're going to strive for.
Nathan Egger: Right. That's the goal for the forums. And that's the show for this week. On a closing note, just have to emphasize we're going to We're going to continue to need your help, listeners. Please subscribe, rate, and review us on iTunes. Tell everyone you know about MacroVoices, or anyone who cares to listen. You can also follow us on Twitter if you'd like, @MacroVoices.
And above all, be sure to tune in next week for our show with Art Berman. We've worked very hard on this. We will have the concept together by the time we go to record. And in the meantime, we'll see you all in the forums.
Erik Townsend: Take care, everybody.
Nathan Egger: Thanks, everybody.
Erik Townsend: See you next week, guys.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only.
The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Jim Rogers — investing legend (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome to the inaugural episode of MacroVoices. I'm Erik Townsend. We have a fantastic show lined up for you with investing legend Jim Rogers coming up as today's special interview guest. I'll be talking to Jim about China, the inevitable unwind of the biggest monetary policy experiment in recorded history, and much more. But first, I want to introduce my producer and co-host, Nathan Egger. I think you're really going to enjoy the fresh perspective that Nathan brings to the program.
Nathan Egger: Thanks, Erik. Hello, everyone. I'm Nathan Egger. Welcome to MacroVoices. I'll introduce myself in more detail in our online listener discussion forums, because I'd like to just dive right into the meat of today's show here.
Nathan Egger: Erik, we have a lot of listeners who miss your commodity reports and your general weekly market outlook. So let's start from the top and run through everything. Start with the stock market. Do you see this current equity rout that we're now seeing as just a temporary pullback in this long-running bull market, or has the tide finally turned here?
Erik Townsend: No, I definitely think the tide has turned, Nathan. And as I have predicted for years, as several other people have, what has been driving this entire massive equity rally all the way from 666 on the S&P back in 2009 to its recent highs above 2,100 has been central bank liquidity. The Fed and other central banks conjure money out of thin air, and it has to go somewhere, and most of it goes into financial markets. They've taken the punch bowl away, and that came first with the ending of quantitative easing. When they hiked interest rates in December, that seems to have been the catalyst that broke the camel's back, and I think that we're into now a cyclical bear market.
The thing, as a lot of people have predicted, Dr. Marc Faber notably has said, what's going to happen is asset prices are going to go down, down, down until it starts to look bad. Then central bankers will come in to save the day again. And of course, each time they do this, they print more money, they create more debt, and they set us up for an even worse event the next time around.
But my prediction is that what's going to happen here is that equity markets are going to get worse, probably a lot worse before they get better. Then there's going to be a U-turn on monetary policy, probably either negative interest rates or another round of quantitative easing. And then we're going to be off to the races with even higher equity prices. Eventually, the central banks are going to either run out of bullets or they're going to run out of political support to continue printing money out of thin air. Then we're really going to be in trouble. But I think that is still quite a ways off.
Nathan Egger: Okay. Well, speaking of central bank liquidity, let's move on to the big one, and that's crude oil. Since that's the area you primarily focus on in your work, and it's been quite a while since our listeners have heard your weekly updates, why don't we start by taking a step back and let's look at the high-level macro picture, and then we'll move on to your market outlook. So let's start with why this huge sell-off in oil prices happened in the first place, what has been driving it, and how long do you think it's going to last?
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, let's really step back to the big picture. We had high oil prices because the peak cheap oil thesis definitely tells us that we should expect production to Decline in conventional oil resources over the next 20 years, and it's going to be a problem. So we had high oil prices. Those high oil prices created opportunity for people to invest in the U.S. shale business. Now, if we'd had normal monetary policy, we might have had normal investment. What we had was just tremendous easy money policies from the Federal Reserve, making a massive, massive amount of money available.
Much of that money went into the junk bond market, and specifically into junk bonds issued. By shale drillers. So all of a sudden we had an overinvestment, or a malinvestment in Austrian economics parlance, that basically allowed us to get ahead of ourselves.
We built so many shale wells, we drilled so many wells and produced so much oil in the United States that it started to push oil prices from $105 down to, say, $95. What everyone expected was for Saudi Arabia and OPEC to cut their production in order to balance the market. In the fall of 2014, OPEC, which really means Saudi Arabia, surprised everyone and said, we're not going to cut until non-OPEC producers cut. We will allow the price to fall. We're not going to be the ones to bear all of the burden of cutting our production in order to support prices.
That changed everything. And sure enough, we've seen this massive sell-off in prices. And the reason is Saudi Arabia is producing as much oil as they possibly can. I think they want prices to go down in order to injure their competitors.
And we have seen the market now being oversupplied by somewhere between 1 million and 2 million barrels per day. IEA just came out this week and actually said that number is up to 2.24 million barrels per day. I'm skeptical that it's really that big, but the world is being oversupplied with crude oil, and we're starting to reach the point where we're running out of room to store it. Those big tanks in Cushing, Oklahoma, where they store the crude oil, are getting full. And that's what this story is all about. When does it change? When does the whole process go into reverse? Only when OPEC, Russia, and probably some other non-OPEC producers finally make a deal and actually cut production.
Now keep in mind, they don't have to cut production very much. OPEC and Russia together account for 40 million barrels per day. So, if we have a 2 million barrel per day oversupply, they only have to cut by 5% each, and that oversupply is completely eliminated. I think the number might be a little smaller than 2 million barrels. So, that would easily do it.
The thing is, we don't have political conditions, even though Russia has tried to allude to it. We don't have political conditions yet that would allow that to happen.
Nathan Egger: All right. I'm glad you brought up peak oil, because before we go any further, I think we should tackle a potentially awkward question. That is, you are known as a peak cheap oil guru. If you take the simplest interpretation, or so far as I understand it, of peak oil, one would think that the premise is basically global production is declining, it's leading to an oil shortage, and eventually much higher prices. But recently, we've been seeing the complete opposite— astonishingly low prices. And we've just even this week tested new cycle lows.
So with all due respect, Erik, what does this mean? Does this mean that you've got it all wrong with your peak cheap oil thesis?
Erik Townsend: Well, it blows my mind, Nathan, how many people say that. I go to professional finance conferences, and people are saying, peak oil? Are you kidding? That's the most thoroughly discredited idea in the history of the world. And I just look at them like, really?
Nathan Egger: Why?
Erik Townsend: I don't think people understand it. So let's take a step back. The peak cheap oil thesis— and I talk about peak cheap oil, because peak oil means We're not going to be able to produce more oil. Of course we're going to be able to produce more oil. You know, innovation knows no limits. If we can't get it from hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling, somebody will invent some new technology. But the point is, all this additional technology is expensive. The days of drill a hole in the ground and oil comes gushing out, those are gone forever.
We'll find more oil, but it'll be increasingly expensive to produce it. So what we have right now is a situation where there was an overinvestment in the US shale patch. If you look at the projected declines out to the year 2030, where as much as 40 million barrels per day of conventional production will fall away to decline and need to be replaced, we got a head start. We got this massive overinvestment in the US shale patch, and it's producing more oil than we need right now. It's not nearly enough to overcome the projected declines for the next 20 years, but it's enough to get us ahead of the game, where we've got a little bit more oil than we need, just a couple million barrels per day.
If there is a lesson to learn from the last year and a half, Nathan, it's this: it only takes a small imbalance between supply and demand to create very, very large changes in the price of oil. What we have is about 85 million barrels per day of total consumption, a 2 million barrel per day oversupply.
Nathan Egger: So—
Erik Townsend: We're talking about approximately 2% or 3% of an oversupply, and that has cut the price of oil in half, actually more than in half. What's going to happen when we see— and I would also argue that we have learned from this experience— what's the most oil the world can produce? We're doing it right now. The Saudis are pedaling as fast as they can. Everybody's making as much oil as they can. Iran is coming back online. We're producing as much oil as we possibly can. So what happens in the next 10 years when conventional producing assets decline by, say, 4 or 5 million barrels per day from where they are now?
Instead of having a 2 million barrel per day oversupply, we would have a 2 or 3 million barrel per day undersupply, and that is going to send prices to the moon.
We're not there yet, but it's coming. And I don't think that the current rout is over. I don't think that the final bottom is in. But eventually, we're going to see much, much higher oil prices. And the peak cheap oil thesis is valid as it ever was, and I stand by it completely.
Nathan Egger: OK, you said earlier that what would or could change everything and start a massive price recovery would be if Russia either joins OPEC or agrees through some kind of treaty to participate with OPEC in production cuts. We saw a headline on January 27th saying the CEO of Lukoil wants to broker a meeting between the Russian government and OPEC to discuss the possibility of such production cuts. Now, you said you don't think the bottom is in, but what about this scenario? How would this play out?
Erik Townsend: Well, what you're getting right now is the jawboning. What the Russians have realized is that they know the market understands that if Russia and OPEC were to jointly agree to a production cut of 5%, That, that would turn the whole thing around and prices would be shooting to the moon the next day. What does Russia do? They look at their actual circumstances, reality. They say, can we cut production by 5%? There's no bloody way they can cut production by 5%, Nathan. The temperatures in that country are such you can't just turn these things off and let them freeze and come back a year later.
Furthermore, Russian oil production is a whole bunch of private companies. There would have to be some agreement and some enforcement mechanism between those private companies. Right. In order for them to all participate in a production cut. None of those things exist. Even if they did exist, Iran is not ready to— Iran wants to increase their production, to throttle up now that the sanctions are gone. They're not going to cut from their current levels. They're going to dramatically increase. Saudi Arabia cannot possibly agree to a production cut with Russia while Iran is doubling their production. Can you imagine the Saudis telling their people, yeah, we're going to get less money for our country, but Our arch rivals, both politically and religiously, the Iranians, they're going to double their production and it's all going to be fine. I don't think so. That's ridiculous. We just can't have that.
So what we have is a situation where the Russians know perfectly well there is no way for a deal like this to come together right now. But they just learned back on the 27th of January that all they have to do is talk about the possibility of such a meeting, they got $7 of oil price bump in a panic reaction to just saying, we think we'd like to broker a meeting with Saudi Arabia. And Saudi Arabia promptly said, there is no meeting. What are you talking about? $7 times 10 million barrels per day.
Okay, that's $70 million per day of additional revenue to Russia just for spreading a little bit of propaganda.
I expect them to continue to try to do that. But the reality is OPEC production cut, joint production cut with Russia and other producers, I think we're several months away from that. If I'm wrong and a deal is actually made, everything changes instantly overnight. But if I'm correct that that deal is not really going to happen, the bottom's not in yet. Prices are still headed lower.
Nathan Egger: So given this dynamic backdrop, are there any trading opportunities that you see in the near to intermediate term?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, there are, and I think we need to really make sure that people understand what's driving this market now. You'll hear a lot of people saying, okay, this is ridiculous. It has to be the bottom. This has to be the bottom because the price is already way below any kind of long-term sustainable cost of production. It's not economic at these prices. This has to be the bottom.
Those arguments all have some basis in reality behind them, but that's just not what's important now. It's true that oil prices are already well below their long-term sustainable It doesn't matter.
The reality of the situation is the world is being oversupplied by somewhere between 1.5 and 2.5 million barrels per day, and we're running out of tanks to store it in. If more oil gets produced than gets consumed, it has to go someplace. Somebody has to store it someplace. You start with the least expensive option, which is the on-land tanks and tank farms in places like Cushing, Oklahoma.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: You run out of that, you start chartering very large crude carrier tanker ships and using them as big floating gas tanks. Eventually you run out of those. We're not at that point yet, but we're starting to get close to it.
The reason Goldman Sachs is now predicting that we're going to see oil prices in the teens is not because anybody thinks it makes sense for oil prices to be that low. The point is, what happens when that expiring front-month futures contract has a couple of days left of trading and there's nobody to buy it because nobody has a tank with capacity to put that oil in and it's not being used in terms of refining it into finished products. Could they just refine more finished products and store them? They've run out of storage for the finished products too. So until we get past this storage crunch, prices can keep going lower.
I would put a caveat in though, which is the people that have been on the short side of this oil trade since the '80s have made a lot of money. We've made a fortune on the way down here. Don't be greedy trying to chase this all the way to the bottom. Are we really going to see the teens? I don't know. I think $25 is a pretty darn certain number that we're going to get to. I would be looking at lightening up short positions and just taking profits below $25. Somewhere in the low $20s I think we're very likely to get to, unless there is some kind of geopolitical shock or something that sends prices in the other direction. Will we really get all the way into the teens? Some people have even said $10 a barrel. It's entirely possible, but if it happens, it will happen in a panic because there's a shortage of storage.
So the trading opportunity, I think the easy money has already been made on the short side. The question is building your strategy for how you're going to take advantage of this final low once it's in, which will be the buying opportunity of a lifetime. Are you going to buy the stocks? Well, you might want to wait for the stocks to kind of catch down to the crude oil, because as the price of crude oil comes down, that's going to result in a wave of bankruptcies and defaults, which will probably have a delayed effect on the price of oil stocks. Are you going to buy the oil futures contracts themselves? Start building your strategy now for how to make the long play of a lifetime. And my feeling is it's not quite time to be buying yet, but we're getting awfully close.
Nathan Egger: All right, let's switch gears a little bit and talk a bit about gold. I know that you made a lot of money being short gold all the way down from $1,850 or so to well below $1,200. Are you still bearish on gold? Gold has been all over the headlines this week. Would you still consider a short position? Where do you think this market is headed in 2016?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's very timely that you brought this up. You know, we talked about recording this show a couple weeks ago, Nathan and I, had my narrative in my head, which is, hey, guys, look. A lot of gold bugs keep telling you it's time to buy gold. Of course, it's always time to buy gold according to them. The reality is that it's been in a consistent downtrend for more than a year now, and it was continuing in that downtrend. That's over. Around the 1st of February, we very decisively broke out above the 200-day moving average and the channel resistance line. So we moved very, very impressively and aggressively above that key resistance number, which was somewhere around $1,135 or so.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: More than $100 higher than that. Boy, that sure sounds like, to a technical analyst, like a very convincing breakout. Probably ought to buy it.
Here's the reason I haven't bought it. I look at what's going on and it feels to me like we could be at the beginning of another 2008 in equity markets. Now, I don't think it'll get as bad as 2008 because I think the Federal Reserve will be quicker to jump in with monetary policy.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Than they did in 2009 eventually. But what happened in 2008? Price of gold went up initially because everybody was starting to panic, and then gold sold off hard, several hundred dollars, along with everything else, because in a panic correlations go to 1. People are selling everything in order to raise cash, whether it makes sense or not. So I do have a little bit of concern that even though this looks like a very, very convincing breakout from the technical channel that gold I worry that it could be what we call a parabolic move, which tends to lead to what traders call a blow-off top.
In other words, it's a panic, it's a rush, everybody goes rushing into gold. And we've heard headlines today about people lined up around the corner in the streets of London waiting to buy gold coins. Those sound to me like ingredients for a blow-off top. I want to ask Jim Rogers this question when we do the interview with him later in the show.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Because I'm a little bit concerned. It looks to me like maybe we could see a continuing move up here. It's going almost straight up. When anything goes up in a straight line, it scares me because it can reverse and go down in a straight line.
I hope I'm wrong, but I'm afraid this could be a 2008-like event where you get an initial spike up and then gold sells off hard when equities are selling off. I could be wrong, but that's the reason I haven't moved on it yet.
Nathan Egger: Okay, well, while we're discussing the risk-off trade, let's touch briefly on the fixed income markets. Can you please give us your outlook for bonds, both the corporates and sovereign credits?
Erik Townsend: Well, I note that we're seeing a very clear divergence in terms of quality. The safety trade is definitely in play. We are seeing very, very low US 10-year yields here. That's the safety trade. People are panicking out of the stock market into Treasury bonds because they consider those to be the safest investment on earth. I would disagree with that statement, but that's what everybody in finance thinks, is that US Treasury bonds are the absolute safest thing that there is anywhere. That's the reason that we're seeing a lot of upward pressure. I think if you go over to Europe and look at European sovereigns, the refugee crisis over there is really giving a lot of support to bond prices, therefore very low bond yields. If I look at high yield, though, we're actually on channel support today, the bottom of the channel in JNK and HYG, which are the 2 junk bond ETFs. So we're seeing low-quality credit selling off aggressively, while there's a safety trade into high-quality credit.
What it says to me is I think the junk bonds are the canary in the coal mine. I think that low-quality credit is going to continue to be adversely affected. But high-quality sovereigns, Treasuries, are probably going to benefit from a safety trade here, at least for a while. I wouldn't be surprised if we eventually retested the low of 1.36% on the US 10-year Treasury yield. That was from— I can't remember if it was 2012 or when that was. But I wouldn't be surprised if we eventually retest that if the equity sell-off continues as I expect it to.
At some point, we'll get some kind of central bank intervention, whether that comes in the form of negative rates or what, I'm not sure. When we get to that, probably that marks where the top comes in the US Treasury bond in terms of prices, low in yields. All right.
Nathan Egger: Well, thank you for your market perspective, Erik. It's clear to me that you haven't lost your touch. But I'm sure our listeners can't wait to hear your interview with Jim Rogers. I know I'm looking forward to it personally. So without further ado, let's move on to today's feature interview right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is a man who needs little introduction, legendary investor Jim Rogers, who co-founded Quantum Fund in 1973. Now, as some of you are old enough to remember, the '70s were a very difficult time for investors, with the S&P 500 advancing only 47% in the entire decade. Jim's Quantum Fund, on the other hand, returned more than 4,200% in the same period, although it was actually a shorter period from the fund's inception in '73 through the end of the decade. 4,200% return to investors. And to this day, Quantum remains one of the most successful hedge funds in world history. Jim retired from professional finance in 1980 at the grand old age of 37 and went for a ride on his motorbike. But Jim took that motorcycle ride Jim Rogers style, literally riding around the world and traversing every continent except Antarctica by motorcycle while chronicling the adventure in his first book, Investment Biker. Then in 1999 through 2001, Jim took his new wife for a drive in the countryside through 116 countries while racking up more than 150,000 miles on a custom-built Mercedes that Jim had created just for that journey.
That trip was the subject of Jim's second book, Adventure Capitalist. Since then, Jim has written 4 more fascinating books and has become, without a doubt, the world's most famous private investor. Our concept for the MacroVoices podcast is to bring you the very brightest minds in the world of macroeconomics, and frankly, it would be hard to even imagine a better guest than Jim Rogers to help us launch this new podcast. Jim, thanks so much for coming on the program as our first feature interview guest. Thank you.
Jim Rogers: Oh my gosh, the very first. Well, thank you, Erik. I'm flattered.
Erik Townsend: Oh, it's fantastic to have you here, Jim. You are famous, sir, for your long-term bullish views on Asia. You literally wrote a book on that subject back in 2007, and you even took the extreme step of moving your family from New York to Singapore because you wanted your daughters to grow up speaking fluent Mandarin and understanding Asian culture. You famously said that moving to Asia in 2007 was akin to moving to London in 1807 or New York in 1907.
And as you know, your public comments on that subject influenced my own decision to move to Hong Kong in 2009. So believe me, I couldn't be more with you on the idea that this is Asia's century. But Jim, on a short to intermediate term basis, China is really hurting right now, and a lot of people think it's going to get worse before it gets better. So please give us an update on your views. Are you still long-term bullish on Asia in general and China in particular? And assuming that you are, is this that blood-in-the-streets moment when investors ought to be buying Chinese stocks hand over fist? Or is it smarter to step back and wait this out until the turbulence is over before investing in China?
Jim Rogers: Well, Erik, that's an interesting question. Let's, let's go back to the US. In the 19th century, the US was on the rise. But along the way, we had a horrible Civil War, we had 15 depressions with a D, we had virtually no human rights, we had very little rule of law, we had massacres in the streets. I mean, We were a mess. Many people wondered if we would survive. And yet, as you know, the US became the most successful country in the 20th century and put together quite a record. So China will certainly have problems along the way. Every individual that rises has setbacks, every company, every family, every country. Nothing goes straight up. So sure, China is going to have problems. I don't know what or when or why or how, but I know that's the way the world works.
The problems that China is having now and will have mainly come from the West, though. If you have to have a particular culprit, it's probably Washington, D.C., where they have been printing staggering amounts of money for years now and spending, borrowing huge amounts of money. It's affecting all of us, not just China.
Hong Kong is being affected, as you know. But, but everybody, Erik, we— the world's got some hard times facing it. And it's not going to be a lot of fun the next couple of years. And if there has to be a culprit, it's Washington, DC. But a lot of people are going to suffer.
Erik Townsend: Would you think that this is a good time to go ahead and start investing in Chinese equities, or is it better to wait this out?
Jim Rogers: Well, I am not buying. If you mean to buy today in February of 2016, I am not buying at the moment. I haven't sold any. I am long China and short the US, for example. So I'm not buying anywhere in the world. As we speak, because I expect some very, very difficult times ahead.
Erik Townsend: A lot of macro analysts are concerned about the risk of both China and Saudi Arabia potentially de-pegging their currencies from the dollar and devaluing. And some have even predicted that if China devalues significantly, which a lot of analysts think is unavoidable, it could set off a contagion of competitive devaluation across Asia and other emerging markets, which in turn could potentially ignite a global deflationary spiral. that could cripple the global economy. Are these kind of fears justified, Jim? And what do you think the consequences would be generally of both Chinese and Saudi Arabian devaluations? Would that lead to a contagion?
Jim Rogers: Well, we already have many currencies collapsing or devaluing. I wouldn't call it quite— it's not devaluing in the sense that there's a conscious devaluation, but the euro's down dramatically. The Japanese yen is down 50%. The Australian dollar, the Canadian dollar, single— I could go on and on. Singapore dollar, you know, with currencies that are down a great deal. Now, this is not like the '30s where there were conscious devaluations and beggar-thy-neighbor policies, but it has happened and it is happening. The Chinese currency has been perhaps the strongest in the world for the last decade, maybe even for the last few months, because it's only down 5 or 6% against the US dollar.
So mainly what's happening, Erik, is the US dollar is very strong because people are terrified of what else to do with their money. They're looking for a safe haven. They think the US dollar is a safe haven. It is not. I hasten to tell you it is not because the US is the largest debtor nation in the history of the world and the debts are getting higher. I own US dollars not because I have any confidence in the fundamentals, but because everybody is going to continue to look for a safe haven during times of turmoil. I also own the renminbi. I'm not selling my renminbi. It has been, as I said, the strongest currency in the world for 10 or 11 years. And now that they're letting it float more, it's still not a completely free float, but they are doing what the US and the IMF requested and letting it float more, pegging it more to other currencies.
You see, you have seen and will see more fluctuations. If they ever make it completely convertible, I suspect many people there will sell because they want to diversify. If it goes down at that point, I hope I'm smart enough to buy more because I'd rather own the renminbi in a normal market rather than just about anything, including the US dollar.
So we're going to have a lot more turmoil ahead of us. It will be, in my view, good for the US dollar, which I own. I own the Hong Kong dollar. You live in Hong Kong, it's tied to the US dollar, which is one reason I own it. I own the Japanese yen because everybody's short it. But those are my main currency positions going forward. If Saudi Arabia decouples, that currency would probably go down a lot if that happens because the price of oil is down so much and they're now building up a lot of debt. But Erik, I don't see many people noticing it except maybe you, because you, you try to notice so many things. But a drop in the value of the Saudi Arabian currency, whether market-induced or a conscious attempt, I don't think it's going to have too much effect on the world.
Chinese currency, US dollar, those currencies, but not Saudi Arabia.
Erik Townsend: Okay, I want to pick up on something that you said a little bit earlier and go back to US monetary policy. We've obviously just undergone the biggest monetary policy experiment in recorded history, the creation of trillions of dollars out of thin air, which Mr. Bernanke has assured us is going to save the day. And the narrative central bankers would like us to believe is that this has worked. Now, the recent stock market volatility, they would tell us, Ever since the December Fed rate hike is just transitory noise and the global economy has been saved and it's now at liftoff condition, according to Ms. Yellen. And that means that stimulus should no longer be required. Organic or economic growth is just around the corner any minute now. Personally, Jim, I'm extremely skeptical of that narrative, as I know you are. I believe the doctrine that there's no free lunch and that we've yet to even find out what the unintended consequences will be of unwinding All of this easy money policy.
I know I'm not smart enough to figure out those unintended consequences. You're a bit smarter than I am. Do you have some insight for our listeners as to what we should expect? First of all, I know your answer already. Are we really at liftoff and headed for organic growth, or are we about to experience a very rude awakening? And more to the point, how does this play out?
Jim Rogers: Well, one unintended consequence, which I suspect even Mrs. Yellen realized, was that People on Wall Street have made a lot of money. So they, they knew that the banks and the people in the financial system would, would benefit from, from all of this throwing money out the window. But no, it has not worked. As you wisely point out, you can look at the unemployment numbers, especially if you get behind the ones that the government fakes, and you will see that it hasn't really worked. It hasn't worked anywhere in the world that I know of, except in the financial community to some extent.
But Erik, even the financial community is suffering. Many banks have problems now. There are layoffs in finance. Going into Wall Street is not the easy layup it was 15 years ago or even 20 years ago. Now everybody is suffering because this is a policy of absolute madness. You cannot just throw money out the window and print money and run up debt. Yeah, the people who benefit from the debt and their friends and the money printing think things are great, but the rest of us are not doing much better and We're having to pay these horrendous debts.
One reason world economies cannot take off is because they've got the huge drag, the huge debt burden that's holding everybody back going forward. Plus, Erik, you know, you were taught and most people were taught to save your money for the future, save and invest. Well, unfortunately, those people are now getting wiped out because interest rates are zero and have been for what, 7, 8, 9 years now. So the people that you really need in a society and an economy, the people who save and invest for the future are being totally wiped out. Pension plans, endowments, trust funds, insurance companies. I mean, this is, this is a disaster except for a very narrow few people, and we are all going to pay a horrendous price.
Erik Townsend: Do you think this year's presidential elections could change that? I've heard a lot of talk about, and I don't think it's a good thing necessarily, but so-called QE for the people, the idea of another massive round of what I would essentially call helicopter Quantitative easing to print money for the purpose of social benefit programs, handouts, that kind of thing. Do you think that's a possibility in this presidential election year?
Jim Rogers: Well, I know what will happen is that as the markets get worse, Mrs. Yellen and the people in Washington are gonna get a lot of phone calls saying you've got to save civilization because the world is coming to an end. And they're bureaucrats and academics, they don't know anything. That's why they work for the government. They're gonna panic and do something. They're gonna have to do more than they did in the past because it didn't work. It didn't work in the past. So sure, they may send us all a check. Who knows what they're going to do coming down the road? Because it's going to get worse. And they've shot a lot of bullets, a lot of bullets that turned out to be blanks. And now we're going to be faced with a much worse problem. And it's a presidential election year. You're right.
Erik Townsend: A lot of people are getting worried about the possibility of another major stock market crash like 2008. And I think that's very possible myself. We may be seeing the beginnings of it now. But frankly, if I think When I think about the long-term macro picture, when I think about the word bubble, my mind goes straight to the bond market, not the stock market. I kind of feel like we're approaching a peak debt moment where maybe finally we wake up and recognize what you and I know, which is a lot of the outstanding debt in the world will never be repaid because it was malinvestment that never should have been made in the first place.
If I'm right, that could potentially lead to an epic crisis in the bond markets in coming years, both corporate and sovereign credits, and maybe even a debt jubilee, as some people have started to suggest. The Treasury bond markets around the globe already feel toppy to me. We're seeing at this point negative interest rates in German Bund yields well beyond 10-year maturities. We seem to be at the end of a 30-year bull market in bonds. Sovereign bonds are still feeling like they're toppy, maybe head a little higher, but the corporates, particularly the high-yield junk bonds, are selling off pretty hard. Is this the beginning of the end, Jim? Is the bond market bubble ending, or is this sell-off in high yield just a little bit of noise that doesn't mean anything?
Jim Rogers: One small correction: the bond bull market has been going on 35 years. It started— the bottom was in September of 1981, so it's been going on over 34 years now. And yes, it's coming to an end. You may have government bonds go higher for a while, just as As the panic takes place. I'm short, in terms of full disclosure, I am short junk bonds in the United States. And you're right, they are going down now, some of them more than others, obviously. But no, we are, we're making a top in interest rates. That does not mean, Erik, that if and when the Federal Reserve panics again, that interest rates won't go down some more, bonds go up, in other words. But no, we're making the top. There's very little question we're making the top. I'm not short sovereigns because I expect so much panic that many people will pile into them like they piled into the US dollar. But I'm certainly short junk bonds, and I wouldn't buy bonds with— I can't imagine unless it's a very special situation bond.
I can't imagine buying bonds anywhere in the world. Well, maybe short-term Russian government bonds or something, just because the yield is so high. But I cannot imagine buying bonds anywhere.
Erik Townsend: Now, I just want to take that a little further with respect to Europe in particular. I'm with you. I am already short junk bonds in the United States. I think there's probably a little bit more upside in US sovereigns. What about something like the German Bund? I mean, we had Bill Gross say this thing's over, this is ridiculous, at a negative 4 basis point yield or something a few months back on the 10-year. With this whole refugee crisis, I'm not even sure what the Bund yield is now, but it's deeply negative. Can this go even farther, or have German Bund yields topped out?
Jim Rogers: Well, I think they've gone even more negative since Bill said that, and I think you're seeing more places in Europe with, with negative yields. And the Japanese, you know, the Japanese said they would not have negative yields, and now they do. Just like most politicians and central bankers, they, they lie to us. Of course it can go lower. I mean, will it? I don't have any clue. I said before, they're going to all panic and do whatever they can to save the world. They're not going to save the world. I mean, unfortunately, after 8 years of this, of this madness, we got to pay the price. And whether we pay the price in 2016 or 2017, or both, We're certainly going to pay the price.
You asked before if there could be a stock market crash. Of course there can be. I mean, we've had stock market crashes every few years since the beginning of time. This time is going to be worse than in the past because the debt, Erik, the debt is so, so, so much higher. We had a problem in 2008 and '09 because of debt. Well, the debt everywhere has skyrocketed since, even China. You know, in 2008 and '09, China had a lot of money saved for a rainy day and could ride to the rescue and did.
But Erik, now even China has a lot of debt, which is worrisome. So you're going to see people in bankruptcy in China next time around. And China's not going to be able to help as much as they did in the past. And you're going to see even in China problems. Well, let's say the government has said they're going to let people go bankrupt, and I hope they mean it. Because that's the way the system is supposed to work.
Erik Townsend: We've been talking about some pretty serious secular risks here: stock market crashes, bond market crashes, out-of-control central bankers that think that they can defy gravity by conjuring money out of thin air. These are all pretty serious risks. Now, Jim, you're the history major, so I want your take on this. I can't help but observe that when governments screw up as badly as ours have recently, And when all hell starts to break loose economically, as I think could happen in the next couple years, if you look at history as a guide, what history teaches us is that the usual government response is to start a war, because that always unites people behind blind faith in their leaders in the name of patriotism, and it shields senior government officials from accountability for their failures while the government continues to tell everyone that foreigners are to blame for all of our woes.
Now, I've not only been criticized for those views, I've been called an alarmist, a doomsayer, a conspiracy theorist, and an outright nutcase. What's your take, Jim? Am I crazy to think that a large global-scale military conflict could be the result of all these easy money and central planning policies of the last 7 years?
Jim Rogers: Well, whether politicians have consciously set out to have a war in times like that, or it's just been forced on them by the times, Doesn't matter. It has happened. History shows it does happen for whatever reason. Whenever you have hard times, people get unhappy and desperate. It's easy to blame foreigners for everything. They have different languages, different skin color, different religion. They smell bad. Their food smells bad. I cannot tell you, Erik, how many times I've heard people say, and not only that, their food smells bad, when they get angry at talking about foreigners. So yeah, no, it's been, it's been the way history's worked. It's not good. It's crazy. We should all get together and drink beer together and we'd have a lot more fun or dance together. But it's easy to stir up people against foreigners. Very easy.
And they— it's always happened. And when things get bad, people look for demons and look for solutions. You know, people like Donald Trump, if he does what— and people look for a man or a woman on a white horse. You remember Joan of Arc? Well, somebody comes along and says, don't worry, guys, I will take care of you. I'll solve your problems. And it always leads to worse, worse economic problems. And that always leads to more propensity to go to war.
It's always happened that way. Is it going to happen again that way? Probably, since it always has. Whenever you've had a stagnant world power who's either stagnant or in decline, such as Britain was, and a rising power such as Germany was, It led to war. The US was a rising power. That led to war. China's a rising power now. The US is certainly stagnant and perhaps in decline. History says that leads to war. Not saying that somebody's out there consciously plotting it right now, but those circumstances have nearly always led to war throughout history.
Erik Townsend: Well, I'll keep my fingers crossed that it doesn't happen this time, but unfortunately, I'm concerned That it's a very real risk. I want to move on now to precious metals, particularly gold. I'm not sure how long it's going to take to play out, Jim, but I'm convinced that eventually the Fed is going to be forced to make a U-turn. They're going to get into more rounds of quantitative easing. I think that that moves precious metals higher eventually, but I didn't think we were quite there yet. I thought we had maybe a little bit more to the downside in precious metals. This dollar rally, we've is the biggest story in macro right now. I don't think it's over. I think the fundamentals that are pushing people into the safety trade around the dollar are still there. And I thought we maybe had a little bit more downside to gold before it was time to start bottoming. But boy, on a technical basis— I know you prefer to stay away from technical analysis, but we are seeing what looks like a breakout in the last few days above some technical levels.
It looks like maybe gold is getting a bid here. Do you think it Do you think it's time for precious metals, or do you think it's still a ways off?
Jim Rogers: Well, I don't own— I mean, I do own, I own gold and silver, a fair amount of both. I'm not buying. I'm not buying. I have the same view you do, that there's going to be a better chance to buy gold. But you're right, gold is up, what, nearly 12%, 15% in the last few months? It's been going through the roof in the last few days. It looks like a blow-off here in the last few days. But, you know, don't ask me about market timing. I'm the single worst market timer in the history of the world.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I know that's how you got the 4,200% in 7 years, was being the world's worst market timer.
Jim Rogers: Well, it's an accurate statement. Even if I was any good then, I'm now the world's worst market timer, I assure you. Okay.
Erik Townsend: Well, and I think definitely history, you know, what I look at here in the beginning of the 2008 crisis, gold went straight up very briefly, then everything including gold, sold off hard. Eventually the bottom was in. It wasn't really until quantitative easing was announced in the spring of '09 that gold really took off. So I'm still thinking that we potentially maybe we'll see a little spike up here, but maybe better buying opportunities still in the future. It sounds like we're on the same page on that one.
Jim Rogers: Well, I expect— but again, if it doesn't happen, I own plenty of gold. If it does happen, you know, I'll thank my my lucky stars that I can buy more.
Erik Townsend: I'd like to move on now to a theory of mine that I'd like your view on. I contend that the next president of the United States is likely to be one of the most important presidents in the nation's history. And the reason that I think that is entirely about the national debt. President Bush approximately doubled the national debt during his time in office, in very rough terms, from $5 to $10 trillion.
President Obama will have more than doubled it again by the time that he leaves office later this year, or beginning of next year, I should say.
Assuming that the next president serves 2 full terms, as most do, that takes us all the way out to 2024. And on present course and speed, that would involve again doubling the national debt towards $40 trillion, or about 200% of current GDP by 2024. Jim, you've read Reinhart and Rogoff's research. You know that we can't possibly get to a $40 trillion national debt without something going bump in the night, maybe even an outright Treasury bond crisis. And I think it's coming before '24.
So I posit that the next US president quite possibly could preside over what would be the biggest fiscal crisis in the nation's history after the bond markets eventually revolt and revoke Washington's longstanding habit of recklessly borrowing spending beyond our means. So first of all, I'd like to know what you think of my theory that this could happen during the next president's term. But more to the point, Jim, when I look at current poll numbers, it seems pretty clear that Donald Trump, Hillary Clinton, or Bernie Sanders is going to be our next president.
Jim, is it just my cynicism, or are we not seeing the same quality of candidates that we used to?
Jim Rogers: I'm not sure we've ever seen a good quality of candidates. You have a nostalgia that I don't. I would tell you I'm proud I'm proud to say I've never voted for anybody who's won the presidency of the United States. And as I look back over Lyndon Johnson, Richard Nixon, Jimmy Carter, the list goes on and on and on. I'm very proud that I've never voted for any of those guys because they've all turned out to be hopeless in the big scheme of things. Even Ronald Reagan, who's still revered by many people, the debt doubled, doubled under Ronald Reagan. Ronald Reagan came in and said, if we don't do it now, who's going to do it ever? Right. And he doubled the debt himself.
So your point is very well taken. No, it's going to continue the way it is. Whoever's elected president, even if Mother Teresa is elected president, the debt's going to go through the roof. And unfortunately, it can happen because they can continue to debase the currency. You may have a pension coming to you of $1,000 a month, say you're going to get your pension, but it's going to be in worthless money. And they will pay their debts to you, but it'll be in worthless money. So they can do anything they want, and history has shown that they will and can and do do anything they want, but it's never good for you and me.
It's always good for them. They always try to make sure that they're protected.
It's not you and me. And maybe there was a time in American history when the politicians actually were looking out for you and me. I don't really remember a time like that looking back in history. They've always been out there, you know, power corrupts. I'm not the first to figure that out.
And it's always happened. Something happens to people when they go to Washington. Most of the people who go to Washington when they're living out in, you know, in XYZ, pretty wonderful, terrific people. They get to Washington and something happens.
Erik Townsend: I want to follow up on this idea. Let's suppose that the next president keeps borrowing and spending, which I think is both of our expectations. And they're on a trajectory that would take them towards 8 years in the White House and another $20 trillion, up to a total of $40 trillion.
Do you think that we can actually get to those kind of numbers with some debasement in the value of the dollar and everything keeps on chugging along? Or do you think that at some point everything blows up and we get into a Treasury market crisis of some kind?
Jim Rogers: Oh no, we're certainly going to have sovereign debt crises between now and 2024. Are you kidding, Erik? We're gonna have all sorts of crises, maybe even serious war by then, probably serious war by then. As the situation gets worse and worse and worse, people will lose confidence in paper money, people will lose confidence in governments. No, no, I guess I'm more worried about the next 8 years than you are.
I don't see much that can save us.
Erik Townsend: So you think as I do, and I'm pretty worried about the next 8 years, you see as I do that something big has to happen. We can't just stay on this current path of printing money and spending it recklessly and assuming it's all going to work out okay. Something really has to fall apart. Do you have any specific thoughts on what it would look like or how it would happen?
Jim Rogers: Well, you can read your history and you will see that it usually happens— they raise taxes, which makes things worse. We go into trade wars, competitive devaluations, which makes things worse. They certainly bring in exchange controls for you and me. They're already talking about abolishing cash, which would be a way for them to control you and me even more.
They're talking about banning foreigners or banning some kinds of foreigners. All of these things have always happened when the world economic conditions deteriorate, and they start somehow or another winding up fighting each other and cursing foreigners, and either big wars or small wars, but it's always happened that way.
You ask how it's going to play out. Just read some history. It always plays out that way. I don't particularly like saying it because I'm alive and well, and I'm going to have to live through it. And I hope I survive it both financially and, and you know, in the flesh. I hope I survive it. No, it's going to be a very difficult time for all of us. But again, Erik, you said they call you all kinds of names. They should read their history books. This is the way it's always worked. You're not making this up. The world has done it over and over again.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I agree with you, Jim, but unfortunately it seems like you and I are the only ones that are reading the history books, that everybody else wants to just assume it's okay. I want to move on now to a related topic.
Jim Rogers: I'm not the first to say that those who don't understand history are doomed to, doomed to have to replay it and relive it because, you know, and, and that one of the things that history teaches us is that people don't read history and they don't know about history, and therefore we have to do the same things over and over again. Because unfortunately, maybe you and I are the only 2 people reading the history books. But if you do read the history books, you know it's coming, and nobody's going to do anything about it till it's too late.
Erik Townsend: I want to move on now to a related topic that's almost never discussed in the Western financial prints, although frankly, I think it ought to be page one news. And what I'm talking about is what French Finance Minister and later President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, famously called exorbitant privilege back in the 1960s.
That term refers to the unique ability of the United States to go into debt almost without consequence because America is the world's reserve currency issuer. d'Estaing was furious that the United States was able to borrow and spend in a way that no other country could get away with because its status as reserve currency issuer created an enormous artificial demand for US dollars.
Recently, Russian scholar Sergey Glazyev who is an economic advisor to Vladimir Putin, has masterminded what he calls a de-dollarization strategy. His stated goal is to persuade as much of the world as possible, starting with the BRICS countries, to abandon the US dollar as the global reserve currency and to both settle international trade and hold central bank reserve assets denominated in other currencies. Most Westerners just laugh this off as irrelevant saber rattling, But I take it pretty seriously. I think that Glazyev's goal is to take away the United States' exorbitant privilege and force the United States to play on a level playing field with other countries.
And while I'm not sure whether it's realistic or not, I think Glazyev's ultimate desire is to catalyze a US Treasury bond crisis. What do you think, Jim? Is it possible that Glazyev's goal is to intentionally sabotage the US Treasury bond market? And if that's his goal, as I fear it may be, do you think that he has any chance whatsoever of being successful or at least doing some damage along the way?
Jim Rogers: It doesn't really matter. It's going to happen anyway. Once upon a time, the British were like we were. Once upon a time, the Dutch, the Spanish, and many people have been in, in this position and they've always lost the position. I mean, the pound sterling when I was a kid was the world's reserve currency. It was losing to the dollar fast. No, no, you don't have to have somebody actually setting out to destroy the dollar. It's destroying itself. Go to Washington, Erik, you'll see. They're doing a very good job.
Something is going to come along, just as happened with the pound sterling, and replace the dollar. People are already looking for things to replace the dollar. The Chinese have started the Asian Bank to compete with the World Bank and the IMF. My goodness, we need competition for the World Bank and the IMF. So it's going to happen. I mean, this guy could fall into the sea and drown tomorrow. It doesn't matter. It's going to happen, whether it's a plot or just by nature taking its course. I mean, who wants to own US dollars? You've already cited the statistics of gigantic debts. Who, 10 years from now, wants to own the US dollar? I own a lot of them right now, but I can't imagine owning any in 10 years.
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm with you, and I think it's, it's scary. We're both in what really is a greater fool trade. You've got to be on this US dollar rally right now. It's, it's the biggest trend in macro. And it's, you know, what's going to happen is when things really hit the fan, the panic trade is all going to be into US Treasuries because people have it just tattooed on the inside of their forehead that the US Treasury is the safest instrument on earth. And the fact that the fundamentals have changed since they first learned that doesn't seem to register for most of them.
Jim Rogers: Well, Erik, there's also the fact that they don't know what else to do as they look around They don't want to buy yen. They don't want to buy euro. I mean, by the way, I own yen mainly because there's so many shorts. It's not that big a position, but I own it. They're not going to buy the euro, which could rally because it's got shorts too. There's nothing that they see that they can buy. You cannot just pick up the phone and buy the renminbi. The Hong Kong dollar is de facto the US dollar. So there's not really much that they have a choice these days. They do have a choice, but they don't see that they have a choice.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jim Rogers: And therefore, you're right about the dollar. That's why I own the dollar. Now, it may be the risk that you and I both are taking is that so many people own the dollar, and there will be a time— my view is that the dollar is going to get overpriced and maybe even turn into a bubble before this is over. If the crisis and the turmoil really get as horrendous as I suspect they will, the dollar could turn into a bubble. Boy, then what do you do? You got to sell it, but where do you put it? Hopefully by then the renminbi would be completely convertible, or gold would have had a big collapse, or something, something would present an opportunity in circumstances like that. But that's, that's how I view the world going forward.
Erik Townsend: Finally, Jim, I'd like to shift gears and close on this note. The challenge in interviewing you is that it's actually hard to decide what's more fascinating, your brilliant market insights or your personal life. which frankly I think might be even more interesting to some of our listeners. We've focused today on markets and investing because that's what MacroVoices, this new podcast, is all about. But for the benefit of those listeners who are fascinated to learn more about you, I'd like to talk about your latest book, Street Smarts. Oh, give us a rundown. What's the idea for this book? How did it come about? What's the book about? What will people learn when they read it?
Jim Rogers: Well, I'd done a few books. I never thought I'd do any books, Erik. It so happens when I did a few and my publisher and agent called me and said, you know, you've got all these books. But there's got to be a fascinating story. How did you wind up from the backwoods of Alabama, where your telephone number was 5, to living in Asia with 2 blue-eyed daughters who speak perfect Mandarin? Something had to happen between that phone number of 5 and sitting there in Asia.
And they said, why don't you put together the story and let's see how it turns out? So I ignored them and put them off and said, who cares? blah, blah, blah. But finally, I sort of put it together. And part of the reason I did it, I did it for my daughter so they would know how all this happened. And many people say it's the best book I've done. I have no idea since, since it's my book. But there are many who say it's a good thing.
Erik Townsend: Well, it certainly got fantastic reviews. Jim, I cannot thank you enough for coming on the program as our first feature interview. Your insights and wisdom are always precious. And you're welcome back on this program anytime you like. As we close, is there anything at all that you'd like to add, any subject at all? The floor is yours.
Jim Rogers: Good luck, and, and, and I hope that you can help people become knowledgeable, you can help people become worried, and you can help people prepare, because it's not going to be fun.
Erik Townsend: Well, I'll tell you what, we'll do our best on this end, and when it's time to sell those US dollars and buy something else, give me a call and we'll do
Jim Rogers: Erik, I've told you I'm the world's worst market timer. You better ask somebody else. Okay, thank, thank you very much. Okay.
Erik Townsend: Once again, folks, Jim's latest book is Street Smarts, available on Amazon, and you can learn more about Jim's world travels at JimRogers.com. Nathan Egger and I will be back with more commentary right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Well, it was great to hear from Jim Rogers. I always enjoy listening to his interviews, and particularly here where we got to hear him speak very candidly about his personal skepticism regarding central bankers in this current environment where we see markets just have blind faith in these central planners, and it may just be misplaced.
Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more. I love listening to Jim Rogers, and the guy is just so impressive. Did you notice I'm talking about this 30-some-odd-year bull market in bonds. And he's like, excuse me, the bottom was in September of 1981. Not '81, but September of '81. You know, the guy's mind, he remembers it like it was yesterday. I was tempted to say, Jim, well, what time of day was that on which day of the month in September of '81? Only 34 years ago. I'm sure he remembers it like it was yesterday.
The guy just never ceases to amaze me. I do want to apologize to our listeners and to Mr. Rogers You probably noticed that the audio quality was not ideal on Jim's side of the interview. We've already taken measures to correct that. And this is our first show. We're doing our best. Please bear with us. We're going to have higher quality audio as we move forward.
Nathan Egger: All right, let's indeed move forward. I'd like to give our listeners a better sense of what they can expect from future episodes of MacroVoices. Now, Erik, Most of our listeners know you as the commodities guy on another popular podcast program, and many of them are subscribers to your Peak Oil Investor newsletter. Now, I know that since you parted ways with the other program, you've been inundated with email from listeners asking you, what happened? When are you going to be back on the air with your weekly commodity reports? So, let's share with our listeners both how we got here and what we have planned for upcoming episodes.
Erik Townsend: Sure thing. I really enjoyed doing those podcasts every And for anybody who may be curious, my departure from that other show was not my decision. I've known for years that I probably ought to just do my own weekly podcast program, but frankly, I manage a hedge fund for a living and I just don't have time for all of the behind-the-scenes work that goes into producing something like this. It really is a lot of work to line up the guests and organize this and so forth.
Nathan gets the credit for coming up with the MacroVoices concept. He came to me and said, Erik, I got a fantastic idea for a new podcast. Okay. Let's do a show that is intentionally not dumbed down so as to be understandable by the lowest common denominator retail investor, like everybody else is doing. Instead, let's target professional finance, high net worth individuals, and other sophisticated investors. And let's build a theme around interviews with top industry experts on more of a professional level, so that we're not trying to oversimplify everything, but rather we're giving you a chance to listen. To interviews that consists of 2 finance professionals talking about markets on a professional level.
Now, the instant that Nathan told me his idea, I knew we had a winner. And I want our listeners to understand that this project is basically Nathan's baby. He's the producer, he's got the concept, and he's going to be challenging me to bring you the very best possible content every single week. Meanwhile, I get to talk to the smartest people in the world and find out what they see in the While meanwhile, you guys get to listen in. That's basically the concept for MacroVoices, or I should say, that's my perception of it. What did I miss, Nathan?
Nathan Egger: No, that's pretty much the gist of it. My goal as the producer of this show is to raise the bar on financial podcasting standards. And I've got a few ideas of how to do that on my own. But I think ultimately, what exactly that's going to entail is going to depend a lot on you, on our listener.
Our goal is to make this a listener-driven program, and we've got a few different ways to interact with our audience. So right now, we've got an online discussion forum, which I will be moderating. And there, you can communicate with me and other listeners and discuss each show after the fact. Or you can suggest how we can improve the program. That's all up and running right now at MacroVoices.com/forums.
You can also request future show topics and interview guests by emailing your requests to requests@macrovoices.com. And in addition, we're planning to include a segment to answer your questions on the air from time to time. And you can send your questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, or just post them in the forums. We'll find them one way or the other.
But most importantly, I just want to make it clear that I'm here to serve the listener. I'm not going to be hiding behind a secretary who screens my calls and emails. I want to hear from you guys directly, and I want to know what you want from this show so we can figure out how to deliver it to you.
You can contribute ideas through a sticky thread we've already set up on our discussion forums, or you're welcome to just email me personally at nathan@macrovoices.com.
Erik Townsend: Before we close, Nathan, let's tell our listeners what you're working on for upcoming shows.
Nathan Egger: Sure. So we've just finished the interview with Jim Rogers, and next week I'm hoping to bring you guys another interesting legend in Dr. Marc Faber. That would be our February 19th show. And as I said earlier, we want this to be a listener-driven program. So by all means, feel free to suggest any specific questions you'd like Erik to ask Dr. Faber by posting your idea on our listener forums. I've already started a discussion thread just for that purpose. Please just understand that obviously, we won't be able to guarantee that there will be time to ask every question we receive from our listeners.
Erik Townsend: Well, but I do promise to personally review and consider every listener suggestion that we receive. So that covers February 19th. Okay, I'm holding my breath. Go ahead and tell them your crazy idea for February 26th.
Nathan Egger: All right, so, so far we brought you Jim Rogers. Next week, hopefully Dr. Marc Faber. 2 really big names everyone in finance has heard of. And originally our plan was to just keep focusing on bringing more of these big names for the next several shows at least.
And then I had an idea. So I happen to know that Erik employs an oil industry consultant. His name is Art Berman, and Art reviews and gives Erik feedback on the oil-related trading strategies that he's using in his hedge fund. So I thought, what if instead of the traditional interview format, we instead tape a conversation— record a conversation, I guess we're not taping much— between Erik and Art that's more like us listening in on a hedge fund manager talking to a consultant about upcoming market opportunities and the strategies for trading them.
Now, I'm a financial podcast junkie. I've listened to them all, and in fact, that's how Erik and I met in the first place— another story. But I know for one that I'd much rather sit in and be the proverbial fly on the wall listening to a hedge fund manager talk shop with another finance professional, as opposed to listening to yet another interview of an expert I've heard interviewed 1,000 times before.
But Erik's still skeptical about the format I envision and how it would play out in a podcast.
Erik Townsend: Well, my concern is simply that you're talking about an extremely technical conversation, and I'm not sure how much our audience would even care about such details. If we really did what you're saying, I'd probably start by talking to Art about how many DUCs are still in inventory, and most listeners would have no reason to know or care that a DUC is a drilled but not yet completed and fracked shale oil well, or that the number of them in inventory is actually much more important, in my opinion, than the much more widely followed Baker Hughes Rig Count Index, which most of the market follows as a proxy for future production changes.
So my feeling is simply that these details might not interest all of our audience. We could talk through the perils of something like getting into a long futures position on a perceived market bottom, but why I think there's going to be a special risk that's unique to commodity futures trading called front spread contango, which might make it not a good idea to buy that front month contract when it bottoms. So listeners who are not commodity futures traders probably wouldn't be familiar with that. Or we could get into, you know, when equities in energy are likely to bottom. I think it's going to be defined more by the high yield credit cycle than by the price of oil itself.
That's again very technical jargon, very complicated stuff. I just want to make sure that we are delivering content that appeals to our listener audience. That's all. So if we do something along the lines of what you're saying, we're going to have to at least stop and explain what we're talking about in order for it to make sense to everyone.
Nathan Egger: These are all fair points. I just still think that 2 professionals talking shop could potentially be more interesting than the traditional interview. format. Erik and I can disagree on this all we want, but if there's one thing that we do agree on 100% is that we want MacroVoices to be a listener-driven show.
So what I did was go ahead and book Art Berman as our special guest for the February 26th show. But whether we do a conventional interview or more of the listen in on a hedge fund manager talking shop to his consultant, that's going to be your choice. We want to hear from you guys on the forum. So So please drop by MacroVoices.com/forums and weigh in with your opinion.
That's all I've got on my end, Erik. Do you have anything else?
Erik Townsend: Yes, there is one more thing, listeners, that we really need your help with. Nathan's ability to recruit the very smartest people in finance as future interview guests on MacroVoices is really a function of the size of our subscriber base. These people are too busy to do this stuff unless we can show them that we've got a fairly significant audience. So please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes or another feed reader so that it's delivered to your phone, iPod, or other mobile device each week automatically. It's always free of charge, and the more subscribers we get, the more we'll be able to entice the very brightest minds in finance to come on the program as future interview guests. To subscribe, just go to MacroVoices.com and click on the subscribe button. We plan to release We release the show at midnight Eastern time every Thursday night so that our professional finance audience receives it on Friday morning, and it's still fresh for our weekend audience.
Nathan Egger: All right, we're going to go ahead and wrap it up on that note. As Erik mentioned, please be sure to subscribe on iTunes, rate and review if you can, if you've got the time, it'll be really helpful. And tune in next week as Erik's interview with Dr. Marc Faber should be another blockbuster. We'll see you soon, everybody. And until then, please stop by and introduce yourself in the introductions thread on our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect like those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.
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MACRO VOICES is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented in MACRO VOICES should NOT be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making important investment decisions. The opinions expressed on MACRO VOICES are those of the participants. MACRO VOICES, its producers, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall NOT be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MACRO VOICES.