Raoul Pal — Global macro investor, writer, and Real Vision Television co-founder (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 9 was recorded on April 7th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Global macro investor, writer, and Real Vision Television co-founder Raoul Pal will be joining me as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Raoul about the US dollar rally, why he thinks it's set to rally much farther, why he's bullish on long bonds, what he thinks about negative-yielding European sovereign debt, and a long list of other macro topics. I think you're really going to enjoy this week's interview.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's dive into the markets. Erik, you've been an equity bear for weeks here, and we've just seen the S&P close Thursday at around 2,040. Dovish comments from the Fed enabled us to make a new year-to-date high early this week, but now we're seeing a pretty compelling head and shoulders formation being completed here on Thursday. Is the market finally ready to cooperate with the bears?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, there was a break of a neckline. It's really just a mini S&P formation that's occurred over just the last couple of weeks. I think that what is still the big question mark here, the reason the rally has stalled— clearly it is not advancing even higher, but it really has not impressively turned down either. And I think the equity market is waiting to see what happens with the oil market.
And I think that the oil I think the oil market will get to that next. Needs another catalyst before— it may need another week before it's ready to move down. I think equities are probably going to drift around here in this range until the oil market turns down first. And I think that's going to be the catalyst to turn the equity market back over.
Nathan Egger: Well, let's cover the crude oil. Saudi Arabia seems to now be backpedaling on the output freeze, suggesting that no freeze is possible without Iran's cooperation, specifically Iran. And Iran has the pedal to the metal and has said they have no intention of taking their foot off the pedal anytime soon. So could this be the catalyst that finally has the market trending lower?
Erik Townsend: No, I don't think so. You know, this, this whole production freeze thing has been so just beaten to death. It was first introduced on the morning of January 20th. It was fully and thoroughly debunked by credible experts by the afternoon of January 20th, and it still has been a major influencing factor in the market.
The oil ministers from OPEC have done an incredible job of political theater, getting people to think that this is meaningful. And it still isn't. I think that Saudi Arabia has been pretty shrewd here. You know, what happened is they didn't want to do anything. Venezuela was really pressuring them very hard to say, oh, come on, come on, come on, you got to at least come to the table. And Saudi Arabia says, hmm, okay, well, what if, you know, they clearly want— we're not going to agree to a production cut, but they want us to agree to some token kind of something, and they're really pushing hard for it. What could we— I know, we'll agree to something that kind of backs Iran into a corner. Hey, we're willing to freeze production as long as everybody will do it. Well, of course, it's absurd to ask Iran to freeze production.
They just had sanctions lifted. They've been in a very depressed condition. They're just trying to return to their normal production. So I don't think any of that is going to play. But the thing is, this week, what we got was, you know, the market had been just really dramatically selling off, as I've expected that it would. We hit the 50-day moving average. I knew that by itself ought to be good for at least a little bit of a bounce. But then what we got was a very unexpected bounce.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: drawdown in inventories. The amount of oil in those tanks actually came down for once, which is the opposite of the trend that we've been seeing. That shocked prices, probably almost $2, $2.50 higher. We were trading in the $35 handle a couple days ago.
As I'm speaking to you now, we're back up above $37. So this thing was headed lower, then we get this inventory report. And I suppose you could interpret that inventory report to mean that Art Berman got the analysis wrong, I got the analysis wrong, IEA got the analysis wrong, and the market's not really oversupplied. And, you know, we're, we're not going to have any more builds in inventory.
The more likely explanation, I think, is the fact that there's been a whole lot of fog around the Houston Ship Channel has delayed the arrival of some ships that were supposed to arrive last week. If I'm right about this, and it's just a hunch, it's not a prediction at this point, I think we've got a setup next week for maybe a massive build in inventory. And it's not because of any change in fundamentals. It's just because a couple of ships that were late getting in might arrive this week instead of last week, and they'll show up in next week's inventory number. So I don't put any fundamental importance on the fact that we had what I think was a fluke of a 5 million barrel inventory drawdown.
Nathan Egger: All right, Erik. So with all these factors together, where does that leave us?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it where it leaves us is in a little bit of limbo, Nathan. I would be surprised if the sell-off in crude oil, which is very much what I do expect to continue, is going to get much lower than the 50-day moving average until we see a catalyst, and that catalyst will be an inventory number. We got the inventory number in the other direction this week. I think it's a fluke. I do think it potentially sets us up for a big number in the other direction next week. That, I think, if it happens, would be the catalyst to take the market. Market to the next level lower. There's pretty good technical support levels at 34 and 32 and again at 30. But I think we're ultimately headed into the 20s. It's just going to be a question of time. And it's those inventory reports that are going to do it. And I think really the Cushing inventory more so than the headline national number is going to be it.
There was an interesting thing that happened in this report, Nathan, which is when the API data came out on Tuesday afternoon, that's the private data. We were expecting a 650,000-barrel build from the private API data on Tuesday afternoon. When we got the EIA data on Wednesday morning, it was a much, much smaller build. So I think that's helped the price to move higher.
What I'm going to be watching most closely on next week's both Tuesday and Wednesday— that's API first and then EIA inventory numbers— is the Cushing, Oklahoma number. If that number continues to build significantly, I think it's going to be the catalyst to push prices considerably lower.
Nathan Egger: Erik, last week gold was experiencing close encounters with its 50-day moving average, and you opined that the big question would be whether it bounced higher off the 50-day or if it would break down below the 50-day. How's it looking this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, what the market's doing is what I call hugging the moving average. In other words, for the last week, it's been bouncing up and down in a narrow trading range, but it's basically right along its 50-day moving average. And what's going on is the bulls and the bears are fighting it out. The bulls are buying the 50-day moving average. They think it's going to bounce higher. The bears are selling it thinking it's going to move lower. So far, the bulls are winning, but this is exactly the kind of pattern that you would expect.
As gold flirts with its moving average here, we need to see one of two things happen. Either it clearly breaks away from the moving average. In other words, there's plenty of space above the moving average, below the trading range on a given daily basis for at least a couple of days, or it breaks down below it. And it hasn't done either one of those. So we are above the moving average, lingering, hovering just above it. Will it break higher? Or will it break down below it? That still is the $64 million question.
Nathan Egger: Thanks for bringing us up to speed, Erik. We've got a killer interview with GMI's Raoul Pal coming up right after this.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Raoul Pal joins me as our featured guest. Raoul began his career on the sell side, where he co-managed hedge fund equity and equity derivatives business for Goldman Sachs in Europe. Raoul then moved to the buy side, where he co-managed Raoul managed a global macro hedge fund for GLG Partners in London. He retired from running other people's money back in 2004 at the grand old age of 36. Raoul now lives in the Cayman Islands, where he writes the Global Macro Investor newsletter. Raoul is also, of course, Grant Williams' partner in Real Vision Television. Raoul, I've been particularly keen to get you on the program for one specific reason, and that is that you have been incredibly right recently in your macro calls, to the point that when you interviewed Hugh Hendry for Real Vision Television recently, Hendry actually opened the interview by, by cracking a few jokes and picking on you for how right you've been. So I've got to congratulate you.
Hugh Hendry is known for a lot of things to a lot of people, but publicly expressing humility and acknowledging someone else's brilliance is not something you get out of Hugh very easily. So my hat is off to you.
Raoul Pal: Thank you. But one thing we have to all understand in this business is Being right is something that's fleeting. Sometimes we can look heroes for a period of time, but usually it doesn't last that long. We all just try our best.
Erik Townsend: Well, you've been hitting it. You've been batting 1,000 so far, for the least in recent history. I want to dive right into what I think is arguably the hottest topic in macro today. And that, of course, is the US dollar rally and the hot debate over whether it is done and ready to falter or if it is just catching its breath and ready to take off, as Goldman Sachs Thanks. Thanks. It is here.
Something I've noticed, though, about this subject, people will get into a debate about whether it's going to end or it's not going to end or it's about to end or whatever. And then they realize they are coming from completely different understandings of what caused the rally in the first place. So, I don't think it's constructive to talk about whether it continues or not until we're on the same page about what caused it. So, let's set the Wayback Machine to the end of 2013. Why did the US Dollar Index rally so aggressively in 2014? What was driving it? Why did it slow down in 2015? And what's going to happen next?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, it's a multi-phase thing. I think it's a really good question because what started off and what generally starts off these kind of giant macro trends is policy divergence. So, we had the Japanese came out of the blue with the massive outsized quantitative easing and the kind of stated aim of weakening the yen. So, what you have is suddenly the Fed who were looking to tried to tighten rates at that point. They didn't obviously do it for a long period of time, but they wanted to slightly tighten rates. Meanwhile, the Japanese were doing the absolute opposite in the biggest possible size.
So what happened is dollar-yen took off, or the yen collapsed, and that started the global macro imbalance because the move of the yen versus all of its trading partners was far too big for the world to deal with. And that was the start of the dollar rally, because then that kind of sucked in the euro. The Europeans had to do something about their own currency. But the US at the same time was trying to strengthen or tighten rates.
So that whole divergence set the thing off. That was the spark that lit the kindling. The kindling was the policy divergence. Then what happened was it started sucking in at the margin a lot of the big carry trade positions, which is $9.8 trillion according to the BIS. And that's a short dollar position that the world has. So what you've got is you've got a massive amount of fuel to this fire.
The policy divergence set it off, and then the thing started. And then it's very difficult to stop once currencies start trending.
So you talk about, yes, it paused last year. Well, it depends what you're looking at. The major currencies that started the move against the dollar, the euro and the yen, did pause, but nothing else did. I mean, I look at a basket of 27 currencies equally weighted against the dollar to give us the best idea.
And almost all of them continue trending lower against the dollar for the entire of last year. The emerging markets obviously got massively smashed in the back of this. But the whole situation is going to go— continues to go on and roll between region to region. One minute, it's the Aussie dollar, next minute, it's the euro, next minute, it's the Swiss franc, then it's the pound. So, it's a big rolling situation.
Okay. Now, going forwards, where do I think we are? Okay, I have to acknowledge I've been one of the big dollar bulls. I've been a dollar bull for a long, long time now. At this point, if I look back at the 2 preceding dollar bull markets, the early '80s and the late '90s, the early '80s bull market, the dollar rose about 100%.
In the late '90s, it rose about 50%. At this time, it's up about 30%. It's a very small dollar bull market compared to the others. We also know that the short position in the dollar based around the carry trade, not the speculative position, but the real positioning, is the biggest the world has ever seen.
What I look at the world is in terms of probabilities. The probability of this carry trade unwind happening is high. What it does is create a situation of a negative gamma in these currencies. And you tend to get an acceleration through that. Now, what's interesting is that carry trade is hardly unwound at all. In fact, arguably not at all. It stopped increasing, which is the only thing we've seen so far. So that makes me think potentially there's another leg to come.
I then lay on technical analysis onto that to look at where we are. And technically, the dollar's not doing anything wrong. Dollar-yen possibly, but that moved the most, so it's having a bigger correction. The euro is just trading sideways. The DXY is trading sideways. And many of the other currencies are actually still starting to weaken again against the dollar. So we've got a situation where it's possible that it tops out. It's possible that the G20 agreed something tacitly to try and stop using currencies. I don't really believe that's the case, but many people do. But let's give them the benefit of the doubt. Maybe they tried to say, OK, let's just try and hold off using currencies.
But if I look at the positioning, the positioning now is people start to get short the dollar, particularly against the yen and even starting against the euro.
So if I think of the short-term speculative positioning, that's potentially on the wrong side of this. Potentially the Fed, if the economic data continues to come out reasonably okay, they may be forced to look to tighten again. We've still got a situation where the Europeans and the Japanese still want to loosen monetary policy, but maybe not using negative interest rates. So the policy divergence is still in place. The technical position looks corrective as opposed to a reversal. And then we know we've got this huge amount of kerosene, which is the global carry trade. So that's all there. So if I use the balance of probabilities, I'd say the probability is this is corrective.
If we look at the previous 2 dollar bull markets, we never had a correction bigger than 10%. We've had about 7% this time around. So we could go a little bit further in this correction. But it looks unlikely. Both of them around the same level, about 35% into the rally, had a big correction. So this is pretty much in line with the previous other 2 dollar bull markets.
So I'm— my base case has and still remains that this will be one of the larger dollar bull markets that we've seen.
I clearly understand there is a risk that there is a reversal, but I don't believe that there's a Plaza Accord-style agreement in Shanghai. There's just not enough evidence to suggest that that's the case. So that's where I stand on the whole situation right now.
Erik Townsend: You made a comment recently, I believe it was on CNBC, where you said you thought that the 10-year Treasury bond could actually go all the way to 50 basis points. And the CNBC commentator just didn't even know what to make of that. They thought you had misspoken. Was that a dollar strength argument, or is there more to that story? What is it that causes you to see this very, very bullish case for long-dated Treasury paper?
Raoul Pal: Yeah. So that is based on 3 things. Firstly, global rate differentials. So everywhere else has interest rates at 10 years negative, both in Germany and in Japan right now. So for the US rates to come down 50 basis points doesn't look unreasonable. It doesn't look unreasonable in terms of the curve flattening, which has been doing aggressively for quite some period of time now. That kind of makes sense to me. If the Fed were to tighten, the curve would flatten anyway. Because they'd start pricing in a recession because growth is too slow in the US.
I also spend a lot of time looking at the business cycle. I use the ISM as my best predictor of the business cycle. Now, the business cycle topped out several years ago now and has been softening ever since. The ISM crossed 50 and then crossed— got down to around 48, giving us about at the time between 65% and 70% chance of a recession.
So if that were the case, then clearly 10-year bond yields have to fall a lot further. You know, if we look at the Atlanta Fed GDP now, it's currently about 0.6%. So the US economy is weak. So therefore, we should see Treasury bonds rallying. Inflation— there is no inflation apart from the year-on-year rate of change of the oil price. Other than that, if we look at core inflation, core inflation lags the ISM by a full 24 months. So we should see core inflation coming lower anyway over the next year or so.
So what we've got is a situation where we've got weak growth in the US, we've got a business cycle that has rolled over, and we've got inflation that should be rolling over in any event. And then we've got the global rate differentials driving it. The dollar itself obviously creates a much slower global economic growth situation. We've seen global trade at its second lowest level since 1958, and that's due to the US dollar. So that's causing tremendous pain around the world. And obviously, the fallout of the global commodity markets has created a huge slowdown anyway in the global economy.
So the only thing conflicting to that that makes me scratch my head is obviously the bounce in the ISM that we've seen. It's very common in the final part of the down cycle leading into recession to get a small bounce. It's rare that it bounces back over 50, which the ISM did at the beginning of this month. So that makes me pay attention and say maybe I'm wrong. Maybe this is a replay of 1998 where the in the middle of the dollar bull market, after the emerging market crisis, the US continued to grow.
Now, the difference between now and then is— and the ISM bounced from below 50, and everything was fine in the US. The difference then was the US was growing at 4.5%, and this time, it's growing at about 0.6%.
I think the probability of this being a new mid-cycle upswing in the US is not the highest probability. It is reasonably high because it's doing something we've not often seen before. But I have a feeling that the ISM will weaken along with economic data around the world going forward. If the dollar starts to rally, then that almost bakes it into the cake. So that's how I'm seeing this. And therefore, I'm expecting bond yields to come down to half a percent. And technically, it looks that way, too.
Erik Townsend: You've described the long Treasury trade as the layup trade of the year, is just the no-brainer. And it's fascinating to me because I think you make a very, very compelling argument, and I agree with you, that there are good reasons to think that bond prices are headed higher, yields are headed lower. But coming from you, Raoul, you've been as outspoken as I've been about the national debt and unsustainability of liabilities and so on and so forth.
Isn't this really, if you think about it, the ultimate Greater Fool trade? Because you're making a loan. To arguably an insolvent borrower that, you know, mathematically cannot repay that money in real terms. It can pay it in inflated terms, but it can't pay it back in real terms. So you're counting on being able to sell that loan to somebody else who thinks it's worth more than what you've got into it because of what you expect to happen between now and then. Aren't you setting yourself up there? And if you are, is there a hedge? Is there a way to hedge that? Or do you just not see it as the Treasury market doesn't turn around that quickly.
Raoul Pal: Okay, so macro, the key to macro is living in the future and understanding where the outcomes are. And you need to know whereabouts in that future trajectory you need to live to understand what the investment opportunity is. If we look 10 years down the line, then what you're talking about is a very real situation.
But if we look currently going forward into the future, you know, a year, let's say, well, what does the world look like then? Well, we're talking about slow global growth situation, where's the greater fool? The greater fool is the person who's lending to Japan and paying to lend.
In a global world where we have relative attractiveness of assets, US Treasuries at even half a percent are incredibly attractive versus paying an even more bankrupt government. That is the situation we're in. The US, yes, there is a huge situation, a huge problem with debt, it's the most indebted than the world has ever known as a percent of world GDP. And that's talking about total debt in the US.
But what it is, it has reserve currency status. We have a situation where everybody owes dollars. If the dollar bull market continues, then everybody is going to fund the US, because that's where they need to put the currency back.
A lot of dollar-denominated debt abroad gets written off. That shortage of dollars, people invest in dollar-based assets. For the US to finance themselves going forward, it's not difficult. When we go further into the future, of course, it's much more difficult. But the problem is here for us living in this investment world is these situations are so far off what is normal or even have been experienced before that none of us really have the toolkit to understand how this plays out, how long it takes.
Japan has been the great the widowmaker trade for so long now. In fact, my entire career since the very early '90s, Japan has lost people money by shorting bonds. There's something about the solvency of sovereign states that we don't understand, and that is complex to me. I think in the end, I think our understanding will be correct. Somewhere down the line, you have to destroy the debt either by massive currency depreciations, inflation or a debt jubilee.
But the various things, it's clear that none of us really understand, and we have to be honest about it, is why governments can continue to fund themselves so long and at negative rates. I mean, nobody would have thought that. Nobody thought it was possible. But yet it's now becoming part of normality. So it's a really complex world. And you talk about how do you hedge that?
Erik Townsend: Well, I was, I was thinking, you know, you just mentioned, I think maybe where the hedge is, which is the situation in Europe is so much uglier than the U.S. The trade that comes to my mind is long US 10-year, short German 10-year Bund, because, you know, first you got to the point where Bill Gross said this is crazy, and then it got even more crazy with the refugee crisis with deeply negative 10-year yields. It's crazy.
Raoul Pal: Yeah, but you're using the same base assumptions that is getting everybody on the wrong foot, which is you're making the assumption that they can't go more negative. Well, maybe we come back in 3 years' time and Bunds are trading negative 2.5%. I don't know. We don't know. So we're using a wrong framework to analyze what's going on. I'm not saying it's right that they should be negative, but we don't know how far negative they can go.
So I think we have to throw that out as a suggestion.
What I do know, there's a much easier hedge for all of this. If we get into the world where negative interest rates are endemic across most of the major world. Well, what you end up with is gold, which— and I'm not a gold bug, but as an asset, gold becomes very interesting because it'll have a relative positive cost of carry.
And it becomes a hedge to the currency risk that's involved with this whole situation of negative rates. That becomes interesting. Interestingly enough, and I know most people would disagree, and I'm just thinking this through in my head, is real estate becomes interesting again. Because it does have a positive yield, and so that becomes much more interesting in a world where there's negative interest rates.
It's very difficult to explain to my father, for example, who's retired and sits on cash, what negative interest rates mean—that he gets poorer every year without doing anything. People are going to be forced to have to do something about it, particularly the baby boomers, because they cannot sit without cash. Now, do this right in the stock market and watch the stock market fall 50%; that would be stupid. You know, there's there's various things that may be more interesting. Gold, I think, is one of them, and real estate potentially. and other, even though real estate is relatively expensive around the world.
Erik Townsend: Now, how do you reconcile— and first of all, I agree with you. I think in the long term, the bull case for gold is extremely strong. But you're also making a very strong argument for the dollar rally continuing, which is obviously, you know, these things are at odds. Do you think the gold argument is just so strong that it overrules the currency argument against it, or how do you balance those?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, so this is— I'm now getting into dodgy ground. Ground, because I follow economic history, and we've only got history of dollar bull markets going back to the early '80s, because the dollar obviously before that was pegged to gold. It's difficult to make the assumption that the dollar can rally and gold can rally for an extended period, because we've never seen it before. Now, I'm in that dodgy ground of I'm making a prediction based on a lack of historical evidence, but I would suggest that in this situation, because we've never had this negative interest rate situation before, That we could see a situation where the dollar is going to be bid up because of what's going on for the dollar shortage around the carry trade, and gold becomes the currency you have to own because owning any other currency earns you a negative yield.
So, gold could go up more than the dollar. So, is there a situation that I can see where you get both? Yeah, it's looking like now could be the time, or coming up in the next 6 months, if things play out as I expect. Yes.
Erik Townsend: Okay. I want to go back to Europe before we move on. You have done some writing recently about the European banking system, and particularly the rapidity at which it has been declining recently. What's going on there? What do you think it means? What is a CoCo bond Why do they keep you awake in the middle of the night? What's this whole Europe story about?
Raoul Pal: The Europe story is multi-layered. I mean, you know, I lived in Spain for 12 years. I've lived intimately with the banking crisis that went on there. Nothing has changed in Europe. And we all use price action to look back and say, look, everything's changed. So when things rally, we say everything's changed. When they get worse, we suddenly realize they haven't changed.
And the situation in Europe is they haven't changed. These banks have enormous leverage still. They can't clean their balance sheets. The ECB has been supporting them on life support by taking all the rubbish off the balance sheets to lend them more money, which doesn't go into the system because the banks can't. They're all raising reserve ratios to make sure that they remain solvent, but it's a struggle.
And so you've got a situation where some of the bigger banks, Deutsche Bank, Credit Suisse, they carry so much leverage on their balance sheets that it's becoming problematic, and the share prices won't get out of their own way.
And then we have the magic situation, which is a true financial market genius, where somebody decides, okay, the problem happens with these banks is they can't raise capital in a falling market. It's very difficult to issue new shares to raise their reserve ratios. So what we'll do is we'll issue these bonds that are a funky way of actually putting people into stock later, i.e., a way of issuing capital if the capital adequacy ratio falls. Okay, that sounds all great on paper. What it actually means is these bonds are so complicated, they go into the hands of arbitrageurs and special situations funds who know exactly how to trade them. And that means When the share price falls, it means the banks are less likely to be able to meet their capital ratios, and therefore, they start selling stock to hedge themselves knowing that stock is going to be put to them.
It creates a death spiral. We had these in the '90s in Europe a lot. They were called reverse convertibles, which were yield enhancement trades. In fact, in South Korea right now, there's a ton of these as well. They're very toxic because they create this negative gamma to the downside. As everybody at some point is a forced seller to hedge themselves. And that creates the death spiral going forwards as you need more stock to be issued for the CoCo bond to keep up the adequacy ratios, etc., etc.
So it's been a big, big mess. And so that's really what's going on in Europe right now. The banking system is just not off its feet, and I don't think it will be for a long time to come. I think we've got some bankruptcies to come.
Erik Townsend: There's a lot There's a lot of talk around the world about banning cash, and almost all of the rhetoric that we hear in the system from the politicians is that the motivation for this is entirely about terrorism and keeping us safe from bad guys and so forth. You and I know that the ban on cash is about one thing and one thing only. What is it really about? And explain that connection, because not everybody sees it.
Raoul Pal: The ban on cash is about control over your assets. The reason they want that is because it's a way of allowing taxations, wealth taxes, negative interest rates to have a true effect on you. Basically, it's financial repression. Switzerland was a great example because they started this process first with negative interest rates.
What happened, very interestingly, one of the big Swiss cantonal pension funds went to their bank and said, right, you've got negative interest rates, so we want to withdraw the cash that we have on deposit and stick it in your vault. And the Swiss bank said, thank you, but you can't. You don't own the cash. What you own is a fungible group of securities, including wire transfers. We can wire transfer this anywhere, but you can't take the cash out. That was the first alarm bell where I thought, okay, I see the picture now. The picture is basically, imagine if you cannot take out your cash from the banking system.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Raoul Pal: So therefore, tomorrow, they can have negative interest rates of 0.5%. You think, okay, that's fine. I don't mind paying for the put option of cash, as opposed to receiving money for the put option of cash. But then let's say the next day, they come and say, we need to raise more money, so we're going to move it to -10%, and you can't take your money out.
So this is where the problem lies, is they have an ability to trap your money, and then take it away from you in various means. They could just say, we've got a wealth tax, all deposits are going to be taxed. There's nothing you can do about it now. So this becomes a very problematic situation. And it's all about control of your assets. It's much the same— you talked about global terrorism— it's much the same.
And I live in the Cayman Islands with FATCA and all of this reporting of foreign income and etc. back to the US and home countries. And it's nothing about terrorism. Funding terrorism is a small issue here. What it really is all about is figuring out how you can tax the money that's abroad, and whether it's legitimately abroad or not legitimately abroad. But it's all about the same thing as increasing tax revenue. Why? And that goes back to the earlier thing: is the government the most indebted the world has ever seen?
At almost every single country, we've got the same problem. That's why they're all trying to do the same thing, which is get hold of your money and somehow pay off their own debt. And that's the risk to this whole thing, is the savers get screwed in this whole situation. They always do.
Erik Townsend: You know, it makes me think a lot. I don't think that systemically negative interest rates out to longer maturities has ever existed in history, as far as I know. So we don't have any precedent for any of this. And it just gets me thinking about what some of the unexpected or unobvious consequences of negative rates are going to be. The, you know, the most obvious One is that it creates a strong incentive for everyone to look to move their wealth out of the financial system, look for hard assets or something. What other implications do you see? You know, one of the things that I think about a lot, we think about short selling as a tactical move. You can buy and hold for the long term, but you don't short and hold for the long term. Well, wait a minute. If you've got negative yielding assets, why wouldn't you short Treasury bonds? for the long term.
You know, you're getting paid to hold it negative, and you know someday the rates are going back up and you're going to make the capital appreciation. So, I think it potentially invites all kinds of behavior that would have been completely counterintuitive previously because we have new motivations. What do you think this could do in terms of changing behaviors in unexpected ways?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, I talk a lot about something called the law of unintended consequences. And when we are off the map, which we are with this, We just don't know the outcomes. The thing that worries me is what does this mean for the pensions industry? Because there is no way you can retire on a fixed income basis. The entire global pension system was set up for annuity-based retirement. That cannot happen now.
It's impossible to meet anybody's retirement planning in this. That's one thing. How does the insurance and life assurance industry work now? It can't. It physically can't work with negative long-term rates, and everyone hopes it goes away. I don't think it does. So I'm more concerned about the death of the pensions industry, what that kind of means, what that means for growth going forwards as the boomers start really finding that they've got trouble.
Now, the difficulty is we talk about, you know, do you find other assets to invest in? Well, it's difficult to know what assets to invest in right now. Yeah, gold is relatively cheap. There's some things that are relatively cheap. Cheap, but there's not many. Even farmland versus the price of agricultural commodities is expensive. There's very few places to go either. This is what worries me is where does that capital go?
Yes, other trading situations, looking at how you should trade bonds, but then you're talking about that situation if everybody shorts bonds and yields get even more negative. If you think positive carries by shorting bonds, then what you're creating is a busting of the global pension system as well. So this whole thing is very, very complex, and it's clear that central banks haven't thought this through.
They don't really know what they're doing. They're still using the same old tricks to try and solve a problem, and they don't even know what problem they're trying to solve. You know, we don't really know what caused all of this in the end, but it was partly demographics, it was partly government policy back from the early '80s, it was partly due to central banks policy. We've got a whole number of things that brought this, and nobody even knows what battle they're fighting anymore. So, it's terrifying in that respect.
Erik Townsend: One of the things that you've said is that with this macro backdrop, with all the things going on in the system, there's so much stress, so much tension, that if we get another recession, probably we're going to be looking at what you call one of the big uglies coming out.
What are the big uglies? Explain the metaphor and And what are the scenarios that you think could come to occur if we see the economic pressure of a recession?
Raoul Pal: Yeah. So, when you look back over history, you can pretty much mark every recession with a big event that happened, whether it was the housing market and the banking system in 2008, whether it was the tech bust in 2001, whether it was, you know, the emerging market crisis running into that beforehand, you know, going back or the early '80s, whether it was the LatAm crisis. There's usually the big stress within the system. The weakest link goes. The problem is right now we've got too many weak links, so we don't know which one's going to go. Is it the Chinese economy that's a mess? Is it the Japanese overindebted economy that's a mess? Is it the European overindebted, rigid economy that's a mess and the banking system that's a mess? Is it the commodity-based businesses imploding and creating a big problem in the banking industry? That's possible, too. Is it the emerging markets and the carry trade blowing up? That's possible too.
Is it the UK and its enormous debts at household level and the financial sector level? It's possible too. We've got too many of these big situations there that I don't like, because if you tip one over, you tip them all over.
If you tip over Spain, you tip over Italy. If you tip over Japan, you'll tip over China. If you tip over China, you'll tip over Europe. Europe. So this is why I'm really concerned about these big uglies. Is it possible to get through a recession without one of these dominoes falling over? Yes. Is the probability high of getting through it without it happening? No. So we have to be realistic about economic history, what events usually happen, and what events they could be.
Now, everybody makes a mistake of trying to forecast which one it's going to be.
We don't know. We have to— we've got too many moving parts to keep our eye on, and it could be another thing that blew up. I remember very clearly that the situation in 2007 really started with Iceland. So, we saw Iceland and its mess, and we didn't really realize that that was the start. That was the ripple that creates the wave that creates the tsunami. I don't know what that's going to be. It can be anything.
Erik Townsend: But in a weak economic situation is when the probability explodes of one of those things A lot of investors think that we're going to have more quantitative easing at some point in the future. And I certainly agree with that. I think a lot of investors make a mistake in assuming it's going to look like the last few rounds of QE. And I think something you and I agree on is it's very likely, especially in an election year, that the next round of quantitative easing will be influenced by it. You know, it'll be helicopter QE for the people, QE for Main Street, not for Wall Street. Very, very clear to me that there will be a strong sentiment that the next QE should be for the benefit of Main Street, not for Wall Street.
What is that going to mean, though? Is it going to mean infrastructure spending instead of supporting banks? Is it going to mean true social transfer payments as helicopter money? Where do you think it's headed? Do you think it will play out in the 2016 election cycle or not until after that?
What do you see on the horizon in terms of how we get back to quantitative easing someday? Do you think we will get back to it? And what will it look like?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, look, I think we do. I mean, unless we get a pickup in global growth, which is possible, as I explained at the beginning of the interview, that there is a possibility of that. So I'm not ruling it out. But if we don't, if we follow the highest probability event, which is leading into a global recession, because global recessions come after certain periods of time and we're into that period of time now and everything's playing out looking like that is the case. Rates.
So if that's the case, then the chances of more quantitative easing ahead of negative interest rates has to be high. You're right, I think if you start giving away money to the rich again, which is basically what quantitative easing did, you know, you see it everywhere.
I deal with a lot of family offices, and they basically could borrow non-recourse money for virtually nothing and invest in virtually anything they wanted to. That is not going to wash anymore. We're seeing the change in populism across the world The political situation is changing dramatically. We don't really know what that means because we've not seen this for a long time either.
For the central banks to continue down the same path of what they've done, which clearly didn't work, would be stupid in the extreme.
Are the governments going to try and bully the central banks into financing infrastructure spends that creates jobs? Yeah, that's an easy, easy thing to do. It's actually probably a good thing. For the countries. Does it actually create a sustainable situation? No. Japan's tried this for decades. It doesn't work.
Would it create some jobs? For a while. Does it create long-lasting economic growth? No chance. We know this because we see every Olympic Games I've ever seen and probably every football World Cup, soccer World Cup, these have usually huge, particularly Olympic Games, have huge infrastructure spends. And then what happens afterwards? Almost without question, every single country goes into recession.
So all you're going to do is you're just robbing growth from the future and you'll get the payback afterwards. So I don't think it's going to help. It doesn't change anything. It doesn't change the structure of the debt situation globally or the demographics that's causing this mess in the first place.
Erik Townsend: Where do you think this eventually goes in terms of the endgame? Because one of the things I ponder a lot, you know, people talk about loss of confidence in central banks and how that's going to change everything. And I feel sometimes like I just don't get it because the evidence has been overwhelmingly clear since 2009, if not well before that.
I was saying in 2009, this quantitative easing thing is never going to work because the market will see through it. The market will recognize that it is an act of desperation on the Fed's part and it's not going to work. I couldn't possibly have been more wrong about that. The reality of the situation is the Fed's got the printing press. If they print money, that money's got to go someplace. This is all going to end very, very badly someday. I think you and I agree on that. But most of us are musing, trying to figure out what that might look like, because we know that there's no free lunch. The piper has to be paid someday. But we really haven't seen, you know, people predicted runaway inflation. There hasn't been any runaway inflation. Where does this go? How does it eventually blow up?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, I think this is the key point that I think we're all having to learn is we don't know what, what this all means. We don't actually understand. We're using the wrong framework of understanding. So when we're using the wrong framework of understanding, we keep drawing the wrong conclusions. Now, I can't suggest that I know how to even analyze this. In terms of understanding how Japan can fund itself with negative interest rates. It just doesn't compute to me. But clearly, the framework of our understanding of the monetary system, human behavior is wrong.
And I think this is part of the flaws of economic analysis. We've been brought up in 2 schools of economic analysis, both of which have proven to not work, which is Keynesianism and monetarism. What we've now done is combine the 2 together and hope that'll work. Which is making things even worse.
So what we have to do is kind of—I think there's a big structural behavioral, structural shift that has to go on in the economics profession and the financial markets, which is understanding behavioral economics. Once we understand behavioral economics, we'll understand why these things are sustainable, and only until then will we understand about tipping points, what it means, what changes this at the margin. We don't know. We don't know how far this can go and what changes it.
We don't even know. We talk about markets now, we don't even know what markets are any longer because there's so few participants in the markets. In a place like Japan now, virtually the only participant really is the central bank buying equities, buying bonds, everything else. I don't even know what it means, but I do know that somewhere down the line, we're all getting screwed.
Anybody who's a saver is going to lose money in this somewhere, somehow, whether it's through grinding negative interest rates, Whether it's via currency depreciation, whether it's via equity market falls. If you force it all into assets and then those assets deflate, you're in big trouble. There's a number of issues. I think in the end, once they realize that you can't just keep doing this and you're not going to generate growth, you're going to have to have a debt jubilee. That's the way the world has always dealt with these issues. That's everybody sitting around the table and writing off as much debt as possible. Now, again, people talk about, well, the central banks could finance that kind of thing, and there's ways of doing it. But somewhere down the line, somebody, as you suggest, is going to have to pay the bill. And again, it's going to come from the saver. So, it's a very complicated situation.
What does it mean for the group of savers in the Western world are the retirees? So, you're going to destroy all the retirees. It's very difficult. It's really complex. I really don't know how it's going to play out. Okay. But I think the debt jubilee of some way, shape, or form is some answer.
Do the governments then have to backstop the global pension system? Probably. The global banking system, half has to be privatized or nationalized, sorry. I don't really know. It's too complex for us to figure out. And that's one of the reasons why central banks continue down the routes that they continue down, and governments continue down that route, because the problem is too big to solve.
And we just don't even know how to do it, because we don't even have the framework of understanding. Until the economics profession moves on and realizes that model-based economics is not how the world works, and the behavioral economics, and even things like Austrian economics, which are much more behavioral in nature, once we start better understanding this, we can actually understand the problem and look at tackling it and how to deal with the outcomes, but it's beyond our current comprehension of how to do this.
Erik Townsend: Well, and it really speaks to your earlier point, too, which is that we're in completely uncharted territory here, because my understanding is any Any example that you can look to in history of debt jubilees all goes back to times when there was no concept of securitization or large banks and so forth. You had a bunch of parties that owed each other money, and they were one-to-one relationships. In this modern banking system, where everything is securitized, it's very difficult to even know who owns your mortgage, ultimately, and the web of interconnectedness between institutions And what happens if the value of this goes down and somebody's forced to sell that? All of the scenarios that could unfold in terms of unintended adverse consequences, completely impossible, I think, to even gauge. And it scares me to death, Raoul.
And I watched a really excellent piece on Real Vision Television recently called The Reset 2, where you were talking about the CoCo bonds And you described this experiment. of literally waking up in the middle of the night in the Cayman Islands and you've had this epiphany. You say, wait a minute, the way this thing works, now that I think about it, it sort of turns into an equity when it gets to a certain— that's going to cause this to happen, that's going to cause— and that means that when this— Raoul, you're one of the smartest guys around. You ran the equity derivatives business in Europe for Goldman Sachs. You know more about this stuff than almost everybody, and you're waking up in the middle of the night late figuring out, oh my gosh, I just realized this does this.
Well, how many things are left that even you haven't figured out that are going to change everything?
Raoul Pal: Yeah, I mean, look, there were a lot. One of the ones I had— one of the things I'm lucky enough and unlucky enough to have uncovered was I spent some time with a group we were trying to put together at the time, the world's safest bank. And for a number of reasons, we couldn't do it.
Actually, it's to do with the Federal Reserve not allowing us to do it. But, um, what it was What I ended up doing was getting in a room with all of the people involved in the global custody business. I can't really disclose who was there, but there were central banks, there were all sorts of people. It was a private meeting, and my job was for 2 days to argue why, if one of the sovereign nations, big sovereign nations went bust, the entire custody system had gone, and that we didn't own any assets.
That was the thing, that was the worst thing I ever discovered in financial markets is that I had the New York Fed confirming to me at one point that US Treasury bonds were reused 35 times in the system, and that then getting confirmed by, you know, various central clearing entities that you actually in the end don't own anything. You own a percentage share of a fungible pool of securities, and therefore if there are 35 different claims on that security, You'll get a 35th of it, even though we're led to believe there's a segregated world where your money is segregated at the cesspool that is the global clearing system and custody system. There's no segregation at all for a number of very complicated reasons. But basically, you start uncovering these things, the weak links in our financial system that we've created through complexity.
And the complexity is the big issue here. The complexity is creating so much of these problems.
So from my understanding, complexity has to disappear from the system. And I see it from the blockchain and Bitcoin. I think that is a true need, and it's a rapid need. We need to start having a better way of recording who owns what and giving allowances for people to use your assets or not use your assets. And that is the one way of picking apart the system in a much much, much better way. So the sooner we get to putting securities and all important kind of financial information onto the blockchain, whichever blockchain it is, the better, because we cannot continue this.
Because if one of these big uglies goes, my fear at the whole of this, you know, we see sovereign nations go under, all of that kind of stuff, but if you find that none of the assets that you thought you owned, you Then that's the end of everything. That's the complete loss of faith in the global financial system.
All this complexity has to come back down to simplicity again. That, I think, is a process that's going to take 20 years. The financial— size of the financial industry and financial marketplace has to shrink over time, because it needs to come back to a much simpler system that is much more accountable and understandable by all participants involved.
Erik Townsend: Amen to that. You know, one of the things I've said for years is we need to remember the reason that capital markets are allowed to exist in the first place is not for finance guys like us to make money. It is to enable the efficient formation of capital to grow American business. And if all this stuff that's going on doesn't support that, then we shouldn't have it. It doesn't make sense.
Raoul Pal: But we've made another fundamental mistake that most people don't understand. Is what we did is the world used to operate with it with labor and capital, so capital supplied the money. So they were the savers, usually the wealthy or corporations that had money or banks. They would supply the capital to businesses to expand in the capitalist system, and labor would be the productive part of the asset that would create a return on the capital. So there was this nice symbiotic relationship.
Then what we did is we invented the pension system and forced basically everybody into the financial market. If you were a car worker, no, not a car worker, a factory worker in the 1940s, '30s, or going back 100 years or so, your savings, or a farm worker, whatever you were, the average guy, your savings were your savings.
What we did is we changed it. And we said, okay, they're not your savings now. We are going to put them in the financial system and force you to invest in equities. So guess what? When equities fall 50% in 2008, and all these people are in their early 60s, late 50s, because they're boomers, they're like, but that wasn't the agreement that you would lose our retirement savings. But you're forced to do it. You're pretty much forced to invest in risky assets. by regulatory changes. So you've made labor become capital. So labor is supplying the capital to the system, which is why the financial system became so big, because they sucked in the average Joe's money into it.
It's not right. They should never have done that. You know, people who can afford to risk money, risk money. That's what you got paid a reward for. People who can't afford to risk money, which is the average guy, they should never have been sucked into the financial system in the first place.
Erik Townsend: And that whole process has to be unpicked Raoul, before we close here, I want to shift gears and ask a question on a completely different topic, and that has to do just with personal motivations, where you're at in life. You're obviously a brilliant guy. You retired at the age of 36. You live on a tropical island. The very best scuba diving in the Caribbean is literally in your backyard on Bloody Bay Wall.
Raoul Pal: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: You're a very smart guy, and you're very capable of doing a lot of things that you could make a lot more money doing, such as, say, launching a hedge fund. You and Grant decided to do what is probably the least lucrative opportunity available to you. So, there must be some passion in it. What led you to put so much time and energy into Real Vision Television when obviously, you guys could have made more money doing something else?
Raoul Pal: Twofold. Firstly is, I think you can get across from the interview that I'm pretty passionate about what's been going on in the world. I understand quite a lot more because I've been at the center of the financial system. I write The Global Macro Investor, which is my economic and investment strategy research publication that's read by all the world's big hedge funds, sovereign wealth funds, family offices.
I get to the middle of the system, and what I know is that those towards the center of the system know a lot more than those on the periphery.
In a situation like this, when we've done bad things like like force the average guy into the financial system of which they don't understand. And then something like 2008 comes along and people say to me, well, why didn't we know? Why did the media not tell us? Why did the banks not tell us what was going on?
And that didn't sit well with me, and it didn't sit well with Grant. And we talked about this and thought, you know what, we have a moral duty to do something about this. People need to know because we're in an extraordinary world, as you and I have just been talking about. We're in a world that has so many potential bad outcomes. There's so many big risks out there that people need to be aware of what is going on.
That's why we started Real Vision. We thought not only— it's not only the hedge fund elite that should know, but even the financial advisors, the RIAs, and all of those guys, they should know. They should understand what it means for their clients. Yes, maybe Real Vision is a little bit complex for the average man on the street, but there's many people, we've got thousands of doctors, dentists, lawyers, all these guys who actively engage with their own retirement savings and investments, they need to know. They can't be told the narrative that the media tells them. They cannot be treated in a dumb way. These are smart people. They've worked their lives for their savings, and they need to understand what they're doing with them. So, that's why we did it.
And the other flip side is the assumption that you can't make money out of it is probably wrong as well, because the whole media industry is up for disruption. And we've got some huge plans with Real Vision rolling out various channels and various other products. So, we'll actually make money out of doing a good thing. And that's how the world could work. You can do good things and make money too.
Erik Townsend: I clearly misspoke then. There's no doubt in my mind that you guys will be successful and will make money. My point was It's simply that I think you are quite capable of making a lot of money in a shorter timeframe with less effort.
This project, I can feel it, Raoul. This is a passion-driven project, just as MacroVoices is. And I think that's the reason that we've kind of hit it off, is that we're both doing this because we're passionate. I was successful in the software industry. I retired in my 30s, a multimillionaire. I don't have to do any of this stuff. I don't do it to make more money. I do it because I want to be engaged in what is going on in the world, because it is so fascinating. And these are such incredibly, incredibly challenging times. It blows my mind. During the Cold War, everybody was scared to death. Now everybody's completely complacent. And I think that a lot of risks in the world are worse than they were then. But it's an amazing passion. And I really— my hat is off to both you and Grant for the fantastic work that you do.
Before we close, though, I do want to come back to GMI. Everybody knows what Real Vision is. Not a lot of people outside of the institutional world know about GMI. Can you talk a little bit more about who it's for? Is it open? Can people sign up for it? Where can they get information and so forth?
Raoul Pal: Yeah. I mean, GMI is what I've been doing since I left the hedge fund game. I decided to start writing because, like you, I love the financial markets. It's in my blood. And one of the things— I love writing as well, and the creative process and the thinking process. It helps me clear my thoughts.
Thoughts. And writing from not sitting in London or New York or wherever, but doing it from Spain for 10 years and now the Cayman Islands, gives me a clarity of thought. So, Global Macro Investor is that, and it's my thoughts on everything in all asset classes around the world, what I think is interesting, the key things to focus on.
And it's not just a negative bear fest about the problems in the world. There's tons of opportunities and different things to look at. So, I've been doing that and keeping a track record. For GMI subscribers for the last 12 years. Luckily, it's been probably one of the most successful research publications and portfolios, it's actually a model portfolio there, that reflects on my own personal investments that's been there, and I have a track record to prove it. The point being, sadly, that the idea is it's a very closed user group, so I only have a restricted number of users. Readers, and they tend to be the ultra-high net worth family offices, hedge funds, pension funds, and those guys who can pay the fees for the research.
It's a very opposite— Grant has a product, which is Things That Make You Go Hmmm... which is $300, and mine is many times that.
It's not really aimed at the man on the street, but actually, with anybody who's subscribed to Real Vision this month, they get a copy of my research. research in it. So, I think they're going to get my April monthly. So, people— anybody who's a subscriber of Real Vision should be able to have a copy of it and look at it. And they can draw their own conclusions whether it adds any value or not.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, we should definitely be clear so we don't waste anyone's time that GMI, from a price point standpoint, is beyond the retail investor's reach. But certainly, for our institutional audience, it's a possibility.
Raoul Pal: Yeah, absolutely right.
Erik Townsend: Raoul, I can't thank you enough for a fantastic interview. You are welcome on this show anytime you like. And if there's anything that we can
Raoul Pal: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: If there's anything that we can do to help you and Grant with the fantastic work that you're doing at Real Vision Television, by all means, let us know. I want to remind our listeners that we are offering a discount, or I don't know, I think it's a free trial of Real Vision Television if you go to realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices.
You can get a free trial, and it's what, $1 a day if you want to sign up, 365 $25 a year for Real Vision, which is an on-demand, basically like MacroVoices, but it's video and it's live, and you guys have a better network than we do, so you're getting some of the guests that we want to get in the future.
Raoul Pal: Absolutely. Yeah. I think what you guys are doing is fabulous. It's very much in line with what we're doing, and widening that discourse over a number of different platforms is a great thing.
Erik Townsend: Raoul, thanks again so much for joining me on the program. Nathan Egger joins me as MacroVoices continues.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Erik, I'm very interested in the idea of the Fed I'm interested in this dollar story, as are many who follow global macro. And Raoul took time to chat with us at a really opportune moment as we see the dollar at a really key technical level right now. We've talked a lot on the program about a couple of different short trades, one in crude oil, with the other being short the S&P.
If the dollar index does break down below the mid-93s or so, how does this affect your view on both of these short trades?
Erik Townsend: You know, I have been in Raoul's camp that I think the dollar rally is set to continue. My view's a little bit— it was interesting to hear Raoul talk about how clearly he sees the cause for the dollar rally, and he did describe it as policy. I see it as a more very narrow, specific policy event, which is you had the U.S. printing money, quantitative easing, that's weakening the dollar, while other countries are not. And then you suddenly shift from that to the U.S. not printing While Europe and Japan are printing money. All of a sudden, the other guys are weakening their currencies. It's just natural that as long as that continues, that it's going to be positive for the dollar. So, I've been in the dollar bull camp with Raoul.
I think Axel Merk made the opposite argument very persuasively a few weeks ago here on the program. I've still sort of sided with Raoul. I'd say a breakdown below 93.50. Especially, you know, below 92 even, that really says to me, okay, the technicals just didn't play out the way we thought they would. It still looks to me like this could be just a healthy pullback, and I'm watching it very closely for signs to move higher, because of course if the dollar is moving higher, then commodities priced in dollars, including gold and oil, should both be expected to move lower on that basis.
Nathan Egger: Okay, and we also heard Raoul suggest suggest that a so-called debt jubilee is far more likely than most will currently want to admit. And we can look to the history books to see how these situations have played out in the past. But if you had to venture to guess how exactly this sort of debt forgiveness could play out this time around, how do you see it? In other words, which parties in the global financial system are the most likely to be forced to forgive some of their outstanding debt?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's a completely, totally, categorically uncharted territory. And the reason I say that is just because the modern financial system is so securitized. The concept of debt means something very different than what it used to. In any context where you might find an example of a debt jubilee occurring, you're going back a long time in history to where a debt was something where a borrower borrowed from one party and then paid that one party back someday, and it didn't change hands.
It's such a complex system now that I don't think it's possible to accurately predict exactly how it will play out. But I think you can count on a few things, which is that the people that are in charge are going to protect themselves first. There will be a public outcry that the debt is unfair, that the system is rigged, rigged, that people who are in over their heads in debt were forced into these circumstances by actions of people that were reckless and irresponsible. It's not their fault and so forth, and they shouldn't have to pay the debt back. That will be countered by, of course, the political influence that all the bankers have. And I think that it potentially creates a great divide.
The current political system, the mainstream, the old-school political system, The establishment is very much designed around things needing to stay the way that they are. So, ultimately, when it comes down to who's going to be forced to forgive debt, nobody is going to do it voluntarily. It's going to be everybody kicking and screaming and who's got the most power. I would expect it to come in phases. At first, the establishment wins.
And, you know, tough luck if you don't want to pay your bills.
Eventually, you start to see politicians looking at the threat of actual revolution where people are really freaking out, and it all changes. What does this look like? You know, as far as I know, I'm not an expert on this. I haven't done much research on it. Debt jubilees have occurred in conjunction with regime changes, changes of government, so forth in the past. You know, somebody lost a war. A bunch of debts end up getting forgiven because the war is over or something. I don't think we have that circumstance here. So I don't know how it would play out. I think it is a very, very ugly picture. But as Raoul said, we are living in completely uncharted territory here.
Nathan Egger: Well, we might not have the conditions yet, but something that we've talked about many times on the program is a ramping up of defense spending and fiscal stimulus in the form of defense spending around the world. And you're seeing these proxy wars start to play out. So, there is a chance that you might start to see some massive regime changes happening in the world, is there not?
Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. I think that there is very likely to be dramatic regime change. I think the oil situation by itself, if this goes where I think it can go, which is all the way down to $20 a barrel, I don't know how long it stays there. If we were to see prolonged oil prices more than 6 months at $20 a barrel. I don't think it's possible, first of all. But if that were to happen, it would cause several governments to fail. No doubt about it. It would dramatically change the political landscape. So there's a lot of really big things in motion here right now. And I don't think it's possible to predict where it's going to go. When you ask a question like debt forgiveness, I think that everybody's going to try to make it be the other guy. And whoever Whoever has the least political clout is going to lose.
Nathan Egger: I was looking at—
Erik Townsend: Least political clout is going to win, and, uh, or is going to— most political clout wins, least loses.
Nathan Egger: As it usually is. I was looking at some numbers today, and by 2030, the student debt in the United States is estimated to be $16, $17 trillion at that time. So that's approaching the national debt level. So when you think about the presidential candidacy, of a guy like Bernie Sanders, all of a sudden, you start looking to these students. These are the ones that are going to have no jobs, no place to go, and all the time in the world to protest and rally and scream about how they've been unfairly tricked into taking on $200,000 worth of college debt, which didn't get them the job that they were promised was going to get them. It'd be very interesting to see how the presidential election in the United States is going to influence a potential debt jubilee or debt forgiveness.
Erik Townsend: Well, and without a doubt, all of that student debt, or not all of it, but a lot of that student debt, the part that will default, what it really is, is national debt. We pretend that these people are going to pay these debts back so we don't have to admit the truth, which is ultimately the federal government is going to get stiffed. And that means that really it's just that much more federal debt, unfunded the debt deficit by another name.
Nathan Egger: Eventually, we're not going to have another balance sheet to transfer all of this debt to, and we're going to have to deal with it. Erik, can you please re-explain to our listeners what our relationship is exactly with Real Vision and why we bring it up so frequently on the show?
Erik Townsend: Well, I just love these guys. They're really the only ones that, like us, they're not motivated to be doing a podcast because they're trying to sell precious metals or because they're trying to pimp some conspiracy theory or because they've got a broker-dealer that they're trying to pimp that service or something. They're doing this because they're really, really passionate about the fact that macroeconomics and the way we think about the way the economy drives the world is so profoundly important. And really the only media that we have in finance is the cable networks. And, you know, they're fine for what they're good for, but they don't get to deep, meaningful, thoughtful analysis like they're doing.
So I just think that they do cool stuff. And what we have agreed with Raoul off the air, we had done a few of these encore presentations just on a short-term basis. I think we'll keep doing those every couple of weeks to provide a little bit of teaser content to let people know what's available there. We don't make anything on it. We don't get any commissions from subscriptions there. We just want to help them out because I really think they're on the cusp of a transition.
They've made their first transition, which is when they launched. It was 2 guys with whoever they had in their own personal Rolodexes that they could beg for an interview, try to get this thing going. Now, they've got enough traction and enough momentum that I'm hearing a lot about them. There are people that I sent emails to a year ago saying, hey, check out Real Vision, that ignored it. Now they're telling me, hey, have you heard about Real Vision? So, the slowpokes, the laggards in society are finally catching on to this trend.
I think they've got another major transition, which is eventually they get to the point where all of the guests realize this is the only chance to really have a thoughtful— what, you know, if I'm Kyle Bass, what is my thesis really about? Right. Out, CNBC is never going to convey it because they just don't spend the time to go in depth with that stuff. So we haven't gotten to the point yet where the real titans of finance are thinking, boy, my outlet, the place where I can really have my thoughts heard, it's Real Vision as opposed to the cable networks. I'm going to call those guys up. Carl Icahn's asking for an opportunity to be interviewed on on Real Vision because of the significance that it carries in the industry. They're a long way from that, but I predict they're going to get there eventually.
All right.
Nathan Egger: Well, you guys, Erik went really deep in his conversation with Raoul today, and we ended up with a little more interview than we are used to. And I'm certainly not complaining, but in the interest of keeping this episode at a reasonable length, I think we're going to call it a show here. Again, we want to thank Raoul for an interview packed with fascinating And please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes, and your ratings and reviews are helping us out a ton. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and even Erik is now starting to get active on Twitter. You can follow him @ErikSTownsend. You can also connect with us directly in our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. For Erik Townsend, this is Patrick Ceresna. This is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented by AIG. For informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its Producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Bill Fleckenstein — Bill Fleckenstein, former short-fund manager (closed his short fund in March 2009, now setting up a fund again); daily column and subscription service at FleckensteinCapital.com (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 8 was recorded March 31st, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Bill Fleckenstein joins me as today's special guest. I'll be talking to Bill about monetary policy, the market outlook, short selling, and much more.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, Equities got a nice bump this week after surprisingly dovish words from Fed Chair Yellen in a speech that she gave on Tuesday to the New York Economic Club. But it looks like we're stalling out here short of new highs in the S&P. What do you make of the Yellen speech and the effect that it is having on risk markets?
Erik Townsend: Well, Janet Yellen's change of tune took a lot of people by surprise, myself included. And the reason I say that is, you know, in the past what we've seen is, okay, let's say the stock market's down 15% and people are getting really worried. And Jim Bullard or somebody is going to save the market with a speech and the Fed comes out all dovish. We've seen this in reaction to market events. If you look at what's going on right now, basically the chart looks like we're well above the 200-day moving average on the S&P, working certainly on a cycle high and rapidly approaching new all-time highs. Why would this be an environment where this Fed would suddenly change face? What they've been trying to do is emphasize before, you know, April's a live meeting. We could hike rates in April. We could if we wanted to. We could. We're trying to emphasize that to everybody. Now they're going the other way. And it really caught me by surprise.
I was not expecting that change of tune from Janet Yellen.
The question now is, is it going to actually mean that there is a new trend in play, or is this one of those cases where a Fed statement maybe spooked the market to where it hits a high and now it's going to roll over? I'm leaning towards that. But boy, the last couple of days of market action after Janet spoke, you know, we pushed above the support level. I think there's another technical support level in the S&P around 2,075 or so. Once we get above that, there's really not a lot of obvious resistance levels until you get to new all-time highs. So we're definitely flirting with something here. On a technical analysis standpoint, all I can say is, wow, it's gone farther than I thought. On a fundamental basis, I still think that there's a lot of downside left in this market. Nothing has been solved. The economy is slowing down. We still have all these problems.
And And I don't think that the problems in the oil market are over either.
Nathan Egger: Speaking of the oil market, we also saw crude react to Yellen's speech initially to the upside before resuming its recent downtrend. Where do you think we're headed here next?
Erik Townsend: Well, I thought it was very interesting. You know, what Art Berman and I have predicted is that there will be a series of big builds on inventory and that the builds, particularly on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, because that's the settlement point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, that was going to be so important.
Well, what we got this week was a fairly weak inventory report. In other words, analysts were expecting there to be a build in inventory of about 3, 3.5 million barrels. We got 2.5 million barrels. 2.2, I think, was the number.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: That doesn't really change my outlook, but I would expect that it would create some upside weakness in price.
We saw a little bit, based on the private API data that came out on Tuesday afternoon, we saw a little bit of anticipation.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And so, you know, there was some anticipatory buying moving the price higher into that. But after the data came out on Wednesday morning at 10:30, the market's done nothing but go down since then.
So what that says to me is even in a week, you know, if you look 2 weeks ago, we had a 10.5 million barrel build. The market wanted to move higher because the short squeeze wasn't over yet, and it shrugged off what should have been very bearish news. Now we're seeing the market shrugging off what should be bullish news, which is the inventory is not building yet as quickly as Art and I expected. That it will.
Once we see a catalyst, and I think the catalyst will be a build in Cushing inventory. Now, even though this week we saw a build in national inventory, it was actually a small drawdown in Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. So there's a little bit more space in those tanks in Cushing, Oklahoma. Those are the most critical ones because it's where the futures contract is settled.
If we see, as I expect in the next few weeks, large builds in inventory that are also builds on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, inventory. I think that that will be the catalyst to allow the oil market to move substantially lower from here, at least $10 lower. And as that happens, I think equities will be taken down with it.
Nathan Egger: And is refinery maintenance season continuing to have an effect on this market?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, we're in the— right in the throes of refinery maintenance season right now in the United States. And so that means we're consuming less crude oil. Another few weeks here, the United States refinery maintenance season will be over, but Europe's refineries are going into maintenance. And remember, crude oil is a global market. So if you're doing maintenance on European refineries, even though it's the other side of the ocean, it still affects the price of the oil globally. So we do have several more weeks that the industry's ability to consume crude oil will be curtailed slightly by the fact that maintenance is going on and what the industry calls turnarounds when they are reversing the configuration. Of the refinery to produce summertime grades of finished product instead of wintertime grades. So that's going to be with us for the next several weeks.
The other thing that, at least as it affects the equity market, that will be with us for the next several weeks is really for the entire month of April, there's no corporate buybacks because we're in the earnings quiet period. It'll be very interesting to me, first of all, to see whether or not we get the sell-off in equities that I'm expecting during April. But then the question is, when we get into May and And the quiet period is over, and it is now possible for corporations to go back to their ways of borrowing in the bond market and then using that money to buy back their own shares. Is that big share repurchase trend going to continue, or is it finally winding down? I think that's going to be a big tell in terms of the direction of the stock market from here.
Nathan Egger: Erik, one would have expected gold to respond very positively to Yellen's comments this week, but thus far, the reaction, at least to my eyes, has been surprisingly muted. Listeners will know that you've been skeptical of gold's rally in 2016, but here is a seemingly dovish-turning Fed. Enough to make you change your tune?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm still waiting, frankly, to figure out what happened here. And obviously, it's very clear what happened in the sense of what was said. But I haven't figured out what's the motivation. Why did Janet Yellen go from emphasizing, going out of her way to really try to steer the markets in the direction of, hey, April's a live meeting, We could hike rates again, could be happening, to now this very dovish commentary. I don't understand what the catalyst was that caused Janet to change her tune. And until I figure out what her motive is, I don't really know that I can interpret the meaning of her actions.
In terms of the market reaction to it, though, what I said last week was that gold is rapidly approaching its 50-day moving average, right around $1,200. Would it be able to bounce off of that? Well, it bounced off fairly impressively on Tuesday, but that was in reaction.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: to incredibly, incredibly unexpectedly dovish comments. And it was a fairly big move, but more than half of that is retraced now.
And we're looking at $1,232, just where we've been for the last month or so. I think that the 50-day moving average is still, particularly in the gold market, 50-day moving average is really important. We are in a process here. Are we going to get through this support at the 50-day, and is the market gonna move lower? Or is it gonna bounce off it and sustain a move higher?
It's only been a couple of days since Janet's comments, if anything was going to turn the market around to the upside, change my outlook of a bearish view on gold, it would be what has happened. So it should be turning up. But as you said, muted reaction. That says to me that the gold market is not ready yet.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, thank you, Erik. Your insights are always appreciated. And we'll be back with this week's feature interview with Bill Fleckenstein right after this.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Bill Fleckenstein. And Bill, you're a fairly notorious guy, but for those listeners who don't know who you are already, you ran a short fund and you shut it down in March of 2009, essentially because you knew what was going to happen. You knew the Fed was going to print money and that money had to go someplace, and a lot of it was going to end up in asset markets.
You're back We're back now, setting your fund back up. And the most immediate question that comes to my mind, Bill, is what's different now? Because obviously you can make a, I'm sure, a very persuasive bearish case on the stock market. I've had at least 5 or 6 rounds of this since 2009 where I just thought, boy, we haven't solved any problems. We've papered over our problems with printed money to address symptoms without solving any problem. This all has to come falling apart. The party's over. And it seems like it's never over. So what's different about this time?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think the problem is that Well, what's different about the last— well, we could call it maybe 18 months— is since QE3 ended, the stock market really hasn't gone up. It hasn't gone down very well, but there have been some bursts of kind of violent downside action, and they've gotten progressively worse. I actually thought that when the market took out the August lows this winter, I thought we'd see a, you know, a rapid collapse. That did not happen. I was lucky enough that when I saw that it wasn't happening, you know, I covered most of the shorts that I have. Even though I haven't restarted my short-only fund, I still run my— I still manage my own money and, and there's some friends and family, and I had a lot of shorts and I took them in. So I was pretty fortunate about that.
So one of the reasons why I why I discussed, uh, opening a new short fund was because some of the things that I think are important to making money on the short side were falling into place. Number one, the Fed was not printing money and the market appeared to have stalled.
You know, I thought there was plenty of bad news that might hit, and bad news was mattering. Right now we're back in a period where bad news doesn't really matter, but I think this is kind of transitory. And another leg will start to the downside. I can't tell you when.
It could be tomorrow, could be in a month, could be anytime. But there's plenty of unfinished business without— I mean, we do have the fumes of QE because the Fed is rolling over its balance sheet. Then you do have the other central bankers doing what they're doing. So it's not like there's no QE going on, but it's not happening here in America. The more important stage of this will be when And the market breaks and the Fed does what it's gonna do next, and we see if the market wants to believe them.
In the wake of the last 2 burst bubbles, the stock bubble and then the real estate bubble, we had a period where the Fed did a lot of easing. And of course, after '08, we had government support programs, and those really weren't perceived to be effective for a while.
You know, but then when, when people started to have confidence again in the Fed, Markets took off. And, and of course, since, oh, the lows in '09, the market has hardly spent any time going down, absent the few breaks we've had in the last couple of years— or sorry, in the last 18 months.
What's changed is the Fed's not doing QE. Now, you're going to have to be on guard for a return of QE when the market breaks. Whatever the heck they're going to do, I don't know, but they'll do something again. So, you know, it's, it's not—
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: as though the market breaks and you can sit back and be short for a year and a half. I mean, the most important thing about short selling, in my opinion, are the tactics that you employ.
You have to do the research. It's important, but all by itself it won't make any money. In fact, it'll probably cost you money.
Erik Townsend: Could you just map out for us what you see on the horizon, Bill? I think that everybody sort of sees the, the same big picture here, which is that the Fed's taken away the punchbowl, markets are set to roll over, but everybody knows that if things get really bad, we're going to see QE4 and more accommodation, and things are going to reverse again. So when you can't really gauge the market based on economic fundamentals because Fed policy is driving everything, how do you trade around that? Is it based entirely on analyzing the Fed?
Bill Fleckenstein: Fed policy— sorry, activist Fed policy intervention has been the case on a progressively larger scale now for for almost 20 years. I mean, Greenspan was completely incompetent, but he makes these people that have come after him, they make him look like Albert Einstein. So it's not new news that we have to factor in what the Fed is doing. It's a major part of how I try to manage risk when I'm running a short portfolio. But you can talk much and say, well, I'm gonna own my stocks and I know the Fed's got my back. Yeah, well, you say that now, but you have a, you know, 15, 20% break in the market and shorts And, you know, those same guys that are saying that'll be shaking in their boots and they'll be selling stocks.
And then it'll take a while for the Fed to ride to the rescue. But as a short seller, you'd have to get out of the way anticipating their next move. And then in the wake of the next move that they make, we'll have to see what happens. Because at the end of the day, these policies don't work. Anyone with an ounce of brains can see that these— that the—
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: Response to failed policies is just doing more of the same failed policy. And that's gone on for some time.
At some point, the bond markets are going to revolt against this because I think at some point people are not going to want to own these low-yielding to negative-yielding pieces of government paper when government deficits are liable to explode. I mean, this is a recipe for disaster. But for the moment, And it's perceived to be completely intelligent policy, even though it's the opposite.
Erik Townsend: Bill, where do you think if we look at monetary policy, the story that we're being told by the Fed is entirely about how we are on a rate normalization cycle. They're not sure how long it will take, but we're headed back towards historically normal interest rates. A lot of skeptics, myself included, have said, hey, it's a matter of time And not a question of if, but when the Fed reverses course towards either QE4 or negative interest rates or some other kind of accommodation. First of all, would you agree with that characterization? And second of all, where do you think we are in this story? Are we close to the point where we are going to see that U-turn, or are we going to follow this for a while more with the Fed trying to save face?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think to any objective observer, It's pretty clear that the Fed's back way off from that storyline. You can see it in the FX market. I mean, the whole— here's what's happened since 2011. The Fed, between the Fed's QE and Draghi's and now Japan's, they managed to push the stock market to the moon in America. The stock market wrote the news. People said, okay guys, market's up, economy's gonna be better. We had this whole storyline of self-sustaining recovery and multiple rate hikes, and there was— the dollar was up and everyone else was going to have to follow our policies, but they're way behind. So the dollar is going to be strong, the other currency is going to be weak, and you had to invest in America and emerging markets were no good. All that was BS. It was all fantasy precipitated by stock prices going up, having people write the news differently and believe different things.
And now guess what? Here we are A year later, about a year ago, is about the zenith of this thinking, and the dollar rolled over pretty hard, at least against the dollar index, not against every small currency on the planet. But, and it's pretty clear that there's no self-sustaining recovery and there's not going to be a lot of rate hikes.
Now, ardent believers in the school of thought that says the Fed knows what it's doing won't agree with that statement, but anybody who's
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Bill Fleckenstein: Who knows anything about history and objective will see that that's true. So when are people going to— when is the Fed going to be forced to do something else? They're not going to do anything else until the stock market gets smoked.
Now, is that down 10, 12, 15, 20? I don't know. I think that the next time the market goes down, we take out those February lows, August lows. This time I think we will hit an air pocket. I thought that would happen last time. I was wrong. I think, but I still think next time it's going to happen. I think the market is an air pocket waiting to happen. There's all these false beliefs based on the premise that all this stuff works, and it's nonsense. And things aren't going to get better materially because these policies don't work. And at some point, people are going to be forced to realize that. When they're forced to, they start to— that dawns on them, the stock market will get hit hard, fast.
At some point, the Fed will panic. When the Fed panics, then we can look at those policies and see what they are and try to come up with some sort of conclusion as to what does it mean. And, you know, if one of these days the bond markets of the world finally decide that they're not going to put up with this central planning that comes out of these, you know, these academics that run the central banks, then, then things are really going to get tough and we're going to have to settle up a lot of these long-running problems that keep getting worse because we've refused to address So, basically, the—
Erik Townsend: if we sort of lay out the picture here that we can expect the market to fail at some point, I think you and I are both looking for that to happen sooner rather than later. But then there will be a stick save. There will be some kind of Fed accommodation that at least temporarily rescues things. I'm assuming that you would agree with me that we're getting to the point where they're running out of bullets and it's not going to work, or at least we're closer To the point where eventually it's not going to work?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, you can't prejudge that. I mean, I don't know. It's not going to work in the sense that it's not going to make the economy— create an economy like we used to have before the Fed started doing all of its intervention and holding rates for too low for too long. But it might work in the sense that it could take the stock market up a bunch in a short space of time. So if you're talking about You're talking about it from an economic standpoint, no, it won't work. You're talking about it from the perspective of a short seller, and you fold your arms and say, I don't care what they do, it's not going to work, and I'm going to stay short, you're liable to get your head ripped off.
So what they're going to do, we don't know. We know they'll do something. There'll be an attempt to ride to the rescue. It won't be successful from an economic standpoint. It will probably be successful from, at least from a short-term standpoint.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Bill Fleckenstein: As far as financial markets go. I remember in '09 when I decided to close down my short funds because I knew they were going to print money. And guys I knew, there were other short sellers, you know, sort of poked fun at me saying, well, this is not going to work. It doesn't work. It didn't work last time. And consumers tapped.
And well, you know what? Fortunately, I stuck to my guns. I got out of the way and I didn't get run over.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: So you have to be very careful when you say it's not going to work, you know what I mean?
Erik Townsend: Oh, I definitely know what you mean. I have made this mistake so many times. In March of 2009, when you were making the right call and shutting down your short fund, I was saying this isn't going to work because the market's going to see through it. This is an act of desperation on the Fed's part. They've gotten to the point where all conventional monetary policy is not working.
We are at the desperation point where they're just reaching for straws. The market will see through that, and it's not going to work. And boy, I couldn't possibly have been more wrong. You print money in dollars, those dollars have to go someplace. And as you've said, they may not solve any systemic problems for society, but you sure can prop up asset markets with printed money if you want to do that.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, you can, as long as people have confidence in what you're doing. Now we're going to get to one of these rounds, whether it's QE4, 5, 6, or 7, I don't know, it'll backfire quickly. And you'll know that because the bond market won't cooperate. And when they lose the bond market, the game is over.
Erik Townsend: So your thesis is basically when you see the bond market reacting in reverse— in other words, normally what we expect in quantitative easing, the government's printing money to buy bonds, you're expecting the price of bonds to go up. Because the government's buying them. When you see the price of bonds going down in that environment because regular investors are scared to death that they're never going to get paid back, that's the moment when confidence has been lost.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, yeah. Well, it's not they're scared to death they won't get paid back, they just know that they're not going to get— you know, they finally decide that they're not going to own this paper because it's a losing proposition, because they know these policies are good. At some point it's going to lead to more inflation. I mean, inflation is higher than people are willing to admit to because the CPI is— the CPI doesn't measure inflation. It measures some sort of after-it's-been-manipulated statistic about how much prices go up if you want to believe in hedonic adjustment, substitution, and all of that sort of crap.
You know, I wrote a book on the Fed and then I had a chapter in it on how the CPI had been manipulated. And so if you rely on CPI inflation or any of the silly measures the Fed uses, you're never going to get any anyway. But it's out there. I mean, ask any— the reason there's no middle class in this country anymore is because the economy has been ruined by the Fed and the politicians. And there's still inflation even though they talk about deflation. So people can't get good jobs in the aggregate, and the price of living keeps going up for the most part. I mean, yeah, we've been in a period of some commodity decline, price declines in the last year, but now once they stabilize, then you start that clock all over again.
So at some point, the Fed will lose the confidence of the bond market, and then it's game over. But I don't know when that will be. And when that happens, then your tactics will You have to be different, and then you can play, you can operate in a totally different fashion than you must when you have to worry about them riding to the rescue.
Erik Townsend: One of the biggest stories in the global macro world in the last couple of years has been the US dollar rally. Basically, ever since the end of QE3, the US dollar has been rallying against other currencies. We had Axel Merk on the program a couple of weeks ago saying that he thinks it's done He thinks the dollar rally is over. Goldman Sachs was out with a note the other day saying they think it's about to take off dramatically further to the upside.
Where do you see this dollar debate headed? Where do you think it's going from here?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think I just covered that. I mean, I think it was a fantasy. It's over. You know, peaked out last year and maybe retested the high recently, but Goldman Sachs is full of crap.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so you, you do see the dollar rally is done at this point?
Bill Fleckenstein: Yes.
Erik Townsend: Okay. And so with respect to a short-selling book and building a short strategy, how do you approach this? You know, I, I, if I were to look at a book about short selling, it would probably be about security analysis and looking at balance sheets and which companies are having the most trouble. It seems to me that this macro cycle of what Fed policy is going to be is much, much bigger than the balance sheet, you know, particulars of any company. So how do you approach a short fund, a short strategy in this environment?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I mean, you basically can't be short. I mean, that's been— let me say it this way: research counts for maybe 10%, although you have to do good research, you have to be right about that. The tactics and how you manage your risk and how you initiate shorts and press them and take them off and cut your losses and all that. All those sorts of things count for about 90%.
And the analysis of what the central banks are up to and how people perceive that and all of that is an integral component of managing the risk. So as I said earlier, it's not about research, it's about your tactics.
So I have a set of rules that I use that say, okay, is it safe to be short or not? And, and how careful do I have to be? And they revolve around Is the market making some highs? Are individual stocks going up or down on bad news? What's the perception of the Fed? What's the Fed doing? All those sorts of things.
Erik Townsend: And are your shorts always against stocks that you've analyzed for a particular weakness, or do you sometimes short sectors on a macro play?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, always individual companies for specific reasons.
Erik Townsend: And that's— I think that's a fairly consistent rule that I've heard from other people, is that, you know, you can, you can be an index trader on the long side But on the short side, you really can't just trade an index. You've got to do the research and the homework.
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I don't think you can do that. I mean, even on the long side, if you're just going to buy an index, what's your edge? You're saying, okay, well, I don't have an edge, but I know the crowd's bullish and they're all going up. Okay. And you could do that on the short side, I guess.
If your tactics were good, it would work. But most of the time, I think I think you need to feel like you've got some sort of an edge or what you're thinking that other people aren't thinking or how you see this. And so that's why I prefer individual securities. I mean, otherwise it's just a guess. Now, sometimes if you know you're making a guess, it's easier to pick some basket of stuff that you're not going to have your— you're not going to be mentally invested in, right? You do a whole bunch of research on a particular company, it's easy to get get sort of dug in over that, where if you pick something that you know you don't have any edge, it's easier to get away from the trade. So from that standpoint, sometimes picking a basket would be useful if you follow my logic.
Erik Townsend: Okay, but you say that at least in your style, you generally short individual securities only?
Bill Fleckenstein: Correct.
Erik Townsend: Okay, if you look at the market right now, I watched this rally start from a few weeks ago, and, you know, I thought it was going to end at the 50-day moving average, and it And then I thought it was going to end at the 100-day moving average, and it didn't. And then we took out the 200-day moving average. We're at the point now, I think we've got one more technical level around 2,070, 2,075. After that, it's really new highs before on a technical level, you know, you could say that this rally is done. So on a pure technical analysis standpoint, I'm thinking, boy, it's time to cover my shorts on the S&P. On a fundamental level, I just have really strong conviction it's short. What do you think has driven this rally that we've seen so far for so long? When so many people seem to have the same hesitations and skepticisms about the health of the rally?
Bill Fleckenstein: I don't know. Could it be a function of how the compute— the algos and computers read the environment at the margin, and versus too many guys who got too short, maybe, or something? I don't really know. I don't spend a lot of time thinking about that. I mean, it is what it is. And if If you knew who was buying and why they were buying, I don't even— I mean, I'm not sure it would do you any good. So, and I don't think any of these technical levels matter.
When I realized I was wrong about the market vapor locking in the downside, I cut myself way, way, way back, got out of the way. And I said to my— I said, okay, this rally is either going to be shorter than people expect and they'll get pulled that way, or it'll last longer. Well, it's fallen into the latter category. So it'll last longer, be more complex, you know, fail at some number that nobody could pick. I don't know. I, I don't spend a lot of time thinking about that because I can't know. Well, I can wait and see. If wherever it fails, I'll start to pay attention and I'll start to see what companies are going down on what kind of news. I'll start to get an idea of what's up, and I'll know what the companies that I think have problems and whether I think it's going to get rugged to be involved. And then I'll, I'll get active again because that, that could be Maybe 3 days from now.
I just don't know, but I don't need to know. As long as I'm not gonna— if it's not working for an extended period of time, I'm not gonna stand there and be in the way.
It's just part of what I've learned. And the way you could have made money shorting stocks in— I don't really know about the '70s, I wasn't in the business yet, but in the '80s or early '90s, it's totally different the way it works now. And you just have to be— you just have to, you know, bow to the reality of that situation.
Erik Townsend: And when you say it's totally different, what's totally different? Because monetary policy is driving markets more than individual—
Bill Fleckenstein: Central banks get in the way all the time, and they just, you know, you can't wait for some company, you know, that's terminal, that can't get funding. You know, all of a sudden the Fed comes with a QE or emergency rate hike, and guys cover shorts, they spike up, and the next thing you know, the company does a deal. I mean, the activist central banker, the Greenspan began has totally changed the way you have to manage your tactics of running a short book. You can't just sit there and fold your arms and be short them and say, ah, now I got them, because there's just too much noise involved given the, the violent rallies that these guys precipitate.
Erik Townsend: Well, and certainly the algorithmic trading and everything else that has changed the market has been amazing.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, but the algorithmic trading could operate on the downside too. You know, I mean, so we have only seen it really operate on the upside. At some point, it'll operate on the downside, and that'll be a— that'll be a horror show, most likely. But so far, that hasn't happened.
Erik Townsend: So as you look at this market today, do you see this as it's time to be building a short book, or are you still in hurry-up-and-wait mode, waiting to see what the Fed does?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I see no reason to be short. Why? I mean, it's like we just talked about it. I mean, the market keeps hitting recovery highs. And bad news doesn't make stocks go down. They ignore it and they go up. So I don't see any reason to get short until something starts to change.
I mean, I have companies that I know, companies I would be willing to get short if I thought it would, you know, if I think the environment's changing. And I think it will change. I think, you know, I don't think April is going to be great for stocks because I think we'll start to see earnings. But, you know, maybe People give it a pass. They'll say, okay, now it's getting better. We thought it was bad. I don't know.
Psychology is a big component in this central bank, activist central bank era. So we'll just have to wait and see. I don't feel like I'm gonna miss something if I'm not on it.
'Cause remember, you've only got a trade in front of you on the downside, 'cause the Fed's gonna ride to the rescue. It's not like the bubble burst and And things are going to get violent quickly, which is what happened after the last 2 bubbles burst. This one's different, the way government bonds are involved and stuff like that.
I mean, if they lost the bond market, that'd be different. You could be maxed out short for the rest of your life until they collapsed, right? But we're just not there.
Erik Townsend: Do you get involved in the— I know you follow macro a lot, and a lot of macro traders pay attention to things like gold. Do you integrate precious metals into your trading a lot, or do you really focus on the equities primarily?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I'm heavily involved in precious metals. That's another reason why I don't feel so compelled to do anything on the short side. Metals are starting to work again. You're able to make good money in these miners and in the metals themselves. And there's way— I felt like at the beginning of this year, there's way more upside in the miners than there was downside in stocks. So, that was fairly easy.
I was the director, I was the lead director of Pan American Silver for about, uh, I was a director for about 15 years. I was the lead director for about 10 or 12. So I've actually been in the industry from that standpoint.
Erik Townsend: And what's your outlook at this point? I, I think a lot of us have felt like the long-term precious metals has got to be a bullish story, but, you know, cyclically we've been in a bear market for the last few years. Does it feel like it's over?
Bill Fleckenstein: I mean, Yeah, the bear market, I think, ended. In the metal and the stocks, it's quite a bit different. So, I think it's over. I think it's— and so I think we're in a new bull market, and I see all these tech— look, the problem with gold is everyone who can spell gold has an opinion about where the price is supposed to be. Most of it's based on slapping a ruler against a chart and drawing a trend line or making up some story about what's gonna happen. So, everyone's got an opinion about it.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Bill Fleckenstein: Most people don't know much about it from a fundamental standpoint. You know, people that are bullish are looking for a correction; those that are bearish are looking for much lower. And the small minority of people think that it's going to be resolved on the upside, and it's a bull market. A lot of these technicians keep looking at the data through the lens of the last three years when we're in a bear market. And if we're not, and if we're not in a bear market, which is my opinion, then the data that they're looking. looking at that's got themselves all twisted sideways isn't gonna matter.
Erik Townsend: So let's move back to short selling. A lot of our listeners are active traders who are very familiar with the concept of what a short sale is. They know how to put a short position in on their account. But experienced short sellers like yourself, Bill, know that there's a lot more to it than just understanding the mechanics of a short trade. There are aspects of of short selling that are different from trading from a long side.
I think a lot of our listeners are maybe looking at whether it's immediately on the horizon or a couple years down the road, I'm not sure, but we're going to be going through a soft patch, I think, in the economy where a lot of people who are traders but not experienced short sellers are going to be involved in more short positions. What would your advice be to new short sellers or experienced traders that don't have a lot of shorting experience? as market conditions tend to drag them more into short trades?
Bill Fleckenstein: That's a pretty complicated question. I don't know that I have a soundbite worth of information to give you. I mean, you have to have rules about what you think is going to happen. You have to know what would make you cover. You know, the hardest thing about short selling is the tactics. You, you know, you have to have conviction to be short, but you have to be flexible enough to say, hey, this is not working, I got to cut it back. You've got to be willing to put it back out. If you're wrong, you've got to be willing to get chopped up and chewed up some. You can't just fold your arms. Something starts to go against you, you've got to start nibbling and taking it in.
And there was a book recently written by Richard Teitelbaum called The Most Dangerous Trade, and in it he profiled some short sellers— myself, Marc Cohodes, David Einhorn, and some others. But some of the guys in the book aren't really short sellers, they're just marquee names.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Bill Fleckenstein: Help sell books, but some of the others are. And you can read that book and see what doesn't work. Marc Cohodes does great research, and he, he was not in the same camp that I am about tactics.
And I could never do it the way he does. He relied, you know, all on the research and tended to go after fraud. I think you have to be much more tactical about it. So, I mean, I think the thing you have to realize is that it takes a great deal of trading, it takes a lot of risk management, and just get Getting the research right is like 1/10 of the problem.
So I think being aware of how difficult it is and how much hands-on and day-to-day management it takes, and again, knowing when to prep and when to cut back, I mean, that's the critical stuff. And if you don't really— if all this sounds foreign to you, you have to be really, really careful and keep those positions small.
Erik Townsend: And what was it about short selling that attracted you to it, Bill? You've got a very strong— so it's just something that you have experience with and got good at, or?
Bill Fleckenstein: No, I mean, yeah, I had experience with in the '80s. I was short Japan after that bubble, and I'd been short stocks in the late '80s and early '90s, you know, frauds and different things like that. But then when I saw the path that Greenspan was on, I knew it was going to lead to disaster. So I left the long firm that I worked— I was a partner partner at and set up a short fund in 1995. I was 5 years too early because the party lasted longer than I would have guessed.
But it came to a bad end, and then they did it again, and then I wrote a book, and, you know, and then they did it again. So it was— these policies were no good, and they were going to end in disaster. But I never dreamed that they'd get, you know, that they'd keep doing the same thing over and over, but that's exactly what's happened.
Erik Townsend: It's absolutely amazing to me that It's amazing that we can go through so many rounds of the same policies, and it's not like it's a mystery. There's lots of smart people that comment on monetary policy and describe all of the reasons why there are so many faults in our government's policies, but we just keep doing the same things over again. It never ceases to amaze me.
Bill Fleckenstein: Yeah, I know what you mean.
Erik Townsend: Bill, as we close, I'd like to just get a perspective from you as to where you see things headed. It sounds like you don't think that it's time to be short yet, but you're definitely getting ready for that to come. So, do you think this is something that's going to play out soon, long?
Bill Fleckenstein: How—
Erik Townsend: what do you see on the horizon?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, I think it's going to happen pretty soon, but I don't need to know that because I can wait and see it start to develop, and then I can act. So, I don't, I don't need to know the future. I just need to start to see it develop, recognize it, and be smart enough to get short at the right time, the right stuff, and manage my risks, and it'll work out. But I think there's more money that's going to be Made in precious metals is going to be made even shorter. So I think that's potentially a much easier place to go for the average person.
Erik Townsend: For the average person, then, you think a long trade in precious metals is both easier, safer, better, smarter than trying to learn short selling of stocks that you're experienced with?
Bill Fleckenstein: Well, yeah, but that doesn't mean it will be actually easy. That means it's easier. We're talking about degrees of difficulty here.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Bill, I can't thank you enough for coming and joining us on the program. It's been a fantastic interview. I know that you write a daily column every day at FleckensteinCapital.com. You also have a subscription service that people can subscribe to to get your perspective. That is at FleckensteinCapital.com. Anything else you'd like to add before we close?
Bill Fleckenstein: Not really. I think you asked all the important questions.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Thanks so much for joining us. Nathan Egger and I will be back right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: Welcome back, everyone.
Nathan Egger: Erik, I wrote down a few questions for you as I was listening to your interview with Bill Fleckenstein. At one point, At one point, you were talking about the bond market and how it will eventually revolt against reckless monetary policy. And you were asking about a specific relationship between bond prices and monetary stimulus.
And when you said the word scared to death, Bill seemed to react to that phrase rather than the price relationship. And that left me a little bit confused. So, could you clarify for us what exactly was the relationship that you were talking about?
Erik Townsend: Well, Nate, where I was headed with that question is to feel Bill out as to whether or not he uses the same type of indicators that I do to sense oncoming problems in the Treasury market. And this goes back to sort of, you know, to explain this, I have to back up to a little bit of explanation.
I call these ELE indicators, and the analogy is to an old movie. I forget the name of it, but basically the asteroid was coming to destroy the Earth and everybody was going to get blown up, and they called it an extinction-level event, or ELE. And I sort of think about, well, if I think that the US Treasury market has structural problems, it is successful because there's no alternative. Someday there will be an alternative to the US Treasury market, and I think that we're going to face really big structural problems. Well, if I think that problem is going to occur in my lifetime, but I have no idea when, what do you do? What you do is you try to develop indicators to tell you when these things are going to happen.
The most important ratio that I look at is the dollar index to the 10-year Treasury yield. In other words, the whole theory of how currencies relate to interest rates is, as any given country is offering a higher or a lower Treasury yield— in other words, as the government is paying a different amount of interest— if they're paying more interest, well, that's rewarding investors better for investing in that country.
Country, the currency should appreciate as the country's Treasury yield is appreciating. Conversely, if a country is reducing its Treasury yield, there's less and less reward for international investors to invest there. They should take their money and go elsewhere, and that will cause the currency to weaken.
So there's always a relationship between the Dollar Index and the 10-year Treasury. What would happen If that were to break down and go into reverse, and particularly if the dollar index were going down at the same time that the Treasury yield were going up? Well, what that would tell you is you're being rewarded with a higher rate of interest to invest in the United States, but international capital isn't taking the deal. It's not worth it. They don't want the extra interest. Something's wrong. They don't trust it. So if the dollar index starts going the opposite direction, from the 10-year Treasury yield. That to me is saying this is the ELE indicator Something is so profoundly wrong with the system that interest rates and their historical relationship to exchange rates are breaking down. So that's an example of an ELE indicator
The next one that I think about is when we're in periods of quantitative easing, what we've seen in the past is that That the government is basically printing money, conjuring money out of thin air, in order effectively to monetize debt. They're buying government bonds. Well, that should cause the price of government bonds to go up and the yield to go down.
And what we've seen historically in quantitative easing periods is that they have succeeded in their stated goal of reducing short-term interest rates. Government buys a bunch of Treasury bonds. The result is that that supply is taken off the market. That results in higher interest rates. International investors are being rewarded and so forth. When this breaks down and goes into reverse, that's going to tell me something's really bad.
Well, what happens when you're printing money and you're buying bonds with them? That ought to be increasing the price of bonds, decreasing the yield, but the price of bonds goes down anyway, even though the government is buying them with freshly minted money. Well, what that would tell you is that there is the beginning of a loss of confidence. Even though the government is printing money and supporting the bond market, the market thinks it's not going to work. The market thinks it's going to fail and it's going to blow up. And even though there are attractive rates, people would rather just take their money and run. So to me, this is a very interesting ELE indicator and it's a tentative one because I don't have enough data to know if it's really reliable.
If you started seeing Let's suppose that we get into another round of quantitative easing, and all of this bond buying is going on, but we're still seeing Treasury rates back up anyway in the face of that bond buying. My hypothesis, and it's tentative, is that's a really important signal. What that's telling you is that a confidence crisis is beginning because people are not doing what they logically ought to be incented to do because they no longer trust the system.
So, to me, it's fascinating to come up with as many of these ELE indicators as I can and constantly follow them. And what I was hoping to get to with Bill is, it sounded at first to me like he was thinking the same way I am, which is, use what you know about quantitative easing and what you believe it has to imply on the 10-year Treasury yield trend and potentially infer an indicator from that. Didn't seem like Bill was thinking about it that way, so I decided to just move on to the next topic.
Nathan Egger: There was another point where you asked Bill to describe the differences inherent to short versus long trading. And I noticed you said specifically that these differences existed, but my sense was that Bill disagreed with you. What differences were you talking about when you brought up that question?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, I was really surprised by his answer on that one. It sounded to me like Bill was saying, from his perspective, you know, same difference, short, long. I don't I don't think of it that way. Now, in fairness, Bill is an accomplished short fund manager. I do a lot of short trading, but I'm not a short fund guy as a matter of background. But I think of it as a completely different environment because markets tend to behave differently on the upside and the downside.
There's a very well-known adage that markets move— they take the escalator up and the express elevator down. In other words, it's a slow, steady slog for stock prices to slowly climb up in a bull market.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Then you have a 1987-like event where all of a sudden you lose 25% in a day.
The point is, I think it's much harder than Bill alluded to just see things coming. You know, he said in a couple of places there, you know, well, I'm not short now because I'll see it coming.
In my experience, it's harder in the short world to see it coming than the long world, because when things start to happen, they happen very quickly and you have to react much more quickly. So I would contend that you have to be more nimble in short trading than in long trading.
I would also say that there are several forms of carry involved in short trading that just don't come into play. If you buy a stock and your motive for buying the stock is capital appreciation, you're not a dividend investor, and the stock happens to have a dividend anyway, okay, that's a free bonus. You probably didn't think too much about it. But if you're shorting a stock that pays a dividend, you as the short seller have to pay that dividend.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If you're shorting a bond that pays interest, you as the short seller, you have to ante up the interest. So if you're doing something like shorting junk bonds, they're called high yield for a reason. That yield, the interest payment is pretty significant. If you're going to carry that position for a year and you're going to be paying what might be an 8 or a 9% high yield return, you're paying that as a carry fee. So I would say, and at least in my opinion, Short selling differs from long trading in the sense that there's usually more time pressure.
You have to get the timing right. You can't just short and hold the way that you can buy and hold. Another reason that that's true is, in addition to the interest and dividend, there's also a broker's cost of carry.
And we should probably take a step back. How is it possible to short something in the first place anyway? How can you possibly sell something that you don't own? Well, the answer is you have to borrow it first.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: If you want to short 100 shares of IBM stock. You borrow those 100 shares of IBM stock. That loan is repayable in shares. So what you have to repay someday is the 100 shares back. You sell those shares. Someday you buy them back. Hopefully you made a profit, and then you can repay the loan. Well, your broker is going to charge you for that loan. How much they charge you and how it's structured probably varies from one brokerage house to the next, but it ain't free. So if you're going to just, you know, you've got a bunch of cash in your account, you think, well, gee, I think I might want to be in such and such a stock for the long haul, just buy that stock and sit on it.
You can't really short for the long haul because you have a long-term view of something. You need to get the timing right. You need to understand that there are costs involved. In futures trading, that cost can go either direction.
In other words, if you are long or short— let's take crude oil as an example. If I go and buy crude oil futures tomorrow, So I'm long crude oil futures. There's going to be a very significant carry cost when I roll that May contract forward into the June contract. There's contango. That means a change in price from one delivery contract to the next. That's going to hurt me if I'm long. It's going to help me if I'm short. So there is a dramatic effect in the roll carry in futures trading that dramatically affects your overall performance as to whether you're getting paid a premium to be in that trade every month as you roll it, or you're paying a premium for the privilege of being in that trade. And that dramatically affects your overall result.
I'm just thinking, there's so many issues that make, to my mind, make short selling just a completely different world. You have to borrow before you can short. It seems logically like a simple enough thing. Oh, I see, the broker borrows stock and he lets me sell it and then I buy it back later. Well, the broker had to find that stock in order to borrow it. Let's suppose that the broker borrowed that stock from somebody else's margin account, and that somebody else finally figures out— let's take an example, a real-life example.
I want to short high-yield junk bonds, so I short the HYG ETF, and I'm paying the interest dividend cost. It's high yield, and I'm on the short side, so I got to pay that yield. I got to pay the interest.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: In order to be in this trade, hoping that I'm going to make more on the price going down. So now this price starts to go down and I'm finally making more and I'm making back that money that I've been paying my broker for the interest and the cost to borrow, the margin interest, all these things.
I get to the point where I'm finally making money. Well, now the other guys that are long HYG, they figure out what I already knew, which is this is not a smart thing to be long. They sell it out of their margin accounts.
Well, guess what happened? The shares that I was short were borrowed from some guy's margin account. Some guy just sold those shares in his margin account, so they're not there in his margin account. That's called a withdraw of borrow. In other words, the broker had borrowed the stock, but the stock had been borrowed from somebody's account, and somebody ended up not having it in their account anymore. So you can't borrow it.
You can actually, as a short seller, be right at the cusp of where your position is about to start paying off, and all of a sudden what happens is the guys that are long start selling out, the borrow is no longer available, your broker closes out your position just before what would have been a really big profit move.
So you have to be constantly aware of the fact that when you're short, you can be liquidated, force liquidated out of your position, not because you did something wrong, but just because the shares are no longer available to borrow.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: The other thing that brokers like to do is play games with the rates that they're charging you. Anything that is popular to short is going to be what they call HTB, hard to borrow, and that means they're going to charge a premium interest rate for letting you borrow it.
So there are completely different costs, transaction costs, carry costs, and probably the biggest one that I can think of in terms of differences, the mechanics of a short squeeze and how it works. It's so important for short sellers to understand that.
There's a point, if you're short, that the other guys that are short are going to give up. You want to give up on your short before the other guys do, because if the other guys give up, they're forced to buy. That carries the price higher. You might know that ultimately the end result is going to be the price ends up much lower. And this is very much what I think has happened just in the last few weeks in the oil market. But the thing is, the guys that are short are all liquidating, and that forces them to buy and it pushes the price up.
You need to know what a short squeeze is. You need to understand it. And as you see one starting— our regular listeners know that on this program we talked in great detail about if we get past $36, north of $36 on the oil price, I predicted that it would become a self-reinforcing event, that it would be carried higher as a result of that.
That. So that happened.
You can't possibly be successful trading an environment like this unless you understand how a short squeeze works. And in this case, what you have to watch is the Commitment of Traders reports are the indication to tell you how many of those other shorts have already exited their positions, how many are still in their shorts, how many longs have been added. And that all can help you to gauge when it's time to— if you were stopped out, as I was stopped out of the crude oil I wanted to get back into that. I knew there was momentum. I knew that when I was stopped out just over $36, that it was going to move higher. I knew it was in my interest to wait it out until it got to a higher price, but I wanted to get back into that short trade when it was time. How could I know if it was time if I didn't understand a short squeeze?
It's mechanics that don't exist on the long side of the market.
So I would have to respectfully disagree with Bill. To my thinking, Short selling and long trading are completely different, and you really need to understand the mechanics in order to be successful at it.
Nathan Egger: Thanks for clearing that up, because this short squeeze terminology has been a real buzz lately at CNBC, Bloomberg, all over the blogs. People talking about a short squeeze both in the S&P, the crude oil market. You've been seeing this, so thank you for helping us to understand that. You also asked Bill about shorting sectors versus individual securities, and his response made it sound almost like there's no other option than to short individual stocks. What were you driving at with that question?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, Bill's answer surprised me on that one as well. What I was driving at is there is a viewpoint, and I was curious as to whether Bill shared it or not, among some short sellers, which is you cannot short an index. You know, you cannot short a basket of things. You have to do the— it's okay to do that in the long case if you're You want to buy defense stocks, you want to buy energy stocks, you buy an ETF like XLE. But boy, don't try that on the short side, is wisdom that some people think makes sense. Doesn't make any sense to me.
A lot, almost all of the short selling that I've done in my career has been ETFs or sectors. And perfect example of this, let's suppose that you believe that the economy is turning and there's what people call a sector rotation. You expect that for whatever reason, there's going to be a rotation out of consumer cyclical stocks into consumer staples, because maybe the economy is weakening. Well, in that case, what I would consider is using the sector ETFs, and those SPDR ETFs are fantastic for this, for going long the— if your expectation is that consumer staples are going to improve, you're going to be long staples and short consumer discretionary.
I've done a lot of long-short trading, pairs trading, and outright short trading against indices and ETFs. And it seems to me like there's no reason that that should work any differently than an individual issue.
Nathan Egger: So it sounds like there's actually plenty to disagree on. And that's not a bad thing. That's a good thing. That's, that's what makes markets and markets make us lots of money.
Nathan Egger: So Erik, before we close today's show, can we just give our listeners a quick update on the MacroVoices project, on the feedback that we've received and where we're headed from here?
Erik Townsend: Sure. You know, fantastic feedback. I cannot thank everybody enough. Please continue to help us. Tell all of your friends and acquaintances about MacroVoices. Everything that we can do to grow our audience will help us to get you even better guests on the program.
It's really surprising to me, some of the feedback that we got in the forums, a lot of people asking for more content from me and less from our guests. And that's very flattering, good for my ego. I'm going to respectfully disagree with the people who said that. I know that a show that's just me talking for an hour is way too boring. So we're definitely going to continue to keep things interesting by bringing you a new guest every week. Frankly, I would rather go the other direction. I'd rather bring you more guests, have 2 or 3 guests on a show for shorter segments, if we can eventually get to that. This idea of additional content that's me only, I don't want to not have new guests every week.
We will consider, though, if there's demand for it, doing additional content in addition to the weekly show. And there's an idea I've been kicking around. I want to just sort of float it and see if we get any reaction.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: This is something I actually designed about 2.5, 3 years ago and proposed to another podcast program who actually committed to doing it but never followed through. And the idea was to kind of create a— not so much a weekly news program, but a targeted class, if you will, for what does it mean to be an accredited investor?
Because my experience when I sold my software company, made a few million bucks, I, you know, suddenly realized, okay, the next thing to do in life is to go learn all about markets and investing, because clearly now my wealth is in liquid form as opposed to owning a company that I had founded. So I had to learn all about this, and I thought, I've been around the block, I ran a company, I'm CEO, I know how to spot a con man in business. I know how not to get taken for a sucker by the con men. When you get to Wall Street, Nathan, the con men have have Ivy League MBAs, and they're really, really good at it, and you're dealing with a whole different league of sleaze.
And I frankly got screwed over pretty badly.
The world's most prestigious private bank lost about half of my net worth in the course of a few years, and it has been a lot of work to, to work that back. I guess it's something that I have a personal investment in because I I feel that I've been hurt by the industry badly, and I'd love to help other entrepreneurs who are coming into wealth not get screwed by private bankers and some of the other sleazy characters in the industry.
So we thought about this high net worth series that we might do, say, a show about angel investing in startup companies, which is only something that accredited investors are allowed to do. Another show about investing in private equity Again, something that only accredited investors can do. Another show about hedge funds and how they work and the ups and downs, why they're a good idea, why they're not a good idea. Some of the estate planning considerations that come into play in the high net worth arena that I was not aware of. So I thought about doing this kind of course about how to be a rich guy, for lack of a better term, that would give people an introduction to the ugly side of private banking and And some of the sleaziness out there.
So I've thought about doing that idea. It would certainly fall in that category of not having a guest, more content from me. That would be Nathan and me doing a series of shows together where Nathan is interviewing me about these subjects.
The hesitation I have is I just don't know if there's really a market for that. We do ask you when you sign up on the website whether or not you're an accredited investor, because we're trying to figure out whether or not this audience has enough accredited investors for us to do accredited investor-centric content. It's kind of the direction that we're leaning in, but we need to know whether or not that's of appeal to you guys. So I've been a little bit more long-winded than I wanted to be, because I think we need to wrap the show up at this point. But please send us, whether it's email or in our listener forums, send us your comments. Let us know your thoughts. We'd love to hear from you as to what you'd like in future shows as we move forward. Thanks, guys.
Nathan Egger: So that's where we're at with the MacroVoices project. But where we're at with this show, I'm afraid, is the bitter end. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. And if you have an extra moment, the ratings and reviews help us out a ton, get us traction on iTunes, move us up the charts. More visibility means greater exposure, better guests.
You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and you can connect with us directly in our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. For Erik Townsend, this has been Nathan Egger. We're wishing you all a great weekend, and we'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. To have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.
Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the Participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, Visit MacroVoices.com.
MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.
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Jack Schwager — author of the legendary Market Wizards book series (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 7 was recorded on March 24th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Jack Schwager, author of the legendary Market Wizards book series, will be joining me as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Jack about lessons learned from the Market Wizards experience, The human side of Jack's experience watching an entire generation of traders grow up reading his books, and his latest project, FundSeeder.com, which aims to help aspiring traders document a track record and draw attention to their trading talents.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Welcome back, everyone. Erik, we've just closed this abbreviated trading week with the S&P printing its first down week in the last 5 weeks. We've seen this ascending wedge pattern that has been forming since February 10th, and that appears to have just broken to the downside today, the afternoon. What's your latest take of the equity markets?
Erik Townsend: Well, as our regular listeners know, I've been saying for 3 or 4 weeks now that I think this is a relief rally and a short squeeze combined. I think that I'm surprised that it's gone this far, and I think it's due to roll over to the downside. It finally looks like that is coming true this week. It's a little bit early to say that decisively from a technical analysis standpoint. I think we really need to see a close on the S&P below about 2,000 in '27, 2028 or so.
And we haven't seen that yet, but I think we're getting pretty close to it. So I do think equities are headed lower from here. And I think also that we've seen equities definitely are starting to respond more. I've been watching the tape action for the last week and see that equities are really chasing the crude oil market. So I think what crude oil does is going to lead equities.
Nathan Egger: And earnings season, buybacks, do you see these things being potential catalysts for a move downward?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I'm glad you brought that up, Nathan. I meant to mention it last week. We just came in this week. A lot of our regular listeners and people that have been following me for a long time know my view for several years now has been that the reason this crazy rally in the stock market has been able to continue nonstop since 2009 is in large part due to the easy money from the Fed enabling corporate buybacks. The basic thesis basis is there's a lot of easy money available in the junk bond market. The corporations borrow money in the debt market, use that money to buy back their own stock, boosting their share price, enhancing the CEO's year-end bonus.
That can only happen outside of earnings season for regulatory reasons. We just went into the quiet period around Q1 earnings this week. I think that that may be the catalyst that would suggest that until about the second week of April, corporate buybacks are essentially shut down for compliance reasons. I think that's going to be the catalyst to get the next move to the downside going in the stock market. And I would think that around the end of that quiet period, say around the middle of April, is probably when we could expect to see a significant bounce, probably from a number in the 1,700s on the S&P.
Nathan Egger: And you mentioned that you expect oil to continue to lead or influence the equity markets, and oil's just recorded its first weekly loss in 6 weeks. It's been pretty quiet on the propaganda front this week, but we've got Plenty of influential data points that are still moving the markets. Are you still short crude oil here?
Erik Townsend: I am short crude oil. I was stopped out of my short trade just above $36 and got back in above $40. And I do think that there's a lot of downside. My downside target is $25, if not lower. I think that it's over here, this entire thing. If anything, I would say that the Oil ministers of the smaller OPEC countries like Nigeria and Venezuela. These guys deserve at least an Academy Award for their theater in jawboning the market higher with this nonsense around production freeze. The beginning of this week, they were still at it. This week it was Algeria. I mean, come on, who are we kidding here? Algeria. Who can even find Algeria on a map, for crying out loud? So Algeria announces that they will attend the meeting to talk about a production freeze.
That was more than a dollar spike up in the price of oil on that. That was Tuesday. Wednesday is the day they've been hitting us, and I think it's trying to offset oil inventory. So Wednesday is the day we usually expect the biggest propaganda. What happened was Wednesday morning, IEA came out and said, this production freeze thing doesn't make any sense. It's not relevant. It doesn't have any meaning. I think that's probably been the biggest catalyst to start oil selling off and moving in the direction that I think is long overdue. The big thing that Art Berman and I predicted, though, was an increase in crude oil inventories. We saw the beginning of that this week with a 9.5 million barrel build in US crude oil inventories. That's 3 times analysts' expectations of about a 3 million barrel build. And remember, we're running out of storage. You know, 10 million barrels in one week, that's a lot.
I think that the market would have dramatically, dramatically reacted to the downside, except for one thing. And that is that the Cushing, Oklahoma component of that inventory was actually a drawdown. So, we saw an increase nationwide, but a drawdown in Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. As we've discussed before on the show, Cushing is crucially important because it's the settlement point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. So, if you run out of storage capacity in Cushing, you're essentially eliminating the buyer of last resort that would normally step in and buy an expiring contract in order to sell it forward into the next month. So, Cushing is critically important. We saw a little bit of relief in the Cushing front. And I think that the expectation that Art and I have, which is several more big inventory builds, definitely heightened by the fact that we're going into refinery maintenance season right now. What happens is every fall and every spring, the refineries have to retool in order to set their production for the next grade of gasoline.
In other words, there's different grades of gasoline for consumption in the wintertime and the summertime.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: They've got to throw all the valves and switches over and set the refinery up to produce summertime gasoline instead of wintertime gasoline. That maintenance period means that they are drawing less crude oil stocks. It puts more pressure on the storage capacity problems that we've talked about. So I think for the next 5 to 6 weeks, as we go through maintenance season, is when we're going to see a string of really big inventory builds. That's the prognosis that Art Berman and I have had. Started to come true with this week's report. It was a muted reaction because of Cushing. I think that this week's report was also affected by a lot of kind of crazy one-time factors. There were storms off the Gulf of Mexico that delayed the arrival of some ships that should have gotten to port 2 weeks ago, got to port this last week.
It looks like a huge, huge spike in imports this past week. I think that's more just a case of the prior week's imports couldn't get into port because of the weather, and now they arrived all at the same time. There was also some fog around the Houston Ship Channel that was affecting things. So there's been some disruptions here. I think we're going to see more builds not only on national inventory but on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. And that will be the catalyst for the downside in the price. Finally, on oil, the thing that I observe is it looks to me— and this is just as we're speaking late session on Thursday— we could be seeing the beginning of a very striking head and shoulders pattern in the crude oil futures market. If you look at the CL futures contract and the May delivery contract, a very impressive left shoulder and then head, and we could be just this afternoon on Thursday seeing the beginning of the formation of a right shoulder.
That's just a guess at this point. If it comes true, what we would see is oil rally from here back up to about $40, $40.50, in there somewhere. Somewhere below $40.50, it would roll back over in the next week, and then when it took out that neckline trading back below today's low, which was just around $38.60, $38.60 on the May delivery contract. If we were to go up to $40.50 and then back down below $38.60 or $38.50, say, that would be a completed head and shoulders pattern. I don't know that that's going to happen, but I'm certainly going to be watching it closely over the next week to see what comes to fruition. In both the chart and in, I think, finally with IEA denouncing this production freeze as being nonsense. The next question in my mind is, what do they replace it with? The production freeze is not going to buy anything anymore in terms of propaganda.
So is the next thing going to be production jubilee, a production something else? They can't get a cut. They know they're not going to get that. What rhymes with production cut that the market might buy now that IEA has discredited this idea of a production freeze? I think I think they'll come up with something. We'll see what next week's theater brings.
Nathan Egger: Production, but— and the algos could pick up on that. Something you've been saying, Erik, since our inaugural episode and beyond is that on a technical basis, the breakout in gold has looked very convincing. And you haven't been able to put your finger on it exactly, but you haven't been buying this rally. Now it looks like that market's rolling over. It's been a pretty rough week for gold investors. What are your thoughts here, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, we're coming up on a very, very important crossroads here, which is the 50-day moving average. As I've said before, I can't believe in this gold rally, and I'm having a hard time putting my finger on why. In a lot of ways, looking at the chart, it appears to be an impressive breakout. I just have a feeling that the dollar rally is not over, and the bottom in gold prices is not in yet. I think we're gonna test $1,000 before this thing is over. I could be completely wrong about that. What's your target?
Well, we're probably about to find out in the next few days here, because if I'm right, we'll break down through the 50-day moving average, which as we speak today on Thursday afternoon is running right around $1,200. If we see the breakdown below $1,200, and especially if that were to continue below $1,140 or so, which is where the 200-day moving average is, that really would confirm my thesis that this was a false breakout. It's correcting back to the downside. It's not time yet for gold. If we bounce off of the 50-day moving average, or in other words, if the price stays above $1,200, and particularly if it breaks above $1,280, the previous high, that says to me, boy, this is really looking like a healthy technical rally, and perhaps it's got legs to it. So far, I haven't bought it, though.
Nathan Egger: And do you see expectations around an April rate hike influencing the direction of gold in the coming months?
Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. You know, I think that the fact that the April meeting is live again, the slang that's been used by traders is the meeting is live if it means that there is a possibility that the Fed will actually change policy and hike or cut rates. They've been saying that the April meeting is live. They don't need a meeting that has a press release in order to have a rate hike. If they hike rates, that, you know, gold's direct competitor is Treasuries. And the biggest argument against gold is it doesn't produce It doesn't produce any income, doesn't throw off any yield. If the yield on those Treasuries that gold competes with is getting better, that's bad news for gold. It has to be. I think also gold has gotten a lot of strength here. There's been an ongoing debate in macro circles about is the US dollar rally coming to an end or is it just taking a breather and about to really take off again?
Goldman Sachs says it's taking off again. It's got a lot more life left in it. We just had Axel Merk tell us that he doesn't think that the dollar rally is likely to continue. If Axel is right, then gold is probably headed higher from here, and that's the reason Axel was bullish on gold. I think the dollar rally is the big question, and that's still unresolved. The dollar got clobbered after the Fed meeting. Is the dollar going to recover from that and make a breakout above 100 on the dollar index, or is it going to break down into the 80s? as Axel seems to be predicting. I could see it going either way.
Nathan Egger: Well, the long bond— you mentioned bonds, and the long bond continues to be one of the better-performing asset classes in 2016. But with this latest stall-out in the dollar, or downward move in the dollar, we're seeing long bonds moving sideways. Are you seeing any opportunities out there in the fixed income space at this point?
Erik Townsend: Well, from the U.S. Treasury standpoint, I don't see a trading opportunity. Right now, and the reason that I say that is just if you look at the dollar rally, I think it does probably have farther to go. That would be positive for U.S. Treasury yields. At the end of the day, though, you're making a loan. You're loaning money on an unsecured basis to an arguably insolvent borrower that you know is mathematically unable. It is mathematically impossible for the U.S. to ever pay back all of its debt.
So you're making a loan to a borrower that you know cannot ever repay it. It is a greater fool trade. You're expecting economic conditions to develop to where somebody will be willing to pay you more for that loan than you actually have into it, even though you know perfectly well that it can never be repaid someday. That's kind of a daunting proposition. On the other hand, if I look If you look at something like the German Bund market, I think German Bunds got ahead of themselves. They were already yielding zeros, what, negative 4 basis points, when Bill Gross came out and said, you know, this is insane. This is a very high-quality credit in terms of German credit rating, is better than most of Europe, and it's crazy for them to have a negative yield. It got more negative as a result of this refugee crisis. There's just been so much panic trade into safe haven assets. I just don't see from deeply negative yields on the 10-year German Bund how it can go a whole lot farther.
So I think if I had to look for a trade in fixed income, it would be shorting German Bunds. And I should, in the interest of full disclosure, say I am short German Bund 10-year futures here. Because I think they've probably gone as far as they can go. But as far as the US Treasury market is concerned, I don't see anything on the Treasury side. High yield, I'm short.
I definitely— when we talked about that trade on the Jim Rogers Show, there's a lot of reasons to be short high yield. But on the sovereign side, I don't see it in the US market. All right.
Nathan Egger: Thanks for bringing that all together for us, Erik. And before we go to this week's feature interview, would you mind taking a moment to explain to our listeners why we're deviating ever so slightly from our usual themes here at MacroVoices?
Erik Townsend: Sure. Well, the theme of the MacroVoices podcast is that we are targeting more sophisticated investors, professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, more sophisticated retail investors. And normally we talk about markets and investing. And with a guy like Jack Schwager, who wrote the Market Wizards book, obviously we want to start by talking about the Market Wizards experience.
What Jack's working on now, though, is a completely different project that has to do with helping people who are amateur traders or who have an interest in trading get noticed and develop a track record and be recognized for their talents. Well, that's not really markets and investing, but it may be of interest to our listener base because we do have people like our friend Matt in Australia, who I actually brought up in the interview. Matt's, you know, wants to get out of the IT business someday and do this for a living.
Living. Jack is a guy who's working on a project that's designed to help traders like Matt move from amateur trading into professional trading. Is that of interest to our MacroVoices audience? We're really not sure. This was an experiment, folks, so we would love to hear from you on our listener forums. We did this just as a one-off, and next week we'll be going back to our normal format of focusing the interview on markets and investing and where the trades are.
Nathan Egger: And of course, as Erik just mentioned, our listener discussion forums at MacroVoices.com/forums are the place to give us your feedback on both this week's content and more generally speaking. We'd love to hear from you. And you'll be hearing Erik's interview with Jack Schwager right after this.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is a man who needs little introduction, no introduction for the serious traders in the audience. Jack Schwager, who of course wrote the infamous book Market Wizards back in 1989. For anyone in the audience who's not familiar with the series, Market Wizards was a compendium of interviews with the very most successful traders in history. The first book was in '89. There were 3 more follow-on books. Jack's books have become something of an institution among serious traders. Thanks so much for joining us on the program, Jack. We've had quite a few requests for
Jack Schwager: Thanks, Erik. Thanks for the introduction.
Erik Townsend: I want to start with the experience from Market Wizards. You know, when I teach people about trading, the very first thing that I teach them is what I call the Schwager Doctrine, named after you because you're who I read about it from. And that is that you have to find— you know, there's lots of different ways to skin a cat. You've got to pick the style of trading that matches your personality. It's not that there's a right kind or a wrong kind. There's a right-for-you kind or a wrong-for-you kind.
I know that's one of the things that you emphasize most strongly in your writing. What are some of the other top insights that you gained from this experience of several decades interviewing, I guess it was hundreds of traders over the course of the project?
Jack Schwager: So, Erik, yeah, even though you— yeah, I bet there's lots of other points, but even though you identified what I would consider the most important point about the need to find an approach that fits your personality, Maybe want to add a little bit to that simply because in my experience, particularly for novice traders or people who are not— don't have a wealth of experience in trading, there's a natural inclination to believe there is some sort of secret to the market, some sort of answer. And it's really about finding the right approach, the right method, the absolute answer, whether it's Elliott Wave or—
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: Gann or some fundamental approach.
And what I think is most important to understand is there is no such thing as a right approach. And I've interviewed people across the entire spectrum, people who completely disdain fundamentals. For example, somebody like Marty Schwartz would tell you he spent a career as a fundamental stock analyst and lost money every year. And then he got rich as a technician. And then you have somebody like Jim Rogers, who will say— will talk about chart analysis or technical analysis as if it's black magic, and make a snide comment like, the only rich technician I've ever met are the ones who sell their services. So, you really run the gamut. And what that tells you is that if people who are wildly successful have completely opposite views about different methodologies, Then there is no single approach. And I think the big thing anybody needs to do to be successful— in fact, the absolute first thing they need to do is to figure out what is their approach.
And it won't always be the first thing that they think it is. It really takes experiment, experience, and so forth.
I know from my own experiences, I've gone through different phases. And starting out with fundamentals, realizing that didn't work for trading, going to technical, and back and forth between systematic and discretionary until I finally settled on an approach which was comfortable for me. What that is is actually not terribly relevant, because that's what's comfortable for me. The point is that each person, each trader needs to figure that out for themselves.
OK, so you asked about other things that are important. Well, this is no surprise, certainly not to anybody who trades. But it can't be emphasized enough is that trading is more about risk management than it is about methodology. I mean, most people think that trading is all about finding the right approach, the right timing method, getting in at the perfect time.
And if they're more sophisticated, getting out at the perfect time. But really, the most important thing is not losing. And by not losing, I don't mean losing on individual trades. I mean by not losing on balance because of a lack of risk management. So literally, I think just about— I mean, I can think of one exception. But just about every successful trader that I've interviewed in my life would have told you that risk management was absolutely essential. And most of them would tell you that risk management is much more important than the method that they use.
So that's also critical.
Also, very, very high on the list would be something like discipline. The people that are successful are very disciplined. If you're sloppy, or if you say you're going to do things, and you kind of— let's say you put on a trade, and let's say you're not using stops for whatever reason. But you say, I'm going to get out at a certain price. And then the market gets to that price. You're losing money. You had said to yourself, based on my approach, it shouldn't get here. If it gets here, I'm going to get out. But then it gets there, and you say, "You know what? I'll give it another day.
If I get out here, I know I lose this much. If I give it another day, maybe I'll come back. Besides, I think this is right near the bottom." Well, that's like a sign of somebody that doesn't have discipline, and good traders will absolutely stick to their methodology. Now they'll change their mind if there's a reason to change their mind, but they they won't change it because. of hope or something like that. They will have the discipline to stick to what they know is right, not what they hope is right.
Erik Townsend: Were there any big surprises in the Market Wizards project? In other words, were there cases where you just assumed it was all going to be about X, Y, and Z, and it turned out that it was all about A, B, and C, or that the traders that you talked to had a different perspective than you thought they were going to have?
Jack Schwager: Well, you know, I guess there are a number of things that surprised me over time. And if I think back to the very start of the project, before the very first book, I certainly didn't anticipate there would be such an extraordinary range of different approaches. And so, I mean, you could probably go through my books and identify, literally— I mean, there's 4 books, as you mentioned. You could probably identify 50 different approaches, meaningfully different approaches. And yet, all these people are successful.
So, the range of possible successful approaches surprised me.
I was, of course, surprised by how phenomenally successful some of these people were in terms of return to risk. And I guess, you know, it was another big surprise. Another big surprise was that even the very, very— not all of them, but even among the most successful people I interviewed, it was probably more common for them to have had failure early on than to have been successful from the beginning. So I guess I was surprised by the degree and scope of failure among the people I interviewed, not obviously as the end result, but as an early result.
And that actually leads to some important points. One is— and that's important people understand— is that early failure is not necessarily predictive. I mean, I've seen that time and time again. That doesn't mean that if you fail in the beginning, you're going to be successful. But conversely, just because you fail in the beginning also does not mean that you won't— that you don't have what it takes or won't be successful.
And I think of somebody like Michael Marcus, who was my first interview in the first Market Wizards book. And I put him first, actually, for a couple of reasons. Well, one, he was a phenomenal trader. I mean, this is a fellow who took a $30,000 account, a prop account that he was given. I know that, and I know this story to be true because I subsequently worked at the same firm, which was Commodities Corp. And Michael was well known to be not only the best trader, but by far the best trader, although he subsequently hired Bruce Kovner. And while Kovner was there, there was some competition between who was the best trader. But in any case, Michael turned that $30,000 into $80 million in the course of about 10, 12 years. And that was with them taking money out for expenses every year. So that is his performance. The thing with Michael, though, is his early trading— the story of how he got into trading, and his first couple of years of trading— is just one debacle after another, one wipeout after another.
And I even got to the point, at one point in that interview, saying, my God, didn't you just think of— I mean, why'd you keep on? I mean, didn't you just think—
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: Hey, I'm not cut out for this. But no, he kind of just felt he could do it. And so, there are going to be people who fail in the beginning, but still have what it takes. And he's living proof of that.
And then the other thing about failure is that it's not the failure that counts. It's the ability to just keep at it. I mean, people like Michael and other people who had those early failures, They just kept at it. And they kept at it, they kept at it, they got better. And also, actually, maybe the most important things that were said about failure came up in the Ray Dalio interview. And Ray Dalio is probably a familiar name to most. Michael Marcus probably is a name that nobody, I think, would know had I not written a book, because he's an extraordinarily private person and never managed outside money.
Erik Townsend: But Dalio—
Jack Schwager: Should be familiar to most people, the founder of Bridgewater. Bridgewater is the world's largest hedge fund. And it also has the distinction of having made the most dollars for investors. If you actually looked at every hedge fund that ever existed— and I don't think I'm wrong on this. Maybe some other hedge fund has come across now and has eclipsed Bridgewater, but I don't think so. But at least when I interviewed him a couple of years ago, At least as of that point, Bridgewater had made more money for their clients than any other hedge fund in raw dollars, if you look at how much investors in a hedge fund made over time from the beginning of time. So that is a function of both performance, and performance with a lot of money under management. So it's not that Bridgewater has the best performance, but they have really good performance with incredibly large amounts of money.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: And that itself is a sort of almost miraculous feat.
Now, the reason I bring up Dalio on this point here with failure is because Dalio has a kind of a world philosophy, a management philosophy, a company philosophy. And anybody who works at Bridgewater, and the company has well over 1,000 employees, is imbued with this philosophy. In fact, they even hand out this pamphlet with something like 240 principles handed down from Dalio.
And they pertain to a lot of things, management and trading. But very, very much a running theme throughout those principles is the critical role of taking advantage of failure, to learn from failure, to learn from your mistakes.
And if there is the best description of what the Bridgewater model is, Without getting into the nitty-gritty of it, but from a philosophical standpoint, it is you have your model of what it is today. Anytime you do something wrong and you can identify why that was wrong or how it can be improved, you build that into the model. And that has been the process from the very beginning.
So I mean, Dalio began with taking notes of his trades. You know, what did he do wrong? In fact, I I, when I was more disciplined or putting in the time, remember keeping a day trader's diary. And I still think it's a very good idea. And if I wasn't so lazy, I would still do it. But it's something I think people should do for the main reason that by writing down any trade that you can learn something from, particularly the ones you made a mistake, that's the way you can improve.
And so failure is really, ironically, A critical element to success, because it is from failure that you can learn how to get better. And that's actually— I guess that's even true for computers as well as people, because I think— though this is not my area of expertise, but my understanding is that programs that border on artificial intelligence or whatever do learn from their mistakes. improved that way. So, I think that's an essential element.
Erik Townsend: I want to focus on the people side of this, because when you wrote the first book in '89, it was a book about trading, and you were basically talking to trading experts, finding out how they trade, and writing it down. By the time you were writing the last of the series, or at least the, the 4th book in the series— it's not the last because there's one more coming.
You haven't interviewed me yet, so we know you're not done. By the time you got to the 4th book in the series, I think the most common theme that I noticed is all the guys you're interviewing are junkies who grew up on reading the first several books in the series. So, you actually now became part of the process where you're interviewing traders about how they got to be great traders. Great traders are all guys that read your books. So, what did that feel like and what was that experience for you?
Jack Schwager: Yeah, it's funny you bring that up because when I was writing Hedge Fund Market Wizards, it actually probably came up even more than I had put it in the book. But I started feeling, God, I felt big. I mean, I felt— because I didn't want to sound like I'm plugging my own book, but it was true. So many of these people I was now interviewing— this was 25 years after the first book— had grown up and come into trading. And I guess the original Market Wizards and New Market Wizards, those 2 books get passed around by traders and certainly prop shops and everything else.
And so, it got to the point where it was unusual for me to interview somebody who had not read one of those first couple of books. And a lot of them were influenced by it. So, I had this dilemma of, what do I do?
I don't want to sound like I'm plugging my own book. And what I ultimately decided was that if the reference to my book was something that I would have included if it wasn't my book, and if somebody said, you know what? What really got me into trading was I found this book, and he said, this is the book.
I would definitely put that in the interview. And just because it's my book, I decided therefore, then the right thing is to put it in. If it wasn't the type of thing where if somebody had mentioned it, where I didn't think it was germane, or I wouldn't have thought it was necessary to put in the interview, then I didn't put it in. So, probably the The references to one or more of my books came up even more than it appeared. And I ended up putting it in quite a bit because, I mean, just factually, a lot of these people were influenced by those early books. And it seemed like it's very awkward to put that down, but yet it seemed honest to do because, as I said, I would have done it if they had mentioned somebody else's book in the same vein.
Erik Townsend: Now, as you got more involved in this, I think you took more of a personal interest in the path of people's individual development becoming traders, not just the trading, but the activity of watching people grow into becoming successful traders after reading your books and attending seminars that you've taught and so forth. At some point you end up having dinner with a guy named Emmanuel Bolloré. Who is Emmanuel? What was the dinner about? And what's FundSeeder?
Jack Schwager: Well, actually Emmanuel Bolloré— so when I had that dinner that you're referring to, we had known each other quite a while. So My previous— last time I was with a— the prior group I was with was a group called the Fortune Group, which was a London-based hedge fund advisory service. And I was always in the US, and I basically— I was the only US partner.
But they had approached me, or the CEO had approached me back in about 2001 when I had started my own little hedge fund of funds. And he met me at a conference, and he sort of pitched me on Fortune Group. And he said, why don't you join us as a partner? And it sort of was the appeal. It was a really appealing idea to work for a group and all that.
And I joined, and it worked out quite well. But while I was there, I actually— while I was there, one of the things that happened is towards the later years that I was with the group, I became more and more disillusioned with the structure of hedge funds from an investor's perspective, that is, and thought that the much better structure was a managed account approach, because it gave you transparency, it gave you control, and so forth. So, I was trying to I was the only one who came from a futures background. And for me, managed accounts were familiar territory. Everybody else, all the other partners, it was foreign to them. So it took me a while to convince other partners that we should do this. We started a— finally got a fund started, which was managed accounts. And Emmanuel was working with ADM. He still has an association with ADM at the time.
But he had a subsidiary with ADM.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Jack Schwager: Which was interested in doing a fund. And so, they engaged Fortune to be the advisor, and I was the point person on this. And so, that's how Emmanuel and I got to know each other. I then subsequently worked as an advisor for ADM after Fortune got taken over, and I left the parent company, which was Close Brothers, which was a UK merchant bank. And really, as the only US person in a large corporation, with the prior direction of the company changed, there was really no role that I saw that I was interested in there. And so, we negotiated a friendly exit, and that's what I did.
So, I was on my own writing books, and Emmanuel came back to me and got me to be an advisor with ADM for one of their funds. And then we were at a conference together, and this was about 2, 3 years ago, and Emmanuel pitches this idea to me.
The idea was FundSeeder. And he says, I have this idea. I want to do a web-based tech company, technology company, that would be sort of the clearinghouse between undiscovered traders and investors. Like, the idea was that Too much or almost all the money, all the investment money gets funneled through the same small list of curators and to the same small list of hedge funds with huge amounts of money. And there's lots of trading talent out there that can't get identified, can't get the money, doesn't have the contacts, and has no way of so-called being discovered. And there are plenty of investors out there who are more interested in finding undiscovered trading talent than in just being the me-too investor in some hedge fund that already has $10 billion in assets. So that was his idea, create this website that would be sort of the central spot where traders could have their results.
The results would be gotten directly from the brokers, so they would be verified. And then investors would have a sort of verified verified, proven track records of traders that are— well, they could be traders who are already managing money. But for the most part, he envisioned it as a way for new talent and had the name FundSeeder. And I actually said, you know what?
I'm the first one to say, hey, that's a ridiculous idea. But it sounded like a pretty good idea to me.
And anyway, Got me to partner with him early on. And so, here we are a few years later. We just launched the— we started out actually about a year and a half ago. So, originally white labeling another software that would show account equity and analytics and all that. I was never a particular fan, but it got us going. sort of with very little staff.
But as we progressed, well, first, it became very— I never particularly liked that old original software. But it became apparent to Emmanuel as well, and our other partner, James, that it was not the best approach. There were lots of things we wanted to do completely differently. And so, we ended up hiring our own programmers.
We've got a whole team. Actually, our team is in Ukraine. But we have a technology team now.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Jack Schwager: I've worked with them as far as the analytic design, and Daniel's worked on the business side, and so forth.
But now, we've basically changed the original platform, literally 100%. And so now, I'm kind of— now, it's what I would have liked to have available, which I wasn't aware of anywhere where it had, which was that you could go on and put your account up, and you could generate an equity curve of your account. You could do analytics on the equity curve. You could do stuff like underwater curve, showing drawdowns, all the drawdowns of your equity curve, compare it to benchmarks.
You could do something like rolling window, like if you want to look, what are your rolling 6-month returns through every day?
And all the analytics was built on a daily basis. So, it's much more meaningful than monthly data, which is the industry norm. So, anybody who's on FundSeeder it's basically daily data. And that is far far, far more meaningful from a statistical standpoint. I mean, you're dealing with 22 times the amount of data points.
Erik Townsend: Let's just take a step back, Jack, if I can interrupt you for a second there, because I want our listeners to appreciate the contrast of what it was like before FundSeeder. The hedge fund business is incredibly— what would you call it? Cliquish? It's like an Ivy League club, and you've got to know the right people and be from the right prep school and the right— It didn't matter previously how good you were or how strong of a proven track record you had as a trader. You're not going to work for any big hedge fund unless you've got the Ivy League MBA from the right school.
You guys are really leveling the playing field. You're saying, let's not make this about who knows who and who's from what family. Let's make this about who knows how to trade, and let's provide tools to objectively measure that so that somebody who's got talent can showcase that to the world at large.
Jack Schwager: Right.
Erik Townsend: The world at large can find them, and you don't have the private club anymore of prep school boys that are in charge of everything.
Jack Schwager: Yeah, Erik, you said it better than I did. That's the core of the philosophy, to globalize and democratize the trading and investment process so that it doesn't make a difference if you came from an Ivy League or not. It doesn't make a difference who you know. You could be like, for example, you could have some guy in In Ukraine, for example, we have a lot of really good, really smart math tech guys in Ukraine. But now, there could be other people— there are other people, let's say, in that country or a lot of other countries where there isn't much of a marketplace. There isn't really an opportunity for somebody who has potential skill to become a trader and money manager. But you could have somebody coming out of that type of environment who has, let's say, great— in this particular case, use the example of great quant skills and build some sort of mathematical model that has an edge in the market.
They would still— even if they were able to do that, they wouldn't have very much money on their own to trade. They'd have no access to other investors, and they'd have a very difficult time proving that they have something.
So FundSeeder actually provides that avenue. Somebody like that could go on FundSeeder. market, get their account on FundSeeder have the account directly linked to the broker. The results come from their broker. It's daily data. And over time, can build up a track record that can speak for itself. So you have the opportunity for people who would not have any access— would be virtually impossible for them to break into the investment arena, the money management arena maybe is a better way of saying it— now have a way to do it. And in fact, In fact, if I'm not mistaken, we probably have had people from over 100 countries register. It's really been very, very global where the traders are coming from.
Erik Townsend: Let's talk through this from the trader's perspective, because this podcast is targeted at more sophisticated investors, and some of them are advanced retail investors who have aspirations of wanting to become professional traders and work in the business. We have one frequent listener in Australia, for example, a guy named Matt Barrie. Matt, who's an IT guy, but he's very good at trading and he wants to do it full-time. He'd like to either make enough money to be able to support himself entirely on trading or somehow get out of the IT business and into the trading business. But the career path for how to do that has not been obvious. Now, in Matt's case, he's already met you and he's already got a FundSeeder account, but let's pretend that he's never heard of FundSeeder.
What do you do for a guy like Matt in terms of what does he need?
Because I think a lot of people wouldn't know that being able to evidence their track record is so important. Aside from a track record and the ability to evidence that it's real, what does Matt need to break into this? And what is a career path for someone who maybe discovered trading either as a hobby or, you know, they're a retail investor, but they're good at it and they want to do it as a career?
What would you recommend to them and how would FundSeeder help
Jack Schwager: Yeah, so FundSeeder for us, it's sort of like a search engine for trading talent. And we're just getting going with the new platform. And we're just— actually, this is actually probably the first interview I'm doing post the very recent launch of the new website. So we're just— and we didn't do any marketing deliberately before, because We wanted to get this new website going and get rid of— debug it to a comfortable standpoint and so forth. So now, it's just the point where we're beginning to do that.
And so what we would like is people like Matt, who have the trade, to get on the platform. And part of the platform has a search engine capability. Now, I should say, there's separate sites for traders and investors. And we focused on the trader side first. In other words, doing the analytics, the graphics, the tools, the free tools, everything for traders. So, we give them really great software for free, just in the hopes and expectation that enough good traders, or more than good traders, superb traders, will find it, get on, and we'll discover them before other people do.
And so, the people on the site are not identified by name. They're identified just by a code number. And so, we will be using that site to search for trading talent ourselves. And 4, Emmanuel has— Emmanuel's real forte is the investors, his contacts, and knowing what investors need, and finding the right managers. So he's the one who's kind of the key liaison with investors. So he can use the platform to find the right managers for the right investors, depending on what they're looking for. Now, we will have an investor site.
That— well, right now, I think there is an investor site, but it's really just almost not much more than a landing site explaining what it will be. But eventually, the investor site will contain a subset of traders. And that subset of traders will be traders who have also gotten— for compliance reasons, we only want to have registered traders on that site.
But ultimately, investors will be able to search on that website and so forth. As far as the company goes, our own plans are to find trading talent, connect them with investors, connect them, or actually form single funds around them, or potentially actually do a multi-manager fund with emerging traders, and then market that fund to the— have that fund meet all the regulatory rules and everything else. And then we would act as the structurer, and the risk manager, and compliance manager, and so forth. and have a product that institutions and high net worth people could invest in. So there's all sorts of avenues of potential investment that would come out of this.
But the beginning part is getting the raw ingredient. And the raw ingredient is trading talent. And that would hopefully— what we will get by people signing up to FundSeeder and then using the search tools to identify the traders who have the best return-risk metrics. And then going from there, that's a starting point. Then of course, from there, you would go through the normal interviewing and compliance and other things. But the very, very first thing would be to use the database that is inherent in the FundSeeder site.
Erik Townsend: So the proposition for traders is essentially, for free, they can create an account. They can track their performance in a way which I suppose it's not technically a legal audit in the sense of being representable, but it's a heck of a lot better than, I said this is my performance.
Jack Schwager: Or like virtually every database out there, you know, basically, you know, people report their numbers, you know, they can be pulling them out of thin air. Now, I should say that because we, right now, there are— we link to a lot of brokers, we don't link to some other brokers. So really, it's not like we link to every broker in the world.
So there are certain There are certainly going to be people who have accounts at brokers which we don't have direct links to yet. And for those traders, they can upload their data on a template that we provide, which makes it very easy. Just if they— it's just an Excel-based template, they can just copy it off an Excel spreadsheet and drop it in, and boom, it's done. And then they will have all use of the same analytics.
The thing there is that in that case, we identify those as unverified. So, if we get the numbers from the broker, Those are in the verified portion of the database. If we're getting it from the trader, which doesn't mean that there's anything wrong with it, because like I say, there are going to be many traders that simply have accounts with brokers where we don't have the link. And in that case, it will show up as unverified, but they can still use the same analytics.
Erik Townsend: So to summarize, what FundSeeder is offering traders is the ability to document their track record and essentially like an actress who's Hopes to be discovered in a coffee shop someplace. It's putting those track records in front of people in the industry, potentially investors that might want to invest with you. It provides all these things. You're still missing something, Jack. You haven't told me how I get interviewed personally for a Market Wizards book. We're not going to finish this interview until we cover that.
Jack Schwager: Oh, yeah. Okay. So, one of the things, one of the ideas, and again, this is Emmanuel's idea was to do actually why not do another Market Wizards book, but basically do it on people we discover through the site? So, that's a planned future book. And the idea is that the best traders that we sort of uncover— and it'll take a couple of years, I think, for the site to be functioning.
And that assumes, of course, that people come on the site already have— many of them will already have track records of some length to begin with. With. But I think in a couple of years, we'll be able to discern that here is a good group of traders that we found through the site that are really excellent, and basically do a book with a working title, Undiscovered Market Wizards.
So, if anybody's really good out there, and they get on the site, that's one way to end up in the book as well, because if they pop up in terms of being really superior in performance, I would basically be looking at, for those people, as interview subjects for this future book.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. I want to talk about how this project is being received so far by the industry. You know, something I think some of our listeners understand but others don't is hedge fund capital introduction is a very antiquated business. It's a lot of who knows who and It's frankly not a lot of gentlemen in that business.
I think that a lot of people could argue that the whole capital introduction business ought to be replaced, just as the travel agents were replaced by the internet.
Do you guys— first of all, do you see yourselves in that role in terms of providing an automated capital introduction service that eliminates the need for capital introduction brokers? And how are you being received by the industry? Do the cap intro guys see you as a threat? Are they excited that you're doing something cool with technology, or are they threatened that you're doing something that might usurp them at some point?
Jack Schwager: Okay, so that's perceptive of you. Yet there are a good number of avenues that we see as big potential for the company, and certainly this cap intro avenue is one very important one, because if you get a website that does— if we are successful and we do become sort If you're a trader, if it becomes a thing, if you're a trader, and you're serious, and you want good analytics, and you want to be potentially discovered, you need to get your account on FundSeeder.
If we get to that point, and that's our goal, then we've got an enormous advantage over the regular rest of the industry, because we can be finding people globally before anybody else does. And we also have the advantage of it being a technology company, and therefore, has all the efficiencies of a technology company. There's not a great marginal cost in finding more traders and so forth. So basically, I think we can offer a superior product in that particular sector, fulfilling that particular need. And that is certainly a potential. So that is one of the directions we do intend to go.
We have not actually focused— we've talked to traders, we've talked to investors. Actually, of obvious reasons— oh, I don't know if Emmanuel's talked to cap intro people, but not that I know of, nor does it seem a very natural place to go, because you're quite right. Ultimately, we would be competitive. Now, I guess initially, we might actually be— there might be a symbiotic relationship here, because if you're a cap intro guy, and you have Like a new trader that people don't know. And this would be a way of getting— and it's also true for a manager who is still looking for assets and is not widely known. Both the manager and the cap intro guy could direct the accounts onto the platform, because it's a way of getting free exposure and potentially an allocation.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: So, for now, I think we could be helpful. But ultimately, providing that cap intro role is one of the things we'll do. Now, I don't think we'd be replacing the whole industry, but I certainly think we'd be competitive. And there's also going to be people who have their own little niche of finding managers that are right for certain investors, and they'll still do fine.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: But I think for a lot of people, we could end up being definitely competition.
Erik Townsend: As we close, Jack, I'd like to just come back to your parting words of wisdom. I think when it comes to educating traders, both participating in teaching traders and also observing people advance through their careers as traders, nobody's got as much boots-on-the-ground time as you do in terms of exposure to some of the most successful people in the world. world through Market Wizards. So for our audience, many of whom are either advanced retails or they're finance professionals or they're high net worth individuals who are more sophisticated investors, as these people who are very serious about this, who really want to advance their knowledge and wisdom about trading and investing, move forward, what would your strongest words of advice to them be?
Jack Schwager: Well, My strongest words of advice is go with where the passion is. So for those people who are really passionate about trading, and that's really what they love doing, they may have another job, but they really would ideally prefer to be trading. This is really what they want to do.
Then go for it. I mean, I'm not telling people to quit their job, to have no source of income. But use all your spare time to develop a methodology. Get to the point where you have confidence, and maybe at some point, then spin off.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Jack Schwager: And go for it.
So, I think if the real desire is there, and if it's what they really love doing, then make the leap for— not to the point of not being able to pay next month's rent, but to the point of maybe giving up a much better paying job if it's not making them happy, and trading is what they really want to do, and they can still get by on trading, and they still have enough money saved up to get by.
On the other hand, or conversely, I should say, there are lots of people out there who think they want to be traders, but what they really want is to make a lot of money. And they think this is an easy way to do it. It's not. Or they are enamored with the Hollywood image of trading, which really has very little to do with trading, but they want to be a big shot hedge fund guy. Or they want to have the power. There are all these other reasons. Now, I think those are all not very good reasons, and they're reasons which ultimately, for many people, end up being routes to failure. So, I think you have to be clear whether trading is what you really want to do.
So, for those people who really want to do it, then I'd encourage them. For those who are in it for the wrong reasons, or who think they want to be traders, but really don't enjoy it, they like what trading could do if they were successful, but they're not enjoying the process, they don't have the confidence, then they need to recognize that maybe trading isn't right for them. Maybe it isn't what they should do.
In fact, I myself, and I make this point, I mean, I trade. Sometimes I trade every day. Sometimes I don't trade for a couple of years. It really depends. But I'm not a trader. I do lots of things. And trading is one of the things I do. It's like I'm a hobby I come in and out of and whatever. But trading was not something that I ever thought I was either good enough to be just a source of livelihood, nor actually wanted to do full-time. I mean, I had too many other things I wanted to do, including writing, analytical projects, speaking, et cetera. So, it was never for me the career path. And I realized I realized that probably a long time ago.
But I think a lot of people sort of get into this thing, and they think they want to be trading. And if they really were honest, they might realize that, hey, it's not the right thing for them.
So the most important thing in that respect is really doing an evaluation to decide, is it the trading that's really attractive that you really want to do? And do you really want to be a trader? I think in one of my books, or more than one of my books, I probably tell people, hey, make sure this is what you want to do.
And I also want to make this point, that some of the things that are involved in being really, really good in trading and really successful are not necessarily things that are good for living a great life or a happy life. It is for some people. It isn't for a lot of other people.
I'll give you an example. I mean, there's one trader, for example, And this trader died at a very young age, but he was a brilliant options trader, a fellow by the name of John Bender. And actually, my most successful investment I ever made was in his fund. This was a guy who made triple-digit returns, at least for a number of years. He was a physicist by background. He was brilliant and obsessive.
And And when he traded, he basically would trade primarily Japanese options. Then he would stay awake and trade the European options market. And very often would then stay awake and then trade American option— US option markets. And literally, many days would be trading 19, 20 hours a day.
Now, he was enormously successful.
He was incredibly obsessive. And that hard work and obsessiveness were key elements to his success. This was part of it. I mean, he was brilliant, yes, but a lot of brilliant people aren't great traders. But his obsessiveness and focus and super hard work were some of the key elements that made him so enormously successful.
However, I would not want to live that life. I mean, trading 20 hours a day is just not my idea of a good life. So, you got to put things in perspective. And for some people, it might be, but in any case, I think that's what people have to do a self-evaluation on.
Erik Townsend: Well, Jack, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. The website is fundseeder.com. The upcoming book, and it sounds like it's a couple years out at this point, will tentatively be called what, Jack?
Jack Schwager: Undiscovered Market Wizards. That's the working title. There is a book I have. I will put it— I will put this out for the For the very analytical people out there in your listening audience who are futures traders, later this year, I will have an update of— most people think Market Wizards was my first book. It was not. I had an analytical book called— many years ago, written actually in 1984, called A Complete Guide to the Futures Market.
And it's finally getting updated, the second edition coming out now, which is like—
Erik Townsend: 2023.
Jack Schwager: Well, over 30 years later, but with the help of my co-author, who did a lot of the legwork on the update, Mark Etzkorn, who's done a great job. So, that book, which has everything from fundamental analysis to technical analysis to spread trading to options to trading principles to you name it.
So, that will be coming out later this year. And that's called The Complete Guide to the Futures Market. A book by that name exists, but it's the '84 edition, so people who have interest should make sure they're getting the 2016 edition, which won't be available for about half a year.
Erik Townsend: Okay, Jack, thanks again so much for joining us. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: So you've just heard from Jack Schwager. And as Erik previously alluded to, we usually talk about markets and investing on MacroVoices. But this week's interview was primarily about the industry and the path that an amateur trader might take to eventually become a professional trader. Personally, I, Nathan Egger, think it's very interesting. It's something that I'm interested in. But I also know that I'm probably not alone in feeling confused by some of the terminology that you and Jack were throwing back and forth. So, before we close the show, I'd like to go over some of that terminology.
One in particular that you guys alluded to was the conventional cap intro business. You mentioned it several times, but you guys never really defined it.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Nathan Egger: Can you explain to myself and our listeners how accredited investors find money managers to begin with?
Erik Townsend: Sure. We should probably take a step back. Let's imagine that we have somebody who is a trader trading their own account, so forth, that has aspirations of wanting to do this professionally. And this is, of course, an experience that I went through several years ago myself as I made the transition from being a private investor to running a hedge fund.
If your background, you know, I'm a retired software entrepreneur. I don't have a finance degree. I don't have experience in finance. I've never worked for Goldman Sachs. I don't have pedigree and so forth. To go and work in the finance industry and run a mutual fund or a pension fund or something else is generally not realistic for a guy like me or a guy like Trader Matt in Australia.
What's realistic is to start a hedge fund because a hedge fund is essentially an unregulated entity. It's only available to accredited investors. That is generally defined in the simplest form of the definition anyway as more than a million dollars of net worth, excluding your primary residence. So if you have aspirations of being in this business, you might think all you have to do is be good at trading. Demonstrate a track record, use a service like FundSeeder in order to share that track record with the world, and build it and they will come. Investors will come running to you with money to invest. Doesn't work that way at all.
There are databases of hedge funds' performance, and people can search through them.
Erik Townsend: Very few people actually do that.
Most people that want to invest in hedge funds work through capital introduction brokers. These guys are like travel agents. Their job is to put a plan together to introduce an investor, whether it be a high net worth individual, a family office, a small institution, or what have you, with a fund manager and potentially broker a deal where the investor invests money with the hedge fund.
These guys would tell you, if you are the investor, that you are crazy to consider investing in a hedge fund without their help because you need their expertise. You need someone with their background to do due diligence work and to vet these hedge funds and to figure out which ones are the fraudsters and to protect you from all the bad guys out there. Very, very effective sales pitch that they use.
In reality, the way Bernie Madoff made all of his money with the fraud schemes that he had was he just paid a higher commission rate to the capital introduction brokers than anybody else was. paying. All of a sudden, he was their best friend, and they said, you know, you can't go wrong with Bernie Madoff. He is the most reputable, secure, safe, reliable guy on Wall Street. Well, of course he had that reputation. What he was doing was overpaying the middlemen. These guys, frankly, are pretty darn sleazy, and I'm sure there are perfect gentlemen in the capital introduction world. Perhaps some of them are our listeners.
I mean, you gentlemen and ladies, no disrespect. Yeah. Respect whatsoever, but you know as well as I do that most of your industry is pretty darn sleazy.
If you look at this whole thing and you say the traditional business of capital introduction is so hard, even if you are good at trading and you launch a hedge fund, unless you have lots and lots of your own money to seed it with, it's very hard to find seed investors. And so what Jack is trying to do is find a way for talented traders to be matched up with investors who want to invest in them or seed their funds or do whatever in order to get them going.
And I think, frankly, that they're doing something that's interesting. It certainly is of great benefit to a guy like Trader Matt in Australia. I frankly think that if they really wanted to look at a lucrative opportunity, they'd be better off just focusing on replacing the traditional capital introduction business, just the same way that travel agents were made obsolete by the internet in the '90s. You don't need these cap intro guys anymore. They don't deliver any value added. In many cases, it's value subtracted. If you had an introduction service that was based on a website that was basically accreditedinvestor.com that allows you to search through all of the hedge funds and, you know, potentially get somebody else's due diligence research on them, that would be profoundly valuable.
But right now we have an antiquated market and a business model that frankly is decades out of date. I'm surprised that they're not focused more on that than they focused on the FundSeeder idea, which is more helping amateur traders as opposed to established small emerging hedge fund But one way or another, I think it's a fantastic idea that they're trying to do something to automate what traditionally has been an extremely non-automated and very archaic capital formation business.
Nathan Egger: You mentioned Madoff and how he was paying the cap intro guys more money than they would— than they were even asking for, so that the cap intro guys would then vet Madoff forgivingly, let's say. So if I've got this straight, you've got the hedge fund industry, trillions of dollars of assets under management, and you're not saying that the whole business is sleazy, but that there is a sleazy element, that there are certainly people out there who are not— there are strong conflicts of interest. And that's something that usually the markets tend to work themselves out. Like you said, we've seen technological disruptions across a host of industries, from Uber replacing taxi drivers, travel websites like Travelocity replacing travel agents, Amazon replacing traditional retail.
So, you're a software entrepreneur guy. And if you could just take a moment, you see this cap intro business as being another area that we can expect big changes due to advancements in technology. And given your, your history, I'd love to hear more about how you think exactly we can solve this if we view it as capital introduction, as indeed there being problems in that industry.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's an industry that is long overdue for an overhaul. Just the way the travel agent industry was overhauled, and I think maybe the issue is just that it's small enough. You know, travel agencies—they're dealing with a smaller price tag than a hedge fund in terms of you know how big a ticket is, but they're dealing with lots and lots of tickets. So it's a very, very large market. Maybe the hedge fund business is small enough that that's the explanation. I'm not sure. But if I were to look at this from an opportunistic standpoint as a software entrepreneur. Oh, absolutely.
You need a website called accreditedinvestor.com that allows sophisticated investors, whether they be professionals or high net worth individuals or family offices or what have you, to have a one-stop shopping experience where they can not only look at what say the existing hedge fund databases like hedgefund.net do today, which is just look at everybody's. Performance, but also if you were to go and do due diligence reviews and sell that as a service. So, you know, you look at a hedge fund on the website and you can see that it's got such and such a tear sheet performance, but there's also a $100 report available that gives you a due diligence background that somebody went and actually met with these guys at their office and looked at what they were doing and so forth.
It's very easy to imagine a platform that would completely obviate the need for traditional cap intro to exist. And believe me, I've thought about doing exactly that project. I'm 50 years old. I'm at a point where I'm running a hedge fund and living where I want to live and enjoying life. I don't want to go back to the life of being a software entrepreneur, but it is an incredibly ripe opportunity for somebody to tap.
Nathan Egger: Real Vision Television, Erik, just a quick update. Some listeners may have noticed that Last Sunday, there was no Real Vision Television Encore. Can you tell us what's going on with that?
Erik Townsend: Sure. I've been in touch with Raoul Pal. We're going to actually try to get on the program at some point as an interview. We had originally talked about just putting up a couple of Encore episodes from Real Vision Television just to give listeners a taste of it. I'm talking to Raoul now about doing that maybe on an ongoing basis. So, what we're going to try is every other week, we're going to put up an encore episode from Real Vision Television. So, you had one 2 weeks ago on Sunday, skipped last Sunday, you're going to have this coming Sunday, March 27th, and then the following week will be off, and then the subsequent week we'll have another one.
I'm going to see if I can talk Raoul into doing that on an indefinite basis. We've only gotten an agreement to try it for a couple months right now. We're going to see where it takes us, and we really want some feedback from We're adding that extra content in hopes that you guys will find it interesting. If it's of interest, we'll continue to bring it to you. If it's not, we'll drop it.
Nathan Egger: All right, you guys, I think that's gonna pretty much do it for this week's episode. Please follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices and join us in the forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. Subscribe, rate, and review on iTunes. The feedback continues to be incredibly satisfying. Satisfyingly positive, but above all, helpful to Erik and I as we continue to take this MacroVoices project forward. Despite the deviation from our usual subject matter, I hope our listeners still found value in today's show. It was slightly different, but we'll be getting back to our primary focuses of macroeconomics and financial markets. And we've got some heavy hitters coming up in the forthcoming weeks, not the least of which will be Bill Fleckenstein, who Erik will be talking with next week. Thank you, Patrick.
But until then, that's going to do it for us. For Erik Townsend and myself, we wish you all a terrific extended weekend. We'll see you next time.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices Automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions.
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Axel Merk — Merk Investments (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we're not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 6 was recorded on March 18th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. The last week has been a veritable hotbed of central bank meetings, with the European Central Bank meeting last week, the Fed's FOMC statement on Wednesday of this week, along with the press conference with Janet Yellen on Wednesday afternoon, and then of course Kuroda-san from the Bank of Japan speaking on Wednesday evening. With all the action in central bank policy this week, I told Nathan we needed a currency and central bank policy expert on the show this week. Nathan outdid himself lining up Axel Merk of Merk Investments as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Axel about the ECB, the Fed, the BOJ, the US dollar rally, and much more.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Erik, before we even get into the stock market, please clear this up. So expectations were for the Fed not to change interest rates, and that's what happened. Yet everyone is saying the FOMC statement was more dovish than expected. So how is that possible? What's a dot plot? And what does forward guidance have to do with markets from stocks to bonds to oil to gold jumping on the news?
Erik Townsend: There's actually a lot of information that's communicated in the FOMC statement after each one of these meetings. The big headline information, of course, is did they change interest rates, and that means interest rates here and now. Did they change the target rate for Fed funds as of this meeting? And that's what people tend to focus the most on. As expected, they didn't change anything in that regard. But there's a lot of other information in that statement.
One of the things that comes out is called the dot plot, and the reason it's called the dot plot is essentially each of the members of the Federal Reserve— and it's important to understand it's all of the members, not just the voting members— these guys are asked to Imagine at various different times in the future what they think the federal funds rate is going to be in the future. And each one of them comes up with their estimate, and each governor's estimate is plotted as a dot on a chart. So you see on the chart this little cluster of dots that means that, okay, a bunch of governors all think this is going to be the interest rate.
That dot plot effectively communicates the Fed's implied expectations about how many times it's going to hike rates in the future. In other words, if a typical The typical federal bank rate hiking cycle is 25 basis points, and the Fed governors, who are the guys that get to decide what the policy is going to be, are currently estimating that rates are going to be 100 basis points higher than they are right now one year from now. Well, 25 basis points per hike, 100 basis points total, that tells you to expect 4 25 basis point hikes over the course of the next year. And that's what the Fed was telling us with these dot plots until now.
What we got in this report was an indication that the governors have lowered their expectation for where they see interest rates a year out. Now they're 50 basis points instead of 100 basis points. Hey, wait a minute. That implies that what we can expect over the next year is only 2 Fed rate hikes instead of 4 Fed rate hikes. That was the unexpectedly dovish information that the Fed delivered this week, is essentially they're saying, we're telling you not to expect as many rate hikes or as much of a hike in cumulative total in interest rates over the next year as we were telling you last month. We've changed our mind. Now we think it's half as much. That's what kind of shocked the market this week.
Nathan Egger: Okay, got it. All right, so on to equities. You've been bearish on the stock market for the last few weeks, but it keeps marching higher. Are you still bearish here post-Fed?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, Nathan, my work centers on both fundamental analysis and technical analysis. I use fundamental analysis to understand the market and decide what trades I want to engage in. And then I use technical analysis for 2 purposes. One is to time the entries and exits to trades. The other is as a sanity check for my fundamental analysis. In other words, if the fundamental analysis is very bullish but the chart is very bearish, well then something doesn't add up.
That sanity check aspect is definitely coming into play here because as I look at the fundamental case for the stock market, nothing has changed. I think that we have not fixed any problems. The Fed is taking the punchbowl away. They've said they're not going to take it away quite as quickly, but they're still going to take it away. They have not yet made any intimations that we're really going to see a further easing cycle such as negative interest rates or more quantitative easing. Now, I think those things are coming eventually, but they haven't shown those cards yet. For now, what they're telling us is what they're telling us. So I think at this point, if you look at this market from a technical analysis standpoint, you You cannot ignore this breakout above the 200-day moving average, and that's why I said the sanity check comes into play here. My outlook is fundamentally still very bearish, but if I look at this chart, you know, I thought this rally was a short squeeze that was going to stop about 100 points ago at the 50-day moving average.
We've taken out the 50-day, the 100-day, the 200-day, and we're still moving higher.
Now, there is a lot of precedent, Nathan. If you have an unexpected event, as we had with this Fed meeting, sometimes there's a blow-off reaction to that. What will happen is markets will race higher for a day or two, and then it kind of wears off and they'll go back to the downside. If my bearish thesis for stocks is going to be proven correct, it needs to happen pretty darn quickly here, because frankly, if we continue this breakout, which is now 2.5 days old, above the 200-day moving average on the S&P 500. If that continues, really, if you look at it from a technical analysis standpoint, the next major target to look for in terms of another resistance level would be new all-time highs. So I think that the market needs to turn around.
It is on a technical level awfully close to telling me that I'm wrong here and it's time to just give up on the short side of this trade. And in the interest of full disclosure, I am still short S&P 500 futures at a considerable I do think that it's possible that we're going to see the effect of the Fed meeting blow over and that markets will reverse to the downside. And I think that what will be particularly important for equities is crude oil. I think the reason equities have managed to break out here is because everybody is jumping for celebration, saying, oh boy, oh boy, the rout in crude oil is finally over. The bottom is in. I don't think it's in. We'll get to crude oil in a minute. I think that the bottom is in for equities. We need crude oil to prove me right here in order to pull the stock market back down.
Otherwise, I think we're rapidly approaching the point where this equity rally could accelerate towards new all-time highs. That could pull oil even higher. Again, I don't think the fundamental case for either oil or equities is very strong. But if the technicals continue to show us a breakout, you've got to take it seriously at some point. And we're getting awfully close to that point where I have to throw in the towel, at least on my equity shorts.
Nathan Egger: Okay, let's cover recent developments in crude oil next, as it looks like we're testing another key resistance level here again, late session on Thursday. Now, the pattern for the last month has been that every Wednesday, which is also EIA inventory day, we get one or more OPEC oil ministers spreading propaganda to jawbone the market higher. So what was this week's propaganda story of choice?
Erik Townsend: Well, the propaganda story of choice this week is still this production freeze meeting that they're still talking about. Played out a little bit differently. And I think at least this week we do have some mitigating fundamental factors that are legitimate that we need to talk about. So you had the, the propaganda campaign overnight session early morning on Wednesday before the inventory data came out. And that did help to move the market higher. But that inventory data coming out, it was a build on inventory, but it was only a 1-point-something million barrel build.
We had a 10 million barrel build a couple of weeks ago. Expectations were for about a 3 million barrel build. So we had a smaller build on inventory nationally than expected. Cushing, Oklahoma inventory was still a build of more than 500,000 barrels, which I see as very significant because we're really getting close to running out of capacity in Cushing. But what you remember, Nathan, is I cautioned a couple weeks ago if this thing went past $36, it could easily turn into a self-reinforcing event on the technicals alone. In other words, it was the jawboning by the oil ministers that got us up above $36, $36.50.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: Then a whole bunch of stops kick in, and that gets the market going further. It becomes a self-reinforcing short squeeze. I said that if we got past $36, it could easily take us into the $40s. We're above $40 now, $40.20 as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon.
There's technical resistance at about $40.50, then again at $42. I'd like to say that this can't go any further, but it's important to understand it can go further. When we get to $40.50, which is the next major milestone, you know they're going to be out with the next propaganda story trying to push the market past that technical milestone, get more technical traders on the bullish side of this trade.
What it will take ultimately to reverse this is Art Berman and I being proven correct about the storage crisis. Now, 2 weeks ago, we had an inventory report that definitely proved that out. 10.5 million barrel inventory build. This week we only saw 1-point-something million barrel inventory built, and less than half of expectations. No surprise that the market risk has been to the upside as a result of that. I don't think the big inventory builds are over yet. I think we have more big builds on inventory and big builds on Cushing inventory coming.
When we see that, that would be the catalyst to force the market down. In the meantime, it seems like sentiment is winning out. Everybody wants to just jump for celebration that there's going There's going to be a meeting. I don't know what they're going to talk about at this meeting. There's really nothing relevant to talk about. It won't have anything to do with the oil market, but it definitely has a lot to do with affecting the prices in the oil market now before the meeting. So go figure. I think we're going to have to wait until the inventory numbers prove themselves to be what they are, and at that point, I think the market will be forced much lower. Will stocks already be at new highs before that happens in oil? I don't know.
Nathan Egger: We saw gold retest cycle highs late last week before correcting down towards $1,230. Then gold got a $30 bump following the Fed statement. What's going to be moving gold in the near term? What should we expect?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I want to look at gold before the Fed statement. We were back down below $1,230, high $1,220s, and from the Fed statement we did get a $30-plus bump. Look at what happened in the Fed statement. Gold bugs were just handed a gift horse on a silver platter. I'm not sure quite how a horse fits on a platter, but forgive the metaphor. What just happened is unexpectedly the Fed told us, hey, we're not going to hike rates half as much as we expected to. And remember, the whole argument for gold— or against gold, I should say— is gold doesn't produce any return. It doesn't generate any income, whereas Treasury bonds do. People who think that Treasury bonds are just as safe as gold, I would disagree with, but a lot of people think that. They prefer Treasuries because they generate a yield. Gold can't generate a yield. What the Fed just told you is, our plan to increase the yield on those US dollar-denominated Treasuries?
Never mind, we didn't mean it. So, that was about the best thing that gold possibly could have asked for.
We didn't even get to new cycle highs on that news. We moved back up to where we were 3 or 4 days ago without even testing the cycle high. What that says to me is gold doesn't have the strength that a lot of people do. Now, on a technical basis, this breakout above the 200-day moving average is very real, it's very strong, but from the news we just got, I would expect it to propel much higher. It didn't do that. So, I do think that the gold rally has run out of steam here. Is it just catching its breath and maybe going to correct a little bit to the downside and then take off again? I think it's more than that. again. I want to wait till we see new highs above $1,280 before I really invest in trusting this rally.
Nathan Egger: So we've seen gold, crude, and equities all move higher post-FOMC, but rather strangely, we saw bonds being bid as well. So what's going on here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that it's a reaction in the wake of the FOMC. What you just heard from the FOMC is what? We're not going to hike rates as much as we thought. What does that mean? Yields are going to be lower. Well, lower yields means higher bond prices. So bond prices are moving higher, yields are moving lower as an adjustment to move those prices in line with what the expectations that are coming from the Fed are now. Because we were being told that interest rates were going to be a full percent higher a year from now. Now we're saying more like half a percent higher. So it's, I think, a short-lived phenomenon that both Both stocks and bonds are moving in the same direction at the same time. And I think it's in the wake of the FOMC meeting.
What I'm waiting for is the immediate effects of the FOMC meeting to wear off so we can see, is this market really going to get carried substantially higher from here, or is this kind of a blow-off in reaction to unexpected dovish news from the FOMC, and the market's going to digest it and realize, okay, but it still doesn't really change anything?
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: I think it's going to be the latter, but I've been wrong here for a few weeks, especially with respect to equities. So we'll see what happens.
Nathan Egger: Thank you for bringing us up to speed and sharing with us your market perspective, Erik. You've made it perfectly clear to us that central banks are what's driving the action this week, and we've got the perfect guy to help us make sense of it all. So let's move on to your interview with Axel Merk right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Axel Merk from Merk Investments. Axel runs a couple of currency mutual funds, and we brought Axel on the program this week because we've got so much central bank activity in the last week between the ECB meeting last week, some unexpected news from the Fed this week, and of course the Bank of Japan was the smaller central bank bit of news. Axel, let's start with the ECB and just Just to review, I think a lot of people don't even understand exactly precisely what happened there. What did the ECB do and what do you see as its consequence?
Axel Merk: Yeah, that's a great question. Good to be with you. Well, Mr. Draghi, head of the ECB, threw in the kitchen sink and he forgot that when you throw a kitchen sink, you need a PhD in plumbing in order to untangle things again. So he utterly confused some people. And then just after he had thrown in the kitchen sink, a few minutes into the press conference, he said, by the way, I'm not going to lower rates any further.
And so if you hadn't been confused by then, you were utterly confused just just after that.
And ever since then, the euro appeared to be on an upward trajectory because previously until then, a key goal of Draghi's policy appeared to have been to weaken the euro. And the argument for that had been that it is done difficult to become more competitive by accepting lower wages. And so why not just make the eurozone more competitive? The problem with that was. That it only helped the folks who are ready to export, meaning it helped Germany, but it didn't really sufficiently help countries like Italy and the southern countries. And so on the day when he held the press conference, he switched gears from focusing on trying to debase the euro to truly try to boost the banking sector. Remember, a key difference between central banking in the US and the eurozone is in the US we have functioning credit markets. And so you can like or dislike QE, but you kind of have an impact by attacking the credit markets.
In Europe, most loans still go through the banking system. And so you've gotta have healthy banks. And that's kind of difficult when you have this huge collection of different regulators and different states and so forth.
And so while he says that the program that he initiated is gonna be kind of a cash-for-funding type of program similar to what the UK had, in essence, what it first and foremost is, it's a way to cut the funding cost of European banks in half. And he does that with, he called it TLTRO II, It's the latest program where he basically allows people to refinance existing bank debt at 0%.
And so with that, he can truly cover the cost of the— funding cost of the banking system. And through that, you might get healthier banks, and through that, you might be able to boost spending. So it's a very change in tone, but in the process, he confused a lot of people.
Erik Townsend: Okay. And how would that work if you can refinance existing bank debt at zero interest? Doesn't that effectively rob The banks of all of their income sources if their customers can refinance without paying interest?
Axel Merk: Well, it's the banks that can refinance, and it's a little bit more complicated than that. So it's a funding-for-lending scheme, and it's a scheme that's aimed at encouraging banks to increase loans to the non-financial private sector. It is a scheme where the banks can borrow at zero. Now, mind you, borrowing at zero is only fun if you can do something with the money, because if you have excess reserves, well, guess what? If you deposit them back at the ECB, you're currently paying -40 basis points, meaning -0.4%. So you're only going to get the cash, take the cash, if you have a project for it. And that's why I said the cash that's available— and there's certain limits as to how much is available— but the cash that is available is best used for the existing bank debt, because that one you can just swap out.
And we did the math, and we come to kind of cutting the cost of the banking system in half. Now, beyond that, you need to have real projects, because otherwise Otherwise, you're going to pay more than what you get in cheap money from the ECB. And if you kind of do the math in fractional reserve banking, sure, they might use the project, but somebody's loan is going to end up at somebody else's deposit. So ultimately, somebody will have excess reserves. So somebody will be stuck with the -40 basis points. And the theory is that ultimately, the ECB is not going to— is going to be fine with that.
Now, one thing I forgot to mention, if these banks exceed certain parameters, the ECB will actually pay the banks. To lend money. And that's where we're getting into territory where a few people are alleging that might not exactly be legal. So I'm sure the courts will have a word to say about it. But clearly, the ECB is trying very hard to get the banks to lend.
Now, as magic a bazooka that Mr. Draghi may want to have, none of that fixes the ultimate problem that there might not be sufficient demand. There is probably a demand issue if credit is just about free and people are simply preferring to buy Treasuries, German Treasuries, with just about zero yield 10 years out rather than invest in a long-term project. That problem Mr. Draghi has not fixed, and that's ultimately what's holding back Europe, and that's holding back the global economy.
Erik Townsend: So to summarize what's going on, at least on the European side of this, the ECB has come forward with an extremely accommodative package. But at the same time, in the next breath, Mario Draghi said that he's essentially never going to lower rates again, that this is as low as it gets. And that's adding some confusion. Why don't we move on to the Fed? Now, that also, I think, was a little bit of confusion. A lot of people were not expecting and I think not understanding what was coming out of the dot plots in terms of different forward guidance for future rate cuts.
Axel Merk: Sure. Just one more word on the ECB. You said it right. Draghi said he's not going to lower rates further. Now, think about what that means. That means we have reached the bottom of the easing cycle in Europe. And that is one of the reasons why the euro reacted so, so strongly to it, because usually it's the change in trend That gets that people to act. Just like look at the Fed. We have been told that the Fed is going to hike rates for years now, and so in that process we have pushed up the dollar versus other currencies because there's going to be this great hiking cycle coming. Well, if and when it actually comes, as we have seen now, well, maybe there isn't so much of a hiking such a dollar already left to be done because so much quote unquote good news, the change in trend has already been priced in.
And so you talk about the dot charts that many. Economists look at. These are basically the projections that the various members of the FOMC make. And in my view, they should probably get rid of those altogether because they cause more confusion than anything else. You have everybody, including the folks who are not voting, make predictions. And you've got to understand a little bit about the composition at the Fed.
You have— obviously, you have Janet Yellen, who's the chair, and everybody knows her. Then you kind of know the vice chair. That's Mr. But then it very quickly gets to be not so clear anymore who it is. There are a couple of governors and then a couple of regional Fed presidents. And the regional Fed presidents, historically, they are mostly some academics and they tend to have various views. They like to debate and some of them have more influence than others. But in many ways, it's a bit of a debating club and they might have views that, oh, we think rates should be higher down the road. And so they put on these little tables that they get when they get their surveys, oh, rates are gonna be higher. And they are human beings like anybody else. They're no smarter than the market is. And indeed, they're usually wrong. And so every time these, these dots change, everybody jumps up and down and says, oh my God, the Fed got more dovish, the Fed got more hawkish, and is trying to kind of evaluate that.
I think what ultimately is far more important is what is the kind of the driver of the thinking of the Fed chair. And there we used to have Greenspan, then we had Bernanke, and we had Janet Yellen. And they have very different frameworks to think about the markets. And I think one has to kind of try to get into their shoes to try to think about what's going to happen rather than think about what this entire debating club is up to.
And when it comes to Janet Yellen, the important thing to remember is that she is a labor economist. One of the first— for the first speech she gave as Fed chair that was directed at policy was about the labor market. And then she profiled, amongst others, 3 unemployed 2 of them, and then she lamented how Fed policy hasn't been able to get those folks jobs. And 2 of those folks were convicted felons. And I cynically then commented, well, you don't have to look at any other indicators than to try to track down these 2 people, the convicted felons. If they have a job, rates are gonna go up. And of course, that's maybe a bit oversimplistic to say it, but the point here is, whereas Bernanke used to look at things like inflation expectations very, very closely,
Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.
Axel Merk: The thing that Janet Yellen looks at most closely is the labor market, and the key difference between looking at inflation expectations and the labor market is that Mr.
Bernanke had a forward-looking indicator, and Janet Yellen has a backward-looking indicator. The labor data are always stale, and that is why you have this environment in the market where it appears that the tail is wagging the dog. Whenever the market behaves, we think rates are going to. go up, and then the market acts up, and expectations about the rate hike go down. It's because the Yellen Fed has made itself a slave to the markets, and that's what we've been seeing unfolding.
Erik Townsend: Now, skeptics of Fed policy, myself included, have said, look, we haven't really solved any of the problems since 2009. We've papered over our problems by printing more money, but we haven't solved the problem of too much debt. And a lot of us are kind of cynically questioning, are we really going to even see these 4 rate hikes that the Fed was talking about, or are they going to reverse course first into a QE4 or negative interest rates or other— some other form of dramatic easing? Where do you stand on that, Axel? Would you agree with the view that I hold that there is a significant risk that they never get their 4 rates and they end up with QE4 first? Or do you think that they're going to stay the course in terms of what they announced?
Axel Merk: A couple of things. First of all, I agree that the policies we've had have not worked. We would not be at near-zero rates. Years after the outbreak of the financial crisis if those policies were working. Now, again, Yellen is looking in the rearview mirror, and that means you have to think about an ocean freighter that is on a set course. She has her thing, she has her model, and she's much less sensitive to things that are happening where— I mentioned inflation expectations in particular— certain things that are happening out there. And so she's going to noodle around with what she wants to do, and then she's going to be surprised that the market is going to react a bit differently, and then she'll react to it.
And so if you think about it from a— where rates are going to be, obviously she said, oh, we got to raise early, we got to be ahead of the game. What Janet Yellen is underestimating, in my view, is that we've based this recovery on asset price inflation.
And asset prices were inflated through QE. What QE does, it compresses risk premia, it takes fear out of the market by buying government securities, you're lowering the cost of credit. And it has an impact from everything from lowering the Yields of junk bonds, but it also has the impact that it lowers the volatility in the equity markets. And so, as the Fed is is shifting towards pursuing an exit, what's happening is these risk premia are rising again, and that means that the junk bonds are going to yield more again, and that means volatility in the stock market is going to be higher. While everything else equal, when volatility in the stock market is higher, prices are lower, and that means we will be getting headwinds towards asset prices. So, just as the Fed inflated asset prices, a negative exit is deflating asset prices. And that is why, as the Fed is trying to, to have rates go higher, they're getting surprised that the headwinds in the economy are increasing.
And the reason why the headwinds in the economy are increasing is because, again, because we've raised the recovery in asset price inflation.
So raising rates lowers asset prices. And you're going to get— you're going to have a much bigger impact on a small rate hike than they expected. And that is, that is a key reason why I agree with you. I don't think the Fed can hike rates as much as they wanted to. We have economy that's slowing down. They might have to raise rates, and it's going to have very negative impact on various assets. Now, the reason I kind of gave this example on the ocean freighter is because I'm not so sure that the Fed is going to recognize that on time.
And so they might do 1 or 2 more rate hikes than many people think is plausible based on how markets react. And so we'll have to wait and see. I actually thought that Janet Yellen in the most recent FOMC press conference would be a tad more hawkish because the markets have been quiet and she would say, yep, we're not going to raise rates, but we're out there watching. Whereas kind of what she said is we're not going to raise rates. And by the way, we're going to keep rates lower and we give you all kinds of reasons why, why we're not going to raise rates for the time being.
Erik Townsend: Now, one of the criticisms that I've seen of this action just in the last 24 hours is a lot of people have said Janet Yellen has told us that this is not about levitating asset markets. It's not about saving the stock market. It's all about the real economy. But if you listen to every everything they've said, they should have hiked rates at this. You know, according to the data that they're working from, they've got their unemployment, at least according to the numbers that they follow, at the number they want it at. They've got inflation expectations moving higher now.
What would you say to that criticism? Do you think that this action proved that Janet Yellen is essentially afraid to shock the markets? Because it would appear that asset markets are the only reason not for hiking at this most recent meeting?
Axel Merk: Well, again, Janet Yellen's framework is the labor market, so she doesn't like the explanation that asset prices dictate the tone. But it doesn't change the fact that Greenspan talked a great deal about the wealth effect. Under the Bernanke Fed, in the minutes of the Fed, it frequently referred to asset prices. And once you start referring to asset prices in your discussions, then the Fed becomes responsible for asset prices. And yes, that has continued with the Yellen Fed. So she may not like it. In a perfect theoretical model, the asset prices shouldn't matter, but in practice they do matter and they have mattered in recent years. And so anything else is revisionist history. Just as she said a couple of other things that she said, for example, every meeting is a live meeting. And if there were credibility in the Fed, the market should have reacted to that quite strongly. Instead, they just ignored it because everybody kind of knows that no, not every meeting is a live meeting.
In Europe, we had Mr. Mr. Trichet, the predecessor to Draghi, always say we are not pre-committed. And Draghi has thrown that out and given calendar deadlines and all kinds of things to say, hell yes, we are pre-committed. We want to keep these rates low. So they'll say whatever they need to say for the moment. And that works for a little while. But at some point, the public will say, yeah, you can tell us whatever you want. But we care about more what we do. And so these extraordinary policies, they have— one of the key things they have done is they have weakened the influence now of central banks because they The market is calling the bluff.
And Draghi recognized that, saying, hey, we can't take rates much lower. Banks are screaming that they can't cope with these negative rates because, by the way, if they pass on those negative rates to retail, they take the money out in cash. And so they have to do other things. In Switzerland, mortgage rates have gone up despite the negative rates. It's because the banks have to recoup the negative margin that they're eating. They can't charge their customers negative rates, and so they're hiking other rates. And so all these things become counterproductive. And what we have at the Fed is that they've told themselves, hey, we are through this, we can have an exit, we are better than everybody else, and yes, we're gonna hike rates. And in the meantime, the market tells them, hey, not so fast, because as you've pointed out, we haven't fixed our own problems either. And let me just kind of round out here with one other comment.
Government debt has increased quite substantially, not just in the US, not just in the Eurozone, not just in Japan, in many places around the world.
And if you are in an environment where government debt is very high, the interests of the government are not aligned with the interests of investors. The government has an incentive to debase the value of that debt. That is why they want to have inflation. You, as somebody who's saving, has an interest in preserving the purchasing power of what you have earned. And so don't count on your government to help you out on this. You're on your own, and you have to find a way to try to retain purchasing power or increase, obviously, what, what you have, the purchasing power of what you have, despite government policy rather than with government policy. And so it's just something to keep in mind as one watches these policymakers throughout the world in an environment where governments have too much debt.
Erik Townsend: Now, I want to come back and talk about some of the consequences and implications of all this Fed policy in a minute. But there was also a BOJ press conference last night where Kuroda-san spoke. What's your perspective on that?
Axel Merk: Well, Mr. Kuroda is highly unpredictable. I'd just leave it at that. And first thing, when we look at the yen, we— when we were quite negative on the yen for a while, while we still have a long-term price target for the yen of infinity, meaning think— we think that the yen cannot survive it. And by the way, the worst thing that can happen to Japanese is that their policies are working. I say worst thing because at that stage, the bond prices should fall and it should become impossible to finance government debt.
Having said that, when Abe came to power, we said that as Abenomics is working, we should see a deterioration of the current account surplus that Japan had. We should see a weakening of the yen. And then if you look at the correlation between the yen and the S&P, for example, many people may be aware that the yen tends to rally when the S&P is down. In 2008, the yen actually was the best performing currency. It wasn't the The dollar did very well versus most everything, but the yen went up, was up almost 20% or so versus the dollar that year. And the flight to safety was to the yen. And as Abenomics was working, the yen started to lose that safe haven appeal. The current account surplus eroded. And as that had eroded, the safe haven appeal evaporated, so to speak, and the yen behaved like just about any other currency.
And then in late last year, We said we are very negative on equity markets, and we also believe that Abenomics has kind of run its course. It's not particularly effective. And so while we continue to have a very negative long-term outlook of the yen, we're taking that off the table. And we actually then in December said we're gonna buy the yen because we think that the safe haven appeal is coming back to the Japanese. And I give all of that background, it's because obviously Kuroda is part of Abenomics, that's the Bank of Japan part of it. Is that to what extent can the Bank of Japan print sufficient money, have enough influence on the markets to weaken the yen? And we saw a couple of weeks ago where the Japanese introduced negative rates and instead the yen rallied.
And it just showed how ineffective the policy is. Now, that doesn't mean you can rule out central bankers because obviously they control the bazooka. They can always come up with yet another scheme. But the main thing that the Japanese have achieved is to destroy liquidity in markets. They have pretty much destroyed the JGB market. And it's very difficult to trade many things in Japan because the Bank of Japan is gobbling everything up.
And so, yes, they'll live for another day. But for the time being and the environment that I foresee, the Bank of Japan has become a sideshow, just like Mr. Draghi has made himself a sideshow in the Eurozone. And it appears that Janet Yellen is on her way of making herself a sideshow. Which is a good thing, by the way. way, if they are, if they are not going to be in command, but maybe the market is going to take an upper hand at some point again.
Erik Townsend: I have to chuckle. It does feel like we're talking about a 3-ring circus here when we talk about the ECB and the Fed and the BOJ. Let's try to pull this all together now. I think one of the biggest trends in global macro for the last few years, almost everyone agrees, is the dollar rally. The US dollar has been rallying very strongly since the beginning of 2014. And a lot of people are beginning to very hotly debate, is it over yet? Is it done? Does it have more to go, or is it ready to reverse? And something I've noticed, Axel, is people will get into hot debates about this and then realize they're talking past each other because the 2 guys talking had completely different concepts of what had caused this big rally in the dollar. So, I'd like to start with your perspective. Let's set the Wayback Machine to the end of 2007. 2013. Quantitative easing is being tapered.
They're winding down the QE program. All of a sudden, the dollar takes off, surprising a lot of people. What happened and why? How did we get to where we are now? And once we've covered that, what's your perspective? Has this thing got further to go, or is the dollar rally done?
Axel Merk: I think that there are 2 drivers that I would point to that not everybody else is talking about. And one of them is that if you look at the dollar rally we had until last summer in particular, so for a 18 months or 3 years or so, the dollar had been rallying when the S&P has been rallying.
And the reason why that is relevant and why I mentioned that instead of interest rate differentials right now is because that's not supposed to happen. Everybody in 2008 learned that in a flight to safety and when risk is off, that when the S&P is down, that's the environment where the dollar is supposed to be rallying. And rather than the other way around, that when risk is on, the dollar is supposed to be rallying.
And the reason that was happening is because the Europeans had lowered interest rates so much that the euro was used as a funding currency for the so-called carry trade. You borrow cheaply, you borrow in euros, and you buy the high-yielding currency. The dollar had become a high-yielding currency.
And so when— that's unusual because Usually the dollar is not a high-yielding currency in a quote-unquote normal environment, and that means the dynamics, the currency dynamics change. And so when risk is on, the dollar has been rallying, but it conversely of course means that when risk is off, the dollar tends to be under pressure. And some of the most dramatic risk-off days we've had in recent months, the dollar has plunged and the euro has skyrocketed in those days.
And so when we talk about the dollar, of course we have to think about, well, which currencies do we talk about? The dollar index has a huge overweight versus the euro, Then there is a trade-weighted index that the Federal Reserve is watching, which has a much bigger weighting towards emerging markets. Now, the difference, the key difference between emerging markets and the developed markets is that emerging market currencies tend to be tightly managed and they tend to be much more driven by liquidity. And so in those markets, when risk is on, money flows into those currencies, and when risk is off, money flows out of those currencies. Now, if you put that together, since last summer, the markets has had a couple of hiccups. I talked about risk premia earlier. Risk premia rising. Rising again. Equity prices have been, have been coming down. We haven't been able to reach new highs in the S&P. In that sort of environment, the dollar has been under pressure.
Now, emerging market currencies have continued to plunge. And indeed, Janet Yellen looks more at the trade-weighted index and has said, even as of a few weeks ago, oh, the dollar has continued to rise, whereas versus the euro and the dollar index, it had actually plunged. It's just that the Fed dollar index that they are watching, the dollar had continued to rise because of that heavy component of emerging markets. And so just looking forward, if indeed we're going to have an environment where equity prices are going to be under pressure, I think from that point of view, the dollar might be under pressure as well.
Now, going back to kind of the more traditional way of looking at currencies, if you look at interest rate differentials, we've been told for years, as I mentioned earlier, that yes, rates in the US are going to go through the roof. In the rest of the world, they're going to go down to deeply negative territory. Well, the real world isn't black and white. It's more tones of gray. And sure enough, the Fed— we talked about the dot charts earlier— hiking expectations have been trimmed down. And conversely, Mr. Draghi said we've reached the bottom. In fact, it's not just Mr. Draghi. If you look at Sweden, which I think is the most extreme example, in Sweden you have good GDP growth and you have very low unemployment. Most recent unemployment data were a tad worse than expected, but generally speaking, very good unemployment numbers.
And the only thing that's quote quote wrong is inflation is low. Well, in practice, the Riksbank, the central bank in Sweden, is paranoid about the Swedish krona outperforming the euro, and they have taken rates deeply into negative territory, utterly inappropriate for the situation they're in. And they'll have to do a U-turn. That's the main implication. The Swedes will have to U-turn. Draghi has said they've bottomed out. Other central banks— the Swiss National Bank, Mr. George Gordon has said that you cannot take rates down forever. Norway just came out and said that yes, we can do negative rates, but by the way, it would take a lot for us to go negative. And in Australia and New Zealand, they have said that there's a limit. And by the way, in Australia, you have a governor who's retiring in the fall. He wants to go down in the books as the one who hasn't caved in, who has kept Australia or the Australian dollar to be a quote unquote normal currency.
We're not going to go to zero and we're not going to follow any of this stuff. And so you have this wave now of other countries that have had enough, maybe not necessarily willingly, but because it's just not effective anymore. And then you have a Fed who says that, oh, by the way, we might not be able to raise rates as much. And then I am somebody who says, well, we're even going to do less than what you think, Madam Yellen. And so you're creating an environment where maybe the dollar rally is overdone.
And then let me give you a third reason. If you just look at the very simple technical thing, if you look at the long-term moving average of the Dollar Index, and if you and then you look at deviation bands, we are way out of whack, significantly above two standard deviations on the Dollar Index, even more so on the on the trade-weighted Dollar Index, to an extreme that the dollar is above the trend line. And so there is I think the odds are favoring that we're going to come back to the average, which would be a credit. significant plunge in the dollar. And so for all those reasons, I think that this dollar rally is, is very, very long in the tooth.
Erik Townsend: So let's assume that you're right for sake of argument, and the dollar rally is either ending or about to end or something like that. What are the implications for investors?
Erik Townsend: What does that mean? I would assume that in terms of earnings and so forth, you know, is this positive, negative? What should investors conclude from your call that the dollar rally may have ended?
Axel Merk: Yeah. So a couple of things. First of all, maybe first on the economic side, the inflation numbers are picking up because the dollar rally had been so strong. And so we had year-over-year dollar rallies of 20% range, lowering the year-over-year cost of imports. Now that's fizzling out. Now the year-over-year comparisons for the dollar index are pretty flat, which means that inflation numbers are picking up, which means that actually Janet Yellen might be inclined to hike rates a little bit more. So that's that as a background. But what it means for corporate America, corporate America is more interested in the price level. They are still absorbing this dollar.
That's not going to evaporate simply if the dollar is going to weaken from here onward. They're still struggling with the implications of the very substantial rally that we've had. And so there's going to be no benefit from a weaker dollar at this stage. We can talk about that in a year from now, maybe. Historically, I think more importantly, historically, companies had been trying to hedge themselves. Those hedges have run out because it's been happening for too long. And so, so corporate America is rather confused and they've been trying to deal with more natural hedges.
Now, what does it mean for the market in general? I kind of phrased it the other way around first. I said because the markets are going to be weak, the dollar is also going to be weak. And the reason I went down that road is because of my view that as the Fed is trying to extricate itself from these policies, and I'm not suggesting they'll rise a rate hike significantly. But as they're going down this path, risk premia are going to expand, and that is inducing volatility. And because the dollar has been rallying in a risk-off environment, that should be bad news for the dollar. And so what it basically means is that risk assets in general, together with the dollar, should be under pressure. And the problem for investors, of course, is where on earth do you hide? Because if, quote unquote, everything has been been going up, junk bonds, equities, all kinds of things, where do you go?
And if you go to Treasuries, the dollar is also gonna be under pressure. And so there is really no easy answer. The textbook answer is you wanna go to somewhere where you can generate a return stream that has a low correlation to the risky portion of your portfolio. That's why historically people invest in bonds. I just happen to not like bonds either, and I don't like the dollar either. And so you can do something in the space of currencies. You can buy a managed basket of currencies. I happen to also like long-short strategies in the currency market. You can do that very nicely, where by design you create an uncorrelated return stream. Say if you buy the Australian dollar but sell the New Zealand dollar— that's not an investment recommendation— but then the return stream you generate is almost certainly not correlated to anything else one holds in the portfolio. If that's too complex, one can look look at gold.
Gold historically has a very low correlation to other asset prices. It's simple to understand. For full disclosure, we do have a gold ETF as well. But beyond that, you've got to look at long-short equity strategies or some other possibly more exotic strategy. The challenge is that if you look into the truly alternative universe, many of these strategies have not performed particularly well during the good times.
And that will make it quite difficult to pick the right investment. But that's exactly where investors need to look. They need to make sure it's And if it's an active product rather than something like gold, that the investment process is a sound one that's behind it. But the dollar, in my view, has a very good chance of weakening from here out, and that has implications for other asset prices. And I don't think that they're very positive, those implications.
Erik Townsend: Well, and certainly the people that are still bearish on gold have been citing the rally in the US dollar as one of their biggest arguments for why to be bearish on gold. So, if you think the US dollar rally is over, presumably, it's time to turn bullish on gold, and it sounds like you are.
Let's move on to equities. I'm assuming that if you're saying that the dollar has been weak at times when equities have been weak, that tends to reinforce the hypothesis a lot of people have that this is about international capital flows, that the reason the US stock market has been so strong is because the dollar has been strong. That results in international investors saying, hmm, if I invest in the United States, I get a double whammy. I get the upside on the S&P, but I also get the upside on the currency for being invested in the dollar.
If that hypothesis is correct, then it sounds like maybe that is all starting to unwind. If the dollar is not going to be strong, international investors are not going to have that extra kicker for being in the dollar at the same time as being in the S&P. That gets them out of the S&P and out of the dollar, and it now becomes a self-reinforcing unwind process in the other direction. Is that something that you see on the horizon?
Axel Merk: It's one of the components, but it's really just an attribute of the bigger picture why we believe prices, equity prices might move lower. But to add into that, one of the changes that's, that's been happening is that sovereign wealth funds now may have to sell their assets because many of the sovereign wealth funds are by oil-producing nations. And they have big, deep budget holes that they have to fill back home. Now, mind you, the Bank of Japan has been buying some foreign equities as well. But still, yes, I would agree with you. Talking anecdotally to advisors in Europe, we see that they have loved the US because everything is, of course, right in the US and everything is bad in the rest of the world. And so they have been piling money into the US precisely on the backdrop of what you've been saying. But of course, everything is a question question of price. And so if you look at the fundamentals in the US, the earnings momentum has been stalling.
Companies are not meeting their revenue targets. The stronger dollar has made the foreign earnings look, look weaker.
And then importantly, I think that that's at least important as the foreign falls, the foreign flows, is buybacks. Buybacks is kind of QE for stocks. And in recent weeks, buybacks have picked up a little bit again. But still, buybacks are less attractive when rates go up. And so those will fizzle out. Also, if you think about it, let's, let's assume that I'm right, that Yellen Fed is going to be slow in doing whatever it's going to do and possibly stay on this course, try to hike a little bit.
Earnings are going to go down because the dollar has been stronger. And I don't think they're going to get kind of the opposite of that anytime soon. So they'll have some challenges. The high interest rates make buybacks less attractive. And at the same time, if you think about, well, you're going to pay out a dividend or you're going to pay your bondholders, well, of course, they're going to pay the bondholders first. And so there's less money, there's less money for shareholders around. So that's another headwind that's going to be there. And then just on, on a number of other factors, I also think that the US market is tired. I don't buy the argument that kind of there's the— based on certain valuation metrics, prices can go up by X percent. Whenever a Wall Street analyst doesn't know what to say they'll tell you stock prices will drop 10%. If somebody tells you something moves by 10%, they have no clue what they're talking about.
That's kind of my, my reaction usually. It's the expansion of risk premia, in my view, that that's going to be a headwind to equity prices. And yes, it is ultimately that money is then going to, going to flow back to some of the countries where it originated from.
Mind you that some of these investors will be slower to react than others. And maybe a big factor we haven't talked about, which is maybe the biggest factor of all is the American investor, both institutional and retail. Think about what happens when prices go up and up and up and volatility is low. Well, guess what? You've got to be thinking that nothing can possibly go wrong. We talked to advisors over and over again who told us that they were getting out of low-risk assets into equities because they're investors wanted them to do it. They were afraid of missing out on the rallies. People bought the dips. And so what that tells me is that investors are overexposed to risk assets. What that also means is that as volatility flares up, investors say, hey, I haven't signed up for that, and that the sentiment is changing. And it's not changing overnight. It's happening gradually over time.
It's going to take months for that to play out. Where people say, oh, maybe I'm more interested in capital preservation.
And if you take a company like Apple, and I'm not giving investment recommendations on Apple here, everybody, in quotes, already owns Apple. If you wanna diversify, you've gotta sell Apple. It doesn't mean whether the sales are gonna be great or horrible, you've gotta diversify and Apple is gonna be one of the companies you're gonna sell. And that's why the so-called FAANG stocks—
Erik Townsend: Uh-huh.
Axel Merk: Have been very top-heavy and they, they look like that, they're toppling over. And so all of these things are ultimately drivers for, for low equity prices. I happen to think that's going to be associated with a weaker dollar.
Erik Townsend: The people that think that the US Treasury yield is headed lower usually cite their belief in an ongoing or a continuing bull market in the US dollar as the reason for why that's going to be true. I would assume that if you feel that the US dollar rally is either over or Almost over. You probably think that either the bottom is in in yields or is almost in. So is it time to short Treasuries? And if it's not time in the United States yet, what about Europe, where the German Bund is now deeply into negative territory, well beyond 10 years out on the maturity curve?
Axel Merk: Well, I should probably leave that to smarter minds because I don't think anybody has been able to predict that the 10-year in most countries accurately for, for an extended period. When rates are a little bit higher, shorting Treasuries can be very expensive. No, clearly when rates are negative, it becomes cheap. It becomes profitable to short the 10-year. So maybe it is something worth considering. If you have a weakening equity market,
Treasuries tend to rise. In Europe, we see a Japanification, so to speak, of the markets where central banks have been kind of pressing down on those yields and locking us in there. At some point, that game is going backfire. But I'm not in a position when that's going to happen. To me, the 10-year in particular is a game that's, that's too risky to play. I don't touch the 10-year with a broomstick, but it also means I'm not going to short it.
I'd rather play it elsewhere. I'd rather play it in the currency sphere or elsewhere. And of course, conversely, though, of course, one does look at things like the spreads between the 10-year in the US and other countries, and there's still a big yield differential. And so those sort of yield differentials do entice certain foreign investors to, to, to engage in certain types of trades. So yes, we look at that, but I would not give an investment recommendation on a 10-year because it's just a, it's just a very, very difficult game to play. And you have lots of people in the streets who have been wrong with those predictions.
Erik Townsend: Axel, you recently did a Black Swans webinar where you talked a lot about tail risks that could affect Could you give our listeners just an overview of what you covered in that webinar?
Axel Merk: It's actually— it's a webinar that's, that's coming up on, uh, on March 23rd. And if you're listening to this recording after March 23rd, we do have a monthly webinar and we try to cover interesting topics, discuss what's happening in the markets, implications. The Black Swan webinar is focusing on what can possibly go wrong, right? And on the sort of risk that, that investors might not be thinking about. And so if you given you kind of lots of ideas. And I hope I've given you some ideas that you don't hear from too many other people.
The reason why we tend to have those sort of ideas that you don't hear everywhere else is because quite frankly, we don't listen to too many other people. We actually do our bottom-up research ourselves. We go to the sources, we go to central banks, we listen to their speeches. Now everybody's familiar, you can do that at the Fed as well.
You've been able to do that at the ECB for many years already. We try to go to the original context of how things have been said. And you can do that when you have an international team that can kind of help to interpret what these guys might be up to. And so that's how we devise our views and our theories.
Now, if you want to learn more about the webinar, you can come to our website at merkinvestments.com, and there's a button to sign up for it.
Erik Townsend: I also want to cover your newsletter because I know you do an excellent newsletter. It's a little I just want to leave with our listeners, even if you are, let's say, a stock trader and you don't follow currencies at all, if you want to understand the big macro picture of what's going on in the world, following currencies, even if you're not trading them directly, is just so valuable in terms of understanding the overall big picture of what's happening in the world. Axel has one of very few currency newsletters that you can get for free. Axel, please tell us about that. Please tell them where they can find it.
Axel Merk: Sure. The easiest place to go to is, again, merkinvestments.com. There's a button to sign up for our newsletter. And we do cover currencies, but we don't cover them from a trading strategy point of view. So we're not going to tell you the latest Fibonacci numbers or things like that. But instead, we tend to focus on the big picture analysis, similar to what I gave you right now, and help people to understand the dynamics. In my view, there's nothing worse than chasing chasing the news and just doing something because something just popped up in the news.
You've got to have your framework to think about the world, and then as the news flow happens, you've got to put it in the context of your framework. And that's when you can make a buy or sell decision on anything, including currencies or equities or whatever it might be. And so we try to help people to develop that sort of framework to think about the global dynamics, which I believe are very, very firmly influencing just about everything these days. And so, yes, again, on our website, MerkInvestments.com, there's a link to sign up for our newsletter, and I appreciate anybody who would like to join it.
Erik Townsend: Well, Axel, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Nathan Egger and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: So, Erik, we have a Fed who says rate hikes are not off the table despite surprising markets with an unexpectedly dovish rate hike guidance revision this week. Now, for the past 6 to 7 years, we have gotten used to equity markets rallying when the Fed turns more dovish than expected. But Axel is making a much different case. Can you clarify for us exactly why he is suggesting that this time is different?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's a number of factors. Let's sort of start with the big picture. If central banks conjure money out of thin air because they need to in order to support asset markets that are crashing otherwise, is that a good thing or a bad thing? Well, you could look at it and say it's an act of desperation. It indicates that things are so bad that even though this printed money is being thrown at the problem, we know it's not a real solution. It can't solve anything. It's not going to fix anything. It won't work.
A lot of people, including myself, took that view in the grand scheme of things back in early 2009, and we were wrong. What was proven is that if you conjure money out of thin air, it has to go somewhere. Now, I still think that it's not solving any problem in in the long term, but it certainly in the short term has supported asset markets, and it supported asset markets very effectively. There comes a point though when the market recognizes, hey, these guys are just running out of options. They're rapidly running out of ammunition. They're trying everything they got left, and they're quickly running out of options.
We're going to get to the point here where the market has to stand on its own legs without relying on the central Bank for support. And I think that's what Axel was alluding to, is we're getting to the point here where the stock market's going to have to be able to support itself on organic economic growth without central banks printing money to throw at it, or markets are eventually going to revolt with a loss of confidence. So it's that loss of confidence in central banks moment that, you know, I think is 5 years overdue, frankly, but it hasn't happened yet. And I think what Axel is suggesting is that maybe we're
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Nathan Egger: Those who follow us here at MacroVoices will know that a lot of the work that you do focuses on the commodity complex, specifically crude oil, and that you've maintained a bearish stance on oil fundamentals despite us seeing prices continue to rally. Now, let's assume Axel is proven right and we see this dollar rally fade and we see a weaker stock market. Is this going to change your views on oil in any way?
Erik Townsend: No. No, Nathan, I don't think it changes my outlook in any way in the long term. What it does do is it forces me to put my seatbelt on because being short crude oil futures, with the Fed doing what the Fed just did, they basically said, look, with respect to these next 4 rate hikes that we promised you guys, we were only kidding. You're only going to get 2 of them. So that's extremely negative for the dollar.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: index, therefore positive for everything denominated in dollars, including commodities such as oil.
I think most of that effect has already been felt. It was a big shock. We didn't think this was coming. It spiked the dollar index down. It spiked oil up as a result. I don't expect anything that the Fed did to cause a trend that's going to continue for months to come. To the contrary, I think that we just got this shock everybody had a wake-up. Probably what we've seen is an overshoot of the effect of this, and it'll start to revert towards the mean.
So yes, I definitely think that it is possible that the Fed— well, I'm certain that the $2 move up in crude oil prices this week is a result of Fed action. Is that going to continue? It very well could, but I don't think it's going to have a long-term effect on crude or any any other commodities.
Nathan Egger: Okay. So if we know that too much supply has been the most important factor in the unbalanced crude oil market, but it is demand that continues to trouble central bankers and limit economic growth in the global economy. Draghi said last week that interest rates will not be lowered any further, and the ECB seems to be doing all they can— well, within their mandate— to spur banks to lend. But the demand just isn't there.
If we try Let's try for a moment to make an optimistic case for the European and global economies. Can you identify any scenarios where we might start to see a material pickup in the demand for capital?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's a pretty ugly picture. You know, I think that in the grand scheme of things, we are coming up on the end of a long, long cycle, long, long, long cycle. And that cycle is the one in which we've gotten used just borrowing and spending, spending on borrowed money, living beyond our means. And it's not just a question of individuals, it's a question of the policies of governments.
There was a time that I can remember when governments tried to instill financial responsibility into their citizens. After the Great Depression, there were actually, you know, signs up on street corners encouraging people, put a little bit of money away for a rainy day, have some savings. Be ready. Don't spend beyond your means. Debt is not your friend.
These were the kind of things that we tried to teach people in society. These days we've gotten to the point where the government is so desperate to try to stimulate the economy somehow, by hook or by crook, that they're actually encouraging reckless and irresponsible behavior.
What can we do to get people spending? What if we were to give them some kind of special benefit card that it expires if you don't spend it by midnight so that they'll have to spend the money? What can we do to force people through negative interest rates into spending more of their money and not saving it? We're trying to punish savings in order to address a short-term problem. I think eventually what this leads to is a reset, a blowup point where we recognize that we have borrowed and spent beyond our means for too long, and debt is excessive at every level, at a personal level, at a government level, at at a corporate level, and it's a huge, huge problem.
So I don't really see this leading— you know, the way you pose the question is, does this lead to a positive scenario in demand for capital? I don't know what happens in the short term, but I think in the long term, eventually, we've got to reconcile the fact that we've reached the point where governments are so desperate to stimulate the economy that they are encouraging reckless and irresponsible behavior among the citizens.
We've actually got the citizens revolting against the government, saying, no, I'm not going to be reckless and irresponsible with my money like my government is actively encouraging me to do. I'm going to be responsible and save it instead. It's just amazing to me that we've seen an absolute reversal of public sentiment since I was a kid, but it doesn't seem to register as a big issue for most people.
Nathan Egger: And we are seeing those savings rates begin to tick up. Maybe people are are getting the message behind the message that we're going to have to reel it in and be more responsible at some point.
So those who have followed your work since before we started MacroVoices will know very well that you've been saying since Janet Yellen was appointed Fed chair that we would be seeing a pronounced shift in the focus of the Fed. You explained that Janet Yellen would be focusing more on the labor market and Main Street and less on inflation. statistics and Wall Street. You suggested that we may be more likely to see some form of direct Main Street stimulus or helicopter money, or more likely to see that than another round of QE like we've seen in the past.
It appears to me that you were largely correct, at least in your perceptions of Chair Yellen. And now we see the Fed hitting their unemployment target. They still seem to be sort of chickening out on normalizing rates. So, what do you think What do you think is causing this backtracking out of the Yellen Fed?
Erik Townsend: Well, the backtracking and the chickening out, I'm convinced that what we're seeing finally in this meeting is Janet's kind of been shown for what she really is. She's been telling this story about how it's not to support Wall Street, it's not to support asset markets and so forth.
I do believe that Janet personally is much more oriented towards stimulus for the economy, for the benefit of the people, rather than for Wall Street. I think that Janet is very much on board with that. But I think she also understands that in this environment, the Fed's got to save the stock market, otherwise it's going to really fall over and crash here. And I think, you know, it's one of the questions that I posed to Axel: how is it possible that they didn't hike here? Because if you go by what the Fed has told us in the past, they should have hiked at this meeting. Why didn't they? There's really no big reason not to in the Main Street economy. There's a lot of reasons in Wall Street markets not to right here, and I think that's what spooked them out of it.
Nathan Egger: One of the other things that you and Axel discussed was this topic of quantitative easing, and in particular, the prospect of more of it from the Federal Reserve before this is over. Would you expect that to look like the last 3 major rounds of quantitative easing? You are that you do expect further stimulus eventually, or do you expect more of the so-called helicopter money or QE for the people that some have discussed?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'd like to broaden your question a little bit and put it another way. A lot of investors are expecting that there's going to be another round of quantitative easing. I agree with them. I think there's more QE coming. Almost everybody is assuming, yeah, we know what that looks like. We've been there before. The Fed prints up a whole bunch of money and they basically give it to banks. They use it to buy Treasury bonds.
The primary deal The big dealers end up front-running those trades. Everybody on Wall Street makes a lot of money on this. Supposedly, it was going to help Main Street. It didn't really help Main Street.
I think that there will be more quantitative easing, that there will be more demands that the Fed support the economy through printing money. But I don't think that it's going to go to Wall Street next time. I think that both politicians and the Main Street populace are going to stand up and say, no, we want helicopter money. If we're going to print more money, don't send it to Wall Street bankers. Send it to us. Give it to the people. Let us go out and buy McDonald's with it or whatever and support the economy that way. Now, I don't think that makes any sense for the economy. I don't think it's an intelligent way to try to solve the problem. But I think it's very likely the way that the public policy discussion is going to take us. QE for the people instead of QE for the bankers.
I just had an email exchange with Dr. Pippa Malmgren the other day. She has a fantastic new book out called Signals. I haven't read it yet, but it really looks interesting, because what she's essentially done is tried to take all of these complex topics about why the social entitlement system is broken and cannot possibly be repaired and so forth, and break it down and explain it in simple terms that anybody can understand. One of her contentions, though, is she thinks the next major round of QE will all be about military spending.
And, you know, that's a particular viewpoint that I don't think anybody else is talking about right now. Maybe there's another one that's not military spending, that's something else.
I think what investors should be doing is saying, the next time the Fed prints a whole bunch of money in order to respond to the economy, where is it really going to go? Stop assuming it's going to work the way it worked last time. Assume that it might be completely and totally different and start thinking about what the political pressures are, what the drivers are that are going to affect that decision. I think that certainly if Donald Trump is elected president, the idea of a bunch of QE going into military spending is very possible. I suppose with either Donald Trump or with Hillary Clinton, a big military spending campaign, as Pippa Malmgren is forecasting, is entirely possible. But I think what investors should do is stop assuming that QE is going to save asset markets and start thinking about how it might come in a different form.
Nathan Egger: We've been talking with Dr. Malmgren, as Erik has suggested, and hopefully, we can get her on the program in the future so that Erik and she can have this conversation and clear some of this up for us and what it might look like exactly if governments around the world start in unison ramping up military spending as a form of fiscal stimulus.
That would really jive with what we've been talking about on the program a lot lately with a lot of our guests, which is when economic conditions continue to deteriorate, military solutions often emerge, as unfortunate and disastrous as those can end up being. It's an easy way out for politicians, even though a lot of friction is going to be caused. It ends up becoming the path of least resistance from a political standpoint. So we'll look forward to having her on the program if she can give us some time in the future.
Nathan Egger: But I think that's going to do it for us this week, folks. We've got another exciting guest coming Coming on next week, Jack Schwager. Many of you guys will know him from his legendary series called Market Wizards. Really excited for that conversation. In the meantime, your subscriptions, your ratings, your reviews on iTunes have been massively helpful and overwhelmingly positive. We really appreciate them.
Keep them coming. And follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, where you can connect with us every day and talk about whatever's going on. Also, our forums at MacroVoices.com is a great place. If Erik and I didn't cover something or something was unclear, I know Axel gave us a lot to digest today. Let's talk about it in the forums and hopefully we can get everybody clear on Axel's perspective at the very least. So until next week, everybody, thanks for listening.
Erik Townsend: Take care.
Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and Macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on. MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management. LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.
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Grant Williams — Grant Williams from the Things That Make You Go Hmmm blog and Real Vision Television (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 5 was recorded on March 10th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. By popular request from our listeners, Grant Williams will be joining me as this week's special guest. I'll be talking to Grant about his forecast of an oncoming US recession, how economic conditions like those that we're seeing right now cause Grant to be concerned about a military conflict our future, and of course, Grant's work with Real Vision Television.
Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. We've got a lot to talk about this week, Erik, so let's get to it. We saw a lot of sideways chop in the stock markets this week with the S&P trading in a narrow 30-point range, probably in anticipation of this ECB meeting. And today that meeting happened. So why don't you bring us up to speed on equities?
Erik Townsend: Well, this was the big one. This was the big central bank meeting that everybody was looking forward to with great anticipation. And this is the one that we were told was going to make or break markets. If the ECB was accommodative, the market should go straight up. If the ECB was not accommodative, maybe not. What happened? The ECB was not only accommodative, they went far beyond the call of duty in being over-accommodated. And stock prices instantly went straight up where they stayed for all of about an hour. And then immediately began to correct sharply to the downside. So what this says to me is the market was waiting for this, maybe hoping for some kind of miracle to happen. You actually got a little bit of a miracle out of the ECB this morning. It was a pretty accommodative announcement in terms of what they're going to do. Yet we still can't get through the 200-day moving average on equities, and it looks like we're going to continue what I think is a bear market from here.
So I think that this has been a short squeeze and a bear market rally. I think it's over. Admittedly, I said that a couple of weeks ago at the 50-day moving average. Then I said it last week at the 100-day moving average. And here we are this week at the 200-day moving average. I do think that it's finally ending, though. And I'd say the caveat is if something unexpectedly happens and oil prices continue to move higher, that could pull equities higher as well. But I don't think that's going to happen.
Nathan Egger: All right. Well, let's cover crude oil next. The OPEC spin doctors have been in the driver's seat for the last few weeks. And last week you warned that If they could manage to jawbone the WTI market above $36, we could see that ignite some upside momentum, induce a short squeeze, and become self-reinforcing purely on the technical factors. And that appears to be exactly what happened. Good call, Erik. I'm sure you're very excited about this.
Erik Townsend: Well, I got stopped out of my short position in the process, so I don't know how excited I am, but it was pretty easy to read the handwriting on the wall here. What's going on is the market has become obsessed obsessed with this idea that a production freeze is a near certainty. Now, on the very first day that this production freeze discussion came up, it was debunked by all the bona fide experts who said this has no meaning. It's like saying we're going to freeze the Earth's oxygen content at no more than 21% of the atmosphere. Well, okay, it would be impossible with any known technology to change that number, so to say we're going to freeze it is a little bit It's silly, but that's what's going on here. It is ruling the market. My theory here is that in the old days, it used to be that oil was traded by oil traders.
These days, with the ETFs, retail investors and small hedge funds are all over trading oil, and there's a lot of people who don't know as much about it who are actively trading this market. A lot of people are assuming that production freeze somehow has some meaningfulness to supply and demand, which it doesn't.
So my fundamental view is as bearish as ever, no change there. I also want to emphasize, you know, my track record here. Last year, I was early twice. I had called both of the 2 major sell-offs in crude oil, but I was, at least in the second one, a couple months early. So maybe I'm a couple months early again. We could see this hope-driven rally, which is what I think it is, continue. I don't think that's going to happen now. And the reason I say that is if I look at the technicals, I think that the stock market is done. It's rolling over. I think that we've pretty much tested as much as we can in this crazy move.
Nathan Egger: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Unless we get an actual production cut, which would be completely, totally different, then I think probably the market is ready to roll over here. But I've been saying that for a couple of weeks. One possible scenario is we might have to wait for March 20th, which is the date that's been thrown around for this production freeze meeting. This morning I saw a headline that that date's off again. So maybe it'll be next week, the headline will be that that date is on. I don't know. We're going to have to wait until the market eventually figures out that production freeze doesn't mean anything and the market is still being oversupplied.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: All right.
Nathan Egger: I want to stay on crude oil because 2 weeks ago, you and Art Berman agreed emphatically on a very bearish outlook for oil prices. You still maintain that view. But oil prices went straight up for the 2 weeks since that show. So, at first glance, it looks like you guys got the call wrong. So, with all due respect, Erik, what would you say to that?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the question that you really have to ask yourself is, what would it take to prove that Art and I got the call right? That we were right in our fundamental view? And my contention is the answer is the last 2 weeks' DOE inventory reports. Art and I predicted that inventory would build and storage would be consumed. Not only did both of those things happen, but the March 2nd inventory build of 10.5 million barrels was just epic in proportion. This week's 3.9 million barrel build wasn't quite as huge, but it's still a very large build in inventory. Cushing was up 1.2 million barrels last week, another 693,000 300,000 barrels this week. So almost 1 million barrels a week on average that we're adding to Cushing inventory. We don't have 100 million barrels to spare. We only have 7 or 8 million barrels of spare capacity left in Cushing, and we're using it up at 1 million barrels a week.
So the bottom line here is that what Art and I actually predicted is already coming true. And we are being proven right in our call that oversupply would swamp available storage capacity. We're not wrong about that. What we also observed is that this cannot continue much longer because a storage crisis is on the horizon. So far, the market is ignoring that risk. But unless the supply is reduced dramatically, then inventory builds are going to continue and storage will eventually be depleted. That's an immutable fact, not an opinion. But oil prices are going up anyway.
So how is that possible? And I think the answer is very simple. Those of you who actually trade these markets actively know as well as as I do. Sometimes the market runs on fundamental data. Sometimes the market runs on human emotion. This is one of those times when it's running on human emotion. A whole bunch of people are really excited. Production freeze is imminent. Any day now, this is going to be over. It's been a couple of years. It's really frustrating people. They're ready for it to be over. They're psychologically and emotionally ready for it to be over. And that's all very fine and well, but it's not over. It's not anywhere close to over. We're still oversupplying the market by a couple million barrels a day.
So what is it going to take to resolve this? What are the risks in either direction? The answer is complicated, but primarily it comes down to understanding storage capacity and supply destruction risk. Now, obviously, you talk about supply, you got to talk about demand. Demand is obviously a consideration here, but I don't think it's going to be the driving factor of change in the price trend. I think this is mostly going to be about supply and storage capacity.
Nathan Egger: This is really important to today's market. So, yeah, I want to come back to storage capacity and talk about supply destruction risk. But since you said it's going to be a complicated answer, let's save it until after the Grant Williams interview.
Nathan Egger: And let's talk gold. We saw it make a new cycle high at the end of last week, briefly popping its head above $1,280. But the metal appeared to be unable to sustain that momentum this week. Where do we stand now?
Erik Townsend: Well, we definitely got a huge bounce out of the ECB decision this morning. Before that, though, before the ECB decision came out Thursday morning, we were looking at gold prices trading below $1,240. So, as I look at this, what we've been talking about for the last couple weeks is what I'd really like to see is that $1,260 number exceeded and the market stays there. The definition of a breakout is when the market moves above a key level and stays there. When it pokes its head above a level for a couple of
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: And then goes back down, that doesn't really count. It was looking to me seriously like it just doesn't really count, like we're not really seeing the follow-through. Maybe this market is about to roll over, maybe it's a little bit ahead of itself. Certainly in terms of the breakout from the 200-day moving average, it's been very impressive. Maybe the market's gotten a little bit ahead of itself and needs to pull back, was my thinking.
Now, the picture has changed as a result of ECB. But that was obviously a dramatically more accommodative than expected announcement that we got from the ECB this morning. And what did we get out of it? You know, from $1,240 to $1,272, as I'm looking at the screen right now, that's $32.
That's pretty good. But that's all you can get out of an epically accommodative ECB announcement? I would have expected more, and I would certainly expect a retest of a higher high, higher than we managed to get to last week in gold.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: We didn't manage to do that on an announcement that was profound in terms of how accommodative it was.
Nathan Egger: Okay. And what effect, if any, is all of this having on the bond market?
Erik Townsend: Well, what we're seeing— and of course, it's very unusual to see bonds and stocks trading in the same direction. They both sold off hard after the ECB announcement. Stocks recovering Thursday afternoon while bonds are still subdued. I think, though, in the big picture of things, what we're seeing here is we were pushing to lower and lower yields. We've had this rally for the last several weeks in the stock market. And of course, that's undone that. I'm really curious to see, are we going to get to still lower yields? Are we eventually going to retest that 1.36 yield on the 10-year from 2012? Are we going to see another, another opportunity like that? I think we probably will. Right now, we're going the other direction. Stock market has been going up. Bond market has been going down in price, up in yield. I think those Those two things are both about to reverse.
Oil is going to be the key if something were to happen, geopolitical upset. Based on what we, we look at the technicals now, oil could easily move to $40, $41 from here. But I'm hoping that this is over, that the market is going to wake up to the fundamentals and recognize we're still being oversupplied by 2 million barrels a day.
Nathan Egger: Thank you, Erik. We're going to come back and revisit the markets in more detail, including the European Central Bank announcement that we had today and more later on in today's show. But now This week's feature interview with Grant Williams right after this.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Grant Williams from the Things That Make You Go Hmmm blog and Real Vision Television. Grant, I want to start with a presentation that you gave recently, which you called the duck test. Why don't you explain what's a duck test? Why are you using this metaphor for talking about the economy in terms of what we're looking at in the macro picture right now?
Grant Williams: Hey, Erik. Thanks for having me on. Yeah, look, the duck test, I mean, look, it's an old test that many people do. And it's quite a simple one. It goes along the lines of if it walks like a duck, and it swims like a duck, and it quacks like a duck, it's probably a duck. And to me, it was really just an attempt to take a step back and amidst all the noise, and the differing opinions that we get, around the state of the economy at the moment, whether it be on a domestic level or a global level, just take a look at some of the top-line facts and strip out the noise and see what we get when we look at it.
And the point I was making was that we are heading for a recession in the US, and you're going to see an awful lot of people arguing both sides of that. And the economists will tell you that according to their forecasts, it's not going to happen. And one of the charts in the Duck Test, which was perhaps my favorite was from the St. Louis Fed website when they went through and they showed the probabilities of recession as measured by the St. Louis Fed going all the way back to 1970. And what fascinated me was that at no point in the last 45 years has that indicator hit 100%. So, even in the depths of 2008, there was only a 99% chance that we were going to hit a recession. So, clearly, there's something amiss here. And when you look at the various manufacturing numbers, you look at You look at what the equity markets are doing, you look at global trade, there are all kinds of high-level data points that suggest that this thing is looking, walking, and quacking like a duck.
So, rather than wait for it to be confirmed, which is always backward-looking, and rather than rely on the opinions of economists, my point was simply just take a look at the big data and see what your gut tells you. And to me, it's screaming recession.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the presentation that you gave is extremely compelling. And, you know, the very first chart that you put up, I thought was fascinating just in terms of total US GDP versus total credit instruments.
Grant Williams: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And even finance professionals, people who do this stuff for a living, if you talk to 80% of them, what they'll tell you is, oh yeah, we had a big credit crisis back in 2008, too much credit in the system, and we've been deleveraging ever since. And it blows my mind. People really believe this. What's the reality of the situation?
Grant Williams: Well, it's funny that you picked that chart, because to me, I've called that chart in previous presentations the one chart to rule them all. I think that is the key chart that people need to look at to understand the big picture of what's been going on and what's happening here. And the chart— I don't know if we'll be able to put it up in the podcast, but just to walk people through it if they can't, it just shows the 2 lines of total credit instruments and US GDP. It goes all the way back to 1950. So, we've got a really good sample size.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Grant Williams: If you look at the chart, both lines grow in lockstep until 1971, which is when obviously Nixon closed the gold window, when they start diverging and the credit line starts to climb at a much steeper rate than GDP growth. And then you get to 1980, where we had peak interest rates. And from that point on, we've been in a declining interest rate environment. And the trajectory picks up. And so, what you see are these 2 charts. Just separating from one another to the point where you've got $60— $55, I think $55 trillion in credit instruments against the $15,000, $20,000, $15,000, $17,000 US GDP, which is obviously completely out of whack and just shows the level and the degree to which that expansion has been built on credit.
And at the very top of the credit instrument charts, you'll see this tiny little dip, which really, in the scheme of things, is nothing. And which is what 2008 looked like on this chart. And it just brings home the degree of pain felt in 2008 versus the total lack of any real deleveraging that we saw there. And obviously, since then, the chart has picked up the pace again and screamed higher because it has to. That credit has to keep expanding, or we're going to see some very, very bad things happen.
So I think everybody should familiarize themselves with that chart, if only to really get that slap-in-the-face moment where you realize that this entire edifice has been built on credit.
Erik Townsend: I want to encourage our listeners to open the presentation, which they can get from the website at MacroVoices.com. Next to Grant's picture and the description of this interview, you'll see a link there for download supplemental information from Grant Williams. And that includes this presentation. It's just shocking to me, you know, if you were to look at how adults would look at the situation in 2008,
Grant Williams: Right.
Erik Townsend: We had this really, really big lesson, which was there was way too much credit in the system. There was way too much debt outstanding, and a lot of it was low quality. And if there was a lesson to learn, it was it's time to curb our appetite for debt, stop living beyond our means on borrowed money, and get our finances in order. And if you look at this chart, it literally is— it looks like noise. The 2008 deleveraging for however long it lasted, was a tiny little wiggle in what is really just a straight-up expansion of credit.
And it's nonstop.
I want to move into where does this take us, Grant? Because it seems that all what you and I might think of as common sense, looking at this problem, realizing that we have an out-of-control debt situation, that the entire Western financial world is potentially at risk long-term if we don't do something about it. It seems like other than a few crazy guys like you and me, nobody really takes this seriously. It looks to me like what's going to happen is we're going to continue to grow credit and expand credit, borrowing and spending and borrowing and spending until something breaks. So, what do you think is going to break first? What's it going to look like?
Grant Williams: Well, you're absolutely right. That's what we have to do because human beings have a big problem and a blind spot. In looking at really big issues. Demographics is a perfect example. People can see demographic change coming from decades out. We can project decades into the future demographic trends. And people can see them coming. They know they're inevitable. But they're just too big to deal with. It's too big to think about what are the implications for my portfolio of the Japanese population starting to shrink in 25 years' time, which is a problem that we faced in 1989. We all knew it was going to happen. But how do you do anything about that? So, you tend to ignore it. And that's what happens. And the ramifications of this situation correcting are way bigger than that, because it's going to require events of a magnitude far more severe than we saw in 2008.
The problem many people have is that they think 2008 was the event, and that it cleared the brush, and we're back to a sustainable path. Nothing could be further from the truth. But it's such a big concept. That people struggle to get their heads around it. And they assume, based on 40-odd years of bull markets and credit expansion, that they won't have to worry about it anyway. When it happens, and it will happen, you can go back as far as you like in history, and you see these cycles roll over.
When it happens, it's going to be very, very bad indeed.
What triggers it? The problem to me is that the thing that's now the glue that binds all this together still unfortunately for everybody, is faith in the ability of central bankers to keep this thing together, because they have done that. And the politicians have promised us things are getting better, and the central banks have thrown everything in their arsenal and more at it. And it's that confidence that is essential for this recovery, such as it is, to continue.
And I think when you look at it, and you look at the chances of these guys being able to fix this, they're very slim indeed. And if people start to believe that they can't fix this, then they have to act accordingly. And that means facing some hard realities. And it means divesting yourself of an awful lot of assets, at which point, it's out of the central bank's hands anyway. So, to have something as ephemeral as confidence in a group of academics holding the world financial system up is a terrifying prospect to me, because we don't know when it will evaporate or what might trigger it. But it could be tomorrow. It could be in 3 years. It's impossible to figure out what it will be. I think we're starting to see it.
I think if you look closely at things like the reaction in Japan when Kuroda, the Bank of Japan governor, after 2 weeks after saying that he wasn't even considering negative rates, moved to negative rates, you saw the immediate action of the market was to fall very, very hard, very, very fast, and the currency to go in the absolute wrong direction for the BOJ. And it turned around intraday, and it bounced and went up again. But it's those knee-jerk reactions, those instant moves without any commentary, without any spin from governors. When you look at where those want to go, which is lower, it gives you the direction that the market naturally wants to take. And I think people should be very, very aware of that.
Erik Townsend: Grant, this brings up a really interesting question in my mind, because the way I look at this is I think if you wanted to solve our problems, our economic problems back in the '90s, when, say, Ross Perot first started complaining about the national debt, it was doable then. But in democracy, I think you would impose too much pain if you were to try to really fix it now, not paper over our problems by printing more money, but really address the problem systemically of too much debt and too much reliance on deficit spending and so forth and all these bad habits of government. You would inflict so much pain that Any politician attempting that would get booted out of office. So I think we've reached a point of no return where in democracy, you can't fix the problems. All you can do is extend and pretend and keep hoping that we can stave off these problems a little bit longer.
But basically, we're waiting for things to blow up, and there's no other choice. Do you see it that way? Am I crazy to think that?
Grant Williams: No, I think it's incredibly unfortunate. But I think that's exactly where we are. I think you're right that the problem with Western democracies is they've all as they've developed and matured, they've all promised way too much to their citizenry, which they have to deliver. And there's just no way they can do it. And so, at this point, as you said, going back to that very first chart we talked about, that little blip, we saw what that looked like from the ground up in 2008.
And in order to bring those 2 lines and converge them again, the lines of credit and GDP, the pain is unimaginable. And so, of course, no elected body is ever going to willingly Is it going to willingly inflict that inflict that pain upon people? So yeah, look, I think their hands are tied. They have to keep doing this. They can try to make adjustments at the margin, but we all know that if you want to get elected, you need to promise people stuff. So you know, unfortunately, this is going to come to a natural end rather than an imposed end by an elected body. And and unfortunately, you would then end up running into the laws of nature, and the laws of nature dictate that that this will end.
Very badly, but end it will. In the meantime, you extend and pretend. And I think what people— again, I get back to this point I was making about these big concepts being tough for people to get their heads around and hard to imagine, so they tend to consciously ignore them.
We haven't seen anything like this in living memory. Realistically, there's nobody around now that remembers the Great Depression clearly, which was a similar type of credit purge. And we can extrapolate the last 40 years, which have been a massive credit binge. But because we haven't seen anything of this nature during that time, people assume they don't happen or assume that this time is different and assume that those problems have all been fixed in the past. So, we're never going to see that event again.
But we will. And my worry is that we're going to see it sooner rather than later. And as you said, there's really nothing that can stop it now.
Erik Townsend: Well, and what concerns me the most, I talked to Jim Rogers about this in the first show that we did. If I look at history, Grant, what it tells me is that when governments screw up as bad as they have here, inevitably what they end up doing next is starting a war, because that shields the elected officials from responsibility. When you have a war, you almost always get complete blind patriotic faith in the government by the people, and people stop questioning their leaders. When I said that to Jim Rogers, he was careful to say, well, you know, you have to be careful.
You can't
Grant Williams: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Now, you can't say conclusively that the government does it on purpose. It may be that the circumstances just forced it upon them. But the reality of the situation is, every time we've had these circumstances, these kinds of economic circumstances where governments have borrowed and spent beyond their means to the point where there's no plausible recovery, it always, 100% of the time, leads to a major global-scale military conflict.
And what scares the heck out of me, Grant, is we don't know how to do this anymore. The world after the Cold War, you know, we sort of got to the point where we said, okay, nuclear war is such an unimaginably horrible thing, we can't let it come to that, so we just won't go there. Well, I'm really getting worried that if you look at the escalation of tension between Obama and the Russians and so forth, you know, we're not talking about Iraq and Afghanistan anymore. We're talking about very well-armed—
Grant Williams: Right.
Erik Townsend: industrialized nations that are getting very upset with us. And I'm really concerned that this economic situation is going to lead us into a major global war conflict. Am I crazy to think that? What do you think?
Grant Williams: Well, you know, again, this is— war is another one of those, of those big concepts that it's, that it's hard, you know, it's unimaginable in, in the literal sense of the word. And people just can't get their heads around the idea that they figure that's all done. But you're right. History is very, very clear, and it's a great teacher. And if you study it, you'll see that at these points in time, there is always a conflict somewhere between 2 global powers. And we're seeing the embers of that, I think, and we've seen them over the last few years.
What's interesting is I gave a presentation about this time last year called The Consequences of the Economic Peace, where I was talking about the path of the world since this peace that was broken after World War II and the Bretton Woods Agreement. And I was talking about big cycles, Kondratiev waves, natural cycles, and the war cycle. And as you said, it's a subject that when you talk about it, people instantly assume that you're crazy. And my belief is that these are all potential outcomes. As we've seen, they are potential outcomes regularly throughout history. So, you have to at least do the thinking about them and how they might come about and what you would do if they did.
And I gave this presentation first in December of 2014. And the room— I could feel the people in the room saying, what the hell is this guy talking about? There's not going to be a war. And the first question I got at the end of the presentation— and it was really based around the parallels between 1914 and the lead-up to World War I and the current state of the world, which if you look at those parallels, are absolutely uncannily similar.
And the first question I got was a guy put his hand up and said, so, are you saying there's going to be a war? And I said to him, no. I said, that's not what I'm saying at all. But what I'm very definitely saying is that there's not not going to be a war. And I wasn't trying to be cute. I think it's an important distinction to make. I'm saying that you cannot rule out the possibility of a war. And in fact, as always, there is a probability that we're going to have a war. And sometimes the probability may be fractions of a percent. But I think it's more than that right now. And it's something people need to be very much aware of.
And the more the economic pressure ratchets up on these governments, as you quite rightly pointed out, Erik, the more there is a need for a solution. And wars are, unfortunately, a very convenient solution to a lot of the economic problems that governments face. So, yes, I don't think it's It's a 70% chance we're going to have a war. I don't think that at all. But I think as the pressure increases, that level of probability increases significantly. And the possibility for a miscalculation ratchets up every single day. So, I think these outcomes are very much within the parameters of acceptable tail risk. And people need to at least do the thinking about what they might entail.
Erik Townsend: I know that we're up against a little bit of a time limit with your schedule today, so I want to keep moving. But I've got to tell you, we're up against a conundrum now, Grant, because the tradition is to give the guest an opportunity to plug whatever they want to promote at the end of the interview. But I'm so excited about Real Vision Television that I want to tell them about it, even though it's your business.
Can I tell them, Grant? Please, pretty please, can I tell them?
Grant Williams: I would be far more comfortable if you told them anyway. Thanks, Erik.
Erik Townsend: Well, I really— and I think it's an interesting story. It's not just a matter of promotional consideration for what you guys are doing. You guys, you and Raoul Pal, are very accomplished in the industry. You have very, very complete networks of people, fat Rolodexes. There are a lot of things that you guys could do.
But instead of launching a hedge fund or doing something, any one of a number of things that would have been more financially lucrative for you, You and Raoul Pal launched Real Vision Television. So why don't you— I'm going to tell our listeners, first of all, it is the only thing in the world of financial reporting that I consider to be what we aspire to become. What we're doing at MacroVoices, what Nathan and I are doing, we're extremely proud of. I think that we're doing a lot better of a job, at least for the audience that we're targeting, which is sophisticated, high net worth, professional finance, more sophisticated investors.
We're doing a better job than everybody except you guys.
And Real Vision Television is who we want to aspire to be. You are doing amazing work. But I want to hit this from the human interest angle. What would cause 2 guys who have much more lucrative opportunities ahead of them to focus so much energy on creating Real Vision Television? What's it about for you guys?
Grant Williams: Well, look, I mean, that's incredibly kind of you to say so, Erik. And you guys are doing a great job here at MacroVoices. Look, Raoul and I, this all started over a dinner we had a couple of years ago, 3 years ago now, I think. And we were just talking about the fact that so many people— I mean, the general narrative around 2008 was nobody saw it coming. And it came out of the clear blue sky. And people were unprepared. And that's why it was so bad.
And Raoul and I said this thing. This is nonsense. So many people saw it coming. The stories of The Big Short and the stories of guys like Kyle Bass, fantastically smart investor and a great guy, making a lot of money out of being on the right side of that trade.
You don't need much more evidence than that. Of course, there were people that saw this coming, but the coverage in the mainstream media leading up to it was just very poor, and it served the public very poorly. People on the street were not prepared for it. And even within the industry, there's such a bias towards the bullish. There's such a bias towards a positive story and things going up because it makes everybody's business better. It makes everybody— it's easy to sell stocks to people. This is a business that's there to make money. It's the absolute ground zero of capitalism.
And so, people tuned out the bad stuff and focused on the good stuff, and that hurt the public. And so Raoul and I, as you said, we've put our time in.
We've both got— well, I've got the gray hair to prove it. Raoul doesn't. I don't know what the hell he does, but he doesn't have any gray hair. But we've been around a long time, and we do have decent networks of people. We've worked all around the world. And we know that hidden away in all the corners of finance, everywhere you look, there are brilliant minds doing fantastic jobs and really understanding what's going on. But they're never going to be put in front of the public.
They either don't want to be on TV, they don't want to go on to CNBC or Bloomberg, or CNBC and Bloomberg won't make the extra 3 or 4 calls it takes to find these people. We just thought, well, why don't we try and give the public access to a much broader array of financial minds who have nothing to gain from telling a bullish story, just want to talk about what they do in the world and how they see it.
And let people make up their minds. We don't want to sell advertising. We don't want to— it's not an exercise in dollar revenue maximization. This is an exercise in trying to bring some truth back to finance and give the public, and obviously amongst public, sophisticated investors, access to the pure thoughts of these guys, just the way you're doing. Let's sit down and have a conversation. There's no angle here. I'm not bringing you on for you to sell a product or raise money.
People listen to you, think you're a really smart guy and want to find out more, that's fantastic. But the idea of this is not to sell anything, is not to try and generate revenue for the people that come on, but just to spark an honest discourse about what's happening and just try and open people's eyes.
And so far, the response, I've got to say, has been incredible, both from the standpoint of the people we've asked to be involved and we've asked to interview, who've been incredibly gracious with their time and their thoughts, and the public who have embraced this project with something bordering on evangelical fervor. I think it's great to get this dialogue, this really open, honest dialogue going amongst engaged people to try and help everybody understand what's going on, and perhaps more importantly, what they can can do about it to position themselves for the next few years. So that's what we've tried to do. And we've been delighted with the response. And we've seen acceptance of the idea that we put together really start to pick up in the last few months as the visibility has increased. And 2016 looks like it's going to be a very, very exciting year for us.
So we're delighted.
Erik Townsend: I think that it's going to be an incredible year for you. And I guess we should probably take a step back here and just explain to our listeners, if there's anybody out there who hasn't heard about Real Vision Television yet, what it is, is essentially the antithesis of Bloomberg and CNBC. It is long-form, thoughtful interviews without interrupting the guest, very similar to what we do here on MacroVoices. But it is video and you get to see the person, you get to see a live interview. And what's your average interview, 45 minutes or so? It's definitely not the 3-minute soundbite.
Grant Williams: No, it's not. We did— we deliberately didn't want to do 3-minute soundbites. We We wanted to give people the time to talk and really explore their thinking and explain their views clearly. So, I mean, look, they range. We have some on there that are 5 minutes long. And we've done several interviews that in total ran to a couple of hours, but we spread those over a couple of weeks. So, the longest you'll find on there is about an hour, and the shortest you'll find is about 5 minutes. But they all average around, I guess, about 20 to 30 minutes.
Erik Townsend: But as you say, what I find fascinating about it is It is not marketing glitz and razzle-dazzle the way the cable networks do. You've got an unbiased, level-headed, bullish and bearish, both cases being told evenly. I'm just so impressed with everything that I've seen there. Myself, I have a fully paid subscription to Real Vision. I was able to negotiate with your partner Raoul to get our listeners an opportunity. So listeners, if you would like a a free subscription to Real Vision Television, go to realvisiontv.com/discounts/macrovoices, and you will find there an opportunity to sign up for a free trial. And I cannot recommend it highly enough. It is a subscription service. You have to pay for it, which certainly makes sense. You can't produce video for free.
And I think it's very attractively It's what, $400 a year?
Grant Williams: Yeah, $365, I think now, just $1 a day. So, we think it's great value. And we would urge people to give it a try. And as I say, if it's not for them, that's fine. We'll refund people's money, and we can all move on. But I think you'll find that if you are interested, and certainly, I know your listeners are very engaged, insightful people, I think they'll find an awful lot of really smart guys there that they can learn a lot
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I definitely would say that for anyone who finds an appeal to this podcast, you like our format, you're going to love Real Vision. Whether or not it's worth it to you to pay for a subscription, you need to make that decision yourself. But you're crazy not to take advantage of the free trial. It really is an awesome service. We're going to start there. And the other thing that we're going to do is we're going to get some of your classic interviews from a couple of years ago, and we're going to start playing them as a Sunday matinee. So in our MacroVoices iTunes feed, And at MacroVoices.com. Starting this weekend on Sundays, you'll find an additional program, not from us at MacroVoices. It'll be a rebroadcast of something from Real Vision Television. And we're going to run that for a month and see how it goes, see if that additional content is of interest to our listeners.
And if so, we'll continue it.
Erik Townsend: Anything else at all, Grant, that you'd like to add? I know that you're on a very tight schedule today. We'd love to have you back on the program when you have more time to talk. Anything else you want to add to wrap it
Grant Williams: Erik, I'd be delighted to come back on anytime. But I just think the stuff you're talking about here, they're all extremely big concepts. And I think people really need to understand right now that it's a time to sit down and think about potential outcomes that you really don't want to think about. Let's face it, we don't want to think about deflation. We don't want to think about another credit crisis. We don't want to think about war.
But these are all possible outcomes right now. They're all in the mix, and you need to assign your own probability to them and understand, okay, what do I need to do to prepare for this?
I think if you do that, just going through the exercise will help you really get your head around a much broader range of outcomes. Listen to MacroVoices, watch Real Vision. The thing these 2 services have in common are just very smart people talking honestly, and you can't help but help shape your own investment strategies by listening to people who have been successful and are willing to give up their time and explain to you the lessons they've learned and the mistakes they've made, and what they think is going to happen. I just think you cannot have enough knowledge right now to inform your own decisions. Be curious.
Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more. It's something I've said before, and I really think that these are challenging times, if you are a little bit smart about macroeconomics, you put 2 and 2 together and you say, boy, I can use this knowledge of macroeconomics that I have and I can make a bet in the market and I can make a few bucks on a trade.
If you are really smart and know a lot about macroeconomics, I think you look at the picture now and you say, wow, this is bigger than making money and losing money. We're coming into a period in our lives which is going to be pivotal in history. Where our governments have screwed up pretty darn badly. And it's going to be a macroeconomic story that's probably going to be punctuated by horrible things, wars and so forth. And I just look at Real Vision and what we're trying to do here is helping people to understand the big picture of the world. And yeah, of course, there's application of that for those of us that make our living in finance, running money for a living. But I think it's more interesting just from the human interest aspect of where we are in history.
We're coming into an incredibly important time. And understanding the macroeconomic backdrop is going to be the most important thing, I think, in understanding the political, you know, the geopolitical near-term future of the world. It's scary, scary stuff.
Grant Williams: That's where we are. That's where we are, I'm afraid, whether people like it or not. There are a lot of scary outcomes. But, you know, I don't think you and I are having this conversation to try and scare people, just to try and make them aware of potential outcomes. I mean, the world carries on, the world gets through these periods, and we will get through this period. I don't think it's going to be without significant pain. So, it's really just a question of everybody trying to plot their own course through this as best they can. And services like yours, and hopefully what we're doing with Real Vision, I genuinely believe are ways for people to try and improve their possibilities of navigating these times successfully.
Erik Townsend: Well, Grant, I cannot thank you enough for joining us. Please feel free to come back anytime. We look forward to a continuing Partnership between MacroVoices and Real Vision, and Nathan Egger will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right after this.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your host. Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.
Nathan Egger: Before we go any further, Erik, let's clarify that free trial subscription offer from Real Vision. What exactly is on offer, and where can our listeners sign up?
Erik Townsend: My apologies, folks. I think at one point that I said a free subscription to Real Vision was on offer. Obviously, that's not what I meant. What I meant to say was Real Vision is offering MacroVoices subscribers a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television. I also misread the URL for where to sign up, so let's just do this a simpler way. Just go to MacroVoices.com, and on the homepage, in the description to the left of Grant Williams' picture, you'll find a link where you can sign up for a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television.
Now, if you're a real glutton for punishment and you prefer the direct URL, it's https://www.realvisiontv.com/realvision. And again, the easy way is just go to MacroVoices.com, look for Grant Williams' picture, just to the left of that, you will find a link where you can get a free trial subscription to Real Vision Television.
Nathan Egger: So, Erik explained to you the Real Vision Television offer, but we've got some more stuff for you. There were 2 presentations mentioned by Grant in that interview. The first is the Duck Test presentation, and we've got a download link for you on the MacroVoices homepage. There, you will also find a link to the second of Grant's presentations that he referred to. And I highly recommend checking out this piece in its entirety. It is called The Consequences of Economic Peace.
And while that presentation was originally delivered late 2014, its subject matter is truly timeless. And while the subject matter, which is to say war, is a little uncomfortable, it would serve us all to know our history a little better. And Grant does a fantastic job of putting history into perspective and parsing out relevant information so that we can make better decisions in the present and prepare ourselves better for the future.
I'm a huge Real Vision fan, as I know you are, Erik, but let's take a minute to share with the listeners why we're partnering with Real Vision to get our listeners both a new weekly audio interview from their rerun library and a free trial subscription to the full-service video product.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, Nathan, as I hear you talking, it almost sounds like we're in commercial mode, like we're trying to sell something for these guys. And I suppose in a way we are. I'd like to help them out because I really believe in what Grant and Raoul are doing at Real Vision. But we're not making anything out of this. We're not being commissioned. We're not trying to make money for these guys.
The thing is that these 2 people just resonate so closely with what Nathan and I are trying to do here at MacroVoices.
We want to focus not on yet another retail podcast that explains the difference between stocks and a bond to some brand new retail investor. We're trying to focus on professional finance, net worth, serious, sophisticated investors. And that's exactly the market that Grant and Raoul are focusing on with Real Vision Television.
The thing is, I just have so much disdain for the mainstream financial press and what Grant and Raoul are doing. And they're the only people out there, as I said in the interview, who are doing an even better job of it than I think you and I are doing, Nathan, is we're really trying to bring substantive content.
These guys are passionate about the content and they're bringing you a full whole hour interview with somebody like Kyle Bass talking about details of sizing positions in a macro strategy. Absolutely fascinating stuff. And if you look at this market, you know, CNBC and Bloomberg have already saturated the biggest segment of the market, and that is people who work in finance who don't have a need to actually know anything but need sound bites that they can repeat. They want something that somebody smarter than them said so that they can say it again in a meeting and sound like they know what talking about. CNBC and Bloomberg perfectly fill that need. If you want to actually have deep, meaningful, thorough conversation about macroeconomics and how the course of the world history is likely to change because of current events in financial markets, Bloomberg and CNBC, they completely ignore that. That level of content doesn't exist. Grant and Raoul are doing that and they're doing a fantastic job and my hat is off to them.
And I told
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And I told them when we invited Grant on the interview, I just said, anything we can do for you guys, I'm happy to do it. We're not trying to make a buck. I just believe in the work that you're doing.
And the other thing I would say is these guys are the adults in the room. It is so refreshing to deal with people that don't think this financial podcasting thing as competitive. You know, I talked to Grant and Raoul and they're always happy to collaborate on ideas of what we're doing on MacroVoices, what they're doing there, because we're all passionate about the content. We want to deliver really great content. The world of financial podcasting, listeners, you wouldn't believe some of the nonsense that goes on. A couple years ago, we actually had one financial podcast host threatening his guests, saying, if you go on that other guy's financial podcast, my arch rival, I'll never invite you back on my show again. You know, this is just utterly childish nonsense. And Grant and Raoul are doing financial reporting for grownups, and that's what we're trying to do here. And my hat's off to them. I just think it's awesome stuff.
So basically, the reason that we're promoting them is because we believe in what they're doing, and I hope it brings them some revenue.
They obviously can't do this for free the way we can. They're producing full television with— you need studio equipment and lighting and all that stuff. They can't possibly do it for free. I think it's a very cost-effective product. I didn't get a comp subscription. I didn't ask for one.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: I was happy to pay for a full-price subscription, and I think it's a fantastic product.
So basically, I just love these guys, and we're trying to help them because we really believe in what they're doing.
Nathan Egger: All right.
Nathan Egger: Well, when we discussed oil in the first segment of today's show, you said there was more to understanding the fundamental picture, particularly relative to supply destruction risk and to storage capacity. I know we've spent way more time on oil in the last few weeks than normal, but frankly, I think the equity market and Just about everything else probably hinges on whether oil can really stage a recovery from here, as many are hoping for, or not. So it's super important to understand this. So let's go a little deeper, Erik, first on storage capacity.
Erik Townsend: Well, Nathan, storage is kind of a moving target, because in the United States, the tank farms are pretty well inventoried. We know how much oil is in those tanks. You get to non-US tank farms, and the governments in other countries are not as complete in their record-keeping So we don't really know how much available storage capacity exists in tank farms outside the United States. The ones that are in the United States are inventoried, but even that data can be a little bit misleading because when you know there's a certain percentage of capacity has been consumed, okay, but you don't know what the effective capacity is. In other words, if you always have to have a couple of empty tanks to To pump things into after you mix them from 2 other tanks. Well, that's an extra tank you have to keep sort of set aside. We don't know how big that set aside is. Is the last 10% of the theoretical capacity of Cushing all available to store oil, or was it something where it falls over and breaks when we get to 95%?
We don't know for sure. The other thing we don't know for sure is when you run out of those tanks that are reliably inventoried in the tank farm.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: The next choice is floating storage. That's chartering a crude oil carrier ship in order to use it as a floating gas tank. How many ships are available for charter? That number is not reflected in any total capacity figure. So, how much left is a relative concept. You can measure how much capacity is left in terms of empty space in US tank farms. But anything other than a US tank farm, whether it's tanks outside the US or floating storage or anything else, You don't really know how much is there.
Depending on who you listen to, there are a lot of estimates. They're kind of rough estimates. Right now, what we do know for sure is that Cushing, Oklahoma is more than 90% full. This is a really big deal because Cushing, I contend, is what really counts. Cushing is the settlement point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract.
What that means is— it's really important for people to understand the mechanism.
Nathan Egger: Right. Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: Of how the market works here. What happens when a futures contract is about to expire and there's not enough buyers? Well, the price goes down. What stops the price from just falling out completely to where it goes to zero? The answer is normally there's always a buyer of last resort, and that buyer of last resort is the storage arbitrageur, the guy who says, wait a minute, this month's futures contract is expiring
Nathan Egger: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: $2 lower than next month's futures contract. I can buy the oil now, store it for a month, and sell it into next month's contract, and I'll pocket that $2 as guaranteed profit. It's that guy, that storage arbitrageur, being able to step in. He's providing that buyer of last resort that stops the market price from crashing completely. If there's no storage, there's no buyer of last resort, and all of a sudden, And then the price can go completely to zero.
So, it is an inherently fuzzy number, especially when you consider floating storage.
But as far as on-land storage is concerned, I think that we have at most 2 to 4 months before it tops out. I think probably less than that. If you look at the last 2 inventory builds in Cushing alone, it's been running about 900,000 barrels per week on average for the last 2 weeks. If you kept up that rate, which I don't expect we will,
Nathan Egger: Mm-hmm.
Erik Townsend: You'd have less than 10 weeks of storage left before we run out completely in Cushing. Of course, there's other factors. Some of the oil that's in Cushing will be moved out of Cushing, pipelined down to Houston, where there might be more capacity available. There's a lot of moving parts. It's very hard to tell. But in general, I think we've got a couple of months at most before this thing really blows up.
Now, if something happened in the meantime, if there was an OPEC production cut, if the If the oversupply were somehow eliminated by some other means, then that would change everything. But failing that happening, I think within the next couple months, we're going to be up against a storage crisis.
Nathan Egger: So that's storage capacity, Erik. What about potential risk to the supply?
Erik Townsend: Well, if we reach the point of a storage crisis, oil prices will crash until production is abruptly cut off. And that would probably mean prices in the teens. So, it's all about understanding what could happen to reduce supply before we get to that point. In other words, if we have the market oversupplied by 2 million barrels a day, as it is now, we're going to have a real problem, Houston, unless something happens. So, what are the things that could happen that would change the whole picture? And if those things don't happen, we got a real problem.
Well, the first thing— there's really 4 big risks that come to mind in terms of upside risk to oil prices. If OPEC and Russia and other large producers were to actually make a deal on a production cut, that would totally, completely change everything. Price could go anywhere from there. I want to emphasize again, that's OPEC and Russia agreeing on a production cut. Production freeze is meaningless. A production cut of 5%, both OPEC and Russia cutting 5%, would completely eliminate the oversupply. That's what we need to see happen here. I don't think it's in the cards anytime soon. I think that OPEC will hold out for several more months.
I think that OPEC— I say that, I really mean to say Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates, which are the 3 countries that are acting together and really in charge of OPEC. I think that if those 3 countries hold out for several more months because they want to see the washout in US shale, they want to see the junk bonds collapse in the US so that there will never in the future be a source of funding for more shale wells in the US.
Their incentive is to not cut production. If I'm wrong about that, if they do cut production, everything totally changes because that could eliminate the oversupply before we get to a storage crisis.
The next one, production freeze. I put that on the list just to reemphasize. It is completely, totally meaningless in terms of effect on supply and demand. There's a caveat though, which is it has been a tremendous influencer of price. And these guys in the Middle East, you know, the Russians and the Saudis and the Venezuelans and Nigerians, they've heard of technical analysis. They know that there are key points where the market reaches a certain level, and if it gets some kind of catalyst that'll pull it up to the next level, usually it stays at that next level.
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: These guys have gotten into the catalyst delivery business in the last month or so. Usually just a couple of minutes after the US inventory data comes out at 10:30 on Wednesday mornings, some oil minister from someplace has got some nonsensical rhetoric about how the production freeze is a near certainty, and it causes prices to rally. So these guys can influence price. I don't know how long they can keep it going. I think eventually—
Nathan Egger: They can't.
Erik Townsend: Eventually, the production freeze will be forgotten about when people wise up to the fact that it didn't mean anything. How long does it take? Well, how long does it take for the mainstream media to wake up to the fact that they're not reporting the news very accurately? At the end of the day, the point is that this production freeze thing is affecting emotions. As long as it continues to affect emotions, it will be meaningful, and then at some point it will be forgotten.
Nathan Egger: Geopolitical upset.
Erik Townsend: That's it. What if a new war broke out that takes 2 million barrels a day of oil production offline because somebody's oil field just got blown up with a bomb? That would certainly do it. And you might think, well, yeah, there's really not a whole lot of geopolitical risks other than the ones we already know and understand pretty well in Syria and Iraq and so forth. Well, wait a minute. Look at what's on the cards here. Don't rule out the possibility of one of these countries that's trying to support the price recognizing, okay, Okay. If we take one of our competitors, and remember that with the whole Sunni-Shia backdrop that you have in the Middle East, it's very easy to find a competitor who's also an arch rival, religiously, culturally, everything else. Let's take one of these guys and let's go bomb their stuff, their oil-producing assets, so that our oil will be worth more money.
That's an entirely plausible thing that could happen before this is over.
Finally, the last upside risk, US production decrease. Clearly, it's coming. No doubt. There has been a total collapse in drilling rigs, in the rig count in the United States, drilling new oil wells. And we've already seen that production has begun to decrease. It will continue to decrease, and it will accelerate its pace of decrease. But it's not going to be enough. We're not going to see the degree of supply destruction that we need to rebalance the market.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: just coming out of the US as a result of what's already happened. We need to see a profound reduction in US production in order to balance this market. And that's not going to come just from the fact that we've been drilling less wells. The price is going to have to collapse in order to force that to happen.
Nathan Egger: Well, an excellent point was made by one of our listeners and forum users. The forum user's name is GHF6. And he pointed out the demand side of oil. The discussion with Art got us well-versed in the supply and storage side of the equation, and we just recapped and updated our listeners on that. But we haven't really touched on the demand side. Can you explain why you didn't put more emphasis on the demand side of this picture?
Erik Townsend: Really excellent question. And I'm sorry, I can't repeat the gentleman's username from—
Nathan Egger: there was too many letters and numbers. GHF6.
Erik Townsend: I was just gonna say that. Hi, GHF6, whoever you are. Thank you for the question. It's a fantastic question, and there is a good answer to this. Normally, obviously, supply and demand go hand in hand. You can't talk about one without talking about the other.
In this case, I really believe that this situation in oil is a man-made problem. It is a man-made problem on the supply side. If you wanted to ask a question like, hey, does this How does this slowdown that we're seeing in the economy jibe with the oil price? And could it be that the oil price being so low is causing the economy to slow down? If you wanted to look at a question like that, then certainly you've got to get into demand on oil. But if you're just trying to understand what's happening here with respect to oil price, first you had this— First exogenous condition was central bank liquidity. A wall of money coming out of the Central Reserve. A lot of it went into malinvestment in the shale patch.
Then you've got the next man-made event, which is the Saudi decision not to cut production. I say Saudi position; in theory, it's an OPEC position. As far as I'm concerned, it's really a Saudi decision not to cut production in order to support the price, but instead to try to defend market share.
So these are all things that have had a profound effect on supply, and I'm convinced that they are the factors that are driving the market.
In a normal market, I would want to know about demand if I were concerned about a question like, what does the price of oil mean to the economic outlook for— is there a recession coming? Then you've got to dive into demand. If you're looking at what's happening with the oil price, I think this is all about a supply-side disruption, a disruption in the supply side of the supply-demand curve. And I think that's where the action is, and that's why we've been focusing on it.
Nathan Egger: All right. I'm pretty certain that we've used up this week's time budget for crude oil. If anything else remains unclear, please ask us in the forums, you guys. So moving on, the ECB meeting today, it's a big deal. It's been widely anticipated. And markets didn't move in either direction. Well, they moved in both directions before moving in no direction, really.
What do you make of all this? What have we heard from the ECB today, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, ECB was way more accommodative than anybody expected, and it still didn't move markets higher. And what it says to me is that the markets were kind of waiting for a miracle that was not really possible. And when the impossible didn't come to fruition, the market started to roll over.
I suspect that we're going to still have some hanging on of people thinking, well, we've got a Fed meeting next week. So before the bottom falls out of oil prices and the stock market and we're headed down into the 20s in oil prices and below 1,800 in stock prices, when does all that start? I don't think it probably starts till after the Fed meeting next week. We'll see.
Nathan Egger: So we're looking for a Fed response to the ECB action today or the ECB announcement today. And how is this— how is this going to affect the US dollar rally that we've been seeing for years now?
Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think it's necessarily the Fed reacting to the ECB. It's a question of what's the Fed's policy statement going to be? And particularly, are they going to hike interest rates again? Almost everybody is assuming that an interest rate hike is off the table because it's completely crazy. They got to support the market with all the negative, you know, bad problems in the They can't do that. Well, hang on, look at the stock market. It's all the way back up as we're speaking now, just about 1990, 10 points shy of 2,000. It's not so bad right now. If you are trying to justify your decision and you are the Fed, the Federal Open Market Committee, next week, it's hard to say that we have to be accommodative in order to arrest a stock market crash.
Nathan Egger: Right.
Erik Townsend: The stock market has been rallying enthusiastically for the last 3 weeks. So I think that most likely they do nothing. It is possible— Jim Rickards in particular has been outspoken in saying that he thinks the Fed is going to hike rates again, hike rates next week. So if we just saw the ECB be profoundly accommodative and the Fed responded and was not at all accommodative, and—
Nathan Egger: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: surprise the market by being tighter than anybody expects, that could really be fireworks. I'm a little bit skeptical. I think that Jim Rickards' idea of a hike coming next week is maybe a little bit too pessimistic, but it's possible.
Nathan Egger: So we didn't see a lot of action in the stock market in response to the ECB announcement today. But we have seen, at least since the middle of 2015, a pretty strong correlation between the stock market And the crude oil market, is that something that you expect to continue beyond this ECB meeting and, and further beyond the Fed meeting of next week?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's been uncanny how strong the correlation between the S&P and crude oil has been. And I think it's a matter more of crude oil pulling the S&P down. I think that most likely what will happen is that regime of strong correlation between S&P and crude will resume. That's my expectation. I have to point out, though, that today, in the wake of this morning's ECB announcement, it's the first time in weeks that I've seen, you know, crude and stocks and bonds all moving independently. You know, for a while, we just had stocks moving opposite of bonds and stocks and crude were moving in lockstep. Now they're moving all in their own independent directions today. It'll be very interesting to see if we come back into that strong correlation regime between S&P and crude oil that we've had for the last couple months. I think we will.
Nathan Egger: So if you're bearish on stocks and commodities, crude in particular, and you expect them both to roll over, where do you hide right now if you're, if you're an investor?
Erik Townsend: I think if I'm looking for new things to invest in, the bottom in crude oil is by far my favorite. I think I think that's the opportunity, certainly, of the last several years, if not of a lifetime. I do think it's early to get into the long side of that trade. So I think it's a wait for that. But I would be mostly waiting to make my move in crude oil.
Gold, I have mixed feelings about. And it's funny, I have a really hard time. I've been thinking about gold for the last few weeks because we bring it up on the show every week. I can't put my finger on why I'm just not buying this rally. If I look at the chart, very, very, very strong momentum above key technical levels. This is a classic breakout, has all the signs on the chart of looking like it's going much, much higher. For some reason, I can't put my finger on it, I'm just having a hard time believing in this gold rally. If you feel differently, though, in general, it looks like, at least on the charts, I don't know why I'm And I'm feeling this, this spidey sense is telling me something's wrong with the gold rally. But if I look at the chart, it really does look like a strong breakout. If you're a gold bull, buying precious metals here is certainly an opportunity.
And finally, I think cash is an attractive place to be. You mentioned the US dollar rally. I want to come back to that point. US dollar rally, I expect, will probably continue. It stalled out here at about 100. I wouldn't be surprised I'm surprised, especially if the stock market rout continues, to see the dollar rally continue as well. And so, you know, being in cash and US dollars is really not a bad place to be. I don't think you need to be fully invested in a market that's as crazy as this one.
Nathan Egger: I think we've just about covered everything that we need to this week, Erik. And listeners out there, know that we're working on another fantastic show next week featuring Axel Merk. And as many of you know, Axel is a currencies guy. So, I'm sure he'll have plenty to say in the wake of the ECB and Fed meetings. I'm really looking forward to that.
In the meantime, your subscriptions, your ratings, and your reviews on iTunes have been incredibly helpful and overwhelmingly positive. Thank you very much for all of them. If you haven't done so yet, we could really use your help. You can follow us on Twitter, @MacroVoices.
Erik Townsend: @MacroVoices.
Nathan Egger: And keep in touch with us in the MacroVoices forums, where we're still trying to stimulate conversation and follow up on the topics that we cover each week on the show. With all of your continued help, I think that we'll continue to recruit the best names in the business as future MacroVoices guests. That's going to do it for us this week. Tune in next week right here at MacroVoices.com. Take care.
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