John Llewellyn — Llewellyn Consulting (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 19 was recorded on June 16th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. John Llewellyn of London institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting will be joining me as today's featured guest. The focus of our feature interview Will be next week's so-called Brexit referendum, and we'll be discussing the implications of the U.K. leaving the European Union in terms of how such an exit, if it happens, would affect the U.K. economy, the rest of the European economy, and knock-on effects for the rest of the global economy. MacroVoices volunteer research team captain Aaron Chan will also be joining us again at the end of today's show, and we'll have a special announcement about Aaron's rapidly growing role in the MacroVoices team.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Before we even get into the equities, let's talk about the Fed, who did not hike rates on Wednesday, as pretty much everyone expected they would not. But Janet Yellen was a little more dovish in her remarks than some would have expected. So, Erik, what did you make of the FOMC press conference Wednesday afternoon?
Erik Townsend: Well, definitely, as I said last week, no hike was not news. Everybody knew there was not going to be a hike. The big question was going to be what stance Janet took in the press conference and would she continue to hold up the story That, hey, we're in a rate normalization cycle. We just didn't do it this month, maybe next month, and so forth. And as I have predicted for years now, when everything changes is when the mainstream figures out that this whole rate normalization story from the Fed is a fantasy, which I'm convinced that it is.
We had a problem in 2008 that was entirely about too much debt. And what we've responded with is creating more debt on the idea that the Fed can somehow boost the economy like jumpstarting a car, and somehow it's going to gain momentum and suddenly Suddenly take off with its own organic growth.
I don't think we're quite there yet, but I think we're getting to the point where the mainstream is figuring this out. Even Steve Liesman, who frankly is usually a cheerleader for the Fed, from CNBC, was asking the same question that I posed last week on this show, which is, what happens when the 10-year Treasury yield keeps going down and keeps signaling that there's a problem? Now, when Janet answered that question, she kind of reframed it and talked about what would What would happen if the Fed wasn't able to make enough money from its assets in order to cover its expenses? But the real question is, when do we get to a credibility problem? When does the Fed lose control of asset markets?
I have continued to feel that it probably isn't until inflation hits the stage that the Fed can't do anything. Right now, they're not admitting that they're ready to make a policy U-turn. I think that will eventually come. But the thing is, the Fed can print a bunch more money out of thin air and can come to the rescue once again. It's when we get to runaway inflation that suddenly their hands are tied. And I don't think we're quite there yet, although certainly somebody like Julian Brigden that we recently had on the program is saying that that might be closer at hand than even I thought.
Nathan Egger: And when we spoke last week, the S&P was flirting with all-time highs, trading just a week ago as high as 2,120. We've since traded as much as 80 points lower on Thursday morning, which is a pretty big down move for a single week, at least. Erik, is this the beginning of that huge move to the downside that all the prominent bears like George Soros, Carl Icahn and Druckenmiller have predicted, or just a little market temper tantrum leading up to Wednesday's FOMC press conference?
Erik Townsend: Well, consider that in the past, what the program has generally been is that temper tantrum before FOMC is for a few weeks leading up to it. Then as soon as the FOMC meeting is over, we get the recovery. This has been the opposite. It's kind of gotten worse since the FOMC meeting. So the no hike and softening message from Janet Yellen apparently is not Not enough, even after confirming expectations there would be no hike, being more dovish than expected, we still see asset markets headed lower. I think the Brexit referendum polls are probably driving a lot of that. So, where it may appear that markets are selling off even further after the FOMC, as if Janet sent the wrong message, I think it may be the message from Europe that is driving a lot of that. But definitely, we're seeing weakness here.
You know, obviously, it would have been nice to predict this at 2120 when we recorded the show last week and go short the S&P. But as I said, you know, you never know how markets are going to react.
If Janet had come back and said, this is confirmation that the rate hiking cycle is definitely over, I think we might have seen even more exuberance. Eventually, I think that Stan Druckenmiller and George Soros and Carl Icahn and the rest of these guys are going to be proven right. But it's a question of when the right catalyst comes. And I think that potentially the Brexit, which we'll talk about in our feature interview today, might be a bigger catalyst than a monetary policy event from the Fed.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Nathan Egger: And when we recorded last week's show, WTI crude oil was trading at $51.60, and you were saying that it looked like a top. Well, we've since traded as low as $46.25 on Thursday, more than 10% drop from that high. So good call on the top, Erik. And do you still think that this is a top? And if so, how far down do you expect to see oil go from here?
Erik Townsend: Well, even in the short time since you wrote down that $46.25, which I think was the close on the futures pit, the market has reopened just in the few minutes that we have been recording show, and I'm looking at $45.85 now. So we're seeing a lot of weakness, more than 10% lower. In fairness, I suppose I did say that it was looking toppy. I also said I thought we would likely hit that $51.90 technical target that a lot of analysts were talking about. We never got there, got within 25 cents of it. So I think for all intents and purposes, we made the top. But, you know, the thing is that we don't know what's gonna happen with Venezuela. So I didn't trade that top, even though I thought it was a top, because I didn't know whether or not Venezuela is falling potentially into total societal collapse, which seems to be very possible, could be a catalyst for a move to the upside.
Now, that's not happened this week.
Meanwhile, EIA data was a little surprising. We had a 930,000-barrel draw on national inventory. That's, you know, to be expected, a draw. But I would almost expect a larger draw this time of year. We're in the end of June. We're right, you know, in the the heart of summer driving season from a refiner's standpoint. 2.6 million barrel draw on gasoline inventories kind of made up for the build last week, so that was good. But a 786,000 barrel build on distillate inventories. Distillates again are the collection of diesel fuel, home heating oil, jet fuel, and other similar products.
The big one though, 904,000 barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. Now despite the fact And despite the fact that the Canada fire situation is more under control than it's been in recent weeks, and despite the fact that seasonally we would be expecting large drawdowns this time of year, we're not. We're still seeing builds on inventory in Cushing. And of course, Cushing, I've stressed many times before, is so critical because that's where the WTI futures contract is settled, and it's storage in Cushing running out that could result in a panic in the markets.
So we can't make it through fall maintenance season unless we see more drawdowns. And I thought that the fall maintenance season would be a seasonal period of builds on inventory. We're already at 93% capacity. Even though I thought that the storage crisis would be averted by the second half, I'm now starting to think, boy, if we don't see some drawdowns of consequence or of significance in Cushing pretty soon, we're going to be really looking at a difficult situation as we head towards fall maintenance season.
What's surprising to me, though, despite the fact that we have a very difficult storage situation, 93% of capacity, a build Sold on inventory this week, so that 93% number is getting worse. The July-August spread closed at only about 52 cents, up to about 55 cents as we're speaking late session, actually in the beginning of the overnight session on Thursday evening, as we're taping the show a little bit late this week. So, you know, 55 cents is nothing close to the $2 front-month contango spreads that we saw when everybody was worried about a storage crisis back when we were at 85% capacity. Now we're at 93% capacity. And that contract— today was options expiration. The contract expires the beginning of next week. This is that crush period where you would expect potentially that spread to blow out if people were worried about a storage crisis. It seems that they're not too worried, at least from what the numbers are telling us.
Nathan Egger: And gold was strong last week and got even stronger this week, finally broke out above $1,300 and tested $1,315 the day after the no-hike announcement from the Fed. Before closing lower, just above $1,285. What's your take on where it's headed from here, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that Janet, she didn't capitulate, she didn't admit that the rate normalization process is not working. But, you know, even Steve Liesman can figure it out. So, we're at a point where I think that the Fed's credibility is coming into question, and it definitely is being reflected in the price of gold.
As a number of guests have commented on the program, in many ways what gold serves as is a hedge or an insurance policy for central bank policy error. So, I do think that probably the bottom is in now on the gold market. At the same time, you know, we're also kind of at the top of a trading range here. I haven't bought it yet. I think I would probably wait for a pullback towards the 50-day moving average, which is still down at $1,250 or so.
But, you know, it's a question of what the news flow tells us. The Brexit situation could also be very positive for gold, and I think that if there is a vote to leave next week, that probably Probably could boost gold even further. So I think the gold chart is looking already very strong, and there could be some more upside catalysts. But again, we are kind of on the, the top of a trading range here, and I'm not sure that it's quite time to be buying hand over fist, but maybe starting to average into a long position in gold is something that would look attractive here.
Nathan Egger: And it came as no surprise to anyone that the dollar index took a big hit on the no-hike news. What do you see on the horizon for the dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, it took a big hit on the no-hike news, but then it went the other way, I think probably in reaction to Bank of Japan not moving and then sort of corrected back. So we're seeing a lot of volatility there. In general, though, where it appeared from a few weeks ago like, boy, maybe there's a lot more softness than I thought in the dollar, we are seeing overall strength. We're not quite up to the previous cycle high, but we got pretty close to it, at least intraday on Thursday. And I think that in general, the dollar rally is still intact.
Nathan Egger: And you said last week that 1.7% on the 10-year Treasury yield could be something of a credibility level for the Fed, and that a move below that level could make it hard for the Fed to justify continuing its rate normalization theme. Well, I saw a 1.53% print on Thursday morning, back up to 1.57% by the end of the day. What does this mean for monetary policy and Fed credibility, for that matter?
Erik Townsend: Well, to my astonishment, this is the question that Steve Liesman asked Janet Yellen during the FOMC press conference, which Which is, hey, look at the 10-year Treasury yield. It's kind of sending us a message here. What is this gonna mean for the Fed? And I think she first kind of ducked his question, and then later in responding to another question, she made some comments about how if the Fed did not earn enough income from its other holdings in order to be able to pay its expenses, that there were other tools available to remedy that problem. Well, that's all interesting, Janet, but that's not what everybody's worried about. Everybody's worried about the fact that the 10-year is sending an outright recession signal, and how can you justify continuing a hiking cycle in the face of that?
Steve Liesman, who is usually a Fed cheerleader, as far as I'm concerned, came out afterwards saying he was shocked and felt this is the closest the Fed has come to capitulation. So, I think the mainstream, which, in my opinion, Mr. Liesman is a good proxy for, are waking up and recognizing that, hey, this story, this narrative that we've been on, which is the Fed's going to make everything better and the economy is going to return to organic growth is not working out.
As far as where we're headed, I have predicted for a couple of years now that the 1.36 low print on the 10-year Treasury yield from several years ago would probably be tested this year. And I wouldn't be surprised if— I don't know if it's going to happen this year in 2016, but before this is over, I wouldn't be surprised if we see 1% 10-year Treasury yield on US Treasuries. Seems like we're headed in that direction. And I do think that at some point we're going to maybe get one more rate hike out of the Fed before they They admit that this so-called rate hiking cycle was basically over after just one token hike. And indeed, it does— Janet Yellen's own comments acknowledged that they needed to create a little bit of buffer so that they would be able to respond with easing if an economic situation warranted it. I think that economic situation that warrants it is probably coming faster than Janet is ready for.
And I would guess that the Fed regrets not having started hiking sooner so that they could build in more buffer and give themselves more room to respond.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: But that's the situation that we're in.
Nathan Egger: All right, well, thank you for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest is John Llewellyn of London-based institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting. We're going to focus almost entirely on next week's Brexit referendum, where U.K. citizens will decide whether to initiate the process of leaving the European Union.
While the interview you're about to hear was being recorded, Jo Cox, a member of the British Parliament, was murdered in cold blood and in broad daylight. And early reports indicate that this horrific murder may have been motivated by this issue, that being the Brexit referendum, with one witness claiming that the assailant yelled, Britain first, during his attack.
This brings into question the possibility that next week's referendum vote could be postponed. Needless to say, our thoughts go out to Ms. Cox's family in this very difficult moment. Erik's interview with Mr. Llewellyn is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: One week from now, on June 23rd, U.K. citizens will vote on a referendum whether or not the U.K. should leave the European Union. For today's feature interview, we wanted to find a guest who could really speak with authority on this subject, and Nathan really came through for us.
Joining me now is John Llewellyn, managing partner at Llewellyn Consulting. John worked for the OECD in Paris, working on forecasting policy for OECD, went from there to become Global Chief Economist at Lehman Brothers, and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, John has formed his own consulting firm where he provides advisory services to institutions. He is a New Zealander, so he has no emotional skin in this game, but he does live in London and has a very ideal perspective on the Brexit issue and what it will mean for the U.K. So, John, thanks so much for joining me on the program.
I'd like to start with what is actually on the table, because this referendum doesn't necessarily dictate that the U.K. would leave the European Union. It actually begins a very complex process. Tell us how it works.
John Llewellyn: I don't think anybody knows how it works, as a matter of fact. I mean, the question on the ballot paper is, do you want to leave, uh, the European Union, or do you want to remain in the European Union? And that seems, of course, very clear, but it's not, because nobody has ever left the European Union. No country has ever left the European Union.
And all there is on the statute books about this is a provision in the EU treaty which says that a country can leave the EU 2 years after giving notice of its intention so to do.
So we don't even know the very first thing, which is, were there to be a decision in the referendum to leave, when would the European Union be notified? You see, it's Parliament that has to pass a resolution saying we intend to leave the EU. And would Parliament do that straight away? Would Parliament Wait, or would Parliament possibly seek some other way of leaving the EU than simply the notifications envisaged in the so-called Article 50? So it's not clear, and I'm sorry I can't tell you that it would be a set of cut-and-dried steps, but that's the reality.
Erik Townsend: Well, and of course markets don't like uncertainty, and it sounds to me like if this referendum has a leave result, what it does is it introduces the beginning of a process that, as you said, nobody fully understands, and that's the last thing that markets like is when nobody understands even what's happening.
As recently as just a week ago, this was considered an outlier risk. Everybody thought, based on early polling, that it was extremely unlikely that a leave vote would happen. In the last few days, we've seen these polls turn around to where it appears that a leave result is more likely. What is your sense, being boots on the ground there in London, as to where this is headed? Do you think that it is quite likely as some of the polls are suggesting, that we could have a leave result? And if so, what does it mean, first of all, for the UK economy?
John Llewellyn: Well, first of all, on the, on the polls, I think you have to say now that it's distinctly possible. Only 7 or 8 days ago, the majority of polls indicated a majority differed in size from poll to poll for remain. But over the weekend, there was a massive swing in the polls, probably of the order of 10 percentage points for leave.
Now, there are some curious features to this. There always are. The polls that are conducted by interview and the polls which are conducted by telephone have been giving different results, although they've been narrowing. The gap between them has been narrowing to some extent. And one reason for this is probably that there are a lot of undecideds.
There are at least 10% and perhaps 20% of those voting are undecided, and nobody knows how they will swing.
A second thing to be said about the polls is that, of course, recently there was a referendum in Scotland on whether the Scots wish to remain part of the EU, and the polls got that wrong, mainly because, again, the undecideds came out to vote. And of course, the polls got the previous British election wrong too, and nobody was more surprised by that than the Tory government which came into power. So the polls, for whatever reason, have not had a good track record of late in the United Kingdom. But nonetheless, the fact is there's been a shift in the polls, and now there's nothing you can say other than that it's a distinct possibility that they will vote on balance to leave.
What does it mean for the British economy? Here there's a huge disparity of opinion between the two sides, and frankly, I'm just going to give you my own opinion. As you said, I'm disinterested. I'm not—I'm a New Zealander, and therefore I'm just living in London. But in my judgment, and partly based on my own country's experience, the near-term negative consequences for the British economy would not only be greater than are claimed by. By the people who want to remain and say if we, if we leave it would be a bad result. I think the results would be even worse than that.
And I think the reason for that is the following: the people who want to leave, of course, have a vested interest in claiming that there'd be no problem. And that, I think, frankly, is absurd for reasons that I can go on and explain to you.
Those who want to remain have to be very careful not to overclaim the negative results which come out from virtually all economists, from 9 out of 10 economists. And so they tend to be very careful about the assumptions that they make, about the models that they use, about the inputs they put into their simulations, and so on. And the result is that, in my view, the economic consequences in the first 5 years could be even more severe, probably would be more severe than those suggested by, for example, the Treasury, Her Majesty's Treasury, or the National Institute of Economic Research, or the OECD, or the IMF.
So I think the results would be very, very negative in the near term for the British economy, and on that I have really very little doubt.
Erik Townsend: Now, you said earlier that what is actually on the table here is the beginning of a process that takes 2 years, and that means that if there are short-term adverse negative consequences that could lead to yet another referendum, a change our mind referendum. So there's just so many possibilities here in terms of what could go wrong in the short term. Please give us a little bit more color. What are the downside risks if a Leave vote were to occur next week?
John Llewellyn: Well, I think there are 2 downside risks. I think the most likely would be a very sharp decline in the level of foreign investment in the United Kingdom economy. Now, this This is denied by the Leave campaign who say no, investment would continue to flow into us because we are, after all, the 5th biggest economy in the world. And that phrase, the 5th biggest economy in the world, is true and it's been repeated a very great number of times.
But what's also true is that the UK is only about 3.5% of world GDP, world gross domestic product.
A substantial proportion of the investment coming into the United Kingdom, but I have no idea, and I don't think anybody can, what that proportion is, comes in because the United Kingdom is a very good place in which to do business, has a very good legal system.
You can settle your agreements under English law, which is commercially highly competent legal structure. But the motive in many cases for coming in and making that investment investment is access to the whole EU, not just access to the United Kingdom.
I was talking, for example, recently to a drug company, and they were saying that they were about to put down a distribution sector for Europe. Now, they were going to put it down the UK, and for all I know, they still may. But the question on their minds, of course, is if the UK were not in the EU, what would the UK be the right place to put it? And I said absolutely not, because you not then know what the trading arrangements would be between the UK and the EU.
And that takes me therefore to my second point, which, which links with the first, which is it's being claimed by the Leave campaign that you don't need trading agreements in order to trade. But that really isn't true. It is true that you can revert to the World Trade Organization and there's a default set of Arrangements there, which cover principally the trade in goods and provide for the maximum level of tariffs that countries can set against on your exports.
But that doesn't remotely cover the sort of access to the EU, for example, which the UK currently has by way of being a member.
Secondly, of course, not only does the UK have a fully worked out trading relationship at the moment with the EU. But it also has fully worked out trading relationships with the other 53 countries in the world with which the EU has negotiated a trade agreement, and which the UK rides on as being part of the EU.
So all of those trading arrangements, those 53 plus one, and the plus one of course is with the UK's biggest trading partner by far, would have to be renegotiated.
Now how long does that take? The Leave campaign has been saying, "Oh, I see no reason why this shouldn't be completed within the next two years." In my judgment and my experience, that is highly, highly unlikely. I spoke recently to a New Zealand friend of mine. I went through university with him, and whereas I went on to do one thing, he went into the New Zealand Treasury and was heavily involved in the New Zealand Treasury at the time that the UK went into the EU, and New Zealand as a result. Had to renegotiate its relationships with the EU on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.
And I said to him, how long did that take? And he said it took 7 years to negotiate. It then had to be ratified by all of the EU countries, and they were very quick at doing that. They did that in the 8th year, and it became operational in the 10th year.
And New Zealand's is a fairly simple structure of trade, a fairly simple economy.
Canada has just completed a trade agreement with the EU that took 7 years to complete, and importantly, it does not contain any agreement on services because that's not something which Canada has been particularly concerned to press with the EU, whereas in the UK, of course, services are a major part, the major part of its exports, including to the EU. So I think to sum up my point, The trading agreements would be highly uncertain for many years. And in that context, there'd be, in my judgment, very likely a substantial weakening, perhaps even a collapse of foreign direct investment into the United Kingdom.
Erik Townsend: Now, for as long as I can remember, I think for all of modern time, the City of London, at least in the world of finance, the City of London has been second only to New York in terms of being a major capital market center where most investment banking and investment management decisions occur.
So are you suggesting that the hegemony that the UK has through the City of London in the world of finance is at risk and the City of London might be displaced if the UK were not to remain with the EU?
John Llewellyn: Well, I certainly think it's impossible to envisage everybody in the City of London or everybody in the financial services industry just up sticks and going to Paris or Frankfurt? Of course not. But there are substantial parts of activity which would be in jeopardy. I mean, one of the curious features about this, there was a move which came out of the European Central Bank, the ECB, to say that trading of foreign exchange had to take place within the geographical boundaries of the EU.
Now, the UK is the world's largest, larger even than New York, trader of foreign exchange, and this would have hit the UK quite hard. The UK appealed against this to the European Court, which found in its favor. Now, of course, the irony of this is that if that move were to take place again and the UK were not in the EU, it would have no access to the European Court, and it would presumably simply go through.
I think also in terms of a lot of trading of securities and so on, one of the indications that you can get of what it would be like would be to look at Switzerland, which for example isn't able to trade itself at all in the EU directly. It has therefore to set up an office somewhere, and it's chosen to set up offices in London in most cases, so that it has an office within, a branch within the European Union, and therefore can trade within the European Union from there.
All sorts of banks, and they've told us this, the American investment banks have said we would have to set up offices or expand our offices and hence our activities on the continent of Europe. So no, it would be absurd to pretend that the City of London would disappear overnight. And of course, it's not all about trading financial securities. It's also about insurance services and many others.
But in my view, it would, it would make a dent. And we've already been told by, for example, the French that they would welcome the chance to eat some of the City of London's lunch.
Erik Townsend: Now, you have opined in the past that although it is conceivable that leaving might be good for the UK economy in the long run, the problem is how they get there from here, because there would be short to intermediate term challenges that would be very difficult for the UK to overcome.
Give us a sense of what those challenges are. What's on the road ahead if we do see a leave decision next week?
John Llewellyn: I think there's 2 classes of problem, really. There's the economic problems which, which I've alluded to. The fact that I think there'd be a weakening, perhaps a collapse in foreign direct investment, and a huge amount of uncertainty for a very long time over the trading relationships. I mean, let me give you a figure there which I find interesting. The UK at the moment has no trade negotiators, no people versed in the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. And the reason is obvious, and that is ever since the joined the EU back in the '70s, all trade negotiations for the UK have been conducted by the EU, which is regarded by trade negotiators all over the world as having a very competent body of negotiators.
Now, there are 5 apparently people of British nationality in the EU team. So let's suppose they came back to the UK. I don't know if they would, but let's suppose they did, would that be enough? No. We were told recently by a senior official in the WTO, the World Trade Organization, that by their estimate, negotiating those trade agreements, which I've discussed with you, the one with Europe and ones with the 53 other countries that Europe has trade agreements, would take something like 500 trade negotiators 10 years to do.
Quite extraordinary.
So Britain would have to train up 500 trade negotiators or some number, something like that, and they'd be at it for 10 years, which is 2 parliamentary terms. So I think that's one of the things which one notices straight away, and that is that Britain's legislative capacity would become— and trade negotiating capacity and civil service capacity would be taken up probably for at least 2 full parliamentary terms by negotiating all of this. So there's a lot of things like that on the economic front, riddled, of course, all the time with uncertainty, which, as you have said, financial markets don't like. But I would also add people thinking of investing in material plant and equipment don't like.
So that's one class of problem. The other class of problem, and to some extent, the UK is going to be faced with this whatever the referendum goes now, and that is that the Tory Party is now absolutely split. It's riven by this debate, which has turned really nasty from the level of the Prime Minister David Cameron and one of his closest friends Michael Gove right the way down. The party has been cleaved by this, and neither side is going to be happy whatever the result.
And so there's going to be a very, very fractious party And at the same time, in a situation where you might in previous epochs have expected a Labour government to be— a Labour opposition, I'm sorry— to be strong and critical and to capitalize on this, it's got a leader who seems curiously quiescent, not only on this issue but on a range of others, and certainly is failing to capitalize politically on it.
So we're looking, I think, at a period of weak governance for the UK. As well as a period of economic and financial uncertainty. So it's, it's, it's, it's quite a contrast with where the UK has really been over the last 20 or even arguably 30 years.
Erik Townsend: From a currency perspective, what do you think this will mean for the pound sterling and for the euro, both with respect to the cross between those 2 currencies, but also as those currencies relate to the rest of the world, to the US dollar and other currencies?
John Llewellyn: I have to say that forecasting currency movements is something of a mug's game, but you have to have a view. I'll offer you a view, but without a great deal of conviction. But if what I'm saying is remotely right about the UK economy being weaker in GDP terms as a result of a vote to Brexit and being weaker as a result both of weaker foreign direct investment and weaker trade, then you would expect to see the pound depreciate against virtually all currencies.
I think it's worth recognizing that in that respect, the United Kingdom doesn't start from a strong position. In fact, quite the reverse. It has a current account deficit, in other words, an excess of what it imports over what it exports, taking goods and services together, of about 7% of GDP, which is a truly enormous number.
We operate in many times with what we call the rule of four, which is that any country which has a public sector deficit of more than four percent, a current account deficit of more than four percent, or even so if it has both, normally has some sort of financial crisis within a couple of years.
So when you look at the UK's current account deficit at seven percent, that would seem big enough to do a. Job on its own. And I think that what will happen if there's a Brexit is that the hawk eye of investors will then zero in on that number and say this is a country which has now got a seriously overvalued currency.
Now, who knows by what amount the pound could depreciate, but numbers of the order of 10% to 15% don't, to me at any rate, sound crazy. Now, much of that would be vis-à-vis the euro, perhaps more than that would be vis-à-vis the United States economy.
Because although the dollar has not been particularly strong of late, the U.S. economy has no real major problems as you look look ahead other than rather soft aggregate demand. It's a it's an energy self-sufficient economy. It's an economy which adjusts to structural change probably quicker and better than most other economies. So if you take any sort of medium-term prognostication. I think the U.S. economy is the best placed in the world and probably will have the strongest, strongest currency. So I'd probably place them in order of strength: U.S. first, euro second, and then sterling under these assumptions a comfortable third.
Erik Townsend: And what would you expect from the ECB in terms of policy response if there is a— let's say there is an overwhelming landslide vote to Brexit? Would the ECB be expected to respond immediately to try to shore up the financial system, or do you think they would take a stand off and say this is a problem the UK has created for itself?
John Llewellyn: It looks unlikely that the ECB or indeed European policymakers more generally would simply stand on the sidelines. Europe is in an interesting position, which is that its economy is recovering now, but rather painfully slowly. The policy responsibility for ensuring that there would be an economic recovery has been left almost exclusively to the ECB because the budgetary position, the fiscal position has been kept quite tight in the majority of European countries, although it's easing a bit now.
And so the ECB, quite rationally in my view, has been taking the position, now that we've got a modest recovery starting and given that we've got no inflation, we really must make sure that this recovery becomes self-sustaining. and starts to induce the corporate sector to invest in capacity expansion again.
So we've seen not only the quantitative easing policy of the European Central Bank purchase government bonds, but it's now moved into the purchasing of corporate bonds as well in really quite an aggressive way, perhaps somewhat more aggressive than had been expected by the market. So you can tell from this that the mood of the ECB is to really try to make sure that this recovery is not jeopardized. In fact, that this recovery gathers momentum. So they would regard a Brexit, I think, as just one more annoying thing which would reduce or damage or dent or hinder, whatever word one should choose, confidence in some way.
And I would guess that it would just lead them to be even more aggressive, if anything, at the margin in their policy of quantitative easing.
I think it would have wider repercussions than just the ECB, however. I was in France yesterday and Berlin three days before that, and there's a very great deal of concern at the policymaking and political level at this because, of course, there are countries in the EU in which there are significant populist constituencies which are hostile to the EU in the same way as they are in the UK.
Denmark is one, the Netherlands is another, Poland is the third. And there's no doubt that policymakers would not want to see those countries receive any greater support than they would do from the fact that the UK was breaking away.
And so, of course, one of the consequences of that is that they probably would not feel that they could be any more accommodating to the UK. There'd be a lot of emphasis on the notion if you want to stay in part of our market, you have to play by all of the rules and don't think you can do otherwise. So I think there'll be a political response, perhaps a policy response, and the monetary policy response would be, as I say, an intensifying, if anything, of the present regime of quantitative easing.
Erik Townsend: So the last question pertained to policy response.
Erik Townsend: Going back to your own views as an economist, we've talked about the UK economy. What would you see as the likely knock-on effects and consequences on both the rest of the European Union and on the global economy, for that matter?
John Llewellyn: I think the further you get away from the UK, the less certain it's possible to become. I think one of the things which I've learned over my lifetime of studying economics is, of course, that sectors of economies are linked to one another, and in turn economies are linked to one another.
As you said in the introduction, I was for many years in charge of international economic forecasting and policy at the OECD. And one of the things that we really used to, to be there for was to see how much a change in the level of activity or any other shock in one country transmitted to another.
Now, of course, one way in which shocks are transmitted is the straightforward one through trade. If a country goes into recession, it imports less, and therefore the countries which are exporting to it, export less. And I think that's a fairly well-understood mechanism. People forget it sometimes, but it's fairly well understood.
What I think is less well understood is that confidence effects are transmitted from economy to economy. One of the really interesting things is that whenever you get a slowdown in the United States, which of course is the world's biggest economy, you then tend to find there's a slowdown in other countries like the U.K. or the continent of Europe.
But if you quantify that slowdown, you find that the slowdown in the UK or the US is about twice as big as you would have expected through the direct trade linkages. In other words, there's a psychological effect.
You could call it the CNN effect, call it what you like. The point is, you can see how it works, that if you're somebody who's planning to undertake some investment on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, And then you see that the leading indicators in the United States are slowing down a bit. You think, oh, there's a slowdown coming. This is not the right time for me to be laying down new capital investment.
So you don't. And if this happens across your whole economy or across the whole of Europe, that compounds any slowdown that was coming anyway.
Now, that's the transmission from the United States to the United Kingdom or to Europe. And I would— it would be absurd to pretend that the United Kingdom is that important in the world that a Brexit in it would necessarily induce huge slowdown in Europe, let alone in the United States. But the confidence effect can be important because that affects countries' own investment levels, of course. And I think that's the thing that we're all most worried about.
I don't want to overstate it, but at the same time, I want to— I want us to remember that if you go back to 2008, if you go back to say September 12th, 2008, it was the judgment of the US Treasury that, well, if Lehman Brothers collapsed, it would collapse and it would be serious, but it wouldn't be a tragedy.
And as we now know, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the linkages, both direct financial linkage and psychological linkages between Lehman Brothers and the rest of the financial community turned out to be much larger than had ever been guessed.
And probably with the benefit of hindsight, the people in the U.S. Treasury took that decision might have said, I wish we hadn't taken that decision now, or I wish we'd handled it differently. So again, without overstating the importance of this rather small economy of the U.K., which is only 3.5% of world GDP, as I said, I think the psychological effects of its deciding to leave its major trading partner on grounds which are yet to be worked out could be rather shocking.
Certainly on the European level, they feel that very strongly. And for what it's worth, we've seen in the speeches of Janet Yellen over the last couple of days that she regards this as an element of uncertainty which is affecting even at least the pace of the rate change behavior in the United States. So I don't want to overstate it, but I've seen a couple of cases where policymakers have understated apparently small shocks which turned out to be bigger than what they
Erik Townsend: Well, now, you said earlier that the effect of this would likely be most depressive from a currency standpoint on the pound sterling, euro in the middle, and U.S. dollar benefiting the most. I'm a little bit concerned that a lot of economists have opined that a U.S. dollar rally resuming and new highs above 100 on the dollar index could create the risk of an emerging market debt crisis. Do you agree with that view, and do you think Do you think that this Brexit situation could exacerbate that risk?
John Llewellyn: Yes, I'm afraid I do. I don't know how much, how much quantitative weight to place on that, but it's certainly the case in a lot of countries in Asia, for example, that there is considerable dollar indebtedness and a rise in the rate of the dollar would make that more onerous.
It's worth recognizing that the situation is quite different from the Asian crisis in '95 and through to '98. That was a case where their banking system had been engaging in arbitrage between the low rates at which you could borrow in United States dollars and the high interest rates that most of those countries— Korea, Thailand, etc.— had at home.
So the banks borrowed cheap, lent expensively, and that was fine. Until their currencies sank, and then they were left with a hugely increased domestic currency cost of servicing that dollar debt. That is not the situation now. It's not the banks which are at risk.
We, by and large, in our macroprudential work around the world, don't get caught the same way twice. Now it seems that it's the corporate sectors which have been borrowing abroad because rates are much, much lower than they are at home. Home, and they are now exposed if that happens.
I haven't seen convincing estimates of the scale of this, but it seems pretty clear that they're not trivial. And people I speak to in Asia who try to put these numbers together say that this is probably their number one Asian risk now and that it's not trivial.
Erik Townsend: As we continue to move further out on this, where do you see the energy price that we're dealing with, particularly the oil Where do you see the oil price headed from here? And how do you think— you know, we've actually seen quite a bit of weakness in the price of oil in the last few days as the polls have turned around. So do you think that Brexit fears are fueling this sudden weakness in energy prices? Do you think energy prices are headed to the moon from here, as many people think? Or do you think we've seen a top recently?
John Llewellyn: It's a good and it's a very important question because of course there's no doubt that hydrocarbons in general and oil in particular have for decades been the fuel of our economies, literally and figuratively. So where the oil price goes is extremely important, not only for the fate of the rich OECD economies, but of course also for a number of the emerging market economies who specialize in oil, not least also in addition Russia.
So I think the oil price is terribly, terribly important. It always has been and it still is, but it's getting less so. If you permit, what I think the true story is, is this: it's a mistake to start thinking about the supply and demand balance for oil. The right thing to do is to think about the supply and demand balance for all energy, of which oil is an important but not the only component.
And I think what's been happening over the last few years is that after a period of very rapid growth of demand for hydrocarbons, both coal and oil, on the part of China, which has been growing, as we all know, extremely fast and in a highly energy-dependent way, first of all, China has slowed.
But secondly, there's been a big increase, and there's going to be a further big increase in supply of mainly renewables. If you look at the past 5 years and see how much increase in energy demand China has represented, and then you look forward to the next 5 years, you find that renewables, solar and wind, are going to add as much to world supply as China added to world demand in the previous A decade.
So no surprise in that circumstance that as China slowed, and as China's growth became somewhat less energy intensive, and at the same time as the prospects as well to some extent already as the reality of a big increment in supply, mainly from renewables, has come on, that the price of energy fell from something around $110 a barrel at its peak. To something like $30 at its trough and now hovering around $50-odd.
That's what explains what's going on with one added wrinkle, which is the world is starting to become more economical in its use of energy. Until about 2 decades ago, world energy use grew at almost exactly the same rate as world GDP growth. They were almost one-to-one tied together in lockstep. 10 or 15 years ago, energy use started to grow a little bit less rapidly than GDP, about a percentage point less. Last year it was over 2 percentage points less. So we're seeing in total what you normally see when you've seen something, in this case the price of oil, be unnaturally high.
You find 3 things going on: conservation or substitution for other forms of energy, energy and discovery of new forms of energy.
So if you then take, say, that's the world global energy scene, and if you say looking forward, we think the world economy is going to continue to grow, but China is probably never again going to grow at that breakneck 8% or 8.5% growth that it did, and furthermore, it's not going to be as energy intensive as it was, the question you have to ask yourself is, well, then in what range will the price of oil settle?
Now, it's very interesting that if you look back all the way through past history, right to where Pennsylvania oil industry started, for 118 of the last 156 years, oil has oscillated at a price of $10 to $40 a barrel in today's prices. It even went back into that channel after the first oil shock and before the second one, which was caused by China's rapid growth after joining the World Trade Organization. Now, it's sunk back to, as we know, to around $50 today.
My guess is that barring a shock, of course, and you can never predict a shock by definition, But the normal supply-demand balance will keep oil probably oscillating in the $10 to $40 range. Now, I would be the first to admit that there's a different school of thought which has diametrically opposite view.
It says no, oil is a scarce resource, and the price of any scarce resource will rise inexorably at or around the real rate of interest in the economy. Until it finally is nearly exhausted. That's the scarce resource or the so-called Hotelling view after the economist who posited the theory.
But I think it's unlikely. It's unlikely that we'll ever use all the oil that we have under the ground.
Now, you don't need to take my word for that. What I think is much more revealing is that the Saudi government, the Saudi oil minister explicitly says, we recognize now that we're never going to sell all the oil that's under our ground. And I think rather tellingly, he uses the aphorism that the Stone Age did not come to an end because of a shortage of stones.
And I think that's the point, that we're— we've reached— we're on the cusp of a change in the world energy market in which renewables of various sorts fuels fueled by technology ultimately, which is, which is making great breakthroughs, is going not to destroy the demand for oil. It'll always be useful with places where you need a high energy demand, a high energy intensity of a fuel, like for example in aircraft.
But increasingly in other applications, I think it's going to be electricity coming from renewables, and therefore we're going to be staring at low oil prices for a very long time, and that countries like— ranging from Russia to Venezuela to the Middle East are going to have to adjust to a new reality.
Erik Townsend: Of course, the other counterargument that's been posited is that the collapse in oil prices was a man-made event that occurred when OPEC decided not to cut production in order to support prices, and that it is possible once they achieve their objectives of damaging the US shale industry and perhaps coercing Russia to either join OPEC or to cooperate with them, that They might cut production in order to support prices. So is your view that that's not likely to happen, or is it your view that they're not able to support prices by that kind of mechanism?
John Llewellyn: I think it's that they're not able. That's right. I think it's the latter. You see, if a country is to act unilaterally by cutting— and cut its oil production in order to raise prices, for it not to be worse off in terms of its oil receipts, the fall in revenues that results from the decreasing volume of sales has to be more than offset by the rise in price.
Now, roughly speaking, you need to have— it's recognized, it's reckoned that a 1% fall in production causes about a 10% price in— rise in price in the first year for oil. So what that means is you can affect your revenue by cutting back production only if you've got a 10% share of the market or more. That's in the first year. After that, the effects get smaller again.
Now, only Saudi Arabia amongst the oil producers has that share. Now, in principle, of course, it could join forces with another country, and the natural one would probably be Iran. But OPEC has never really been able to do that because the temptation in any such agreement is for both countries or 3 countries or more to sign up, but then to cheat and say, well, I'll rely on the fact the others have cut back and I'll sell more at the now higher price.
I think barring some huge geopolitical change in the world, OPEC is from a price-setting point of view now a busted flush. And of course, the big new supplier at the margin, as you alluded to, is the US with fracking.
Now, frackers, you don't by and large drive out of business because the fascinating thing about fracking is the marginal cost is coming down all the time. Nobody knows quite what the marginal cost of a new hole drilled in the United States is, but it's come down a long way. Is at least fallen to $50 and quite likely to $40.
What, of course, you've got in the United States is something like 40,000 holes which have been dug but haven't yet been exploited, and they're ready to come on and be exploited as soon as the oil price rises much above, shall we say, $50. It's likely there that we've got a highly elastic supply of US oil. For really quite a long time.
So I doubt the operative ability of OPEC to cut back supply and achieve that. And it is notable that all of the meetings that they've had so far have singularly failed to reach any agreement.
Erik Townsend: It's fascinating how many different facets of the global economy this Brexit conversation has taken us to. We're starting to run out of time. I wonder if there's any question I've missed. Is there any aspect of Brexit or what it could mean in terms of knock-on effects Contagion to other countries in the European Union, perhaps also wanting to leave. What have I missed, and what else might we want to consider with respect to this potentially historic event coming next week?
John Llewellyn: Well, perhaps I could leave you with one high-level thought, and that's the following: I don't think very many people in the United Kingdom thought that this Brexit campaign would ever reach the sort of intensity that it's reached. Reached, that it would descend into the type of bitterness that it's reached.
And one of the questions that people are asking themselves is, how is, how is it possible? What has changed? And of course, as a professor of mine used to say, when something changes, look for something else that changed a bit before.
And of course, what's new in this debate is the role of the social media, the fact that people can form constituencies with other people whom in previous epochs they would never have been able to meet. They would never have known them. But now you can find them on the web, you can talk to them, you can— in other words, I'm talking, if you like, about the rise of populism.
And however important or unemployment— however important or unimportant the UK is, it might be a harbinger for the much more important phenomenon of the US economy and US society. And when you look across the Atlantic at Donald Trump, you realize that there's a rise of populism there too. I don't want to comment particularly on the United States. I think that should be left to people who understand it better than I do.
But it was very noticeable that probably the man you'd have to call the intellectual leader of the Vote Leave in the UK, the man called Michael Gove, who was a close friend of the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleague of the Prime Minister. One of his most revealing comments, I think, when told, "Look, nine out of ten economists think that it would be a bad thing for the United Kingdom." You've been told by the IMF, the OECD, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, President Obama, former Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury. His reply was, "The British people are sick of." Experts, tired of experts.
And that is the phenomenon which we're noticing: that that somehow something has changed. That even those whose business it is to study these matters, and however carefully they phrase their their policy, are simply dismissed. They're dismissed as scaremongers. I would be the last to pretend that economists understand everything or get it right.
But they're dismissed out of hand, and I I think I end with a question to you: To what extent is this going on in the United States? To what extent is Donald Trump appealing to people who formed constituents who just say, "I'm sick of experts," or "I'm sick of elites," or "I'm sick of the ruling class," or "I'm sick of Washington D.C."
And in that respect, I think what's going on in the United Kingdom raises a very interesting specter for what might go on in the United
Erik Townsend: Well, I could not possibly agree with you more on that. I think that this election in the United States is all about the American people waking up and recognizing something is very, very wrong. And they don't know what it is. They don't understand it for the most part, but they've figured out that something is very wrong. And I think this is the first election I can remember where I don't know anybody who's voting for anyone. Everyone is voting against someone. And it scares me.
John Llewellyn: I think you would You've just described what's going on here. The extent to which people are really voting to leave Europe or to what extent they're just expressing a high level of discontent is a really moot question.
Erik Townsend: That's very perceptive indeed. As we've pretty much run out of time, I just want to close by asking you to tell us a little bit more about Llewellyn Consulting. What services do you offer to your institutional clients?
John Llewellyn: Well, that's very kind. Well, whereas you couldn't tell from my comments We're a top-down macro firm. We we offer macroeconomic services, but we also define macroeconomic to include all the other big macro drivers like demography, technological change, climate change, and so on. So we tend to offer services to some of the big investment managers, no names, no pack drill, and also to some governments and to some large corporations. Corporations about the big things which are shaped, which are in, are going to drive their future. We, we call economic drivers powerful, inexorable, and long-lasting forces.
And companies and investment managers tend to come to us when they want to see how those may play out. And that's what we do.
Erik Townsend: Well, John, thank you so much for joining us on the program. I really appreciate it. I think you've given our listeners some fantastic perspective on what next week's vote Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger, back with you. Last week, our MacroVoices research team captain, Aaron Chan, was kind enough to help me co-host the final segment of the show because my travel schedule didn't allow me to listen to the feature interview before we taped the final segment. Well, we ended up getting a lot of positive feedback from listeners who enjoyed Aaron's fresh perspective and the questions that he brought to Erik and said they'd like to hear more of him on future shows. This comes as a blessing to me because, as regular listeners will know, MacroVoices is a part-time job for me. I have a lot of personal travel planned this summer, and to be honest, I wasn't that excited about having to carry my studio microphone with me and having to organize my travel schedule around taping the show from afar every Thursday afternoon. So I'm pleased to announce that Aaron has agreed to take over co-hosting responsibilities for the rest of the summer, starting with next week's show.
And I'll be back when my travel situation permits. Meanwhile, Aaron, thanks for agreeing to help us out as co-host. Thank you, Patrick.
Aaron Chan: Hey, Nate. It's really my pleasure, and I'm looking forward to it.
Nathan Egger: So you did a fantastic job with the follow-up questions for Erik last week, so please take it away from here.
Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. So Erik, we got John's perspective on so many aspects of Brexit and its economic implications. And I notice his view is decidedly different from last week's guest, Dr. Ben Hunt, who really— who opined that the impact of a Brexit would be minimal because the U.K. is part of the E.U. and not the EMU, meaning that they have their own currency and don't use Now, I'm curious, what is your view? If the Brits vote to leave next week, is it a big deal or not for the global economy?
Erik Townsend: Oh, I think it's a huge big deal, and I respectfully disagree with Ben Hunt on this one. I think he made a very valid point that the fundamental impact in terms of what could happen certainly would be worse if they were also leaving the European Monetary Union, which could disrupt the currency.
But the thing is, as John Llewellyn correctly pointed out, It's a good point. What is being voted on next week is whether or not to begin a process which no one has ever experienced before, because it's never been done, which the rules— if you look up the Brexit referendum on Wikipedia, there is an analysis there of what's involved, and it's hard to even figure it out. It's this 2-year process. There has to be a vote of other members to approve the nation that wants to leave. It's not as simple as the The U.K. just saying, we're gonna take our marbles and go home. Thanks a lot, guys.
So, markets don't like uncertainty, and you're potentially inviting a 2-year period of nobody knowing which way is up. And I think that if you look at the breakup of Lehman Brothers, as John said, should not unto itself have been the catalyst to start the 2008 financial crisis. But it was a big enough catalyst to start something that was ready to happen already because of excessive of debt. Now, look at all of the smart people in the room, the George Soros's and the Stan Druckenmiller's and the Carl Icahn's and the Andy Xie's and the David Rosenberg's, all saying, we're in a situation where if a catalyst came along, you could see things really seriously fall apart.
Could the Brexit be the catalyst that brings that on? I don't know. Entirely possible. Just as you couldn't have possibly predicted Lehman. Would have been the catalyst. Nobody knows ahead of time, but the pump is primed. The economy is in a situation where it's waiting for a catalyst to cause this whole house of cards to come crashing down. And I think it's entirely plausible that this could be that catalyst.
Aaron Chan: So, my next question is about currencies, and it's really a 2-part question. John discussed sort of the safe haven move from pound sterling into euro and the dollar. But what about the yen? The yen got pounded by a weaker dollar, I think up to around 150. And what other beneficiaries of a flight from pound sterling do you see? Possibly gold? I mean, Bitcoin's at $700. So what other lifeboats do you see people running to from pound sterling?
Erik Townsend: I think that probably gold and silver will benefit. And I don't think it's so much as the gold bugs would tell you that everybody is going to prefer them. It's just a question of liquidity. There's a lot of money involved. And the gold and silver markets are relatively small in terms of their capacity to absorb large capital flows. Flows without large price moves. So I think it's quite possible that this could be a major move to the upside for precious metals.
As far as something like Bitcoin, I think probably China is driving the Bitcoin situation more than anything else. Bitcoin is particularly attractive to Chinese that are trying to hide wealth and figure out ways of smuggling it out of their country. You don't really have that problem I don't think there's a problem in terms of capital controls per se in Europe. So I wouldn't see Bitcoin as being as big of a benefactor from this situation. The yen, I think, probably, you know, Japanese BOJ monetary policy is going to influence the yen. So yeah, of course, flight capital coming out of the pound sterling could wind up in the yen. But I think the size of that effect would probably be dwarfed by the size of monetary policy effects out of the BOJ.
So if I were trying to bet on some asset benefiting from a Brexit, I would think precious metals would be the first place to look.
Aaron Chan: Great. So we've covered crude oil quite a bit on MacroVoices in the past, and it was really interesting to hear John's take on Brexit's impact on oil prices. And he said that we'll probably likely see lower oil prices for longer. So, Erik, how do you factor Brexit into your outlook for oil?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the Brexit event likely causes a lot of people to sort of panic about everything, and I do think that we, just from last week's 5160 or so high, you know, we're probably at a cycle high, and certainly Brexit could take us back down to the bottom of the trading channel, maybe lower than that, I don't know.
But as far as the longer-term view, the one place I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Llewellyn is I really think that, although I agree that OPEC's cartel pricing capability is pretty much compromised at this point. I think they want very much to get it back. And I think that, you know, his comment about Saudi Arabia and Iran, well, that's not going to happen because, I mean, on every level— religious, philosophical, ideological— Saudi Arabia and Iran just don't ever want to be friends. Saudi Arabia enticing Russia to play ball with them. I think Russia was ready and has now stepped back, but could probably be coerced again Once the situation with Iran stabilizes and Saudi Arabia is able to contemplate a cut without it looking to their citizenry as though they are cutting at a time while Iran is increasing production, which I think is what made it untenable for them to accept Russia's offer. At some point, I think Russia and Saudi Arabia could come together and maybe, not for certain, but maybe that does restore a cartel pricing ability where they could move prices dramatically higher.
I would agree that if that doesn't happen, then I think that John's arguments for why oil prices could stay depressed for a long time, I would agree with. But I think he's maybe not giving as much credence to that possibility as I would— the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining forces with Russia and recreating the former cartel pricing capability that OPEC once had.
Aaron Chan: That's fascinating. It'll be interesting to see that play out in the future. So my last question is about the psychological contagion that John talked about. So there was a fascinating discussion about the trade channel and the psychological channel in terms of influences between economies and industry. I thought a telling quote from Michael Gove is that the British people are tired of experts.
And right now you can see that the venom is directed at politicians, but the experts running the global economy, Erik, you and I know know, are the professorial central bankers. So do you see the populist gaze turning towards the central bankers anytime soon?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the real question is going to be the populist response of Europeans in general to staying in the E.U. In addition to the Brexit referendum, you've also got this Unidos Podemos group in Spain. Now, ironically, translated from Spanish, that means united we can, yet they appear to be favoring withdrawal of Spain from the EU. So being ununited from the EU seems to be on their mind.
Right now, Greece is sort of out of the news, but do we have another Greek crisis? I think that there is a risk at some point that if other countries are doing it and are fed up with the European Union, it could cause a contagion where several other countries exit. Once those— it's sort of like a bank run. It doesn't make sense until everybody else is doing it, and then it kind of doesn't make sense not to participate in it. yourself.
And as I think Ben Hunt very accurately opined, the Brexit exiting the E.U. was not that— it was not as big of a deal as it would have been if the U.K. were also in the EMU. In other words, participating in the euro currency.
If you were to have some of the larger countries like France and Spain, which are in the E.U., exit the E.U. and go back to their own currencies, that could have catastrophic implications for the That could lead to a Europe-wide banking crisis, which then becomes self-reinforcing. As that crisis is falling apart, the euro is devaluing dramatically. Now Europeans lose confidence in the euro system, and they want out. They want to go back to their own currencies. That would take at least ten years to clean up the mess if that happened. Now I'm not predicting that, and I don't think that that's likely. But I think that kind of contagion effect is entirely possible.
And these things are like avalanches. You know, it takes just a tiny little bit of snow falling in just the right spot to get it started. And once it gets started, it can't be stopped. So I don't think it's possible to predict it. But if it were to start to happen, it could be huge.
Aaron Chan: Thanks, Erik. It really sounds like it's gonna be spicy next week.
Nathan Egger: Aaron, I know Erik very well. And I can tell that you're really putting him to the test, and we're getting the best out of him as a result of that. So I really can't tell you how much— well, first of all, that I'm comfortable passing the baton to you for the summer and how much I appreciate you stepping up to help out with the co-hosting on MacroVoices.
So I'm really looking forward to Professor Steve Keen coming back to talk to us about alternative currencies on next week's show. But I should let you, Aaron, do the show wrap as our new co-host.
Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. It's time to put on the big boy pants here. So before we close, I wanted to update our listeners on what to expect for this week's Research Roundup newsletter. We've got a great video of Jim Grant speaking at Google about his book, The Forgotten Depression of 1921. We also have Shane Obata-Muzarich's extensive paper, which reviews industry and academic research about the unconventional policies and their effects on financial markets.
And finally, for those of you who might be a little bit more research or data inclined, there's a really interesting academic paper called Lazy Prices that explores a quantitative connection between changes in corporate earnings language and financial returns. The reception for Research Roundup so far has been really positive. And again, we continue to welcome any feedback or submissions to researchroundup@macrovoices.com.
So that about wraps it up for this week's program. Nate, you're going to be missed, and I hope you enjoy your travels. They're very well deserved. But I'm really looking forward to working with Erik and to continue bringing great content to our community. Again, the best way to support us is by leaving a review on iTunes. And don't forget to subscribe on MacroVoices to get the latest episodes and Research Roundup newsletters straight into your inbox. If you're Twitter inclined, you can follow Erik @ErikSTownsend. It's Erik with a K.
And myself @AaronChan_. For Erik and Nathan, I'm Aaron Chan. Till next week.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management. LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Ben Hunt — Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 18 was recorded a day early this week to accommodate travel schedules on Wednesday, June 8th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author Dr. Ben Hunt Will be joining me as this week's featured guest. Dr. Hunt and I will be discussing the U.S. dollar, the upcoming Brexit referendum, U.S. monetary policy, negative interest rates, and much more. And MacroVoices' own volunteer research team captain, Aaron Chan, will be joining us again at the end of today's program.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's talk equities, Erik. By midweek, the S&P had already traded above 2,120, nearing those all-time highs. And all of this in the face of economic data that has been just awful, including last Friday's nonfarm payroll report coming in at only— it was 38,000 new jobs created. Erik, what's going on here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's exactly about the awful data, and it's— we're going back to this bad is the new good doctrine. And it's crazy that this is happening because just this week, you know, last week we talked about Andy Xie joining the chorus of bears along with George Soros and Carl Icahn and Stan Druckenmiller and all these, you know, rock of finance who are just saying, this is crazy. Asset markets are way overvalued. Rosenberg came in this week. He has a new 106-slide PowerPoint presentation, which I thought was excellent. We've got a link to that in this week's Research Roundup, which has already been emailed to our registered listeners here at MacroVoices.com. And for that matter, Goldman Sachs was out Tuesday evening with a bearish note predicting a significant drawdown in equities. So how are all these things possible? In that we have the market almost flirting with all-time highs in the face of the smartest guys in the room all saying that the economy is headed for the toilet?
And the answer is because we're back to this bad is the new good doctrine, which really has existed since 2009, where it is expectations of Fed easing that are driving things more than actual economic data. And of course, the effect of the nonfarm payroll report on Friday was to virtually guarantee that there will be no hike at next week's FOMC meeting.
So if we're not going to get a hike in June, a lot of people seem to think a hike in July is impossible because there's no press conference. Now, the Fed has been pretty clear that the July meeting is a live meeting and there could be a hike then. But there hasn't ever been one, at least in recent times, before when there was no press conference. And so a lot of people think that that is not possible. I said last week that no hike could ignite a rally towards all-time highs. And that's exactly what's happening. But it's happening early because people are basically assuming it's a foregone conclusion after this nonfarm payroll report. And Janet Yellen's emphasis on being data dependent, that, well, gee, the data really does not justify a rate hike at this point.
So it remains to be seen whether or not this rate hike is going to be a buy the rumor, sell the news event where we see a top in equities, which would be, say, a double top testing those all-time highs. And maybe that's where the top is in and it's downhill from there and all these smart guys are proven right. Or maybe we see an actual breakout above those prior highs. If that happened, it would definitely be self-reinforcing because pretty much any technician will tell you that a breakout to new all-time highs is always a bullish buy signal. Now, a disciplined technician would also tell you that you have to wait for that breakout to be qualified as a legitimate breakout. In other words, it needs to stay above those all-time highs for more than just a few days, and it also needs to significantly move well above the prior highs.
In this environment where there's so much irrational exuberance and very strong bullish investor sentiment in the system, I think as soon as we see a couple of points above the previous high, a lot of people are going to be buying hand over fist in what I think is really more hysteria than sensible risk-taking.
But, you know, I think the biggest mistake that you don't want to make here is say, oh, it's impossible in the face of this economic data for the market to move higher. It's not impossible if the majority of market participants think that a U-turn in policy is coming.
In other words, not only is there no hike at the June meeting, But there's no more hikes. We're not gonna have any more hikes. The attempted hiking cycle is over after only one hike. If that's what happens, or if expectations in the market are that that is what happens, that the rate normalization narrative that we've been living under is over, then we're back to the same kind of craziness that's happened since 2009, where people start expecting the next round of quantitative easing and so forth. So now that's not what Janet Yellen is saying. She's saying that we are in a normalization process and that if it doesn't happen at this meeting, Well, then maybe it'll happen at the next meeting. I think a lot of people are starting to assume that maybe the rate normalization attempt is over. And the reason a lot of them are saying that is that if we don't have a hike at the June meeting next week, which seems almost certain that we will not, well, then it's been too many meetings between rate hikes.
And if you look at prior precedents, normally a rate hiking cycle, you don't go that many meetings without having a hike. So that sort of implies that it's over. I think that's misplaced logic, frankly, but a lot of people think that. And what we're seeing right now is a lot of exuberance. Let's suppose this thing does break above the previous all-time high and starts to gain momentum and moves even more to the upside.
You know, at some point, what does this mean? You know, is it bad is the new good forever? So if we had another Great Depression, that would send the S&P to 5,000? Obviously, this can't go on forever. So the question to ask yourself is, what breaks this bad is the new good doctrine?
And I think it's one of two things. Number one, when inflation hits the stage again. The Fed can get away with accommodating asset markets and boosting asset markets to create wealth effect. We had an article in, I think, last week's Research Roundup from Jesse Felder describing why he feels that the Fed is entirely Dow-dependent rather than data-dependent.
The thing is, they're getting away with that because of the current deflationary backdrop. When inflation hits the stage again, whenever that happens, all of a sudden the Fed's hands are tied. They're forced to hike rates. rates in order to combat inflation, they can't support asset markets, and then you potentially get a really abrupt sell-off, if not a bigger crash than 2008.
Now, a lot of people have said to me, Erik, you're crazy to even bring up inflation. Look at what's going on. Very, very clearly, the macro backdrop here is deflationary, not inflationary. Well, they're right about that, but if you look at your history, every epic inflation in history has been preceded by a whiff of very strong deflation. And usually what happens, the Weimar Hyperinflation is a good example. There's a deflationary backdrop that allows central bankers to become overconfident and think they can get away with printing unlimited amounts of money, which of course Rudolf von Havenstein did back in Germany in, in the Weimar hyperinflation. That works for a while until it doesn't work and you get runaway inflation, and then you've got a really crazy situation. I didn't think that there was any sign of inflation on the horizon. I was very surprised when Julian Brigden a couple of weeks ago said Hey, you know, I think by the end of the year we could be looking at inflation and inflation expectations starting to take off.
I'll be surprised to see that, actually, but boy, I'll be watching carefully for it, because when you start to see inflation take off, that's where I really get concerned.
The other way that this bad is the new good doctrine could come to an end would be if we start to see the Fed moving back to an accommodative stance, maybe another round of quantitative easing, and there is a public outcry. And I think in the current political cycle, it's very possible that this could happen, where the people say, look, if we're going to do more money printing, it should support Main Street, not Wall Street. This business of propping up asset markets is immoral because it helps only a very small part of the population. If there's going to be more money printing, it should go into infrastructure or some other kind of spending which is much broader based. That could be what short-circuits the Wall Street expectation of the Yellen put, that the Fed is going to be there to bail out Right.
Until one of those things happens, though, I think if we are indeed going to watch the Fed abandon its attempted rate hiking cycle, or rate normalization cycle, as they call it, that could lead to another big round of irrational exuberance and more upside in asset markets. I don't think it makes any sense in terms of the economic backdrop. And I'm noticing that some of the smarter guys, you know, Rosenberg is not saying that he thinks the stock market is going to crash. He just thinks that the broader economy is in big trouble. And I think I think Andy Xie said the same thing about the global economy. So maybe what we're looking at is a period, at least, where we were kind of like the Austrian concept of a crack-up boom, where asset prices continue to rise as the economy falls apart. I don't know, but I think the fundamental backdrop looks awful.
Asset prices are still moving higher and may continue to move higher if there is an expectation of more accommodation from the Fed.
Nathan Egger: I often wonder who exactly it is that's waking up every morning and deciding they need to buy more equities. But we saw crude oil We saw crude oil last week, Erik, meet considerable resistance around $50. And we've seen a lot more strength in crude oil. We got back above that $50 level, and we've been able to trade there for a bit. Saw WTI trading above $51 on Wednesday. What's your outlook for the crude?
Erik Townsend: Well, we had a couple of things happen this week. As you said, we couldn't get above $50. There's a psychological barrier there. But I think most technicians have said the more important technical level is not $50, which is a psychological number, but more like Like $51.90, just below $52. And that shows up in the longer-term charts, in the weekly charts, as a major retracement level.
And as we speak, just after the close on Wednesday, we're almost there. We're 30 cents away from it at $51.53 as we're speaking late on Wednesday. I think we're probably going to get to that $51.90 number. That also coincides with what looks like it could be the final reaction high on an ascending wedge pattern in both the CL and the Brent crude oil charts. So it does look like we're maybe on a high here, but with all of this Fed exuberance, I'm not sure I dare to short it just because everybody's buying everything hand over fist. A couple things happened this week.
Tuesday, EIA's short-term energy outlook reported a much larger drop in production in May than we had seen previously. Remember Art Berman last week on the show saying, you know, we were seeing these 50,000 barrel per day drops in a given month, and it maybe got as much as 100, but it's not enough. We need 150 before it's really going to make a difference in terms of allowing higher oil prices. Well, guess what? We've got that north of 150 now. Also, relative inventories, both in absolute and in relative terms, inventories are falling. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on that because Art Berman does have an excellent new blog post out on that exact subject. We've got a link to that post in your Research Roundup email this week.
EIA inventory came out Wednesday morning. Drawdown in national inventories of 3.2 million barrels, about in line with expectations and entirely consistent with what would be regular and normal at this time of year. We are in drawdown season. It's summer driving season. Cushing, Oklahoma, drawing down 1.4 million barrels. 1.363 actually was the number.
That's a little bit bigger than analyst expectations. Doesn't really surprise me, though, because of the Canada wildfires, which are affecting supply of Alberta oil into Cushing. That is a major stick save, though, for the storage crisis. We got as far as 96.42% of operating capacity in Cushing, down to about 92.5% as of today. 92.5% is still a huge number, but in terms of how much spare capacity is available, we've gone from 3% to 7%. So we've got, you know, twice as much buffer as we had before. The surprise, though, was gasoline and distillates. Distillates, of course, is a collective term for diesel fuel and jet fuel and all the other stuff that's made from crude oil, types of fuels other than gasoline. A build in inventories of 1 million barrels of gasoline, 1.7 million barrels in distillates. Well, hang on. That 3.2 million barrel crude oil drawdown is about right for this time of year. But if you consider that there was a buildup of 2.7 million barrels of finished products, they're processing the crude oil, they're refining it into refined products that apparently are not selling.
So it almost mitigates or cancels out most of that 3.2 million barrel drawdown. The $51.90 retrace target that I mentioned is definitely in the crosshairs. I'm noticing a lot of technicians, whether they're talking about that number or they're talking about the ascending wedge pattern or they're talking about just prior levels that existed, for different reasons, different technicians are talking about tops here. So I do think that we may be at a cycle high at $51.90, which I expect that we'll test before the week is out.
Nathan Egger: Okay. Yeah.
Erik Townsend: I'm also watching carefully the front-month spread. That's the difference between the July and the August contract. Because as I've described in previous shows, the place where you potentially get downside risk in terms of storage capacity being a problem is if the speculative longs— and remember, even if the longs want to stay long, they're still forced to sell that expiring July contract. Who are they going to sell it to? They can't sell it to other speculators because other speculators have to be into the next contract, the one that It does not require you to take physical delivery if you trade beyond the 21st of June, which is when this contract expires. So if they're forced to sell that and there's nobody to sell it to, you could see that spread dramatically widen out. Now, back when we were at 85% of capacity, we were seeing $2 contango spreads near expiration. We're not seeing anything close to that.
It moved from $0.45 a week and a half ago to $0.61 as we're speaking now on Wednesday. So we are seeing a widening of the spread, which is not unusual. If there is tight storage, as we have, but it's nothing out of bounds. It's nothing to suggest a panic. So it does not look to me like there's any storage crisis that's going to happen. I think the market, even though we're above 90% capacity, is saying, "Hey, the trend is reversed. We're seeing drawdowns. We're also seeing a lot of supply destruction around the world." I think the market is breathing a big sigh of relief.
I have noticed also. You can see also that there's been temporary compression in those spreads, spreads across the board, not just the front month. Each time the market moved above 50, there was a temporary compression of spreads that lasted for several hours and then came back out. What that says to me is each time the market moved above 50, there was another wave of producer hedging. And again, producer hedging means that oil producers are selling the long-dated contracts as speculators are buying the near-dated contracts. That flattens out the curve.
If you think, as I do, that that is not sustainable long-term, that either the front month moves down or the back months move up, one or the other, then that curve steepener trade that I've talked about in previous shows ought to be profitable.
Nathan Egger: And the gold chart was looking awfully bearish last week. We saw the yellow metal struggling to stay above $1,200, but the upward price spike in reaction to the weak jobs report on Friday was dramatic. It was instantaneous. What are you seeing in the gold market?
Erik Townsend: Well, it was not only dramatic and instantaneous, it took us right back to a critical level, which was around 1,250 or so, and the 50-day moving average. To see a data report like that jerk the market back to a key technical level such as a moving average is really not a big deal as long as it stays below that moving average. And for a couple of days, it looks like it was going to stay below the 50-day moving average. I thought that might be kind of a False up move and it might roll back over as the, the news from the payroll kind of faded out of traders' minds. Today on Wednesday though, we saw a very aggressive breakout up above the 50-day moving average, testing $1,267 at one point on Wednesday. So that's $12 above where the moving average was. What this all says to me is we're seeing some pretty darn good strength here. I had said last week, I think, that what we might see happen with Gold is if we got to the FOMC meeting and there was no rate hike, that might mark a bottom.
I think that could be what is in play here, but it wasn't the FOMC meeting, it was the payroll report, which basically guaranteed the outcome of the FOMC meeting. And that clearly, at least on Wednesday, is showing a lot of strength. So I think maybe we are seeing the beginning of another move higher. The next big test, of course, will be can we get above $1,300, above the most recent high, and start to move higher from there.
It's still a matter of watching, and I think that next week's FOMC press conference is going to be absolutely critical, because if Janet Yellen reinforces the message of, hey guys, we are in a rate hiking cycle, we've decided to pause here, we're not going to do it this month because of data, we're going to wait for next month and see if the data looks good, but don't be surprised if a rate hike comes next month, boys and girls. If Janet Yellen were to express that sentiment, I think gold would be turning right back down just as quickly as it went up.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: But more consistent with her recent statements, if she kind of said, yeah, well, maybe we don't have to do any more hiking, and we're not going to perhaps do any more hikes this year, and maybe that's it. If she continued to send a dovish message, as she has, that could very easily shock both equity and precious metal prices much higher.
So I think that the tell is probably going to be what happens at next week's FOMC meeting, which of course is Wednesday afternoon, the 15th of So, we're seeing buying in gold in response to weak economic data and statement from the Fed.
Nathan Egger: How's this been affecting the US dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, obviously, the big move was way down in reaction, again, to the jobs report. Everybody knew that that was going to take the rate hike off the table. And of course, if the rate hike is not there, that was— it was the expectation of the possibility of a rate hike, or at least the fact that we're still in a hiking cycle, that was providing strength to the dollar. When I saw that massive downside spike, I said, I sort of thought to myself, okay, markets tend to overshoot and overreact to data points. Maybe this is a buying opportunity here. Maybe it is going to be uphill from here and this is a buying opportunity, but I'll watch it for a couple days before I buy anything.
Sure enough, what's happened in the last couple days is we're seeing continued weakening. We've dropped almost another full large handle on the dollar index since that jobs report. And what it says to me is the market is starting to say, hey, wait a minute.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: If the Fed is not really going to follow through with this rate hiking program, maybe that wasn't the low that we saw back at '92 or so on the dollar index. Maybe this was a false move to the upside and actually there's a much lower. So I see continued selling this week following Friday's data. It's not just the crazy reaction on Friday, but it's continuing. That says to me that there are growing market market expectations that the hiking cycle, the rate normalization cycle, is over and about to be abandoned by the Fed. I think they'll probably be proven wrong by that, but it won't be till Janet Yellen's press conference that we get a better indication of what's going on.
Nathan Egger: So, equities up, gold up, dollar's getting crushed. Why are we seeing bond yields getting crushed with Wednesday's 10-year reopening printing a 1.7 yield? What's going on here in fixed income?
Erik Townsend: Well, of course, what's going on is the, the same thing. The jobs report is pretty much assuring that there's going to be no hike of short-term interest rates. And so as a result of that, long-term interest rates are starting to drift down as well. 1.7 is kind of a key level in a lot of technical charts, and I think that a lot of people are perceiving it as sort of a credibility level. In other words, we were seeing increasing 10-year yields So, if we continue to see higher yields, that's an indication that market participants are expecting improvement in the broader economy. But if we start falling below 1.7%, how does the Fed justify a hiking cycle if we're seeing really what is a pretty strong oncoming recession signal coming from longer-dated Treasury securities? And how does the Fed continue to justify staying on its rate normalization cycle in the face of that?
So, what happens here?
Nathan Egger: Lower?
Erik Townsend: We'll see. I think, again, it's going to depend very much on Janet Yellen's comments next week. If she reinforces the message of, hey folks, don't forget, we are committed to a rate normalization cycle, it's just a question of taking pause until the data supports it, then I think you'll see things turn around. If the Fed backs away and says, oh, maybe we're done with this rate normalization cycle after only one hike, then I think it's a whole new ballgame. And I think you could see lower bond yields. I think that you could You'll definitely see asset markets in general going crazy.
Nathan Egger: Thank you for the market update. This week's featured guest is Dr. Ben Hunt of Salient Partners. Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Dr. Ben Hunt, Chief Risk Officer at Salient Partners, and of course, author of the very popular Epsilon Theory blog. Ben, thanks so much for joining me on the program. I want to start with the US dollar because, as you know, everything else hinges on that. We've had some guests on the program tell us the tops are in and it's all downhill from here on the dollar. Others have said the pause is over and it's all uphill from here. What's your perspective?
Ben Hunt: Well, it's great to be here, and you're right that this is the topic that we need to be discussing first and foremost. So, so, so here's my view. My view is that the dollar is not a, um, let's call it an independent entity or security like a, a stock would be. It doesn't have its own independent cash flows or anything the like.
What the dollar is— what, and by the dollar, what we mean is the exchange rate of the dollar versus our trading partners— the dollar is a reflection of monetary policy.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Ben Hunt: Not just to the Fed, but a reflection of the strategic interaction, the game that's being played between the Fed, People's Bank of China, the ECB, and the yen. So I'm not perplexed, because I understand that that's what we do in this world. We try to predict if something's going up or down. But what I'll tell you is that when you're dealing with something like the dollar today, that is driven
Erik Townsend: That's right.
Ben Hunt: That's driven by game-playing, that's driven by strategic interactions.
It's very different from trying to predict whether something that has fundamental causes will go up or down. That is, whether the dollar goes up from here or down from here depends entirely not just on the decisions that the Fed makes, but on the interplay, the interaction between the decisions that the Fed makes and particularly the Chinese So I'll tell you, if I'm a betting man, I say that the dollar goes up from here because I think it's an existential issue, political issue in China, that they have to keep devaluing their currency. It's massively overvalued today for reasons we can discuss, but I think that the political dynamic is going to be driven by this existential issue in China. to devalue their currency, to continue to promote industrial production and exports.
Erik Townsend: Okay, why don't we go ahead and pick up on the China overvalued argument?
Ben Hunt: Yeah, sure, sure. That— I mean, this is the, uh, you know, I, I try in my, my blog and the notes that I write to try to apply the lenses of, of game theory, which we just kind of touched in passing, but also of history. And, you know, the last time we had such overwhelming debt in the world was in the 1930s. And I think people are kind of familiar with that dynamic.
But, you know, what I think is most interesting about China, the historical comparison I would make with China, is that I think they're very similar to Germany before World War I. You know, what do I mean by that? What I mean is that As Germany was in, say, 1910, 1912, they are the up-and-coming challenger in the global economy.
They are also a country that is, let's call it, more authoritarian than their neighbors, the European neighbors in the case of Germany, and of course, their Pacific neighbors in the case of China.
And they're also responding to their new position as the challenger for the largest economy in the world in a very similar way. And what I mean by that is they're printing a lot of money. It's something that one does as a government or a country in this sort of position, because what you're trying to do is you're trying to Well, let me back up a second. You've built this position of being a challenger in a tremendous economy by trading with the world.
And what you need to do now is what— or what you think you need to do now is you need to develop internally. And that's what China's trying to do too, just like Germany tried to do before World War I. They're trying to build out their own domestic— they didn't call it consumption in 1910, But they, they, because they're trying to build out their own domestic, particularly financial system. It's the same in China.
So what do you do when that happens? When you have shocks that are occurring in the world, as you did in, you know, in the early 20th century? Well, you print a lot of money.
You print a lot of money because you don't want to be tied, you don't want to be vulnerable to what's going on in the, in the, in than the rest of the world. And the way this played out with China was that in the Great Recession, 2008, they flooded their country domestically with credit. It's a very sensible thing to do, right? You can, in a sense, inoculate yourself from the enormous recessionary, deflationary pressures that are washing up, in that case, on China's shores. From the financial crisis in the US and Europe by just printing a lot of money. That's what they did. So, to give you a sense of this, in the US today, when we talk about M2, the broad-based monetary supply, it's about, I don't know, 75%, 80% of US GDP.
In China today, it's about 250%, 260%.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Ben Hunt: Of their GDP. It's a tremendous difference, and almost all of that difference has occurred since 2008, where they've just printed lots of money. Now, that's fine. Like I say, it's a very sensible thing to do to try to protect yourself as a big growing economy.
You want to— you don't want to get knocked back by whatever's happening in other countries. But here's the downside. The downside is That because you've printed so much money, your currency should be worth less, right? I mean, if you now have to exchange that currency that you've printed 10 times of over the past few years, it means it's going to be worth less when you're exchanging it for dollars.
But that's a problem. It was a problem for Germany when they were on the gold standard, and it's a problem for China today when they're effectively on the US dollar. Dollar standard, because they haven't been able to devalue their currency. All right? So why is that a problem? It's a problem because then it makes their goods and— not so much services, but the things they make, the industrial output that they have, it makes it more expensive to sell abroad.
And for the next decade or so, as much as they're trying to develop that internal market, China is still going to be an export-led economy. Exports to the United States for sure, but also to Japan, to the emerging markets of Russia, India, Brazil, and particularly to Europe. And when their currency is overvalued, they can't sell as much stuff, and so their industrial production goes down.
Why do I call that an existential threat? Because ever since Donald Deng Xiaoping really reformulated the legitimacy of the Chinese state from Mao and the Gang of Four, and that legitimacy was based on the idea of, you know what, we can all get rich together. We can develop the economy. It's glorious to be rich, and that's going to be the driving force of the Chinese state.
So, So in this world that Deng Xiaoping created 35 years ago, they, meaning Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party, have to have real people making real stuff in real factories that they can really sell. They don't care if they sell it domestically or internationally, but for, let's say, the next decade, most of it's going to have to be sold internationally.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Ben Hunt: So they have to export. Their exports are declining, declining precipitously. And that's the existential risk that China has, and that's what I think will continue to press them to devalue their currency so they can keep selling stuff to the rest of the world.
Erik Townsend: Let's go back to Europe, but perhaps to the part that is not sure if it wants to be in Europe, which of course is the upcoming Brexit referendum on June 23rd. Most of the interviews I've heard on this topic are with British economists who seem to have a lot of political capital invested personally. I wonder if you can give us the level-headed— for both outcomes, what are the economic consequences to the rest of the global economy on either result of this referendum?
Ben Hunt: Minimal. Minimal. So, so, and here's, here's why I say that. There are, in my thinking, I think I think there are 2 what I'll call Humpty Dumpty moments, right? Meaning that events that are so damaging to the status quo of monetary policy and this edifice that, you know, the central banks and the status quo politicians have built up over the years.
There are 2 of those Humpty Dumpty moments that I can identify. One is what we just talked about. If China floats their currency and it devalues, If the euro devalues by 20%, which I think it would, that's an atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, and Asian and European banks are in an unbelievable world of hurt if that happens. We can talk about that.
The other Humpty Dumpty moment is something that strikes at the heart of the euro.
You'll notice both of these Humpty Dumpty moments have to do with currencies. And that is the world we're in. And that's why I think you smartly started off our discussion talking about the dollar. It really is currencies today through which all of these political and monetary forces present themselves.
So the thing, though, that would break up the euro, it's not Brexit, right? So obviously, you know, the U.K. is not part of the euro system, so their exit doesn't threaten the euro system.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Ben Hunt: And that's why I say it's not an issue that really is that big of an impact fundamentally on markets, because it doesn't impact the euro system. It impacts the E.U., the European Union, but it doesn't impact the euro system. What would impact the euro system?
A President Le Pen, right?
Erik Townsend: Right.
Ben Hunt: An election in Germany in 2017 Where, you know, a Le Pen equivalent, right, comes to the fore in German politics. That is what strikes at the heart of the euro system. And those are the Humpty Dumpty moments that I think you have to look at for Europe. So, look, is Brexit important? Of course Brexit is important. It's particularly important for the U.K. I'd vote to leave in a heartbeat if I were over there and I were voting.
You know, that's just me. I think that the politics of identity and sovereignty are clearly making a resurgence in the world. I think this is a— the Brexit vote is a symptom of that. And if I were a betting man, I'd say that they leave. But I don't think that it has that great of an economic impact. I think, you know, Look, I think you can have a risk-off moment in markets if they vote to leave, because the dollar will go up when they leave.
The pound will go down when they leave. That's a risk-off scenario. But for me, that's a moment to jump in and buy, as opposed to those other Humpty Dumpty moments I spoke of, you know, a Chinese devaluation, a French election, of the National Front candidate. Those are events where I want to sell on the risk-off and then keep selling.
Erik Townsend: Let's come back to the United States. Equities, as we're speaking on Wednesday morning, are flirting with all-time highs. And of course, it appears that the catalyst for that is bad news, that we had this dreadful payrolls report. So I particularly have been looking forward to asking you this question because you view economics through the lens of game theory. And what I see here is just nobody's talking about the fact that we've completely inverted the price signal. You know, the S&P 500 used to be a leading— or still is a leading economic indicator. But what we see now is bad is the new good.
You know, it seems to me if the sun were to rise in the west tomorrow, that would be big news. That would make the news, right?
Ben Hunt: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: But we've completely inverted the price signal and nobody's talking about What does this mean and what are the knock-on effects of it?
Ben Hunt: Well, the knock-on effects is that we continue to gravitate higher. Look, you're right that the S&P used to be a leading indicator of what was going on in the actual economy. Why? Because stocks were in fact fractional ownership shares of real companies where the earnings, GAAP or otherwise, the The cash flows, that was all then reflected in stock prices. But, you know, as you're alluding to, and again, as you started off the start of this conversation, you know, that hasn't been the case for— well, it's remarkable how the correlation, how now the S&P is actually a following indicator, again, of monetary policy as reflected in the dollar.
That's been the case really for the past 30 years. Well, 5 years. I mean, obviously, these events started in March of '09 with the first imposition of QE by the Fed. And as you know, I've got some charts on this that I like to show in some of my blog posts and the like.
But if you look at the 9 years before March of '09, so from 2000 to March of '09, what we would call a quality factor, and you can, you know, Deutsche Bank and some other guys do indices of these different factors, right? And the quality factor, which is exactly what you would think it means, right? These are companies, these are large-cap companies that have a high return on equity, high return on invested capital, have positive accruals from accounting perspective.
If you had just invested in those companies and you insured And shorted the companies that, that had the worst on this score, i.e., you're market neutral, right? So you're, you're purely market neutral. You just want to be long quality and short crap, right? That index for the 9 years, March of 2000 to March of 2009, was up 70-something percent. What was S&P? It was down 50%. Since March of '09, So the S&P 500 has tripled.
That quality index, flat. It's up about 9% over the intervening, you know, 7 years now.
That's what happens when the banks, the central banks, insert themselves into markets. And today it's, you know, every, every month, every year I wake up and say, well, we can't possibly become more correlated more linked to, more driven by monetary policy. And every month and every year, yes, we are. So you're exactly right that, that in a sense, the sun is now rising in the west and setting in the east. And in the sense that you were correct in is that the stocks, equity prices are no longer a leading indicator of what's happening in the real economy. They're no longer a reflection of what happens in the real economy at all.
They are purely a lagging indicator, a reflection of monetary policy. And that's the prison we're in right now.
Erik Townsend: And with respect to monetary policy, I mean, this is just one payroll report, and obviously the implication is that we're not going to get a rate hike in June. But, you know, supposedly Janet Yellen's story is that we're still in a rate normalization process, even if the hike doesn't happen this month, maybe it'll happen next month. But the time between hikes has already exceeded any past precedent in terms of how long they wait between hikes when there is a true rate hiking cycle in play. So do you see this as we're on the verge of a policy U-turn that's headed back towards negative rates and more QE, or is this just a brief pause as Janet says it is?
Ben Hunt: So, look, this gets back to that first question you were asking about how do you predict the dollar, where the dollar's going to go up or down. And I wish we were back in those happy days when I could look at U.S. industrial production, I could look at U.S. jobs, I could look at U.S.-only indicators and tell you which way is the dollar going, because I could then do the same thing about interest rates as well. And that's how we all grew up. We all grew up in markets that, okay, if you just focus on the U.S., you can figure out what U.S. policy's gonna be.
But that's not the world we're in anymore, whether you're talking about the dollar, which is, again, that reflection of monetary policy, or you're talking about monetary policy itself.
So, in that March speech that Janet Yellen gave, where she essentially turned the barge entirely around and said, oh, you know, we were talking in December about 4 rate hikes, And Stanley Fischer was talking about doing 4 rate hikes. And maybe we won't hike at all here in 2016. That was the big dovish moment, right, in March.
In that speech, she mentioned China and the dollar more frequently than she had mentioned China and the dollar in every other speech she's given put together. And that's what's changed. I think that the Fed The Fed has slowly, belatedly come to realize that it's not just what's happening in the U.S.
I'm sorry, but— and look, I wish it were. I wish it were just what was happening in the U.S., but it's not. It is that strategic interaction between the U.S. and particularly China, also Europe, also Japan. So, when you look at the rest of the world and you see how just— it's just obliteration out there. There in terms of inflation, in terms of growth.
I mean, for God's sake, the German 10-year Bund is, what, at 2 basis points today? I mean, it's— we are truly in a world where, even though I think the Fed really does want to normalize, they want to— look, they're just people, right? And they're like people like you and me. I would love to go back to normal times where fundamentals mattered and where the Fed could just stay the heck out of the way.
But we're not.
And so long as the rest of the world is in negative rates and getting more negative, so long as the rest of the world is declining from an economic growth perspective, so long as inflation expectations are declining, so long as— and this is the most important thing to me— global trade is shrinking, there's no way the Fed can raise rates.
Or if they do, it'll be like December and you have major freakout moments and they have to reverse themselves. That is unfortunately the world we're in today.
Erik Townsend: And whether or not we actually get to negative rates in the United States, as you said, we've already got them around the world. I just saw this week Toyota issued a corporate bond at 1/10 of 1 basis point.
Ben Hunt: Hey, let's— let me be clear. Negative rates are here in the U.S. And here's what I mean by that. In money market funds, money market funds, and this is driven both by global rates, but also by new regulations that have been passed here in the United States governing money market funds. So, I'm aware of 2 large money market fund complexes that As of April 2017, will be no longer offering positive rate of interest on their money market funds.
The fact is, is that for money market funds, because there's a cost of maintaining these funds, they've been giving essentially refunds, a rebate, on their safest money market funds. Market accounts, which are the ones that are only in short-term government paper. You can get a few more basis points if you're prepared to go into munis, if you're prepared to go into commercial paper, like the Toyota— the short-term paper, not the long-term bond that you're referring to.
But because of these regulations, most money market complexes are going to be Eliminating those funds that can actually pay, you know, 20, 30 basis points in favor of only offering the most conservative, you know, US government, other sovereign government short-term paper. That is obviously at zero or close to zero, and they are no longer going to be offering the rebate.
So, starting Starting in April of 2017, you've got a money market fund, you're going to open up that statement, and there's a big— let me assure you, there's a big difference between zero or a few basis points of positive interest and seeing that you are now paying for the privilege of keeping your money in a money market fund.
So, that's coming soon to a money market fund in the U.S.
Erik Townsend: I'd like to look at this a little deeper in terms of game theory, because what astonishes me is nobody is talking about the risk of a run on the bank coming from, you know, as soon as we get substantially negative returns, there's an incentive to just hoard cash, put it in a safe deposit box.
Ben Hunt: For sure.
Erik Townsend: And the whole fractional reserve banking system can't tolerate a massive run on the bank and everybody hoarding cash. So, short of outright banning cash, how can this
Ben Hunt: Well, you say banning cash. I mean, that's not— that is how it works. So, let me be clear what I mean. So, an acquaintance of mine, he's for one of the big Swiss banks, he runs their retail branches. You know, the bank starts with— the name of it, you know, starts with a U and ends with an S.
And he was talking about the branches and the vaults and the safe deposit boxes. Well, they've totally run out of safe deposit box space in Switzerland, because, obviously, people are using their safe deposit boxes to take money at Swiss francs and just put them in the safe deposit box.
They have a special holder for the notes. They're out, of course, of those holders, but the real problem is That the holder, the currency holder, doesn't really fit. You know, in Europe, many European countries, the size of the— the greater the denomination, the larger physically the note is. So the largest denomination Swiss franc note does not fit well inside the currency holder they have for the safe deposit boxes. So what they're doing now is they roll them up, roll the highest denomination bills up, put a rubber band around it, and he said, you know, it's like, We're drug dealers, right? I mean, this is how we're storing our money now, exactly to your point.
So, so, so what, what's the reaction to this? Well, I mean, it'll come soon, I'm sure, in Switzerland, but, but in, in the EU, which of course is the, you know, much larger issue here around negative rates, yeah, they're going to get rid of the, of the €500 note.
They're going to get rid of it. Uh, I would, I would be I'm not surprised in the least if the US gets rid of the $100 bill. And the rationale for this is going to be, well, well, these are the notes that are used for money laundering. You don't want to be supporting terrorists, do you? Because, you know, if you've got $100 bills, you're clearly, you know, you're with the bad guys here. You're supporting terrorism. That's why we need to get rid of these notes.
And it's just, you know, it's just a crock, right? They want to get rid of the higher denomination notes because it makes it that much more difficult to take cash out and to store the cash. And it forces you to keep your money in the system, forcing you to accept the negative interest rates. And listen, that's, like I say, it's already here in the rest of the world, and it's coming soon to a money market fund near you.
Erik Townsend: Just the notion. The notion that central banks need to eliminate high-denomination banknotes in order to make sure that a lot of money doesn't fit into the available vaults is really—
Ben Hunt: Crazy, right?
Erik Townsend: An amazing thing. That obviously leads us to the topic of precious metals, because if you start to lose faith in the system, that's usually the most obvious place to go. Gold has— was really— the gold chart was looking awful until we got this news. It bounced immediately to the 50-day moving average and is now today as we're talking broken well above that. Do you think that the, the bottom is in now for gold and it's all higher from here, or do you think as we get back to at least a narrative about rate normalization that we're still going to see some weakness in the yellow metal?
Ben Hunt: Look, I, I think that what gold is is an insurance policy. It's an insurance policy against central bank error. And my view is that particularly when interest rates are zero or negative, particularly when the price of gold is where it is today, it's a— and what it could be with a significant central bank error.
I think it's a phenomenally cheap insurance policy. But it's like any other insurance policy, right? It's, it's even if you're not paying for it, right, there's an opportunity cost. You're, you, you are buying gold as a As opposed to putting your capital somewhere else, somewhere that might have actual cash flow dynamics and actual production. So, you know, when I think of how to protect myself, you know, and I think about my investments, what I'm looking for is something close to me, something that's out of the casino of public markets that— because nothing is going to be perfectly insulated. Isolated from the monetary policy casino that we have going on.
But you can get more— as much distance as you can put between you and that, the better.
And typically, that means private activities, private businesses. And it means insurance policies like gold. So, look, again, I think it's a phenomenally inexpensive insurance policy, but that's the way to think of it. It's not, it's not a currency. It's not a store of value. It's an insurance policy. And, and I think it's a cheap one at that.
Erik Townsend: Moving on to the rest of the commodity complex, we're getting some mixed signals. A lot of people have been saying, okay, look at how impressively oil is bouncing. So clearly the commodity bear market is over. Well, if the commodity bear market is over, Dr. Copper didn't get the memo, at least not in the last few days. Where do you see commodities in general going from here?
Ben Hunt: Well, so, so look, so, so the firm I work for, Salient, we're, you know, got a big Houston base. We've got a— sure, we've got $5 billion in, you know, MLP investments. So this is something we spend a lot of time thinking about.
And I will tell you that, again, it gets back to that very first question you asked. You tell me where the dollars go And I'll tell you what the commodities are doing. Oil is a little bit different, but only a little bit different than, as you said, copper, because oil has this other narrative, the narrative of supply and demand, that also impacts its price action.
You know, as the dollar appreciates, through February of this year, copper, industrial metals went down. With the weakening of the dollar from, call it, mid-February, February 22nd, I think it was, to that jobs report, or, you know, actually the dollar started to strengthen again a little bit more When, you know, we got that renewed thinking that, oh, well, maybe they'll hike rates in June.
You know, you got the dollar then strengthening again, and so most commodities went down again. Oil's been flattish, right? Maybe nominally higher, because again, that supply and demand narrative has switched around 180 degrees.
But as far as what happens with commodities going forward, look, if we're able to preserve this status quo environment where Yellen and the Fed jawbone about wanting to raise rates, but really don't, where we're able to keep the political genie in the bottle, bad genie in the bottle, by not having a trade war sparked from the US, not having A euro-destroying election in France or Germany in 2017.
Yeah, the dollar gets— maybe gets a little weaker because U.S. data is getting a little weaker. The dollar gets weaker, that is all good. It's all good for risk assets. It's all good for commodities. It's all good for China. The dollar gets weaker, even if it's because we've got some weaker U.S. data, that's good for risk assets.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Ben Hunt: My concern is actually that the U.S. data gets better. My concern is that actually, from a political perspective, the Fed does hike. My concern is that as the dollar goes up, commodities go down, and China is forced to devalue. And that, my friend, like I say, that's the atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, not just for commodities but all risk assets.
Erik Townsend: And that's self-reinforcing for the dollar because of And of course, if China devalues, the dollar goes right on up.
Ben Hunt: That's exactly right. It's a— it is a non-equilibrium situation, as we'd say in economics.
Erik Townsend: And we covered China already. What do you make of this whole Japan situation? Of course, Kyle Bass has been very outspoken in saying he thinks it's all about to come crashing down. How do you see the BOJ?
Ben Hunt: Yeah, I know Kyle, and, you know, you know, talked to him I'm thinking about his China thesis now as well. By the way, I disagree with Kyle on his China thesis. I think that China domestically is likely to come out of this just fine. You know, you end up in China with zombie banks with a devaluation, but very similar to the Japanese banks of the 1990s, and that's not good, but China has the ability, much more than Japan did then or does today to grow their way out of that zombiness in their banking system.
So, on Japan specifically, look, I agree with everyone who points to this demographic time bomb in Japan, but the thing about demographic time bombs is that the timeframe you're talking about is decades. And there's, there's, there's not really, I think, an investable catalyst around, uh, around demographics. That, that's always been my issue with investment themes or an investment thesis based on demographics. You know, what's the catalyst, right? What's the event that says, aha, this is an untenable situation or something has to be done or et cetera, et cetera.
You don't get it in markets around demographics. And also, you rarely get it in politics. You rarely get that kind of political catalyst around a purely demographic issue, like a change in the composition of the electorate or the change in the aging of the population or the like.
So I understand the arguments that about the death of Japan, literally the death of Japan. Sorry, I shouldn't laugh, but that it is a literal statement when people are making this argument. I just don't know how to invest on that, right? Because the, like I say, these demographic arguments, it's just very hard to find a catalyst.
Erik Townsend: Speaking of politics, the front-running presidential candidates have very different views. Mr. Trump seems to want to start a cultural war with Mexico. Mrs. Clinton has some, I think, fairly aggressive ideas that maybe lead to more American hegemony. The markets tend to hate uncertainty, and we really have no idea where we're headed. How do you see the economic consequences of the potential different presidential election outcomes?
Ben Hunt: Well, look, the— for me, the most important consequences of this election, and this gets back to the What I was describing as the observation about the world that I find most troubling is that global trade, that global trade pie is now shrinking. That hasn't happened in a long time. And what I mean is that since Q3 of 2014, not coincidentally, when you started to get competition in monetary policies, when Europe, Draghi, Went to double down on QE in June of 2014, and Janet Yellen, that was her moment of saying, we're now on a tightening course.
It's not an accident that that's when the dollar started to go straight up. It's not an accident that that's when global trade started to shrink. And my big concern is that no matter who's elected here in the U.S. in November, that tightening, that shrinking, is going to accelerate. I think it accelerates more with a Trump in office, right? I mean, as he says, who's afraid of a little trade war? Well, I am.
I am. You know, it's— the unfortunate thing is that it's such a powerful electoral issue when a majority of voters in the United States States think that free trade is a bad thing, right?
I don't know what you do with that, except if you're on either party's standard bearer, you run with it, and you campaign on that basis, and then you actually do something about it. And that, to me, is— that is a catalyst, because when you have a declining trade pie, what happens is that the financial institutions that are levered to global trade— and that's mostly Asian banks, and that's certainly mostly European banks— they, they are revealed as being as insolvent as they actually are. And that's a bad thing.
Erik Townsend: Finally, about 3 years ago now, you wrote a piece called The Epsilon Theory Manifesto, which—
Ben Hunt: Oh yeah, my start. Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Got a lot of attention, and it's actually morphed now into the Epsilon Theory blog at the Salient Partners website. Tell us about it. What's it about? What information is available there? We're going to send a link to that to our registered users through our Research Roundup email.
Ben Hunt: Oh, well, thanks very much for that. Look, I was a hedge fund manager here in Connecticut for a lot of years, and We did well, and I was just looking at that like, I want to go back to my roots, which are really more writing and being an academic, but I wanted to stay in the business.
Salient is an asset manager, I'd say, based in Houston, San Francisco. They'd been investors in my hedge fund. I joined them 2 years ago as their Chief Risk Officer, and it gave me that perch, that ability to continue to write about risk and reward in markets today. So as you say, I'd started about really 3 years ago, almost to the day.
And it was really just writing to myself and, you know, a few colleagues and clients, about 200. And I tell you, it's just, it's just trying to speak honestly, to call things by their proper names, from
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Ben Hunt: Someone who's actually managed money and is in the business of this, but not to present it with the pablum that you get from the sell side and the, you know, people trying to pitch their own fund. I'm not pitching a fund.
It really is my observations about this golden age, now silver age, of the central banker and, you know, how dangerous And how difficult it is to be an investment survivor in it. So we've got about, oh, about 100,000 email subscribers now. So it's been very gratifying that it does seem to have struck a chord.
So absolutely, if anybody's interested in looking at it, there are a lot of pieces. It's all free, of course, on the website. You can find it at Salient Partners or at Epsilon Theory.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Ben Hunt: And, you know, it really is trying to look at the world through those lenses of game theory and history, because I think that's the necessary lens to see the world today, because we haven't been in this sort of policy-driven market since the 1930s. So our traditional measuring sticks and mileposts, they just don't— I just don't think they work as well.
Erik Townsend: Well, and I certainly think that of the free content that's available on the internet, Epsilon Theory definitely has a reputation for being some of the highest quality content that is out there. So, Ben, I cannot thank you—
Ben Hunt: Thank you a lot. You're very welcome, and the compliment is well deserved.
Erik Townsend: I can't thank you enough for joining us on the program. Thanks so much. Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Nathan Egger back with you. Normally, as co-host, I get to listen to our feature interview before we tape the final segment of the show so that I can ask Erik questions about what was discussed with our featured guest. But due to my tight travel schedule this week, I was unable to do so.
Thankfully, however, as we announced last week, Aaron Chan has joined forces with us as captain of the MacroVoices research team. So now I get to delegate. Aaron, what did you think of Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt? And what questions did it bring to mind? The floor is all yours.
Aaron Chan: Well, Nathan, thanks. You missed a good one, but I'm happy to take the steering wheel for a little bit. So, Erik, I thought that was a fascinating interview, and you guys really stamped your passports in terms of geographic coverage. So right off the bat, and this may be for our listeners who may not be as familiar with Dr. Hunt's work, what is game theory, and why are game theoretical concepts something investors need to think about when considering the macro environment?
Erik Townsend: Well, people may remember the movie A Beautiful Mind, which was actually about the guy who did
Aaron Chan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And he did a lot of pioneering work on game theory. But essentially, if you look at how competing parties that are trying to outsmart each other, whether it's in a poker game, or in markets, or what have you, what are the ways that they do that? A lot of the concepts around that are very vague, or tend to be very vague in the way that they were thought of before the development of game theory, which is basically applying mathematical discipline to building mathematical models to describe how different actors that are expected to act on their own behalf may try to manipulate situations and events in order to have the outcome that they want.
So it is the mathematical study of these interactions, and what Dr. Hunt does is apply that mathematical study to analyzing markets and trying to figure out how different players are going to affect each other and what the reflexive relationships are between them. between the actions of different entities.
Aaron Chan: That makes sense. Now, near the end of the interview, Dr. Hunt noted that his writing represents observations about the gold or silver age of the central banker. Now, in a recent interview, and along a similar vein to the market-neutral strategy he described where you are long quality and short garbage, he spoke about a surprisingly effective Fed-based strategy. And so the strategy It involved buying an MLP, which is a master limited partnership index, on Fed days versus buying on any other day. And the Fed strategy actually outperformed the other strategy by nearly 70%.
So with Draghi recently coming out insinuating that QE might not be working, and Japan's continued lack of success with negative interest rates, might we be transitioning to a bronze or even a stone age of central bankers?
Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think that we are yet. Yet, my expectation, you know, what people do when they're desperate, let's take the example of young adults that get themselves overextended on credit cards, and they know that the situation is not going to resolve itself. They're going to eventually end up in bankruptcy. Human nature is people tend to just keep reaching, trying to hope and pray and somehow cross their fingers and hope somehow if they can just get one more credit card and take cash advances on it in order to pay the minimum payments on the other credit cards, they won't get foreclosed on or something.
And it never works out. But people tend to not give up until something comes crashing down in the night. So I do think that we are headed towards a major transformation where the whole world wakes up and says, this whole business of central bankers trying to control the economy by essentially price-fixing the cost of money was a really dumb idea and it didn't work. But I don't think we get to that point until Until the house of cards that they've built on printed money comes crashing down. When does it come crashing down? When they can't do it anymore. And I think inflation is likely to be the trigger for that.
So when inflation hits the stage, according to Julian Brigden, could happen this year. I think that's probably— I would have guessed it would take longer than that, but we'll see. That's the point where I think you see the transformation to a realization of, oh, all that we did with all of this central banks trying to centrally plan the economy was to make the next crash dramatically Worse than the last crash. It doesn't come until their hand is forced, though. I think what you're describing is maybe somebody would wake up and recognize that what they're doing is stupid. I don't see them doing that. I think it's not until their hand is forced. Hmm.
Aaron Chan: Well, Dr. Hunt also made numerous references to the Depressionary 1930s and drew interesting parallels to our present-day scenario. For me, the Great Boom and Panic of the 1930s wasn't taught in any of my business or finance classes in undergrad. So I was curious, when Dr. Hunt talks about the world swimming in debt and draws similarities between early 20th century Germany and present-day China, what other similarities do you see, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm going to focus actually on the dissimilarity, which is, I think, the most important one. There are huge similarities between the 1930s Great Depression era and what we've had since 2008. The difference is that on a gold standard, you didn't have the ability for the Fed to just print money. So we don't now have the discipline of a gold standard. If you look at what's happened since 2008, it really is the same thing as the '30s. And what the proponents of money printing, quantitative easing, and central bank management of the economy would say is, look how beautifully it's working. We have not had the repeat of the Great Depression, and that's because we got off of the gold standard, which was a bad idea according to them, not to me.
And that means that now central banks have the tools that they need to be able to print money in order to deal with these problems, and everything is just hunky-dory.
So far, those people are being proven right in the short term. My contention is, in the long term, there's no free lunch. This house of cards that's been built on printed money is going to come crashing down, and when it comes crashing down, it's going to be considerably worse than 2008.
But the thing is, that doesn't have to happen until inflation hits the stage. Until then, the Fed can get away with papering over our problems, and not just the Fed, but other central bankers can get away with papering over all of our problems and mistakes with freshly printed money.
They're getting away with that because of the deflationary backdrop. If you look at your history, go back to the Weimar hyperinflation. It started with a deflationary backdrop, allowing Rudi von Havenstein to do what he did. Right. To print way too much money. He got carried away, he got complacent, and eventually you had the Weimar hyperinflation. I don't think we'd have a US dollar hyperinflation, but we could see easily sustained periods of 20% inflation per year for 10 years or something in order to inflate away the mess that's been made, and we could have an inflationary depression. None of that has to start until inflation hits the stage, and until then, I think we'll have the continuing false perception that all of this is working. And it's not until inflation hits the stage that it starts to fall apart.
Aaron Chan: So let's stay with the 1930s for a second. Separately, I've heard Dr. Hunt talk about the parallels between Deutsche Bank and Creditanstalt, which was a German bank that went bankrupt in 1931 due to an overexposure to merchant loans and plummeting global trade, which Dr. Hunt brought up in the So interestingly, Deutsche Bank is actually an heir to Creditanstalt. And given that Deutsche Bank's CDS spreads are now well above 500 basis points, should investors be paying attention to Deutsche Bank, or maybe some second-order entities that may spread contagion into an already precarious situation in the European Union?
Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that investors should be watching. You know, the problem that we have here, as Steve Keen said so eloquently when we interviewed David Hume, is too much private debt. We have too much debt on every level, public and private. What we need to all be watching for is when does that actually start to cause a problem? When does it start to fall apart? Widening credit default swap spreads on Deutsche Bank are a perfect early sign. It's certainly not the only one.
Now, as far as the analog to the 1930s, again, the difference is because we're not on a gold standard and central banks can do things, like print money out of thin air in order to buy toxic debt from financial institutions at artificially high prices in order to bail those institutions out for the sake of protecting the overall system. Those tools were not available under the discipline of a gold standard. A lot of people would say that was a good thing. The current thinking in central banking is that it was a bad thing and it's good that they have these tools available. The question is, will people like me be proven right eventually that these tools were just exacerbating the problem and making the next crash worse than the last one? Or will they be proven right that, yeah, you really can have something for nothing, print money out of thin air and have no adverse long-term consequence?
You know which way I'm thinking, but obviously that is a question that is yet to be resolved.
Aaron Chan: Yeah. And it could be, as Dr. Hunt said, with demographics in Japan, it could be a long time and the timeframe just doesn't make sense for investors. So, Erik, last question. Dr. Hunt talked about money market funds no longer offering positive interest rates, and that really sounds pretty concerning.
We all know investors are clawing for yield, and we also know this low-yield environment has resulted in certain municipal credits like Puerto Rico raising more funds than is warranted. So taking into account the pension crises in New Jersey and Illinois, which Andrew Levine, a fellow listener, wrote about a couple weeks ago, do you think money market funds going negative Do you think the negative will push investors to ignore the putrid fundamentals and to bid up bad muni credit?
Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. And I think that what we'll continue to see is this reach for yield, both on a retail and an institutional level, where people, you know, people used to be satisfied with a so-called 5% risk-free yield. When there was no more risk-free yield at 5%, they had to meet their 5%.
So they took whatever they could get in order to get the 5%. Now it's very hard even in junk bonds, which a lot of institutions are not able to hold in order to get those yields. And yes, the reach for yield will continue and eventually it will exacerbate the magnitude of the crash.
Nathan Egger: And Aaron, you also just took over curating our free Research Roundup email, which has already been sent to registered users at MacroVoices.com. Would you please mind giving us a quick rundown of what's in this week's roundup before we close?
Aaron Chan: For sure. We've got a 7-course meal lined up for our registered users. And frankly, there's a lot of solid content, but we don't have the time to cover it all. But this week we're bringing you a 106-page macro deck from David Rosenberg, which offers sweeping coverage of the monetary mess we're in. We've also got a great video interview between Dr. Benn Steil, the Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Keith McCullough of Hedgeye, where they discuss internal Fed politics. Finally, Danielle DiMartino Booth's article on Venezuela's socialist tire provided some much-needed historical context to what's happening there.
Again, I look forward to your feedback and want to remind our subscribers that they can submit their own content for inclusion in the Research Roundup newsletter by emailing us at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter.
Nathan Egger: Thanks again for all your help, Aaron. You've made my life a heck of a lot easier this week while I'm traveling. We'd like to thank all you listeners again for tuning in, and we encourage you to subscribe to MacroVoices While you're there, rating and reviewing us helps us expand our audience in a massive way. If you have colleagues, friends, or families who find value in the work that we do at MacroVoices, please let them know about us. We're on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Erik has a personal handle @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. You can also find Aaron on Twitter That's @_Aaroanchan_.
Erik Townsend: @Aaroanchan_.
Nathan Egger: If you don't do Twitter, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. We'll be back with you again next week when economist John Llewellyn of Llewellyn Consulting will be joining us to discuss in greater depth the upcoming Brexit referendum. For Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. See you next time.
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Art Berman — Petroleum geologist (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 17 was recorded on June 2nd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Petroleum geologist Art Berman will be joining us as today's special guest. Art and I will review the analysis of oil market fundamentals that we presented back in MacroVoices Episode 3 back in February, as well as the predictions we made about supply, demand, demand, inventory stocks, and price. We'll compare the picture as it stood then to how it looks today and get Art's take on where the story is headed from here. We also have a special second guest to introduce you to at the end of the program.
Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Erik, we saw the S&P break through 2,100 again this week, and we closed this Thursday that we are recording at 2,105. Is everything as completely awesome as it seems here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think it's as awesome as it seems. I definitely still think the smartest guys in the room are George George Soros and Carl Icahn and Stan Druckenmiller, and really the small chorus of voices that have been saying this market is just way overdone and the Fed is taking the punch bowl away, albeit slowly.
This week, Andy Xie joined the chorus. Andy was for many years Morgan Stanley's chief economist in Asia. If there is a really smart guy who understands the feedback loops and unintended consequences of a strengthening U.S. dollar in Emerging markets. Andy is the guy, and he has joined in this week in saying the global economy is not looking good and does not justify current asset prices. So what gives? How come we're seeing all this strength? I think it's probably 2 things: collapsing rate hike expectations. It seems like nobody thinks the Fed is going to hike rates at next week's FOMC meeting. I'm not really sure why they think that. I think that there is room for that. One analysis that I saw this week actually said That Fed fund futures are implying as low as a 4% possibility of a rate hike. I think the number is higher than 4%, folks. I don't know that it's 50%, but I would have guessed 30%.
The other one probably is the resumption of the U.S. dollar rally. Just on a technical basis, the dollar chart looks pretty strong. It seems like maybe the bottom is in. And as more international investors are looking at that, and as we continue to see difficulty in Europe, I think we're seeing a lot of capital flows into the dollar and into the U.S. stock market. That's boosting asset prices. So, for longs, I would say, in my opinion, now is not a bad time to be taking profits and reducing equity exposure, but it's hard to justify going short here when I can't reconcile the tape action. It doesn't really make sense to me. If we have no hike next week, as everybody's expecting, is it already cooked in and we just see the market, you know, buy the rumor, sell the news event, or is that going to spark another rally to all-time highs? I don't know. The market is not making sense to me, and as the old saying goes, the market can stay irrational longer than I can stay solvent.
And so I'm just on the sidelines right now.
Nathan Egger: We're going to save the bulk of the crude oil conversation this week for our feature interview with petroleum geologist Art Berman. But our listeners should know that this interview was recorded on Wednesday to accommodate Mr. Berman's travel schedule. So Erik and Art didn't have the benefit of knowing the outcome of either the EIA inventory report, which was delayed until Thursday this week due to a holiday, or the results of the OPEC meeting, which was also on Thursday. So, Erik, what do our listeners need to know in terms of the news that came out after the interview that was recorded with Art Berman on Wednesday?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the Niger Delta Avengers striking again in Nigeria and vowing to crush Nigerian production to zero, which is a threat they made again on Thursday. It's probably the biggest news to come out today. As far as the OPEC meeting, surprise, surprise, no production freeze. Oh boy. Why do people think this is news? I don't know, but it was a dollar down spike. On the non-news that there's no production freeze, which I think was made very clear by several ministers before the meeting. And it's something I just don't understand why the market doesn't see as clearly as I think it is. What's going on here is Saudi Arabia has no intention of agreeing to a production freeze, but they see that they can make their archrival Iran look bad by saying, oh look, we were willing to freeze, but oh, Iran doesn't want to play ball. And obviously Iran's not going to agree to a freeze when they're just ramping up to get to their former production now that sanctions have been lifted.
So I think this is all political theater. I don't know why anybody takes it seriously. That was a dollar down spike. Then when the EIA came out, delayed until 11 o'clock today— it's usually 10:30 on Wednesdays, it was 11 o'clock on Thursday today— a 1.4 million barrel national drawdown was smaller than analyst expectations. The consensus was about a 2.5 million barrel draw, although the Cushing, Oklahoma drawdown of 700,000 barrels was a little bit bigger than expected.
Doesn't really surprise me. Remember that the Canadian wildfires are most directly affecting that Cushing number because that's where the Alberta oil goes is into Cushing, Oklahoma. These are very small drawdowns for this time of year, and I know that seems at odds with what we were saying a month ago when we were talking about how any build on inventory was a big deal. Now we're seeing drawdowns. Well, it just comes with the season. How do you interpret this information when it is so seasonal? The answer is something. called a comparative inventory chart. If you've never seen one of those, we sent you one in your email if you are a registered user here at MacroVoices.com. And Art Berman will be going into all kinds of detail to explain what comparative inventory is and how it works when we get into today's feature interview.
Nathan Egger: And we know, and those listeners who have been paying attention will know, that you're long-term bullish on precious metals, but you've also been cautioning for weeks that the party could be over in the short term for gold as the US dollar rally appears to be For now, back on track again. And when we recorded last week's show, we were looking at gold prices around $1,220. So, what's happened since then?
Erik Townsend: Well, we went and tested all the way down to $1,200, hit some round number support there at $1,200, bounced back up as high again, almost to $1,220. As we're speaking now, just after the close on Thursday, we're looking at $1,212. So, the question is, we're headed down from here. Down how far? Is $1,200 going to hold? There's a round number support level there. I don't think it will. The next logical target to look for after that would be the 200-day moving average, which on the futures chart is about 1168 right now. So I think that we're probably going to head down, and the Fed meeting next week will probably be where we find our direction. If there is a rate hike, I think it would be a sudden and immediate downhill move for gold. If there is no rate hike, that might mark the bottom, and we might see a. reversal here. Are we at the end of a cycle where we really have begun a bull cycle and maybe this is the dip that you should be buying?
Maybe. I'd like to see what happens at the FOMC meeting before I make any final decision on that.
Nathan Egger: And anything new to say about the dollar this week, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, just that the tape action continues to be reasonably strong. We did get a little bit of a pullback this week, but still well within, you know, an ongoing uptrend. The uptrend isn't quite as vigorous as it was a couple of weeks ago, but to me, the The chart still looks strong, and I think we are moving towards a higher dollar. All right.
Nathan Egger: Well, thanks for bringing us up to speed on the market. This week's featured guest is petroleum geologist Art Berman, who was also our featured guest way back in MacroVoices episode 3, which we aired in February. Erik and Art will review the predictions they made back in February and assess the crude oil fundamentals landscape as it exists today.
Erik Townsend: And again, folks, we taped this interview on Wednesday. So Art sent us some fantastic relative inventory charts. that have already been emailed to registered users at MacroVoices.com.
Nathan Egger: And we're still receiving emails from people asking us to register them, and I can't emphasize enough how much I can't do this for you, as much as I'd love to. If you haven't registered yourself yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button on the top right side of the homepage, then click the Register for Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page that you will see.
Again, it's always free, and we promise never to spam you or sell your email address to anyone. Once you're registered and logged in, you can click the Research Library function on the menu bar, then choose Documents, then choose Guest Publications. From there, you can download a PDF file containing Mr. Berman's charts.
So we're going to get to Erik's interview with Art Berman. That's coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is petroleum geologist Art Berman. Art, thanks so much for coming back and joining us on the program.
Art Berman: Oh, it's a pleasure to be here again, Erik.
Erik Townsend: When we recorded episode 3 of MacroVoices back in February, we made a number of predictions that led me to a very bearish outlook on Crude oil. At that time, prices were around $30, and we both thought that they were headed lower. So I definitely want to start by acknowledging I was dead wrong on the price call and definitely lost money as a result. And in this business, you can't get away with saying, I got the analysis right, but I lost money anyway. When you lose money, you were wrong, bottom line. But holy cow, Art, I went back and listened very carefully to episode 3, and as much as the price has done the exact opposite of what we expected it to do, almost all of the predictions that we made about supply and demand and inventory and so forth were actually spot on. So, what I'd like to do in this interview is review what we said in episode 3 and compare what the situation looked like then to how it looks now.
So, we both agreed at that time in February that Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait were working together in this market share strategy. And we thought that their goals were probably to sabotage the source of U.S. shale oil funding. In other words, damage the junk bond market's ability to fund another shale revolution, and also to coerce at least Russia and possibly others into joining them in joint production cuts. We thought that their strategy was essentially to keep on producing as much as possible, force the price down until other countries had no choice but to join in with the OPEC countries in price cuts. But a whole lot has changed since then.
Saudi Arabia allowed the price to rise dramatically in advance of that Doha production freeze meeting. Saudi Arabia fired the former oil minister, Mr. Al-Naimi, who was presumably the architect of that market share strategy. At the time that that happened, a lot of analysts thought that was bearish, that Mohammed bin Salman, the prince who fired Al-Naimi, probably was about to turn up the dial on production in order to force prices lower, as if the reason for firing him perhaps was that the prices had risen too much. But there hasn't really been any follow-through on those threats. And now this week, the United Arab Emirates is starting to talk up $60 oil. So that's not at all consistent with them still having the goals that we presumed at the time. So what does all this mean? Did Saudi Arabia change its strategy, or what's going on here?
Art Berman: That's a great question, and those are fantastic observations. Thanks, Erik. And the simple answer is I don't know, and I don't think we ever really know. Trying to figure out the inscrutable minds behind whatever Saudi Arabia is doing, I think, is— oh, it's a fun game to play, but it's probably not one that we can win, certainly not that I can win.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: I think at this point is that I really didn't see that the firing of al-Naimi represented a change in strategy. And, of course, that did come after our February discussion. Why did they decide to unceremoniously get rid of him? Beats me. But at the time, I really didn't think it meant a big change in their strategy, except insofar as that one meeting in Doha.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: The meeting where they were supposed to agree on a production freeze that never really made much sense to anybody, but apparently Al-Naimi had put a lot of his own personal capital into that agreement, and Mohammed bin Salman just didn't want to do it. And at the time, prices were in the low $40s, going towards $45.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: And why do anything if prices are in the direction that you want them to go in?
I mean, that's the way I read it. So, I can't tell you why they fired al-Naimi, but I think the truth and the reality is, is that Saudi Arabia is hurting financially, and they're not hurting as much as some people would like to think they are. They're not desperate, but they can use the revenue from higher prices. And I don't think there's any way to, you know, to dispute that. At the same time, I would say that their strategy, if we're correct in greatly restricting the flow of capital to the U.S. unconventional producers, I think that's working.
The way I read the U.S. situation, and I base this on people in the field who pretty much live in the field in places like South Texas, West Texas— I've been in both places in the last few weeks— they tell me, and I believe them, that there's no way that we're going to get back to drilling in the U.S. anytime soon.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: I don't think oil is going to come back anytime soon in a big way. There seems to be a lot of analysts who, I might add, have absolutely no experience working in the oil and gas business, that talk about, oh, well, once prices get above $50, we're going to go right back to drilling again.
I don't think that's a likely scenario. I think that the oilfield service companies have gotten rid of so many people, have stacked so many rigs. Rigs and other equipment, cannibalized existing rigs and equipment. I think it's going to be a long time, regardless of demand, before they're back on their feet again, ready to, ready to party on. Plus, I think that the, the clear evidence is, yes, there's still capital available and apparently flowing to the U.S. E&Ps, but it's not being used for drilling.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: It's being used to repair balance sheets. It's being used to, you know, to pay salaries and overhead costs. So I think the damage is done, and surely Saudi Arabia and everyone else who takes the time to notice understands that. So the question now is, well, what's next?
You know, having perhaps accomplished some of those goals, where do we go from here? The, you know, the price rise, as you said, Erik, from a fundamental standpoint, we got it, we nailed it. And as always, fundamentals, eventually the markets come into harmony with fundamentals, but they can take an awful lot of strange pathways to get there and even some excursions.
And my read on what's happened is that Fatih Birol, the chief economist at the International Energy Agency, showed up here in Houston during CERAWeek in late February and gave a very chilling talk about future supply with all the lack of investment that's gone on.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: In the last 2 years.
The workers' strike followed almost immediately after that, or a few weeks after that, kind of bringing everybody back to the reality of a world with no spare capacity, the result of OPEC producing like crazy for the last couple of years, among other things. And then a series of other events followed Including the wildfires in Canada, outages in Nigeria, concerns about Venezuela, none of which, by the way, affected supply.
But, you know, we're coming out of the stupor of the mindset that, oh my God, we're drowning in oil. And we're starting to think, well, we may have an oversupply, but— We're not going to run out. But it's precarious. And the other thing that's important to understand is there just hasn't been any real global economic bad news.
A lot of what was pushing prices down below $30 was all this terrible depression about what's happening in China and their currency devaluation and their inability to control their stock market.
Erik Townsend: China Yeah.
Art Berman: The Fed has retrenched. They've gone back to controlling their currency, and we haven't heard any bad news. And even this latest round of potential Greek problems that brought the market down last summer, in part, they fixed that real quickly. So, you know, there just seems to be, you know, a harmony of lack of bad economic news, more attention to outages, even though we've, we've kind of had them before, and just this overwhelming wish that we, you know, we're just really sick of low oil prices. The market wants to find every reason it can to push them higher. And you put all those together, plus interest rates— let's not forget interest rates— interest rates have pretty much been going down ever since prices started going up, and now And that's, that's another consistent relationship. And you mix it all up and you got the price rally that we're looking at now.
Erik Townsend: And of course, the US dollar rally pausing certainly did not help with respect to a bearish outlook on oil prices. But one thing we were very clear about is we both thought our bearish view on oil prices back in February was short-term. And we both agreed that in the second half of 2016, the market would rebalance itself. So the question becomes how How close are we to that happening? Because even though I think we did get a lot of those fundamental factors spot on, the fact is, it's not February anymore. It's June. And the second half starts next month. So, we were both extremely skeptical back in February of the 2.24 million barrel oversupply estimate that IEA had just released when we did that interview. We both thought it was going to be really lower than that. And of course, it was subsequently revised way lower.
But we also agreed that U.S. production needed to decline much more dramatically than it had at the time before the market would balance. So what's the update, Art, on U.S. production? Where is it now and where is it headed?
Art Berman: U.S. production declined 100,000 barrels a day roughly in, in April compared to March. Now, the EIA, the U.S. Department of Energy, they went back and completely revised all of, all of their numbers going back as far as, as, as a year, and essentially increased consumption, which is what they use as a proxy for demand.
And the result of that was
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Art Berman: And the other thing is, is that kind of as we, as we suspected, that those near months in the early part of 2016, the oversupply, at least from EIA's perspective, was significantly less than they had previously said. So I think in a way we were spot on in those observations as well. You know, how much stock do you want to put in these kind of revisions? I don't know.
I think it's normal to be skeptical about them. At the same time, where else are you going to go for data? I mean, you've got EIA and you've got IEA. IEA comes out with quarterly data, and so when we have the full picture for the second quarter, great, but, you know, we don't, and so EIA is what we have.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: Have to work with. So I think, I think the story is that the, the oversupply was to some extent— I won't say it was exaggerated, it was just overestimated a little bit. And, and we had so much momentum on the downside coming into the new year that, that, that kind of colored the sorts of wording that were used in IEA, EIA, reports and certainly the, the, you know, the, the press coverage of it. And now the mood has shifted. It's again mostly momentum, which is a nice way of saying sentiment.
But there are some, there are some, there are some reasons behind it. And, you know, I've stated a few of those, uh, which have to do mostly with world events. But, um, you know, let's talk about inventories, because that, that really is, is the story that I think is ultimately what is going to tell the, you know, where we go with price. And so—
Erik Townsend: Well, and that, that just blows my mind, Art, that inventories— when we spoke before, inventory was at 85%, and you were very emphatic in saying history teaches us when Cushing, Oklahoma inventory goes over 80%, prices get crushed. And there's a lot of data to back that assertion up. That was 85%.
We went all the way to 96.42% 2 weeks ago, and prices rose 90% at the same time. I mean, how how could that be possible? Number one, and number two, I think an even stronger indication besides outright price is the contango—the difference between the first and second month—and at that time, because everybody was worried about storage, we were seeing contracts closing at as much as a $2 spread, $2 discount. in the expiring contract to the next contract. But now that we're above 95% of operating capacity at Cushing, that first to second month spread is only 39 cents, which just doesn't make any sense to me.
Can you make any sense of this?
Art Berman: Well, no, I really can't, because you're 100% right that, that— all right, comparative inventory, that's what I look at. And in some way, I think that a lot of professional traders look at some version of that, comparing at least current inventory with a year ago. And there's no doubt that the— you can look at just the absolute inventories, that the spread between earlier in the year or the end of last year and And today, that, that, that, you know, that difference is narrowing. And when I say comparative inventories, I'm comparing this year, the current storage, with a moving average of the last 5 years. And so it is, it is declining, and, and that's, that's a positive thing.
And so going back to history, when we look again at the, you know, the price rally and April, May, June of 2015, there, you know, we had grotesque overhang of storage, but prices did go up to $60, and there was a very nice and pronounced fall in comparative inventory. Now, it didn't last, partly because people went back to drilling, but partly because I think the reality of how much we have in storage came home to, you know, to kind of haunt people. And they said, oh my God, what are we getting so excited about?
And I suspect that something similar to that is where we're heading today, that, you know, the market wants to push the price up. We are seeing comparative inventories falling, both U.S. and Gulf Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast is by far the largest single storage area. The problem is, is that Cushing was falling for a while and it's been rising for the last several weeks. So there's some mixed signals there. But the bottom line, just to cut through it, is all right, comparative inventory is falling. That's a good thing.
We usually see a price response to that, and we do. But will we wake up as we did in July of 2015 and say, well, that is a great thing, but we still got so much, so much storage, we're at such a high percentage of capacity, how's that going to work? And prices, prices slid.
I don't anticipate that we're gonna, you know, that we're gonna go back down that much. But people who think
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Art Berman: And those who think that prices just move in one direction really need a lesson in history, because they never do. As I've written, and I'll say it again, I think that we are— we're going to see a series of price cycles.
We're in one now. These cycles, for the last couple of years, have lasted, on average, about 150 days, which means that, you know, We're on the outside of this cycle, and I suspect that something is going to bring it back down. We haven't been able to, you know, we've seen resistance at $50. That seems to be kind of a, you know, kind of a top for this one, and I suspect it's going to go down. It's not going to go down as low as it had before, probably, barring some kind of, you know, terrible economic Economic world news or something like that, but it's going to go down before it goes back up again.
And then this storage thing, there's no way, in my way of looking at the world, that we're going to— that people that talk about getting to $70 or $80, not until we work off 100, 150 million barrels of U.S. storage.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: And we're not going to do that in anything less than something like a year. It's just not going to happen, short of, you know, if Venezuela shuts down all of its production, okay, you know, that'll be a different story. But in a relatively normal functioning world, which means you have periodic outages and all of that and periodic conflicts, it's going to take a It's gonna take a long time. It's gonna take 9, 12, I don't know, 16 months to work through it, assuming everything keeps moving in one direction.
Erik Townsend: Now, before we move away from comparative inventory, I just want to point out you sent us a PDF file which we've already emailed to all of our registered users at MacroVoices.com. Any listeners who are not registered can go and register and then find that PDF in our research library download area.
You did include a comparative inventory chart, actually a couple of them, in that handout. Could you just define comparative inventory? Comparison of what to what? And then what exactly is the chart telling us?
Art Berman: Okay, so, so the way this works is I take this week's storage number, whatever it is, and I compare it Compare it to a 4-week moving average of last year, 2015, and the 4 previous years. So you get a number that averages the 4 weeks prior to today in all of those past 5 years.
And what that does and why it's so powerful is because it normalizes out the kind of seasonal issues of more use, less use, refinery maintenance, you know, all kinds of things like that. Because all— everything I'm comparing it to is happening at the exact same time of the year when those seasonal or maintenance kinds of events ordinarily happen. So, so it is truly a relative thing. It's happening right now. So, so if comparative inventory are falling, that means that's irrespective of weather and irrespective of maintenance and other kinds of issues. So it's saying that we are seeing a real drop. It's not a, you know, it's not just an absolute number, it's compared to normal usage.
And why that's important, obviously it's an important benchmark, but What I didn't include in the package, because it's a little bit confusing to look at, is when you plot that comparative inventory versus price, and it's hard to look at because there's no time scale on it, that gives you a yield curve.
And that yield curve is absolutely the best predictor of price trends that I know of. And— When we see that yield curve turn around and start paralleling or following a trajectory that we know from the past, then we can tell where the mid-cycle price is. And the mid-cycle price is the price that the market, whatever the market is, thinks is necessary to maintain supply. That doesn't mean it's going to be tomorrow's price, but that's the direction that we're going. So, that's what comparative analysis is. Inventory is about. It's not something that I expect everybody to immediately latch on to and say, oh yeah, I get it, you know, I'm gonna start doing that, because it's, it's a little bit abstract. But it is by far the most— if you had to choose one thing, it is the most significant, meaningful, and insightful way to look at where prices are going and And even, even getting a little bit specific about where they're headed.
So that's, that's why I think it's very, very important.
Erik Townsend: Now, you mentioned that $50 magic number that seems to be a psychological barrier. We have traded— and you mentioned actually in the February interview that $50 to $55 was, even for the very best operators, the people that had the very best plays, the best land leases, $50 to $55 was their breakeven. They're not even making any money at that. We've traded above $50 for all of about 20 minutes, quite frankly, so far.
You know, a couple of little spikes to just above $50. They didn't last long. We're just right around $49 as we're speaking on this Wednesday that we're recording this interview. So, how is it possible that I'm already seeing articles in the paper about how U.S. drillers are gearing up for more drilling because they've got $50 oil prices. Is this rhetoric that they're spewing trying to get the sources of funding to believe that they could be profitable, or is it true that they could actually be profitable? I mean, should we expect the rig count to, to tick up from here as we hit $50 and the shale drillers go back to work?
Art Berman: Well, those are, those are critical questions. That's a great question, Erik. And, again, the answer is, I don't know, but I don't think so.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Art Berman: The rig count over the last couple of weeks has, you know, effectively— it's flattened out. I mean, you know, we're losing a couple of rigs a week as opposed to 20 or 15 or 25 rigs a week not very long ago.
Well, there's a reason for that. I mean, it's a diminishing returns thing. You reach a point where, you know, you just can't, you don't have any more rigs to get rid of. I mean, we're down to, you know, to just sort of basic maintenance at this point. So, and as far as, you know, the breakeven price, I'm sure that all the listeners, you know, are just completely bewildered by the You know, the range of breakeven prices that they read about and they hear. And, I mean, there was a Bloomberg report, and they put it on television at one point about, you know, all the counties in Texas that can actually make money below $40 oil. And there's even a few, they said, that, you know, can make money in the $20s. And that's just pure crap. I mean, that is just— It's just so fundamentally distorted and untrue that it's painful to me, because, I mean, this is the business I'm in, and I've got a pretty good sense of what the floor is. And I promise you, nobody's making money or breaking even at the prices that that Bloomberg report was talking about.
And so the question is, well, how did they get there? And they get there in a real Well, they do it in a very simple way.
They exclude costs. You know, they exclude taxes and royalties and overhead and interest expense. You exclude everything except for drilling and completion. And, well, yeah, okay, you know, that will get you down to a pretty low number, but that's, you know, that's not real. I mean, that's like me telling my bank that, You know, my only monthly cost is my mortgage.
Well, you know, they're not going to believe that. They're going to say, yeah, what about loans? And what about, you know, do you eat? You know, do you drive a car? I mean, those are, you know, without those, I don't live. And it's the same for these companies. They, you know, to just to use some number and to not even discount it. I mean, that's another thing.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: So, there's a million things. I could talk for an hour or two just about the flaws in the way that many analysts evaluate the profitability of these companies. Why do they do it? Well, they're selling stuff, aren't they? I mean, there's nothing wrong with that. That's the business they're in.
They're pushing stock. They're pushing investment banking transactions, and they need to talk it up.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: And that's what they do, but it's wrong. It's just not even close to true. And I'm not the only one that thinks that. And this is the business I'm in. I mean, I'm not an analyst. I drill wells. I make maps. You know, I explain dry holes. I look at deals. That's the world I live in. And I promise you that there are no companies, little bitty companies, companies like the one I'm sitting in right now that has very little overhead and no debt.
You know, we can't make money at the prices that some of those analysts say others are. So, you know, $50 is an absolute floor for companies that just happen to be in the very sweetest parts of the very best plays. And like you said, Erik, they're not They're not making money. That's breakeven. Okay? And they're not investing. They're not, you know, they're not growing at those prices. So, go back to drilling at $50? I don't think so.
Erik Townsend: I'd love to spend that hour and a half talking this up in more detail, but we need to move on. So, I want to go to the really big thing that we both predicted. I think, actually, we both predicted it would happen someday. I think you even said you thought it was likely to happen in 2016. We predicted in 2016, which is that Saudi Arabia and OPEC would eventually cut production in order to support higher prices. And we predicted that several things had to happen before that. One, we thought that capital providers needed to pull back meaningfully so that shale didn't have the source of funding it had. You said already that the signs that you're seeing is that that has happened. We also said that U.S. production had to drop significantly, and the number that you cited was At the time, we were seeing maybe drops of 50,000 barrels per day in a given month from the previous month.
You thought that number needed to go to 150,000. It's gone to about 100,000. So maybe we're halfway there. I had suggested that I didn't think that OPEC would cut until Russia joined the party and agreed to cut with them. Just this week, Russia pulled away from their previous willingness to agree to a freeze, never mind cuts, just a freeze. They're no longer willing to do that. So we're not there yet on that one.
What's your take now? Do you still see these things as prerequisites to OPEC cutting, and do you still think an OPEC cut is likely, which would imply that those things would get resolved over the course of 2016?
Art Berman: Well, let's just back up a second and talk about U.S. production, because you did ask me that, and I, I did say that, you know, it had fallen 100,000 barrels in the last month. And the EIA forecast on that, I think, is worth looking at. And I don't believe anybody's forecasts out, you know, more than 6 or 12 months, but I think that the EIA is probably pretty close to right on that. And they're saying that by the end of the summer, by September, U.S. production will have fallen We're going to be down 1.5 million barrels per day, roughly, since the peak in April 2015. So we'll be down close to 8 million barrels a day from a high of about 9.7 million barrels a day.
At the same time, it's worth looking at what EIA thinks West Texas Intermediate prices are going to be, and they're already wrong, but Interestingly, by December 7th, 2017, the end of their forecast, they see WTI at $59. Again, I don't— wouldn't take that to the bank or anything, but I do have a certain amount of respect for the sophistication of the modeling and the work that goes on there, just as a rough kind of a benchmark number.
EIA is not— they're not seeing prices going back to, you know, to $70 or $80. Is it enough? The answer to that is it depends. It depends on what's happening in the rest of the world. And, and the, the mood and the sense right now is that the rest of the world is precarious.
And I think it's relevant— we were talking about the damage done to US producers and, and the financial providers and enablers. Well, I think a lot of, a lot of the rest of what's going on in the world— the outages in Nigeria, the outages in Venezuela— these are directly related to the governments of those countries having no money from lack of oil revenue. And so we reach a point where the pain gets, gets so bad that we actually have countries on the verge of failure.
And, and that's where we are. And, and so the time for, you know, for some relief from price before the world order implodes on itself, I, I think is at hand. And, and is there, you know, are there some silent hands Working behind the scenes to, you know, to try to restore, you know, some semblance of future order. I don't know. I don't subscribe to those kinds of theories, but we are in that kind of scenario right now, and it's dire. I mean, we really need to take this seriously. There's not a thing we can do about it, but the specter— I mean, Venezuela produces more than 2 million million barrels a day, and that country is on the verge of collapse.
And, you know, you take 2 million barrels of oil off the world market, and I promise you that prices are going to go up a lot. So, are we there based on U.S. production? No. We're sure heading in the right direction. And is 1.5 million barrels a day by the end of the summer enough? It's probably Probably enough, given everything else that's going on in the world. And that's changed a lot too, Erik, since we talked a couple of months ago.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, one of the things that I think— a prediction you made in February that was very prescient. You said everybody's talking about Iran, but the true wild card, was your word, is Libya, not Iran. Now, at the time, nobody was talking about Libya, and we were discussing it in the context of, you know, you said if Libya were somehow able to solve their unrest problems, they could increase their production, and that would be very bearish for prices. Of course, the opposite has happened. It's gone the other way, and their unrest has gotten much worse, which I think you had actually said in that interview. You didn't think it was likely they could solve their unrest problems.
Meanwhile, we've got the situation you described in Venezuela, literally on the verge of societal collapse. And for our listeners who may not be aware, what's going on there Venezuela's most important thing it has to do is keep producing and selling oil. But they have mismanaged their country so badly that the foreign contractors that are essential to producing oil were not getting paid and basically gave up and went home. And they're not able to produce as much oil because the whole country is falling into disarray. Nigerian militants attacking pipelines, creating major shortages. And of course, the Canadian wildfires.
The estimates I've seen from analysts are as high as 3.75 million barrels taken offline as a result of these various geopolitical developments. And of course, we were only talking about a 1 to 1.5 million barrel oversupply. If you subtract 3.75 from 1.5, you get a negative number. And so it looks like, you know, the surplus, the oversupply, is now a deficit. So I think the key thing is Are these things temporary or are they going to last?
And particularly, can these geopolitical events last long enough to get us to that point later in 2016 when you thought that the market was going to rebalance itself anyway because of U.S. production declines? So, what do you— what's your take on these things, particularly Canada, because that's the one that most directly affects Cushing inventory, which we both agree is very critical?
Art Berman: Well, as I understand it, despite all the, you know, the fanfare— and it was a gripping thing to watch those fires— that Canadian supply to the U.S. did not change. And I mean, you know, you may have more information on that than I do, but that there was enough oil in storage available that, you know, that was a temporary thing.
Erik Townsend: Right. Mm-hmm.
Art Berman: Albeit a dramatic one. So, I've seen the same reports that talk about 3+ million barrels a day offline, and frankly, I just don't believe it. I think that's, you know, what could potentially happen, or what, you know, may have, you know, could have potentially happened, but I just don't see numbers like that. You know, you want to add 2.3 million a day from Venezuela into that, Or half of that, yeah, sure, you can get there. But that hasn't happened yet. And I think we have to keep that in mind, that, you know, the sky is falling, you know, people get hysterical about things like that. And let's talk about, you know, what has happened versus what may happen.
So, you know, back to February, you know, Iran, yep, they're, you know, they're going to increase production, and we've seen it. And it's steady, and it's within predicted ranges. And for Iran to be at 500,000 or even 600,000 or 700,000 barrels a day above December sometime in 2016, I think, is probably realistic.
Iraq. Iraq was the big sleeper that nobody was paying attention to. The country second only to the United States that had increased its production the most since early 2014. It seems like Iraq's economic and political problems have probably reached a point where that production is, is, is not going to grow anymore, and, and it may actually fall. Libya, if I had to say, I mean, Libya I think Libya is probably incrementally closer to a solution than they were when we talked in February. At least they have a unity government. It's not functioning very well, but there is a government, and that's a step in the right direction. So I don't want to get anybody's hopes up about Libya, but let's not forget, Libya solves its civil problems and there's 1 million barrels a day that is right back online.
So, I still see there's plenty of sources of oversupply remaining in the world. And let's not forget, either, that even these very desperate countries and companies, they still have to produce for cash flow, and they're going to take advantage of higher prices. You know, these higher prices of nearly $50
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: From $30, $20 a barrel. I mean, that is a huge increase. Not, you know, it doesn't bring them back to profitability.
And I guess the other thing that's important to bear in mind, and I didn't send the chart, but it's on my website, I've got a chart that compares, you know, OPEC fiscal breakeven numbers from the IEA. IMF with the oil sands plays in Canada and the key U.S. shale plays.
And the truth about that situation is that for as expensive as unconventional oil, deepwater, oil sands, tight oil is, that so is everybody else's oil, including OPEC. And this idea that OPEC has been And Saudi particularly has been promoting, you know, that we're the low-cost producers and you guys are the high-cost producers. Well, not when you consider overhead.
Companies have overheads and countries have overheads. And you look at those numbers and everybody, I mean everybody, has to have at least $50 oil to break even, including OPEC. And that's a— That's the world we live in. And, you know, that's something that nobody— most people don't want to pay attention to. The age of cheap oil is over. That's momentum moving us in the other direction, unfortunately.
Erik Townsend: Speaking of OPEC, I'd like to go back to Saudi Arabia, and particularly something that the firing of Mr. Al-Naimi really spoke to me is the ascendance to power of Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 30-year-old prince. Who apparently is kind of the head honcho in charge now in Saudi Arabia. So I immediately wanted to learn more about this guy and find out what his vision of the future was. And very conveniently, he had just published a document called Vision 2030, which I expected to articulate Saudi Arabia's energy future strategy.
This guy is talking about getting Saudi Arabia out of the oil business and into the tourism business. I just don't know what to— I was speechless to read that. Is this guy lost in space? Is this intentional misinformation? Is he serious about what he's saying, that Saudi Arabia should move away from dependency on oil exports, which really is the key natural resource that the country has?
Art Berman: Well, you're not alone in that reaction, Erik. There are an awful lot of Saudi Arabia watchers who know a lot more than I will ever know about the royal family and the internal workings of that country, who think that his Vision 2030 is reckless, is irrational, that it's meant to produce an effect which is, by gosh, we're going to change in a big way. And that's something That is needed for internal consumption in Saudi Arabia, apparently. But let's talk about reality. So Saudi Arabia, I don't think it's going to be a big tourist— I mean, it's not on my list of places to visit with my family. The Saudi munitions piece, I guess, is perhaps the most doable part.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: But, you know, on a more philosophical level, it seems to me that, you know, what I was just talking about, that, oh my gosh, if everybody in the world's breakeven price is $70 or $80 on average, you know, is there an end to the age of petroleum just because the world can't afford it coming in the near future?
And put in a, you know, put in the, the kind of price spikes that are inevitable as a result now of 2-plus years of underinvestment. And, uh, you know, that perhaps Mohammed bin Salman is, is thinking along those lines. I, I honestly can't, can't decode the message there, uh, for myself, much less for other people, but he is, uh, You know, he— let's, let's give him credit. He's probably a very smart guy, but let's also remember that a lot of this is, is, is for internal consumption and dramatic effect.
Erik Townsend: I have several more questions on my outline here, Art, but unfortunately we're starting to run out of time. I do want to just quickly go over the charts that you sent us. Give our listeners a quick sense of what's in that PDF so that they know what they're looking at when they open it
Art Berman: Well, there's there's three charts that that show comparative inventory versus price along a timeline, and and they're gonna they're gonna see that there are there there's Cushing, which I think is is absolutely central to understanding pricing. And and and what's interesting about Cushing is that Comparative inventory fell through mid-April and then started rising again. So that's a countercurrent kind of movement.
The total U.S.— that's commercial crude oil— I show the same kind of data there. And what we see there is that beginning in mid-March, those comparative inventory inventories started falling, which is consistent with the price rise.
And then I think the final chart that I had there was a combined Cushing plus Gulf Coast, and that accounts for something like 70% of U.S. storage. And there I'm showing that the comparative inventories are generally falling. But I'm also showing a front-to-back futures spread. So, you know, that's typically going to be like a June-December futures contract spread, and it rolls a little bit forward in the last month or so of that chart.
But that gives, you know, some idea of the incentive for, you know, for lower price or higher price. And so typically the higher spread
Erik Townsend: Right.
Art Berman: Higher spreads reflect lower prices and vice versa. So, those are the charts.
And then, of course, the other one that's always— people always forget to think about, or some people do, is going to be the strength of the dollar versus the futures price. And that's the NYMEX WTI, and I use the Wall Street Journal Dollar Index, but you can use a lot of them.
People scramble for explanations for why oil prices are falling and rising, and they're all valid, but I always remind myself to look at this because when the strength of the dollar is high, prices tend to go down and vice versa. That's a whole other discussion as to why that happens, but empirically, that's generally the way it works.
Erik Townsend: So, Erik?
Art Berman: Those are the charts.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. As we close, I think our listeners already know your blog at artberman.com is free and one of my favorite resources on the internet. Your for-profit business is Labyrinth Consulting. Tell us a little bit about what you do and what services you offer.
Art Berman: Labyrinth is basically me and a couple of engineering colleagues. We, we advise We advise investment companies, hedge funds, money managers on their portfolios. We do reserve forecasts, we do economics, and we also do basic geology. So that's what we do. We have a very interesting and diverse clientele.
Erik Townsend: Well, Art, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Nathan Egger and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Every time I hear Art speak, Erik, I enjoy it. There is no unnecessary emotion, no BS, not even a lot of opinion unless you're begging him for it. It's just insightful analysis. But I'm curious, after this update from Art, what are your conclusions about where we are in this whole crude oil story?
Erik Townsend: Well, the biggest thing that I see is really this question of what is Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait's agenda really, and has it changed? I was absolutely convinced that there was no way that Saudi Arabia went on this market share strategy on an indefinite basis, just thinking it was a smart idea to do for the long term. Obviously, they're going to suffer lower total revenue from their oil sales as a result of allowing the price to drop. So, I've made the assumption that they were intentionally allowing the price to drop in order to do damage to their competitors. And I believed to coerce Russia and others into playing ball with them. I think perhaps what's happened is Russia did capitulate. They were talking about a freeze, but probably could have been led down a negotiation path towards a joint cut.
And I think that Saudi Arabia is not willing to talk about a freeze or a cut or anything when Iran is growing production. The idea politically in Saudi Arabia of The Saudis reducing production in order to allow Iran to increase it is just on every level, socially, culturally, religiously, it is anathema to everything that they stand for. And I cannot figure out this Mohammed bin Salman guy who is preaching about how Saudi Arabia should get out of the oil business and into the tourist business. That just doesn't make any sense. So I really think the key is in understanding what their intentions are and at what At what point are they going to be willing to consider some kind of joint cut?
That's not happening yet, and I do think that we are at the top of a cycle. Technicians I'm reading are saying $51.90 is a major retracement level that might mark a top in this cycle. I'd consider shorting it from there. In the meantime, I'm just in the crude oil term structure steepener trade that we've talked about in previous episodes and waiting to see what happens.
Nathan Egger: Well, as the MacroVoices project gains momentum, we're excited to be growing our team here. It's been necessary, but we've come across some great people to help us out with the content of this program. So we're pleased to announce that Aaron Chan is joining our production team, and we're going to spend the last few minutes of today's show introducing Aaron to our audience. So, Erik, give us the backstory on how Aaron will fit into the team before we bring him in to introduce himself.
Erik Townsend: Well, as I've described in prior episodes, the whole vision for the MacroVoices project is to create a global community of sophisticated private investors, family offices, and other smart people, and to encourage them to collaborate and share investing ideas online. We've actually had several people reach out to us and expressed interest in helping the cause, but Aaron Chan has probably been our most vocal proponent. Ever since episode 1, Aaron has been talking us up on Twitter sending us interesting articles for our Research Roundup, and so forth.
And believe me, folks, we need the help. This project has turned out to be way more work than Nathan and I first imagined. Registered users probably noticed that this week's Research Roundup email was kind of light on content, and that's just because we're swamped and we don't have time to do as good of a job as we had first envisioned with the Research Roundup.
So Aaron has agreed to join our team as the captain of what we're calling the MacroVoices Research Team. The first responsibility of the research team under Aaron's leadership will be to curate and expand our Research Roundup emails, which have been extremely well received so far. Over time, we envision the research team also helping us to identify and recruit future interview guests for the program and to help us refine the format in order to promote the development of that global community of sophisticated investors that I described a moment ago.
Nathan Egger: So we're going to go ahead and introduce Aaron to our listeners Aaron, welcome aboard Please tell our listeners a little bit about yourself, your personal and professional background, and how you discovered MacroVoices.
Aaron Chan: Thanks for having me. I'm really excited to join the team. Well, I'm originally from Toronto, and I'm currently based in New York. Academically, I studied finance on a Division I tennis scholarship at Fairfield University and then received my master's in sustainability management with an emphasis on energy markets. From Columbia University.
In terms of my professional experience, I was a fixed income derivatives summer analyst at Morgan Stanley, and then afterwards, an energy investment banking analyst at JP Morgan. Following my time in investment banking, I decided to level up my data analysis skills and recently graduated from a full-time data science program at Galvanize in San Francisco.
Although not finance related, this program culminated with a capstone project I worked on where I designed a system that scraped data from over 100,000 Kickstarter crowdfunding campaigns and applied a random forest classification algorithm to predict fundraising success with around 80% accuracy. With all that being said, I'm now looking to apply my finance and data science skills towards asset management and macro research.
As for how I discovered MacroVoices, I would say that there are really 2 main drivers. Back in January and February, when I was interviewing with tech companies, as you know, markets were tanking and China was seemingly falling off the precipice. So I found myself reading voraciously about what was happening while repositioning my own portfolio, as in getting off of the QE escalator.
I was reading and listening to all the mainstream financial outlets, but was really left desperately wanting for more nuanced and sophisticated analysis.
So secondly, I love the podcast medium. I even started my own project, the Laissez-Faire Podcast, with one of my best friends from college, Ricardo Espaillat, where we talk about politics, economics, and finance from the perspectives of free markets and individual liberty. So in the process of working on my own project, I stumbled upon MacroVoices and I was basically hooked from day one because it introduced me to content that I hadn't seen or heard anywhere else. And it also introduced me to a community of like-minded, inquisitive people.
Erik Townsend: Well, Aaron, thank you so much for volunteering to help us with this project. We are excited to have you aboard. Why don't we start by telling our listeners, first of all, where they can find your podcast in case they're interested in that, but also what is #MacroVoices? MVRR all about, and how can our listeners use it?
Aaron Chan: Yeah, for sure. You can find my podcast on iTunes. It's the Laissez-Faire Podcast, and we're also on SoundCloud. As far as the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, Erik, as you had mentioned earlier, our vision is to create a global community of sophisticated investors to collaborate and share investing ideas online.
As such, the weekly Research Roundup newsletter is really one of the main vectors through which we can build and share interesting research with our community. So to that end, we are introducing the #MVRR hashtag as a way for our Twitter-savvy listeners to tag interesting research or articles for inclusion in the next Research Roundup. Of course, our non-Twitter listeners also have the option of submitting content to our researchroundup@macrovoices.com email as well.
Erik Townsend: So basically, any listener who's got something that they think is worthy of our other listeners' attention that should go into our Research Roundup email, the 2 options are to email us at researchroundup@macrovoices.com at MacroVoices.com, or if you're on Twitter, just retweet with the #MVRR hashtag, and that will get Aaron's attention and he'll be able to evaluate whether it fits into the next Research Roundup email.
Aaron Chan: That's right.
Erik Townsend: So again, Aaron, I cannot thank you enough for helping us out in this capacity. I hope to find ways to make this experience as rewarding for you as I'm sure your contribution will be for our listeners. But we are putting you basically in charge as the captain of a ship that doesn't yet have a crew. So please tell us what kind of help you're looking for as you build the MacroVoices research team.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, for sure. So initially, for the purposes of sourcing and curating content for the Research Roundup, we're looking for a team of volunteers who have experience reading financial literature, be it out of personal interest or for their own investing. The process itself is still being developed, but I envision one that is collaborative. And I know we have listeners from all around the world, so all time zones are welcome.
I'd also encourage our Twitter-savvy listeners to volunteer. Our goal is to build out the community, and Twitter is one of the venues where we can really do that while engaging in the marketplace of ideas.
And lastly, generally speaking, we want volunteers who are eager to learn and want to be part of building something that, for me, and I'm sure for tons of our listeners, contributes greatly to our financial education. Again, this is not an exhaustive list, and nor should it be construed as a set of job requirements. Participation is purely on a volunteering basis. And as this project continues to grow, there may be opportunities for greater involvement, be it in guest recruiting or content development. In that vein, we also encourage listeners who have skills outside of finance and social media.
But Erik, more than anything, I'm most looking forward to getting to know and learning from other engaged listeners.
Nathan Egger: And if our listeners want to volunteer some of their own time to help the cause, how can they contact you, Aaron?
Aaron Chan: Yeah, listeners can email me directly at aaron@macrovoices.com and on Twitter @AaronChan_.
Nathan Egger: So that's aaron@macrovoices.com. Besides outright volunteering to help us here at MacroVoices, the best way you can support MacroVoices is by subscribing, rating, and reviewing us on iTunes. This helps us move up in the rankings and gain more visibility. What we're essentially trying to do is get the word out. So telling your friends, family, coworkers, sharing on social media, this really helps us grow. Speaking of social media, you can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Erik has a personal handle, which is @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. And remember folks, #MVRR is how you get our attention on Twitter for research that you would like to see included in our Research Roundup. Aside from Twitter, you can continue the discussion of topics covered on the show by joining us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.
We really hope you'll be back again next week as Dr. Ben Hunt will be joining us. He is the Chief Risk Officer at Salient Partners and the author of the popular newsletter, Epsilon Theory. For Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend.
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Nathan. We'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge.
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The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts. Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Julian Brigden — Julian Brigden, Macro Intelligence 2 Partners (introduced as 'Macro Intelligence 2 founder' by Erik at w85 and 'Macro Intelligence co-founder' by Nathan at w2008) (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 16 was recorded on May 26th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Macro Intelligence 2 founder Julian Brigden will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts to support this interview, and we'll be talking about the US dollar cycle, what it means to both developed and emerging markets, inflation, precious metals, and much more.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's get started with equities, Erik. 2 weeks ago, you said you were watching the S&P and waiting for a daily close below the 50-day moving average before you'd consider putting on a short trade. And we got that close on Friday, 2 weeks ago. But then last week, you were a little hesitant, saying that you didn't like the tape action. And you said you were going to wait and see what happened with the head and shoulders pattern that has been developing. which was actually trading below the neckline intraday when we were recording last week's show. Did you end up going short?
Erik Townsend: No, and I'm glad I didn't. Obviously, this week's upside tape action has just blown my mind. When we did not see an acceleration of downside momentum on that intraday break below the neckline and eventually closed above it, I knew we were set up for at least some kind of a bounce. I wasn't expecting quite this much. And frankly, what really kind of blows my mind is that The expectations, market expectations of a Fed rate hike at the June meeting have collapsed. Now, in the past, what we've seen is coming into these meetings where there was a threat of a hike, the market would throw a little tantrum. It would be down 100 S&P points effectively to scare the Fed out of hiking. The market's not trying to scare the Fed. I think that it's— it is a live meeting. As Mr. Dudley said last week, it's entirely possible that they could hike rates at the June meeting. It seems like the market has decided that's not a risk.
And I'm looking at 2,000 We're trading at 2,090 right now, which has been a technical level that's been thrown around by some technicians as maybe where we're going to find resistance. I don't know what to make of this, though. Clearly, the head and shoulders pattern has been invalidated now as we've moved well above what would have been the right shoulder. So, we're in uncharted territory. And I think that the Fed meeting in 2 and a half weeks' time is going to be very telling. Until then, I don't know what to make of the equity market.
Nathan Egger: And of course, the crude oil market comes next, Erik. The financial press finally got their $50 crude headlines. Where do you see us going from here?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I was actually surprised. As bearish as I've been, I thought we were going to see a breakout above $50 with a lot of irrational exuberance and marching band music and retail investors piling in saying, okay, it's over. And I thought we might get to $51 or $52. And then I thought probably that would be the cycle high.
I did expect that we would break above $50. I thought it would last for more than half an hour, which is about what it's been so far. And then we saw a very aggressive sell-off. We closed on Thursday below the $49.50 level, which a lot of technicians have said is where that long-term channel resistance line is. So we're still, you know, in that trading range.
It's not an upside breakout. I would still expect probably a little bit more action above $50. If that was it, just the half an hour that we spent above $50 this morning, then I think that's a very bearish sign. Next week's inventory, of course, will be very important. And it's hard to tell. You know, the oil that comes from Canada in the pipeline, it takes it a month to get from Canada to the United States where it eventually hits those tanks. So with the disruptions and all of the up and down, first the Canada wildfire situation was critical, then it was resolved supposedly, then it turned out not to be resolved and there was another evacuation. It's been a lot of up and down. So what is that going to mean to Cushing inventory numbers next week remains to be seen. The 4.2 million barrel drawdown that was kind of the catalyst for the move higher this week. Was, I don't think, any real big deal.
It should be expected given seasonality. First of all, it's time of year that we should be having drawdowns on national inventory. Canada fires, Venezuela, and so forth. The fact that we only saw a 650,000-barrel drawdown in Cushing inventory in the face of the Canadian fires is really amazing to me. And to put it in context, you know, we were at 96.42%, I think, of operating capacity. We're all the way down to 95.51%. of operating capacity at Cushing, Oklahoma, as of this week's report. The thing that people didn't seem to really focus on in this report is there was a 2 million barrel gasoline build.
So, they're producing gasoline for summer driving season, which is upon us. The demand hasn't quite been there. And that is, to me, a bearish signal that the market didn't really discount as much as it should have. If the Canada situation gets resolved and normal flows into Cushing continue, we could still be setting up for that storage crisis. I don't think it would happen now, but, you know, We should be seeing big drawdowns in inventory this time of year. We won't get through fall maintenance season if we start at these inventory levels. So we've got to see drawdowns in inventory between now and the fall. Well, it's summer driving season and that should solve everything, right? Because we'll be consuming more oil. Look at this unexpected build in gasoline inventories. It seems like the demand is not coming as much as people thought. So I do think that the market rebalance should take care of itself in the second half.
But boy, we need to see Cushing Cushing in particular. And it's interesting to me, at 96% of operating capacity, the opportunity to pipeline some of that oil out of Cushing down to Houston, you'd think that would be happening. But what the traders tell me is the price levels just aren't there in order to arbitrage that trade. By the time you pay for the oil in Cushing and then pay for the delivery expense of sending it through the pipeline, nobody in Houston is willing to pay extra for it. So, You know, we still got this situation in Cushing, and I think we could see that in the expiration of this July contract, which would be in the middle of June. Right now, the difference between the first and second month is only about 39 cents as we're speaking. It was about 75 cents in the first to second spread a month ago. So, what happens when we get toward the expiry of this contract?
All the people that are piling in, the speculative longs that are saying, okay, you know, this is it.
Nathan Egger: That's it.
Erik Townsend: We're headed higher from here. Those people are buying front-month contracts, and as that contract expires, they have to sell them. They can't sell them to other speculators. Normally, who you sell them to is the guy with the storage tank who makes a little bit of money storing it for a month. If those storage tanks are full, I think you could see a dramatic widening of that spread as we approach the expiration of the July contract. In general, though, this cycle, I think it's getting tired, but it may not be over yet.
I think probably $51, $52 are some irrational exuberance before maybe next week's inventory could be the catalyst to begin a move to the downside. There are continuing signs of hedging going on in the oil market, as evidenced in those time spreads compressing. What that says to me is the front month is strong as it is pushing the curve up. The back months are being sold by producers hedging their forward production.
Nathan Egger: And you said last week that while you're long-term bullish precious metals, you feared that the party might be over for gold At least in the short term. And this week we saw gold lose $25 in a single day. That was on Tuesday. And as we're taping on Thursday, it looks like the selling is continuing. What do you see next?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, $1,219 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon before the futures close. And in general, something I've noticed about the gold market is the 50-day moving average tends to be more important in gold than it is in some other markets. It was the close below the 50-day moving average that we had earlier this week that really accelerated the downside selling. The next logical target to look at would be the 200-day moving average, which right now is right around $1,168 or so, at least on the futures chart. And I would say, if I had to, you know, what I like to do is kind of project just what the trajectory is. How long is it gonna be before we would get there? Looks to me like the test of the 200-day would come right around the time of the FOMC meeting on the 15th of June. So, I'm guessing that we're gonna see continued weakness in gold.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: If there is a rate hike, I think that would be the catalyst to send gold below the 200-day moving average.
If there's no rate hike at that meeting, I think that's where you might see the upside reversal, and that might be a buying point.
Nathan Egger: We've also been keeping a close eye on the dollar index here at MacroVoices for the last couple of weeks. And I'm sure our featured guest today, Julian Brigden, is going to have a lot to say about it. But is there anything that you would like to add, Erik, from your perspective?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, what has surprised me, what I said last week is, boy, we've seen really good tape action. The case for the dollar index really looks bullish. But boy, you know, a lot of that was this Fed minutes thing. And I thought we would see a pullback and we didn't really see the pullback. We have in the last couple of days seen a little bit of weakness, but, you know, nothing that's big enough to worry about. Where I thought we would see a pullback and a retracement of some of that strength that happened in response to the FOMC minutes. We're still holding right about at the same level as, as after that big move up. So, I think that it's— the tape is saying to me that this dollar rally is pretty strong. We do have a little bit of a pullback here.
I think that no hike at the Fed meeting might be a catalyst for a little bit of a move lower. But I think the lows are probably in. And if we did see a Fed rate hike, I think we're headed higher from here.
Nathan Egger: Thank you, as always, for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest, as I mentioned, is Macro Intelligence co-founder Julian Brigden. Brigden. This guy is brilliant. I think you guys are really going to enjoy this one.
Erik Townsend: You know, Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts that he's going to be referring to in the interview. So, for those of you who are not listening at the gym or someplace where you can't look at a PDF file, I recommend that you pause now and open Julian's PDF file full of charts. He'll be referring to them in the interview. Registered users at MacroVoices.com should have already received this presentation via our Research Roundup email, which was sent to you when the podcast was published.
Nathan Egger: We've had a problem actually over the last couple of weeks where people are emailing me asking me to register them. Look, folks, this is a part-time job for me. And as much as I'd like to help you out, I can't do your registration for you. This is something you're going to have to do on your own. So, if you haven't registered yourself yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button on the top right side of the homepage, then click the Register Your Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page that you will see. It's always free. And we promise We promise never to spam you, and we're not going to sell your email address to anyone else.
Erik Townsend: We did discover a flaw in the registration process, which we fixed, and the problem was people were going ahead and registering at MacroVoices.com, as Nathan just described. That automatically signs you up to receive the next Research Roundup email, but what a lot of people wanted was the current Research Roundup email so that they could look at this week's content, which had already been sent out.
To solve this problem, we've added a new Research Library tab to the MacroVoices.com homepage. This new area of the site is eventually going to allow registered and logged-in users to go back and peruse all of the past content that we've ever distributed through our Research Roundup, including the latest content that supports this week's podcast.
So, if you were not already registered and you want Julian Brigden's presentation, here's what you need to do. First of all, go to MacroVoices.com, register a free account, per the instructions Nathan just gave you. Once you've done that and you're logged in, on the black menu bar at the top of the page, choose the Research Library function from the title bar, then choose the Documents dropdown. From there, click on Guest Publications, and then look for the Macro Intelligence 2 Partners presentation, which is about halfway down in that list of documents. We just set this up over the last couple of weeks, and frankly, the navigation could be better. We don't have pictures of the guests and that stuff yet.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: We'll get to that at some point, but for now, we do have a solution. So, that's how to get Julian's presentation right now if you're not registered yet.
Nathan Egger: Thank you for the clarification, Erik. And thanks for your patience, folks, for those of you who are already registered. But explaining this in detail on the show is going to save me from answering dozens of emails from listeners asking me to register for them. Erik's interview with Julian Brigden coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next from Macro Intelligence 2 Partners is Julian Brigden, one of my favorite Real Vision appearances. I really love the graphs and charts that you have produced, Julian, and thank you so much for sending them to our audience ahead of time. Before we get into your first chart, though, about the US dollar, something I've noticed— I interview almost everyone in this program about the US dollar rally. And most people on Wall Street, when they talk about the US dollar, are talking about the DXY, the dollar index. But I noticed that most of the smartest guys in the room, yourself included, all prefer the broad real trade-weighted dollar index instead of the DXY. So, let's start with what's wrong with the DXY and why do you prefer the trade-weighted dollar index?
Julian Brigden: I don't think there's anything wrong per se with the DXY. It just has a, you know, a huge euro component to it, which makes, to be honest, from a trading perspective, it's sort of a waste of time. You might as well trade the euro.
But really, from an analysis perspective, I think we have to move beyond that. When we're looking at trying to look at macro effects of the dollar, you have to think well beyond the DXY, because the DXY is essentially the developed markets. So, it's got euro, sterling, CAD, Aussie, etc., etc. When we're trying to see the macro impact of dollar moves, I much prefer to look at the broad dollar, because it contains a huge element of EM in that. And that's important because these are the guys in the EM space are the guys who generally tend to fund themselves in dollars. You don't find many European or UK companies funding themselves in dollars, because they have large domestic deep capital markets. So when you want to look at the impact of the dollar, we prefer to— from a macro perspective, I said, we prefer to use that that broad dollar.
Erik Townsend: And as I look at the chart that you've provided, you've got— looks like about a 40-year history of the Trade-Weighted Dollar Index showing the massive buildup in the '80s before the Plaza Accord, and then again another peak around 2002 or so. And that cycle bottomed in the last couple of years, and it looks like we're headed higher. And of course, the question on everybody's mind is, is this rally in the dollar That has clearly paused. Is it over or is it just pausing? And is the pause over? Are we headed higher? What's the direction from here? And what does this history tell you about what we can expect next?
Julian Brigden: So I find, you know, if you've got the chart in front of you, you can see this broad swing in the dollar. But if you don't, essentially what you're looking at is 3 cycles for the dollar. And you have these extended multi-year declines in the dollar. During those periods, whether it was— and it's hidden slightly by the gold standard, you know, we had all the Bretton Woods game. But essentially, the dollar was falling in value hard even before this chart began in '72. And that was because we were essentially devaluing the dollar or debasing the dollar by printing money to pay for the Vietnam War.
But as the dollar falls in value, you tend to build up bubbles in things that are very dollar sensitive. So emerging markets, commodities, that type of thing. And then as the dollar rallies, what you find, and you can see it on the chart, is roughly at around 21-plus percent, between 21 and sort of 24, 25, you tend to get a problem. And it's simply because the reserve currency has moved so far that you start to undermine the excesses created in the falling dollar periods. As I said, those typically tend to be in EM or in the commodity space.
So the first one that we saw was in the early '80s where we get the Latin American debt crisis. We'd built up massive bubbles in the Latin American commodity space fed by petrodollars out of the Middle East as their oil prices had boomed post the end of controlled commodity and oil prices in the '70s.
And as the dollar rises, Led by Volcker's extremely tight monetary policy, basically 21% change off the lows in the dollar. We get Latin American debt crisis, and that has consequences for the United States. We saw you know big losses in U.S. banks, people like Chemical Bank and Citibank, who were very present down in Latin America. They take hits, and the Fed steps off the gas, and we get this corrective pause.
The same happened in the late '90s. So this time we're coming off the highs of the dollar in the Plaza Accord. In 1985, the dollar falls steadily, steadily, steadily. The first thing that we do as the dollar is falling, we're building excesses actually in Japan because the yen's rising every single day as the dollar is falling. The money floods in naturally into Japan seeking to double dip both in terms of the currency appreciation and the equity market appreciation that's going on there. And then we get the Nikkei bubble burst eventually. The money comes flooding out of that and it goes into the next hot topic, which is Asia. And so we build excesses there. And then We put a low in the dollar when Sakakibara comes in in 1995 and says, look, yen strength is just too excessive. The dollar starts to rally 24% and change off the lows. We get the beginning of the Asian crisis.
It actually kicks in around 21%. It's the first time we get problems with Thailand in early 1987— 1997, sorry. And the US pauses. The Fed pauses because you've got problems. And the dollar dips.
But here's the point. In both of those cycles, it was a corrective pause. It was not a top. And when we look at the current scenario, we've been using this chart. And you can see here— or you can't see here— but basically, we're 25% off the lows of 2011 now. So, all of last year, we were saying we're going to get an emerging market crisis, and we were playing for an emerging market crisis.
And we did very well out of that. And now essentially we're in that pause phase.
But here's the point. History dictates that this is not the top. And I think there's some other things that we can talk about, gents, in terms of what's driven this structural move in the dollar, which do make it somewhat different and much more difficult to prevent that continued dollar strength. So this is a pause. We've been playing for the pause. We tend to think the pause is probably over in terms of the move down. We're down to the lows on the dollar.
We may not be ready quite yet to break out to the highs. That's going to take Fed rate hikes. But we think that's coming in the second half of the year. And we can explain that as you would like.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, this entire move in the dollar, if you expect the dollar to be headed higher after this pause, most people would say, okay, that is inherently a deflationary event. If the dollar is stronger, then things that are priced in dollars would go down in price. And so, this is inherently deflationary. But I think you have a different view.
Julian Brigden: Yeah. So one of the things that we've been intrigued about is the way that central banks have— well, firstly, you know, you'll see in the chart pack if you've got it, you'll see that a dollar pause is itself truly reflationary. I mean, basically, if you look at— we've got a chart in here of G7 inflation against the dollar.
And you can see that the highs of the dollar are the lows of G7 inflation and the lows in the dollars are the highs of G7 inflation. It literally, within a sort of broadly structural disinflationary world that we live in. I don't like to use the word deflationary because deflation implies falling aggregate demand and falling inflation. So in this sort of disinflationary environment, the cycle is set by the dollar.
So what I find quite intriguing is that we've seen this hugely disinflationary pulse by a rapid rise in the dollar since, particularly since the summer of 2014, which has crushed oil prices. But the key thing for us is that, you know, back in the spring, in February, we started to suggest to clients that they actually start to buy oil.
And when you look at inflation, the issue is obviously we've had this massive disinflationary pulse. We've seen a bunch of central banks across the world, not so much the Fed, but certainly they've delayed hiking because of the disinflationary pulse. But certainly in the ECB, we've seen a bunch of central banks ease into this disinflationary pulse.
You know, that policy is now passed. We're already starting to see the base effects drop out from the oil price. And if you look at one of the final charts we put in there, we look at CPI in the United States. And you can see that essentially the big key components of CPI— owners' equivalent rent, services, and medical costs— are all sitting well comfortably above 3%.
What we've had is this huge drop in energy prices, which from a CPI perspective at the lows when the dollar peaked basically in January, February, were running at around 20% negative year over year in energy costs. So, that pushed down overall CPI.
But the point is that this is a one-off deflationary shock or disinflationary shock. Oil prices are by their very nature transitory. So, and we've seen this in the past, you've seen scenarios where particularly in the mid-'80s, '80s, where you saw huge drops in oil prices, similar sort of magnitude that we saw now, big drops in interest rates as central banks moved to ease into that thing. But a year later, those base effects drop out. I mean, literally, you go back to where you were with your underlying inflation, which in the US is above 3%.
And then unfortunately, you have to build into, to take into effect what happens then to the oil price. And we've actually You essentially doubled the oil price now, and so we have to then add in that inflationary pulse. So, as we move into the second half of the year, we truly believe that you get this cyclical upturn in inflation within a structurally disinflationary world, but a cyclical upturn in inflation, which causes huge problems for the central banks and potentially the bond markets because central banks have distorted bond markets and rates to such a large extent.
So, in the second half of of the year, what we expect to happen is the Fed to be forced to hike rates potentially significantly more than certainly the market's pricing, not necessarily the Fed is pricing, but the market is certainly pricing. And that we believe will reignite the next leg of the dollar up move that will be destructive again. So this is a cycle. This is a sequence of events and it's a sequencing game, but it will be, we truly toxic for emerging markets and I think do some significant damage.
So it's this misjudgment by central banks that we think is the big problem, that they've misjudged oil as a disinflationary event or as a deflationary event when it really is a transitory disinflationary event. And even in the US, where we have a huge shale industry, which has been responsible for a lot of the growth outperformance we've seen over the last few years, even in the US is ultimately stimulative lower oil prices.
Erik Townsend: Now, I want to go back to your comment about emerging markets and what could happen there, because a lot of people have expressed great, dire concern about the risk that exists of another Asian financial crisis, as we had in the late '90s, if the dollar were to continue to appreciate. I think you have a slightly different view than the mainstream on that. So, could you elaborate on what you see happening there? Where are the risks, and how do reserves play into that?
Julian Brigden: So, if you look at if you look at Asia, one of the things that you can see is certainly from a currency perspective, one of the few regions that's seen little to no adjustment or the least adjustment, should we put it that way, in this dollar move has been Asia. You know, part of that is because you know as the savings pool is built up in Asia, the money has sort of stayed at home. It's been they've been very stable, safe places for domestic investors to keep their money. I mean, far better than you. Yes, in nominal terms, we've seen, you know, huge increase in US equity markets. We've seen big increases in European equity markets as these central banks have QE'd.
But because the currencies in Asia have stayed strong, there's been less incentive for this money to leave. The problem is, is, is that since last year, we have been building this disinflationary cycle in Asia because they have had— they've kept these very strong currencies. And we obviously have borrowing exposure. In US dollars, either directly or indirectly.
So, for example, if you look at somewhere like Singapore, if you track money supply growth in Singapore year over year, it is an utter mirror image of the fluctuations of the dollar because they run a true peg. And as they run a true peg, what happens when, you know, in 2006, when the dollar— '07, when the dollar was on the low, Singapore money supply growth was running at 25% almost year over year, which is why she has one of the most overvalued property markets. And overvalued asset markets in the world. And as the dollar started to appreciate, that money supply growth slipped dramatically.
And in the autumn of 2014, it was approaching zero, which is why she had to allow her currency to take some of the strain.
The same metrics essentially apply in China. So much more closed capital account, obviously. But essentially, while the dollar is stable or falling in value, which we saw into 2011, China, outside the absurdities of the GFC, and you can see this in the slide, basically control money supply growth somewhere between sort of 15 to 20% per annum. All is well.
The dollar starts to appreciate in 2011. Money supply growth slips a little bit. She manages to rejig it. But then in 2014, when the dollar really takes off, China is forced to intervene. Reserves fall. Remember, she takes dollars, they come straight through the front door, they get converted into renminbi, and her money supply growth slips towards 10%, which is when you started to get problems in the housing market, problems in the real economy, and problems in the equity market. Simply isn't enough cash to keep all those balls in the air.
So she had to let the currency go. And the point is, I think, is that we're in this, the eye of the storm at the moment, for better, for want of a better term.
And while the dollar is pausing, it is a pause to use a sort of trite phrase, a pause that refreshes because the fact that the dollar isn't appreciating takes the pressure off places like Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and most importantly, China. It allows them to not have to continue to intervene to maintain currency values and not draw down their own domestic money supply growth. But if we're right, and as this inflation story picks up in the second half of the year, and the Fed is then forced to hike rates and the dollar reaccelerates, and you can see Towards the end of the chart pack, we show the dollar how the typical correction in the dollar, if you look at that '81-'82 phase or that '97-'98 phase, is sort of 4% versus EM on a TWI basis and about 8% to 9% versus DM on a TWI basis. And we've essentially seen those moves.
So you'll also see at the end of the thing at the pack, the last slide that I put in there is the rate of change of this real broad trade-weighted dollar index. And you can see that Once we get over 12% to 13%, the wheels fall off the world. And that's that green line we put up there. You get an emerging market crisis. But the point is, is there's only 2 occasions where the dollar has lost all forward momentum and gone negative year over year. And that is Plaza, which was central bank intervention, and we're not about to see that. And that was post the GFC, where the Fed came in with QE1. And absent QE4, which we all know is still a long, long way away, That isn't going to happen either. And in every other occasion, we see a dip, a bleed-off of momentum, and then a secondary reacceleration.
So I think in that secondary reacceleration, which, as I said, I think we've possibly seen the lows on the dollar yet now already. We may not be ready to break out to new highs until the Fed is forced to acknowledge the rising inflation story. But once that happens and the dollar reaccelerates, we go very, very, very quickly. Back to the chaotic crisis we saw in EM, and particularly focused around Asia that we saw before. And I think the Chinese will have to let the renminbi at that point continue to gradually depreciate. I'm not so much in the sort of huge one-off 20% type thing, but I do believe they will let this renminbi march steadily, dollar-renminbi march steadily higher.
Erik Townsend: There has been an extraordinary appreciation in property values, particularly high-end luxury real estate in Hong Kong, Vancouver, San Francisco, and several other cities, which most people have attributed to money leaking out of China, essentially saying that it has entirely to do with the wealthiest Chinese wanting to get their money out of the country. How would this whole picture that you're painting reflect on And what property owners might expect in those markets?
Julian Brigden: Interesting tangential question. Look, I mean, I think that's entirely true. I mean, we have seen, you know, huge outflows. And I think we continue to see sort of steady outflows. They're trying to clamp down on this. They have to clamp down on this. But I think— and as I said, we're in this sort of eye in the storm where we've seen— I mean, if you actually started to see Chinese reserve growth actually improve a wee bit, and we've got some charts that sort of show that literally, you know, is part of this pause that refreshes in terms of the dollar pausing. That's literally what happens. But as soon as the dollar starts to reaccelerate again, I think you will see that pressure to the extent that it can from those Asians to continue to file out, fly out.
And I think it's not only going to see it just from the Chinese.
I think you're going to see it from numerous wealthy Asians who, as I said, have been Essentially, up until the latter half of last year, were cocooned by their strong domestic currencies. And certainly, I know by talking to Asian clients of mine, you know, starting last year was the first year in five or six that they'd actually started to allocate cash to overseas investments. So I think, you know, we will definitely see renewed interest by by Asian investors to the extent that they can. Can, to the extent the Chinese can, I think this is a trend that's not going away. Does it mean that Vancouver real estate isn't a bubble?
No, it doesn't. Because I think you can see it everywhere that there's huge excesses in the system. But I think there's always going to be a solid bid there. And you're going to have to see something, I think, really quite dramatic to call these markets to collapse. Cool off, cool down a wee bit, because just domestics can't buy this stuff. I mean, look at London. You know, look at the center of London. It isn't domestics who are buying this stuff. They're selling and moving out to the suburbs because the price arb is so huge. But there's still a constant bid underneath the market.
Erik Townsend: Now, you've articulated a bullish story for the US dollar, which most people would initially think of as bearish for precious metals. But you've also described an inflation case, which most people would think of as bullish for precious metals. I know you've got a slide here which makes a bull argument for silver. So, explain first why you see the current environment in the face of— you're expecting stronger, you know, strength in the dollar, but also strength in precious metals, and why silver over gold?
Julian Brigden: So, one of the trades that we recommended at the end of last year in December was to buy silver. It was purely a sort of chart-based call. So, you can see here, we've, we've got a Quite heavily scripted sort of silver chart, and there's a reason for that. First off, these the key thing to note is these are essentially anti-dollar trades because you can see here we've marked 2002 dollar high, 2011 dollar low. Those were literally the lows and highs of the silver price. So don't ever con yourself that these are any more. Than anti-dollar trades.
The reason why we scripted this silver chart so heavily, it is because we follow this pattern in charts which we use for all sorts of things. You know, for example, Triple D, the 3D printing people, or Apple stock at the moment, or whatever. And this is what we call a classic bubble. And we did a ton of work over the last few years looking and trying to identify a classic bubble. And essentially, it has nothing to do with valuation. It is all about greed and fear.
And it breaks down into sort of 4 parts: stealth, discovery, mania, bust. And it has some key components. You have to get a bear trap, you have to get a parabolic move, you have to get a bull trap, a failed neckline.
And silver fit all of those metrics. And believe it or not, we wrote a piece back in 2011 when silver was breaking through sort of $36, $37. And we said, our target on this is $13.50, this very long-term trend line that comes off the lows of the early 2000s. And so we got down to sort of $13.50, $13.75 at the end of last year. We recommended buying it because we were expecting this dollar pause because we'd done simply so much damage to the underlying global economy that the Fed would have to back off.
So as things stand at the moment, we've been long some silver. We took a little bit of profit recently or recommended taking a little bit of profit recently as the dollar started to show signs of basing. We're hoping we can get up to sort of $18.50, $18.60, $18.80, where there's a trend line. And I do think in an extreme scenario, we could possibly move up to $20.00. But I will stress this, that we like precious metals. But let's say we get that inflation dollar strength story in the second half of the year.
I'm really not expecting precious metals to massively outperform. I think they are going to be what they say on the can, and that is a store of value. So in an environment where my big fear is as the dollar rises, we get what I call a risk-off dollar rally. So you're getting the dollar rising as global equities are under pressure from this rising inflation and potentially bonds are under pressure too.
I think it's possible that precious metals hold their own. I'm not sure if I can really believe that we get a massive rally. I just do not believe we're getting back to much above even in the best-case scenario 25 on something like silver. So, we like it. We like it. We've liked it off these very tempting lows. We're getting closer to some resistance.
But, you know, I do like it as a potential store of value.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to emerging market equities. Obviously, the weak dollar and rising commodity prices has been good news for emerging market stocks. One of the biggest trades of the last few years has been short emerging market equities, whether it be through the EEM or the MSCI Emerging Markets Index or whatever. A lot of people have said, though, that that trade is over. Certainly if you draw a trend line through the 2002 low and the— I guess it's the 2008 or '09 low, you know, from the financial crisis, we already hit that trend line. A lot of people say the bottom is in and it's uphill from here for emerging market stocks. I think you have a different view. Why is that?
Julian Brigden: Yeah, I mean, you know, for those of you who've got the slides in front of you, you will see that we've got a chart of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index here. And as with silver, I mean, this is a classic bubble. It is actually a classic bubble that should have burst in 2011, 2010, and should have collapsed. But QE came along and supplied the world with sufficient dollars to keep the game going via outflows from the US current account— sorry, capital account.
And when we look at precious metals, as I said, sorry, when we look at EM and emerging market equities, we cover most of our position back in January as we hit this trend line, and we've seen a countertrend rally.
But I can't be a bull on emerging market equities if I suspect that we have a secondary reaccelerative move coming in the dollar. And if I don't believe a top is coming in the dollar, and I think the only way that you can be a bull, and I think a lot of people are bulls, is this assumption that the highs are in on the dollar.
But I fundamentally don't believe the highs are in on the dollar for numerous reasons. I mean, we haven't even seen a single— well, we've seen one rate hike. So this has not been a dollar rally that's been driven by interest rate differentials. This is driven by much more structural underlying problems, which we can discuss in a second.
But when those interest rate differentials start to rise, as you know, as the inflation picture starts to accelerate, I think the dollar reaccelerates. And at that point, I'm— when we break that trend line in in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which, as you correctly point out, comes off those sort of 2001, 2002 lows, then I think we are going to see a major liquidation.
And the other sector that I'm watching very, very closely, which I think held up remarkably well in the second half of the year in the face of that weakness in emerging market equities, has been emerging market bonds. But if I'm right that we've got inflation and dollar strength coming through, It's in— it's— that's where I think we are going to start to see some real wealth destruction, destruction potentially, is not so much in the equity space, but in the bond space. And when that happens, I think, and you start to see outflows out of things like EMB, then you're going to see major pressure on those equities again. And our ultimate target for the MSCI Emerging Markets Index is about 400, which would in EM terms is about 15%.
Erik Townsend: Now, one of the common narratives that you'll hear is that for exactly the reason that you just described, having to do with emerging market debt as opposed to emerging market equities, that the central bankers of the world cannot allow the dollar to appreciate as natural forces might want it to. And some kind of intervention along the lines of a Plaza Accord would be necessary because they're smart enough to know that if they let the dollar appreciate, it's going to cause an emerging market debt crisis.
Julian Brigden: Right.
Erik Townsend: What do you think about that? Is that realistic thinking?
Julian Brigden: I mean, look, here's the thing. I mean, there was obviously a lot of talk at the beginning of the year about some sort of pact. And I worked for policy consultancy policy groups for a number of years in my career, Medley Advisors being sort of one of them. And I'm always suspicious about this sort of coordinated intervention stuff, because when you actually chat to these guys on a one-on-one basis, the level of sort of international cooperation is not as great as you imagine.
And don't get me wrong, I think there was a sort of handshake that we got at the beginning of the year, which was facilitated by conditions. So, you know, given that we were starting to see equity weakness in the US as a consequence of the sort of deterioration we were seeing elsewhere in the world, given that we were starting to see pressure from the Chinese on the currency, I think everyone was in a position to stand back and allow the dollar to pause and allow the renminbi's depreciation to stabilize.
But that's where this inflation story comes through, because there comes a— you know, and we've just seen it from the G7. There just isn't that degree of cooperation. I mean, they can't even agree between the Japanese and the Germans and the US to allow the Japanese to try and push dollar-yen off the lows. I mean, they've done a decent job chatting it off the lows. But, you know, there's no way heading into a US election that the US can condone this, particularly since they know that they'd be handing a battering ram to Donald Trump. The Germans just aren't in favor of it, period, end of story, because they don't want to see the euro strengthen. So, I think that the practicalities of actually something much more concrete than a handshake, which in itself is, I said, afforded by this dollar pause, is it can only come about from something that I think is much, much more destructive.
So, in other words, I think I'm not I'm not putting the concept of some sort of Plaza Accord completely off the table, but I think you have to see a hell of a lot of pain to create that. It doesn't just happen now. And as I said, if domestic conditions in the United States start to materially change as the inflation picture, as the disinflation from the oil shock drops out, and then we have to factor in the 100% increase in oil prices that we've seen since January, I don't know.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Julian Brigden: I don't think the Fed can just stand back and just let, you know, and ignore it, because otherwise they're going to lose control of the bond market. And I think that's a far greater fear.
Erik Townsend: Now, I want to, I want to come back to that bond market point, but maybe in the context of another narrative that you hear a lot, even from some Fed governors recently, which is that there's just way too much complacency in developed equity markets, because people believe in what used to be called the Greenspan put or the Bernanke put, or I suppose now it's the Yellen put.
And what people have said is, look, at some point, the ability of central banks to bail out the stock market, even if they wanted to, breaks down. How does it break down? I would think what you were alluding to with the bond market is probably the answer. What does that look like? And what does it mean in terms of— I think there is tremendous complacency that, you know, nothing can really go wrong. 20% down, we know we're going to get more QE and a bailout. It's all going to be fine.
Where does that breakdown?
Julian Brigden: So as I said, I mean, if when I look at bonds and equities, there are some indicators which I sort of look at which just show just this extreme. And essentially, in the sort of halcyon world of academia that now passes itself off for central banking, it may be justifiable to have risk assets nailed to the ceiling.
And risk-free bond yields nailed to the floor. But as an investor, and clearly not of the same intellectual weight as these central bankers that we have now, I look at that and I just go, hmm, one of these things is wrong, and arguably possibly even both. Either we do have a recovery and reflation, in which case we've got the equity markets right, bond market is wrong, And we get a scenario like we got last spring starting in Europe. And particularly, I think the sensitivities in Europe, as I said, given how much they've overreacted to the fall in oil prices, and we get a massive correction in the European bond markets because, you know, if the DAX sitting at 12,000, I don't want to own Bobl 5-year Bobls at minus 37 basis points. It's just simple. We get this huge correction that in itself, as we saw last spring, will tend to undermine the equity market.
The other alternative is that the bond market is right. My natural inclination as a sort of bond-biased individual is to always believe the bond market's right. And there is no recovery. There is really no sustainable reflation. And in which case, the equity market's just a Ponzi scheme. Now, in that situation, in that latter situation, I think you can get a correction in the equity market, but absent inflation, You will, I think correctly to what most people's assumptions, get a central bank put at some point.
Now, does it work? We'll see. I mean, I'm very worried by the apparent lack of effectiveness of ECB and BOJ QE. And I do believe that the efficacy of QE depends very heavily on us believing it works. Right? Rather than it actually working, we have to believe it's working. We have to take money out of the bond market and put it into the risk asset market. And if you like Japan, and this is a problem in Japan, the Japanese have never believed it's worked. They've never taken money out of their own bond market. So, in that latter scenario, let's say the bond market's right, there is no reflation, then yes, I think the central bank put can come in. Where does it come in? We can all argue the toss. Is it, you know, 1,600? Is it 1,800? Is it 1,900? 1,900? Sorry, 1,600 or whatever on the S&P doesn't really matter.
But in the first scenario, where the equity market is actually right that we have growth, that we have reflation, and in the second half of the year we get that inflationary pickup, which all our models are starting to show in Europe, in the U.S. in particular, then I. I think the ability of central banks to act is actually really restrained. And I actually think that's the worst and the most dangerous outcome. So, we get this cyclical burst of inflation created by swings in the oil prices, which is what it generally does.
And a major disconnect between bond and equity prices created by this overreaction, this panicked reaction of central bankers. And in that case, as the bond market is under pressure, and the equity market starts to strain, the ability of those central bankers to come out and act will be heavily, heavily tied.
And in that environment, I think you're looking at a much, much, much more toxic, dangerous environment, you know, an environment eventually that leads to, you know, a major equity correction. Pushes us right back into deflation again, but with central banks' ability highly questioned, and the efficacy of QE even potentially questioned, which I think would be tragic.
Erik Townsend: Now, one of the slides that you have in your chartbook just says very simply, either the Fed hikes in the second half of this year, or the bond market does it for them. I assume by does it for them, you mean the reemergence of inflation expectations is going to force
Julian Brigden: Correct. So, you know, as I said, they can, they can, you know, they'll try as much as they can to be behind the curve. And its logic dictates this is the right thing. I mean, there is an asymmetry to the risks here. But we've already started to see a pretty solid pickup in some of the breakeven indicators.
And if you look at the bond market, we kind of like to think of it as a sort of, you know, sort of First World War analogy, 3 sets of trenches.
So, your first trench with the onslaught of inflation is breakevens. Breakevens should naturally take the strain as the inflation wave starts to hit. And we've seen, as I said, solid pickup in US breakevens. We think that's got a lot, lot further to go. Then depending on how the central bank reacts, we come to the second trench. And the second trench is essentially the shape of the curve. So if the Fed is ahead of the game, game and hiking aggressively into that inflation pickup, then it's very possible that we get a flattening curve.
If they hang behind, which I think is their natural inclination, I think it's entirely possible if they prevaricate, you know, we don't get a hike in June, they maybe don't go in July, then we get into the, oh God, can they go in front of the election as that inflation pick accelerates, I think you see the curve potentially steepen.
And then the third and final line of defense will be those ED strips, you know, sort of Z 2016s against Z 2017, that kind of thing. So I think, you know, so far we're only in the embryonic stage. The only pressure that we're really seeing in, in the bond market is really in the breakevens. The curves have really done very little, certainly not protesting anything. But I think I think the Fed, they've picked up in the US, but I'm actually expecting in the next couple of months to see a marked acceleration of European inflation as those base effects that we've seen in the US already start to drop out.
We think that inflation picks up markedly in Europe into the second half of the year. With the ECB still pumping like crazy, I think we could start to see some pressure in that bond market. And let's be honest, I mean, ECB's reaction function to oil prices has been deplorable.
You've only got to go back to the summer of 2008, where we had, you know, Trichet saying— I have a slide which I show my clients— you know, he had a quote where he said, if we do not act decisively, inflation may explode. I think at the time oil prices were like $142. So, we were literally, you know, within a few bucks of the absolute high of oil prices. And of course, Of course, by treating it as a purely inflationary-deflationary event rather than a demand stimulative or demand destructive event, they overreacted. They hiked rates. And in January of this year, we had the mirror image of that where Draghi says, we will not surrender to low inflation. Well, they won't have to.
They will not have to. Inflation is going to rise markedly in Europe. Inflation, consumer inflation expectations are already rising. Raising and tend to lead the turn in the actual inflation. Wage growth is really robust in Europe. In fact, if you look at that versus CPI, we're at 2.8% now year over year compensation growth in Europe.
This is the sort of level where back in 2011, the ECB actually hiked. Now, we've changed colors totally in the ECB from sort of too So, from sort of Nordic toughies to sort of southern Mediterranean wussies when it comes to the inflation story. But the reality is that this situation, I think, emerges hard in the second half of the year, ties these guys' hands down markedly.
Erik Townsend: Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but from everything you're saying, I hear what sounds almost like a perfect storm analogy that you see inflation expectations rising that will force central banks to allow the dollar to appreciate, allowing the dollar to appreciate. At a time when inflation expectations are rising potentially takes away the ability of central banks to provide that Bernanke put or Greenspan put capability. And that potentially ignites a major risk-off situation. Am I, am I putting the lining the dominoes up correctly here?
Julian Brigden: Yeah. I mean, here's, here's the thing. I think I keep saying, you know, people say to me, you know, oh, but this is what central banks want. Right. And I keep saying, well, they've got to be careful what they wish for, because in a normal world, this wouldn't be a problem, right?
In a normal world where we hadn't distorted bond markets, this wouldn't be a problem. But the problem occurs because we have distorted bond markets and because we have created historical-wide divergences between bond markets and risk assets. So, yes, this may be what they want. But my concern is, as I said, is in the reset process where we push bond yields markedly higher, how much damage does that potentially do to these, to these, to these risk assets? And I think, you know, it may not be catastrophic, you know, because ultimately we do want reflation. It may not be catastrophic, but I fear That, you know, it may make last spring's bond meltdown and ensuing equity correction look like a walk in the park.
Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, we have not gotten to all of the excellent slides in your chartbook that you provided our listeners, but we are running out of time. I want to stress for our listeners, many of our listeners are also Real Vision television subscribers. I know you are one of the most prolific and popular personalities on Real Vision, so there's quite a bit more of your research available on Real Vision for people who are subscribers. Before we close, what can you tell us about Macro Intelligence 2 Partners, or MI2? I'm pretty sure that's the British Secret Service agency that James Bond worked for.
Julian Brigden: But I think— It's funny you pick up on that, actually. It was— he's actually MI6. But there was actually an MI2, and it is sort of a play on words. We set the company up 5 years ago this summer at the behest of a couple of hedge funds. Clients of mine who were reading my sort of my muses, musings that I was sort of making on from from my prior employer. And so we were looking around for a sort of name. And you know, look, as I said, I'm a Brit, and you know, I do love everything James Bond.
So I sort of came up with a logo that looks frighteningly similar to the sort of Universal Exports logo. And MI2 was just a play because there was actually a there were two of us who starting it off, and there was an MI2. And an MI3 and an MI4 and an MI5 and MI6. But MI2 was in charge of geographical intelligence up until just after the First World War. So, that's kind of— that was the play.
We've now grown the company over the last 5 years to sort of 8 individuals, 4 professionals. And we've got guys in London, we've got guys in New York, and I'm lucky enough to live out here in the mountains in Colorado. But essentially, we produce— the underlying aim of the business is not to pontificate about economics. I really— I'm not an economist.
And our role is to try and help clients make money. So, we develop these structural themes, some of the stuff that you're seeing today, where we talk about the bigger picture themes to help get people's heads around the issues that they should be watching. Those are a key part of the product. Then we have this piece that we called MI2 Trader, which is produced by one of my colleagues who's got 25 years as a hedge fund PM.
And essentially, his role is to look at the instruments we can express these views in, and more importantly, to say now, this is breaking now.
So, for example, last spring, we'd been bearish on US fixed income. We expected a slowdown in the US at the start of the year. We weren't looking at it from a weather perspective. We were looking at it from the shale perspective. We'd ridden the rise in the US bond market, and we were waiting for that turn where the market went, okay, this is over, and then the bond market started to sell off. But Erik, who's the trader, said— called me up one day and said, look, mate, I'm afraid it's not the Treasury market that goes. It's the Bund market, and it's going now. So, that's where we put the piece out, managed to catch the Bund sell-off.
And then finally, we have a Japan product, which is just produced by another colleague. It's fantastic. People love it. It's a very different product from the main product. It's basically a summary of the news with some commentary and analysis by a guy who's traded Japanese markets for 35 years and is beyond a fluent Japanese speaker. He frequently ends up putting out pieces where he's correcting some misinterpretation by Bloomberg and Reuters.
But yeah, that's, that's kind of what We are an institutional client base, ranging from family offices through to big money managers.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so your primary products are all institutional, which is a large part of our listener base. We also have a retail component. Is Real Vision the best place for them to follow you? Because for the folks that can't afford institutionally priced research, you do some fantastic stuff. Where can they find it?
Julian Brigden: Yeah, I think Real Vision— Raoul and I have— we've known each other since I used to cover him when he was at GLG. The hedge fund, and I was at Medley. And so, yeah, that's probably the best place to do it, because I certainly will be a relative— at least sort of 3 to 4 times a year, I'll be on Real Vision.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. And of course, for our institutional listeners, MI2Partners.com is your website. Julian, thanks so much for joining us today. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at Macro
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Erik, we mentioned Julian Brigden's excellent Excellent work on Real Vision Television a couple of times today. And I just want to remind our audience that they can receive a free 1-week trial of Real Vision Television by visiting realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices. There's absolutely no financial incentive for us in promoting Real Vision, but we really do believe in their work. And we like to get you guys discounts wherever and whenever we can.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, and you know, I want to mention something else, Nathan, which is a question in my mind. We, we really love the Real Vision guys. They are doing a video format, and one of the things that differentiates us, aside from being free, is you can take us to the gym and listen to us on the treadmill because we're audio. So, I don't really know the best way to handle an interview like this. Julian had such fantastic charts, I just wanted to talk to them and talk about the detail of the chart. We welcome your feedback. Should we be doing that, or should we be trying to keep it focused on talk so you don't need to look at anything, giving you more flexibility to listen from wherever you are. We tried to kind of balance it today, but we would welcome your feedback on that point.
Nathan Egger: So, Erik, what did you think of Mr. Brigden's view that inflation is returning and that it might handcuff the Fed in terms of their options going forward?
Erik Townsend: It's absolutely fascinating to me that he brought that up. This is something I've been talking about literally for 5 years, and I don't have a prediction for when inflation comes back. But the point that I've been making is that you know a lot of people say, "Boy, quantitative easing, just printing money, trying to paper over all of our problems. This has to end badly someday."
And usually they don't fill in the blank and say, "Well, how would that happen? How would it end badly?" My answer to that is the Fed can get away with this money printing in order to paper over our problems until inflation rears its ugly head.
Once we have inflation, the Fed is forced to tighten policy in order to arrest inflation. And that means they can't bail out the stock market. So, I don't think that we really get to the endgame where we find out what the unintended adverse consequences of all of this money printing is until inflation starts to rear its ugly head. What Mr. Brigden is saying is that's coming by the end of this year. And if that's true, I don't really have an opinion on the timing of it. When and if it happens, Houston, we have a problem. Okay.
Nathan Egger: And do you tend to agree with his view that it was, in fact, the US dollar rally that caused the oil price collapse?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's a, it's a very interesting one, because I'm sure that the US dollar rally has had a lot to do with exacerbating the downside. I personally am very strongly of the conviction that the oil situation was a man-made event caused by Saudi Arabia intentionally. They could have supported prices by cutting production, as everyone expected them to do. Going into that Thanksgiving of 2014 OPEC meeting. They did the opposite. I am convinced that that was the catalyst that caused the massive downside move in oil prices.
Now, would it really have gone all the way to $26, or would it only have gone down to $50 if not for the US dollar rally? I think it definitely was an exacerbating factor, but I really think the catalyst that brought it on was Saudi Arabian policy. And the catalyst that has not happened What hasn't happened yet that will really bring on a strong recovery in oil prices is a reversal of that Saudi policy. I think eventually Saudi Arabia intends to coerce Russia and other producing nations to join forces with them in a cartel. When that happens and they cut production, everything changes overnight.
Erik Townsend: Until then, I think right now we're in an overbought condition, and I would expect a move back at least into the high 30s before this thing
Nathan Egger: Listeners should know that in addition to all the excellent feedback that we've asked you for and you've been providing, the very best way that you can support MacroVoices is by subscribing, rating, and reviewing us on iTunes. You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and you can get regular market updates from Erik throughout the week by following his personal handle @ErikSTownsend, E-R-I-K-S Townsend. If you're not already subscribed, If you're not a Twitter person, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.
Next week, we'll be back with fan favorite Art Berman. He's going to be bringing us up to speed on the oil market fundamentals just as we're reaching this key $50 level. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions. based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Jeffrey Christian — CPM Group founder (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 15 was recorded on May 19th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. CPM Group founder Jeff Christian will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. Many of you know Jeff as a precious metals expert, but his background is actually much broader than metals, so I'm looking forward to bringing you a side of Jeff that you may not have seen in his other media appearances.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Before we even get into the equities today, we're going to touch on monetary policy real quick. The minutes from the April 26th, 27th FOMC meeting were released on Wednesday afternoon, and everything from equities to Treasuries to crude oil to gold instantly took a nosedive on that news. What happened, Erik? What's going on?
Erik Townsend: Abject silliness as far as I'm concerned. You know, it reminds me of parents. I'm not a parent myself, but I see parents of 2 to 4-year-olds planning. Okay, we'll give little Johnny his birthday present, and then when Susie has a conniption fit and cries and throws a temper tantrum, we'll get her birthday present from last month and we'll remind her she got something too. And then when little Jimmy gets upset, we'll bring out the birthday cake, and then we'll play pin the tail on the donkey until both kids are so tired that they fall asleep and forget all about it by tomorrow.
And I think the FOMC kind of works the same way. We've got exactly the same message that they've been telling us for years, which is it's data dependent. They are intending to be in a rate normalization cycle, meaning a hiking cycle, and they're going to see what the economy permits. The message has not changed. And frankly, the FOMC minutes, which were released on Wednesday, didn't change anything.
What was covered in— I don't think anybody reads the entire statement except for maybe 10 guys. Everybody else goes by the short little one-line headline. summary that Bloomberg and other news services put out, and they picked up on the fact that several members of the FOMC favored a June rate hike if the economy warranted— the exact same message that they've been telling us.
Now, for people who bothered to read the next paragraph, it said that other members were very concerned about the global economy and didn't know if it could tolerate that. So there's no change here whatsoever. But What was highlighted for some reason was that the rate hike was on the table. A lot of people were assuming that it was off the table, even though that's really not consistent with what the Fed has been telling us. So they're posturing in order to allow any outcome. They're making it clear that the June meeting is a live meeting, that there could be a rate hike.
And just like the parents who have to deal with the temper tantrums after the fact, what they did is they planned. They knew that this was going to have some effect on the market. So they had We had both Lacker and Dudley, 2 Fed governors, giving public speeches this morning. And I was actually surprised because the market had reacted so strongly negatively. What Dudley in particular said is, I don't know why people weren't listening before, because we've been pretty darn clear that the June meeting is a live meeting and that if the economy permits, that we will hike rates. This is not new news, guys. It's, it's stuff we've been talking about. A lot of big names. Jeff Gundlach was in the news today saying that he thinks something has changed at the Fed. What he thinks has changed.
To me, they've been really, really consistent. There was a time that I can remember when we actually used to make decisions about investments based on economic fundamentals, and that would mean that a rate hike would be considered good for stocks because it indicated that the economy was turning up. What's amazing to me is that there's almost no discussion publicly in the media anywhere of the fact that Monetary policy has totally distorted the price signal. What we now see is markets go up on bad news because people assume that there will be more accommodation from the Fed. Markets go down on good news. Good is the new bad. We've completely turned everything upside down and it doesn't make sense, but nobody seems to care.
Nathan Egger: So last week you said you were waiting for a daily close on the S&P below the 50-day moving average before you'd consider putting a short trade on yourself. And we got that close Friday last week. Did you go short and how's that trade looking?
Erik Townsend: No, I didn't. Perhaps I should have, but what happened, I looked at that close Friday, I said, okay, I'm gonna watch this on the open Monday. I did not wanna trade it on the futures open Sunday because there was a pretty big spike down that looked to me like it was likely to retrace, which it did. So I looked at where I thought the technicals kind of showed resistance and I came up with 2,053 or so on the E-mini S&P futures contract. I thought that was a good sell point.
Frankly, by the time we got there, the market was moving so quickly on oil-related hysteria to the upside, I knew it was going to go through that level.
And so I decided to hold off and wait and see. Sure enough, what happened was we bounced notably back up above the 50-day moving average. So despite that daily close below it, it turned out to be a false breakdown, at least initially. There was some more strength. The day traders on Twitter, who are much better technical analysts, at least in the short run than I am, we're saying could be as high as 2090 before this euphoria is over and we see a move back to the downside.
Of course, when we had this message come out of the FOMC, there was just a panic reaction to the downside, even took out briefly this morning as I was interviewing Jeff Christian, we took out the neckline on a head and shoulders pattern that's been building since April on the S&P 500 futures contract. Sure enough, though, I watched that, I thought about trading it, and I said, you know what, this is Fed-driven nonsense. This is a panic reaction that doesn't make sense. And sure enough, over the course of the day, that has retraced. And although we're speaking still during the active trading day, I expect the close to be above that. I'm drawing the neckline right at about 2031, and I expect that we'll see a close above that today.
So, uh, I don't know where this market is going.
I definitely think that the fundamentals call for it to have been much lower much sooner. But, you know, I was saying that as we were 100 points lower, still headed up. At 1950, I thought this thing ought to be done and ready to roll over. It went all the way to 2100. So I'm waiting and seeing. I definitely think the fundamentals are very bearish.
But so— and I also think that the rate hike in June is very possible and not at all inconsistent with either this week or previous messaging from the Fed. It seems like we're back into euphoria mode this afternoon, and so I'm kind of taking a wait-and-see approach to this.
Nathan Egger: And of course, Erik, Crude Oil Voices is up next.
Erik Townsend: What do we got? Well, we promised last week, look, we're not going to let MacroVoices turn into Crude Oil Voices. We just had so much news flow we had to cover it. Well, this week we've got even more news flow, so I'll try to be concise.
But when the facts change, I am forced to change my opinion, and the facts are changing really fast. Biggest news to come out since our last show, EIA, massive, massive revisions to their surplus estimates. You'll remember, regular listeners on this program, when EIA came out and said the global oversupply had now reached 2.24 million barrels, I said, hmm, even as bearish as I am, that's hard to believe. I think the real number is less than that. They revised all those numbers and said, yeah, actually, we didn't mean it It's much, much lower.
That was a pretty big shot to the chest for the bears. But Sunday, Goldman Sachs, who previously has been even more bearish than I have, turned semi-bullish and said, look, we didn't expect this, happened way sooner than expected. But what's going on is this market just balanced itself much sooner than anybody thought. And sure enough, the tape action Monday, which was very brisk to the upside, was probably in reaction to those 2 things, Goldman Sachs and EIA.
Meanwhile, we had been told last week, Fort McMurray situation pretty much under control, be working on getting people back into their homes, at least the homes that survived the horrible, horrible destruction that occurred there, and everything's gonna be fine. Oil production should be fully back online within a week or two. This week, the news is that the oil-producing assets, which we were previously told were never at risk, are at risk, and the fires have gotten worse in some areas.
They— Syncrude has completely evacuated. There was a message today, on Thursday, that they have told their customers not to expect any oil shipments for the month of May. And at the same time, we have Nigeria, the situation there escalating rapidly. There was a message from militants saying they're just getting started and they intend to shut down the entire Nigerian oil production capability. Today, we did see the shutdown of their shipping port.
Nathan Egger: Hmm.
Erik Townsend: And I just got that news before we taped this segment. I don't know whether that was terrorism-related or some other security risk, but the port has been shut down somehow. Situation in Venezuela is deteriorating rapidly. There is a force majeure order from President Maduro, basically bypassing the Congress and trying to seize dictator authority over the economy because it is about to descend into total chaos. Libya situation, meanwhile, has taken more oil offline. Analysts estimate that all of these factors together— Canada fires, Nigeria militants, Venezuela societal collapse, Libyan security tension— that's 3.75 million barrels per day taken offline.
Remember, the whole bearish thesis was that there was an oversupply of 1 to 1.5 million barrels per day. You subtract 3.75 from 1.5, all of a sudden what was a surplus turns into a deficit. Now, we still are at record storage levels, but at It looks like we've not only totally eliminated the surplus, but at least in the short term, we've turned it into a deficit.
We thought the Canada situation was temporary. Now it may not be so temporary. That makes a huge difference in the Cushing storage crisis, because remember, Cushing is so important because it is the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. Cushing storage is being driven by that Canadian oil coming out of Alberta. You shut that down, and now the risk of a storage crisis in Cushing is much greater. And that's the other thing. Is mitigated dramatically.
So the confluence of all these factors coming together, what it says to me is that we will probably muddle through this environment that we're in without actually getting to a storage crisis that would cause the price crash that Art Berman and I expected. So, you know, it sucks to be wrong, but the only thing that sucks more than being wrong is not being able to admit when you're wrong. And this is a case that's really frustrating because if I look at these fundamentals, if I look at this week's data, We were expecting, because of this 3.75 million barrels globally being taken offline, a million barrels being taken offline in Canada, everybody was expecting drawdowns across the board. We saw a national 1.3 million barrel build increase in national inventory this week against expectations of a drawdown of 3 million barrels. We saw Cushing, Oklahoma, despite the Canada fires, still showed a build of 500,000 barrels against drawdown expectations. Says very clearly to me that if not for the Canada, Nigeria, Libya, Venezuela situation, exactly the storage crisis that we predicted would be happening.
But, you know, you cannot account for the randomness of geopolitics, and that's just how the oil market is.
What's amazing to me, Cushing now, after this build, is now at 96.42%.
Nathan Egger: Wow.
Erik Townsend: operating capacity. No, I didn't misspeak. 96.5%. There's only 3.5% left in terms of Cushing operating capacity. But the market is not panicking about it because they're focused on other things. Now, in fairness, I need to define operating capacity.
The way to think about it, you go to the filling station with your car, you put the nozzle in your gas tank, you squeeze the handle. If you're in a state which still allows you to put the little lock on, you put the lock on and you stand there and you wait until it automatically shuts off. When it automatically shuts off, that tank is at its operating capacity. That's what it's designed to support.
We all know, even though it's illegal in some states, you can probably squeeze another gallon into that tank if you just milk it carefully and squeeze that handle gently in order to let a little bit of gas flow in without overflowing. That's also true of the big tank farms in Cushing, Oklahoma. So even though we're at 96.42% of operating capacity, they can go above operating capacity by a little bit. How much? Frankly, Nobody knows because we never tried it before. And who knows what kind of logistic situations come up. So, a crisis is still possible. We've only got 3% of operating capacity left. But with the Canada fires now looking like they're worsening, and it sounds like a whole month that some operators have already told their customers, we're not going to be shipping any oil.
Boy, it sounds like we're going to get through this one.
The one place I would say there's an exception to that Watch for a surprise from Prince Mohammed bin Salman. I haven't figured this guy out yet. I don't know what his agenda is. Why did he fire the previous oil minister, Al-Naimi? Is it because he thinks that Al-Naimi never should have let the price get this high, which Saudi Arabia didn't need to do? Or does he think that the whole idea of suppressing price in order to compete with other countries was a dumb idea and he wants higher prices? I don't know, but I'm waiting for a surprise from him. His last statements before the Doha meeting were certainly threatening. We can turn up production if we want to. I wonder if he's waiting for an opportunity to do that, but I really don't know what's on this guy's mind. Bottom line, we are now, despite the fact that I now think we can get through this without a storage crisis, we're still overbought on the RSI, right on the channel resistance line.
Now, the reaction—
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: to the Fed was just amazing. 96.42% of operating capacity. That data came out that we are almost out of space at Cushing. Price went straight down and then it retraced in less than 3 minutes. So the fact that we're out of storage space just isn't registering for traders.
About an hour, a couple hours later, this meaningless statement from the FOMC minutes comes out and everything crashes dramatically lower. So, the market is responding to signals that I don't think important and is ignoring signals that I do think are important. One way or another now, before the FOMC-induced down spike, which, as we're speaking, looks like it's more than halfway retraced and will probably fully retrace, we're at channel resistance on the major trend. We're at an overbought signal on the RSI, Relative Strength Indicator. These things all say to me, this is already built into the market. The price is already reflecting the fact the market thinks that everything is fine. We could still have a storage crisis. It's still possible. But even if it isn't, I think the market's already hit its high.
A lot of fundamental analysts are saying that $50 is where everybody is going to continue hedging. And I've definitely seen strong signs of hedging this week, watching the time spreads. They're collapsing exactly as I predicted as we come close to $50 oil. What's happening is the price is going up on the front month about 1 to 2 years out. The back months are being sold by hedgers who are protecting their ability to essentially lock in their prices and make themselves immune from another leg down. So definitely we're seeing that hedging as predicted. I did put on the curve steepener trade that I've talked about in previous shows, but no outright short here because my short conviction is Not as strong now that I see that we can get through this without what I previously thought was an unavoidable storage crisis.
Now, I'm saying we can get through it when we're at 97% of operating capacity. We're going to get to 100% of operating capacity. How much past 100% operating capacity is the real ultimate limit? I've scoured the internet. There's a lot of different opinions. I don't think anybody knows for sure.
What's going to happen there is anyone's guess, but I am more interested in this point in Looking away from directional trades and towards something like a term structure trade, a curve steepener in this case, which I think makes a lot more sense here.
Nathan Egger: Followers of today's guest, Jeff Christian's work, will know that he'll have plenty to say on gold. But what is the latest market action telling you, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, gold really tanked hard and decisively took out its 50-day moving average on this FOMC minutes news, which I think was just a silly overreaction to nothing new. But one way or another, that's what it did. So what it says to me, as I have alluded in previous shows, is if the Fed follows through and hikes rates in June and continues in subsequent meetings to continue hiking rates, which is what they've told us very consistently their intention is, I think the party could be over for gold in the short term. Now, I definitely am very bullish gold in the long term. I think everybody has realized during the course of the day Thursday that Wednesday afternoon's overreaction was an overreaction. I'm looking at hammer patterns forming in the charts for crude oil, for gold, for S&P 500 futures. That says that basically this was a panic sell-off that didn't make sense and the market is coming to its senses.
So, I think gold will probably close today above its 50-day moving average again. It's actually trading just barely above it as we're speaking mid-afternoon on Thursday. And will it bounce up dramatically from here? I don't know, but I think that we're only a couple weeks away from knowing what the June outcome is going to be. I think that if there is a rate hike in June, that probably gold is going to take it in the teeth.
Nathan Egger: And the dollar bulls are already out starting to pat themselves on the back as we broke above 95, and we really put some distance between the current prices and that May 3rd low. How is the U.S. dollar looking to you, Erik, in the wake of the Fed minutes?
Erik Townsend: Well, the wake of the Fed minutes is the key phrase there. Let's first look at it in isolation without considering that very important point. And boy, the chart looks fantastic. Not only have we taken out that downsloping trendline, the next thing to look for, for a technical analyst, would be a higher high than the previous one. We've got the higher high. The next thing to look for would be the higher low and then another higher high after that. The chart looks absolutely fantastic. It appears that the bottom is in and that it's all uphill from here and it's all great. But hang on. There is just silly, irrational exuberance that happened in reaction to the FOMC minutes. As I've said, I don't think they're as significant as the market took them to be. So I would look for maybe a little bit of a retracement of this bullish action in the Dollar Index. See it come back down a little bit.
What we need to see is we've got the higher high. We need to make sure that we get the higher low and not a lower low. And then I think the signals are looking pretty darn strong for the dollar bull market rally to continue. But right now, in reaction to the Fed, and of course a rate hike would imply a stronger dollar because we now have a marketplace that has rate hike expectations they didn't have before the Fed restated what they'd already said previously. I think we might see a pullback before the bull market in the dollar continues.
Nathan Egger: Well, thanks for helping us to make sense of this mess. Truly sounds like a mess, Erik. Now, this week's featured guest, as mentioned, is Jeff Christian. He's the founder of the CPM Group, and he's probably best known as a precious metals expert. But what I've been learning this week is Mr. Christian's background is actually considerably broader than that. So, I think you guys are really going to enjoy Erik's interview with Mr. Christian, whether you take an interest in the precious metals space or not.
That interview is coming up next as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is CPM Group's Jeffrey Christian. Many of you know Jeff as a precious metals expert, but Jeff, I'd like to start with the U.S. dollar because so many other things hinge on that. Something I've noticed interviewing a number of experts on this program is everybody has a different idea about what caused this massive rally in the US dollar in 2014 and most of 2015. So let's start with your view on why the dollar appreciated so much during that period.
Jeffrey Christian: I think there are a couple factors, and— but it all comes down to relative strength of economies, you know. And the US economy over the last 18 months has been extremely attractive to foreign investors, while many other economies have been far less attractive than they were in the period, say, 2010 to 2013 or '14.
And if you look at the strength of the United States and the advantages going for it, it has a lot of really big long-term advantages to other countries that give it a more powerful economic output. In addition to that, on a cyclical basis over the last couple years, the United States has been doing much better than Europe and Japan. China has actually been doing very well, but people haven't been giving it the credit because they're looking at percentage changes in factors instead of actual levels.
But a lot of other emerging markets— Russia, Brazil, South Africa— have stumbled. And what you've seen, you know, our interpretation of the strength in the dollar since 2014 has been that a lot of people have been buying dollars because they wanted to invest in the United States stock market, real estate, and corporations. So there's been a demand for dollars in order to take advantage of the relative strength of the U.S. economy. And I think that's the major factor that has been behind the strength of the dollar.
There's another factor which I'll throw out, which is relative interest rates, and not so much for individuals but for commercial banks. You have the Fed in the United States paying banks 25 basis points for excess reserves, whereas you have negative interest rates on excess reserves in other countries— Switzerland, the EU bloc, now Japan.
And that has been a major factor in the overall economy, but I think it's also been a factor in, in the strength in the dollar, in that you can just park your excess reserves here and earn 25 basis points as a commercial bank rather than take the risks of lending it out to people.
Erik Townsend: And what is your view going forward? Some people are saying that the top is in, the dollar index touched 100 and that's it, we're headed down from here. Others say this is just a pause and the dollar's headed much higher. What's your view?
Jeffrey Christian: My view is in the middle of those two. I think that we won't see the kind of strength that we've seen over the last 18 months in the U.S. dollar, that that big shift has gone away.
And in fact, staying on that topic for a second, what we think that we're seeing in the first several months of this year is that there's a rebalancing of global portfolios. Is abandoning the United States economy, stock market, real estate market, and takeovers of the U.S. corporations— Bayer versus— looking at Monsanto, for example. It's not that anybody's abandoning the U.S., but they're rebalancing their portfolio and they're saying, okay, because Brazil and China and Japan and Europe and other countries have been hammered down, they now have some short-term cyclical advantages and attractions that they didn't have 18 months ago. So what we're seeing, I think, in the dollar is a shift, a partial shift away from a mad dash into U.S. investments toward a more balanced global approach. But I think the emphasis will continue on U.S. investments because we still have these longer-term relative strengths.
Now, that given my background, that's my background for it and how I think that interprets itself into a trade-weighted dollar is that we maybe now have not seen the top. I think the dollar will move sideways with an upward bias in a less volatile fashion. So I don't see the dollar on a trade-weighted basis, and we look at the Fed trade-weighted dollar. I don't see it going back to to 80 or 75 or anything else. You know, I see it staying basically above 85 over the next couple of years, but I also see it probably moving somewhat higher and taking out its early 2016 peaks over the next couple of years as well. So I see it moving sideways with an upward bias in a less volatile fashion over the next couple of years.
Erik Townsend: Now, just Wednesday of this week, FOMC minutes were released from the April meeting, and it appears that markets are having something of a temper tantrum in reaction to the Fed hinting that perhaps some members thought that June rate hike was possible. In the short 5.5 minutes that we've been speaking mid-morning on Thursday, the S&P 500 futures have broken down below a fairly key neckline in a head and shoulders pattern that goes back to April. Gold is trading below its 50-day moving average for the first time in three weeks or so.
Do you think there's significance to this announcement, or do you think that we're just having a short-term temper tantrum reaction to yesterday's news?
Jeffrey Christian: I I think it's a short-term temper tantrum. You know, Fed board members, FOMC board members can think whatever they want, as long as they don't act on their thoughts. And we've seen 18 months of them thinking but not acting. And then there was one action in the last 2 years. So I think the Fed can say, yeah, maybe we should raise interest rates. And, you know, importantly, they said if the economy looks significantly stronger— and I do think the economy will show signs of strength over the next 4 or 5 weeks before the next Fed meeting. But I think that the Fed should remain extremely hesitant about raising interest rates. It may not raise interest rates in June, and if it doesn't raise interest rates in June, that probably puts the kibosh on it until after the election.
So I think that what you're seeing is the markets are reacting to these comments, but it's probably an overreaction. You know, if I were a short-term investor, I I'd be more likely to be buying S&P calls than puts.
Erik Townsend: Okay, let's go ahead and move on to gold now. As I mentioned, we are just today breaking below the 50-day moving average, although we haven't seen a close below it yet. What is your take? You know, with the dollar, you've kind of taken a neutral view. Do you think that gold is— the bottom is in and the rally is on, or do you think this is temporary, the strength that we've seen in the last few months?
Jeffrey Christian: I think that what we've seen is, you know, I think gold made a cyclical low in December, and coming off of that cyclical low in January through March, you had a very rapid appreciation, which reflected several things. One was real investors, longer-term investors and shorter-term investors, coming back into the gold market to buy gold because the cyclical lows seemed to have been made.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: But more importantly, because they were worried about the stock market, interest rates were moving down. The Bank of Japan moved to negative interest rates. There was concern about a U.S. recession. There was a concern about Chinese recessionary economic conditions. There were a lot of factors that were causing investors to buy gold, and coming off of that low after you know I think it was about four and a half years of declining prices since September 2011, coming off of that low, what you saw was a massive amount of liquidation of short positions, not only on the COMEX where you have numbers, but also anecdotally in the forward market, and also an enormous increase in long positions.
On the COMEX where you have numbers, you saw about 7 million ounces of short gold open interest liquidated by institutional investors in the first 4 months of this year, and that represented about 2/3 of the short position. So, you've had this massive short covering, and then you also had about 15 million ounces of fresh long building. Now, maybe half of that 15 million ounces was the guys who were liquidating their 7 million ounces short then went long, but then you had additional investors who were not short going long. And, but, you know, coming off of the floor in December and early January, you had the price goose- by this shift away from shorts to long positions. I don't think that— I think that that's in the market and in the price now. Our expectation is the price probably cools off over the next 3 or 4 months. There's a lot of reasons for that economically, seasonally, fundamentally.
But, you know, the question is how low does it go? You know, does it go to $1,180? Does it go to $1,130? I think it doesn't go back back to the December lows, that the cyclical decline is behind us. But I'm not necessarily looking for it to race sharply higher in the next 5 months or the next 10 months the way it has in the last 5 months.
Erik Townsend: You mentioned commitment of traders and positioning with respect to longs and shorts. I'm curious as to your view on the relevance of the commitment of traders reports for gold in specific, because I rely on them heavily. in the oil market, but my feeling is they're relevant because NYMEX represents the entire WTI oil market. In the case of gold, COMEX futures are a very, very small percentage of the overall gold market. Most of it is the London Exchange. So, it seems to me that what you're seeing in terms of commercial and speculative long and shorts in the Commitment of Traders reports is probably nothing more than arbitrage flows between LBMA and COMEX markets. Am I missing something there? Is there more relevance to COT with respect to gold than I think there is?
Jeffrey Christian: I think there is more relevance there because the COMEX is a significant place where a lot of short-term investors get involved. I will say this: we rarely look at the commercial positions because the commercials are really hedging their OTC positions and/or they are providing
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: And they're not getting the liquidity that the institutional investors want on the other side. So, people talk about the large buildup in short positions on the COMEX. That usually reflects the fact that the commercial, the banks and brokerage houses, are going long in the physical market, which is actually negative, because that means that there are more buyers than sellers in the physical market.
It also means that people are going long in the futures market. Because for everybody, every investor that comes in and says, "I want a 100-ounce gold futures position on the long side," there has to be a commercial entity that that sells it to them. And and so the the commercials are far less important.
But we look at the institutional investors, and we look at them across commodities, not just gold. And I do think that you see some very important trends there. So, for example, In the first quarter of 2013, you saw a reemergence of institutional investors who were willing to go long and went long at historically large amounts after about a decade of being very reluctant. I mean, going short institutional investors in first quarter of 2013 went short at historically large levels after a decade of being very reluctant to short. To short gold futures, and that was a gigantic sell signal. And that sell signal, which was really in place by the end of March, then was manifested in the mid-April, April 12th, April 15th decline in gold prices. But you saw this in the commitment of traders as well as in the OTC market in Shanghai.
You saw this growing bearishness.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: on the part of institutional investors, which was a giant sell signal. So, I think it's a little bit more important than just an anecdote.
But one of the things you always have to pay attention to, and one of the points we always tell our clients, is you have to understand the futures market is not the physical market, and the people who participate in the futures market are different entities than the people who are buying physical gold.
Erik Townsend: And what about silver? We're seeing more weakness today in silver than we are in gold. Is that just because Is it because it tends to be a more volatile product, or is it because it's an industrial as well as a precious metal?
Jeffrey Christian: I think it's partly because it's more volatile. I don't think it reflects its industrial nature. I think it's the smaller size, and also a lot of people are much more skittish about being long silver. Silver has had a better run-up than gold over the last 5 months, and there was some nervousness And it got up to, you know, $18 and started to back off. And while there was a tremendous amount of bearishness as long as it was rising, as soon as it fell, you start seeing some people reevaluate their bearish— their bullish positions. And then, you know, today I think one of the things that you saw was it broke below $17 in a very forceful way, and that led a lot of short-term people to get out.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, very forceful. We're speaking mid-morning on Thursday, and I'm looking at $1,636. So we've lost quite a bit just this morning. I know that CPM Group has also done some research on the other precious metals, the ones that nobody talks about, which of course are palladium and platinum. What's going on there? What do you guys see happening?
Jeffrey Christian: That's an interesting one because, you know, platinum and palladium tend to be tend to be mined together. Platinum is dominantly mined in South Africa. It's probably about, you know, 73% of mine production comes from South Africa. The South African mining industry is in extremely bad shape and, and, and probably, uh, it's facing a lot of long-term problems that we're not sure how they're going to be resolved because they're also political issues. So that on
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: Which on the surface sounds bullish, but if you dig down into the fabrication side, platinum tends to be used in diesel vehicle autocatalytic converters that clean up the exhaust for diesel vehicles, and palladium tends to be used in catalytic converters for cleaning up gasoline or petrol-powered engines, internal combustion engines. And there's a massive shift going on away from diesel engines from diesel to petrol. And then within the diesel market, you also see some technological changes. So the first thing is people are moving away from diesel passenger cars. You've seen market share of diesel passenger cars in Europe— the 2 big markets for diesel passenger cars are Europe and India.
India got rid of its diesel fuel subsidies in December 2014 and lost about 10 or 12 12% of its diesel market share last year. So you're already seeing a shift away from diesel toward petrol in the Indian passenger vehicle market. And then in Europe, they're starting to move away from it. And you've gone from about 56% of the passenger cars being diesel to about 51% last year, with a continuation of that and probably an acceleration of it in the years ahead.
Okay. So, in terms of the passenger car market, you're losing diesel market share. Diesel is still very important for trucks, lorries, and buses, and that's going to continue. So, you're losing diesel to gas, and that means less platinum use in autocatalysts and more palladium use. But then within the diesel sector, you're seeing more palladium being used relative to the platinum than used to be the case. And you're seeing this thing called selective reduction catalysts, which use urea instead of precious metals, being used especially with trucks and buses. And actually, you know, BMW, Audi, and Mercedes are using SCR technology on their high-end passenger cars. And now Volkswagen, in the wake of its scandal, said that they're probably going to go to SCR. So SCR uses A little bit of platinum, but mostly urea.
So, platinum is losing market share within the diesel market, and the diesel market is losing market share within the vehicle market. And that means less platinum demand and more palladium demand. Now, so that's bearish for platinum, bullish for palladium. And then you go back to what I was saying about mine production, which is primarily platinum in South Africa.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: It becomes a very bullish story for palladium and not so bullish for platinum.
Erik Townsend: Now, is this a trend that's early enough in its history that we would consider something like a pairs trade, long palladium and short platinum, or is this already played out and too late for that trade?
Jeffrey Christian: No, I think it's— it hasn't played out. I think it's got a lot further to go. We know people who are doing pair tradings, you know, shorting platinum, buying palladium. Most of our investors don't necessarily want to short platinum, but they are going long palladium at the expense of not going long platinum. So, yeah, it's a very interesting trend. It's a technological change. And A, it's early in the days, so you can still get into it. And B, the market itself hasn't necessarily focused on it.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, you heard it here first on MacroVoices. You gave a presentation a few weeks ago about commodity markets in general, and our registered listeners will receive that presentation before you receive the podcast in our Research Roundup email blast. So, give us a sense— basically, I think the gist of the presentation is the 3- to 5-year bear market in commodities. I'm not sure if you think it's over or it's late in its life, but it certainly is getting tired. Where are we in the commodity cycle? What are the factors that are going to determine when the bottom is in?
Jeffrey Christian: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And where do you see things headed from here?
Jeffrey Christian: Yeah, you know, our view has been— we started talking about a long-term secular upward shift in commodity prices around 2000, 2001, and our view was, you know, commodity supercycle is just marketing, but there are a lot of basic economic factors. You had all of these people uncaged economically around the world who were stepping up And it wasn't just China. China was very important, but it was India and the former Soviet republics and Eastern Europe and Brazil and other parts of Latin America and Africa. And you saw a tremendous amount of growth. You know, real GDP on a global basis went from 3.2% per annum in the period 1980 to 2000 to 4.5% from 2000 to 2007. When the Great Recession hit. And so you had this upward shift in the fabrication demand and consumption demand curves for commodities.
And you saw almost all commodities rise. Around 2006, 2010, we started saying, look, we may reach a cyclical peak within this secular bull market, and we could see commodity prices correct downward for 3 to 5 years. That cyclical peak occurred occurred for most commodities around 2011, and we are now about 4.5 years into it.
And it's looking to us as if we've probably made the lows for a lot of commodities. There are some commodities we don't like for fundamentals to those individual commodities, but, you know, for a lot of commodities, it looks like we've made a cyclical low.
And it's not that we're just looking at the price. We look at the fundamentals of supply and demand. And we also go back to those Commitments of Traders. If you look at the Commitments of Traders reports, what you saw over the last couple years as the dollar was rising, you saw this very strange and unexplained enormous increase in short positions from institutional investors across commodities.
And what we think you saw were a lot of investors Investors putting money into commodities, which had been hammered down, at a time when the stock market was rising and rising and rising, but looking top-heavy, and there was increasing concern about the state of the global economy and the U.S. economy. If you go back to the first quarter of 2014, first quarter of 2015, and the first quarter of 2016, you will find the financial press kept talking about, is the U.S. in a recession this year?
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: And each— in each year, by the time you get into the second quarter, they say, no, it was just a cold winter.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jeffrey Christian: So, you had investors being concerned about the economic environment, concerned that the stock market was looking top-heavy, and there was some money moving into commodities. But the money was being manifested on the short side, and you had this unprecedented short-side buildup across commodities. Now, over the last 5 months,
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: In the last couple of months, you've seen an enormous liquidation of that short position and a large increase in the long positions, which tells us that a lot of institutionally managed money has moved into commodities over the last couple of years.
And, again, you know, as I was explaining with gold, you get off that bounce where you have— once people's computers tell those people that the low was in, the computer's telling them, liquidate your shorts and go long. And I think that we've seen that across commodities.
So I think that we're probably at the end or a little bit past the end of the bear market in commodities, the cyclical downward pause, and we're going to resume the secular bull market going long-term because a lot of the economic conditions that fueled that bull market remain in place.
Erik Townsend: And with your views on the dollar, you said you did not expect a screaming rise higher, but over time you did expect higher U.S. dollar. A lot of people have forecast that the higher U.S. dollar could eventually lead to an emerging market debt crisis. Would you agree with that view, or it sounds like maybe your dollar view is, is not quite high enough, fast enough to bring on that kind of outcome?
Jeffrey Christian: I think I think our dollar view is not quite so dramatic as to do that, but I think that there are real risks of debt crises in the emerging markets, similar to what we saw in 1981 and '82 when we had the international debt crisis back then. And— but with several important differences. A, these economies are much larger and much more important on a global basis, and B, the tendency to cooperate among governments that we saw in 1981, '82 has largely dissipated. So I think that handling a future emerging market debt crisis will be a lot more difficult because the political willpower and capacity to handle it is diminished over the last 3 decades.
Erik Townsend: And what about China in specific? I know you mentioned it referenced commodities, but in a broader context, just some people feel that the overall global macro backdrop, China is probably the biggest risk if their troubles continue. So do you— would you agree with that view? And do you think that their troubles will continue?
Jeffrey Christian: I think China is an economy that has grown tremendously for the last 30 years, 35 years, and it's continuing to grow. Part of it— now, it does have problems, but I think the problems are grossly overblown in the Western press and grossly misunderstood. So if you look at, for example, the dollar value or the yuan value of GDP growth in 2015, you know, 2015 GDP grew about 6.9% according to official official statistics, but the actual value increase in Chinese GDP at that 6.9% growth was roughly equivalent to the value increase in 2007 when GDP grew 14.7%.
You know, so part of it's simple. You know, we don't teach math in universities or high schools or grade schools anymore in this So some of it's just bad math on the part— you know, people say, well, you know, China used to be growing 9% to 15% per annum, and now it's only growing 6.5%, 7% per annum.
But part of that is the fact that the Chinese economy used to be a $3 trillion economy, and now it's a $12 trillion economy. You know, and you could see— I use the example a lot of times of high-speed railroads. Chinese policymakers have had the country building 1,000 kilometers of high-speed rail every year for about 17 years now.
And, you know, the first year it was immeasurable growth in high-speed rail. The second year it was a 50% growth. And now it's down to about a 5% growth rate, you know, but it's still 1,000 1,000 miles or 1,000 kilometers of high-speed rail every year using the same volume of aluminum, same value of concrete, same volume of steel, and same value of copper. You know, but people don't necessarily see that.
Now, as I said, there are problems within the Chinese economy. They're trying to do something that's unprecedented in terms of the mass urbanization of farmers' subsistence farmers. They have a lot of issues that they're dealing with, but I think that they have the capacity to deal with them and they seem to be doing that so far.
Erik Townsend: Let's move next door to Japan. Kyle Bass, of course, has been very outspoken in saying Japan is in its endgame and, you know, the yen and JGBs are potentially imminently in big trouble here. What do you think about that view? Japan's role in the global macro backdrop in general?
Jeffrey Christian: Well, yeah, Japan has been diminished and it's going to continue to diminish. It has demographics against it. It's got a lot of financial problems. It has not been able to grow sufficiently to, to really get itself out of the malaise that it got itself into in the 1990s. And, and the power The policies that they have in place weigh against them getting things better. They have to make some radical changes in the way they view themselves, view their place in the world, allow immigration, allow other people to come in and help build up the country, and deal with the social compact between the government and an aging population. And you know, the United States. States and European countries all face the same problems. Japan may be worse in many ways than a lot of European countries in terms of its reluctance to do the things it needs to do.
And from a long-term perspective, the need to revise the social compact between governments and people in Europe, Japan, the United States, even in some of the emerging economies, is one of the the biggest negatives we see to long-term growth and one of the biggest positives for investing in gold. Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And speaking of positives for investing in gold, let's go around the globe to Europe. Boy, you know, between the sovereign debt situation and now the migrant crisis, seems like Europe is really having some difficulty. Where do you see that situation going from here?
Jeffrey Christian: It's very— it's, it's— I I don't know. I mean, yeah, and, you know, the fact that I don't have a clear view of where Europe is going is meaningless, but the fact that a lot of people look at Europe and they say, I don't see how this thing gets resolved, is very important.
And I think that that's where it is. I think the British referendum on E.U. membership on June 23rd is actually very important for the future of Europe. You know, one of the things I've been surprised by is the number of wealthy Tories that I know who have shifted from being lifelong pro-EU membership to saying, well, maybe it is time to leave.
You know, the EU was created in the '50s and '60s and then into the '70s and '80s it was actually organized and all and built upon. In an era of increasingly larger governments. But by the time you got into the late '80s, into the '90s, and going forward from there, the big social trend was devolution of economic— of political power into ever smaller regions. And, and, and so I think the EU and, and global governmental type structures are kind of passé, and they're running counter to what people want and what society wants. And what I'm finding in England are these people who, you know, lifelong supporters of membership to the EU, saying we probably should get out and this should probably be a good time.
And my comment was, I think the time will come when devolution of power in the EU makes sense, but I'm not sure this is the time. And their reaction is, well, maybe it is the time, and maybe if England says we want out, it starts the process elsewhere. And, and that's a very interesting thing. So I think that the British referendum on June 23rd actually has a lot more political and economic importance than just what happens in England.
And, and then when you start looking at Europe, as you said, you know, you've got major problems.
You have the social compact that's broken down. They have gotten better in terms of their management of sovereign debt in that the courts have ruled— and you saw this last year with the Greek rescheduling— the governments have greater capacity to deal with the problems of sovereign debt. But the sovereign debt problems are just going to grow and grow and grow until you have a redefinition of the social compact. And they That is just not on the horizon there. And meanwhile, you have this immigration flow. I mean, if you look at the UN's demographic numbers, you know, Europe has been contracting in population for decades, and they have it turning around over the next several decades. And when you say what's going to cause the population of Europe to grow, it's immigration.
And if I can go back to Japan for a second, you know, one of the problems with Japan is their hesitance to allow immigrants to come into the countries. Then you go to Europe and you say, well, who's immigrating there? These are not people who are coming to Europe to live the European dream and make their fortune. These are political, religious, socioeconomic refugees and immigrants.
And in many cases, what they try to do is get to Europe so they can get to England so they can get to Canada, Australia, or the United States. You know, one of the most embarrassing things is the refugee camps in Calais at the entrance to the Channel, because you have all these people who are willing to risk their lives walking through the Channel Tunnel or riding under trucks to get to England from France.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jeffrey Christian: So in Europe you have an immigration problem, but these are refugees. They're not people coming to make the dream. And then in Canada, the United States, Australia, New Zealand, other countries, you have people coming there because they want to work really hard, work 90 hours a week and make a fortune and live a better life.
And that difference in the types of immigrants that North America attracts compared to Europe and Japan speaks volumes about why the dollar probably won't collapse.
Erik Townsend: Now Russia's economy is obviously under tremendous stress as a result of depressed oil prices. I saw a headline, I forget who the gentleman's name was, but one, a former European military commander was very outspoken in the press saying that he's appalled that European governments are not preparing for outright war with Russia because he thinks it's inevitable. I don't know about that view, but I certainly see tremendous pressure building on Russia's economy with the oil situation. So what do you see there in terms of both both geopolitical risk and economic factors as a result of the Russian economic depression?
Jeffrey Christian: Well, I am concerned about the military issues, but I'm also probably more concerned about the social and political. And Russia has any number of problems— declining population, very unproductive industry, very unproductive labor force. That they're not really dealing with. These problems were extremely difficult in the 1990s, and you had probably— well, you had measured real GDP falling 5 to 10% per year in the late 1990s. Putin came in as a reformer, and he was starting to make some reforms, but then he got off track.
And the higher oil prices from 2000 to 2008 I think sort of papered over a lot of these problems. Now, with the lower oil prices, the problems are very much apparent again, and there doesn't seem to be too much of a policy move to correct them. And and so I think that Russia, from a political, economic, and social perspective, is facing really. Large problems with no signs that the government or society in general are acting to address those issues.
Whether that is reflected in militarism or not is partly Russia's fault and it's partly the U.S. and NATO's fault, too. You know, the U.S. had promised them when they agreed to allow the Germans to reunify that the U.S. and NATO would not put— extend NATO beyond Germany. And we broke that promise. And when the Russians complained about it, the U.S. State Department said, well, we didn't put it in writing.
You know, that's not the way you work among countries that want to be friends with each other.
I once had a CEO of a company that had done us wrong say, well, we've talked to our lawyers and we don't have any legal liability here. And I said, no, it's just an ethical liability. And he said, well, then we have nothing to talk about. And, you know, that's not the way you do business if you want to do business on an ongoing basis.
So I think that you've got a real problem with the Russian psyche, which is not only pervasive within the Kremlin, but it's pervasive with 60 or 70% of the Russian population, according to You know, various polls, you have the Russian psyche looking at itself as set upon by the West, and you have the West sort of saying, let's set upon the Russians. So you have a lot of saber rattling on both sides. It's extremely problematic. It's extremely worrisome. And when you've got generals saying, you know, we really should be preparing for war with them, on both sides—
Erik Townsend: Russia.
Jeffrey Christian: both sides, it just makes it that much more dangerous. I don't know if a war will come, but, you know, again, the political leadership in the United States, the political leadership in NATO, and the political leadership in Russia all seem to be unprepared to avoid war.
Erik Townsend: Russian scholar Sergei Glazyev has articulated a plan where he says that Russia should engage in economic war with the West before outright real war. And he suggested that the reason that the US dollar is the world's reserve currency is because there is no viable alternative. And he therefore reasons that Russia and China should work together to create a viable alternative.
Number one, do you think that there's any realistic chance of that happening? And number two, do you think that it is possible if these things were to happen, if Russia and China tried to create an alternate currency that was backed by gold or something, as some have suggested, would that actually change anything? Would it cause central banks to prefer that currency, or is Mr. Glazyev just spitting into the wind to suggest these ideas?
Jeffrey Christian: I don't know Mr. Glazyev, but every country has people who come up with radical ideas, and I think it's a sign of
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jeffrey Christian: Democratic progress in Russia and in China, you hear people say, well, we should have a gold standard and stuff like that, even though the government and the central bank don't buy into that and don't want that. They allow people to say those things.
I think that there are 2 big issues that you have. The first one— the second one is the currency issue and the dollar and the future of international currency regimes. The first one that I want to address is the idea of Russia engaging in economic warfare. The Soviet Union and post-Soviet Russia have always worked hard to disengage their economic and commercial activities from their political activities. The United States has always been— well, we go back and forth. We vacillate between saying there's a relationship between human rights and commercial practices, and we're going to meddle in other countries.
If you look at the history of the Soviet Union and then the post-Soviet Russia, what you find is that these guys have worked very hard, even at the height of the Cold War, to be responsible suppliers of raw materials and other goods to the world. So, you know, in the platinum and palladium market, Like last year, when you started seeing the U.S. and Europe impose increased sanctions on Russian entities, there were people in the platinum and palladium market saying, "Well, Russia may stop exporting palladium to Europe and the United States because of these sanctions." And the Russian government said, "No, we're not going to do that. That's not what we do.
We disaggregate our commercial." activity from our political activity. And, yes, we don't like the sanctions, and we don't like the belligerence toward us, and we don't like what we see as a cultural refusal to understand why Russia does what it does. But that doesn't mean we're going to resort to economic warfare. Now, the Soviet Union did that, as I said, throughout its history, including at the height of the Cold War.
Post-Soviet Russia has done that too.
So I think the idea that Russia changes its stripes and starts engaging in economic warfare is probably highly unlikely. It's possible, but I think it's highly unlikely because there's a cultural embeddedness, you know, that you don't do that. So I don't see that the Russians would engage in economic warfare.
Also, the Russians are very straightforward. If they're going to attack you, they're going to attack you. You know, U.S. will will smile in your face, you know, and then stab you in the back. That's our history. That's not their history.
Now, going on to the currency, most central banks around the world have spent the last twenty, twenty-five years now talking about and thinking about. What happens in a post-dollar international currency regime. And the problem is there's nothing on the horizon to replace the dollar. The dollar has hegemonic power within the monetary system. Something like 62% of monetary reserves held by central banks are held in the dollar or dollar-based assets. And something like 75% or 80% of private sector wealth is in dollars on a global basis. So, for you to move away from the dollar to something else, or a basket of currencies or something else, you'd have to have this massive increase in liquidity in those other currencies.
And if it's a basket of all the other currencies combined, you have hyperinflationary pressures because of the monetary liquidity creation. We, we as a world have been trapped into a world that is sort of locked into the dollar.
Central banks look at it and they say we would love to slowly and non-volatilely move toward a world where we have a poly multipolar international currency regime, where there's enough liquidity in other currencies that they. They don't necessarily compete, but they complement the dollar. And it's going to take decades to do this, if we can do it at all. And it's going to take a level of international cooperation that we really haven't seen since the 1970s or '80s, I guess, on a global basis. But what— this is what central bankers would like. They don't necessarily see any role for gold in denominating currencies.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jeffrey Christian: They do see an enhanced role for gold as a monetary reserve to help them diversify away from the dollar, and as they diversify into other currencies as well. But I think the long-term goal that central bankers see is a situation there. Now, you know, there are two gigantic obstacles. One is the lack of liquidity in alternative currencies, including gold, to the dollar.
And the other one is national laws prohibiting people to hold wealth in other currencies. You so you need governments around the world to sort of say, okay, we wanted to liberalize our currency and banking system.
Turkey did this in 2011 during the financial crisis in Europe and in the EU next door in Greece. Turkey said, okay. Okay, you can hold wealth in Turkish lira, dollars, euros, or gold in our banks. And those dollars, lira, and gold can be used to meet reserve requirements, freeing up the Turkish lira in the banks to be lent to keep Turkey out of the economic recession that Greece and the rest of Europe was falling into.
But Turkey is a small country, and we've been surprised that other countries Countries haven't pursued similar policies. That's got to be done on a global basis, and but it's got to be done unilaterally by each country. You know, the United States, European countries, South Africa, Brazil, China, Russia—all of these countries slowly but surely have to get to the point where they can say our citizens can hold their wealth in whatever currency, including gold and silver. That they want.
And that then allows you to start moving toward this post-dollar system. And I think, you know, if you talk to the central bank in Russia or China or Japan, or you talk to European central bankers or Latin American central bankers, this is what they would like to try to move toward. And they've been stymied, I think, by, as I said, the breakdown in international cooperation on a political and fiscal level, and they've been stymied by other problems too.
I don't necessarily see a new currency created by China and Russia, with or without a gold backing, ever being a viable alternative to the dollar.
Erik Townsend: Finally, before we close, I want to go back around the globe to New York City and talk about what you guys do at CPM Group, because I think honestly you're one of the most misunderstood people. You've spent a lot of energy, Jeff, debunking some of the conspiracy theories in the gold and silver markets, and that's kind of made you the target of the gold bugs as public enemy number one. My favorite allegation is that Jeffrey Christian is nothing but an apologist for the bullion banks, who turn out to be your direct competitors, as I understand it. So, tell us what you actually do for a living at CPM Group.
Jeffrey Christian: Right. CPM Group is an independent commodity research consulting company. We do a lot of very basic research. We develop good numbers on supply and demand for precious metals, specialty metals like vanadium, molybdenum, and manganese that don't have good stuff. And we also do a lot of research on energy, agricultural, and other commodities. So we study the commodities markets and we apply economic and econometric practices to analyzing these markets that a lot of other people don't do.
In addition to that, because we're in New York and because we grew out of the financial system, we were originally the research department at J. Aron, then we became the commodities research group at Goldman Sachs. And 30 years ago this month, by the way, I bought— I was running the commodities research group at Goldman Sachs. And 30 years ago this month, I bought it from Goldman and set up CPM Group as an independent shop, saying I don't want to be involved in an investment bank.
I think there are inherent conflicts of research being owned by investment banking and trading companies. I want to set up an independent shop and provide research consulting and financial consulting to people. So our 5 product lines are research and commodity Commodities-oriented consulting, but then we also do a lot of work on financial consulting, on hedging and materials management across commodities.
We also do work on asset management, and we'll advise companies and investors on managing their assets, whether they should be buying gold. Right now, we're spending a lot of time telling people don't buy lithium mining companies because. Because we don't think lithium makes sense. We'll do commodities management, asset management, and then we do some financial advisory work and investment banking advisory work where we'll help. We you know we'll help a company do a gold stream prepaid forward to finance development or expansion of a mine. We'll analyze mining opportunities for institutional investors and say you know okay you've been up. You know, if you're approached by this guy who wants to develop a lithium mine, don't, don't, don't buy it.
Or, you know, we'll look at individual assets that people are interested in buying and we'll help them determine whether or not it makes sense for them to invest in them.
Erik Townsend: And you were kind enough to send us a couple of sample research notes that sort of give our listeners a sense of what you do. Those will be attached to our Research Roundup email that our registered users at MacroVoices.com MacroVoices.com will receive at the same time as this podcast. Jeff, thanks so much for joining me on the program. Nathan Egger will be back with me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: All right, Erik, I feel you and Jeff Christian just pretty much zipped us around the globe there in record time. Tons of illumination on a wide variety of subjects. And you know, as I said, I've heard a lot about him in the precious metals world, but I wasn't aware he and his firm were active in so many other areas.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, Jeff's a really good guy. I've known him for several years, and I think he's a little bit of a masochist. He tries to debunk the gold bugs. Conspiracy theories. He's trying to help people because he has a passion for the truth. In many cases, the people he's trying to help are people who don't want to be helped. And he's kind of been labeled as, you know, the public enemy number one of the gold bugs. But he's a super talented guy, and we actually talked off the air, and I said, give me a list of topics. I don't want to keep it precious metals-centric that you're comfortable covering. And Jeff is a formally trained journalist, and he said, what are you talking about? Your job is to ask me hard questions, including ones I don't know the answer to. That's what journalism is all about.
And I just love his style. And Jeff and I know each other well enough that he could say that. I said, okay, fine. And I very intentionally just said, okay, let's take it around the globe.
He didn't know what was coming. And I'm just hitting him with China, Japan, Russia. He didn't know who Sergei Glazyev was, but frankly, neither has pretty much any other guest I've asked that question of. But he's a super guy. And I always enjoy his commentary. And I think he has a very level-headed perspective.
He's one of the very few people I know who is in the precious metals business who doesn't really have a permanent bullish bias. You know, it's not buy precious metals because I'm in the business of selling them to you. It's I'm in the business of consulting, and right now, he said, I think we could be in for a soft patch. We had the gold market— he does seem to think that the bottom is in, but he thinks it's gotten ahead of itself and maybe is in for a soft patch. You don't hear that from the coin dealers.
So, I really appreciate Jeff's perspective. And frankly, every time my inbox pops up with a CPM Group research paper, I'm always eager to see it because it's produced—
Nathan Egger: Erik, while you're speaking of research papers, sorry, I need to interrupt you here because we've been doing this Research Roundup, which we email to all of our registered guests so that they can get the supporting documents that we mention on the show. And we've had a lot of emails from listeners in the past week who have been asking to be signed up. to our Research Roundup so they can receive those papers, charts, presentations, and all this.
We can't sign you up for you.
What you'll need to do is go to www.MacroVoices.com and click on the button that says log in or register. There you will be able to create an account with us, and it's not going to cost you anything. You will not receive any spam. We will never sell your email address to anybody, but you will receive the Research Roundup that we be continuing to refer to in the future, and a notification as well when new shows are published. You'll also gain access to our listener discussion forums, and there you can discuss subjects covered on the show and also recommend to us future show guests and topics. Just needed to get that out of the way. Go ahead, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so we'll now return to our non-commercial program, which has no commercial breaks or interruptions. Anyway, I love the CPM Group stuff. It's level-headed. It's not skewed in terms of a bullish view in what they happen to be selling. And I love those guys.
Nathan Egger: Erik, while you were talking with Jeff, I got a little confused about a number of things. First of all, what were you getting at when you were asking Jeff about the Commitments of Traders reports for gold? And you mentioned something about arbitrage flows. Is there any way that you can shine further light on those subjects and explain to me why exactly were you asking him that?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I was curious whether he would share a view that I have been persuaded by. I don't want to take credit for it. It was actually Bron Suchecki, who used to be with Perth Mint and has moved on to another position now, who I interviewed years ago, who really woke me up to this. And he— first of all, we should explain his background, what Commitment of Traders reports are.
Large traders, anybody in the futures market who trades more than a certain number of contracts, is required by law to report their positions to the government.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And the government then publishes what's known as the Commitment of Traders reports, and it shows what is the net long and net short exposure of different categories of traders. So the commercial traders are like the big banks and large commercial enterprises. The speculators are hedge funds and individual traders and people that are speculating in these markets. And the idea is that if you know that the speculators tend to be the ones that change their mind and give up on positions and so forth.
When everybody's on one side of the boat, you want to be on the other side of the boat. And that's what the Commitment of Traders reports are used for by futures traders. I use it and I put a lot of faith in it in something like the crude oil market, because those tell you where all the large traders are positioned. The NYMEX is basically the whole West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. Now, of course, there are physical markets which are not traded as futures.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: But most of them are all indexed to that WTI futures contract price. So the futures contract is discovering the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil. That's where the price gets set. It's the definitive source, and that's it.
A lot of the people in the gold and silver community point to these Commitment of Traders reports and they say, look, look at what's going on with how big the commercial short interest is. There's a conspiracy here. Something's going on. Well, first of all, there's no conspiracy. It makes perfect sense that large commercials who have vaults that are full of gold and silver, if they want to not take market risk, they hold the long position in the metal and then a short position in the futures contract in order to hedge their risk to zero so that their value of their position doesn't go up and down with the market, but they have the gold on hand in order to be able to meet the needs of their customers and so forth. So, it really does make sense in that regard.
But what Bron pointed out to me is, wait a minute, most of the action in gold is all in the London Bullion Metal Exchange. It's not in the COMEX futures contract. Most of the volume of gold is all traded in London. And what happens anytime you have multiple markets is a process called arbitrage. In other words, if the price of gold gets to be 50 cents per ounce higher in London than it is in New York, what the banks are going to do is make a profit from that. They're going to sell London gold and buy New York gold. And in theory, they would have to move that gold from New York to London in order to settle that, but they don't do it that way. They just keep exploiting these little inefficiencies, and eventually it all washes out, and they don't have to move any physical gold around. They're just leveling the price back and forth.
So what Bron pointed out to me is when you look at the positions of the commercials changing, you know, they just added 5,000 contracts since the last weekly report, and suddenly the commercials are more short than they were, or less short than they were. Does it really mean that anybody bought or sold anything, or does it just mean that those are banks that are noticing imbalances between London and New York prices, and their positions are changing, quite understandably, because as they arbitrage those price differences, That means that their COMEX exposure, that's the number that's visible in the Commitment of Traders reports, is going to go up and down reflective of what's going on in London.
And the true story of how the biggest traders are really positioned would be hidden in over-the-counter derivatives contracts, forwards, traded on the London Metals Exchange, which we don't have visibility to. So, Bron's argument is COT is irrelevant to precious metals because the COMEX is not the primary market for them. And therefore, the positioning of who's on the COMEX is more of an indication of arbitrage flows between London and New York, as opposed to anybody's actual positioning.
Nathan Egger: This makes sense to me, Erik, and I appreciate you clarifying that. But that is not nearly as fun as a juicy Illuminati conspiracy theory to suppress the price of gold.
Nathan Egger: So, we received a huge increase in the amount of ratings and reviews on iTunes in the last So I just want to thank listeners who took the time to do either of those. And I just want to remind you guys that while we don't want your money, you can still support us hugely and support the program in a big way by subscribing, rating, and reviewing on iTunes. If you don't know how to do this, please email me at Nathan@MacroVoices.com, and I'll help you get it worked out.
You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices. And while you're there, if you're interested in getting updates throughout the week from Erik, follow his personal handle. That's @erikstownsend. If you don't do the social media thing, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.
We'll be back next week with Julian Brigden. He's the co-founder and president of Macro Intelligence II Partners, and he's another brilliant macro mind. So we sincerely hope you'll be kind enough to join us again. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.
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