Steve Keen — Professor (as introduced on the show)

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Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 14 was recorded on May 12th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Professor Steve Keen will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. We'll review some of the ideas that were discussed in our last 2 feature interviews. We'll compare and contrast how those views relate to the various different schools of economic thought. And then we'll dive into Professor Keen's prescriptions for what reforms are needed to prevent another catastrophic financial crisis. But wait, there's more! After our feature interview with Steve Keen, we're going to announce some format changes that we have planned, and we even have a special surprise second guest joining us for a short interview. So if you don't already know what #OOTT is, we're going to tell you all about it before the show's over.

S&P 500: the 50-day average and bearish signals

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Welcome back, everybody. Erik, Last week I observed that the chart was looking pretty grim for the S&P 500, but you countered that it wasn't yet time to go short because the S&P was still trading above its 50-day moving average and you thought it looked like, you know, a nice setup for a bounce. And it was looking like you called that one perfectly, at least initially, but what are you seeing now?

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm seeing what I expected. I was not necessarily expecting a bounce to new all-time highs, but there's always going to be at least a little bit of support on a major moving average. I figured that we would get at least a bounce. It would last for however long it lasted, and eventually we would break down below that level. If I'm going to put a short on, I'm going to wait for a daily close below the 50-day moving average. We may still get it today because, as I expected, we had that bounce off the 50-day. It lasted a couple of days, and it looks like maybe by the end of Thursday's trading session we'll be there. Daily close below the 50-day, I will definitely consider putting a short on at that point.

And the reason for that, number one, Bank of America, Merrill Lynch reported this week an all-time record 15-week consecutive series of institutional net selling by their institutional clients. So, in other words, as we evaluate what the big money is doing, they're selling. Now, they're selling into a rally. When does that happen? The final stages of a bull market, when the smart money is selling what they're holding to retail investors. That's number one.

Number 2, Carl Icahn reportedly 150% net short equities. That's number one. And that was reported by ZeroHedge this week. Now, it's interesting. I've been to a pitch meeting for Carl's fund. I've met Carl. He is normally an activist investor. He looks for companies with corrupt management or problems that he can solve by changing their management. And he has a very specific style. He doesn't usually take really large, outsized, directional macro bets. So, Carl Icahn is so concerned about the state of the market that he's 150% net short? Holy cow, that's a big position, especially considering it kind of amounts to style drift based on the charter of his fund. George Soros reportedly levered up now with put options on S&P 500 futures. I do want to be short here, frankly. I've lost a bit of money recently being wrong on the oil trade, so I'm going to wait till I see a little bit of a stronger indication that the sell-off is really on.

The breakdown below the 50-day moving average, which I'm sure is coming, I just don't know how long it's going to take to get there, will probably be the trigger for me.

Oil: Saudi oil minister fired, Fort McMurray, Cushing storage

Nathan Egger: And speaking of oil, we've seen plenty of volatility in crude, but it just looks like the market is having a tough time making up its mind. So, what do you think is moving prices this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, we don't want MacroVoices to turn into crude oil voices. I'm sure it's probably sounded that way, but the news flow has been just so overwhelming in the last few weeks, and it's really been overwhelming this week. So, it'll be another long one. Please bear with us, folks. I'll try to be as short as I can.

Big news out of Saudi Arabia this past weekend. Saudi Arabia fires its oil minister, Ali Al-Naimi, who has been in that position for more than 20 years, replaces him with a new guy, Khalid Al-Falih, which I'm probably mispronouncing. Most observers are reporting on this story in the context of, okay, so who's the new guy? How does his view differ from the old guy? What can we expect? I don't think that's the right way to look at this story.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: The story here is not about the new oil minister. The story is about another guy, Prince Mohammed bin Salman.

He's often referred to, by the way, as just MBS. MBS is the 30-year-old prince. And until now, most people outside the Saudi royal family kind of had the impression that, okay, Al-Naimi is maybe not a prince, he's not royalty, but he's been in that position for a long time. He has the king's ear. The 30-year-old prince, obviously he's royalty. That's very important in that culture. But he's not really in power. It's become really clear MBS just fired this guy because he doesn't like it. So I think the story is mostly about the rise to power within the Saudi royal family of Mohammed bin Salman.

So what we need to ask ourselves is, why did he fire Al-Naimi? Was the reason because he listened to MacroVoices last week and heard me say that Saudi Arabia shouldn't have allowed the price to rise as much as it has? And what MBS wants is to get the price back down in order to Do a more effective job of prosecuting this agenda, which I believe Mr. Al-Naimi was the originator of? Or is this, I'm firing him because this whole plan of his didn't work and we never should have tried to suppress the price. We should reverse our strategy and fire this guy and get somebody else.

All indications so far are it's the former, that they want to continue the strategy, the market share strategy, as it's been called. And I think that that primes the pump potentially for some next moves out of Saudi Arabia to try to jawbone the market lower. But it could be that it's for different reasons. So we really don't know. But if you want to look at this issue, it's about MBS, Mohammed bin Salman. It's not about who the new oil minister is. Let's move on.

Fort McMurray situation, perhaps under control in the sense that they appear to have saved about 90% of the city. For a long time, what people were thinking is, okay, the oil-producing assets are not really at risk. They're 30 kilometers away from the fires. We don't have to worry about that. But if the whole town burns down and there's no place for the oil workers to sleep, then we can't possibly run those assets. Well, there was horrible destruction of a couple of thousand homes in Fort McMurray, and our hearts definitely go out to the listeners that we have that were displaced by that. But in terms of will this shut down oil production, no, it looks like the production outages are already starting to be corrected, and within a couple of weeks they'll be back up to normal production.

Nigeria, however, has lost about 400,000 barrels per day due to militant activity and a attack on a pipeline.

Venezuela, meanwhile, has a whole different problem, which is that the failure of socialism is so bad there that the state-owned oil company can't pay its bills. Foreign contractors are pulling out, and they're losing production capacity. You could see, if there was an actual societal collapse in Venezuela, which a lot of geopolitical observers think is very possible, you could see the entire country taken offline, not because of military conflict, but just because their economic state of affairs is so screwed up that they They can't continue to do the most important thing for them to do, which is to produce and sell oil.

So, that situation is gonna be very interesting to watch. If it falls into an outright societal collapse, civil war, whatever, Venezuela is probably the most oil-rich country in the world. That would be huge.

In general, though, the speculative longs, according to the Commitments of Traders reports, are starting to give up. It looks like maybe we are starting to see a topping process, at least in terms of market internals.

A lot of empty crude oil tankers departed the Houston Ship Channel last weekend. Now, it's hard to tell from that data because we don't know whether or not they were unloaded on Friday or unloaded on Saturday. So does that oil, just a whole lot of oil, hit Houston last weekend? Was it going to come in this week's inventory number or next week's inventory number?

Looks like next week's inventory number because this week's inventory number surprised everybody.

There were expectations initially of about a 1 million barrel build on inventory, an increase on national inventory. Hmm. But then API, the American Petroleum Institute, on Tuesday afternoon reported expectations of a 3.5 million barrel build. That started to send the price down. When the official government data came out, it was actually a 3.5 million barrel drawdown on inventory, a 7 million barrel discrepancy from what expectations had been just before, and that sent the price skyrocketing $3 higher to new cycle highs.

Next week, I can see a lot of good reason for there to be a huge surprise in the DOE inventory report. Drum roll, please. Are you ready for which direction? I have no clue, because we've got this huge flow of oil into Houston that should result in a very large increase in inventory. On the other hand, we're going to see the brunt of the Canada fire-related loss of production in the inventory numbers this week. Which one is going to outweigh the other one? I don't think I don't think anybody knows, and my suggestion is be ready for anything to happen when inventory occurs next week.

The real story, though, I think, is not about national inventory. It's Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. And again, the reason that's important is because it's the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. Look at it this way. The 1.5 million barrel build on inventory, even though it was a national drawdown, we still had a 1.5 million barrel build on Cushing inventory.

Right. We just used up 20% of the remaining spare storage capacity in Cushing, Oklahoma in one week. 5 more weeks of that would go to a complete crisis situation that would put oil prices into the teens, guaranteed. Is that going to happen? Remains to be seen. Certainly, technicians looking at the price say new cycle highs are possible, so I think we probably have not seen the most of this oil rally.

If we had the right confluence of events and the Cushing inventory numbers continued to increase at the rate they did this week, we will have a storage crisis and we will have a price crash. The thing is, Canada may be what bailed us out, because remember that all that oil going into Houston from ships overseas, that doesn't go into Cushing inventory. That goes into PADD 3 inventory. Where does the oil from Canada go? A lot of it goes to Cushing, Oklahoma. So we've got a real problem. The crunch and the place that you have to watch out for that could crash the market Cushing, Oklahoma, and it's not going to be receiving as much oil from Canada now as a result of the fires.

So, that does change my views. As Lord Keynes famously said, when the facts change, I'm forced to change my opinion. I think that there is a huge, huge wildcard with Mohammed bin Salman. If this guy fired Al-Naimi because he thinks Al-Naimi was not aggressive enough, certainly MBS has shown the world already that he is willing to make very bold statements and do unexpected things. If he wants to I think he's going to aggressively try to jawbone the market lower. I think he can do it, and I think he could be very effective. I wouldn't be surprised to see something next from this man. On the other hand, we don't know what his motivations are. Maybe he has decided that this whole strategy was wrong. So far, I'm kind of leaning on the side of watch out for a wild card from him that pushes prices lower, not higher.

Canada is definitely something, though, that could take the pressure off of Cushing, Oklahoma, and that could undo my whole bearish thesis. Just the Canada The Fort McMurray in that area of Canada produces somewhere between 1 and 1.6 million barrels per day of oil. That's enough to totally neutralize the whole situation that Art Berman and I have talked about, if it were to stay offline. It's not going to stay offline. It's going to come back online. But maybe it was offline for long enough to avert the crisis that I've feared, and maybe seasonality will come into play again. We'll see what happens. Point is, you don't know. And until we get some more data, I feel like I have no choice but to stay on the sidelines.

Gold, the dollar and the Shanghai Accord theory

Nathan Egger: Okay. We've also been watching gold continue to gradually back off from that high that was just a hair under $1,306 made back on May 2nd. Where do you see the gold market headed next, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, we did see some really nice-looking separation. I call it space above the line. The bottom of the trading range on a given day is visibly well above the 50-day moving average. That was last week. We've come back to this week to where we, I think, just almost kissed the moving average on Wednesday. And looks like we're above it again today, but still kind of hugging the line there. The big question, I think, for gold, though, is all about the U.S. dollar, as we discussed last week. If the dollar rally— or I should say, if the dollar correction, assuming that that's what it is, is over and the dollar is just going to rally from here, I think that it's going to mean bad news for gold. On the other hand, if we saw the dollar move to new lows, say a dollar index below 92, I think that gold would really take off to the upside.

I want to be clear, too, for our retail

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Retail listeners especially, my long-term view on gold is and always has been extremely bullish.

I think it's going to several thousand dollars per ounce over the next 10 years, and that is based on my prediction that we've got a lot more quantitative easing and money printing coming. So my bearish views on oil that I've expressed are really intended for traders who are trying to figure out what's going to happen in the next few weeks. With respect to the long-term picture, I definitely think it's much higher. If you're a retail investor, you don't yet own gold, You know, down here in the less than 1,500 range is a good place to be buying it. Just don't be surprised if you get an opportunity, and I would say save some dry powder for that opportunity if it comes, to buy some more below 1,000, because I think that's entirely possible, especially if the dollar rally continues.

Nathan Egger: So, you said last week, Erik, to keep a close eye on the dollar index, particularly if it were to drop below that 92 level again. How's it looking?

Erik Townsend: Well, I've been doing a lot of thinking about the dollar over the last week, and here's my conclusion. If the conspiracy theories about this Shanghai Accord, a secret meeting by government to weaken the dollar, a conspiracy of several different central bankers that supposedly occurred on February 26th, if that is false, then I am absolutely with the dollar bulls. I think all of the fundamental analysis that I can see says this was a correction, it's probably ended, and it's all up from here for the dollar. The thing about conspiracy theories, though, is sometimes they get proven to be conspiracy facts. And that could be the case here. If we see the dollar move back down below 92, that's going to say to me, okay, something's up. There's something outside of the fundamentals that I can't see. Maybe this Shanghai Accord thing is real. I don't know. But the fundamentals have changed in a way that I cannot account for if this is not over yet.

So what we've seen is a very nice persuasive bounce that looks like it could be the beginning of a bottoming pattern and that maybe we're going much higher from here on the dollar index. But really in the last couple days was the first time we got to the upper side of that channel, what we call channel resistance in technical analysis. Right now, we're not breaking through channel resistance. We're sitting right on the short-term channel resistance. I want to see it move again above that. If we go in the other direction and it rolls over from here, something's up, and I'm going to start to look for this conspiracy theory to maybe start to have some facts behind it.

Why Duncan, Das and Keen disagree

Nathan Egger: Erik, 2 weeks ago, when you interviewed Richard Duncan, he opined that governments should seize this opportunity that's been presented by this deflationary backdrop and print print trillions of dollars and then invest that money in technology companies so that we can both advance the economy, but also society as a whole.

Then last week you interviewed, and I'm going to mess this up, Satyajit Das. But that interview sounded much more critical of government rather than suggesting that government could actually provide the cure for what ails us. So how is it possible that 2 recognized experts could have such diametrically opposing views on the same subject matter here?

Erik Townsend: Because economics isn't really a science, even though they claim it is. It's the study of the effects of imposing a specific economic ideology on society. And generally speaking, the people who are doing the so-called objective research are generally very heavily invested in their own views. So fiscal and monetary policy will forever and all time be dictated by people who have a strong vested interest in their own economic ideology. That's just politics, and it's how the way the world works, whether we like it or not. So when you hear opposing views from experts like Richard Duncan and Das— I'm not going to try to take the first name on, dude, you're more daring than I am— that's perfectly normal. It almost makes you want to look up your old economics professor from college and ask them to help you dissect on how to understand each different expert's viewpoint and maybe even map those to one of the prevailing schools of economic thought, such as Keynesian, neoclassical, or even Austrian economics.

Nathan Egger: Well, why settle for an economics professor when you can get the department head Professor Steve Keen heads up the School of Economics, Politics, and History for Kingston University in London. He's also one of the very few mainstream economists who saw the 2008 crisis coming and accurately predicted what would occur. Erik's interview with Professor Keen is coming up next as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Feature interview: Professor Steve Keen introduced

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager

Erik Townsend: In the 8 years since the 2008 financial crisis, literally thousands of economists have weighed in with post facto opinions as to what caused it. But very, very few can say that they saw it coming and accurately predicted what would happen and why. Professor Steve Keen is one member of that very exclusive and small club. Professor Keen now heads up the School of Economics, Politics, and History for Kingston University in London.

Professor Keen, thanks so much for joining us on the program. Our regular listeners have heard 2 separate interviews on essentially the same macroeconomic subject matter over the last 2 weeks. One with Richard Duncan, who believes that governments should be seizing the opportunity to use further quantitative easing to make massive government-managed investments in technology. And the second one was Satyajit Das, who frankly, his interview sounded more like an indictment of government as the cause of all of our problems.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Now, economics isn't a hard science, and the only way that I can equate how it's possible that 2 experts could have such diametrically opposing views is because there are several different prevailing schools of thought. My experience is, though, a lot of people throw words around like Keynesianism, but really don't have a very accurate understanding. So, I'd like to start, if we could, with a comparison. What are the prevailing schools of thought in economics? And if possible, how do they explain how 2 different experts could have such diametrically opposing views.

Schools of economic thought: neoclassical, Austrian, post-Keynesian

Steve Keen: Well, there's the dominant school of thought in economics is called neoclassical economics. Ironically enough, a lot of people who are neoclassical economists will deny that they are when you tell them that they are, because this neoclassical school is divided into 2 major forks when it comes to how they analyze the macroeconomy. If you're familiar with the writings of Paul Krugman, he refers to one school as the freshwater economists, the other as saltwater economists. And what they share in common is a belief that capitalism is a system which tends towards equilibrium, that it's fundamentally a barter system in which you can normally ignore the financial sector, and certainly you can almost always ignore banks.

And the differences they have is that what they call the freshwater school is a pure neoclassical school that believes the economy is always in equilibrium, even during events like the Great Depression, which they say was caused by workers deciding to take an extended holiday. I'm not joking. And the saltwater mob who argue, well, there are various frictions that slow down the perfect working of the market mechanism. So if those frictions weren't there, then the freshwater crowd would be right and the economy would always be in equilibrium. But because there are frictions like trade unions, government spending, people's slow reactions, relatively slow reactions to some external stimuli. They say the economy can be out of equilibrium, but it's always tending back there again. So that's the dominant school.

The 2 major groups that oppose that are Austrian economists on one side— you might call that the right-wing side, but I think it's not necessarily right versus left— and the other, the post-Keynesian school. And the Austrian school are people who believe that capitalism is a system which tends towards equilibrium, but its strengths come from how it behaves in disequilibrium. So they emphasize that the economy is always out of equilibrium, and that gives opportunity for entrepreneurs, and that's what gives capitalism its motive force. And they tend to blame sustained problems on the government sector, where they say the government's created too much money, caused a bubble, etc., etc.

And they're against what they call fractional reserve banking.

Post-Keynesians are people who argue that what was called Keynesian economics by people like Paul Krugman actually owes far more to Paul Samuelson than it ever did to Keynes and ignores all the to some extent, Austrian attitudes that Keynes had about instability, uncertainty, and the role of the market in coordinating incomplete and totally small packets of information and making it possible to make sensible decisions. But the post-Keynesians argue that capitalism can fall into a permanent slump caused really by the financial factors, which the mainstream neoclassicals completely ignore.

And that's, that's largely the perspective that I come from. Of course, Hyman Minsky is the person who's my main inspiration, and he to some extent straddles the Austrian and the post-Keynesian perspectives.

Credit, money and inventories in mainstream models

Erik Townsend: Now, something I was fascinated to learn about economics is that there's actually disagreement on issues as simple as whether or not credit counts as part of the money supply, or perhaps not technically the money supply, but the amount of available money in the economy. It's hard for me to understand how something that fundamental wouldn't fit or be agreed upon. Is that true? Is that true, and which schools feel which way, and what's your view in terms of the role of credit in the economy?

Steve Keen: That's absolutely true, and it's really because economics is more a set of competing religions than it is anything even resembling a science. And the, the two dominant perspectives are that it's tending towards equilibrium and it's effectively a barter system, and that it's always in disequilibrium and that it's fundamentally a monetary system. Now, to hold the first set of beliefs. And that's what the mainstream, uh, you know, with both the, uh, the saltwater and the freshwater sides of it, they both hold to that view. And to hold to it, they have to argue that you can ignore banks, ignore debt, and ignore money when analyzing the macroeconomy, except for taking into account the role of increasing government money supply and causing inflation. That's their mental frame set. It is totally and absolutely at odds with the real world.

And it frustrates the hell out of me that I've got to waste my time even discussing it, but that's the mainstream view. So the minority view, which is that credit is absolutely essential and creation of money by banks plays a fundamental role in macroeconomics, that's largely the province of the post-Keynesian school that I'm part of.

Erik Townsend: And I'm curious too, because this is something that, as I understand it, at least in the mainstream schools, They really do not account for the concept of inventory. There's this analysis of supply and demand and so forth. I trade crude oil myself. The economic school of thought, as I understand it, is entirely about supply and demand without any consideration of how much oil is being held in inventory or how much spare capacity exists to hold more of it, which to me is central to what happens to oil prices. Am I correct in understanding that the major schools don't even recognize

Steve Keen: Yeah, you are. And it's bizarre for me as well. I mean, I've had a few instances of— they give nice little cameos for that. I remember having a conversation with the New Zealand Central Bank and the Treasury, because at that stage, the Treasury Secretary wanted to use my Minsky software to build a dynamic non-equilibrium monetary model of the New Zealand economy. He was blocked by his own economic staff. I mean, he couldn't persuade that it was a useful thing to do. And in that discussion with the economic staff, I was trying to persuade them to at least try some different angle, as opposed to their normal equilibrium-fixated

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: One of the staff said, look, I walk down the street and I see markets clear. And I said, so you walk past car yards every night and you see that they're empty, do you? And he said, huh? And I said, well, if you're right, markets clear, there'd be no cars left over in the car yards every night.

There'd be no products left on the shelves of the supermarket every night. That's what you mean by clearing. The flow of demand will always be equal to the flow of supply because for every buyer, there's a seller. But the flow of production may exceed the flow of demand, and therefore you're going to get a rising stock.

This is what we've seen in the case of oil. And if you don't include stock dynamics in your thinking, you're going to be completely wrong in analyzing where the market is headed. You'd think they'd be realistic about the markets, but this obsession with the intersecting demand and supply curves, as if it's defining economics, makes them think that's where all the action is in the market. Whereas even if you use that, I think, pretty nonsensical abstraction as a way of modeling dynamic processes like the markets. When there's a— when the price is such that supply exceeds demand, demand, you're going to get an increase in stocks and vice versa. And that's an essential part of how you should think about real, real-life markets. But because their model excludes these dynamics, they ignore inventory almost completely.

How Keen saw 2008 coming: Minsky and private debt

Erik Townsend: Now, you've been an outspoken critic of the mainstream neoclassical school of economics. And I think you get a lot of credibility and recognition because you're one of very few people who saw the 2008 event coming. So, I'd like to really focus the rest of this interview on your prescriptions for what's wrong with neoclassical economics, how it needs to change, and particularly how central bank policy and government policy in general needs to adapt. But I'm sure our listeners are curious to know, how did you see 2008 coming? What was your perspective that was different from everyone else that allowed you to see something that very few people did?

Steve Keen: Well, I think that, you know, I was a professor of economics.

Erik Townsend: few economists saw on the horizon?

Steve Keen: Well, fundamentally, I'm informed by Hyman Minsky's financial instability hypothesis. And if anybody wants to follow up on that, do not buy his book, Stabilizing an Unstable Economy. Buy his book of readings instead called Can It Happen Again?, which is far better written and far more concise. So in reading Minsky back in 1987, I regarded that as the first really, I thought, coherent overall analysis and critique of capitalism that I'd ever seen. A lot of left-wing critics of capitalism come from a Marxist background, and they'll talk about a tendency for the rate of profit to fall and this tendency for stagnation in capitalism, which just sounded like nonsense to me.

And whereas Minsky talks about capitalism having a tendency towards euphoria. And his basic argument was that if you have a period of tranquil growth in capitalism, that's actually the exception. The rule has been a crisis which has occurred just beforehand.

And in the aftermath of the crisis, everybody's conservative about the amount of leverage they'll take on, both banks, lenders, and borrowers. But as you recede from the crisis, people tend to forget the crisis occurred, and a period of stable growth leads to rising expectations, which therefore leads to a higher willingness to borrow, which then drives up investment and stimulates the economy, and you get a cycle coming out of that. But the cycle tends to lead to firms taking on debt to finance investment during a boom, and then having to repay some of that debt during a slump.

And consequently, you get a tendency for the level of debt to ratchet up over a series of trade cycles until you finally get a level of debt where it simply is so great that the system can't reset and reduce the debt and go back for another cycle again. You simply have a black hole of debt phenomenon occur. So that was my basic mental picture.

And for my PhD, I wrote a mathematical model of Minsky's hypothesis. He hadn't managed to produce one himself.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Steve Keen: And one curious side effect of that model was, and not predicted by Minsky's theory at all, was that before the crisis, there'd be diminished cycles. There'd be what economists later named the Great Moderation. So informed by that model, when I looked at the debt data, an essential part of this model was a rising level of private debt to GDP. I looked at my model and looked at the data.

The data had all the characteristics my model predicted back in 1992. And looking at 2005, I saw that the level of private debt in America was the highest it's ever been and growing basically in exponential growth in the debt ratio from 1945 on. And I thought, this can't continue. At some point, the rate of growth of debt has to slow down. And when that rate of growth of debt slows down, which is fundamentally where credit comes from, the economy will go into a serious recession, the worst it's had since the Second World War.

Erik Townsend: Now, as I understand you, one of your criticisms of neoclassical economics is that adherence to that school would have left someone unable to make the prediction that you made. So what's wrong with neoclassical economics that would prevent someone who only subscribed to that school of thought from seeing what you saw back before the 2008 event?

Steve Keen: Oh God, it's almost like they were in— they'd be wearing marble

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Steve Keen: Marble glasses 2 inches thick. They're not even looking at the important data, even though they might— the statistical agencies record it. So they completely ignore private debt. That's not even part of their thinking. And you read Bernanke on that. Bernanke is supposedly the expert on the Great Depression, dismissed Irving Fisher's debt deflation theory on the argument that a debt deflation is no more than a redistribution from one group to another group. That comment's absurd in its own right, but it means he simply ignores the level of private So they don't even look at the major signal that's indicating a problem because so far as they're concerned, debt is a transfer from one non-bank agent to another non-bank agent. And the person who lends has less spending power, but the person who borrows has more spending power and the 2 cancel each other out. And that's their argument for just ignoring the level of debt completely.

And when I model that, which I've modeled their fantasy in my software package Minsky, and when I do it, they're quite right. If the lending is from one non-bank to another non-bank, it just redistributes the existing amount of money. It doesn't create any extra money and it doesn't create any extra demand. But as soon as you acknowledge that, gee, guess what? Banks actually lend money. And when they lend the money, people who borrow that money spend it into existence.

You don't actually have— you're not liable to a debt until you actually execute the capacity to create the money that the debt contract gives you. When you spend that money, you add to demand as well.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: And of course, if you have declining credit, that's actually taking demand out of the economy. So they're completely blindsided to the most important causal factor in the dynamics of capitalism. That's why they can't— didn't see it coming. And they still can't understand why it happened, and they're still floundering around trying to explain why growth is not occurring now when exactly the same causal factor's behind it. We have very low credit growth, and that's why we have a stagnant economy.

Zombie economies and the next debt crises

Erik Townsend: Professor Keen, you're working on a new book now titled Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? And my understanding is that almost a rhetorical title. Your point really is to express some criticisms and perhaps prescribe some reforms that may be needed in order to avoid that crisis. Am I correct in understanding that that's what the book is about? And then by all means, tell us about the book, because I think our listeners are very interested to know what needs to be fixed.

Steve Keen: Yeah, well, the book actually has an interesting title. It could be a one-word book, as you're saying. It could be a single word, no, could be the total content. But it's a 25,000-word book, which is quite short by academic publishing standards. It's just a particular format that my publisher has chosen that I quite like.

So in 25,000 words, I have to explain why we've got the zombie economies we have around the globe. And what I explain is fundamentally that countries like America, obviously England, Spain, Greece, Portugal, that are in a long-term slump right now, now, and Japan, the oldest of all the zombies, are debt zombies. They took on too much private debt.

They are in the aftermath. They have failed to address private debt as the cause of the crisis. So debt's still at very high levels by historical standards. There's no great increase in the level of debt. Therefore, credit is extremely anemic. And that's why all these countries are zombies. But I'm also— I identify about, I think, about 15 other countries that are likely to be the next bunch of debt zombies. And of course, that includes China. And when you take a look at those countries, we've got about— comparing them to the size of the USA, the countries that are liable to suffer a debt crisis in the next 1 to 3 years are equivalent to slightly larger than the American economy.

So we're in for another crisis, not in countries like America and England themselves directly, because they're zombified. You have to have a large amount of credit growth to have a credit crisis when it slows down, but you have stagnation coming out of it. So they're going to be stagnant. We're going into crisis in China, crisis in Australia, Canada, Sweden, Norway, and a few other countries, including Korea.

And that's going to mean, of course, for the zombie country, the growth they're getting from exports will itself decline. So yeah, crises are going to be the order of the day, and they will be until we reduce the level of private debt.

Erik Townsend: You mentioned this idea of zombie countries, essentially describing a country that's had so much trouble with debt that it will be difficult for its economy to recover. That's— I would kind of like to know whether the country I'm living in at any given moment is on the list. Is there a way to tell which countries? Is there one de facto indicator that tells us who is a zombie country?

Steve Keen: Yeah, there's a combination of indicators. First of all, it's the level of private debt compared to GDP. The higher that level is, then the more susceptible you are to have a crisis. With a low level of private debt to GDP, like for example, Germany, you're not going to have a domestic crisis. So that's the first thing, high level of private debt. By high, I mean anything over 1.5 times GDP. Second indicator is how fast has debt been growing in the previous 5 years? And that therefore tells you how much credit makes up of total demand. And And this is working actually from work by an American philanthropist called Richard Vague, who runs what he calls the Debt Economic Project these days. He was a banker and creator of credit card companies who then saw the crisis coming, got out of the credit card business, and is now campaigning against private debt.

He did the empirical work to identify those 2 levels, and I've since verified it. So a country with a debt level of more than 1.5 times GDP per capita, where that debt level has risen by 20% or more over the previous 5 years is on its way to being a zombie.

And countries which have already had that phenomenon and had the rate of credit slow down and turn negative are the zombies. And America is clearly in the zombie class. It had a debt bubble that took private debt from about 90% of GDP in about 1990 to 170% in 2009.

And when the rate of growth of that debt started slowing down in late 2006, that's when the American crisis began. Now, a country like Australia, which managed to avoid the crisis by pretty much encouraging the private sector to go back into borrowing money again through a couple of housing schemes they pulled, that avoided the crisis phenomenon.

But it's now got to the stage where its private debt level is about 210% of GDP, and the increase in credit last year was equivalent to 15— or the increase in debt, which is credit was equivalent to 15% of GDP. So all you have to have to have a crisis is the rate of growth of that debt slowing down. It doesn't even have to go negative. And that will be such a major reduction in credit demand that the economy will suffer a recession. And countries like Australia and Canada are clearly lined up for that, as is China and also Korea.

Prescription: debt jubilee, lending curbs and private money

Erik Townsend: So what are the specific reforms if you were in charge of everything and could dictate government policy? What needs to change in order— I guess you said you don't think that we can avoid another crisis, but in order to mitigate the effects and put us back on the right track, what needs to change?

Steve Keen: We have to reduce the level of private debt. That's the bottom line. Government spending can counteract the depressing impact of low credit demand, but it can't eliminate it. And this is the situation Japan's been in now for one quarter of a century. So, people focus upon the level of government debt. In Japan and say that's what caused its crisis. In fact, that was a response to the crisis that attenuated its severity, but hasn't ended it. So Japan has now had one quarter of a century of stagnant credit-based demand, compensated to some extent by government debt rising at the same time, but it hasn't got out of its crisis.

I'll give you an idea of some numbers there. When the crisis hit in 1990, Japan's Japan's government debt ratio was 60% of GDP. Its private debt ratio was 210% of GDP. Its private debt ratio since peaked at 220% and has fallen down to about 170% of GDP, where it's flatlined for the last 10 years, while government debt's risen from 60% of GDP to 220% of GDP.

Now, it's still stuck in a crisis. It hasn't got out of the problem. So the only thing that actually gets you out of it is writing off that private debt. And you need to write it off in such a way that it doesn't destroy demand at the same time. So I'd be using the government's money-creating capacity to actually cancel that private debt, reset the whole system, but then make private debt a target of government policy. In other words, realizing capitalism has an innate tendency to generate too much debt, and then using the government's fiat money capacity to write that debt off, as we used to do with our pre-capitalist nations, or what we call Jubilee.

Erik Townsend: So essentially what you're saying is erase the debt, and that gives the debtor a free lunch, and the creditor gets paid off with printed money, which presumably has a dilutive effect on the rest of the money supply. Is that essentially the picture?

Steve Keen: Partly, but you can't do it just for the debtors. I mean, a lot of people have argued quite, you know, we're saying, look, there's a moral hazard issue. This means debtors always get rescued, then you just generate an encouragement to get into debt again, which is quite true.

So what I say we should actually use is that there are 2 ways you create money in a capitalist economy. The banks lend more than they get back in repayments, which is the standard fashion. But of course, that can give you a rising private debt ratio if the debt grows faster than GDP, which it historically has done. Or the government can run a deficit. The government runs a deficit, it spends more into the economy than it takes back in Those are the 2 ways we create money. Now, because the government owns its own central bank, it's possible for it to use that central government bank money creation capacity to put money directly into people's private bank accounts.

And my argument is we should do that irrespective of whether people are in debt or are savers. But if a debtor gets the money, they have to pay their debt off, have to reduce their debt level. If a saver gets the money, they get a cash injection. So that means you can balance the depressing impact of writing the debt off by the stimulating impact of giving savers a bonus. It doesn't give debtors any advantage for having been in debt beforehand. And I'd also want to reform the financial system to prevent banks lending to finance Ponzi schemes, which is fundamentally what a housing bubble is and what, frankly, share market speculation is as well.

So I think we need to do a whole range of reforms to control the one out-of-control element of the capitalist system, which is the financial sector. Unless we do it, we're going to be stuck in the situation Japan has been for the last quarter century. without its social cohesion. And that to me is not a recipe for a peaceful capitalist America.

Erik Townsend: So to summarize your prescription, it's essentially helicopter money, massive money printing that is shared equally by everyone, but with the rule that debtors must use that to pay off their debt, to essentially cancel debt, make it go away. And it sounds like a fascinating idea to me, but I'm a little bit troubled by one thing, which is every single thing I've seen out of central bankers since 2009 has been entirely this narrative, which is about how we need to get credit moving again so that consumers can borrow more and spend more in the economy.

Are you optimistic? I mean, it seems to me like you're talking about a complete and total reversal. And it— as far as I can tell, what most mainstream central bank thinking is these days is we need more credit, and you're saying we need less. So I passionately agree with you. I wonder if anybody's ready to

Steve Keen: Not in the central banks. I've pretty much given up on them. And I'm now working with a number of private sector companies and entrepreneurs that see this as an opportunity to create parallel currencies. But the thing— the capitalist system has stuffed itself up for 2 reasons. One, the banks have funded Ponzi schemes rather than genuine investment. And 2, the government doesn't understand the monetary system itself is in control of and is actually encouraging private debt while doing all sorts of other stuff-ups as well. So maybe what the— what we should do is have the private sector start creating its own money, because we fundamentally need money for transactions. And if you can get some way of backing private money so that people accept it as cancellation of debts and as payment for transfer of goods and so on, we can stimulate some economic activity out of it and maybe slowly teach the bureaucrats and the economists in mainstream government departments that this is how the world actually operates.

So I've given up on the— even though, like, my reforms are all about government money creation in that sense, I think it's not going to happen. The entrepreneurs are going to see it more rapidly, and I'm going with private money creation, but not by banks.

Erik Townsend: Now, when you say private money creation, are you talking about cryptocurrencies like Bitcoin, or are you talking about other forms of currencies?

Steve Keen: Other forms. I'm not a fan of Bitcoin because it was based on a false model that gold was money. Money and a false model of gold as well. It's far easier to create new Bitcoin-like technologies than it is to create gold. So in that sense, the analogy was false. It takes far too long to verify transactions. You could never have the capability to enable Bitcoin-style cryptocurrencies to take over normal transactions. But blockchain works. And if— so long as you have a verified hierarchy of money and, uh, and convertibility between different forms of money, which is feasible, then you can have an electronic monetary system, which would be created by private sector and backed by private sector either assets or private sector obligations between units verified in the same sort of way that the Bitcoin— the blockchain behind Bitcoin is verified. So it's feasible. And I think that's why I'm far more likely to get success with the private sector than I am with the government, for

Erik Townsend: Professor Keen, I think we could talk about gold and cryptocurrencies for an entire full-length interview.

Keen's book and how to follow his work

Erik Townsend: I look forward to doing that someday, but unfortunately we are out of time. Before we close, tell us a little bit more. When is the new book coming out? Where can people get it? Is there a pre-order on Amazon? And in general, how can people follow your work?

Steve Keen: Okay, I mean, in terms of following my work, I have, uh, I write an occasional column on Forbes, though the pressure of writing the book has meant I've written almost nothing for the last month. I also have my blog, debtdeflation.com/blogs. The book itself is being published by Polity Press, P-O-L-I-T-Y, and it should be out, I'm hoping, by October. I've got to finish writing the draft on the 30th of June, so it's a pretty tight schedule, but I think I'll get it out by the end of the year. I'll whack up pre-release or presales on my website and probably also link it through Forbes. So it should be possible to start making orders, I hope, by about September.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Well, Professor Keen, thanks so much for joining us on the program. Nathan Egger will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Erik's take on the Duncan, Das and Keen series

Nathan Egger: Great interview with Professor Keen, Erik. But now that we've completed our 3-week series of interviews designed to contrast and compare the perspectives of different recognized experts, I'm sure our listeners might enjoy hearing your opinion as well. We certainly got some passionate posts, to say the least, in our listener discussion forum about these interviews. What was your take on these 3 interviews?

Erik Townsend: Actually, it was the Listener Discussion Forum reaction that surprised me the most. What it seemed like is people wanted us to bring on an economist that we would agree with, or that everybody could really like what they had to say and feel like we got the guy who had the best prescription for solving the economy.

If that was our goal, I would have asked you to call the von Mises Institute and get 3 pure Austrian economics guys that we could compare and contrast their views on how to solve That would be a fun podcast. I'd enjoy being on that podcast if anybody wants me to do it on some other podcast that they produce. But that's just not what MacroVoices is for. The goal that I have and the way I think about this is what I think should happen for the world. I do that on my own time, and it is a passionate subject for me. But as a money manager, my job is not to think about what I think should happen for the world. I have to stay out of the should happen business and try to keep my brain focused on the what's likely to actually happen.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: And what is it going to mean for markets business?

And so for me, I'd say Richard Duncan was definitely one of the strongest interviews, if not the strongest, that we did. Why? He's a guy that I couldn't possibly disagree more with in terms of how his views differ from mine. I don't think it's the job of the government to try to interfere with or control the economy at all. So obviously our views are diametrically opposed, but my job is to understand how the people who are actually in power think.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: think. Richard Duncan, definitely, his thinking represents the way the people that are in charge of the central banks think. And so, it's very instructive for me, even though it disagrees strongly with my personal values, to listen to a guy like that who thinks the way the people that are in power think, because that helps me to understand what comes next.

And I think, definitely, if you wanted to understand, okay, well, what drives those people in power, what shapes their thinking, a guy like Steve Keen clearly has the academic perspective on all the different schools of thought. He can compare and contrast all of the differences between these different economic models and help us to understand how these people think, even though he very strongly criticizes those views. It's clear that he understands it. So, what I wanted the most from these interviews was not for somebody to agree with me, but for somebody to help me understand what I might expect to come next. From the people that are actually in charge of all this stuff. And I would say that the combination of Richard Duncan and Steve Keen was most effective for me in that regard. I love Das. He's just an amazing guy. He's a cool author. Probably his views are more close to my views than anyone else's that we interviewed in this series.

But honestly, that's not the most important thing for me.

I was hoping in the Steve Keen interview today that he was going to tell me that his goal with this book was to influence central bank policy. And he was going to go through the whole process of essentially taking his own prescriptions for how to fix this, publish it in a book, subject it to the peer review process, and maybe eventually make a difference. I think he's probably right to have given up hope, but it's still disheartening for me to hear that because, you know, he's actually got the academic credentials where he could be taken seriously. He's also got the card to play of being one of very, very few people who saw 2008 coming and accurately predicted it. So, I would love to see a guy like that who might actually be able to change things, change things. I think he has realistically given up on things changing and he's off doing other stuff.

So, I thought they were all great interviews, but I thought it was most interesting that what I look for from these is not for somebody to agree with me. me, but to give me insight into what I can expect to come next from policymakers.

MacroVoices at three months, the Research Roundup and a new segment

Nathan Egger: Well, you guys, MacroVoices is 3 months old today, and thanks to your support, we've really been starting to get some traction. So, I feel it's time to open the proverbial kimono and tell our listeners a little bit more about our plans for the MacroVoices project. Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, MacroVoices has never been just about the podcast. From day one, what Nathan and I have envisioned is to create a global network network of sophisticated investors who collaborate, share investing ideas, and make personal connections with other interesting people online all over the world. That's what this project has always been all about for us. Our concept of how to achieve that was to launch the podcast and our listener discussion forums at the same time. The whole idea was that a podcast centered around a featured interview guest every week would be the perfect way to get the conversation started. And then our listener discussion forums would be the place where all of us would come together and continue the discussion that began with the guest interview in the podcast.

Nathan Egger: And your thoughts on how it's going so far with this approach?

Erik Townsend: Well, the podcast itself has been getting fantastic traction. Our download counts are skyrocketing, and we've experienced an almost unanimous positive feedback. The listener discussion forums were never expected to achieve critical mass for at least the first months, so it's still early to say. But I've certainly noticed a huge pickup in interesting exchanges between some very knowledgeable listeners in the last 3 weeks. So it's a chicken and egg problem. When we get enough smart, interesting people participating, that by itself will draw in more smart, interesting people, and it becomes a self-reinforcing virtuous cycle. My talk radio mentors tell me 6 months is the bare minimum to achieve traction and gain a regular audience.

Nathan Egger: So we seem to be already experiencing a pickup in interest in the forum, so I guess we're ahead of Plenty of ups and downs, and, and we've learned quite a lot in these last 3 months, and that's led us to make some changes that we're going to announce this week. Erik, let's start with how things have gone and where we think that we can improve.

Erik Townsend: Well, the listener discussion forums are gaining traction. I expect them to be successful. But frankly, as a former software entrepreneur, I am ashamed of myself to admit that I had absolutely no clue how much investment value exists on Twitter.

Our MacroVoices podcasts are actually being discussed and debated more actively on Twitter than in our own listener discussion forums, and that really got our attention. When we look at what a tiny percentage of our listeners are actually registering and participating in the discussion forums, it's just obvious threaded discussion forums are not for everyone. So, maybe I'm dating myself by thinking that that was the way to make this happen.

I don't really think, though, that Twitter is the end-all answer either. It's fantastically well-suited to day traders and maybe swing traders who are sharing charts and news items and even some friendly banter among a community of traders who all know one another from their online presence. And it's super cool. I'm very excited to continue to participate in this community myself. But MacroVoices isn't meant to be about day trading or swing trading, where it's easy to fit your whole idea into 140 characters or less.

We're here to provoke and encourage Thoughtful, detailed intellectual discourse about the issues of the day in the global economy. In my opinion, Twitter is not nearly as well suited to that objective as it is, let's say, to something like day traders sharing opinions on support and resistance levels.

Nathan Egger: So, since constant improvement is in fact our mantra, what do we want to do next in pursuit of our end goal of creating that global community of sophisticated investors who are willing to collaborate rather than compete and share ideas online.

Erik Townsend: We're making 2 changes today to address this problem. The first is that we could do a better job of sharing all of the cool stuff that we've been receiving as a result of this project. Perfect example: our listeners loved the way Art Berman was so kind as to provide a PowerPoint presentation full of graphs and charts to back up what he said in his interview on the program.

Well, guess what, folks? I've received 2 more really cool chart books from Art since that interview. I've got them and you don't. That's not right. We've got to fix that. So starting with today's show, we're going to email all of our registered users a new newsletter that we're calling the MacroVoices Research Roundup.

This is going to be a very simple, straightforward list of links to the coolest free stuff that we could find on the internet or from our past show guests in any particular week. It will never, I say again, never include any marketing or sales content from us or anyone else, period. We're very committed to that. We invite our featured guests to send us new stuff. If Art's got a new book of charts, or Rick Rule wants to send us information about something that he's doing, we want to be able to keep you up to date on that.

So this email blast that we're going to send out will be the mechanism to send you all the cool information that we receive here at MacroVoices. We also want you, our listeners, to feel free to send us cool stuff. Stuff that you think other listeners would enjoy, provided that it's in the public domain and that we can redistribute it without any intellectual property issues. But I need to be crystal clear on this one point: we do not want to spam anyone, and we will reject anything that even remotely smells like marketing or advertising. So, please, don't take offense if we don't use something that you send us, even if it's really great content that might be of interest. If we think it has any risk whatsoever, of feeling to our listeners like we're sending them sales pitches, we're just not going to run it.

Frankly, we also don't have enough time to be able to process everything completely. So please don't be offended if we don't use information that you send us. I have to be super clear too, we never want to spam or offend anybody. I can't imagine why anybody listening would not want this free research. But if you don't, there's a safe unsubscribe link at the bottom that will instantly and permanently take you off the Research Roundup So listeners who want to submit public domain content for consideration in this newsletter should email researchroundup@macrovoices.com.

Nathan Egger: And I also want to let everyone know that I'm going to do my best to send these Research Roundup emails out whenever we get really great content to share with you. But please understand that MacroVoices is a part-time job for me at least. And frankly, we haven't yet decided how frequently we should send these things out. We're going to play it by ear. So the frequency may be sporadic at first as we experiment to see what works for our listeners. Please bear with us while we figure out how to best execute this idea.

Erik, you said there were 2 things we had to announce today. What's the second one?

Erik Townsend: This is the one that we're really excited about. Now, keep in mind here, the goal again is to create a global network of sophisticated investors who collaborate and share ideas online. You've heard me talk a lot on this program about Samir Madani, who goes by the name Sam, by the way. Sam is a sales executive for a Swedish internet router company by day, but his passionate hobby is doing deep research on how many crude oil tankers are waiting to get into port because that knowledge translates directly into trading edge. Sam can front-run those EIA inventory reports because he's watching the ships and knows exactly what's going on. Sam publishes all of his research absolutely absolutely free of charge to anybody who wants it because he's as passionate as I am about the idea of collaborating with other smart people and sharing research and investment ideas with them online.

Now, that's exactly the kind of guy that I feel most passionate about helping. Sure, someday this program is going to be big enough that we'll be able to get big-name guests like Stan Druckenmiller and Kyle Bass and Hugh Hendry, and I certainly look forward to that day.

But frankly, if there is one place where I feel that we can truly make the investing world a better place through our actions with this podcast, it's by seeking out, finding, and helping guys like Sam to promote what they're doing and to connect with other sophisticated investors around the globe.

So here's what we're going to do. The central focus of this show will always center on a long-form feature interview interview with a guest who's somebody of notoriety in the field, somebody relatively famous. That's the same. It's not going to change. It's exactly the same as what we've been doing from day one. But when we come across a guy like Sam who really has something of value that he's willing to share with other investors and has nothing to sell or promote beyond what he wants to just give away for free, we're going to just plain make time in the schedule to accommodate a brief 10-minute interview with a guy like that, to introduce you to that person, tell you where you can learn more about their work, and so on.

So, the whole idea is to both discover guys like Sam and help them to promote what they're doing, and also, frankly, to inspire other people. We've got lots of smart private investors that do a lot of research for their own investments. I'm trying to inspire you guys to learn the value of doing this the way Sam does it, which is share your research with other investors online. and benefit from what you get back from creating a community. Going forward, we can only allocate 10 minutes to this because of time constraints, but we managed to carve out just a couple of extra minutes this week for Sam because we really think his project is worthy of your attention.

Nathan Egger: And that interview with Sam is coming up next right here at MacroVoices.com.

Samir Madani on #OOTT and tanker tracking

Erik Townsend: Sam, thanks so much for joining us on the program. Let's start Let's start with #OOTT. What does it stand for and how did it come about?

Samir Madani: Right. Thank you for having me. The #OOTT stands for #OrganizationOfOilTradingTweeters. And the way it came about was basically that I spend a lot of time on Twitter looking for news in the world of oil, and I'm very interested in oil as a sector. Oil is an economy. Oil is a market. And what really was difficult was collecting all this information and finding people who have similar interests. So I figured I would start something by pulling everyone in as a hub under a separate hashtag, which was not #oil but #OOTT.

And sure enough, now we have a lot of people from all over the world People around the world, different walks of life, different professions, they're all using this hashtag when they have anything oil-related to tweet about. And what you can do is once a day, twice a day, just click on that hashtag and you get a long list of interesting topics and news related to oil. So it's a very, how do you say, it's almost as if it's centralized, but it's decentralized in the form of a peer-to-peer network.

Erik Townsend: Now normally I'd ask you to go into what kind of work you do yourself, You've been doing a lot yourself for #OOTT, but this week you just produced a fantastic Periscope video, almost 2 hours long. We've already emailed a link to that video to our registered users through our new Research Roundup email blast. Anybody else who wants it can find it by following you @SamirMadani on Twitter. Just give us a real quick idea of what people are going to find in that video, and then I want to move on from there.

Samir Madani: Sure. Right. The Periscope video is something I've been meaning to put together for some time now. And what it covers is firstly a brief explanation of what OOTT is. And then I gave a virtual tour of the world where I showed the interesting storage sites and facilities and ports for oil. And sure enough, it varies so much country to country. And we first started off with Japan, which is actually the most interesting in Innovative place for storing oil because they do it offshore. They do it out in the water, and that's because of the landscape and because of the fact that there's earthquakes and tsunamis and what have you. So they have a very unique and very innovative storage solution versus some other countries which have very impromptu setups, and others, of course, which use on land storage, which obviously takes up a lot of space.

And then we went into the characteristics of various vessels fleets, which I track.

And in my database, I am I'm tracking close to 500 supertankers from all over the world, or not all over the world. It's about ten different countries. They're the top producers and top buyers of oil, and they account for about 578 million barrels, which I'm tracking. So, gave him a nice tour through Periscope on that, and then obviously also what I do daily, and that is the Houston reports and and LOOP Louisiana Offshore Oil Port report.

So I put together this report daily every night here in Stockholm, and for those of you in the U.S., you get it sometime during the late afternoon, and you can see what has moved in and out of Houston and. LOOP in terms of the volume of barrels.

Erik Townsend: And that video basically allows people to effectively look over your shoulder and see what you're doing and how you do what you do. And I think it's really fascinating. It is a long one, but a very interesting one. But hang on a second, Sam, because you are a Kuwaiti-born Jordanian of Saudi Arabian and Croatian ancestry living in Stockholm, Sweden, working as a sales executive for an internet router company that you co-founded.

You're also the father of 2 young children, but somehow you make time for this passionate hobby and you choose to share this fantastic wealth of information completely for free with anybody who wants it through your Twitter account. Now, I think there's maybe just a little bit of a personal interest story here. So what makes Sam tick? And particularly, why would you put so much work into something and then give it away for free? What do you get out of all this?

Samir Madani: This is a very good question. I really appreciate that you asked. I have to look at it as a, as a, you know, like a dice, a cube, and there are many different facets which are of interest for me. And when I came to this oil table not too long ago, I mean, I'm an enthusiast, a hobbyist. I started off basically around somewhere around 7 months ago, and I felt that I have most of the sides of this cube covered because I have an in-depth knowledge of geopolitics, of culture, linguistics, and other things around oil, which are mostly what we don't see. Yeah, because all we see on our screens are the graphs and the headlines and so on. But I know how the negotiations take place because I understand those cultures within OPEC, between Russia and OPEC, and so on. So I have— I was able to forecast, predict some conclusions to some of the events that have been going on within in all these discussions. And I saw these breakdowns coming miles away.

And what I really wanted to learn more about was the actual oil as a sector, how it works, the logistics behind it, because I'm very much— I have daily work with logistics.

So I've been tracking vessels previous to oil, my own shipments of routers and so on. What I figured was when, when I heard about all this regarding the oil glut worldwide, I said I have to look at that. So I, I went to marinetraffic.com, I fired up my profile there, and I clicked on the filter called tankers. And sure enough, my screen just went red. I mean, there was tankers everywhere. And I zoomed in on many different ports, and I had to Google up all the list of the top ports around the world, and, and I started building up databases. On various fleets.

And the easiest fleet I was able to find was the Iranian one because they were blacklisted several years ago, obviously because of the sanctions. And so there was a very, very well-detailed list of tankers, and I imported that into the database, and I can see where they are now in real time. And it's amazing because 2/5 of that fleet is incapacitated. It is just stuck off the port of Asaluyeh as storage. containing 50.5 million barrels at this speaking moment.

Erik Townsend: So you— I see how you got into all this fascinating research, and I see how it gives you tremendous trading edge as a trader. What makes you feel inspired though to give it away for free, and what do you get out of the relationships that you've built as a result of doing so?

Samir Madani: What you get out of something like this, really, it's— there's no economic incentive for me to start charging anyone for this because I feel like I'm only contributing. I'm just one cogwheel in this giant clock here. And if we all work together, traders, people who— I mean, honestly, the hashtag #OOTT is comprised of people that work within everything within oil. And you have people who have worked down at the docks, people who worked at ports, people who trade it. They've never even touched the liquid, obviously.

And bring them all together under one hashtag, and we all exchanging ideas, news, and views. And, and I, I find that amazing. And this only started about just a little over 2 weeks ago. And the way it happened was I felt that I had just a very small glimpse of, of what's happening, and that's PADD 3 the Gulf Coast, Gulf of Mexico.

And I was monitoring Houston and Loop, and that accounts for maybe, what, a third of, of all the oil intake into the the US. And I said, I need more coverage here, so I need to start, uh, seeking volunteers. And I started posting up tweets on Twitter asking for volunteers. And I then all of a sudden I'm getting people who, who are volunteering to follow tankers, others who are willing to follow weather, others who are willing to follow news and events and start logging all that stuff.

So we started logging. And how do you— how do different people start logging things? So, we all set up our own spreadsheets with Google Docs, Excel sheets. And sure enough, you have people editing them daily. And if you look at the top right, you'll see so many spectators 24/7 who are in those spreadsheets, and they're finding out so much regarding oil in real time. So, real-time events, real-time updates on tankers, and it's just amazing. And the best thing out of Part of it is this network that you build of contacts, people who share these interests with you. And we're all learning from each other. That's the best thing. So it gives me great joy to learn every day something new from these people.

Erik Townsend: So maybe to put it another way, everybody knows that individual investors have a huge disadvantage over something like, let's say, a hedge fund with a research staff of 30 or 40 people. What you're doing is you're basically turning the tables on that and saying, no, we can have a research staff of of 30 or 40 people who just choose to voluntarily collaborate with each other and all benefit from each other's research and ideas. And you guys all get not only that benefit, but you also take something being an individual investor, which is very isolating and not socially interesting. And all of a sudden, you have a whole network of friends all over the world that you're working and collaborating with, and it all supports your investments. So, I just really want to applaud you the leadership that you've shown in doing this.

Samir Madani: Thank you very much. I mean, this is the power of the internet.

Erik Townsend: And you know, I think it's so important too for people to understand. I think there's a culture in finance and investing of secrecy that just doesn't make sense. It is absolutely true. If you're Warren Buffett or you're George Soros, you can't say what's on your mind because people will steal your ideas and front-run you. We just don't have that problem. Individual investors don't have it. I'm a hedge fund manager, but I'm a small-time hedge fund manager. The fact that I say something is not— and share information or tell people what trades I'm in is not going to cost me anything. I don't have the problem of being Warren Buffett. And I think so many people let their egos get in the way and they fail to see the opportunity that's out there from collaboration with all these fantastic tools we have on the internet. So I just think I think that it's wonderful what you're doing. I want to thank you for your leadership, and I really want to speak to other people.

I know for sure that we have a lot of other investors listening to this program regularly who do just as much interesting research in support of their own investments as Sam has done.

Think about sharing it with other people the way Sam has done it. He gets a lot of benefit that you can't get without sharing. Try it. It's worth it. Sam, anything you want to add? We've only got about a half A minute before we have to wrap this up.

Samir Madani: Yes, uh, the only thing I want to add is everyone can contribute, and the simplest way to do it is if you have something of importance or something you feel like you want to get out there in regards to oil, uh, any news, any figures, anything possible, just put a hashtag #OOTT and everyone will be able to spot that within seconds. Thank you very much.

Erik Townsend: Sam, thanks so much for joining us on the program.

Nathan's close and disclaimer

Nathan Egger: Well, thank you, gentlemen. I'm super excited to kick off this new format with Samir Madani, who we truly feel shares our vision for collaboration, as Erik mentioned. And we definitely welcome feedback from our listeners on everything we've announced today. So if you know of other people who are not selling or promoting anything, but are doing work as interesting as that which Sam was kind enough to share with us today, please email me directly at nathan@macrovoices.com to recommend them as a future guest for this new 10-minute segment.

And now, as we close, I also want to remind listeners that while we do do this show for free and we never want to monetize it in any way, you should remember that you can still very much support the program in a massive way by rating and reviewing us on iTunes. If you just open your iTunes, and if you're not already subscribed to MacroVoices, please do so, then right-click on the MacroVoices logo and select Show in iTunes Store from the dropdown menu. Then immediately to the right of the MacroVoices logo, click Ratings and Reviews. And under the heading Customer Ratings, where it says Click to Rate, we hope you'll be inspired to give us 5 stars, but all honest feedback is good feedback. So then there's another heading, Customer Reviews, and you can click Write a Review button, and you'll be taken to a page that allows you to share your opinions with other iTunes users.

And to this point, we've received loads of emails and posts in our forums with really kind words, and we certainly value and appreciate this feedback. But placing that same feedback in the review section on iTunes increases our visibility and our presence in the iTunes podcast directories. So that's going to really help us continue to expand our audience.

You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Mr. Townsend is more and more active by the day. So if you want to follow his personal handle, you can do so at @ErikTownsend.

Erik Townsend: Thank you. @ErikSTownsend.

Nathan Egger: If Twitter isn't quite your gig, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, I encourage you to come join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. We hope to have you back next week when Jeff Christian of CPM Group will be our featured guest. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a fantastic weekend. We'll see you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this week's MacroVoices. That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices Voices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable. For losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

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Satyajit Das — None stated; introduced as Satyajit Das, author of Traders, Guns and Money (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 13 was recorded May 5th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Satyajit Das is on deck as today's special guest. I'll be talking with Das about the US dollar rally, monetary policy around the world, China, precious metals, and much more. All of that's coming up when Das joins us after today's market wrap.

Market wrap: S&P 500 topping pattern and short setup

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Good to be back with you, Erik. To my relatively untrained eye, the equity markets are finally starting to look like they want lower. What are you seeing?

Erik Townsend: Well, there's definitely signs of that. Visually, it looks like a topping pattern on the S&P. I would also note Raoul Pal, who's one of our favorite macro commentators interviewed recently on this program, tweeted this week that he has been waiting all He's been waiting for a year for the opportunity to short the S&P, and he sees it upon us now. I haven't spoken to Raoul, so I don't know anything more about his view than that. I have felt very strongly that this rally was not supported by fundamentals. I was unable, though, to explain what the heck happened and what drove it, and I'm still unable to explain that.

As I look at the chart right now, we're hovering just over the 50-day moving average. I'm looking at the E-mini futures chart, so the moving average may be a little bit different in the cash market. I just look at this and say, hmm, Looks to me like maybe it's coming up on time for another short here, but I think I'd like to see the 50-day moving average get taken out decisively. Kind of tough to justify shorting right on top of what could be a rebound point.

I can't describe, I can't explain why this happened anyway. I do also worry as we're coming into the month of May, we're out of earnings quiet period. That means that corporate buybacks could be starting up in earnest again. That could create buying pressure. So I want to short this market, but I'm a little bit skittish having been wrong one once before this year, and I'm still watching it to see what develops.

Crude oil: storage thesis, Fort McMurray fires, Hormuz, Saudi motives

Nathan Egger: And plenty of crude oil volatility on considerable volume since we last spoke. Erik, how is your view of the goo shaping up from here?

Erik Townsend: The view of the goo. Okay. First of all, seasonality is super important this time of year. Normally what happens is during refinery maintenance season, we see builds on inventory because the refineries are not using it. Then once that's over and we're starting to get geared up towards summer driving season, we're consuming more oil.

May is a month historically, if we look at the data for the last 5 years, there's only been 1 year in the last 5 where there was a net build on inventory for the month of May overall. That was 2012 with a 5.1 million barrel build on inventory.

Well, if you look at that in isolation, boy, it's not looking good for my fundamental view, which is that we're headed towards a storage crisis. Because from a seasonality standpoint, we're now facing a headwind from the standpoint that it's May, which Which is traditionally a drawdown month, where before we had a tailwind, which was coming from the fact that it was refinery maintenance season.

But hang on a second. If you follow Samir Madani's work, there's 28 million barrels of oil anchored off of Houston, waiting to get into the ship channel. That's 5 times more than the biggest monthly draw. Now, of course, not all of that oil goes into storage when it hits the dock. A lot of it will get consumed. But if you believe, as I do, and as Samir's analysis reveals, that a lot of that oil is going to get counted as inventory, I think we could see a massive surprise in the month of May where it's traditionally— and I think a lot of analysts might be expecting a drawdown on inventories to begin in May. I think this is where the market has the opportunity to be surprised and say, oh, wait a minute, there's more.

As I've opined in the past, if Saudi Arabia wants to make a move to try to push the market lower, certainly it would be sensible for them to do that in conjunction with another bearish catalyst in order to get the maximum effect. That's not this week's inventory because, you know, we've seen the last several weeks that the market has shrugged off massive inventory builds and managed to move higher anyway. This week, the action was a little bit different, just as Samir predicted.

He was saying there was going to be either a draw on inventory nationally or a very small build. We got what initially looked from API like a small build, a little bit bigger from the EIA on Wednesday morning.

2.8 million barrels is certainly not a trivial build on inventory. But it's nothing close to 10.5 million barrels that we had a few weeks ago. So to my surprise, what I thought is with a relatively small build, a negligible Cushing, Oklahoma build, which I think is the most important number, I thought maybe we were going to see a repeat of the last few weeks where there's bearish catalysts that should shock the market lower. That happens for an hour or so and then the market just moves higher.

Well, it looked like fundamentals were maybe actually starting to work again this week because after the inventory data came out, the market did end up closing not just on the lows of the day. Last few minutes of pit trading, there was a big move higher, perhaps somebody trying to bang the close and manipulate that closing number. But there was a lot of weakness over the course of the day.

Overnight from Wednesday into Thursday, of course, the news of the Canadian wildfires in Fort McMurray, as well as escalating tensions in Libya, came out. That's creating upside pressure on oil prices. So far, at least as far as the Fort McMurray situation is concerned, There are no critical oil production assets at risk. The fires are about 30 kilometers away from where the oil production is.

The problem is the town of Fort McMurray is basically where all of the oil workers live, and there have just been horrible, terrible damage there. 1,800 homes and other buildings in Fort McMurray, which of course is a town in Alberta where the Canadian tar sands business is kind of headquartered. All the oil workers, even though the producing assets are still there, Many of their homes have been burned to the ground. 90,000 residents have been evacuated from Fort McMurray.

And we do, unfortunately, have at least one MacroVoices regular listener, boots on the ground there.

Our listener Dean and his family were evacuated and may have lost their homes. So this is a really, really serious situation for the industry. I got an email from Dean telling me that, you know, the big question is it looks like there's not going to be any fire risk to the oil-producing assets, but there's no place for the oil workers to sleep. Because so many homes were destroyed. So it's going to be very interesting to see what happens there.

Meanwhile, we also had news on Thursday that an Iranian military commander had threatened to close the Straits of Hormuz, which of course is a global oil delivery choke point because all the oil coming out of the Middle East has to pass through the Straits of Hormuz. Last data that we had this afternoon on Thursday was just that threat. Just looking at the tape action Thursday afternoon, that must have died down because oil prices have come back down. As far as where we're headed Where do you think we're headed from here?

I think that the fundamental view that I've expressed, I really feel strongly about. As far as calling tops and bottoms, it's difficult work to start with, and I don't consider myself to be the world's greatest technical analyst. If I look at this market, it appears to me that we've got one more wave higher. Maybe we're going to test that $50 Brent number. I do see strong signs of hedging occurring in this market because the time spreads in the front end of the curve especially are collapsing with this strength in the market. So that tells me that we're seeing front-end strength But hedging on the back end as we get closer to that $50 number.

Nathan Egger: Erik, we've heard you and Art Berman discuss more recently a need to revisit some of your fundamental analysis. Can you give us any update on that front?

Erik Townsend: Well, I've spoken to Art, and I think both of us really feel that in terms of the supply-demand analysis, we got it right. This market has just gone crazy with sentiment as far as we're concerned. The thing that I really think is Interesting though, and as I've really thought through all of my assumptions, I have assumed, as most people have, it was very, very clear that Saudi Arabia wanted oil prices to go lower, at least through the beginning of February.

If you look at what happened with this production freeze nonsense, at first Saudi Arabia was pretty aggressive in denying that rumor, saying, no way, we don't know about any meeting, it's not happening. Then at some point, they kind of changed their tune and were willing to attend meetings and so forth. And I just think about if their goal was And if their goal was, as Art and I believed, to cut off the source of funding, cause massive collateral damage in the US junk bond market in order to prevent the shale drillers from getting funding next time around, if that's their goal, why did they let this go as far as it did?

They could have shut down this production freeze rumor long before the Doha meeting. Saudi Arabia could have just denounced it and said, this is nonsense, it's not happening. Right. Continue to want to suppress the price, why are they letting it go on so long? And why, since the Doha meeting, has Saudi Arabia not been more forthcoming or more aggressive about jawboning the market, more threats about increasing production, so on and so forth? So it almost feels like they're allowing the price to come up so that the US producers can hedge before maybe the supply-demand fundamentals kick in and there's another move lower.

That would totally unseat my theory about what Saudi Arabia's motivations have been. So, that's the only thing I can find that doesn't really add up for me is why Saudi Arabia has allowed this rally to happen when, in my eyes, it would've been pretty easy for them to stop it in its tracks. Aside from that, I think the fundamental analysis is spot on.

Gold breaks from the 50-day average

Nathan Egger: Perfect. And I should mention that our thoughts are certainly with Dean, his family, and all those affected by this fire in Alberta right now. Erik, last week you opined that the gold rally doesn't really get serious until gold clearly rejects its 50-day moving average and we see a move away from this hugging the line that we've been seeing in the gold market for the last couple of weeks, in fact. So you got your wish the very next day after last week's show when we saw a notable move higher. So does this mean that the gold bull market is finally on?

Erik Townsend: Well, possibly. From a technical standpoint, we were hugging that 50-day moving average line on the futures chart. Definitely last Friday, big break away from that, just flirting with $1,300, rejecting $1,300. I think that's natural round number resistance. As we're speaking Thursday afternoon, we're looking at $1,279.

If I look at this chart, yeah, it is breaking away. Like I said, needed to happen next. The next test will be, can it get through $1,300 and decisively above $1,300? All of these things really are looking pretty bullish for gold, and it really makes me think, okay, What's my problem? How come I haven't bought it yet? And I think the reason is this US dollar rally question. I don't really have a firm answer to, is the US dollar rally paused or have we seen the tops? And I think that as that question becomes clearer, or the answer to that becomes clearer, and particularly if we get clarity if there is another rate hike from the Fed, June rate hike, okay, I think that's bad news for gold.

On the other hand, if the Fed chickens out of a rate hike in June, I think that maybe could be the catalyst to really help it move further. I'm a little bit nervous about this market still. I want to see it stay off of its moving average for a good solid week. Coming up on that, it is correcting back to the downside, but well above the moving average. Let's see if it holds up. And I am playing this one conservatively. I haven't bought it yet. And I just wonder if there's another move down before the gold cyclical bear market is over.

I want to stress, though, for anyone listening, these are short-term views. I am I'm absolutely extremely bullish long-term on gold. I think it's going well above $2,000 in the next 10 years. The question is, is it ready yet? And for traders who are trading with leverage and have to be careful about what positions they put on, I don't really feel that we have a trend that is established decisively enough to really give me confidence in this market.

US dollar, DXY 92.50 and secret central-bank meetings

Nathan Egger: Okay. And I just want to stay on the US dollar for a moment, because you've asked several of our guests over the past couple of months whether they think this is a pause in the dollar rally or if the top is in. We've gotten a wide variety of answers and explanations for why it's going to go this way or that. But can you expound a little bit on your views on the US dollar right now?

Erik Townsend: Well, the reason that I'm asking all of our guests that same question, and I'm definitely planning to ask Das that question today, is that I don't know, and I feel it's the most important question to answer. If you look at what a lot of technical analysts have said, they say 92.50 on the dollar index is a really important number. A breakdown below that level would maybe indicate That there's a lot worse to come. I think it got all the way down to 91.89, but it stayed below 92.50 for like an hour. It didn't really count as far as I'm concerned.

I don't think we've got room to do another test lower that breaks below the prior low without really wondering what's going on. And the reason I'm asking all the guests the same question is I'm trying to assimilate a view of my own from all the smart people that we talked to. And frankly, what I come to at this point, my conclusion is—

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: There are unelected government officials, that is monetary policy-setting officials, in secret meetings around the world that are setting policy. Now, I don't know if this Jim Rickards theory that there was a February 26th Shanghai Accord meeting, he's calling it essentially the equivalent of the Plaza Accord, there was a secret meeting in Shanghai, you know, that's a great theory. Sounds like it kind of explains what's going on. I can't prove that. I haven't seen any compelling evidence to suggest that. Are these ideas true? I think that guys like Raoul Pal, Really articulate what to me is a very, very persuasive bull argument for the US dollar rally to continue.

My feeling is if it's not going to continue, it's probably because of some kind of government intervention somewhere. Is that Jim Rickards' theory of a Shanghai Accord, or is it something else? Why did Janet Yellen meet with President Obama with not a lot of description of what was going on a few weeks ago? I don't know. But something's going on here, and I think that we're probably going to find out in the next few weeks which way this is going to go, because we're flirting with a technical support level that if it breaks, most technicians I'm reading are saying, okay, something's really changing here.

Nathan Egger: So, if I understand you correctly here, what you're suggesting is maybe we should put a little less faith in technical levels than we normally would, knowing that this market is going to be moved primarily by the people in power who can move

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I mean, there's an argument for that. The reason that technical analysis works to some extent does have to do with psychology of traders. So if you think that the traders don't know the secret information and it's really being kept secret, there's good reason to conclude that technical analysis won't work on that.

The thing is, somebody always knows what's going on. People are trading inside information. Somebody knows what's happening, has better information than we do. And those are very well-heeled people that are putting a lot of trades on. So I tend to believe in technical analysis.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: technical analysis is being able to see through a situation like this, even though theoretically it shouldn't work if that secret information was truly secret.

Sovereign bond crisis: Bunds and JGBs

Nathan Egger: Gotcha. And we haven't covered the fixed income space in a while. Do you have any thoughts on global bond markets this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, we have had questions from listeners and discussions I've seen elsewhere on the internet. A lot of people are interested in this idea of shorting the US sovereign bond market, the US Treasury market, because they feel that, okay, there's a 30-year, 35-year, as Jim Rogers pointed out, bear market here in interest rates, bull market in bond prices. And from a secular perspective, we're about due for a reversal. I really think that's a bad idea. When I first learned about the US debt situation and how bad it was, I thought maybe there's a play shorting US Treasury debt.

What I've realized is it's going to happen in other parts of the world first. The US is still It's the cleanest dirty shirt in a very, very dirty laundry pile. So, what I'm starting to think about, not for any immediate trades, it's just when the sovereign bond crisis comes, and I'm convinced that it's coming, and I'm convinced that it does not start in the United States. And I don't know if it's tomorrow, next week, or 3 years from now.

So, how do you play that when you get to the point where the world maybe really is on the verge of a sovereign debt crisis?

I look at the German Bund deeply into negative yield territory all the way out beyond 10-year maturity. There are signs in that market. That's the Golf Bravo Lima futures contract, GBL. Signs of what looks kind of like a topping pattern, maybe the formation beginning of a right shoulder here. Maybe it's moving higher still. I'm kind of watching that market and I'm watching Japanese government bonds. I think between German bonds being the safest asset in Europe and therefore the one that's deepest into negative yield territory, or Japanese government bonds because the Japanese situation is growing dire, those are the places where the sovereign bond crash would happen long before a US Treasury crash.

I'm not saying it's upon us. I'm not saying it's imminent. What I am saying is I'm starting to think hard about where to play the sovereign bond crisis someday when it comes.

Why contrasting guests: Duncan, Das and Keen

Nathan Egger: Erik, before we move on to your feature interview with Satyajit Das, I'd like to share a little perspective with our listeners about what I've been trying to accomplish in our recent guest booking strategy. Because I've intentionally chose 2 recognized experts in the world of macroeconomics, Richard Duncan last week and Satyajit Das this week, specifically because we knew that they would likely have sharply contrasting views on many of the same subjects. So our listeners who are paying attention at home will notice that the series of questions that Erik is going to ask Das this week will be quite similar to those he posed for Mr. Duncan last week. So the whole idea is that we're trying to bring you contrasting views from different experts so that you can shape your own opinion.

Erik Townsend: And I really want to make this point emphatically, folks. The worst mistake you could make is to think of this as a contest or a debate where you're trying to decide which guest got it right and which guest got it wrong. Much to the contrary, what makes a good investor is the ability to be open-minded and listen to the views of several different experts, including those that you tend to disagree And then to assimilate your own worldview based on integrating the arguments that you found most compelling from each different expert. So, it's not about whether Mr. Duncan or Mr. Das has it right. It's about helping you get it right by presenting you with contrasting views on the same subjects from a number of recognized experts. We're starting with Richard Duncan and Satyajit Das, and we're going to add another economist next week in order to round out a trifecta of different viewpoints for you to consider about the current

Nathan Egger: It's good advice, Erik, and I think it's advice that really

Erik Townsend: pertains to all aspects of life, not just in the investing world.

Nathan Egger: But we don't cover all aspects of life. We're talking about investing here. So without further ado, let's go right to Erik's interview with Satyajit Das coming up as MacroVoices continues here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Interview with Satyajit Das: currency wars and the US dollar

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Satyajit Das, and that's not really his name because nobody, including me, can pronounce his first name. So we're just going to go by Das. I was absolutely delighted to get Das on the show because his first book, Traders, Guns and Money, bestselling book, was one of my all-time favorite finance reads. Das, thanks so much for joining me on the program. And just so people can hear it, let's hear just one time, what's your full name, sir? Satyajit Das.

Satyajit Das: Satyajit Das.

Erik Townsend: We're going to stick with Das because that's beyond my pay grade, sir. Let's dive right in. I think the most interesting thing in the world of global macro right now is this US dollar rally. Some people say we're just looking at a pause here. Others say the top is in. Still others are theorizing that perhaps there's some secret central banker meeting, this Shanghai Accord theory, that might involve an intentional policy to arrest the rise of the dollar. How do you see this issue, Das? Where is it going from here? Are we looking at a pause? Is the top in, or are we going to see more dollar strength?

Satyajit Das: I think you have to back up a little bit to look at the dollar in a wider context. And the context is the currency wars, which, according to central bankers, as you know, is not happening. And I think what you need to think about is how we used to think of currencies.

Which is in terms of certain fundamental factors like interest rate differentials, inflation rates, particularly relative inflation rates, growth rates in countries, their current account, their need for capital, you know, all of those sorts of things. The best way I can describe that is you take that— those textbooks and you make a bonfire because it's basically irrelevant now.

Because essentially what is now going on and has been going on since 2009 is a game about manipulating several indices, but one of them is obviously currencies. So to talk about what the dollar is going to do and what the dollar is not going to do is kind of asking the wrong question. The answer will depend on what the central banks want to do.

And I think to come back to your question of the dollar, let's look at what people did after 2009. What they actually did in the United States at least was use a variety of techniques, low interest rates, the QE programs to devalue the dollar. And that obviously gave some impetus to the US economy.

But the problem with that is in a world of limited growth, if you grow, other people get less of that growth if you're growing quicker. So what we saw And particularly over the last two or three years, we've seen the Europeans, the Japanese, and the Chinese start to try to devalue their currency.

So what we're now seeing is this battle going backwards and forwards, and I think what you're going to see is enormous volatility. And what you're going to see is the dollar rise, and then everybody's going to no no no no no! It's risen too much. It's risen too much. And then they're going to back right off, and then. And then everybody's going to go, no, no, no, no, no, no, it's fallen too much. Other currencies are going up too much. And you're just going to see this entire volatility going on. So I think the question is what that volatility means in the longer run. I think the US dollar will be stronger because essentially the United States is the cleanest shirt in a very dirty laundry basket of economies.

Emerging-market dollar debt and the risk of defaults

Erik Townsend: OK. If that is the situation with the US dollar, you expect volatility and then eventually it moving higher. Does that mean that there is a risk of an emerging market debt crisis as a result of dollar appreciation, or do you disagree with that view?

Satyajit Das: Well, I think the emerging markets are kind of interesting. And I go back to essentially the hypothesis that James O'Neill or Jim O'Neill Actually, I can't call him that now. He's now Lord, so I have to call him Lord O'Neill. When he was at Goldman Sachs, when he published the BRICS research, and essentially what he was positing was stronger rates of growth in emerging markets. Now, that's all fine. And to some extent, in fact, a large extent, his views of the growth have been correct.

But I think post-2007, 2008, you need to ask a question of what happened to these emerging countries. And effectively, there's a series of problems that emerging markets actually face. But I think central to that problem is their model of growth changed post-2008, 2009, and in part reflecting the quantitative easing policies in the developed markets. They used a lot more credit. So there's been a huge buildup of debt, and there's roughly $9 trillion of dollar debt outside of the United States. Of which probably about three trillion is in emerging markets.

Now, what you're pointing to is if rates go up, if the dollar goes up, what happens to this debt? And this is a conundrum that everybody has been focusing on since about 2013, when Fed Chairman Ben Bernanke started to talk about the taper causing enormous volatility. Now, my view is. You have to ask the question, is this dollar debt covered firstly by productive assets and secondly by dollar revenues?

And I think overall the conclusion that you reach if you look carefully is that the projects that a lot of this money went into aren't actually that productive. A lot of that went into building overcapacity. A lot of that went into real estate speculation. And what went into real projects was a lot of that was in commodities, which obviously throws off US dollar revenues, which is nice. But the problem is that if you have most of your money in unproductive projects, or alternatively you have it in matters which are linked to commodity prices, it's the combination of low commodity prices which is going to force down your revenues. And there's high levels of US dollar debt. Debt, which is going to cause you some problems. And my view is that you are going to see problems in emerging markets. They will vary.

And I think you're going to see rising defaults in emerging markets. People forget that foreigners have lent about $1 trillion to China, for instance. And these are mainly Chinese companies, and many of them are state-owned. So I think the emerging markets look suspect to me from that financial point of view. But also, the other thing I would say is everybody assumes that all this debt was covered by US dollar revenues.

I've spent the better part of about 30 years working around emerging markets. And the reality is they borrow in US dollars for a variety of reasons. And they haven't changed a lot in that 30 years. One is lower interest rates. And the second is the fact of abundant dollar liquidity.

And so I think you're going to find when the tide goes out, that many of these companies don't have the revenues and they certainly don't have the productive projects on the other side. And that contraction of liquidity from the withdrawal of dollars and also from higher dollar rates and the stronger dollar will come back to haunt them.

And there is a second part of the mythology which is kind of interesting. And that second part of the mythology is that everybody learned from '97, '98 with the Asian monetary crisis. And essentially that, that process will not repeat. I think to some extent they're correct. Many of these countries moved off fixed exchange rate. They built up reserves. But the problem is that when they did all of those things, and also the third thing they did was they redenominated a lot of their debt in domestic currencies. But the problem is they're still capital importers. So many of the actual investors in, say, Indonesian rupiah bonds or South African rand bonds or in Malaysian ringgit bonds or Brazilian real bonds are actually foreigners.

And they did it as part of the carry trade because essentially these securities gave higher returns. So if there is a problem in capital flows and if there is a problem in terms of emerging market currency weaknesses, they're going to start to sell this. And that's going to cause some problems. So, yes, you're quite correct. The stronger dollar outlook will cause some problems in emerging markets.

And the old famous saying about emerging markets that when things go pear-shaped, they go to submerging markets will, I think, play out over the next few years.

Cyclical downturn or structural shift: the Fed's exit trap

Erik Townsend: Well, based on your answer, it sounds like comparative monetary policy, how the US monetary policy compares with other nations, is going to play a very important role in this. So let's move on to that now, because we We still have the ECB and the Bank of Japan clearly in easing mode. They're still in money printing mode. What the Fed would like us to believe is, hey, they have reached so-called liftoff. They feel that the US economy is able to resume organic growth on its own, and we are embarking now in a rate normalization cycle that will basically take us back to historically normal interest rates. I know that I'm extremely skeptical of that view myself. But where do you see this? Is this true or is a policy U-turn imminent towards either negative interest rates or more quantitative easing from the Federal Reserve?

Satyajit Das: Well, again, I think you need to put the policy in context. And the context is that when the Lehman incident and the great slowdown of 2008, 2009 took place, I think you have to look at that and ask yourself a question. Is this a cyclical downturn? Or is this something different? In other words, a structural shift, a discontinuity.

I think the central bankers essentially thought that it was just a normal cyclical downturn, which means run a few deficits on the fiscal side, cut interest rates, and things will recover. And to be very fair to them, over the last 30 years, that sort of rinse and repeat formula has worked quite well. Well, the problem this time around, I don't think was that it wasn't what they thought it was. I think it's a structural discontinuity. And as you know, people who are much more eminent than me, like George Soros, have been arguing that fairly vociferously for the last 7 or 8 years.

And once you get that divergence between a structural shift and a cyclical downturn, then your policy settings need to be thought through. And I think cutting interest rates was fine in the sense that it bought you a bit of time, but you needed to do a whole lot of things. And the 2 major things I think were crucial was to address debt and the global imbalances issue between, say, a whole bunch of people who saved and exported their savings and a whole bunch of people who didn't save and just imported those savings.

Now, we didn't do either. We didn't address the debt and we didn't address the global imbalances. And part of the debt was also future debt in the sense of entitlement programs, which are being addressed but in a very piecemeal way. So if you look at that overall context of having bought some time with low interest rates and then basically hoping that there is a cyclical recovery and growth and inflation take care of the debt problem, that has proved to be be completely, totally wrong.

And now what you've got is a real problem of firstly different economies in different places, which is going to your point of the fact that different central banks have policies. But the more important thing is the total debt levels have actually now increased. And to look at that in context, let's say if you normalize U.S. interest rates, you'd get back to 3%.

Now, to put that into context, for the US federal government alone, with $19 trillion of debt, that means that you would add roughly $570 billion in additional interest costs. Now, that is actually larger than the fiscal deficit that's being currently run by the US government. And that deficit is, in historical terms, still substantial.

So you're now trapped in a situation where if you push up interest rates, you basically have additional interest burden, which actually makes the management of the entire debt complex terribly difficult. Now, to put that into another context, in say a place like Japan, at the moment, firstly, for every dollar the Japanese government spends, Less than half of that, so less than 50 cents of that, is covered by tax revenues. But of that 50 cents, a quarter of that is going to servicing Japanese government bonds in terms of interest.

Now, that's under conditions of zero interest rates. So you have a problem of trying to normalize interest rates when you get into this conundrum of high debt, low growth, and disinflation. Now, then the next issue for the Fed is that, okay, do we separate out our international obligations such that we have and our domestic obligation, which are very clear and documented?

And if you look at the domestic story, it's patchy. But overall, you could make a case for normalization and mainly to avoid speculative bubbles in many markets, which we know from evidence exists. But on the other side, if I push up interest rates, And what we saw in 2013 is when the 10-year Treasury bond in the United States went up 1%, interest rates pretty much around the world went up by 1%, except actually in Japan— I beg your pardon— in Japan, where they actually had a quantitative easing program that was being launched at that time.

So what you're going to do is now export instability. And the interesting thing about the Fed is that it has this waxing and waning process. Every once in a while they talk about international stability and then they don't. And for instance, everybody's taken a lot of sort of notice of the fact that the Federal Reserve's latest statements don't have international stability as a problem. So they're assuming that rates are going to go up. But I think it's a more complicated program than that. And I think the issue is that the recovery that we have, the financial market stability and the higher asset prices we have are actually a function of these low rates. So I don't think anybody really knows what will happen when you, when you remove this.

And don't forget, the problem will very quickly go to the core of the financial system, which is the banks, because if you have asset prices falling, they form the major part of the collateral which supports lending in the banking system, which is what we saw in 2008, 2009. And if that collapses, then we have a real problem. So I personally think the Fed and indeed central banks around the world now have a major problem that they can't exit from this actual position that they've actually found themselves in.

And I think the best way to describe it is there was a woman called Ashley Lorenza, who apparently was a high-class prostitute and wrote a memoir. And in it— I have fairly eclectic reading tastes, so I did read this. And essentially, at one point, she says, that the definition of an addiction is something which you can give up next Tuesday.

And I think the central banks are now in that position of they're going to actually keep saying that they're going to normalize policies, but they're going to find the constraints on them such that they're actually not going to be able to do it. And if you want a good historical precedent for that is I think if you ask the Japanese central bankers in 1994, '96, whether they thought these policies that they were putting in place were going to be there some 20, 21 years later, they would have laughed and said these are just emergency measures.

And the problem is those emergency measures have now become permanent. And it would not surprise me at all to see that process play out in developed economies other than Japan.

More debt, negative rates, cash bans and central bankers

Erik Townsend: I think you've really hit the key of this is the problem we started with was too much debt. And the solution that's been engineered since 2009 is more debt. And what's being discussed— we already have negative interest rates in many places in the world. There's discussion of that in the United States. There's a lot of discussion of banning cash because it's essentially necessary in order to get substantive negative interest rates. You have to ban cash, otherwise people would just hoard cash. So, it seems like everything the government is doing is really encouraging more borrowing and more spending, which I think you and I agree is really the causal problem. So, it seems like not only are we only treating the symptoms and not the real causal problem, but we're making it worse. Am I right about that? And if so, where does this whole quantitative easing story, you know, helicopter money, the various things that have been discussed, where does this take us and what are the unintended consequences of it?

of this?

Satyajit Das: Well, I think I agree with you that this is very, very definitely the problem. But I think to get people to acknowledge the problem is going to be extremely difficult. And let me explain why I think that's a huge problem.

The first issue is you have to again look at the, I suppose, the understructure of this. And the understructure is we need growth. And if you actually look at the history of the world in the last 20 or 30 years, we— and this goes back to the 1970s and the period of stagflation when growth started to peter out and people start to experiment with how we actually restart the growth engines because people are basically addicted to higher living standards. And if you look at history, the improvement in living standards is actually only the last probably 150 years.

Before that, you didn't actually see much in the way of improvement in living standards. And part of that's technological. Part of that's economic.

But I think the crucial thing here is once you get hooked onto this, then the problem is you've got to keep going. And when the normal engines of growth, which are things like population growth, things like innovation, productivity improvements, those things started to slow down. Down, we started to use debt as an accelerant.

And there's no mystery about what debt does. It just brings forward consumption and investment, which in itself is not a bad thing. But the problem is if you can't pay back that debt— in other words, what you've invested in doesn't provide the income or the appreciation capital value of the asset to pay that back— you've got a serious problem.

And I don't think there's any acknowledgment of that because I have not seen any central banker, any policymakers who actually accept that. And one of the things that'll amuse you is, as you know, I recently published a book called The Age of Stagnation in North America, but it's called A Banquet of Consequences elsewhere. The US publisher thought A Banquet of Consequences sounded like a cookbook. So they changed the title. But it was interesting to see the reviews of that book, which have been, to be very candid, uniformly negative.

And essentially everybody's view is that I make too much of debt. That's fine. That's not a problem because it'll take care of itself. Now, unfortunately, I don't agree with that because no matter what you do, it creates a burden going forward. And to now come back to not dealing with the debt and let's see how they are dealing with the debt and let's look at what you just mentioned, which is, I think, the crucial policy going forward, which is negative interest rates.

Now, we can dance on the head of this pin in whichever way you like, but What negative interest rates are is actually a form of taxation or a form of confiscation of money. Because if I put my money in the bank of $100 and at the end of the year I get $98 or $95 back, what it's doing, it's being used to actually wipe out part of the debt.

And what that does is essentially create the most perverse incentives in the world. Because under those circumstances, a logical person would not put money in a bank. Why would you do that? So you take it out. And this is where your allusion to banning cash becomes important.

And this is not actually hypothetical. In Japan in the 1990s, and then towards the middle of the 1990s, I observed that the sales of bank— sorry, not bank, but house safes went up. And essentially, that was the only industry that was growing in a substantive way in Japan. And the reason was very simple. People were just taking their money out of the bank and stuffing it into these safes. And we're now seeing that process play out. But this is kind of quite bizarre if you look at it in terms of a modern economy which is driven by credit, if people start to do that.

And I'll show you how absurd the policies are. On the one side, the policymakers are trying to make sure that banks have balance sheets which are funded by deposits and the tenor of the deposits, the maturity of the deposits matches the assets. In other words, the asset liability mismatches are minimized.

But at the same time, they're putting in policies elsewhere which are actually counterproductive in the sense that people will take out their money from the bank, creating instability of the funding of these banks.

And I think the most important thing about this is to understand that this is actually a form of financial repression, which actually becomes political repression. And the most interesting way to think about this is what Andrew Haldane, which is the Chief Economist of the Bank of England, actually explained this. He was the most candid of all the central bankers about negative interest rates. And he said, look, interest rates at zero or substantively zero And we're reaching the end of our policy toolkit.

And he was quite open and said there's a crisis coming. We all know that. And if that crisis occurs, we're going to have to cut interest rates. And he said— and I actually have been saying this for a long time— that in a crisis, you need to have around about 3 to 4% interest rate cuts up your sleeve.

Now, here you can't cut by 3 to 4% because you're already at zero. So he said we're going to have to go into negative interest rates in a very, very deep way. And if we do that, then the problem is the policy will be defeated by people taking money out of the banks. So we have to ban cash.

He was actually explicit. And I would go one step further. You not only have to ban cash, you have to put capital controls in place because people will take their money out of countries if you do this.

So you get these sorts of repressive processes being put in place. And I think one of the key things here to grasp, I think, is the fact that we have a bunch of central bankers who, in my view, have never worked an honest day in their lives. They have a career path, which means they just get PhDs at universities, mill around with other PhDs, then get a job at a central bank and mill around with other central bankers who've never really worked in the real world. They don't understand very much about that world. And, and if you want evidence of that, I think Mr. Dudley, who was at the New York Fed, decided to have a town hall meeting in Brooklyn and explain to people in Brooklyn how everybody was better off. And I think he was pretty lucky to escape alive out of that meeting. And so these people have no cognizance of how the real world works.

And more importantly, they're unelected officials and they can do whatever they like or they think they like. And they don't understand the political and social implications of this. And I think that's really, really dangerous. And you're seeing some spinoff from that in places like the United States. You can see the rise of some of the populist politicians like Bernie Sanders and and Donald Trump. Now, I'm not saying their policies are right or wrong, but they certainly are a reaction to the types of steps that are being contemplated. So I think this is actually a very dangerous point, not only from an economic point of view, but from a social and political point of view. But, you know, I think it's important to actually give the listeners an idea of what they should do. So I've worked out for them if they have, say, money in the bank and they want to take it out, I'll give them an idea of how to save up.

Because if they're going to carry $10 million in large banknotes, and I assume the largest banknote is $100, $10 million is going to weigh 100 kilos. So I think you should basically go to the gym and muscle up. And the other thing is, if you're going to buy a home safe, I was trying to work out how much money you could put in a 1 cubic meter safe. And in the United States, that happens to be a substantial sum of money, which is about $86 million. So, I think your listeners can sort of scale up or down according to their net worth as to what they're going to need.

China: debt, bad loans and turning Japanese

Erik Townsend: Well, and I couldn't agree with you more. And of course, we don't have to worry about any pushback from the people on the loss of liberty associated with banning cash, because all you have to do is tell them it's because of terrorism. Let's move on to China. I think China is obviously a huge story in the macroeconomy. In the global macro environment, there's every opinion from the worst is over to the worst has yet to begin.

Where do you see the whole story on China? Where are we in the cycle? Can the current leadership survive? And what will the knock-on effects be? Because obviously there's a lot of money that flows out of China into Vancouver real estate and various other places. Where is this story headed?

Satyajit Das: How do you see it playing Well, I think there's several things that you need to think about. I'm always reminded of China because Charles de Gaulle, General Charles de Gaulle, who was the president of France for many, many years, once gave a view of China. He said China is a very large country with a lot of Chinese people in it.

And I suspect that Western understanding of China has always sort of struggled to get beyond that level. So I think the size dazzles everyone. Everybody. And to be honest, in recent times, China's become such an important catalyst in terms of growth, company profits, and also in terms of recycling of savings, it plays a disproportionate sort of role in people's consciousness. But you got to keep that in perspective.

The US economy is still about double the size of China. And China's It's large, but not as large, say, even as the Eurozone economies combined. But it is substantial. And they face enormous challenges. And those challenges, I think you can sort of say, range from slowing growth, the debt problems, which everybody talks about. But they also have problems of industrial structure, which is a very inefficient state-owned enterprise sector. They overinvest relative to consumption. There's massive overcapacity. There are asset bubbles in property. The social problems of demographics, and also their environment is very degraded. And politically, it's, it's got a huge series of challenges. So it's a very complex story.

But the real issue for me is the one that everybody's worried about, which is the debt problem. Now, to put that into perspective, let's look at what China's debt has done. In 2000, China's debt was around $2 trillion. In 2007, it was about $7 trillion. The last definitive figures are around about the end of 2014.

It had gone to $28 trillion. So I repeat, in 14 years, their debt has gone from $2 trillion to $28 trillion. Now, in fairness, during the same period, the country has grown. But even if you look at it as a percentage of GDP, it's doubled. Now, that's That's just extraordinary, extraordinary expansion credit. And to be honest, I struggle to find another country in the world which has experienced that.

Then the question is, okay, is that good or bad? And the answer to that question is it depends on what you did with the money. And I think that's where the real problem comes. We know that a lot of that money was used in investment. And that investment may or may not return what is needed to pay back that debt. I think that lies at the heart of the problem. And a lot of that was done purely to prop up demand.

And the reason it was done was in 2007, 2008, what happened as the global economy turned down is the Chinese economy also turned down. And there was just in Guangzhou Province alone about 20 million people who became unemployed in a very short period of time. And whatever else dominates Chinese thinking, social stability and political hegemony of the Chinese Communist Party are paramount.

So they had to do something. And so this whole debt building up is part of the process of restarting demand. Now, that's all fine. Have they spent wisely? My suspicion is some of the things have been pretty wise. Some of them have been pretty dumb. You know, you can build fast trains, but if no Chinese can afford to be on those fast trains, they would have been far better off just looking at their existing infrastructure and trying to improve their existing normal train services. They've built superhighways, yet I know of Thousands and thousands of small villages in China, which don't have anything other than a dirt road leading up to them, which has huge economic consequences. So I don't think they spend well.

But we are where we are, and to some extent, the question particularly important for Western observers is how this problem will be dealt with. And obviously, it becomes this sort of dichotomy between people who assume. That the world is going to end and it's all going to collapse. And the other sort of everything will be all right group who basically are saying, well, no, no, no, it's all under control.

I think I would actually sit somewhere more towards the middle of that spectrum. And this is because you have to understand how China has dealt with these problems in the past.

This is going to be my 3rd debt crisis in China in terms of banking system crises. And this happens periodically. And every time it happens, it's exactly the same. There is actually no change. It is essentially the government-owned banks lending to state-owned enterprises and local governments who then misspend the money. And then the banks have to essentially manage manage what is non-performing loans.

And this is how they're going to do it, because this is what they've done in the past. What will happen is the state has 4 asset management companies which are very, very large, and they will buy these bad loans from the banks. And what they will do is finance that purchase by issuing government bonds, which are guaranteed by central government, and they will sell them back to the banks from whence the non-performing loans came.

How do I know this? Because this is what happened last time.

Now, the interesting thing about that process is that the idea is that over time these loans will be dealt with. And I think going forward, this is the problem that China has. The last time this happened, which was in the late '90s, early 2000s, The bad loans were 20% of GDP, and that amounted to about $200 billion at the time.

So what they did was the process that I've just described, and what bailed them out was very strong growth of 6, 7, 8%. So what was 20% of GDP in 10 years' time became 5% of GDP and could be restructured or written off as the case might be. The problem this time is they're not going to get that level of growth, and the size of the problem is larger, and the economy is coming off a much larger base, and they will not have the uplift from external demand that they probably enjoyed during this period.

So I think it's going to be more difficult to deal with. But because the Chinese state essentially owns both the borrowers and the lenders. And they have substantial resources, they will be able to muddle their way through it.

And I think the longer-term impact of this is slightly different. What you're going to see in China is a Potemkin village economy, which looks fine on the outside, but essentially it's hollow inside, filled with underperforming assets, which are like zombie companies which are kept alive. In fact, what I have argued for a very long period of time is that what is actually happening is China is turning Japanese. Because if you look at what happened in Japan post the bursting of the bubble economy, and particularly the appreciation of the yen in '85, is the process we're going to see play out in China.

And what that means is that China may not collapse, but China's focus is going to become more inward. And also, it's not going to provide the growth to the rest of the world and the markets for products and the trading opportunities that people are looking for. And I think that is the bigger story. But that's not going to happen quickly. That's going to play out over long periods of time.

And just as an aside, I find it hugely amusing amusing to hear people talking about Chinese reforms. I've been dealing with China for about 30 years. And during that period, I've learned several things. One is China is not a country. It's a family business. And the family is the Chinese Communist Party.

And they run it as a family business. And the only thing that matters is the familia, essentially to keep them in power. And they have absolutely no interest in reform. And their adherence to what I would call market principles is very superficial. They like the market as long as the market gives them what they want. They don't like it, as we saw last year and the year before, when the stock market started to come down. They didn't find the market to be terribly helpful. So they're not going to reform.

And there's a very funny story about that, the assumption about the control over the economy that the Chinese Politburo has is kind of overstated as well. And one of the things about that is a story when Henry— which Henry Kissinger reports about Richard Nixon's visit to China in 1972. So Richard Nixon is sitting across from Mao Zedong, and he starts to flatter Mao Zedong by telling him what a great man he is.

And how it's remarkable that he's been able to bring this huge landmass and a billion people under control. And Mao Zedong starts to laugh when he hears the translation of this question. And he looks at Richard Nixon and responds in Mandarin, I control Beijing, just about. And that's essentially the problem. That's essentially the problem that you have. So China, I don't actually see the collapse scenario, but I do see a period of stagnation emerging which has significant implications. And there's one last implication that's worth mentioning.

That overcapacity in China in terms of steel, various raw metals and so forth does impact the rest of the world. As you've now seen, there's a lot of low-priced steel being let onto the world market as that overcapacity is released. And that has huge implications for the rest of the world. Which interestingly enough, people like Donald Trump are tapping into, Bernie Sanders is tapping into, with interesting anti-China rhetoric, some of which, to be very fair, has some factual basis.

Gold: currency, confidence and faith

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to a subject that we've had a lot of interest in, which is precious metals. Something I find very interesting is we've had quite a few guests on this program who agree with you. They are long-term dollar bulls. But they're about evenly divided. Half feel that that means you should be gold bearish because you're dollar bullish. And then others say, no, no, no, it's a different equation because of this environment. It's time to be gold bullish regardless of what the dollar does.

Where do you fall in this? Or perhaps you have a completely different view?

Satyajit Das: Well, I have never really understood gold. But what I do think of gold as now is in 3 dimensions. The first dimension is I think of gold as a currency. Currency. And essentially, it's a vote of confidence or a lack of vote of confidence in things like, for instance, the US dollar, the euro, or the yen.

So essentially, if people think these currencies are going to weaken, they just buy gold because they can convert it back at some stage. The second element of that, which is related to that, is it's a vote in fiat money systems. And essentially, the— I suppose the integrity and the management expertise of central banks. So essentially, gold tends to function as if we don't like these policies as a default position. And the third is really nominal interest rates.

If you push nominal interest rates to negative territory, gold becomes attractive. It's simple as that. And to some extent, there is a mythological element to gold as well. And there is There is some truth in that in the sense that if you look at it historically during times of turbulence or volatility, gold sometimes does very, very well.

And that means that essentially people now add gold to their portfolio or precious metals to their portfolio as kind of a hedge against that. But to be very fair, I think most people would not have their entire portfolio in gold. So they're looking at a period of instability. So they say, well, we'll add some gold to the portfolio. And I think if you actually look at the history of gold, it's not a great long-term store of value.

My friend Dylan Grice from when he used to be at Société Générale did a famous paper when, being Scottish, he went back to his ancestors about 500 years ago. And he said if they'd taken all their money and put it into gold, what would have happened? Dylan found out after his calculations that they would have lost around 95% of their value.

So I don't think it's a good long-term store of value necessarily.

But over certain periods of history, it's done very, very well. And particularly in recent history against things like fiat currencies, the argument goes it does well. So I think it has a role. But to some extent, gold is really not financial. It's religious. So there are people who believe in it and people who don't. So it's a matter of faith. in that sort of sense. And I never ask people about their religious beliefs because it only leads to conflict.

Outlook: Lazarus, stagnation or the wheels come off

Erik Townsend: Now, as we're starting to run out of time here, my final question to Das would be, what is all this going to mean? What is the medium to long-term outlook look like? Got fantastic news for you. Das has written an excellent paper really going into a lot of detail. Registered users at MacroVoices.com should have already received that from us via email by the time that you hear this episode. I don't want you to miss it, though. It's a really good one. So, Das, could you please give them just maybe the 3 to 4 minute executive summary of what that paper is about?

Satyajit Das: Sure. I think we now face a whole bunch of areas of instability, which could be equity markets, debt markets, particularly things like energy and corporate and emerging. And we obviously have slow growth and deflation, the risk of a Chinese hard landing. The currency volatility, the liquidity conditions which are tightening in some areas, and the problem of policy errors and policy exhaustion, as well as social and political breakdowns, are always there. And I see the world working out in one of three scenarios.

One is what I call the Lazarus economy, which is that I'm completely wrong and everything sort of goes back to normal, and essentially the economy grows and inflates its way out of these problems, and we manage to resolve all of these. I give that about a. Half a percent chance, because you should never say never.

And that might be some external catalyst like cold fusion or something like that, or something miraculous happening. I think the most likely scenario, which is I'd give about a 70% chance, is stagnation, which is we turn Japanese. So essentially what happens is we actually become a low-growth, low-inflation or deflationary economy where the central bank pettifoggery keeps us going, but we don't improve very much and we just drag the problem out.

The last risk, obviously the 30% chance, is the wheels come off.

And the major concern I now have is essentially we have so much buildup of risk, and particularly in certain asset prices, and it's all dependent on this Hail Mary pass to essentially the central bankers. Who we want to believe are right, yet we know in our heart of hearts, they don't know what they're doing. And basically, there's no real solution to this other than hard choices, which would involve a massive drop of living standards, which nobody's willing to tolerate.

And the problem is, everybody sort of knows this and senses this. But there's going to be a moment, an inflection point, when people just lose faith in all of this. And at that point in time, everybody's going to hit the exits. And once you do that, it becomes uncontrollable. And this time around, you have to keep in mind that whatever happens, it's going to be very different to what actually happened in 2007, 2008.

The reason is, in 2007, 2008, the problems were smaller. The problems have become bigger. For instance, debt in the world has grown by $57 trillion, which is around about 17 percentage points of GDP. And many of the problems have become much, much more intractable. The second element is the policy measures available in terms of government balance sheets and interest rates and QE options are now much more constrained. And even things like negative interest rates, as we saw in the earlier part of this year, have created massive backlashes. Emerging markets, which were a source of growth and demand in 2008 are now a source of weakness.

And as I said, the belief in policymakers is now actually much less because we've discovered the emperor does have no clothes. And the last element in this, which I think people need to keep in the back of their mind, is the geopolitical situation is much worse than it was in 2008. So if the wheels do come off, they're going to come off in a rather spectacular way.

So I think those are the 3 scenarios. And I think the best one can say is that you should actually think through that in terms of your personal financial choices and investment decisions. I think it was Michael Tyson who once said that everybody has a plan. The problem, he went on to add, is everybody has a plan until they get punched in the mouth. So I think it'll be a difficult process for people to negotiate. But the one thing I do strongly believe believe is that volatility, and particularly episodes of very large melt-ups and meltdowns, are going to be with us for a very, very long period of time. And that's going to make any investing decision much more complicated than perhaps in the recent past.

Erik Townsend: I really feel privileged to have you on the program, Das. It is normal and customary at this point to invite our guests to promote whatever they're You're not selling anything. You're basically retired and you make the time to do an interview like this, not because you have some commercial interest, but because it's a passionate subject. And it's people like you that we really feel passionate about getting on the program. I know you've got nothing to sell, but for people who would like to follow your work and learn more about you, are there any places online that they can read more of your writings?

Satyajit Das: Well, I'm sort of winding up, but I still write a column called Das Kapital. With a name like Das, what else would you call it? In The Independent in the U.K. UK. I still write occasionally for MarketWatch, and those are the 2 major sources. And I have a couple of books out, so people might, if they want to basically get depressive literature— I actually think if they should read that, they should get a bottle of vodka or their preferred tipple next to them and perhaps get away— take away all sharp objects and essentially any ligatures around the room just in case it has the wrong

Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, we really appreciate your joining us today. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Traders, Guns and Money and how derivatives get complicated

Nathan Egger: That was a great interview with Das, Erik. I could listen to that guy talk all day, even if he was reading nursery rhymes. I just love his voice. But something that I picked up on immediately was when you described Traders, Guns and Money, his book from the mid-2000s, mid to late 2000s, as one of your all-time best finance reads. And those are pretty strong words of praise coming from you. So, I was actually looking forward to the point at the end where we let our guests promote and where Das would promote his books. But in the end, he didn't care at all about promoting anything because apparently he's retiring. It must be nice. But I still want to know, what's the story on this book? Or, you know, why did it resonate with you?

Erik Townsend: Well, it came at a particularly ripe time in my education. I was going through the process of reinventing myself from retired software entrepreneur to full-time investor and trying to learn to really be a professional investor on a full-time basis. So, I'm reading all of the wrong things. I was looking mostly at textbooks from finance degree programs, MBA programs, and so forth. And I don't know why I was naive enough to think that they would teach people in those programs anything useful about the markets, which so far as I can tell, they don't. So, I'm reading about efficient market hypothesis and modern portfolio theory and rational expectations theory. And all of this nonsense, frankly. And I see this book as I'm walking through the Borders bookstore in San Francisco, and it's just such a catchy title. I pick it up just out of curiosity.

One of the best things that ever happened to me, because one of the stories I remember Das telling in the book is he describes the history of the derivatives industry in terms that really made sense to me.

He says, look, in the early '70s, we got listed options, puts and calls on stocks. And that meant that the big banks had to make a market in these things. And the people that ran the market-making desks had no idea how to price them. Well, if you are a super high-paid Wall Street executive and you manage a trading desk or a market-making desk, you don't admit to your boss that you don't know how to price something. You figure it out. So what happened is they didn't know how to figure it out. This was before the Black-Scholes option pricing model had been published. So really smart guys figured out how on their own before Black-Scholes to price options efficiently. The market-making desks didn't. That created a Tremendous, just huge inefficiency that some people exploited and made a huge amount of money. Because basically, the people that were responsible in the finance industry had to either admit that they didn't know how to price it or try to save face and act like they did.

And they did the later. Eventually, Black-Scholes gets published, and that means that this inefficiency is gone because now the market makers know how to price options.

Well, the greediest and sleaziest people in the room watched this whole story go down. And in Das's description, they said, wait a minute, we got the memo. All you have to do is make something so complicated that nobody can understand it. And the finance professionals who ought to understand it are forced to pretend because they would lose face in front of their management otherwise. And you get a bunch of people that are acting in very foolish, inefficient ways because you've set them up essentially to look bad in front of their management otherwise.

So, I imagined from reading this story, I don't think this was actually in Das's book, but I just imagined this room full of 100 PhDs that had just been hired. And this Wall Street guy with a Brooklyn accent comes in and he says, all right, you PhD guys, here's the story.

You guys are gonna invent some new financial derivatives. You're gonna come back and present them to management. If we understand one word of what you're saying, then you're fired and you're never gonna work in the industry again, but it's got to be full of math because we might get a guy from one of these freaking firms that wants to talk math and understand this, and you got to keep them busy for at least a few hours so we can buy a hooker for his boss and get the deal done. Okay, you guys got it? Good. And hence the financial derivatives industry is born, and it is about creating things that are too complex for anybody to understand so that you can sell them things that they don't understand the risk they're taking.

So I've got this perspective from Das this book, just months later, I had moved to New York and I had joined a high net worth investor club in New York City. Most of the guys are way more experienced than me, Wall Street veterans, and they're all trying to get their heads around what a collateralized debt obligation is. And there's also something called a CDO squared, which is an obligation of other obligations. So, it's— you've got starting with a CDO, it's multiple tranches of bonds, and then you've got multiple tranches of CDOs within a CDO squared. I'm just looking So, I'm looking at this way over my head at that time. I had no idea what these guys are talking about. But I'm looking at veterans, 40 years in the industry, made lots of money in their careers. They can't figure it out. Das told me how this goes down. I don't need to understand this myself. What I need to do is look for who's the guy who knows how to short this thing, whatever it is.

And so, in the movie, The Big Short, they portray it as if the only guy who figured this out was Michael Burry, the hedge fund manager from

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: There were actually about a dozen different hedge fund managers that figured this out and were trading credit default swaps on the bonds in these subprime mortgage CDOs.

I managed to get into one of those funds as a result, really, of the insight I got from Das's book. I'm like, I get it. This is exactly what they're doing is what Das said. They're making it too complicated. They sold a whole bunch of people a bunch of risk that they didn't understand, and it's blowing up. And that was what prompted me to invest in a fund that actually made a very healthy profit.

That guy actually was, I think his best year was 2007 at over 200% return. I was not in the fund for that whole time, so I didn't make that much, but other people did. And Das goes on to just debunk all kinds of stuff that was big in the industry at the time, whether it's portable alpha or any of these other buzzwords. He's saying it's all nonsense. They make this stuff up in order to confuse people.

Portable alpha and the pay-to-play conference

Nathan Egger: Wait a minute, Erik, portable alpha? What is that? That sounds, I've never heard that before.

Erik Townsend: Oh, that was a mid-2000s buzzword. So let's say you're a pension fund, manager and you really like some investment you're looking at, might be a stock, it might be something else, but whatever it is, it has a really high beta to the S&P 500. In other words, if you buy this thing, you're going to even further increase your correlation to the S&P 500. And you'd like to be a little bit decorrelated from a risk management standpoint. So what do you do?

Nathan Egger: I mean, I think you either reduce your S&P exposure or you find a short S&P hedge to reduce your net S&P exposure.

Erik Townsend: Nathan, Nathan, Nathan, you're not listening. What you just said simply, easily, directly addresses the problem and solves it. It does not generate millions of dollars for middlemen. It does not confuse anybody. You're not getting the memo here. You call it portable alpha.

First of all, I actually went to a portable alpha conference once in San Francisco. So you get a whole bunch of pension fund managers from all over the country in in a room, and the first thing you do is get a super confident Wall Street guy come and tell them how great this is, that portable alpha is going to change everything. Then you get a math guy that's got 3 PhDs talking about fractals and quadratic equations. And the favorite one is Greek letters. Anything involving Greek letters gets everybody confused. So, the gamma to the beta of the inverse differential of the something. And I'm just watching exactly as Das explained. I'm looking around the room and I'm seeing these guys first, their jaw drops, they're confused, they don't understand what's What's going on? Then they kind of do this, oh, wait a minute, I better not look like I don't know that I understand this. I'll act cool.

And they get them to the point where everybody's trying to act cool and nobody understands it. And then they start explaining, well, I've got this magic financial engineering that's so amazing. What you can do is you can take an investment that's a high-beta investment and you can effectively port that alpha, take the alpha you want, whatever the investment generates above and beyond the S&P 500, and you can decouple it from the investment and move it onto another portfolio without affecting your beta. Isn't that amazing? Amazing. Now, how do they accomplish that? They do exactly what you said, which is trivial, and a retail trader like yourself can learn it kind of in your first year, but that doesn't generate lots of fees. So they go through all this stuff.

Then this woman that they had hired to emcee the event gets up and there's a lot of confused faces. She finally says, okay, think of it this way, guys. You've got some big investment you want to make, but think of what it is, is it's got this little bit of alpha and this great big piece of beta, and that beta is the S&P. So, what you do is you short the S&P, very similar to your description, Nathan. She says you short the S&P, that effectively allows you to separate the alpha and minimize your beta impact on your portfolio when you buy this investment.

Then she goes on and she says, and as you do that, the alpha is now a smaller overall thing because you've hedged most of the overall overall notional size of this investment out with the short S&P hedge. Therefore, it becomes even more important to be aware of things like what your fee structure is, because fees are now a larger percentage of things. She gives a succinct, clear explanation that was almost as clear as yours was. And all of a sudden, there's a lot of heads nodding and everybody gets it.

Now, I used to do a lot of public speaking in the software business, and I know what it feels like to be a public speaker. And I know you don't— it's often a thankless job. So, I approach her afterwards and say, I just want to introduce myself. I thought you did a fantastic job of clarifying that. She gets offended and turns around and walks away. And I'm thinking, what the heck just happened here? And she sees me later and says, what firm are you with? Who are you again? And I said, I'm not with any firm. I'm a private investor. I'm just, you know, trying to learn this. She says, oh my goodness, your comment to me was sincere. You don't know what's going on. I said, no, I don't know what's going on. She says, I'm very proud of my public speaking. It's something I feel very strongly about, but I'm in the process of being fired today.

The comment that I made where I I said you want to focus on your fees. This is a pay-to-play conference, which means that the people who paid for this are the salesmen that are here to sell these services. I just told their customers that it is smart to understand what you're paying for this stuff. And it looks like I'm going to be fired. And there are people talking about walking me out the door even before the day is over. So, when your comment came, I thought you were being sarcastic. I'm sorry. I took it seriously. No, no, no. took offense.

And I'm like, are you serious? So we ended up— it's kind of a funny story. We ended up having breakfast the next day before both of our flights. And when I moved to New York, I ended up dating her for a little while.

Nathan Egger: Happy ending.

Erik Townsend: Woohoo!

Buffett on sales over investing

Nathan Egger: This kind of reminds me of and reinforces Warren Buffett's comments from last weekend's Berkshire Hathaway annual meeting, where he was saying that the majority of money that has been made on Wall Street has been made through sales acumen and not investing Well, I don't usually agree with Warren Buffett on many things, but on that one, I couldn't possibly agree more.

Erik Townsend: If there's anything I've learned as I've gone from private investor to getting involved with this business, it is all about BS. It's about marketing. And I think that Traders, Guns and Money, although it's— and Das has another book out which I've not read yet, unfortunately. Traders, Guns and Money was a classic in my mind because it really really just explained what this is all about. It's people that are selling bullshit, frankly.

Next week: Steve Keen; sign-off

Nathan Egger: Well, next week, Erik, as you mentioned, you're going to be talking with an economist. He's also an author. His name is Steve Keen. For those who aren't familiar, Mr. Keen considers himself to be a post-Keynesian and has been an outspoken critic of neoclassical economics. So, he should have plenty more to say on the topics we've been focused on for the last 2 Please subscribe, rate, and review on iTunes and follow us on Twitter if you're active on Twitter. Our handle is @MacroVoices. You can also find Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend.

Also remember that if you'd like to continue today's discussion or the discussion we're really having over these 3 weeks, you can do so by joining us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums, or just go to MacroVoices.com and click on the Listener Discussion Forum tab. Thank you all for listening. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Richard Duncan — Chief economist at Blackhorse Asset Management in Singapore; author of The Dollar Crisis; formerly ABN Amro, World Bank, James Capel, Salomon Brothers (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 12 was recorded on April 28th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've got Richard Duncan coming up as today's special guest. I'll be talking with Richard about the genesis of the 2008 credit crisis, the theory and history of quantitative easing, and why, unfortunately, Richard shares my view that history teaches us that economic challenges like those the world faces today often lead to war. All of that and much more is coming up when Richard joins us after today's market wrap.

Market wrap: Fed minutes, BOJ and the equity market

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Erik, I personally find it extremely difficult to refer to anything regarding the FOMC and Janet Yellen as exciting, but I know that our listeners who do follow and invest in equities would have been on the edge of their seats yesterday expecting this release, latest release of the FOMC minutes. What did we get from the Fed yesterday, Erik, and what's happening in the stock markets right now?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think actually the BOJ not taking action last night had more of a market impact than the Fed did. You know, the Fed did pretty much what was expected. I'd say what I think is changing here is the Fed seems to be softening the message of we are in a rate hike cycle and we're definitely going to have more rate hikes coming. And they're, they're stressing the need for patience more. I think this is very important and very telling because if we had the stock market crashing in they had to save the day with another Jim Bullard speech to bail out the market. It would all add up.

It seems to me like the Fed's kind of running scared here. What are they scared of when the stock market is almost at all-time highs? What's going on? I think that they are backing off of their tightening policy. I think it's probably a good idea because I do think that the global economy is slowing, but it doesn't seem like the messaging really matches what they've said in the past. So I wonder what has the Fed so spooked.

I also noticed we traced almost We saw almost all of the BOJ correction during today's session on Thursday. By noon, it was almost a complete retracement. Around 3:00 PM, last hour of trading, which is usually when equity markets are most busy and exciting, we saw a huge move to the downside with at least, as we're taping mid-afternoon, still trading in New York, it looks like a big move to the downside is beginning with no proximal trigger hitting the wires yet. I'm sure that some news event happened in the last few minutes as we're recording this, and it's probably about to hit the wires. By the time you hear this, you'll know what triggered that.

In general, though, I think you have to look at this equity market, as I said last week, and say, this just looks out of sight. It looks to me like it's headed for new all-time highs. I can't explain it. I don't think the fundamentals support it. That leaves me on the sidelines.

One thing I do want to point out is one of my bearish arguments that I made against the S&P 500 more than a month ago was that I think a lot of the strength in the last several years has come from buybacks, corporations buying back their own stock. And I said we're in this quiet period around earnings where they're not allowed to do that. That's going to take a lot of buying pressure out of the market during the month of April. Guess what? Month of April's over. We're coming out of that period. Corporate buybacks are going to come back into the picture. To me, that just looks like it's going to bring more upside potential to this market that I think is profoundly overvalued. I do think that it doesn't make sense, but I have to stand on the sidelines until it starts to do something that I can equate to some That's my fundamental view right now.

It is just crazy to me.

Crude oil: Cushing build, $50 Brent and the steepener trade

Nathan Egger: So maybe more all-time highs and everything is awesome. I, I, yay, I hope so. And, uh, of course crude oil comes next. I'm bracing myself a little bit here, but, uh, Erik, is there any chance you can give our listeners a normal length update this week and breathe? Don't forget to breathe this time.

Erik Townsend: You don't think I was long-winded last week, do you?

Nathan Egger: Not much.

Erik Townsend: I know that Chris Curran, our audio editor, didn't say anything about having to stay up till 4 in the morning. He hasn't mentioned it. Oh, the invoice For the overtime, yeah, I remember that now. Let's keep it a little tighter.

I think that there's some really exciting stuff going on. There was a 1.9 million barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. Both Art Berman and I have opined that the reason there's been so much strength in oil is it's really the Cushing inventory builds that are the catalyst that should cause selling pressure in the market.

Well, we got our catalyst that we were calling for, and there's been strong upward tape. Action in the face of it. So it seems like sentiment is so strong and so bullish right now that it really is going to take a lot. That 1.9 million barrel build in Cushing, although I think that's extremely significant and should have created more selling pressure, it came in the face of a national, a nationwide draw on inventory and a finished product draw on inventory. So I think the market is saying, hey, this thing is ending. Are they paying attention to the weather in Houston? Have they noticed that all those ships are still stuck waiting to get into the Houston Ship Channel? And when they do, all that inventory— inventory, by the way, doesn't get recorded until the ship clears customs when it arrives port, is when the— I learned that on Twitter last week— is when the inventory is counted. So when that happens, when the weather clears, I think we could see a big national build on inventory.

If we see more builds on Cushing inventory, the combination of those, boy, that That ought to be a huge downside catalyst.

Guess what? I've called a whole bunch of downside catalysts in the last couple of months and it hasn't happened. We've just got to accept that there is huge, massive upside sentiment right now, and that's what's driving the market. I think $50 Brent is a very obvious target. It's a psychological round number. Still got about $2, $2.50 to go in order to get there. I would imagine that that's coming. I don't think the fundamentals support it, but the tape action has been really strong. We're going to need some kind of catalyst. I did speak with Art Berman. I asked him since our long interview last week to really think about, are we missing anything? Art says he can't find anything that he's missing. He thinks this is irrational exuberance. Situation in Houston, I do think there's good reason to think that next week's inventory report might be the big one where a lot of ships come into port and that oil gets counted.

That will, of course, depend on the weather. I'll be watching. Samir Madani's work on Twitter, as we discussed last week, in order to see where he thinks that's going. But I think that's coming. The thing is, what we do have now is what was previously record short interest in speculative short interest in crude oil futures is now approaching record long interest.

That's a perfect setup for a major reversal, but that reversal is not going to come until there is a major catalyst because there is just so much positive sentiment. If I were Prince Salman— and I want to say first, I make the assumption that Saudi Arabia's desire here is to continue to suppress prices in order to do damage to other producers, and I believe that their goal is eventually to coerce Russia and some of the other large producers into agreeing to joint production cuts, but I don't think that we're there yet.

If I were Prince Salman, I would Wait for that inventory report, the big inventory report that might be coming next week, where we get a big build in both national and Cushing inventories. And then I would the very next day or the same day come out with some kind of announcement that says we're turning the screws up here. We're going to produce an additional million barrels per day starting right now. I don't think he's got the ability to do that, but he certainly has the ability to say that he's going to do that. And I wouldn't be surprised to see him play that card, to see Saudi Arabia look for where the market is ripe to react. Reverse and to try to catalyze a sudden and extreme downside move. It ain't happening yet. The shorts have been crushed here. I've stepped out of this trade and I am waiting to see what happens. We need to see some kind of catalyst that breaks this just really, really strong bullish sentiment in the market.

I do believe that the fundamental analysis that Art Berman and I have offered is correct, but it is clearly not

Nathan Egger: Erik, last week you mentioned that a term structure steepener trade may be better than an outright short at this point. Can you give us an update on your thinking around that trade?

Erik Townsend: Sure. Let's review the logic from last week, and then I'll give you the update. What I said is, if you have the view that I have, which is that there's a very significant risk of a very, very big downside move before this thing is over, possibly new lows lower than the $26 that we saw before, but you don't dare to go short because you've been overrun already by this massive bullish sentiment. What you want to look for is an asymmetric return opportunity where you can make a huge return if that big downside move happens, but you don't lose very much if oil just continues to drift higher. The trade that really stood out to me is a term structure steepener. In other words, you're betting that the contango is going to get steeper, and specifically, you're betting that the curve, which is almost flat now— I mean, not completely, but it's compared to what it was, it's very close to flat, that it can't possibly go into structural backwardation from here.

And the reason I thought that seemed very, very unlikely is that backwardation tends to occur for 2 reasons. One has to do with storage, how much storage capacity is available. It's a supply and demand thing at the front of the curve in particular. What contango is really measuring is the cost of storage from one month to the next.

It also, especially in the back end of the curve, is very much affected by long-term expectations of the market. And my view has been you've just got to believe that oil prices are headed much, much higher from here. We know that they're already below the long-term cost of production. So I think this is a man-made problem. It's created by Saudi Arabian policy— actually Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and United Arab Emirates working together on this market share strategy. And eventually, they will— it will be revealed what they wanted. They'll get what they want or they won't. There will be some negotiation. We'll probably at some point get to production cuts and a return to north of $80 oil. So I think that if the expectation has to be of much higher oil prices in the future, and you don't have a storage problem right now, I think, how can the curve go into backwardation? So that means If you make that trade, you've got a huge upside and a very limited downside, as long as that backwardation is something you consider to be very unlikely to occur.

Much to my surprise, and that I've just told you my view, a much bigger fish in the world of macro than me is Goldman Sachs' Jeff Currie. Jeff was on Squawk Box, I believe, the other day. I was traveling, just been more than 20,000 frequent flyer miles logged in the last 3 days, so I've been a little bit out of the loop. I was shocked to hear that Jeff Currie of Goldman Sachs is predicting a move into structural backwardation in the crude oil market. I managed to pull up his April 22nd research note, and I'm going to read a quote from it directly.

The key to our commodity returns forecasts during the second half of 2016 is not the price level, but rather our view on a positive carry in key commodity markets due to the expected return of backwardation. Goldman expects a return of backwardation. Holy cow, how could they think that when obviously expectations are going to be for much higher oil prices? Well, the answer, as Mr. Currie continues, he says, at the micro level, the sharp drop in long-term price expectations has helped to create the near-term disruptions in supply and destocking that helped fuel the recent rally.

But this does nothing to resolve the longer-term supply overhang. This, according to Mr. Currie, reinforces tightness in the front of the curve and weakens the back of the curve.

So he is saying essentially that the market has a huge supply overhang, and that is going to cause market expectations— that is, what people think is going to happen— to assume that the back end of the curve, long-dated futures, are going to stay low priced because nobody thinks the price is going to go back back up.

Nathan Egger: Wow.

Erik Townsend: Well, when you're that far off in opinion, and I certainly disagree very, very strongly with that view because I think it's very clear that this is a man-made problem that will be eventually resolved by a negotiation of some kind, and that production cuts will lead to a very rapid rebalancing and return to higher prices.

The thing is, the part of my view that is about backwardation not happening isn't based on fundamentals. It's based on market sentiment, because that's what drives this. If Goldman Sachs says that market expectations are for the back end of the curve to be weak and the front end to be strong, I think it's crazy, and I think the logic doesn't make any sense.

But Goldman doesn't just opine on the market. They actually have enough influence to define the market view. So if they keep saying things like this, and especially if other banks share that view, Whether I'm right or wrong doesn't matter. The market perception is going to enable the curve to move back into backwardation. Now, I would certainly welcome a move back into structural backwardation because it enables some other trades that I'm extremely fond of. I don't know what's going to happen here, but it does change my view because the whole reason that I saw so much asymmetry in the term structure steepener trade was entirely based on my idea that we couldn't see backwardation because surely everybody must be thinking like I am, that oil prices are headed much higher in the next couple of years.

Goldman is selling a story that I think they have a lot more influence on the market than I do that says the opposite, and they can change perceptions. I've backed off a little bit. I do see an opportunity in that trade, but I'm not sure that the asymmetry is quite as strong as I originally thought because I think that the market is a little bit further out of touch with reality than I previously thought.

Gold hugging the 50-day moving average

Nathan Egger: And last week we skipped gold due to us being in the middle of a 2-part gold series, and we had a lot to say, obviously, on other subjects. But Erik, are you seeing any signs here of a resolution of this trading range we've been in, in gold? Is anything changing for you? What do you see on the horizon?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's really been a month now that gold's been doing what I call hugging the 50-day moving average. In other words, it goes up and down, but every single daily bar, almost every single one I'm looking at a chart right now. There's a couple that don't touch the line, but almost every day gold trades through its 50-day moving average. As we're speaking Thursday afternoon, it happens to be on a high at $1,269.40 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon.

Okay, it doesn't look like any major breakout. We haven't seen a new cycle high or anything, and it looks to me like what the market's doing is hugging the 50-day moving average, waiting for a signal. And I think the waiting that it's doing is to see what the Fed does.

If there is another rate hike, if they follow through on the next meeting, Nobody really expected it in this meeting, but if the next meeting has a rate hike, I think it's going to be really hard for gold. If the Fed backs off, and especially if we get more dovish commentary out of Janet Yellen or other Fed governors, and we see that gold price move substantially north of the 50-day moving average, where it's not hugging the line anymore, I might start to believe in this rally. But right now, I think gold is waiting for a signal, and if it gets a signal that the Fed is serious about continuing the hiking cycle, I think it could mean some significant more downside.

Nathan Egger: Well, we had a mammoth show last week, so we're going to keep things moving and go straight to Erik's interview with Richard Duncan coming up next right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik introduces Richard Duncan

Erik Townsend: Today's feature interview will focus on monetary policy, the role of the US dollar as a reserve currency, and in general, quantitative easing. Is it a good idea, a bad idea? Are we done with it yet? Where are we headed? This is a subject that I find fascinating, but I find it's hard to find the right guest. A lot of guys who are writing about this stuff on the internet, frankly, have no background. They're conspiracy theory bloggers talking about the US dollar's going to hyperinflate and the stock market's going to crash. I never quite figured out how that works. Kind of like falling off a building and Dying of hypoxia because you fall up instead of down.

Today's guest is no conspiracy blogger. Since beginning his career as an equities analyst in Hong Kong in 1986, Richard Duncan has served as Global Head of Investment Strategy at ABN Amro Bank in London. He's worked as a financial sector specialist for the World Bank in Washington, DC. He's headed equity research departments for James Capel Securities and Salomon Brothers in Bangkok. He also worked as a consultant for the IMF in Thailand during the Asia crisis. He's now Chief economist at Blackhorse Asset Management in Singapore.

This guy has been around the block when it comes to macro, yet he still has a view. He wrote a book called The Dollar Crisis, which in many ways predicted the events of 2008. And no, it's not another conspiracy theory that the US dollar is going to crash tomorrow.

Richard, let's start with what your book, The Dollar Crisis, predicted and what happened in 2008. What caused the 2008 event? And Let's start with a framework, and we'll go from there into the government's response.

From World War I to the 2008 credit bubble

Richard Duncan: Erik, okay, thank you for— first of all, let me thank you for having me on this program. It's an honor to be here. And okay, so let's do start with what caused the crisis of 2008. It's become such a politicized world and subject that many people are very confused about how the crisis came about to begin with, and seem to have the impression that it's something that went wrong 20 years ago, or perhaps 30 years ago.

But actually, I would suggest that where we are now, really, this crisis originated as far back as World War I. And this is why. In World War I, all the European countries went to war with each other, and they didn't have enough gold to fight the war. So they went off the gold standard, and those governments started printing a lot of paper money to finance all the government bonds that they had to issue to finance the war.

And so all of that paper money and all of that government debt issued during World War I, that led to a worldwide credit bubble that we call the Roaring Twenties. But in 1930, all of that credit couldn't be repaid. And at that point, the international monetary system collapsed, the international financial system collapsed, the banks failed, and international trade collapsed.

And the Great Depression started. And that lasted for 10 years.

And during that 10-year period, Germany became fascist and took over Europe. Japan became militarized and took over Asia. And then World War II started. And then at that point in 1940, the United States government increased its spending by 900%. And that 900% increase in government spending ended the Depression.

Of course, World War II killed 60 million people. Now, at the end of the war, our side won, but policymakers were terrified that if they cut back on the government spending, that we would collapse back into depression. And that was a horrifying prospect, because at that point, the Soviet Union had half of Europe, and communism was spreading like wildfire around the world.

And during the Great Depression, the US itself became quite socialist. And so there was a fear that there would be a communist worldwide revolution.

So from that point on, the government didn't cut back on its spending in the United States. Government spending just increased rapidly year after year. So if you look at a chart of government spending going back, say, to 1900, World War II looks just like a very small blip now compared to the amount of spending that's occurred ever afterwards.

So first, many people blame the government for for what's gone wrong with the global economy and for creating this bubble. And of course, in some respects, that is exactly right. But the alternative of not spending all of that money in war would have been a fascist takeover of the world, probably, and a defeat of the United States and the remaining democracies that were still in existence in 1940. And the number were not many.

So it was necessary to have that increase in government spending, and afterwards we continued to spend more and more. And by doing so, particularly effectively under President Reagan, who ramped up government spending quite radically, the United States defeated the Soviet Union.

But it took more and more government spending, and so decade after decade. Year after year, government spending increased and the debt grew. And by the 1960s, there was not enough gold left in the United States to allow the Fed to continue backing dollars with gold. Up until that time, there was a law that The Fed had to maintain at least 25% gold backing for every dollar that it issued.

But by the late '60s, so many dollars had been— had gone overseas for one reason or another, the Vietnam War, or banks investing in Europe, or corporations investing in Europe. These other countries had the right to convert those foreign-held dollars into US gold. So during the 1960s, the United States lost half of its gold reserves.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Richard Duncan: And by the time President Nixon closed the gold window, as they say, there were something like at least 4 times as many dollars overseas as the U.S. had gold available to allow those dollars to be converted into. And so we stopped backing dollars with gold, domestically in 1968, internationally in 1971.

And that was That was the end of what was left of the gold standard. Afterwards, credit absolutely exploded. Total credit in the United States first went through $1 trillion in 1964, and over the next 43 years, it expanded 50 times to $50 trillion by 2007. And what I mean by total credit— credit and debt are 2 sides of the same coin. Total credit is equal to total debt. So total debt, government debt, household sector debt, corporate debt, financial sector debt, all the debt. It went from $1 to $50 trillion in 43 years.

And that explosion of credit, which by the way, couldn't have happened if we'd continued to back money with gold, that explosion of credit completely transformed the world. It created the world we live in. It is the thing that allowed Asia to industrialize. The entire modern world was built on the back of that explosion of credit.

But the problem arrived in 2008, when the American households could no longer afford to repay all of the debt they had incurred. And at that point, credit started to contract.

Erik Townsend: Now, where is the proximal trigger in this story, Richard? Because, as you said, 43 years of massive credit expansion through, obviously, several economic cycles, good times and bad times. But 2007, 2008, all of a sudden some straw broke the camel's back. What happened?

Richard Duncan: Wages and income in the United States started stagnating in the 1970s. But by pushing up home prices, by extending more and more credit through Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and extending it to household sector, the household sector, it created a housing price boom and then bubble. And as the housing prices inflated, that allowed the Americans to take equity out of their homes and continue to have an improving standard of living, even though their wages were stagnant.

But this went on and lasted and helped for quite a long time, 15, 20 years perhaps. But by 2008, the Americans just had so much debt, and the structure of these mortgages, as you as you well know, some of them people were not required to pay any interest for for one or two or three years, and then they started having to pay interest, and there were all kinds of schemes, and the whole thing just blew up once people hit the point where they couldn't afford to pay interest on all of that debt. Any longer, then the banking system blew up and the shadow banking system blew up. And we were in a 1930s moment again.

But rather than allowing the 1930s to replay— in the 1930s, the policymakers really did believe in laissez-faire and market forces, and they just more or less stepped back and let market forces work. And so market forces did work. Market forces established a new market-determined equilibrium. But unfortunately, that equilibrium was at a level of GDP in the United States that was only half the size that it had been in 1929.

And it was a level of unemployment that ranged between 15% and 25% for that entire decade.

So in 2008, rather than allowing that to replay, this time policymakers did did absolutely everything in their power to keep this global credit bubble inflated. And they did that with trillion-dollar budget deficits, in large part financed with paper money creation on a multi-trillion-dollar scale. So they have managed to keep this global bubble inflated for 8 years now.

And that's where we are. We still have a massive global credit bubble, and it continues to be Inflated by government policy. And without government policy, it will deflate into a 1930s-style depression, and policymakers are determined not to allow that to happen.

How quantitative easing worked

Erik Townsend: Okay, so to summarize what we've talked about so far, you've got 4 decades at least of massive credit expansion blowing up this bubble of credit. That bubble starts to pop in 2008. The government decides not to allow it to pop, and the remedy that they propose is to print money in order to rescue the economy. And I think that's obviously a very contentious subject— was that the right thing or not? But they've done what they've done. So let's go next into what is the theory of how quantitative easing works, because I think Mr. Bernanke tells us it's about stock. There's also this flow argument. What's that about? How does quantitative easing work, or what are the different views on how it works? And what were they trying to do? And how effective do you think it's been in the last 8 years in terms of stopping this bubble from deflating? And I think you and I both are more concerned about whether or not stopping it was a good idea.

We'll come later on in this interview to what's going to happen next.

Richard Duncan: Okay, well, quantitative easing can't really be analyzed on its own. In other words, it wasn't only monetary policy that was in effect. It was monetary policy combined with fiscal policy. And US government debt, we had budget deficits of more than $1 trillion a year for 4 or 5 years in a row. And since 2008, US government debt has increased by $9 trillion. That's a 140% increase in US government debt.

And so how quantitative easing worked is, well, first of all, it wouldn't have been possible for the government to run these trillion-dollar-plus budget deficits a year without quantitative easing, because borrowing so much money would have pushed interest rates to a very high level, and the higher interest rates would have crushed the already destroyed property market and pushed home prices down further and further and further, creating a depression.

So So by printing what turned out to be, in the United States, $3.6 trillion, that enabled the government to finance this $9 trillion of government spending since 2008 at extremely low interest rates. So you got the fiscal kick of that $9 trillion of government spending that creating— you know how the GDP is calculated. The economy is made up of personal consumption, household consumption, Business investment, government spending, and net trade.

So that government spending was nine trillion dollar kick that boosted the economy very radically compared to what would have occurred without nine trillion dollars of government spending. After all, the U.S. economy size is now only about is roughly seventeen trillion. So that it QE first of all, first and foremost, it financed.

Against the fiscal stimulus. But in addition to that, when— so the Fed, quantitative easing, the Fed prints money from thin air and it buys government bonds or a combination of government bonds and/or bonds issued by Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac or guaranteed by Fannie and Freddie.

So when the Fed does that, when it buys those bonds, Whoever it buys them from, they then end up with that amount of money. Let's call it $3.6 trillion, and they have $3.6 trillion in cash. What are they going to do with it? Well, they're going to buy other assets with it, and a lot of the other—and money is fungible, so it really doesn't matter what they buy.

They could buy old government bonds that would push up the price of the old bonds. And push down their yields. And so people, other people who would have bought Treasury bonds yielding 5% buy corporate bonds, which are now yielding 5% because the government bonds are only yielding 3%. And people who would have bought the corporate bonds at 5% are now buying junk bonds.

And a lot of people end up buying stocks.

So before the first round of quantitative easing started, the US stock market was in freefall.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: But when QE1 started, that was the bottom, and stocks started going up, and the economy revived. But QE1 ended, stocks fell, the economy hit a soft patch. So pretty soon they launched QE2.

That pushed the stock market back up. That revived the economy. Then they ended QE2, and we get the stocks skid. The economy hit another soft patch.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: And so they launched a very big round of QE3, long and large and long-lasting, and the stocks went up and up and up.

And as a result, household sector net— stocks went up and also property went up. And so as a result, household sector net worth went up. In other words, the wealth of the public. And so household sector net worth, let's see, I think it's now $87 trillion.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Richard Duncan: $6 trillion. That's up, if I recall correctly, almost 60% from 2009.

So that was entirely the result of quantitative easing. There was no other magical reason asset prices went up 60% after 2009. It was because of the fiat money creation and using that fiat money to buy financial assets.

And so that enormous increase in wealth created a big wealth effect. And so people spent more money, and that boosted the economy in the United States. That created jobs in the United States. So there was much more consumption than there would have been otherwise. And that pulled in more imports into the United States. And so that allowed other countries around the world to export more.

And so that's really the main 2 ways how quantitative easing worked. It worked by financing the fiscal stimulus and by this incredible increase in wealth that it brought about.

Did QE succeed? Better to die tomorrow than today

Erik Townsend: Now, in terms of how it's worked, if I go back to 2009 when QE1 was announced, what I was saying at the time is I said, this is insanity. We have become a nation of debtors addicted to living beyond our means on credit. The United States went from being the biggest creditor nation in the world to the biggest debtor nation in the history of the world. And as we have a bursting credit bubble, the government's response is to encourage everyone to borrow and spend more and print money. And I said, we have to change our ways. We can't continue doing this. It's going to end very badly. There's no free lunch. You can't just bail the economy out with the printing press. It won't work, is what I said.

I think a lot of people would say, boy, it's been 8 years. Clearly, they were successful at propping the stock market up and recovering the losses, at least the nominal losses, that had occurred in the stock market. And, you know, there's not been any runaway inflation so far. The massive negative consequence that I and other people thought might be coming as a result of this hasn't happened. So a lot of people would say this has been really, really successful. The government's done a fantastic job. QE has worked. It saved the economy, and we can just keep on doing more of it as we need it from here. I'm very skeptical of that, but how would you answer someone who— Well, who says, hey, a lot of people predicted things would go wrong and they haven't.

Richard Duncan: Well, of course, there was good reason to have those concerns and a lot of common sense and all of those things that you, you just mentioned. But as it turned out, the policymakers, I believe, had the, the opinion and that if they allowed the credit bubble to collapse, that the Great Depression That would follow would be so catastrophic that perhaps our civilization wouldn't survive.

So, in other words, the steps they took, even if they weren't really quite sure if they would work in the long term, they were just happy to live another day. So the policy was based on their belief that it's better to die tomorrow than die today, because if you die, you're dead forever. You can't get any more dead than dead. So it's better to die 8 years later if we die tomorrow than it would have been 8 years earlier. I mean, just think about the last 8 years. I didn't even have an iPad 8 years ago. You know, I've enjoyed the last 8 years.

I'm completely pleased that they have kept this global bubble inflated for the next 8 years. And recall, this whole artificial economy that we have Some people call it a fraudulent economy. This didn't begin in 2008. This began in 1940 when the U.S. government increased its spending by 900% out of necessity to win the war that ended the Depression.

So 1940—that was 76 years ago. That's how long this fraudulent, as some people call it, system has been functioning—76 years. Years, more than 2 generations. So if this bubble pops now, or 8 years ago, or 8 years from now, the consequences, the collapse will be so catastrophic that it will, you know, just think what happened in the 1930s.

All the banks failed, all the savings were destroyed, international trade collapsed. So we had protectionism, and then we had war. What would be different this time? Well, this time we have probably 3 or 4 times as many people on the planet, and we have nuclear weapons. So it wouldn't be pretty.

So a lot of people still hold the opinion, you know, okay, we brought this on ourselves. We've been spending too much money, consuming too much, borrowing too much. And those things are all true. But I would just again like to emphasize A lot of that was to defeat the Nazis and the Japanese who attacked us, and then later the Soviet Union, in which we succeeded as a nation led by a government with government policies and government direction. After all, during World War II, the U.S. government took over complete control of the economy, over what was produced, how it was distributed. They controlled prices. And they controlled labor up to the point of sending people off to war to die.

And that was when capitalism died. We've never returned to a form of capitalism after that. The economy's been government-directed ever since. And that's what people really need to understand. We've had a government-directed economic system for 76 years. If we let it collapse, then the game's over. So people need to understand that if the debt contracts, One person's debt is another person's asset.

So if debt shrinks, assets shrink. It's just one is equal to the other. So we need to— we know there's a problem. There is a very big problem. We have a very high level of debt relative to GDP in the United States, and it's a worldwide problem. So yes, we all understand that there is a very serious problem.

And this is how the problem came about, starting in World War I, when we went off the classical gold standard, allowing a big bubble to form. So now, what are we going to do about it? Are we going to let it collapse, or are we going to find a better way to solve it?

Why no hyperinflation: globalization and fiat money

Erik Townsend: I want to focus on specifically the timing and the imminence of this. A lot of people thought that by extending and pretending, by printing more money to bail our economy out, that as you have described, that would just make the next crash worse. And a lot of people have said it's imminent, it can't go on much longer, but they've been saying that for 8 years. So your description is that we've basically just continued the inflation of an artificial bubble for another 8 years. Can the government keep doing this for another 8 years, another 20 years, another 30 years, or is there a point where we just have to face the piper here?

Richard Duncan: Well, I'm afraid we're going to find out. But what people have overlooked is that in the past, I mean, they're absolutely right. If governments and central banks had printed so much money as they have done this time, it would have very quickly led to hyperinflation. So just even take a mild version, a very mild version of that. In the 1960s, President Johnson was spending too much money on the Vietnam War overseas and the domestic welfare Great Society programs at home, and so that overstimulated the economy, and that led to full employment and full capacity utilization.

And at that point, we were still on the Bretton Woods system, and at that time, international trade between nations. Balanced. There was balanced trade. That was just that was the way the gold standard worked, and that was the way the Bretton Woods system worked.

So the U.S. was essentially just a national economy, and when it hit full employment and full capacity, then it generated inflation and wage push inflation. So we had very high rates of inflation in the '70s as a result, and Paul Volcker had to crush the high rates of inflation with extremely high interest rates. rates, causing a very, very painful recession in the early 1980s.

Then President Reagan is elected, and he has much larger budget deficits than Lyndon Johnson did. I think it was 5%— the budget deficits were 5% of GDP for 6 years in a row. But we didn't get a new massive round of inflation in the United States.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: Something had changed.

And the thing that had changed was the United States, no longer on the Bretton Woods system, discovered that it could run very large trade deficits with other countries. It didn't hit domestic bottlenecks in the United States because it could buy things from other countries like Japan, or increasingly all kinds of other developing countries around the world with very low wages.

So the United States started running very large trade deficits, initially with Japan. By the mid-'80s, the trade deficit hit 3.5% of GDP, which was completely unprecedented. And by 2006, it hit 6% of GDP. So we no longer had a national economy. We had a global economy. And rather than being constrained by inflationary pressures caused by domestic bottlenecks in the United States, We had a global economy in which 2 billion people, even today, 2 billion people live on less than $3 a day.

So there are no constraints on labor. We have an infinite supply of very, very, very cheap labor. I would say the going wage rate in the manufacturing sector is something like $7 or $8 a day now, with no benefits.

So that is extremely deflationary. Globalization is very, very deflationary. It puts downward pressure on US wages and wages in all the developing countries, and it makes things much, much cheaper to buy. So globalization has allowed us to avoid these domestic bottlenecks. It's resulted in extreme deflationary pressure that has offset all of the inflationary pressure. That normally would have accompanied this explosion of credit, and later this explosion of paper money creation.

And so this time, that's why this time is different. We're in a different world. It is a combination of fiat money and globalization that's never occurred before. It is a unique moment in history, and that's why we've gotten away with it, and that's why they will continue to get away with.

Credit is the new money: the 2% rule

Erik Townsend: Okay. When you say that they'll continue to get away with it, you know, what we've described so far is essentially, we've got real problems, structural problems. The government's solution is printing money, which I see as not really solving any causal problem, but definitely it has been effective as a Band-Aid to paper over our problems and cover the symptoms. So far, it's been working that way.

Right now, the government's telling us we're going to begin a rate normalization cycle. So, we're going to get away from this money printing and not do any more of it.

Richard Duncan: Right.

Erik Townsend: Some people are skeptical. What does history teach us about what happens when governments start printing money and they say they're going to stop printing money? Where is this headed and how does it end? Because what you're describing is essentially they have to keep continuing to print money. They're getting away with it because of deflationary force. Doesn't that mean at some point the deflationary force ends and they still have to print money in order to shore up the economy and we get an extreme inflation event?

Richard Duncan: Well, all right, well, let's talk about money and credit. In the past, when dollars were backed by gold up until 1968, there was a difference between money and credit. Money was money backed by gold, and credit was the promise to repay money at some point in the future.

But now, I would suggest there is no longer any difference between the two. There's no difference whatsoever between money and credit. If you take a dollar bill to the Treasury Department, in the past they had to give you some gold for it. Now they'll just give you another dollar bill.

So there's no difference between a dollar bill and a 10-year Treasury bond. They're both credit instruments. One pays no interest and one pays almost no interest these days.

So in the past, people monitored the money supply Because that determined how much credit could be created. Credit was a multiple, a function of how much money there was. So it made sense to track M2 because it told you how much credit we would have in the future.

But now it's pointless to track the money supply. The money supply is completely irrelevant. Credit is the new money. It's the credit supply that matters now.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: So rather than monitoring how much M2 grows by, what everyone needs to focus on is how much total credit grows by. And going back to 1950, anytime that total credit— again, meaning all types of debt, government debt, household sector debt, corporate debt, financial sector debt— anytime total debt or total credit grew by less than 2%, adjusted for inflation, Then the United States went into a recession.

That happened 9 times. And each time the recession didn't end until we had another big surge of credit expansion. So once 2008 hit, then credit stopped expanding and started contracting. And at that point, we of course had a very serious recession, but things would become very much worse. Because Because we have such a big base now, credit, as of this year now, credit's grown to $63 trillion. It's hard to make it grow by 2% a year.

The household sectors can't borrow very much more because household sector wages aren't increasing enough to support more debt. So that leaves Fannie and Freddie, which is in conservatorship, the corporate sector, the banks, and the governments.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: So credit is not growing rapidly enough to drive the economy anymore. In our modern post-Bretton Woods world, credit growth drives economic growth.

And if we don't get at least 2% credit growth, we have a recession, a very long one, until we get another surge of credit. So the problem is, is now we're stuck in a situation where we can't get credit to grow much more. I think this year it was about, adjusted for inflation, in 2015 it grew by 3%. But that's because there was no inflation, only 0.1% CPI inflation. So we don't have enough credit growth to make the economy grow. And if credit starts to contract, that means assets will be destroyed and we will spiral into a deflationary Great Depression.

So, it's important to understand that credit is the new money, and we have to monitor the credit supply just the way that we used to monitor the money supply in the past.

What happens next: more borrowing, welfare, war or technology

Erik Townsend: Okay, Richard. So, where does that leave us in terms of what happens next and what history tells us? The government says that we're on a rate normalization cycle. We're done with quantitative easing. It worked. The economy is at liftoff, meaning that the government expects now there will be natural organic growth in the economy. The government won't need to intervene. Everything's going to be hunky-dory from here because Ben Bernanke solved all our problems. Guessing you don't agree completely with that view, but what do you think happens next?

Richard Duncan: Well, I mean, no, that's completely untrue. As you look around the world, the world is really in recession. Global trade is collapsing, and the IMF has just revised down its global GDP forecast again to something like 3%, which is quite recessionary by by global growth standards. Commodity prices have crashed. And this morning, they announced that US GDP grew by 0.5% in the first quarter.

So we're in a very serious crisis, and policymakers understand that, regardless of what they say. I mean, they, they were going to increase interest rates. They did increase interest rates by 25 basis points in December. But now they're saying, well, Well, we thought better of that, and we're not quite sure when we're going to do it again.

And so we have a big problem, and we have to think about how we're going to solve it. I mean, the policymakers are thinking about it, and the American public also needs to think about it.

Now, you have a lot of very bright and well-meaning people who tell us that we just have to reduce our debt. We have been spending too much. And, you know, the price of the punishment for people who spend too much is they must suffer. And so if we cut back our debt, there'll probably be, you know, a couple of difficult years, and then we'll be back in some sort of laissez-faire Garden of Eden, and we'll be back to the races and everything will be fine.

But that's just so wrong. If we allow this global bubble to start deflating, it could get out of control and spiral into a Great Depression. And the depression would probably last so long that no one alive today would live long enough to see its end.

So policymakers and the public need to think about a different solution rather than reducing our debt. Now, what can the solution be? Well, they just can't keep printing money and money and money, because if they print so much money, they're eventually— they will buy up all the government bonds and push all the interest rates to zero.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Richard Duncan: And that's going to cause a new, an entirely new set of problems. So in one sense, monetary policy and quantitative easing—they're already running out of ammunition. They've created these benefits that have kept this global bubble inflated, combined with fiscal deficit spending for eight years. But now they've got to the point where they're printing so much there aren't enough bonds left for them to buy, and interest rates. So therefore, the bond prices are going. Up and bond yields are going down. And we have a lot of negative interest rates around the world. Not too long ago, $7 trillion of bonds were trading at negative interest rates, making it very hard for savers to plan for their retirement or pension funds and insurance companies to remain solvent or for banks to make any money.

So the monetary policy on its own, the quantitative easing, is running into very serious constraints. The negative benefits may now So that's not going to work. So what else can we do? Well, the households can't take on more and more debt because their income is not going up because globalization is pushing it down.

So where does that leave us? Well, the corporations have been borrowing more, but most— they haven't been investing more because it doesn't make sense to invest in the United States because it's much more sensible to invest in China. Okay. Invest somewhere where wages are seven dollars a day, so they borrow, but they just use the borrowed money to buy back their stock, and which benefits the corporations and the shareholders and the managements who get big bonuses. But it doesn't help the country or the average American.

So that really just leaves the government and the government potential to borrow. So right now, the U.S. government has something like let's just call it 100%. Government debt to GDP. The GDP is about $18 trillion and the government debt's about $18 trillion. So one way to keep this bubble inflated for many more years is simply to have the government borrow more.

And they can do that, and this is very likely to happen.

So the policymakers are going to keep this bubble inflated because the alternative is too dire to consider. So it's going to require more government borrowing and spending. So then the question comes down to how should the government borrow? Now, many people think, you know, think, oh gee, we got 100% government debt to GDP. Surely that's, that's got to be too much and we can't keep doing this.

But that's wrong.

Japan's bubble popped 26 years ago. In 1990, Japan's government debt was 60% of GDP. Now Japan's government debt is 250% of GDP, and Japanese interest rates are negative. There is deflation. There is no hyperinflation, and the Bank of Japan's printing money like it's going out of style. So the US government's debt is only 100% of GDP, and the government can borrow money for 1.8% a year.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Richard Duncan: On 10-year government bonds. So what is the most sensible approach going forward is to have the government borrow more. And then you have to ask, well, if they're going to borrow more, how are they going to spend it?

And there are really 3 main ways they could spend it. They could just have much larger social welfare programs. Or they could have a war. Let's say we could attack Iran and spend several trillion dollars in that process. Or there's a third alternative: they could borrow money and they could invest it in new industries and new technologies.

In fact, over the next ten years, they could easily afford, for instance, to invest a trillion dollars in solar energy and a trillion dollars in genetic engineering and a trillion dollars in biotech and a trillion dollars in nanotech. Tech. And if they did invest on that kind of scale, then they could induce a new technological revolution that would result in the creation of new jobs, new industries, new growth, technological miracles, and medical marvels that would allow the United States to grow out of this crisis.

So that is the most sensible approach. But given that the consensus among the American public now, after so many years of propaganda from Fox News and the likes of CNBC. They believe that the government can't possibly do anything right or couldn't possibly manage anything like that, and that government is bad and anything involving the government is doomed to fail.

Of course, ignoring the government's success winning World War II and defeating the Soviet Union and sending a man to the moon, and all of the other technologies that have resulted from government investment. Things like all of the things that go into a smartphone that make it smart were the result of government-funded investment programs, such as the internet and GPS and Siri, and almost everything else in smartphone that makes it smart.

So the general public doesn't believe that because they've been exposed to so much propaganda for so long from people who are keen to see the government lower taxes, particularly on the wealthy, that this option doesn't seem like it's possible politically. But who knows? Politics are now in such flux.

It seems that the Republican Party has just been stolen by Donald Trump. The Republican Party seems to have been abandoned by the Republican members of the party in favor of someone proposing completely radically different policies than the Republican Party has espoused.

And for that matter, the Democrat Party itself is also under siege from Bernie Sanders for the similar reasons. So who knows what is possible in politics? But unfortunately, what we're more likely to see of those three possible options—more spending on welfare, more spending on war, or more government spending on sensible investments—war may well be the most probable outcome.

And that would certainly boost the economy for several more years. But it is increasingly difficult to find the right size. Partner to have a war with. Venezuela is far too small, and Russia and China are far too nuclear. So, you know, maybe Iran, you know, Iraq served the purpose for a while, but that's done.

Maybe Iran, but, you know, unfortunately, those are our options, and those are the options that are probably going to have a good chance of playing out.

Policymakers are not going to allow this bubble to implode as long as they can possibly prevent it. And so policymakers are going to choose how to increase government spending, and if necessary, they'll finance it with more paper money creation.

Helicopter money and the dollar's reserve status

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, Richard, this is a fascinating interview. We're starting to run out of the time. I just want to hit a couple of important topics. QE for the people, or helicopter money as some people call it, is one. The other, of course, back in the 1960s, French finance minister, later president of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, coined this term exorbitant privilege, claiming that the United States has extraordinary privileges because it's the reserve currency issuer. These days, a lot of people in China and Russia, particularly Sergei Glazyev, are intentionally scheming to try to strip the United States of its US dollar being the reserve currency. Does that matter? Could that bring about major change, or is that just political rhetoric? Can you try to address those 2 topics before we close?

Richard Duncan: Sure. Well, QE for the people, or helicopter money, that essentially just means printing money and giving it to the people. That's not a very good idea because the people would just go out and spend that money on consumer trinkets made in China. So that would benefit China's economy, but it would not do very much for the U.S. economy. And once the money was spent, it would be gone, and they would have to do it again. So it'd be much more It's sensible to print money and have the government invest it in new industries and technologies that would actually generate massive profits and pay for itself many times over. So that would be the way to do helicopter money, is to print it and give it to the government for investment purposes.

Now, in terms of is the dollar going to lose its reserve status, and is China planning to try to put the yuan in place of the US dollar? Or is Russia— are Russia and China conspiring to do away with the dollar standard? No, they're not. The dollar standard works very, very well for China.

For instance, last year, the US trade deficit with China was $360 billion. Now, that created enormous growth in China and employed tens of millions of Chinese people who were very happy as a result. And politically docile. If we had any other standard in which the United States had to pay for those imports in some other currency other than dollars, just for simplicity, let's say gold.

The US has something like, I think, $80 billion worth of gold. So after about 2 months of Chinese imports, the US would have no more gold. They couldn't buy one more pair of Chinese tennis shoes. So China's economy would completely implode, and China's economy would be destroyed, and the political system would probably fall apart.

So the last thing China wants is to force the United States to pay with some other currency than dollars, which the U.S. doesn't have, because China has been transformed as a benefit resulting from the dollar standard. So, they may say what they want, but there's no escaping for them from the dollar standard. There is no replacement for the dollar standard.

If the dollar standard collapses, the global economy will collapse with it into a very, very severe global depression. And the Chinese know that.

MacroWatch and a listener discount

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, we're going to have to leave it there just because of time. But before we go, I want to share with you, Richard, when we conceived this podcast, the original name I conceived for it was going to be MacroWatch, and I Googled it and you beat me to it. You've got a fantastic product and you beat me to the best name on the internet. What is MacroWatch? Because this podcast turned out to be MacroVoices instead.

Richard Duncan: Well, Erik, well, I, I am glad I beat you to that name. MacroWatch is a video newsletter, so it's a newsletter that monitors macroeconomic developments and their impact on Not only the economy, but on asset prices. So every 2 weeks I make a new video. Effectively, it is me making a PowerPoint presentation describing some important aspect of the global economy, such as the latest news by the European Central Bank and their increase of— their big increase in quantitative easing last month, and how that's likely to impact impact stock markets and currencies and bond yields.

So that is Macro Watch. This has been going for 2 and a half years. The archive now has 24 hours of video presentations, which I believe present a framework that explains exactly what's going on in the global economy, what policymakers are doing, What they're likely to do next, and how that's going to impact not only the economy but asset prices.

Erik Townsend: Well, I'll tell you what, since you beat me to it, I'll be a gentleman and let you keep the name. How about if you reciprocate by giving MacroVoices listeners a discount if they're interested in Macro Watch?

Richard Duncan: Thank you very much. Yes, I would be delighted to take you up on that offer. If your listeners will go to my website, they can Google Macro Watch or Or RichardDuncanEconomics.com and click on the orange subscribe button. If they use the coupon code VOICES, then they can have a 50% discount to subscribe, and that will give them a 1-year subscription for $250 instead of the normal price of $500.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Richard, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Nathan Egger and I will be back as Macro MacroVoices continues right after this.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Erik compares his views with Duncan's

Nathan Egger: Erik. Obviously, you're interviewing Mr. Duncan here, so the focus is on his views, but I'm curious how your own perspective compares with his vis-à-vis where we are in this story of monetary policy history. Where do your views agree with Richard and where do they differ?

Erik Townsend: Well, that's a great question. It's amazing to me how similar our views are because he has a very different political orientation than I do. I'm a government skeptic. I don't really identify with any political party, but if I had to pick one, it would probably be libertarian. Obviously, Richard Duncan is much more of a believer in the power of government, and I certainly respect that view. That's what MacroVoices is all about, is bringing you contrasting views. For a guy who's as far off as I am in his political orientation, we really see a lot of things the same way.

He says the government couldn't let 2008 go. You couldn't just let the market take care of itself. They had to bail it out because we literally— civilization itself could have been at risk. I don't know that I agree completely with that. Part of that might be true, okay, but I would say, what if you go back to 2000? If they had not responded to that event with easy money policy, if we hadn't had all these previous rounds, clearly there was a point where this was recoverable. I agree with him that we've gotten to a point of no return where the only way this credit expansion can resolve itself is in a horrific bad outcome of some kind. I totally agree with him on that. But I think the way we got here was specifically because of government failures.

And I think had the Fed not responded to the 2000 dot-com burst by printing money, they wouldn't have enabled the housing crisis, and the 2008 event wouldn't have been as bad. By doing what they've done and printing more money, they basically guarantee that the next crisis will be worse. Can we possibly get through the next one to another one after that? Well, if they continue to respond this way, they'll get progressively worse until eventually it all falls apart. How long does that take? I don't think anybody knows.

The place where I really have a different view, though, is that I think it's all about the straw that broke the camel's back. I agree completely with Mr. Duncan that what happened is we've had 40 years and an acceleration in the last couple of decades of just crazy credit expansion that we're living and spending beyond our means. What I asked him though is, okay, why suddenly in 2008? What was the straw that broke the camel's back? My view is that it's entirely about a complete government failure, massive control fraud. We had a huge ripoff of the entire economy by the issuers of mortgage-backed securities that were, you know, liar loans and all this stuff.

The regulators were asleep at the switch. The rating agencies didn't do their job. Everybody was bought off. Nobody went to jail. I think it's entirely about a complete failure of government and massive control fraud, and really the exploitation of the weakest people in American society who got suckered into these mortgages that they couldn't afford and didn't understand what they were signing up for. So I see that as the trigger that basically ignited a powder keg of debt that I couldn't agree more with Mr. Duncan had been sitting there ready to explode for decades.

I think that what's really interesting though, and the place where I really respect Mr. Duncan's view, is he does, unlike the mainstream that just refuses to acknowledge that we have a real structural problem here, he does see, as I do, that we are in a doomsday story here. We've gotten to a point where there's really no option for the government but to keep doing these bailout actions. They're not solving any core problem. I don't see how that's going to change. Someday we're in real big trouble. What you have is the mainstream just is blind to that, and then you've got these conspiracy bloggers who are telling you that the US dollar is going to hyperinflate starting tomorrow morning.

What I perceived from this interview, and what I agree with wholeheartedly, is that we are a doomsday story of credit expansion, but it's been going on for decades. And to say it's about to come crashing down tomorrow is crazy. It could go on for another decade. We don't know. At some point, I think this has to end very badly. And unfortunately, I agree with him completely that history teaches us the way this stuff got resolved last time when we had this kind of huge, crazy credit response was with a world war.

And I couldn't agree more with his observation. That's never happened before when there were nuclear weapons. We're in a completely different environment, and I think that he makes a good argument. The government doesn't have much choice but to keep putting Band-Aid solutions on until eventually it's not enough and everything falls apart. I hope to enjoy my life between now and then because I think the world's going to get real ugly after that.

Postgame: election year, protest votes and war risk

Nathan Egger: Well, you and Richard are both giving a perspective that involves war and what, what next big war could look like. But you can't speak about this in a US election year without considering who the next president of the United States is going to be. Do you have any thoughts on that?

Erik Townsend: Oh yeah, you know, I think that where the United States is at right now is one massive nationwide protest vote. I don't think that people really love Donald Trump as much as the poll numbers would seem to suggest. I think what's going on with both Trump and Sanders, is that the American people are so sick of everything going on that they want to vote in a protest way.

And I liken this— I think the first wave of this that we saw was the Occupy Wall Street movement and the Tea Party.

Now, people will probably think, what are you talking about? Those are 2 totally opposite things. I don't see them as opposite things at all. What I see is everyday people who don't understand very much about economics figure out intuitively that something is very, very wrong, that they're getting screwed over by their own government, and it's not fair, and it's not right, and it's time to say enough is enough.

Then, based on their political orientations, because most of them don't understand how all of this stuff really works, they ally themselves either with an Occupy Wall Street— let's just blame anybody who's ever, you know, had anything to do with the financial markets, it must be their fault.

And then there's the opposite Tea Party orientation, which, you know, pulls in the libertarian side and the other extreme. I don't think either Tea Party or Occupy Wall Street, either one of them really ever knew what they were talking about, but they reflect a growing intolerance by the American people of how badly the government has gone astray.

And I think what we're seeing in this election is nobody's trying to elect the best president. They're trying to elect the guy who is most different different from what was there before. And I think it sets us up in a really, really bad situation because, frankly, Mr. Trump has been very clear that he is not afraid to use the authority of the presidency in order to get tough with people that he feels are a threat to the United States. Hillary Clinton has had a lot of very strong rhetoric, tough talk rhetoric, I don't really know where Mr. Sanders would stand in terms of a war president, but frankly, I think Clinton or Trump are more likely at this point to take the election. And I don't really have a strong opinion on either one of them other than to say I don't think anybody is a pacifist here.

And I think that if there's a situation that is ripe to be resolved by armed conflict, I think that we're coming into a period of history where the people that are in charge, not just in the United States but in other governments around the world, They're ready to rumble, and this is what a Fourth Turning is all about. This is what Neil Howe's research is entirely about, is just how society goes through these moods, and it's a cycle that goes 80 years or so. Right now, the world is in a bad mood called a Kondratiev Winter or a Fourth Turning, and I think it's going to get worse before it gets better.

Nathan Egger: Certainly, if we look at the voting records of Hillary and Bernie, they are very similar, and they are far from from pacifists. Trump is an outlier, but his stage presence doesn't suggest to me that he's going to be doing much backing down from

Sign-off, next week's guest and disclaimer

Nathan Egger: anybody anytime soon. Kind of scary any way you look at it.

Well, we're bumping up against our time limit for this week, so we're going to wrap it up here. We really hope you'll tune in next week when we'll be speaking with Satyajit Das. He's the author of the international bestseller Traders, Guns, and Money, a really fun and informative book. Highly suggest reading that.

Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. Ratings and reviews are a huge help to us. So if you have a moment, please do so. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices and follow Erik directly @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. Please drop by our listener forums where we like to continue these discussions.

You can communicate with Erik directly. You can also engage with Erik directly and send him your thoughts and get more of his. You can find those forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. You can also suggest future show topics, future guests, and post questions for Erik, which we will, I promise, answer on the show from time to time when we find time. We've been running overtime lately.

For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Rick Rule — Sprott Global Resources founder (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Show preview: oil special, Rick Rule, Art Berman bonus

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 11 was recorded on April 21st, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've got a really big show lined up for you guys today, and please trust me, this is an episode you're not going to want to miss. We've got Sprott Global Resources founder Rick Rule coming up as today's feature interview. But we're going to take that interview in a completely different direction than anything you've ever heard on any other podcast. I'll save the details as a surprise. As regular listeners know, we planned this week's episode as part 2 in our special on the new bull market in gold. But news from the oil markets was so big this week that we almost postponed Mr. Rule in order to do another oil special. So how are we going to resolve this conundrum? By doing both. So put your seatbelts on, folks. This is going to be a longer than usual and very content-rich show. We've got expanded depth coverage in our oil commentary in the beginning of the show.

Then we've got a full-length interview that you've been looking forward to with Sprott Global's Rick Rule, but we'll also be bringing you a bonus interview with petroleum geologist Art Berman, who's coming back to give us an update on oil fundamentals since his feature interview here on MacroVoices back in February. Please forgive us for leaving out a few subjects we normally cover each week. It was everything we could do to squeeze all the content that we had into today's program.

Equity market: 'I don't get it'

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Welcome back, everyone. As Erik said, we've got a longer than usual show. We've got a lot to cover. So, let's jump right in and discuss the equity market briefly.

Erik Townsend: You know, Nathan, if there's one thing that we can do at MacroVoices to differentiate ourselves from the rest of the industry, it's not to respond to a situation where we don't have a good answer by making shit up, which is what most people do. So, I'm going to summarize my in-depth analysis of the entire equity market for you in 4 words. I don't get it.

The equity market is moving higher at breakneck speed. All indications that I can see from a technical basis looking at the chart are that we are headed for new all-time highs. I think it's very, very strong bullish technical picture on the chart, and it just does not add up for me. I wonder about whether there's some big fundamental driver that might be behind that. But you know what? It doesn't matter. I don't get what's going on. If it doesn't make sense, I don't have an opinion on it. Let's move on. We got a busy show.

Doha freeze, Sue Saudi bill and Saudi Treasury threat

Nathan Egger: Don't be too proud of yourself for saving time with that answer, because normally I only have to ask you, at least at the outset of the show, one oil question. What did the market do this week? But after this week's action, I have at least 6 questions, maybe more, depending on what you have to say. And you told me off the air that your views are slowly starting to change. So we really need to go deep on oil this week. Let's start with a review of all the crazy events that have happened in the market this week.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so first of all, the setup coming into— let's go back to last week's show. We knew what we were coming up to was there has been what seems to me like a lot of hysteria about this production freeze nonsense. We're talking about 5 countries that couldn't possibly increase their production if they wanted to agreeing not to do something. You know, it made no sense. It was political theater. I thought what was going to happen was the only big news that would happen between last week's show and this week's show was we'd have that Doha meeting and the market would move down after one of two things happened. Either there was no deal or there was a deal, and the deal was shortly thereafter debunked as meaningless, which is what was going to happen. I had to take notes for today's show, Nate. I've got like 12 bullets of other major news events that are affecting this story.

End of last week, this Sue Saudi bill came up. Now, there are people in the United States who believe that Afghanistan and Iraq didn't do it. Saudi Arabia is responsible for 9/11, and the families of 9/11 victims ought to be able to sue Saudi Arabia in the United States for their, their I'm not even going to comment on whether I think that makes sense or not. It's not my field. Suffice it to say, there are people who hold that view, and there are congressmen who are trying to push this idea of a Sue Saudi bill, making it possible for 9/11 victims to sue Saudi Arabia.

Something I have predicted for years, Nathan, is that at some point, the major holders of US debt would play the card of saying, look it, we're sick of the United States pushing the rest of the world around and telling us what we have to do, whether it's your stupid FATCA tax law or your other stupid policies.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Other policies of trying to dictate things to the rest of the world. Stop telling us what to do or we are going to crash your Treasury market by selling all of the US Treasuries that we hold. We don't need to be able to compete with you, United States, you invincible military force. We can take you out economically if you keep messing with us. I have opined for years now that I thought that was coming, that one of these 3 countries, China, Japan, or Saudi Arabia, which have massive Treasury holdings, would eventually Eventually play that card of threatening the United States by intentionally damaging the Treasury market.

And it would be big damage. It would cost them a lot, 'cause to do the damage, they'd have to sell it sloppy, as the expression goes in the industry, intentionally dump all those Treasuries. They would lose a lot of money in the process, but they would do immense, immense damage to the United States.

I thought someday, 10 years from now, China would threaten that once we got closer, you know, an escalated Cold War. For it to come from Saudi Arabia now really surprised me. I could do an entire show on this subject. I've been thinking about it for years. It's one of my 11 bullets, and it's only your first of 6 questions.

Prince Salman's threats and the Doha meeting

Erik Townsend: Let's move on. Prince Salman made some very important threats. I think this was either Friday or Saturday. It was before the Doha meeting. Prince Salman said, look, we're going into this Doha thing. We're going to listen. But I want to be clear. We can increase production by 1 million barrels tomorrow if we want to. If I want to turn up production, don't put it past me to increase our production by 1 million barrels per day starting tomorrow morning. I can turn the valve. And I'll tell you something else. In 6 to 9 months, I could add another million barrels of production.

So, we'll consider a freeze if Iran participates. If Iran doesn't participate, hey, we might turn the dials up, guys. Watch out.

I think that Prince Salman is definitely bluffing on part of that, but not all of it. I think he is dead serious in saying, we are ready to do everything within our power. Saudi Arabia is ready to turn the screws and really, really try to make this situation worse in order to improve their negotiating position.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: So I say this guy could be for real in terms of his intentions. He has the ability, he says, to increase production by 1 million barrels starting tomorrow morning. Baloney. I don't believe it. I think they're pedaling as fast as they can already. But they can take action to increase production. In fact, they don't have to. All they have to do is announce that they have increased production. That can be validated and verified 6 months later, but that's 6 months later. If they want to have the propaganda effect of, we've just increased our production by 2 million barrels, all they have to do is announce it.

People will believe it.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: So, finally, we get through all this stuff, and we get to the Doha meeting. No great surprise. What happens is Saudi Arabia shows up and says, there's no way that we're going to participate in this unless Iran cooperates, and Iran's not going to cooperate.

Now, Saudi Arabia had been misquoted widely last week. People were saying, oh, Saudi Arabia said that they're going to be ready to freeze production, even if Iran doesn't. And they never said that. What they said is that they would come to the meeting, and they would make their decision independent of what No matter what Iran does, they're not going to make any decision before the meeting based on Iran. That didn't say that they were going to agree to anything. They said they were not going to go into the meeting with a foregone conclusion just because Iran was refusing to participate. The idea that anybody thought that they were really going to get a deal out of that or a meaningful deal blows my mind. It didn't happen. We get the meeting, we're waiting for the market to open on Sunday because it was early Sunday morning US time that we got the news that there's no deal in Doha.

We're waiting for the 6 PM open.

Kuwait strike, gap-downs, Houston Ship Channel and the rally

Nathan Egger: Then what happens?

Erik Townsend: Massive strike in Kuwait. Now, wait a minute. This is super huge because when there's news of a strike, you don't know how big it's going to get. If it were to take Kuwait offline, if it was something that just erupted into massive confrontation and Kuwait stopped producing oil, that's 1.7 million barrels per day. That totally rebalances the market. That solves the whole problem Art and I have been talking about overnight. Kuwait could have changed everything. So now I'm thinking, boy, I'm predicting a huge gap-down open.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: on Sunday's session. But now there is something that fundamentally could change everything on the table. I'm pretty sure it's going to just blow over, which it did, but you don't know that. We still get the $2 gap-down open. $2 gap-down open on Sunday. Massive profit for the shorts. Lasted all of a few hours.

And you know, at that open, when I watched the market, it felt like Thanksgiving of '14 when we saw that OPEC meeting and it just straight down from there. All of the crude oil traders on Twitter were talking about, yeah, here we are, We are at 37.70. I predict 36 by morning and 34 by tomorrow afternoon. Everybody was calling for major moves into the low 30s. The major banks were coming out with calls, moves into the low 30s.

What happens 12 hours later? Actually, it was closer to 24 hours later. The market is right back to where it started, trading above the level when the Doha meeting fell apart. Okay, you can explain that by saying maybe what happened is people really came to terms with what the Kuwait strike could mean. They realized Kuwait's a really big deal, or it could be. So maybe we shouldn't be jumping for joy, or not jumping for joy, but expecting that prices have to go down. Jumping for joy if you're short, as a result of no Doha meeting.

So the Kuwait strike is on the table. They get the massive gap-down open. It retraces in less than 24 hours. Well, now the Kuwait strike ends and it's completely over. Happens while the market is closed. Market opens to another small gap-down. Looks like again, we're headed down finally.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: The other fundamental factor's off the table. Kuwait's not a factor. We got no Doha. It's got to be pure down from here. Just has to be. Oh, wait a minute.

We've got again a retrace, a full retrace in less than 24 hours.

On what catalyst? EIA data was a build, even if not a spectacular build. It was 2.1 million barrels of additional inventory cataloged this week that we didn't have last week. The Houston Ship Channel has been closed.

Nathan Egger: Oh, wow.

Erik Townsend: Quite a bit. If you haven't seen the news, Houston is just flooded. The whole city is in trouble. A whole bunch of ships, 33 at the beginning of the week, I don't have an update as of today as we're taping, are sitting outside of Houston waiting to come and deliver their oil. That's all oil that should have been in this week's inventory report that didn't get there because the ships are stuck at sea. That oil potentially will be coming back at some point. Then after that, There's nothing, nothing, nothing but bearish news.

What happens? The market breaks out to the upside to $44.50. Is there any news to explain it? The only news that came out that seemed to be a proximal trigger is Russia says there's going to be no meeting in May. There was people saying, you know, they were going to resurrect the production freeze, have another meeting in May. Russia says, no, that's baloney. We don't know anything about any meeting. Russia and Saudi Arabia both make public threats. to immediately begin production increases.

Couldn't imagine a more bearish statement than that. That took us from $44 up to $44.50. Nate, something is going on here. Something is up. And I just have to admit, it appears to me that there is some bullish fundamental factor in play that I have not been in touch with, and I still can't figure out what it is.

Everybody that I'm following, all the traders on Twitter, everybody is confused. What the heck is pushing this market higher? But it is clear that the upside The upside momentum is massive. The action and reaction to Wednesday's inventory report, it's been just straight up. And in theory, it should have been a modestly bearish report, but still a bearish report. And, you know, we moved up a couple dollars from there. So this market is just going higher. Something is in play that I don't understand.

Inventory builds ignored; ship tracking and Samir Madani

Nathan Egger: What I find most fascinating is that on one hand, the predictions that led you and Art Berman to conclude that the market was headed much lower did in fact come true to a large extent. You predicted some big builds on inventory. And for a while there, we were getting them. And I remember one week came in literally 3 times expectations at 10.5 million barrels of inventory built in a single week. And there was another big build in the high single digits. So, the predictions you and Art made about inventory came true, but they came true at a time when the market just shrugged them off and it moved higher anyway. Perhaps that was because of the hysteria around the production freeze and the Doha meeting, perhaps. But one way or another, US refinery maintenance season is now winding down. For the last few weeks, we've seen consistent drawdowns on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, even though the national number has been a build.

They were very small drawdowns, but they were drawdowns just the same. And that's bucking the trend. So even though you guys got the inventory supply-demand story right, The market didn't listen because of the production freeze. And now that the production freeze and Kuwait strike appear to be dead issues, we're not seeing the big draws anymore. It's almost as if the big downside catalyst you guys predicted came true. It was that pair of really big inventory builds that by reasonable logic should have pushed the market much lower. But the spin doctors can and did win out over fundamentals and common sense in the short run. So where does that leave us? Do you still have the same strong bearish conviction on crude oil? At least in the very short term?

Erik Townsend: Well, my conclusion until now has been that the rally from, let's say, February 11th has been primarily driven by expectations around this production freeze thing. Certainly, if you look at the tape action, all of the moves up were in reaction to an oil minister from one country or another making a statement. I am forced at this point, because this has moved so far beyond where I thought it could, to really look carefully at this and say, wait a minute, what could I be missing? Is there some hidden fundamental factor that could be be responsible for driving this entire thing.

Certainly, some dollar weakness would play into that. I agree that the builds that you mentioned, the inventory builds, came and were ineffective. I was expecting more builds than that. I was expecting— the 10 million barrel inventory build didn't surprise me at all, but I thought it was going to be the first of a string of 5 of those. And we did get 2 really big ones. Not enough, and they came at the wrong time to be effective in moving the market lower. From an inventory standpoint, though, The ship channel really speaks to me. I think that, you know, how is it that Art and I both really thought that this bunch of builds was coming and it didn't come when we thought it was going to come? Well, because the ships can't get into port. Kind of makes sense. What do you do about that?

I'll be the first— I wish I could afford it. There is really expensive research available in the oil industry that very accurately tracks all of the ships and where the cargoes are and who's got how much oil and so forth.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: That's, you know, really heavy-duty, expensive research that people with a lot more assets under management than me can afford to buy.

You gotta love the internet, Nathan, and this is something you turned me on to, is Twitter. There's this dude on Twitter. His name is Samir Madani. He is a Kuwaiti-born guy. He lives in Stockholm, Sweden. When I approached Samir and asked his permission to talk about his work on the show today, he said, yeah, you can tell people, you know, I don't do this for any kind of business. It was just a bizarre—

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Confluence of personal interests that turned into a hobby of this guy doing research on where all the crude oil ships are and what the delays are into port. And he does predictions of how that's going to affect inventory reports and so on and so forth.

Now, I certainly have to comment, what am I talking about using some random guy on the internet's research when he's not even a professional? And I think a lot of people would judge that. Certainly, I take it cautiously with a grain of salt, but I look at this guy's work. The one thing that I can tell with certainty from looking at it He knows more about this than I do. So is he as smart as the guys at Platts that I could buy this research for $1 million a year from? Probably not. I don't have the $1 million a year to spend on it. So I follow this guy's work, and he does a fantastic job, I think. He says that he thinks that he predicted before this week that it was going to be a soft build. He thought that this week, because of ship traffic, that the inventory report would be soft. And he thinks it's going to be soft again next week, although he'll probably have an update again.

Anybody who wants to follow that, Twitter, Samir Madani, Samir underscore, and the rest of it will come up automatically.

If you're my age and you don't use Twitter because this social networking crap is for kids and you don't have Nathan beating you over the head every day with a baseball bat saying, I'm telling you this is worthwhile, guys, it's worthwhile. I resisted pretty hard. There's a lot of interesting stuff out there on Twitter.

Cushing as the forcing function for a crash

Erik Townsend: The really big Cushing builds that we expected to have come If the ship backup clears, all the ships are easily able to get into port, the weather is sunny in Houston, all the ships have unloaded, and we still haven't had the big inventory builds that Art and I predicted, well, then we were wrong. And that's just it. I think that there is still room that we will be proven right and that it will be massive builds and that the market shocks much lower. I still think that that's possible, but it ain't gonna happen until we have a catalyst.

And that catalyst has to be a really big threat that a storage crisis is coming. That means a build on Cushing inventory. Build on national inventory doesn't count because what the industry is doing very effectively right now is they're making room in Cushing. They're pipelining oil out of Cushing. The national inventory goes up, but the Cushing inventory goes down. Why? Because the guys in Cushing ain't stupid. They know that they're the critical choke point. They're pumping as much oil to other storage facilities as they can.

This invites a thought experiment. If Art and I predicted that the market was gonna balance itself within 6 months on natural factors because of declining US production, but we saw a crash coming first because of this crunch on inventory, well, it was 6 months that it had to happen in before the market was gonna rebalance itself.

This production freeze idea came up on the morning of January 20th. How long did it take until it had been fully debunked as nonsense by the experts and all the smart people in the room knew that it was irrelevant and had nothing to do with anything?

Nathan Egger: 2 days.

Erik Townsend: About 3 hours. Yet, for 3 more months, it's had a profound effect on prices, or at least it appears to. That or something else is having a profound effect on prices and I'm missing it. So, if they make another 3-month rhetoric story about who knows what they call it next, and they burn another 3 months, then the market could have balanced itself. Have they won? Could it be that the spin doctors could keep prices elevated and the scenario that Art and I anticipated never happens because of the actions of the Fed?

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: of political theater by oil ministers? Well, there's a forcing function here, and that's Cushing inventory.

If we get to the point where Cushing is running out of inventory, I don't care who's saying what, the price is going to crash. But here's the thing, we weren't really counting on that happening. I was never convinced we were going to have a Cushing storage crisis. I thought we'd get close enough to one to scare everybody.

Nobody's getting scared here, and I don't understand it.

But what's going on is, until we see massive Cushing builds, which I think might still be coming, the market is not going to respond. That bear factor is not going to be there. If they come, it could happen dramatically, instantly, overnight. It could be a dramatic crash. The inventory reports will be very, very important to watch. But it's also possible, you know, if we get through the next couple months and we still haven't seen it, then we really have to look at a different scenario playing out than we originally thought.

Nathan Egger: Yeah. Okay. So, is that your current thinking, that what's going on here is hysteria about the Doha production freeze meeting carried us through inventory vulnerability season, also known as refinery maintenance season? And if so, does that mean that this will come down to whether or not the big builds resume after the weather-related issues in Houston are resolved?

Hunting the hidden driver: Shanghai Accord theory

Erik Townsend: I think that question, Nathan, comes down to whether or not the factor that's been driving this rally since February 11th Really is what I think it's been, which is a lot of hype and hysteria about the Doha production freeze meeting. We know that that's now nonsense, so that's not going to be affecting things, but the market has risen all the way up to $44 here.

I'm increasingly focusing on a hunch that I have, and I can't see what the factor is, but I just look at this and I say, this hasn't gone the way I thought. The market has gone farther than I thought it could.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: What could be the fundamental factor that I'm not seeing? Is there something that's not public knowledge yet? I can't explain Wednesday's tape after the Doha meeting is dead, the Kuwait strike is over, and then Russia says that this supposed meeting where we're gonna, you know, maybe we are gonna revive the production freeze, yeah, that's BS. It's not really happening, guys. These are all profoundly bearish factors. What does the market do? Goes up $2 in response. Something's going on here that is not making sense to me. I haven't figured it out yet.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: yet. And it makes me wonder what hidden driver could be behind the scenes here.

Nathan Egger: Okay, then clearly the central question has to be what the hidden fundamental driver could be that we've all been missing for the past 3 months. Put another way, if this rally wasn't really about the production freeze propaganda, what could have been the driver?

Erik Townsend: Art Berman and I both, you know, have been exchanging emails and we can't see it in terms of any public knowledge stuff. I hate to get into conspiracy theories and that kind of stuff. And when I first read about this Shanghai Accord theory on ZeroHedge I just thought, oh, here we go, another conspiracy theory about supposed, you know, evil government officials that are doing who knows what kind of thing.

I'm sure many of our listeners are familiar with the Plaza Accord back in 1984, which was the famous meeting where a number of nations agreed to work together to intentionally devalue the US dollar against other currencies. So, there are people who are speculating that perhaps there has been a so-called Shanghai Accord, a secret meeting between government officials that would somehow mean that there's a secret story that only the most powerful people in the world know that they're going to dramatically weaken the dollar. Weaker dollar, stronger oil. If somebody really and truly knew that a Plaza Accord kind of thing had happened on the QT, and that was really true, It would explain a lot. It would explain the equity story. It would explain a lot of things. Now, I don't like, you know, correlation does not mean causation, and I don't like conspiracy theories. On this particular one, I have to at least follow this and take it seriously because, you know, there's a lot of suspicious things happening.

There's this really weird meeting announced between President Obama and Janet Yellen last week. It was just a few days before the meeting. I suspect it was probably some obligation they had, statutory obligation to make it public notice.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: that President Obama has asked Janet Yellen to come to the White House for a Monday afternoon chat. The President of the United States doesn't invite Janet Yellen into the Oval Office to chat about the weather. Something was up.

Then Saudi Arabia is threatening to literally crash the US Treasury market if the Congress doesn't back down on this sue Saudi stuff. President Obama meets with King Salman. Promptly after that meeting, publicly vows that he will veto The suit sought— it's very unusual for the president to publicly vow to veto something like that when the, you know, the guys that want it to be vetoed are foreigners and the guys that don't want it to be vetoed, who will be— whose feelings are going to be hurt by that, are Americans whose families were lost in 9/11. A politician taking that move publicly, promising to veto, he wants to make damn sure that this thing doesn't go through. Both equities and crude oil have been going gangbusters despite no apparent fundamental driver that I can explain.

I had, I thought, a very good explanation.

Short squeeze made perfect sense. Well, guess what? The shorts have been squeezed out. If you look at the Commitments of Traders reports, it's not a short squeeze anymore. The markets are not acting like I think they should. I don't like to take conspiracy theories seriously. I don't have any belief that this thing has happened, this Shanghai Accord. But I sure do wonder what could be going on to explain these weird meetings between Janet Yellen and the president.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: and King Salman and all these things, it feels to me like maybe there's an invisible hand of government doing something and I don't know what. And maybe that somehow explains why the oil market is just so far out of whack with what I thought it was going to be doing right now.

Erik's position: covering shorts and re-entry conditions

Nathan Egger: So where does that leave you in terms of your view on this trade, specifically on the trade? In the past weeks, you've been extremely bearish and you said you thought the market had to get Doha out of its system. Well, Doha came and went. The freeze was debunked as nonsense, as you predicted, but the market went straight up anyway. So are you still short WTI futures here? Are you still convinced that the bottom is not yet in and that the market has yet to find a true final low?

Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, let me be really clear that you have to, as an investor, be humble enough to recognize no matter how strong your conviction is, when the market is telling you, is proving to you That what you thought is wrong, you have to accept it. Until the Doha meeting, where I was with this is, I think it's crazy that people are putting so much apparent faith in this Doha idea, but I knew it was going to be disproven. I thought that had to be what moved the market much lower.

I was proven right on Doha, and the market went straight up anyway. What I've done, you know, I had to get out of the way of this. I immediately covered on that because it proved to me that whatever's going on, is not what I thought was going on.

The only reason I could justify all of this strength was— actually, it was not just Doha. After Doha happened, I was out of the market waiting to see where it was going to go. I thought that it made sense to re-enter the short if and when the strike in Kuwait was resolved. The strike was resolved. I put a short on, a smaller short position there.

We saw another retrace. I got out of that one at my entry price. I wasn't going to take a loss on that one.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: And sure enough, the market moved considerably higher from there. In order for me to still be proven right on the original trading thesis, that was low 20s on WTI before this is over, we gotta have the inventory builds and they gotta be inventory builds in Cushing. If the industry can succeed at pumping enough oil out of Cushing, so you maybe have a storage crisis in Houston, but we never get to a storage crisis in Cushing, then that's going to eliminate my scenario of a crash.

The reason that I thought a crash was likely to happen is I thought we were headed towards an imminent storage crisis. Now, that could still be true. If Samir Madani is right, we could be in the middle of a temporary delay. Now, you would think, well, wait a minute, oil traders are smart. If this is about ships being backed up into Houston, surely when they see those inventory reports, they would think about it that— No, don't give them that much credit, guys. The headline comes out, the number is not a big build, the market goes up. People don't really do the cause and effect and think about the ships that are stuck at sea. Some people do, but most of the people I don't.

I'm going to be the first to admit that I have changed my view to where I still think that all of our analysis was right unless there's some fundamental factor that is hidden or I'm not seeing. But I'm becoming much more open to the possibility that that hidden factor is there because things are happening in this market that just don't add up for me. I will definitely reconsider entering the short trade again if we get And then we get the really big inventory builds that we've been predicting. That definitely should be the big downside shock. And I mean, I don't mean big inventory builds like it's not 2 million, it's 3 million. I mean, it's 10 million, it's 12 million, it's 15 million barrels a week for a period of several weeks. That's what crashes the market to the teens if it happens. My confidence that that's going to happen was strong when we did that interview with Art.

I still think there's a good chance of that. I am not banking on it definitely happening.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: Certainly, if it does happen, I will take that short trade a little differently. I won't be as aggressive about holding out for a price target. I'll be taking money off the table and taking profits, you know, a little bit earlier because I just don't know that the case is as strong as it is. But that could change. It really depends on what we see in the inventory numbers. My prior view was that we don't need to run out of storage in Cushing. All we have to do is come close and everybody will panic.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Nobody's panicking. They're panicking in the other direction. They're panicking with exuberance and they're ignoring these risk factors. I don't know if that sentiment is going to change, but right now, with current sentiment, the only way the market's going to crash is if we actually get the Cushing storage crisis. It really happens, not just is imminent to maybe happen. So I think it takes a little bit more to crash the market than it used to, and I think that the likelihood of happening— of that happening, my confidence is not as strong as it was, but I still think the fundamental analysis was spot on. There's either something something completely hidden that we're not seeing, or what we anticipated should play out eventually.

Nathan Egger: All right.

Post-mortem on a losing trade

Nathan Egger: Well, Erik, as you know, as our listeners know, our charter at MacroVoices is to bring our listeners into the inside world of what a hedge fund manager actually does day to day, what he thinks about and so forth. I hope you won't mind this question, but you've expressed really, really strong bearish conviction on crude oil ever since we launched this podcast almost 3 months And the market has done nothing but move against you for that entire time. And I know that for compliance reasons, you can't make any representations about the fund you manage on the air. But with all due respect, I can only guess that you're probably not having your best month ever.

So are you willing to talk on the air about the personal aspects of this? You're a really smart guy. You've articulated a really convincing bear argument on crude oil. But the bottom line is that by your own analysis, the big Cushing inventory builds you predicted have to start real soon, or we're getting close to when you and Art predicted the market would rebalance itself. You gave it about 6 months, give or take. So, what does a fund manager do in a situation like that? Your arguments have all made a hell of a lot of sense, at least to me, and our regular listeners, many of them will probably agree. But you expected to be proven right by now, and it's yet to happen. So, so now what?

Erik Townsend: Well, yes, I'm certainly happy to talk about it. That's why we do this show. And I'm also happy to acknowledge my mistakes, and I've made them I think the original analysis that Art and I made was spot on. I'm proud of it. I think it's— I think that view that we expressed in that show in February was extremely well articulated. And I think we were right. And we were careful to say there were plenty of things that could upset it. We had this view about inventory. We said very clearly that if some exogenous event occurred, if there were a war or something that took 1.5 million barrels of supply offline, that would change everything.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: So, I think we did identify what the realistic risks that were counter to our expectation were, and I think it was a good set of calls. The biggest mistake that I think I made, though, is when the market didn't do what I expected, my reaction was to just arrogantly judge these morons that are dumb enough to take this production freeze thing seriously. Well, am I doing myself Am I doing myself any favor by spending my time and energy pontificating here on MacroVoices and in my private life about how stupid other traders are? Or would I be better served really looking hard for, is there something that some of them are seeing that I'm not seeing? Because it is retarded for everybody to have been as bullish as they were over this stupid production freeze thing. Could it have been that I thought that was what was driving the market, but really the people doing the buying were buying for a different reason?

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: You know, I have to say I made a huge mistake because I wasn't paying close enough attention. Well, now I am paying close enough attention. Frankly, when I go back and do the postmortem and really look carefully at it, I still can't see how that could be it. Because if I look at every leg up, technical traders will understand that the most important legs, if you're trying to analyze the cause of a market move, is when there are technical resistance levels that in theory should hold and the market breaks breaks through those resistance levels. What was the news event that was the catalyst that took it through what should have been technical resistance? Well, every time it broke through a technical resistance level, it was on yet another oil minister talking up this production freeze thing. So I really do think, although I did make a mistake in not being a little more humble about thinking about it, I've humbled myself.

I've spent a lot of time in this week really, really carefully looking at this, and I still can't find Any evidence that anything other than production freeze stuff was driving this.

The fact that it still kept going up after the production freeze didn't happen made sense because of the Kuwait strike. It really did make sense. But then the Kuwait strike was over. Not only did it go up, but after the Wednesday inventory report from DOE, it went skyrocketing up.

And that should have been— I mean, not a hugely bearish number of 2.1 million barrel inventory build, but still a significant one. It should have been at least a little bit bearish. The market breathed a huge sigh of relief, went much higher. Everybody seems to think the fundamentals call for higher prices, and I just don't get it.

There's also another factor that will come into play here, which is we're very rapidly reaching $50 Brent. $50 Brent, a lot of analysts think, is a magic number where a lot of people will start hedging again. So there'll be selling pressure from the producers hedging their forward production. They'll be selling farther out on the curve, hopefully depressing some of those longer-dated contracts.

Second biggest mistake that I made: I assumed that the imminent threat of a storage crisis— not, not actual storage crisis, but just fear that one was near— was going to be enough to crash the market. And the reason I assumed that is because I really do think all indications when I said that were that that's how sentiment was. People were ready to react to something like that.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: The sentiment changed. We went bull silly to the point where we got to nothing short of an actual out-of-space crisis is going to bring this on because the market is so ready to just accept bearish news and ignore it and shrug it off.

At the end of the day, wrong is wrong. The worst mistake that an asset manager can ever make is to tell yourself that I got it right, but the market got it wrong. Or the dummies who made money being long were wrong because they're not as smart as me and I'm smarter than them and I just lost money anyway. Anyway, baloney. If your goal is to make money, wrong is wrong. You lose money, you were wrong. That's the story. That said, what sucks most for me, frankly, is I feel like I did get the analysis right, and it's a factor I've not seen that's doing this.

And yeah, you're right, it does affect you personally. It happens that we launched a MacroVoices podcast, so the first time ever I'm being extremely public about my views and my— one of my strongest, highest conviction trades of the last few years. And I do think the analysis was very sound. And guess what? It doesn't matter whether I was smart or not smart or right or not right. I'm wrong in the sense that the trade didn't play out. And you just have to take that at what it is and not kid yourself about it.

As far as to what do you do now? How do you respond to this? First step for me is going to be to collaborate with Art Berman. I want to touch base with Art. I see changes in the fundamentals. The Cushing draws don't surprise me that much because I think we're still seeing national builds People are just pumping oil out of Cushing. in order to forestall this. How long can they forestall it? How long can they keep pumping that out? Art knows more than that about me. So I would definitely look to my consultant to advance my own knowledge when it comes to the fundamentals.

Overall, if I had to grade myself on this trade, it might surprise some of our listeners, I would grade myself as an A+ all the way up to the point where I was first stopped out of this trade when we hit $36. Up to that point, frankly, yeah, I was losing money as the market was going up. Guess what? That's just part of the game. The market goes in cycles. It was well within an established trading range. When it broke out of $36, I predicted on this program that if that happened, it would take on a mind of its own because it would trigger a short squeeze.

I got out at $36. That was the right thing to do. I stepped out of the way, but I still had very strong views. And what I did So what I did is I went ahead and get— I waited for the market to get to the next level at 40.5, and I shorted there. And it broke that, I covered my short, I waited till 42, and I got the next level. I was gaining ground each time, but I was trying to get back into a short trade. It was already out of range. You know, the fact that we'd broken north of 36 said to me something is not working the way I think it should. I wrote that off as a short squeeze, and I looked at the Commitments of Traders data, and I said, as soon as we see the short interest coming down and we go back to net long speculative interest, it's time to get short again. And I went back into the trade short a little bit early.

And, you know, that has not been profitable. So this whole thing is not happy. But at the same time, I don't really regret most of the decisions I made. I think the original analysis was exactly right. I still think it can be proven out, especially if the ship channel thesis plays out. But it's definitely time to look at other possibilities.

New idea: a term-structure steepener

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: How do you go from here? You really have to step back. When something has not worked, you have to take a step back, forget about trying to get back into the same trade that you had so much emotional attachment to, and just look at where you are.

Where we are is I see a whole new opportunity here, and it's not a directional trade, it's a term structure trade. I look at what's going on in this market, and I say, wait a minute, the effect of this big rally is it's flattened the term structure, so we're looking at all the contracts basically, you know, the difference in price between between each month is not that much anymore. That really invites an opportunity. It's a trade that our professionals, I'm sure, are familiar with called a steepener. You're basically betting that the contango is going to come back into the market.

Well, this is all about asymmetric return. Do I think that the contango is coming back into the market? Well, I know if Art and I are proven right, there's going to be massive contango, because if that front month crashes in an inventory crisis, it will happen on record contango.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: There you go. That steepener trade profits wildly. It is massively profitable if the crash happens.

What happens if the crash doesn't happen and prices just drift higher from here? As far as I can see, and this is— I've only been looking at this trade for a day now. I'm not ready to put it on. I have to do some more analysis. I don't see it as realistic that this market, on fundamental factors, moves into backwardation, which is what would cause that trade to lose money.

I think that it could just be flat and not make very much money because nothing happened, or it could profit tremendously if the crash happened. But I don't see a whole lot of downside.

One big downside risk, if you look at that steepener, that means you're going to be short a near month and you're going to be long a further out month. If a war broke out, it could spike that near month up. So you would have to hedge that with a 3rd derivative leg, probably with a call on an out-of-the-money call. on whatever the front side of that spread is that you're trading as a steepener. I'm starting to do analysis of that kind of trade because I think that trade makes a lot more sense than an outright directional trade based on what I see in the market.

That's pretty much where I'm at right now. And I'd say this last few days, you know, when this stuff happens, it's not like, oh, I do this for a living, so therefore I know the answers. It's, I do this for a living, so I sit down and try to figure out the answers, and it takes time. And we're just digging into this, but boy, it has been an amazing week.

Nathan Egger: I have a very different job here at MacroVoices, and I think our regular listeners already know what drives my thinking as the show's producers. And if Erik's next step is to consult with his favorite petroleum geologist on the inventory fundamentals, you guys already know I'm going to want to get in on that phone call.

So, that's exactly what we have lined up for you. And at the end of today's show, we're going to do a special second interview segment with Art Berman. And this is real behind-the-scenes stuff, folks. We're not going to plan an interview or do a presentation. Erik is going to have a heart-to-heart with Art about how the market has evolved differently than expected and where it's headed from here. Now, we normally cover gold with Erik at this point before our feature guest interview, but we just don't have time today. But we've got plenty of gold coming up next. I think you guys are really going to like today's feature interview with Sprott Global Resources founder Rick Rule, because Erik's going to take that interview with Rick in a completely different direction than you're probably expecting. That interview is coming up next as MacroVoices MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Rick Rule's three-minute precious metals summary

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Rick Rule, founder of Sprott Global Resources International. We're going to do this interview in a little bit of a different direction. So Rick, what I'd like you to do— I know this is not your first rodeo, you do these podcast interviews all the I'd like you to take your standard-issue Rick Rule 45-minute precious metals interview intended for a retail audience. You got that in your head?

Rick Rule: Absolutely.

Erik Townsend: Okay, we're not going to do that because this is not a retail podcast, but we do have that audience component. Could you give me, please, the 3-minute condensed executive summary for the benefit of our retail audience? What's your take on precious metals? Because we do want to deliver that content.

Rick Rule: Well, that one's pretty simple. There's a lot of discussion about precious metals and what causes precious metals to move. I think the most important factor is that precious metals trade contra to the US dollar, and particularly the US dollar as expressed by the US 10-year Treasury. My own belief is that the US 10-year Treasury, after a 35-year bull market, is much closer to the top than the bottom. And if you agree with my thesis that gold trades contra to the Treasury, That means that gold and precious metals are much closer to the bottom than the top. 2 things here.

5 or 6 years ago, if you owned gold, you paid an implied rent which was the equivalent to the yield on the U.S. 10-year Treasury, a 5 handle. Today, you pay something like 1.7. So, the rent you pay on gold is less, at the same time that the relative attractiveness of the competing asset class, the U.S. 10-year Treasury, is much higher.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Rick Rule: is much, much, much less attractive.

That means, I think, that with the 35-year bond market closer to the top than the bottom, the precious metals market, I think, is much closer to the bottom than the top.

Capital formation: why private placements

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Thank you so much, Rick. And I know that you've done a lot of other retail podcasts. People who want more depth from a retail perspective can find it on the internet. You're a very famous guy. Google Rick Rule. We're not going to go there. This is MacroVoices. This is not a retail podcast. We're going to take this in a completely different direction. So, let's kick it into gear now and talk about what the capital formation process is that actually brings these companies into existence. Something I've noticed, particularly for gold investors, people will do so much research and learn so much about gold and mining and so forth. Do they ever do any research on gold companies? Where do these mining companies come from? How does the capital formation process occur? When you buy them in a public offering, who are you actually buying them from?

Rick Rule: Right.

Erik Townsend: Have you ever heard of something called overhang in a stock?

Do you know what the risk is associated with that? I bet you don't. We're going to go in a completely different direction, focused on the opportunities that exist for accredited investors. That's our finance professionals, high net worth individuals, essentially more than $1 million of investable assets. Retail guys, don't tune out on me. You're going to learn more about the industry and how businesses come into play than you're going to find out anyplace else. So this really is going to be of interest to everyone, but particularly for our accredited audience.

I want to start this, Rick, just with how you and I didn't meet the first time. I had sold a software company. I'm a software entrepreneur. I'm a technical guy. I tried to be retired for a few years, flunked retirement, lived on a yacht for a couple of years. Don't ever do that. That's a dumb idea. And I started getting interested in precious metals. I'm going to conferences, and there's one guy who seemed to really know a lot. He says, you're an accredited— you're a retired entrepreneur. You're an accredited investor. Yeah. Have you talked to Rick Rule? And I said, who the hell is Rick Rule? And the answer was the guy that's giving the keynote at the conference. You got to talk to him about private placements. And I thought to myself, wait a minute, as a software entrepreneur, I know what a private placement is.

It's when somebody invests in a startup company buying stock. And from my perspective, the equation is entirely about who's got the killer app, finding the, you know, the incredible new idea for the hot software company, something as low-tech as drilling a hole in the ground and pulling rock out of it.

Why in the world, I thought, would any idiot consider a private placement in a gold mining company? Well, the answer is because I didn't know anything about it and should have come and talked to you.

So, let's imagine that I did meet you in the early 2000s. I said, Rick, what's this private placements in natural resources? Let's expand it, by the way, not just to talk about gold, natural resources in general. And before we get into the specific investment opportunity, Give us some perspective on what does natural resources involve? Is it just mining? Is it— does it include just precious metals? Is it also oil and energy? And what are the differences between these things in terms of their capital requirements and how they each operate in terms of early-stage capital formation before they become public companies?

Natural resources, contrarian cycles and trade-show stories

Rick Rule: Broad question. So for our purpose, let's differentiate between precious metals and other natural resource asset classes. The precious metals component are unique in the sense that they're financial assets as opposed to merely commodities. Gold, silver, and to a lesser extent platinum and palladium have functioned for decades and decades and decades—in fact, thousands of years—as both a medium of exchange and simultaneously a store of value.

Most fiat currency around the world is a promise to pay, and precious metals constitute payment. So they're unique asset classes. And I believe that precious metals are already in a bull market. I believe that industrial materials—that's energy and base metals, non-ferrous metals—probably are either at a bottom or approaching a bottom. But I suspect that you're going to be 18 months before you see a demonstrated recovery. So first of all, let's talk about a bifurcation in natural resource. Markets between precious metals and industrial materials.

In terms of your question as to what you could have expected when you first met me, I think the important thing to know about natural resource-based businesses is that they are simultaneously extremely cyclical and also very volatile, both of which can be good if you're a contrarian. But if you don't have a contrarian orientation We like to say in resource-based businesses, you are either a contrarian or you will be a victim.

What is attractive about resource-based businesses is that they're broadly predictable, meaning that an industry that sells its product for less than the cost of production in a bear market, in liquidation, has set the stage for its own recovery. And if you have the courage to buy the sector when the sector is in fact in liquidation, you are setting up for a very predictable recovery. Volatility similarly can be attractive if you're psychologically equipped to benefit from it rather than being victimized by it. If you have some sense of value, what volatility does is it means the asset that you have a sense in— a sense about the value of goes on sale periodically. Sometimes extremely deep sales. But if your own orientation is not value-oriented and isn't disciplined, and if you aren't by nature a contrarian, the resource-based businesses are a great place to stay out of.

Now let's dial back to the point in time in the early part of the— the early part of the last decade that you talked about. The resource-based businesses had been, by one measure, in a 5-year bear market. In another measure by a 20-year bear market that began really in the early '80s after the bull market of the 1970s. So expectations for natural resource investments were extremely low. Markets move because you exceed expectation, and the expectations were so low that you couldn't help but exceed them.

Private placements in small companies in the resource sector meant that you were taking an out-of-favor bet in an out-of-favor sector. You know, a sort of a spectacular combination for contrarian investors. And the performance that one enjoyed by having the courage to participate when nobody else wanted to participate was spectacular.

We syndicated a private placement partnership— that is, an aggregation of capital— that took part in numerous private placements. It was called Exploration Capital Partners 2000. And if my memory serves me correctly, that partnership generated a 22-to-1 return for investors over 7 years. My best effort, by the way, to date. It had to do precisely with, as Buffett would say, being brave when others are afraid and afraid when others are brave.

And let me tell you one more story to illustrate things. Talking about conferences. In the early part of the decade, the last decade, when resources were unpopular, it was fairly difficult to get an audience, although the rewards that the audience enjoyed were spectacular. Later on in 2006, at similar conferences, after the thesis had been proved, I was in fact so popular That at one conference— by the way, popular when I had very little remaining utility because the sector was so popular— I had one occasion where I was a keynote speaker in San Francisco. I had consumed a bit too much coffee before I went on the podium, and by the end of my speech, the need to release the coffee was extraordinary. And rather than taking questions, I sort of exited from the stage to the men's room, and I was followed into the men's room by 30 or 40 people, uh, normally polite people, who were so overcome by the greed engendered in a bull market that they formed semicircles behind me firing questions while I went around my business.

It's interesting that the demand for information and contrarian topics is the least when the information is most valuable and is, of course, most intense when the information is the most dangerous.

Erik Townsend: That's a great story. And you definitely have a reputation as being quite a character. I remember another story, I think from another trade show. You had given your talk, probably a keynote, because you're kind of big man on campus at a lot of these natural resource events. And you took your suit off, put your blue jeans on, and went to check out the trade show. And there's one particularly confident fellow who just knew he would be successful. Tell us why.

Rick Rule: Well, that was highly amusing. And as you suggest, I had been a speaker and I had then gone into civilian clothes wandering around the exhibitors. And there was a particularly aggressive salesman, you know, the type, white shoe, you know, yellow tie, good-looking, very voluble. And he had great lateral moves like a linebacker. I couldn't get around him.

And I started listening and he was just going on and on about all the work they were going to do, all the money they were going to spend, all the exploration they were going to do. And I, you know, sort of decided to humor myself, and I said, you know, this is all very aggressive and very impressive. All of this is going to take a lot of money.

Can you talk to me about money? And I remember his opening line, well, the money doesn't matter. I was thinking, well, that's interesting. My money matters. But I played along. I said, how's that? This should happen to everybody once in their life. The young gentleman replied, well, there's a very well-known— Hott, I think was his name— West Coast broker. broker by the name of Rick Rule, uh, myself, who was going to give this guy all the money he needed. And the—

Erik Townsend: Oh, he has an unlimited, uh, blank check from Rick Rule?

Rick Rule: Yeah, basically. And he said the opportunity here is that my stock is selling at 50 cents now, but Rick feels that there's a reputational disadvantage to 50-cent stocks. And when the stock gets to $2, he'll finance me. And that was a bit more I could take. I got my wallet out, got my driver's license out, and said, listen, I know this Rick Rule fella pretty well, and the probability of you getting any money at any price, much less $2, is way south of slim.

It teaches you, I think, in all speculative realms, that a market where good salesmen can paint dreams on pieces of paper And trade them for specie is a very, very dangerous place.

Private placements and warrants versus ETFs; debt structures

Erik Townsend: So, Rick, I think that most of our audience is already sold on the idea that long-term gold is definitely a buy, whether or not the bottom's in or yet. Maybe different people have a different view, but, you know, it's headed higher. A lot of people just think, look at this as ETFs. Could be GLD, could be the Sprott ETFs, which are excellent products as well. But why would an accredited investor who doesn't have to invest in retail products choose to do anything else? And the way I would look at this is, it's so easy to buy an ETF, whether it's one of your Sprott ETFs or one of the other ones. Why in the world would I get involved in something like a private placement or any of the other work that you guys offer?

Rick Rule: The cyclicality and volatility of gold and gold equities markets, and the lack of an equitable distribution of information, is why private placement and PIPE investing can be preferable for sophisticated investors to an ETF product. Smaller companies in a volatile sector like gold outperform on the upside. And the important part of a private placement is that the private placement, if properly constructed, in addition to giving you shares, gives you warrants. Warrants being the right but not the obligation to buy more shares at a fixed price.

If the capital that you have contributed to a company is the sort of catalytic infusion which changes the company's ability to profit from the increase in gold price, by providing that catalytic capital, if you have the warrant, you get an extra dose of the benefit relative to everybody else.

Now, the truth is, in small company investing, in venture capital investing, in private placement investing, the whole process is highly risky. The expectation If you invest in 10 private placements, is that you're going to lose money on 3 or 4 or 5. You're going to break even on a couple, and almost all of your gain is going to come in 1 or 2. By magnifying the gain with the warrants, which are the chief attractiveness of private placements, what can happen is that a 10-bagger— that is, a tenfold increase in one stock— can be magnified by the warrants to become a 15 or a 17-bagger.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Rick Rule: 17-fold increase.

And a 17-fold increase in one company in a 10-company portfolio can generate returns that hide the sin in the rest of the portfolio and still leave a very attractive margin left over for the investor.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so to summarize what we're talking about here, private equity means getting into companies before they go public. And unfortunately, Rick and I don't make the rules, but we do have to follow These are investments that are not available to retail investors. Institutional investors, high net worth individuals, people who meet the definition of an accredited investor are allowed to do this.

You're saying that the principal benefit, as you perceive it, is you can structure that deal. It's not buy a share for X amount of money. It's buy a share for X amount of money that comes for free with an opportunity to buy another share for an agreed amount of money. It's like you bought a call option and a share, but you only paid for the share. Is that essentially the, the summary of what you're saying?

Rick Rule: That's absolutely correct. And by the way, it isn't just pre-public. You often have the opportunity to do that after companies are public, and sometimes at a discount, occasionally at a substantial discount to the existing public market price of the company.

Erik Townsend: I definitely want to come back to PIPEs because the PIPE mechanism most people don't understand at all, even professionals. I've invested in a PIPE fund before. I want to come back to that, but let's finish out with when you say a private placement, most people would assume you're talking about, you said a share and a warrant, so we're talking about stock and a warrant. I know at least in my industry in software, a lot of angel investors prefer to work from convertible debt. They would much rather have that company owe them debt that they can actually sue against and then convert it to equity once they've seen the company actually succeed.

Rick Rule: Right.

Erik Townsend: Is that same kind of model applicable to natural resource investing? Does that come into play?

Rick Rule: Absolutely. You need to structure an instrument, be it equity, convertible debt, or straight debt, that suits both the investor and the company that is looking to raise money. I've been active for 20 or 25 years in privately placed debt and privately placed convertible debt. The beauty of that is depending on how well you know the collateral, you are participating in a reward transfer but not a risk transfer.

If you are a debt investor, anytime you're an investor in early-stage companies, you subject yourself to the upside story from the promoter, from the insiders. When you're a debt investor, you have to say to the company, this is interesting, Interesting, but not relevant. You get the upside, I don't. I want to get paid back with an agreeable internal rate of return.

But the important thing to note about that is that while your upside is somewhat limited, if you structure the investment correctly, you can take away most of your downside.

One illustration of that has been the recent Sprott performance, where in our debt portfolio, privately structured debt we've generated a 5-year compound internal rate of return of almost 20% annualized, where the underlying equities as measured by the Toronto Stock Exchange Junior Resource Index is almost— is off by almost 90% in the same period. So the delta between the median market performance, which is off 90% over 5 years, and the lending experience experience at Sprott, which is a 20% compound internal rate of return, is very striking.

Rule's own portfolio and alignment of interests

Erik Townsend: Okay. So, in terms of Rick Rule wants for your own money to— you say you think gold has turned around. You think gold's in a bull market. You've got a lot of your own assets. To what extent do you invest in the public market versus private markets? Is this something that you do on a 50/50 basis? Is it something that you think people who are able to should focus on private markets? How would you address that?

Rick Rule: Well, Erik, I've been very fortunate. I've taken a lot of risks in my life. I've saved fairly religiously. I have a reasonably high net worth. So I'm actually speculating to make money now, not to sustain my family. The consequence of that is that my own portfolio has come to resemble a barbell.

On one side, I have very, very, very low risk. Investments with a lot of stability but fairly low and predictable internal rates of return. And on the other hand, I have very, very, very risky investments. In terms of my own resource portfolio, my portfolio now is skewed much more aggressively to the high-risk, high-reward private placement markets and away from the general securities market.

Markets. At Sprott, where we manage money for all nature of investors, of course the majority of the money that we manage is skewed towards less speculative debt and equity markets and natural resources. But you asked the question with regards to me personally, and with regards to me personally, New Capital in particular is overwhelmingly oriented towards higher Higher reward private placement debt and equity.

Erik Townsend: And if I understand your business, essentially what you're doing is you're taking your personal skill and knowledge and saying, I'm going to figure out what I, Rick Rule, want to invest in personally. But I don't have billions of dollars personally that, that's needed to— if I meet a guy who's a really brilliant rock head and he's going to just nail it with this next mine, I can't finance that whole thing. Your company basically sells investments that allow people to invest alongside you. Is it true that you personally are investing in all of these deals, or are there some that you're maybe selling to people that aren't quite as smart as you, that don't pick the good ones?

Rick Rule: Well, certainly in every aggregated investment, that is partnerships that we put together that we manage over the 5 or 10-year period of time, or non-public single asset private placements where we would buy an interest in an oil field or an interest in a pipeline. I personally subscribe for 10% of the interest in every one of those private placements.

In addition to that, Sprott probably originates $200-$250 million a year in private debt and equity transactions. Where permissible, I participate in those. Securities laws and I would say a moral obligation mean means with regards to private placement where we're acting as agent in the private placement. If the private placement is oversubscribed by clients, then Sprott and Sprott personnel are prohibited from competing with clients in the placement.

So I think you need to differentiate Sprott-managed products where we are raising money from investors to invest alongside of us in a process that might take 5 or 10 years. I always own 10% of the partnerships or the investment vehicles that we syndicate. Where we are operating as originators and agents raising either debt or equity for companies on a one-off basis, we always guarantee the offering, meaning that we always guarantee as a company and individually to subscribe for all of the unsubscribed interest in the private placement. But there are circumstances where the demand for the issue from clients is large enough that we aren't allowed to participate in the offering. Clients come first.

Erik Townsend: Okay. But from an investor's perspective, I feel pretty comfortable with that. My immediate skepticism of any kind of private offering is there's no free market price discovery. I have to trust your expertise and your honesty to tell me whether or not the valuation that we're negotiating is fair and reasonable. And I don't have that knowledge and expertise. I want you in the deal. I want you to be at risk of losing more than I am, or else I'm not going to pursue it. And, you know, that answer satisfies me that you're trying to be in the deal unless there's no room.

Rick Rule: Absolutely. The other thing, as I think I mentioned at the outset, is with regards to our own proprietary offerings, the compensation is always on the European plan, meaning that we get paid on the back end. We get paid to succeed. Many sponsors get performance fees on performance that accrues.

We only get performance fees on performance that occurs, meaning after the investor has received his or her money back with the agreed-upon priority rate of return, we get some of the surplus, if any. A much fairer structure for investors.

Erik Townsend: And I would definitely encourage our listeners who may not have experience with these kind of investments, you absolutely have to look very carefully for conflicts of interest. And, you know, you are doing 2 things. You are selling investments to help investors to be successful. You're also helping these resource companies to raise assets. There is the potential for conflict of interest. And, you know, it's very important for an investor to very carefully evaluate that.

To my thinking, the single most important measure of conflict of interest is not how persuasive you can tell me this great argument about why it's safe. It's whether or not you're putting your own money on the line. And that's what says it to me. So, I think you've got a pretty good story there. I want to come back, though, to, you know, we're talking about these early-stage companies that have not gone public yet.

PIPE transactions and a caution about PIPE funds

Erik Townsend: So, This whole benefit of the— boy, you're saying you can buy these early-stage companies. They're not public yet. So for the price of the share, you get the share and the warrant that lets you get the next share at a discount. You're getting a free call option. There's this huge discount that you're buying. But of course, most investors assume the rules are once a company goes public, you can't do that anymore because public companies are only traded on stock exchanges. That's simply not true. There's something called a PIPE transaction.

Explain what it is, how it works.

Rick Rule: A PIPE is an acronym for Private Investment in Public Equity, meaning that you are doing a new private offering in a company that's already public. The attraction to the company of that is that private offerings are often much cheaper for them to complete than public offerings. The attraction to the investor is that you participate at a pre-negotiated price. Often you can buy a large position in a private offering where that— a position of that size wouldn't be available easily in the public market. But more importantly, of course, you have the ability, if you negotiate well, to acquire the warrant that we talked about earlier in the discussion.

It's worth noting Noting that one thing that we joke about in the private equity business in terms of pre-public is that IPO itself is often an acronym for it's probably overpriced. And the advantage of a PIPE offering over participation in a private company is, first of all, the certainty that the stock you buy is going to trade, that it will come public, because it's already public.

But in a market like the market that we're in today in resource-based businesses, where the appropriate index for small-cap resource issuers is off by 90%, what you are often doing is buying assets that you're familiar with at a dime on the dollar— the type of investment that doesn't happen in the pre-public market.

When you have an echo market, that is a market that is starting to come back after having suffered severe price deterioration, the PIPE market is vastly, vastly preferable to the pre-public market because you are buying assets that have been benefited with capital raised in prior public offerings at extraordinary discounts.

Erik Townsend: And it truly— I think most CEOs of small companies, it's often companies that maybe went public a little bit too early. They need more money. They just cannot do a secondary public offering. They don't even realize that this is available. I just feel a responsibility, Rick, to say something if we're covering this topic. Obviously, I respect you as an honorable, high-integrity kind of guy, or I never would have invited you on this program.

If we look at the world of hedge funds, that focus specifically on the PIPE strategy, and I would go so far as to say specifically on exploiting the financial naivety of relatively inexperienced CEOs. I would just caution our listeners that PIPE deals, especially if you are on the company that needs to be funded side, you need to look very carefully at the reputation and integrity of the people that you're dealing with. Some of the The guys that run PIPE funds are there to very aggressively exploit and use and abuse their customers. They often make a deal and then short your stock in order to really rip you off. So if you are going to consider a PIPE deal as an investor, it's a fantastic deal for the investor. It can be a fantastic deal for the company if you don't get taken. Rick's a good guy. Not everybody is. I just felt that we needed to say that.

And I'm guessing I'm guessing you would agree with that.

Rick Rule: Yeah, absolutely. And, you know, frankly, on both sides, for the investor, you need to make sure that the jockey, the person that's allocating your capital, is a very sober investor who understands the ins and outs of extractive industries. I think it was Mark Twain once, who once defined a miner as a liar standing next to a hole in the ground. And while that's probably too broad a statement, the truth is anytime Anytime that you're in a business where you can monetize other people's dreams, where you can paint dreams on a piece of paper and trade them for specie, you do attract a reasonable number of bad actors.

How investors engage: mindset and the uranium example

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I think the PIPE space is particularly attractive to them. So let's look at this from the standpoint— suppose that I'm an accredited investor, whether I'm a high net worth individual, a family office, or whatever. This story sounds really interesting. My status as an accredited investor The trade-off, of course, if I'm buying this investment that only I can buy, that means that I can't sell it to anybody other than another accredited investor. So, from a liquidity standpoint, I'm probably in it for a reasonably long haul. Sounds good, but I'm a rich guy. I enjoy my yachting and my golf course. I don't want to go and travel all around Zimbabwe and Mongolia looking at gold mines. It sounds like a lot of due diligence is in these things. So how does a private investor or a small institution like a family office typically interface with your industry? Is it something where they get confident with you and allocate a certain amount of capital and you just manage it?

Or do you present deals to them on an individual basis and they make individual investments in private placements? How— if I were someone who had a lot of experience trading in public markets, I am accredited, I am eligible to do this, how would it look to me? What would it— what would the structure be?

Rick Rule: Private placement investing is a bit risky and it requires a certain mindset. So I would advise investors who are thinking about the sector to be prepared to spend some time and be prepared to educate themselves enough so that they're prepared to make non-emotional decisions. To handle volatility and to handle cyclicality.

Certainly it isn't in the interest of most generalist investors to invest the time and treasure to be able to do all of the due diligence competently themselves. It is in their interest to understand enough about the sector so that when we describe the processes that we employ on their behalf, they become comfortable the themselves with the process. But you know, a lot of this has to do with common sense.

If I describe an investment to you, and let's say that the headline is uranium, and I say to you, on a global basis, we sell uranium for $34 a pound, but it costs us $60 a pound to make it, including the cost of capital. Therefore, over 5 or 6 years, there's 2 possible outcomes.

The price of uranium goes up or the lights go out. There's 2 different types of investors. There's one who sees the attractiveness of a business that's in liquidation. There's another who, when they hear the word uranium, thinks Hiroshima and Nagasaki and doesn't understand that the fact that the industry is in liquidation guarantees the fact that the price of uranium is going to go up. Right. Up.

It's the investor who takes the time to shape his or her paradigm that will do well in industries that require a contrarian orientation, a value orientation. For investors who are more narrative-oriented than fact-oriented, for investors who are more interested in social trends than arithmetic, they should avoid the natural resources sector So the time and treasure that's required is really time and treasure that an investor spends on their own psyche and their own process.

We don't expect investors to duplicate the investment that we make, about $3.5 million a year currently, in information acquisition. We don't expect them to hire their own geologists and their own engineers. What we do expect them to do is condition themselves mentally to the process. processes that will allow us to act successfully for them in contrarian, volatile, cyclical industries.

Learning resources and Sprott retail products

Erik Townsend: Okay, Rick, let's suppose that some of our listeners who are accredited high-net-worth individuals, family offices, what have you, are compelled by this and want to move forward. The first advice I would give them is don't. If you are looking at making your first private equity investment, investments and you've never done it before, my strongest advice is learn about it first. And yes, there is a huge benefit in terms of being able to invest in private equity, which non-accredited investors can't do. That benefit is derived by people who do their homework and learn how this stuff works. And I just feel a sense of responsibility. I'm trying to think of a book or something, Rick. I would love to see people pursue these things. I think the idea, especially of PIPE deals where you can literally take a company that is trading on a stock exchange and has a listed price and buy shares at a discount to the quoted price.

It seems like that shouldn't be legal, but it is. And it's a great deal for the investor. Sometimes it's a good deal for the company. Boy, I don't want to see our listeners doing that unless we can find a book for them to read or some source of more information than just a 45-minute podcast. Where do we send them?

Rick Rule: Well, 4 sources. Ground yourself in investing first. The Intelligent Investor by Ben Graham is a great place to start. I'll give you some more book reviews later after you start there. The second place with regards to specific information about natural resources is our website, www.sprottglobal.com. There are about 200 hours of educational material on that site, including something called the Mining Investment College that we did in conjunction with the Colorado School of Mines for accredited investors.

The third thing would be to subscribe to Sprott's Thoughts, a blog that comes out that has the best minds at Sprott and the best minds that we can acquire elsewhere. I guarantee your listeners will get their money's worth because it's absolutely free. But finally, we enjoy educating and talking to people. Investors should feel free to contact me directly one of two ways: rrule@sprottglobal.com by email, or if the investor lives in the United States or Canada, by calling me directly toll-free at 800-477-7853. Because the best advice is bespoke advice, and what strategy is appropriate to an investor is a subject that deals with the investor

Erik Townsend: Couldn't possibly agree more. And, you know, my advice— we have a lot of people that have asked us among our listeners to do a gold show. We have a lot of accredited investors asking for that. My advice to accredited investors is, if you think that gold has turned the corner, which a lot of people do— I'm not quite sure yet myself, but I think it's close. If we're not— if we haven't seen the bottom, we're awfully close to it.

My advice is, learn as much as you can do. This is not something to go invest in. This is something to go learn a lot more about. And I think that's a great point. The opportunities in the private equity space are extremely compelling, as are the risks, and it definitely requires education. Before we close, Rick, is there anything— I guess I do want to give you a chance. We do have still a retail audience. I hate to leave our poor retail guys who are not allowed to invest in this stuff. Sprott has plenty of offerings for them. If you want ETFs, what's available? What's in the Sprott universe for the retail audience?

Rick Rule: Yeah, we have a vast number of retail offerings. In the first instance, if you think that gold is going to go up and you want to buy the gold itself, buying the Sprott-certificated product, the PHYS, is vastly superior, we believe, to the competitive ETFs for 2 reasons. The Sprott product isn't structured as an ETF, so we don't buy and sell gold, which means that all of our assets is physical metal. We never take depository receipts, which the ETF has to do.

The second reason, of course, that's structured as a trust, if you make money on the underlying investment in the United States, you're taxed at the capital gains rate rather than the ordinary income tax rate, which can make a substantial difference. With regard to the equities, our own equity ETF we think is superior to the industry-leading ETF because our ETF is factors-based where theirs is market cap weighted. They buy just based on size. We buy based on factors, things like profit margin, things like EBITDA to enterprise value, and in product— in particular, revenue growth. We're looking for companies that are increasing their production rather than decreasing their production, people that offer leverage to the gold price now and will continue to offer leverage to the gold price 5 years from now. The symbol there is SGDM for the major gold companies and SGDJ for the small-cap gold companies.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. So you've got a broad offering for retail and for our accredited investors. They can call you directly or email you at rrule@sprottglobal.com.

Rick Rule: I really, really thank you for the high quality of questions that you've given me and the opportunity to address your audience today.

Erik Townsend: Rick, as we close, I can't thank you enough.

Rick Rule: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: Rick, thank you enough for a fantastic interview. I really think it's probably been of interest to our listeners. It sounds like you do have a broad range of products for our retail audience at Sprott, but more importantly, if our accredited investors are interested in the gold space, in gold equities, I definitely think that looking at your opportunities in the private equity space is tremendously compelling. But boy, it's not something to go invest in tomorrow. It's something to go learn a whole lot more about. Give Rick a call. Call or start wherever you like. I think it's something that definitely warrants your consideration.

Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Accredited investor definition and proposed reform

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Welcome back. Most of this interview was specifically designed for our accredited investor audience, as that's our primary focus here at MacroVoices. But we need to clearly define that term. I know it's a regulatory thing, but please, Erik, explain what it means and where did that term even come from?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, this is one of the few cases where I can really give the U.S. government a lot of credit for doing something really smart and right halfway, and then they totally screwed it up. You get a problem, which is that the investment world is full of con men and scumbags and sleazeballs, and the SEC needs to protect retail investors, naive retail investors, from being taken by these guys. And so they have all kinds of rules to protect you. Those rules can get in the way of your— of a sophisticated investor doing business with someone they want to. So what the rule is, what the law says is that if you are not a sophisticated, what's called an accredited investor, then you're not allowed to invest in hedge funds, private equity, private placements, all of these investment categories that really require some due diligence, where somebody could be just plain old ripping you off.

The SEC, for your own protection, and I think it's a good rule, does not allow people who have very little knowledge to invest in such things. But they do say, for an accredited investor, someone who knows what they're doing, they should have the right to do whatever they want and the government should be out of the way. Nice libertarian value. I feel great about this story so far. I feel proud of the government for having it.

Then it comes to implement that. How do you decide who's smart and who's not? The answer, according to the government, is how much money they have. So, this is a true fact. Let's suppose Suppose that you are a nail technician from Fort Lauderdale, Florida, and like, you talk like this, and you don't know anything about, like, finance, and you just won the Tri-State Mega Bucks. Well, you're an accredited investor. You're sophisticated. You're allowed to invest in hedge funds and private placements and so forth, because you're a sophisticated investor based on your assets, according to the SEC.

Now, let's consider another investor. The person is a senior, let's say the head of the economics department at Columbia University, holds 2 PhDs in economics and another MBA, and is also a Nobel laureate in economics. That guy is prohibited by law from investing in a hedge fund or private placement or any other kind of accredited investment, because he is presumed, if he has less than a million dollars, to be not sophisticated enough to understand the risks that might be inherent to this. The basic premise of this rule Keep people out of trouble if they need to be kept out of trouble. Stay out of the way of people that don't need that help. I could not possibly agree with that more. Deciding who is smart enough to understand risks based on how much money they have, that's just crazy. It doesn't make any sense.

Nathan Egger: If that doesn't make any sense, then what should it be? How would, how would you change things?

Erik Townsend: Oh, if I was in charge, and if anybody from SEC is listening, believe me, I would— nothing would honor me more. Than to be contracted by the SEC to design a curriculum called the Accredited Investor Class, which you have to pass the test. I would imagine a test approximately on the same scale of complexity and difficulty as, say, the FINRA Series 65, which is the Investment Advisor Representative Test, which I've taken. I think something about that complicated, but not that subject matter. Subject matter entirely on how not to How to get screwed, how to watch out for yourself, and so forth. And I think every single human being, regardless of their asset level, should have an equal right to take that test. And those who pass it ought to have the right to tell the SEC to stay the hell out of what their investment decisions are. I would love nothing more than to be involved with that.

I have a certain passion, having been frankly screwed over by Wall Street when I was a naive high net worth investor, having sold my software company. I would love to help people learn how to be good accredited investors. And that's a big reason that we produce this show. But right now, the way the rules work, the definition of how smart you are is your bank statement.

What 'overhang' means

Nathan Egger: Now, in the introduction, you mentioned that most of our listeners might not know what overhang refers to in regards to a stock. I certainly don't. So, I think you're probably on the right track. So, you guys never technically defined that. Could you help us out?

Erik Townsend: Yes, a lot of things, the internals of the stock market that most most investors don't understand. And I learned about this when I sold my software company. Overhang refers to how many guys like the founders of the company have a whole bunch of new wealth that they're not used to having and can't wait to spend it and just got a bunch of restricted stock. So in other words, it was a private company, either the company went public, the company got acquired, one way or another, there are people who have a whole bunch of this company's stock.

It is basically a windfall to them. They were never rich before, and now they are. The thing they want to do is sell that stock, but they can't, because usually most of these deals, if it's a public offering, the founders are not allowed to sell their stock for a certain period after the public offering. If it's an acquisition where a public company acquired your company, you as the founder of the acquired company got a whole bunch of stock stock in the acquiring company in exchange for selling them your company, that stock is restricted. You're not allowed to sell it.

When that restriction runs out, you're gonna sell it. You would be stupid not to, because if nothing else, you just want to diversify. You've got 100% of your assets in whoever this company that just acquired your business is. You want to diversify into other things.

A very, very important thing that you can find out from public data on any stock is, you know, what acquisitions have these guys How many shares did they pay to who, and what are the dates on those? There are dates on any stock where certain guys have zillions of shares, you know, hundreds of thousands of shares or millions of shares that they're not allowed to sell, and there's a certain date on which they're allowed to start selling it. That's a day that there's going to be selling pressure in that stock. What an incredible opportunity to analyze what's going to happen to stocks just based on guys getting rich, obviously wanting to diversify out of whatever they were just acquired into. Almost nobody looks at that. I learned about it from the investment bankers that handled the acquisition of my software company.

Erik on PIPE funds: risks to entrepreneurs and investors

Nathan Egger: And at another point, you suddenly seemed to feel a need to protect our listeners from some evil force when Rick brought up the PIPE investment mechanism. You went out of your way to acknowledge that Rick is an honorable guy and you wouldn't have invited him on the program otherwise. But dude, sounds like your opinion of others in the PIPE financing business isn't quite as high as Rick's is. How about elaborating for our listeners on what that was all about?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, I didn't know Rick was going to bring up PIPE transactions. It caught me a little bit by surprise. I am embarrassed to say that I have been an investor in a PIPE fund before because I didn't understand that much about them. Most of what I can tell you, I think you're asking about investor risk, but I want to start with entrepreneur risks, because frankly, I think a lot of our MacroVoices listeners are entrepreneurs who are preparing to eventually sell their companies or to go public or so forth.

The PIPEs guys are basically in the business, and I don't mean Rick in the natural resources space. There's a lot of reasons that what he said makes sense. I'm talking about, let's say you're a doctor, you started a medical devices company because you invented some cool pacemaker thing. You went public earlier than you should have because you met another sleazy investment banker who just wanted to make fees taking you public when it didn't make sense.

Right. Now you can't raise any money because it's very, very hard for a public company to raise any kind of debt money in private markets. You gotta go do a secondary public offering and you can't do it because it costs too much and you're screwed. You are stuck. Your company has got maybe great prospects, but you cannot get any more financing. Basically, the way you got here, with all due respect, is you're being taken by finance guys who know that entrepreneurs like you, the doctor who invented the pacemaker, They see you coming. They know how to play you. They make you feel really good about your company and how great it is. They exploit the fact that you don't understand the warrants. They basically make what would be too good of a deal for you. It's a really fantastic deal for you. And oh, by the way, there's these warrant things that you don't really understand too that come into it.

Now, so far on the face of it, even with the warrants, maybe you can live with it.

Maybe you're smart and you do understand the warrants. What you don't know is how sleazy the guys in that business are, what their reputation is. What they do, if they can get away with it, they negotiate with the guy who's running the company, with the CEO, and say, look, we can basically, you know, you're going to have to give us a small discount below what your stock is trading at in the public market, and that's our profit. You can't blame us for wanting that profit. It's a small one. It's a very small discount below the public price. You'll also give us this warrant, and don't worry, it's just technical stuff that us finance understand. Don't worry about that. And, you know, it's going to be a great deal. Well, it's a way to get financing. You're the doctor. You don't understand all this high finance stuff. You just want your company to be successful. Okay, I'll take that deal.

What you didn't realize is you just signed a contract where they're going to set your valuation of your deal based on the average price of the stock during some period in the future, starting next Tuesday and for 3 weeks after that. You were not astute enough to think about how sleazy these guys are. You didn't know that as soon as Tuesday comes, they are going to aggressively short your stock and intentionally crash it. This is the guy you just signed up to help you. He's helping you finance your company. What is the first action he takes? He crashes your stock and he doesn't tell you he's doing that. You panic. You call him up and you say, oh my God, well, we made this deal. It was based on this call option. That you described, we're going to go by the stock price during this period, but the stock price during this period is suddenly not what anybody expected.

We have to call the deal off. No, it's not not what anybody expected. It's exactly what he designed, because the whole thing is a scam designed to take advantage of inexperienced CEOs who don't understand finance. It's a rip-off. It is the only investment ever in my life— I made money on that.

I made more than a 30% return being invested in a PIPE fund I had heard originally that there were some ethical questions about PIPE funds I thought it was just the idea that you're buying stock for less than a guy who's could you know a regular retail guy has to pay the the quoted price on the stock exchange. You're getting a discount below that because you're an accredited investor. That seems kind of unfair to the retail guy. I thought that was the extent of the ethical argument. I had no idea how incredibly sleazy. These guys can be. I want to be clear though, I haven't mentioned the fund I was invested in. I don't know that the fund I invested in did all this stuff. When I learned that PIPE funds in general do these things, even despite having made a 30% return, I got out of that investment because I just didn't feel good about what may be happening to entrepreneurs like myself.

And I don't walk away from a 30% a year return investment over ethical objections unless my ethical objections are pretty strong. I don't know that the fund I was in was engaging in this stuff, but I've learned that these PIPE funds, they exist to rip off naive CEOs. Now, what Rick was talking about was a different use. He's talking about an entirely valid use of that PIPE mechanism. He's not talking about being one of these guys I'm talking about. So don't think it's a criticism of Rick.

In terms of investor risks, let's suppose that your ethical concern is not as strong. You think 30% return What fund was that, Erik? I want to invest in that one. Here's what you need to think about. Inherently, as Rick described, the reason a PIPE deal makes sense is because of the warrants you get out of it. That's where the upside is for the investor.

If you're investing in a hedge fund that holds illiquid warrants, those are not Level 1 assets. They're not traded in a market. The value of the warrants is determined by the hedge fund's own staff. They have a valuation committee. Inside the hedge fund, no conflict of interest there, where they decide what they think the assets they're holding are really worth, even though they're not liquid and it's not possible to sell them to anyone on any market. So basically, you can very easily manipulate your returns. You can show on your tear sheet that you're making 5 or 10% a month. In reality, all you're doing is overstating the value of these warrants. And all you need to do that is just a good Excel model that's complicated enough that nobody Nobody can figure it out.

These things generally always have liquidity gates, and that means there's a situation where as soon as a lot of investors want to get out of that fund, they want to get out at the same time. Well, gee, we can sell the stock we've got, but we can't sell the warrants because the warrants are not liquid investments. So even though, trust us, your investment really is worth that million dollars that it says on your statement, we can't give it back to you right now. And by the way, you signed some fine print in your investment.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: your subscription, agreeing to something called a liquidity gate, which says all we have to do is make an announcement that nobody's allowed to have their money back. And as long as we make that announcement equally and we don't allow any investor to have their money back, it's legal and you don't have to like it.

So, there's a lot that can go wrong. I'm not saying there's anything wrong at all with the private investment in public equity mechanism in the sense that a guy like Rick could use it in a responsible way.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: Anyway, there are sleazy people in the world that really do sleazy things around that investment mechanism. And I just caution that people be very careful with it.

Nathan Egger: So, I hope that helps to clarify the complicated world filled with pitfalls. But folks, in the interest of time, we're going to forego the usual back and forth reflections between Erik and I on today's interview in order to make time for something much more important, or at least we consider it to be more important. And that's Erik's call to Art Berman in in which Erik and Art will reconsider their predictions from February based on the recent developments in the crude oil market. As promised, that's coming up next as MacroVoices continues right after this.

Art Berman: why the Cushing builds failed

Announcer: Now back to your host, hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Petroleum geologist Art Berman joins me for a special interview segment next on MacroVoices. Art was kind enough to share a fantastic Fantastic new presentation that he's developed, full of up-to-date graphs and charts about the oil market. That has already been emailed to all registered MacroVoices.com users, so it should already be in your inbox by the time you're listening to this interview.

Art, back in February, you and I both predicted a number of things. We predicted that the market would eventually balance itself after U.S. production declines, but that'll take at least 6 months or so. We thought that there was a very, very high risk of an outright crash in WTI crude oil in the interim, and the reason is we feared a storage crisis developing in Cushing, Oklahoma. That is, of course, the settlement location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, and it is a place that is filling up quickly. Initially, we were very much proven right. Huge inventory builds— 10.5 million barrels added in one week 3 times the highest analyst expectations, really, really looked like our view was playing out. Shockingly, on that day that we had the 10.5 million barrel build, the market still closed higher. How could that possibly be? I think everybody was just completely absorbed in this production freeze rhetoric, which we think is nonsense.

But the point is, the prices moved higher. Now what we're starting to see is a small trend of drawdown. In that Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, which is so critical, and we were looking for big builds. What's going on here, Art?

Art Berman: Erik, I think there's a lot going on. To try to simplify it, though, the essence of it is, is the following: based on fundamentals alone, there is very little reason for the price rally that we've seen since late January. I can, you know, I can find a couple of odds and ends here and there, particularly in the last few weeks, that suggest that there is something going on with inventories in the United States that might turn into something interesting. But as yet, I'd have to say it's too fragmentary, and it certainly doesn't explain the whole thing.

So what I think is happening is the market is pretty smart about figuring out when there's a problem down the road. And we had— IEA came to Houston for the Cambridge Energy Research Associates meeting, made a big deal about how we really need to look out for dwindling supply, all this underinvestment. We've underinvested for 2 years, that's going to come back and bite us. And I think that, that probably, you know, set off a certain amount of thinking and speculation. And I think the main thing that's happening here— yeah, the Doha meeting is certainly a piece of it— but I think that there's now this kind of medium-term concern that there's just not going to be enough supply.

And that's, I think, That's what's kind of been driving things. That's what has caused a lot of big things that we would have thought would have made a difference in prices, normal kinds of things. They didn't have that impact. The Doha meeting turned out to be nothing, as I think we both thought it would. Should have had a couple-of-dollar effect on oil prices, did for a few hours. By the end of the day, Brent was flat and WTI was You know, just down 40 or 50 cents. So that's what I think is going on.

However, what I see is that I look a lot at something called comparative inventories. Now, comparative inventories is simply looking at the current stock level, the current storage level, and comparing it with a moving average of a certain number of weeks over the last 5 years. I think this is a The most powerful tool to try to understand certainly WTI, if not global prices. And what I see is that Cushing comparative inventory has been falling since the first week in January, and falling pretty impressively. Now, we don't see that for overall U.S. crude. We don't see that for Gulf Coast or PADD 3. We only see it at Cushing.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: But I can go back and I look at the price rally that happened in March through June of 2015, see a real strong Cushing drop in comparative inventory. Even the weird price rally in late August that lasted until early November, same thing. What I'm seeing right now is stronger than either of those.

So, what I'm saying is that we got this kind of medium-term to long-term concern about supply, and things are freeing up at Cushing. I agree completely with, you know, your, your statement earlier. It doesn't mean we're using more oil, we're just moving it somewhere else. But I think that's, that's the simplest answer that I can provide.

Pipelining out of Cushing and the Houston Ship Channel thesis

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that that's a very important point, though, that we're not using more oil, we're moving it somewhere else. This is like a calculus problem, you know, where there's the 2 cones and which one's going to run out of water Because if you can just hold over by moving oil someplace else for 6 months, you and I have both predicted the market's going to balance itself in that 6 months on natural factors anyway. So the question is, can they be creative enough to take what was looking like an imminent Cushing storage crisis— and I emphasize the word crisis— can they be creative about pipelining that oil out of Cushing into PADD 3 other places, and buy enough time to wait for the U.S. production decline to kick in, as everyone is expecting. If that happens, it's entirely possible that we missed the bottom. It's in. And I'll be very disappointed because this was a very high conviction trade for me, probably the highest conviction trade in several years.

But you can never be 100% right. And it looks to me like what's starting to happen here is Because I still think all the factors that were there are there, but maybe we can buy enough time to avert the storage crisis.

I also think the key to this is the way the market sentiment was operating when we did that interview in February. I didn't think we needed a storage crisis in order to crash the market. I think we needed to persuade people that there was a realistic chance that one could occur, and I thought that that fear would capture the market. What we're seeing now is a big change in sentiment. It's going to take hard evidence that something's wrong or this excitement rally is going to continue on momentum. And the way I'm starting to look at it, I think a lot about the weather in the last few weeks, in the closure of the Houston Ship Channel in particular.

There's sort of one last explanation here. And I think especially if you look at what happened on Wednesday of this week, the tape action was very clear. It was about inventory.

Art Berman: Right.

Erik Townsend: We were starting to see correction to the downside. We bounced up off of that, that reaction low to the Doha no meeting. But it looked like maybe it was going to roll over and it was kind of following what on a technical level looked like maybe that was the last top. Then we got the inventory report, DOE. It was a build on inventory, 2.1 million barrels. It wasn't a huge build. That seemed to be the sigh of relief that just sent the market skyrocketing all the way to $44.50.

Art Berman: Wow.

Erik Townsend: So, I think about that and I think, boy, there's at least some people who think that what's happened is the last 2 weeks of arrivals of cargoes into Houston have been delayed. Houston Ship Channel has been certainly closed for most of the last 2 weeks, I think. I'm not sure whether it's reopened. Last I had checked a couple days ago, there were 35 ships waiting to get into port. That inventory doesn't get counted until those ships get into port. So, there's maybe one theory left, and I want to be careful not to be grasping at straws here, which is if we're having artificially depressed inventory reports as a result of slowdowns in ship arrivals into Houston, then when the weather clears and that backlog of all those ships waiting in the Gulf of Mexico deliver their cargoes to Houston, you could see a massive, huge build all in one week. And that could be a big turnaround.

You know way more about this end of things than I do.

So I follow an analyst named Samir Madani who publishes a free oil tanker analysis on Twitter. Samir predicted that this week's build would be light or a draw, and it was, and he expects possibly another draw or light build next week because of the situation with the Houston Ship Channel. My interpretation of Samir's analysis overall is that delayed arrival of tanker ships into Houston could very well explain why we've yet to see the big inventory builds that we both expected. What's your take, Art? Would you concur with that view, or is that grasping at straws for the bears here?

Art Berman: No, I, I don't think that's grasping at straws at all. We've had a lot of— a big bottleneck trying to get into the Houston Ship Channel for, you know, for, for weeks and weeks. And as most people who pay attention to the As those of you who have been following national news understand, Houston just got taken out for the better part of this week by big floods, massive rain, which, by the way, is not over yet.

And so that's just compounding what has been a big problem of, you know, oil from who knows where, Iraq and all kinds of places, trying to get into the United States. So it's been a long-term problem. It's been a long-term problem. I say long-term meaning all year, all of 2016, and it just got a lot worse. And the question is, you know, how quickly does that resolve itself? And I think at this point the weather crisis, the flooding here in Houston is, I would say, largely over.

And at least there's not abandoned cars sitting out on the street trying to get into work.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: But, you know, it's still an issue. So, we have to watch it. But, no, I think those guys are right on. I think that's a big deal. And like you said, the fact that we had a storage build and, you know, prices went up anyway, that tells me this market wants to raise price for any excuse whatsoever.

It's— there's momentum in that direction for who knows I don't know for what reason, and it's going to take something that, you know, that really brings everyone to their senses to cause it to move in the other direction.

Risks to the bearish case; 150-day cycles; steepener

Erik Townsend: You know, Art, as I look at this trade, it seems to me that one of two things has to be true. Either we got it right, those big inventory builds are still coming, they've been delayed because of the Houston Ship Channel situation, and that means that we're going to be proven right, there's going to be a really big move down. And we're going to see probably still lower oil prices. Bottom's not in yet. That's been the scenario that we're talking about. But I think we need to consider the other possibility, which is that there is some unforeseen fundamental driver that you and I have somehow missed, that somehow this rally really wasn't all about the production freeze and the political theater associated with it, and really it was something else. Now, I've looked pretty hard and I can't find it. But as we've done a pretty good job with our analysis, we should consider the possibility that we might have missed something.

So I've looked at this very closely. I know you've been doing a lot of analysis in the last few days. I wonder if there's something nonpublic. You know, we've had funky meetings lately— Obama and Yellen, Obama and King Salman. Could there be something going on politically? Is the invisible hand of government somehow doing something that's not public that's affecting the market?

I worry about these things, but frankly, I think our analysis is pretty darn solid. As I evaluate the current landscape, I don't think an outright short is the effective way to trade this anymore. As I look at what's happened to the term structure, I think a term structure steepener is a much, much better way to play this. At this point, I think it offers a much better asymmetric return profile. I explained the reasons for that earlier in this program. Before we did the interview with Rick Rule. Now, that means that my risk concern is completely changed. I used to think 10 hours a day, what have I not thought of? Where's the upside price risk in crude oil? If we look at a term structure steepener in lieu of an outright short, we don't care about upside price risk because that's not a risk anymore. We care about backwardation risk because that's where you lose on that trade.

Clearly, if we ran out of inventory, that would do it. Well, that's not going to happen.

Art Berman: Right.

Erik Townsend: If there was a war, that would do it. I know how to hedge that though by putting a third leg on that in terms of using a call to hedge it. But what other backwardation risks might I not be thinking of? So I wonder if you have any thoughts specifically on what I might have missed in terms of backwardation risks using a steepener rather than an outright short.

Art Berman: Right. Well, first of all, I think let's, let's put a little context around around being right and wrong on fundamentals. I suppose it's possible to miss something, as you say. I'm not perfect. You're not perfect. But I don't think I've missed anything significant. So, what I'm going to say right now is that looking at the price cycles of the last year, year and a half, What I see is that, for whatever reason these cycles form, they have a period, a term, of about 150 days.

Okay? So, in the case of the 2 big cycles in 2015, we had WTI— WTI went up to $60 and then down to high $30s.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: And then towards the end of the 3rd quarter, it went up again, not quite as high, and crashed way down to almost $26. Those were both about 150-day events.

We're 68 days into the current event, and so that says we're, you know, assuming that it works out the same— there's no saying that it will— we're halfway into it. Okay, so what I would predict is that That this cycle is going to peak, maybe it already has, and it's going to go down. And it's going to go down a lot, and then we'll have another cycle after that. So, I think it's— what I'm saying, Erik, is that I think it's too early to say that we were fundamentally wrong, and I promise that you're going to see lower prices than right now. But as to your question, you know, what could make us wrong?

Short of a war, I, you know, I really— I guess the only thing that could happen is, you know, some sort of other supply interruption. That's the only thing I can imagine. Should the Islamic State somehow move into the oil fields in southern Iraq, that would do it. Should there be some kind of a terrorist action in Saudi Arabia with the pipeline, Or a refinery, that would do it.

Those are the kinds of— I mean, those are, you know, you can put any kind of probability on those you like, and maybe we can say it's low probability in either case, but those are exactly the kind of things that, you know, those are exogenous events that no one can predict. But we should have those in our, you know, in our Our range of possibilities, because it's not as if they're— you know, these guys aren't thinking about doing that. So, but, you know, business as usual kinds of things, no, I don't see it. I, I don't, you know, and even, even so, with the amount of oil we have in storage in the world, and we got more than 3.1 billion barrels in OECD inventories right now, and, you know, you can And you can qualify that all you want and say, okay, well, you know, compared to 5-year averages, you know, that's a mere, you know, 500 or 600 million barrels or something.

But, you know, we've got a lot of days to cover, whether you're talking about OECD or just U.S. And it's gonna, you know, it's gonna take a— it would take an event of fairly unprecedented magnitude Unprecedented magnitude, barring a war.

War, you know, that'll do something like that.

But then you have to think, well, you know, where does US oil come from? And the public thinks that most of our imported oil comes from the Middle East, and that's just not the case. You know, half of our oil imports come from Canada, or almost half. Saudi Arabia counts for, you know, maybe 17% of our oil imports. Iraq is a big one. Iraq is 5%. Iraq is almost as much as Mexico and Venezuela.

Point is, is that the United States has got a pretty diversified source for its imported oil. And, you know, that's not to say that, you know, that a million-barrel, million-barrel-a-day event— well, we had a million-and-a-half-barrel event last week in Kuwait, and it definitely had an impact on price, but it, it didn't affect actual supply. So I'm hard-pressed to answer your question because I think it, it falls into, you know, a gray swan kind of category.

Under ordinary weird world situations, hard for me to see it.

Erik Townsend: Art, this is fantastic content. I don't know about you, I could go on for 2 more hours. But we actually already had our feature interview today. I'm sure we're going to be running overtime. I need to wrap it up. But one thing we did miss on your last interview, I really want to hit because we did get some inquiries, people asking us in emails. Please give us the sign-off, not only on your newsletter, which is certainly something I recommend for everyone, retail professional or otherwise. Your blog is fantastic. But what business are you actually in? We have a lot of pro finance, high net worth family offices and so Explain what services you guys offer to investors.

Art Berman: I collaborate with a first-rate reservoir petroleum engineer. We do all kinds of reserve forecasts, property valuations, production forecasts, anything to do with, you know, how does, how does a reserve or how does production affect value. you, we do it. We do a lot of consulting for money managers, hedge fund managers, portfolio managers. So if it has to do with valuation, that, that, that's what we do. And of course, I'm a petroleum geologist, so I do all sorts of things like make maps and drill wells. So I'm always happy to talk about those too.

Erik Townsend: Well, you're always an absolute pleasure to work So thanks so much again for joining us on the program. We're going to have to wrap it there, and Nathan and I will be back in just a moment as MacroVoices continues here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Well, that was great hearing from Art again. I can't help but feel like, Erik, you guys could have gone on for another 2 hours. This show is going to be 2 hours as it is. So what do you think about getting Art back on the show sometime soon for a full-length interview?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, absolutely. We have Art on our list, I think, already to come back. We were waiting, frankly, until this crude oil story had played out. I don't know when it's going to play out, but we should definitely get him back. We'll look at the scheduling, but we will schedule Art for sure for a full-length interview. I wanted to squeeze him in here, but obviously we've already gone way late, folks.

Sign-off: Richard Duncan next week

Nathan Egger: So this is as We have indeed gone very late, so we're going to cut it off for this week at least. Please remember to join us next week when Richard Duncan is going to be with us. And if you subscribe to us on MacroVoices on iTunes, you're just going to get these directly sent to you. You can always find it on the website, www.MacroVoices.com. We've changed things up a little bit. We've removed a button that was unclear to some people. We put in a player. It should be very obvious where everything is listed on the front page there. Thank you, Patrick.

And if you have a spare moment, rating us and reviewing us on iTunes is massive for us. So please, if you haven't done so already, help us out. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices. And while you're at it, please follow Erik directly. He's getting more and more into the Twittersphere every week. I'm excited about it.

Erik Townsend: I'm a cool dude in a Twitter mood.

Nathan Egger: Yes.

Erik Townsend: I'm going millennial. I'm taking the youth pill.

Nathan Egger: I don't know. So that handle is @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K-S Townsend. Drop by our listener forums, as I said, MacroVoices.com/forums, where you can suggest future show topics, future show guests, and pose questions for Erik. Feel free to ask us questions, and we're going to answer these on the show, on the air, from time to time. So for Erik Townsend, this has been Nathan Egger, wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Erik Townsend: Thank you.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Jim Rickards — Bestselling author Jim Rickards (Currency Wars, 2010; new book The New Case for Gold) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Why a gold special: Rickards now, Rick Rule next week

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 10 was recorded April 14th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. By far the best feedback we've received from our first 9 shows was on our first 2-part special, The Coming Bottom in Oil Prices, featuring Art Berman. We've received a lot of requests also that we do a gold show. But, you know, a pet peeve of mine is that all these gold bug podcasts are constantly hyping the same old arguments. And in my opinion, they serve little purpose other than giving the precious metal dealers a platform from which to peddle an old and worn-out story of central bank conspiracies to suppress the gold price and how you're almost certain to get filthy rich overnight when the conspiracy fails and your gold is suddenly worth 10 times more. It's an always bullish narrative that seldom changes. Or even reflects current macroeconomic conditions. I contend that for serious investors, if you want to look at gold as a speculative investment, you need to understand a lot more than just the usual gold bug narrative.

You need to know where we stand in the rate normalization process, where the risks of a monetary policy reversal lie, and so on and so forth. It's more of a macro discussion than a precious metals discussion. But even if the macro arguments are compelling and you decide to go long, You gotta decide what to go long. Physical bullion, ETFs like GLD, mining shares, call options. If you wanna answer those questions, you're going to have to consider this from the perspective of someone who has serious experience in natural resources speculating. Someone who can talk, for example, to the economic conditions that mining companies are facing right now with the depressed precious metals prices so that you can gauge whether or not they can be profitable and whether they make sense as investment plays. And then, of course, there's the whole question of allocation ratios between gold, silver, and other precious metals And so forth. So, the point is, there's a whole lot to this.

It's not as simple as people tend to make it out to be.

So, to address these needs with a proper MacroVoices degree of attention that they deserve, we've designed another 2-part special for you. This week's guest, Jim Rickards, bestselling author. The book, of course, was Currency Wars back in 2010. Jim has a new book out now called The New Case for Gold, and he'll be giving you the big picture perspective on exactly where we stand in the currency wars and why Jim believes that the tide has turned and gold has entered a new bull market. So, the plan for the MacroVoices Gold Special is Jim this week, then next week we're going to be bringing you another guest, Rick Rule, rock star of boots-on-the-ground natural resource investing. Nathan and I will be back after this interview to tell you more about what to expect next week.

S&P 500 stop-out and cycle high

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. I'm happy to be back with you guys. Erik, equities found a consolidation zone around the 2050 area after the relentless march higher, and equity prices seemed to stall and level off for the last couple of weeks. But this week we were able to make that new cycle high. What's your take?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, it's definitely past time for me at least. I was stopped out of my position this week. I would say if I had to grade myself, the mistake I made was not putting that trade on in the first place. I think that my logic was very good. Way— well, boy, 100 S&P points lower. But you know what? It turned out not to be right. The mistake I made here is I really didn't see how the S&P could break higher if crude didn't. And I really have strong conviction in my crude oil views. I think what we're starting to see now What we're seeing now, Nathan, is some decoupling. And if I look in hindsight, I don't mind admitting publicly that my original stop for this trade was right at the 200-day moving average. I gave it more room because I just didn't think it was gonna work, and I should have known better. We are seeing a move that on a fundamental level I cannot explain.

Technically, it looks very bullish in terms of what I see on the chart. I do not understand that because on a fundamental level it's not making sense. What that says to me is I can't be in the trade. I've gotta be on the sidelines for the S&P because what's going on here, doesn't make sense. Definitely, I will be watching for the opportunity for the short entry if we see signs of a reversal. But I've followed this short position way too far already. And as much as it doesn't make sense to me, it looks like the market is pushing higher.

OPEC Doha production-freeze meeting as political theater

Nathan Egger: And crude oil, there's a big meeting scheduled this Sunday in Doha, Qatar, where a subset of OPEC members, as well as Russia and a couple of other non-OPEC members, will discuss a so-called production freeze. We've heard a lot about this production freeze for the last couple of months.

Anticipation of that meeting seems to have captivated the market, but how do you see this, Erik? Is there anything real or of substance that can come out of this meeting, or are we just going to see more of OPEC playing propaganda hacky sack?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think it's propaganda hacky sack, but it's very real. And one of the things that you've got to consider— I want to go back to, oh, I think it was September or October of 2014 on another podcast program. I said I had a prediction. And then one of my prediction was, as I said, I smell a rat, and I think it's going to be served on Thanksgiving Day in Vienna, Austria, with stuffing and gravy, because it did not make sense to me that they had such an important OPEC meeting and they scheduled it on Thanksgiving Day. Now, Thanksgiving Day is obviously a very important holiday in the United States, where most of the oil trading occurs, but the futures markets are open because it is not an international holiday. It is probably the thinnest liquidity day of the year because nobody. Nobody is trading in New York hours when the New York traders are on vacation.

But it is trading. So you saw what I thought was going to be some action by Saudi Arabia intended to spike the market in one direction or the other. That's exactly what they did. They intentionally, I think, had their meeting on Thanksgiving Day so that they would make their press announcement into the thinnest liquidity moment possible and have the biggest impact on the market.

You just said, Nathan, this weekend there is a very important meeting.

If it's a very important meeting, why is it on a weekend? Why isn't it on a weekday? Why would this meeting have been scheduled so that whatever announcement comes out of it will be made at the most thin liquidity moment of the trading week, which is 6 PM Eastern time on Sunday, not Monday? when the futures market opens for that Sunday pre-session, it almost feels as if somebody is setting up to shock the market one way or the other.

I think that what's going to happen here— I do think there's a good possibility of more upside. I think there are a lot of people who are wrong, frankly, who think that this meeting is going to solve everything, and I think that that will be proven wrong. So I think it's a huge setup for a buy the rumor, sell the news event. I think there could be more strength on Friday. We're recording this at the end of Thursday's trading session. On Friday, I wouldn't be at all surprised if there's more strength as people want to be long into that meeting. I want to be short into that meeting. You got to be careful being short because I won't be the slightest bit surprised if at the end of the meeting on Sunday afternoon, there is a grand announcement that consensus has been reached and there will be a freeze, which means absolutely nothing.

Again, to explain what's going on here, There is a group of 5 or 6 countries who could not possibly increase their oil production if they tried. Those people who could not possibly increase their production if they tried are contemplating an agreement to agree not to do something that they cannot possibly do even if they wanted to.

This is craziness, but it is profoundly effective. By saying, There's a production freeze coming. Ooh, there's a freeze. It sounds good. To anybody who doesn't study this carefully, it sounds like a deal of substance, significance, potentially market-changing impact is coming this Sunday. And it's a lie. It's not true. What's happening on Sunday is political theater. A bunch of oil ministers are getting together to talk about nothing of substance in order to try to create a perception that there is some effort to support the oil market here. Now, I think That Saudi Arabia really screwed up. When this thing first came up on January 20th, Saudi was getting everything they wanted, and they were very well set up to create a washout in the junk bond market in the United States.

All this Doha production freeze stuff has given us a 50% rally in oil prices, more than 50% now, on nothing. I think if I was Saudi Arabia, I would walk into that meeting and I'd say, okay guys, We made an agreement earlier this week, and that agreement was we promised that we would come and make a decision at this meeting independent of Iran. We're going to make our decision without regard to what Iran's going to do. So our decision is no, period, end of discussion, no further debate, no further anything. We're done. That's the story.

If I was Saudi Arabia, that's exactly what I would do, because I don't think Saudi Arabia wants higher oil prices. I think Saudi Arabia wants to wash out the source of credit. We're coming into credit redetermination season. Season for the U.S. shale drillers. This is exactly when Saudi wants to do the most damage. And I think that they are setting up this meeting in order for a big down move in prices.

I know I've been saying that for several weeks, folks, but frankly, if you really look objectively here, what Art Berman and I have said about fundamentals has been proven true. Now, the market price has gone the opposite direction of what we expected because of this political theater about the production freeze. Once that is debunked, which I think sometime shortly after the meeting it should have been debunked, By sometime next week, I expect prices to be correcting markedly lower. I've said that several times before. Whether I've been wrong or just early remains to be seen.

Gold: long-term bull, 50-day moving average test

Nathan Egger: And as mentioned, gold is going to be a major theme of this entire show as well as next week's show. But let's still take a moment to get your take on this week's tape action in the gold market.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I think we should leave the substantive talk about gold for our guest interviews. One thing I do want to say here, though, because I'm not sure that I've actually said it on the show before, is I am fantastically bullish long-term There's no doubt in my mind that central banks are going to print more money. This is not over. We have not solved any problems since 2008. There will be more turning to the printing press. Gold will do profoundly well. No doubt in my mind. The question is, is the cyclical bear market over and has the new bull market really begun? And that, I think, we'll get into with our guests. One thing I do want to note, because it just happened after we taped today's interview, is that we did finally break down below that $50 level.

Nathan Egger: Yes.

Erik Townsend: 50-day moving average just on today's close. I want to point out, though, we broke below the 50-day moving average by just a smidgen, such a small amount that if you were to look at the 50-day moving average drawn on the futures chart and the 50-day moving average drawn on, say, StockCharts.com on the spot price, just the little difference that there is might make the difference between whether we're above or below it.

So I'm not going to call this a breakdown below the 50-day moving average. I'm going to call it a— the beginning of a breakdown.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: Looks like we could see that move lower that I've been talking about. I do think whether or not the 50-day holds is going to be the test here. It's sort of kind of starting to look on Thursday afternoon like maybe it's not going to hold, but we haven't seen enough weakness to really persuade me that that line is going to break yet.

Nathan Egger: Excellent. Thank you for your insights as always, Erik. We're going to kick off our 2-part gold special with Erik's interview with bestselling author Jim Rickards. Due to Mr. Rickards' schedule limitations, we taped this interview back on March 31st. That interview is coming up as Massil MacroVoices continues right after this.

Why gold needs the macro backdrop

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: We've had numerous listener requests to do a gold show, but a pet peeve of mine is that many of the self-professed gold experts just want to talk gold, gold, gold all day long, but they're not prepared to discuss precious metals in the context of the prevailing macroeconomic backdrop.

I mean, stop and think about it. How can one possibly have an opinion on the price of gold without first having an opinion on whether or not the stalled US dollar rally is set to continue or falter? How can you possibly have a view on gold without first understanding the role that gold plays in the global central bank reserve asset system? And what about the topic of currency wars? How does gold fit into that story? My complaint with the gold bugs is that they're so excited about gold that they can't articulate how gold fits into the big picture. Joining me now is bestselling author Jim Rickards. who is the absolute antithesis of the narrow-minded gold bugs that I described a moment ago. Jim is not only aware of the currency wars, but he literally wrote the book on that subject back in 2010. He has a new book out called The New Case for Gold.

Jim, thanks so much for joining us today.

Jim Rickards: Thank you, Erik. Great to be with you.

Erik Townsend: Jim, our audience is pro-finance, high net worth, and other sophisticated investors. So, these guys already know the basics. And they know that despite the excellent long-term fundamental argument for gold, the fact remains That gold and silver have been in a cyclical bear market for almost 5 years now. So, our audience is very keen to know whether that cyclical bear market is over, but they want the full story in the context of currency wars, central bank policy, the perspective of a macroeconomic framework that may be bringing negative interest rates and so forth. In this environment, why in the world would a zero-yielding asset make sense? So, I've got a checklist of a few topics here, Jim, but I know this is a topic that you're extremely experienced with.

Jim Rickards: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Where do you want to start?

Gold as numéraire, money not investment, zero yield

Jim Rickards: Well, I guess I'd make a couple of points, Erik. You know, the bull market, bear market analysis, it's a little bit a matter of picking your spots. Gold is the— first, the first problem is that when people say gold is up or down or it's in a bull market or bear market, what they're really doing is they're privileging the US dollar. In other words, what they're saying is the dollar price of gold is up or the dollar price of gold is down. And then they use that to back into analyses such as bull market, bear market. But what they don't realize that they're actually doing is saying the That the dollar is the measure of all things.

But what you can do is you can make gold the measure, make gold what the French mathematical term called the numéraire. And the numéraire matters in terms of how you think about whether things are up or down. For example, if I send out 2 people and I ask them to measure a football field, and I give one of them a ruler and I give the other one a yardstick, and they come back and the guy with the ruler says it's 300 feet long, and the guy with the yardstick says it's 100 yards long, Well, of course, they're both correct, but they came up with different numeric values because they had different measuring sticks or numeraires. So when you say gold is up or gold is down, that's not how I think about it. I think of an ounce of gold as my yardstick, if you will, as my numeraire. And then when gold is $1,000 an ounce, I say, well, it takes— a dollar gets you 1/1,000th of an ounce of gold.

And if gold is $1,500 an ounce, I say that a dollar gets you 1/1,500th of an ounce of gold.

And what really happened is that gold didn't go up, the dollar went down. So the easiest way to understand gold, you know, if you think of it as investment, which I don't— I don't think gold is an investment, I think of it as money— but if you want to think of it as investment, you know, when the dollar price of gold is up, you're just getting less gold for your dollar. When the dollar price of gold is down, you're getting more gold for your dollar. In other words, what really happened is the dollar went down and the dollar went up. So I think that's sort of mentally going through the looking glass, and you start to look at the world in a completely different way.

Now, it is true that if you measure it in dollars, gold was down about 45% from from August 2011 to November 2015. That's a, you know, depending on how you start, where you start, that could be a 50% retracement, which is not uncommon in commodities trading, for example. But gold is the best-performing asset class in 2016. It's also the best-performing asset class of the 21st century, you know, compared to stocks, bonds, and other commodities. So I know that's a little bit of a game, picking, you know, pick your starting point, and anybody can pick a starting point that suits them. A stock bull can say, hey, I'm going to measure from March 2009, as if—

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: Everyone's a genius and went out and bought stocks in March 2009. And that's fine. But I just point out that there are 2 flaws, or I guess 2 differences I would have in the reasoning of calling it a bear market. Because if you look at the dollar index, I use the Fed's broad trade-weighted dollar index. I don't use DXY because that's really just a substitute for euro-dollar cross rate. But if you use the Fed's broad trade-weighted real dollar index, the all-time low for the dollar was August 2011, which was also the all-time high for Or gold denominated in dollars, which is another way of saying that the dollar price of gold is just a cross rate. It's like, you know, you can look at dollar-euro, look at dollar-yen, yen-euro. These are all cross rates. And if you think of gold as money, it's just another cross rate. So I don't think of gold as an investment because it has no yield.

That's another critique of gold. People go, oh, why would you have gold? It has no yield. Well, it's not supposed to have a yield. It's money. You know, take it, reach into your pocket and take a dollar bill out of your pocket, hold it up and look at What's the yield? Zero. You know, take a €500 note, hold it in front of you. What's the yield? It's zero. In other words, if you have a Bitcoin, I don't recommend Bitcoins, but I consider them a form of money. If you have a Bitcoin, what's the yield? It's zero. In other words, all forms of money have zero yield. If you want yield, you have to take risk. You have to take your money and convert it into something else. Now, people take money and they put it in the bank and the bank, you know, pays them practically nothing, but pays you a little something.

You get a little bit of yield there, or you can put it in money market fund to get a little more yield.

Erik Townsend: And people say, see, my money has yield.

Jim Rickards: Yeah. And I say, no, it doesn't, because that's not money. If you put money in a bank, that's a deposit, which is an unsecured liability of a financial institution, which have occasionally been insolvent. As recently as 2008, all the major banks were insolvent. And you say, well, I've got deposit insurance. Well, okay, but maybe the deposit insurance fund goes bankrupt. Maybe the bank is shut. Maybe the power grid's down. Maybe your amount is more than the deposit insurance amount, or maybe you live in Greece, or maybe you live in Cyprus.

In other words, the point is bank deposits are not risk-free. They may be low risk. I'm not saying pull all your money out of the bank and go buy gold. But what I What I am saying is that to get yield, you have to take risk. And money has no yield because it has no risk. So gold, dollars, euros, yen, Bitcoin, they're all forms of money and they have zero yield. But just for the record, obviously the world is moving to negative interest rates. And in a world of negative interest rates, the zero yield is the high yield asset.

Yellen's dovish turn, the dollar, and a 10% gold allocation

Erik Townsend: Now, let's pick up on this dollar theme for those investors who do keep score in dollars. They care about the value in dollars. So the US dollar has been appreciating against other currencies since the beginning of 2014, end of 2013. Some people think that's over because that rally appears to have stalled, and they think it's going to reverse. We had Axel Merk a couple weeks ago on the program. Other people think that the dollar rally— Goldman Sachs recently said the dollar rally was set to continue. So, where do you stand on the dollar rally? Because, as you described, that obviously has a very direct impact on the price of gold.

Jim Rickards: Sure. Well, the dollar rally depends what side of the bed Janet Yellen gets out of in the morning. You know, in December, She laid out a path of increasing the Fed funds target rate, policy rate, 300 basis points over 3 years, which would have worked out to about 100 basis points a year.

She set a slow tempo. Typically, that means 25 basis points. There are 8 FOMC meetings a year, so that would be 4 rate hikes a year for the next 3 years. Every other meeting was like clockwork. Now, of course, it wasn't like clockwork, and everybody knew it was data dependent and there could be exceptions. But she basically laid out a path. Path, 25 basis point rate hikes every other meeting for the next 3 years. You get to March, which was the first crunch point, that's when they should have raised rates according to her schedule, and they didn't do it. So they tore that up right off the— right out of the gate.

And then her speech at the New York Economic Club yesterday was, uh, or 2 days ago, was, um, I don't know, shocking, or, uh, I'm not sure what the right word is, but she has— she's like a pod person. I mean, She had been taken over, her brain had been taken over by Charlie Evans of the Chicago Fed and Lael Brainard, who's one of the Board of Governors. And she went completely with what Evans had been saying through all of 2015. Charlie Evans said, you know, president of the Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, wrote a very good academic paper in March 2015. And he said, look, the risks of changing policy in a period of high uncertainty are asymmetric. And it was what he said was, if we wait and don't raise rates, he was voting not to raise rates.

He said, if we don't raise rates, if inflation runs away from us a little bit, No problem. We can just raise rates faster and squash it. We know how to do that. But if we raise rates prematurely and we exacerbate deflation, we don't know how to get out of deflation. So he says, we know how to cure inflation. We don't necessarily know how to cure deflation. So because those risks are asymmetric, that argues in favor of doing nothing until we really see the inflation, you know, see the whites of its eyes.

Yellen pushed back on that. Yellen said, no, monetary policy acts with a lag. Inflation's a genie we don't want to get out of the bottle. We want to stay ahead of it. She was using Phillips Curve, NAIRU, a number of other metrics, looking at unemployment, looking at job creation, saying, you know, inflation's right around the corner. That was the debate through all of 2015. Yellen basically won in December with the rate hike. And then Charlie Evans must have given her a brain transplant because in her speech at the Economic Club, she just practically quoted Evans.

There's a section of the speech. It's just, you know, it's her words, but right out of Evans' playbook. She uses the word asymmetric. She says, you know, inflation's easier to stop than deflation. That argues. So anyway, the market I mean, correctly interpreted, this is super dovish. But then you then you say, okay, where does that leave us? Because we were you know we were kind of set up for this string of rate hikes. Now they probably do want to hike rates for other reasons, which has to do with something Larry Summers pointed out, which was that historically, and Summers did a nice piece of research on this. He said when the U.S. goes into a recession, it takes 300 basis points of cuts to get out of the recession. That's how much easing the Fed has to do to kind of reverse the impact of a recession. Well, how do you cut? How do you get to 300 basis points when you're at 25?

The answer is you can't, obviously. And so part of Yellen saying, I want to get to 300 basis points, was that so she could have 300 basis points to cut in the next recession.

By the way, this recovery, it's been anemic. It's been one of the weakest recoveries in US history, but it's a recovery nonetheless. And it's about, if I'm not mistaken, 84 months old. The average post-1980 recession is 78 months old. So this is longer than the average post-1980 recession, which— sorry, expansion. I said recession, I meant to say expansion.

This is longer than the average post-1980 expansion by a number of months. And the post-1980 period is, as I said, 2 of the longest peacetime expansions in US history. So, you know, recessions don't die of old age. It doesn't mean that the recession starts tomorrow, but nobody should be surprised if it does. So here's Yellen sort of caught between a rock and a hard place. She wants to raise rates so she can cut them in the recession.

A recession could be right around the corner. It could be staring her in the face. A lot of data is coming in weak. It's mixed. You know, some is positive, but there's a lot of negative data. On the other hand, she's got Charlie Evans on one shoulder and Lael Brainard on the other saying, don't you dare raise rates because the economy is weak. You know, you're going to— this is where the currency wars come in. You know, if China is pegged to the dollar and we make the dollar stronger, the Chinese currency gets stronger vis-à-vis their trading partners in Europe and Japan at a time when they want to cut rates because their economy is falling off a cliff. So there's just no There's no good way out of this. She can't escape the room. So for now, obviously, no rate hike in April. And they'll talk about June, but markets have already priced in no rate hikes probably until late 2016, early 2017.

So if she wants to hike rates in June, they're going to have to change expectations. That means leaks and speeches and all that, but that could knock the market out of bed. Meanwhile, gold is sitting there like a form of money. Yeah, an easier dollar, weaker dollar is good for gold. So gold's had a good lift. That's gold, as I say, is the best performing asset class in 2016, partly based on these dovish noises that are coming out of the Fed. But they, you know, they're very inconsistent. They could turn on a dime. So what I expect most of all is volatility. I think we're going to see stocks kind of go— it's what I call non-directional volatility. I think stocks will go sideways, you know, up and down quite a bit. But, but not really go anywhere based on the latest, uh, you know, leaks from the Fed. And gold will probably do likewise until some of this gets resolved.

But my advice for investors, Erik, is to just have 10% of your investable assets in gold. And I talk about this in my book, The New Case for Gold. When I say investable assets, you know, take your home equity and take your business equity, put it to one side. So if you're, you know, whatever, a car dealer, Dentist, doctor, lawyer, pizza parlor operator, dry cleaner operator, you know, whatever it may be.

Put that equity to one side, put your home equity to one side. Whatever's left over, those are your investable assets, and I recommend 10% of that in gold. If everything falls apart, you'll be very well served. The gold will hold up very well to preserve value in every state of the world.

If everything's wonderful, maybe the gold kind of goes sideways, but you'll be making so much money on everything else, you'll be a happy camper. So it's kind of a A portfolio insurance approach. I analogize it to buying fire insurance on your house. Nobody wants his house to burn down. But if it does burn down, you're very happy you have the insurance. And when you write the check to the insurance company, you don't think you're wasting money. You think you're— that's money well spent because it's preserving your wealth and your dwelling. So, gold can perform that role in a portfolio.

Confiscation risk and the 1933 precedent

Erik Townsend: It's the one thing that'll still be standing when everything else falls Now, I want to check in with you on that idea that it'll still be standing, though, because a lot of people are concerned about prohibition, confiscation, taxation considerations. And I think this is particularly timely right now because I think that negative interest rates are definitely something that a lot of central banks around the world are contemplating. You can't really have negative interest rates and still have cash because people would just take the cash out and put it in Bitcoin.

Jim Rickards: Right.

Erik Townsend: out and put it in a safe deposit box. To some extent, gold really provides another workaround to what the system is trying to accomplish with negative interest rates.

Are you concerned, Jim, that regulators will prohibit retail investors from owning gold because it undermines the government's agenda with negative interest rates?

Jim Rickards: Well, let's say I were. Isn't that a good reason to buy it right now?

Erik Townsend: If you, uh, if you, if you don't think it's going to be taken away from you, I guess that would be Well, that's unconstitutional.

Jim Rickards: But look, I know what happened in 1933. President Roosevelt issued an executive order. Now, President Roosevelt got around the 5th Amendment by, uh, he ordered the gold to be handed in, but he paid everybody $20 an ounce. What he didn't tell us is it was the ultimate insider trading case, because what he didn't tell Americans was that his plan was to raise it to $35 an ounce, which he did. So what he wanted to do, he wanted to scoop up all the gold at $20 Then raise it to $35, and the Treasury would get all the profit. And that's exactly what happened. In fact, that delta between the $20 price and the $35 price, which went to the Treasury, that was used to fund the something called the ESF, the Exchange Stabilization Fund, which to this day is an unaccountable Treasury slush fund.

It does not require congressional authorization to use or spend. It's completely in the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury and by extension, ultimately, the White House. It was actually used by Bob Rubin to bail out Mexico in 1994 when the Congress refused to do so. Congress— there was a Mexican bailout proposal on the table. Congress was asked for a vote to bail out Mexico. They refused. And Bob Rubin said, well, the heck with Congress, I'll just use the Exchange Stabilization Fund. And he did. So, he kind of walked all over Congress in that one. But that fund came from the profit that the Treasury made by hoovering up gold at $20 and repricing it. Now, could they do that again? They would have to.

It's very unlikely in my view for a couple of reasons. The statutory authority that the president used, President Roosevelt used in 1933, believe it or not, was the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917. Now, the Trading with the Enemy Act of 1917 was enacted during the Woodrow Wilson administration so we could seize German assets at a time when we were at war with Germany. This is how we got Bayer Aspirin, which was part of Bayer AG, a big German pharmaceutical and chemical company. So we seized a bunch of German assets. So Roosevelt used that to seize the gold in 1933. I don't know who the enemy was. It was trading with the enemy.

Enemy Act. I guess the enemy was the American people. But that was a stretch. And then he got some post hoc ratification from Congress. But I think today— I think then there was a lot more trust in government. There was a lot more belief that government knew what they were doing. There was certainly a sense that people had to pull together in the Great Depression. And I think Roosevelt traded on all that goodwill. Today, that goodwill doesn't exist. People distrust government. I think you look at the rise of Bernie Sanders and the rise of Donald Trump as pretty good testimony to the fact that people consider the government an adversary.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: So, I'm not sure they would be such willing sheep led to the slaughter. I don't think you could get the congressional approval. There would be legal impediments, etc. Absent something much closer to social chaos and martial law, I don't see that happening. I think there'd be a lot of pushback if there was. But the fact is, it's— so, I don't necessarily see that coming. But, and I hear it a lot. You know, it's funny, people who hear the argument for gold understand the logic of it, then they start looking for reasons not to do it.

And they say, well, what's the point of buying gold? They're just going to take it away. Well, they're not— probably not going to take it away, but that's a pretty weak reason not to buy it. I mean, they could take your stocks away. You're not going to buy stocks because of that. So, you know, years ago I ran into people when gold was $700, and I would make a lot of the same points I'm making now, or I make in my book, The New Case for Gold. And people say, yeah, good idea, Jim. I'm going to get some gold. And then you see them a year later and say, hey, did you ever get the gold? Nah, I never did it. You know, so Americans have been conditioned, miseducated, brainwashed, you know, pick your word, for 40 years going on 3 generations at this point to believe that gold has no monetary role and no investment role.

And so Americans really don't understand gold. It's interesting, I travel on 5 continents, I speak to people all over the world, and when you go abroad, they have a much, much better understanding of it. But, you know, I do my best, and I consider my book, The New Case for Gold, to be educational. I'm not a gold salesman. I don't get, you know, commissions when people buy gold, but I am an author, an analyst, and a researcher and advisor and a consultant, a couple other things. And I wrote it really for educational purposes because I was kind of fed up with all the stereotypical arguments which— against gold, which actually do not hold water.

Fed policy forecasts, easing tools, gold as chameleon

Erik Townsend: Let's come back to Fed policy. You talked about at some point more accommodation, a QE4 from the Fed would obviously— they're printing more money, they're weakening the value of the dollar, that's good for gold. But on the other And Fed, at least the advertised policy, let's call it the advertised monetary policy, is supposedly we can expect a long string of Fed rate hikes as we go through a normalization process back to traditionally normal interest rates. I personally don't believe that that's really gonna happen, but a lot of people do. So where does that leave us in this whole gold story? We have kind of an ambiguous policy direction from the Fed because on the one hand, their message is very clear. about rate normalization and hiking. It's just that nobody believes that.

Jim Rickards: Well, my— let's go back to early December before the December 15th rate hike. Now, you know, actually, let's go all the way back to November 2014. I said in November 2014 categorically that the Fed— I didn't see how the Fed will be able to raise interest rates in, in 2015. And this was when Wall Street was telling you March.

Then March came and went. Wall Street told you June. And then June came and went. Wall Street said September. And September came and went. The whole time I was sticking to my forecast that the Fed would not and could not raise rates. So I got, you know, I was right for 11 out of 12 months or 7 out of 8 meetings. And finally, by December, it was clear that they were going to raise rates. And I said so at the time.

I said, okay, they're finally going to raise rates, but it's a blunder. I said that the economy's weak. We're bordering on recession. China is collapsing. Japan's in a recession. Russia, Brazil, Europe are all in recessions.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: The global growth is hanging by a thread. Christine Lagarde said the same thing. And I said, okay, the Fed will raise rates in December, finally, after going 11 months without doing it. But it'll be a blunder. The market's going to fall out of bed. They're tightening into weakness. The Fed is supposed to ease into weakness and tighten into strength when things get— when inflation gets hot or labor markets get tight. And here they are tightening into weakness, which makes absolutely no sense.

So anyway, tightened and they laid out this 300 basis point rate hike path. And, you know, right on cue, markets fell out of bed and we had a, you know, basically a technical correction over the course of January, early February. So then the Fed— and my expectation at the time was that they would persist in this course based on their models, which are obsolete, but they believe them. So based on their models until the evidence of weakness and probably technical recession became undeniable, at which point they would start to ease again. So my big forecast in December for 2016 was the Fed would ease before the end of the year. Where I missed it was that they threw in the towel 6 months earlier than I thought. I thought that they would— it would take until August before they got the wake-up call.

They actually got the wake-up call and, you know, right out of the gate in January, February. So they've already thrown in the towel. So I think I won my bet because what the Fed did at the March meeting is, is a form of ease by talking. You know, the— and actually, I think the— we'll see what they do in April. But the Economic Club speech is really a form of forward guidance.

The Fed has a lot of easing tools. Now, obviously, they can cut rates.

Now they can cut them 25 basis points because they raised them 25 basis points. I don't expect that right away, but that's one tool. But the other tools, of course, are some of them you mentioned, Erik. There's QE. There's the negative interest rates if you want to get back to zero. There's forward guidance, currency wars, Operation Twist, financial repression. They actually have a lot of tools in the toolkit. So it will be interesting to see what they do next. If they don't raise— it looks like there's no chance in April. I guess June is still on the table, though the markets are not giving that a high

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Jim Rickards: But the way to ease is kind of what Janet Yellen did 2 days ago, which is forward guidance. Just say, hey, coast is clear. Put on the carry trade, risk on, you know, go borrow dollars, invest in— you're gonna have a weak dollar. We're not gonna raise rates. Go buy some South African stocks or whatever it is, you know, just sort of start

the party again.

The problem with that is that you're creating asset bubbles. I mean, they want inflation, meaning consumer price inflation. You know, a PCE core deflator, but they're not getting it. But we are getting bubbles. Same mistake Greenspan made between 2002 and 2005. So, you know, what's it going to be? You know, tighten into recession, raise rates to have a little dry powder if you get to a recession, but do you cause the recession in the process of doing so? Do you continue weakness and get asset bubbles? And when the asset bubbles burst, you'll have a financial panic, which is worse than a recession. Again, going back to what I said earlier, I just don't see I don't see any good ways out for them.

But so gold, I wrote a column recently, I said gold is a chameleon, meaning at times it trades like a commodity. It trades, you know, kind of pretty highly correlated to the Continuous Commodity Index. I don't think gold is a commodity. The reason I think it's not a commodity is because it's not good for anything. In other words, gold is the best form of money, but it's not really good for anything else. I mean, it's not a major industrial input. The industrial uses of gold are quite

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: People say, what about jewelry? Well, jewelry is just wearable wealth. I mean, you can have rings and necklaces and bracelets all day long, but to me, that's just a form of wealth preservation, wealth storage. It's gold bullion in, you know, cosmetically appealing form. So, just talk to any Indian bride adorned with necklaces. She'll say, this is my savings account. This is my legacy. This is my inheritance to my children, my gift to my children. They, you know, they can wear it, but it's really just wearable wealth. So, I don't distinguish between jewelry and And bullion. As I said, there are a few industrial uses.

So gold's not— the definition of a commodity is it's sort of a more or less generic input to something else. So you use oil for energy, use copper for pipes, you use, you know, wood, lumber for construction. They're all inputs, but they're kind of not particularly high value added. They might have extraction costs, but they're simple inputs to other more high value added processes. That's what a commodity is. Gold doesn't fit that definition. I know it trades on the COMEX.

But it's not really a commodity, although sometimes it trades that way.

The second definition of gold, people think of it as an investment. I don't. I think it belongs in investors' portfolios to preserve wealth in a particular form of money and as a hedge against dollar inflation and in fact dollar deflation. We can talk about why gold is a good deflation hedge. But it's not really an investment because it has no yield. We talked about that earlier. Investments are supposed to have some risk and some yield. Gold has no risk and it has no yield because it's money.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: Then the third element is it is money, and we already talked about that. So, so the point I was making, I said gold can sometimes be a commodity, sometimes be an investment, sometimes be money. I personally think of it as money, but the market thinks of it as one of the three. So it's like a chameleon, it changes its character. Interestingly, and this began in November—

Gold as deflation hedge and the currency wars

Erik Townsend: Let me just interrupt you for a second, Jim. Please go ahead and elaborate on the deflation hedge aspect of gold, because I think a lot of investors aren't aware of them.

Jim Rickards: Well, the longest sustained period of deflation in U.S. history was 1929 to 1933. In that period, gold went up 75%. So the best performing stock on the New York Stock Exchange during the Great Depression was Homestake Mining, which was a gold mine. And why was that? It was because the government forced the price of gold up.

And, you know, as I mentioned earlier, President Roosevelt, by fiat, by order, basically told the Treasury to bid up the price of gold. There's a very famous story where It was by Allan Meltzer who put it in his history of the Federal Reserve where President Roosevelt was in bed in his pajamas and summoned the Secretary of the Treasury, Henry Morgenthau, and said, Henry, what do we want the price of gold to be today?

I know, bid it up 7 cents an ounce because 7 cents is my lucky number. And sure enough, Morgenthau called the Federal Reserve Bank of New York and they bid up the price of gold 7 cents that day.

They did it in small increments, but over about an 8-month period. They took it from $20 an ounce to $35 an ounce. Now, why did they do that? They certainly did not want to reward gold holders. They, in fact, they had already confiscated all the gold. Uh, they did it because they wanted to get the price of everything else up. You know, nothing happens in a vacuum, and gold was viewed as a form of money. So by bidding up the price of gold, what they were really doing was devaluing the dollar. It was an early— what was an earlier version of the currency wars. They were devaluing the But what they wanted to happen was exactly what did happen, which is all of a sudden, you know, coal, wheat, corn, steel. 1933 was one of the best years ever for the stock market, beginning in March 1933 and into 1934. There was a great rally. So they bid up the price of gold to get the price of everything else to go up.

You know, if gold goes to— right now it's around $1,220 an ounce, give or take. If gold goes to $5,000 an ounce, that's not happening in isolation. That $5,000 gold, you know, that's the world of, you know, $300 oil, $100 silver, you know, etc. Cotton, all these other commodities are going to go a lot higher because, as I say, gold is not, not a commodity really. It's a form of money. And so the point being, governments cannot tolerate deflation. They cannot tolerate deflation for several reasons.

Number one, it increases the real value of the debt. The, the U.S. debt is, you know, people say it's unpayable. It doesn't have to be paid. It does have to be rolled over. Alexander Hamilton figured that out, you know, 230 years ago. It has to be To be rolled over, it has to be sustainable, right? Right now, the US is on a non-sustainable path. We're not at the point of a complete bond market breakdown, but we're getting closer to that point.

Well, when you have deflation, the real value of the debt goes up and makes the debt even more non-sustainable. It gets closer to that panic point. So you've got to have inflation to make the value of the debt go away, number one.

Number two, governments can't tax it. In other words, let's say you make $100,000 and you get a 10% raise. Let's assume prices are Well, you had a 10% increase in your standard of living because you got a 10% raise with constant prices. But the government comes along and takes half. So, you know, your real standard of living only went up 5%, not 10%. Now imagine another world where you have $100,000, you don't get a raise, but prices drop 10%.

Well, you have the same 10% increase in your standard of living with the same nominal salary. Your standard of living went up 10% because prices dropped that much. That's deflation.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Jim Rickards: But the government can't tax it. The government hasn't figured out how to tax your improvement in your standard of living coming from deflation. So governments hate deflation because they can't tax it.

The third reason is that it leads to debt defaults, and that goes back on the banking system, and the Fed's job one is to preserve the banks. So, so for all the reasons I mentioned, makes debt non-sustainable, hurts the banking system, and government cannot tax the benefit to the people.

Governments hate deflation, have to do everything possible to stop it. So that's what's been going on the last 6 or 7— last 7 years with, you know, QE1, QE2, QE3, Operation Twist, currency wars, forward guidance, you know, etc. It's all designed to get some inflation. Currency wars are about importing inflation in the form of higher import prices once your currency cheapens.

None of it's working. None of it's working. And if deflation gets out of control, there's one thing that always works, which is to raise the dollar price of oil.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: Gold, because gold can't fight back. If you think of gold as an entrant in the currency wars, if I cheapen against the euro, then Mario Draghi can come back and cheapen the euro, then I cheapen the dollar again, he cheapens the euro again. Same thing with the yen, Chinese yuan.

This is what the currency wars are all about. But the problem is nobody can win a currency war because all advantage is temporary. And you're kind of on a seesaw. See, currencies cannot all depreciate against each other at the same same time. It's a mathematical impossibility.

That's why it's very easy to analyze currencies because you go back to 2012, let's say, I mean, what was going on? You had Roubini and Krugman and Stiglitz and all these guys running around with their hair on fire saying, you know, the euro's collapsing and Greece is going to quit and get kicked out and Spain should quit and go back to the peseta and devalue the peseta and lower the unit labor costs and there should be a northern tier and a southern tier. And I said at the time that that was nonsense, that nobody was quitting the euro, nobody was getting kicked out of the euro.

The euro would hang together and actually expand, which has happened. When I said that there were 16 members, today there are 19 members and several applications pending. So the euro is fine. But the point I was making is that was— everyone kept saying the euro was going to go down. I said, well, how does the euro go down without the dollar going up? They never— in talking trash about the euro, they never looked over at the United States and said, well, that means a stronger dollar.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: And this was at a time when the dollar was quite low, going back to 2011. And if you do have a stronger dollar, that's going to hurt the US economy, which ultimately it has. So you have to look at all these cross rates. But there is one way. There is one and only one way for every currency in the world to depreciate at the same time. And that is against gold.

Because gold is a form of money that's not printed, not issued by a central bank, and gold can't fight back.

That is what happened in the 1930s. Now, we're not We're not at that stage yet, but my point to asset allocators is, you know, gold's going to do very well in inflation. You can count on that. But in extreme deflation, gold also does well because governments force the price up because they're desperate to get out of deflation.

Helicopter money, QE, structural depression and China's wasted growth

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to go back to monetary policy for a minute, particularly with respect to quantitative easing. I'm hearing more and more voices come out saying different versions of the same story, which basically is one or another form of helicopter money. They think that more quantitative easing is coming, but they don't think it's going to look like the last 3 rounds. They think it's maybe going to be more focused on printing money, not for the benefit of Wall Street, but for the benefit of Main Street, potentially in connection with some political campaign.

If that were to happen— One variation of that I've even seen Dr. Pippa Malmgren has a book coming out talking about her prediction that the next round of QE will all go into military spending. The point, though, is not to prop up asset prices. First question, do you agree with the people who see that coming? The next round of QE might not be supporting asset prices. It might be doing something else. And if so, what does that mean for the outlook on gold?

Jim Rickards: I agree completely. I mean, there's no— there's very little doubt that that's what's happening. I mean, I know Pippa, she's a great analyst. She's right Larry Summers has been calling for it. Yeah, everyone's calling for it. Ray Dalio, Christine Lagarde. The real— if you want to see the real blueprint, the power elite blueprint for what we just discussed, there's a book called Between Debt and the Devil by Adair Turner. Adair Turner is the head of a George Soros think tank called the Institute for New Economic Thinking. But it's basically the power elite blueprint for what we just discussed.

Now, the difference between this and QE is that you have to combine monetary policy and fiscal policy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: So, the way QE works is governments buy bonds from the banks, but they pay for the bonds with money that comes out of thin air. So, you know, I'm the Federal Reserve, you're Citibank, I say, you know, sell me some 10-year notes, and you sell them to me, and I pay you for them, and the money I pay— I use to pay you comes out of thin air. But the problem is the banks then take the money and give it back to the Federal Reserve in the form of excess reserves. So, the money doesn't go anywhere. There's no velocity. There's no lending.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: There's no spending. It's not stimulating aggregate demand. It's just, you know, you're kind of affecting the shape of the yield curve and the level of rates, but you're not really doing anything to get the money into circulation, help the real economy.

Now, helicopter money, so-called, also involves printing money, but it comes in a different form. First, the fiscal authority, and that would be the Congress or a parliament or some legislative body, to vote to approve more spending. And, you know, take your pick. If it's the Democrats, it's probably, you know, more on healthcare and Medicare, Medicaid, education, the environment, social welfare, etc. If it's the Republicans, it's probably more military spending.

If you get Paul Ryan and, you know, Nancy Pelosi together, you'll probably have both. You know, you'll have a spending party. But the point is, there's more spending. The deficits are larger. Now, that money actually does get spent, unlike the money that the Fed prints under QE, which doesn't go anywhere. This money gets— somebody gets it. I mean, it could be Boeing or Lockheed or Northrop Grumman, or it could be some community organizer, ACORN, whatever, but somebody's getting the money.

And, you know, under kind of Keynesian 101, you know, they then go take their wife out to dinner, husband out to dinner, whatever, and then somehow this money gets into circulation. I'm very doubtful that that's the result, by the way, but that's the theory.

So now you've increased the deficit and the Treasury has to issue more bonds to cover the deficit. And the Fed buys the bonds by printing money. So you still have— so it's really debt monetization. So you still have money printing at the end of the day, but it's being used to spend rather than end up in the Fed in the form of excess reserves.

And, you know, Adair Turner also argues for debt cancellation. And, you know, then it does make a difference how you spend the money. Some ways are more wasteful than others. You know, 2009 We had a big stimulus bill that did nothing for the economy, and I don't think Larry Summers will ever live it down. But that's another example of wasted spending. There are a lot of skeptics on this, but that's the basic idea. This is definitely coming because there's no other way out.

See, the problem is that we're in a depression. The world has been in a depression since 2007. Depressions are structural in nature. That's the difference between depression and a business cycle or a technical recession. They're structural in nature. You cannot fix a structural problem with monetary solutions. They don't work. You need structural solutions. Structural solutions involve the fiscal authority. So it could be bigger deficits, more deficit spending. It could be labor market, labor mobility, labor market reform, environmental reform, regulatory reform. It could take many forms. But unless you step up and make those structural reforms, you're not going to get out of the depression we're in.

Now, that's the theory that is in the air. You're absolutely right, Erik. And it's being talked about by a lot of the power elites, you know, finance ministers and professors and, you know, large hedge fund managers, etc. The problem is getting it done. You can't just wave a magic wand. You've actually got to get the Congress to vote for this. I don't see the US Congress doing it. Maybe the British Parliament, but Britain's not that big a player. Also, Japan has been doing this on and off, but of course they wasted a lot of the money.

China's very good at it, but they wasted even more money. I mean, I've been to China, you know, walked around construction sites, got mud on my boots in these ghost I've seen the ghost cities, you know, to the horizon. Not just one ghost city. I saw 7 ghost cities in a row, you know, one after the other, each one with a couple high-rises, apartment buildings, golf course, luxury hotel, conference center, high-end shopping, you know, metro stop, highway exit, etc. Everything, all empty, all empty as far as the eye can see. So, you know, you can roll steel.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Jim Rickards: And make glass and cut copper and do construction and build this stuff. And that's how they've been powering their GDP for the last 10 years, at least a significant part of it. But it's all wasted. If you adjusted China's GDP for the amount of waste, their actual growth would have been more like maybe 4% instead of when it was 9% or 10%. And today, it's probably down as low as 3%.

I mean, it's dangerously low for such a large economy. So, the problem that you're absolutely I think you're probably right about the theory of helicopter money, but it won't actually work, in my view, for 3 reasons. Number one, there's a reluctance of the fiscal authorities to actually do the deficit spending. Number 2, I'm doubtful about velocity because of socio-psychological reasons. Maybe people do get the money, but that doesn't mean they go spend it. They might just put it in the bank or pay it on debt. I mean, a good example of that was when the price of oil plunged beginning in June 2014. Remember how many accounts were opened? Economists in late 2014 going into 2015, they were saying, well, you know, price of oil, price of gasoline has come from $4 a gallon to $2 a gallon, and people use, you know, 50 gallons a week. And so that's $100 savings. It's $5,000 a year pre-tax. You know, they're gonna go out and spend all this money. Happy days are here again.

And I said, no. I said, the $5,000 is real. You know, gas goes down $2 a gallon. And you get, you know, $5,000 a year in your pocket if you're using 50 gallons a week. So that's real. But it doesn't mean people are going to spend it. They either save the money or they pay down debt, whether it's home equity loans, credit cards, student loans, you know, whatever it might be.

And again, there's no velocity. And that's not— that's a psychological problem. So I'm doubtful that helicopter money will be enacted. If it is, I'm doubtful it will work because people People might just pay down debt. And then I'm even more doubtful that the projects selected will be productive at the end of the day. So it just looks like another slow-motion train wreck. Meanwhile, the world is not getting out of this depression that I described.

De-dollarization, the financial war game, Russia and China gold

Erik Townsend: I'd like to close on a final topic that almost nobody is talking about. Russian scholar Sergei Glazyev has masterminded what he calls a de-dollarization plan. And basically, Mr. Glazyev's agenda is that he feels that the U.S. enjoys too much privilege— what French Finance Minister Valéry Giscard d'Estaing called exorbitant privilege— the ability to borrow money in the world's reserve currency.

Mr. Glazyev is trying to persuade the world, starting with the BRICS countries, to abandon the dollar as a reserve currency. And the West, as far as I can tell, is Ignoring this completely. I feel sometimes like I'm the only guy that takes this seriously. And yes, it's true that Russia is not the most powerful nation in the world, but the BRICS countries represent like half the human beings on the planet.

And my take on this, Jim, is the reason that the US dollar is the world's reserve currency is because there is no viable alternative. Well, if we've got this guy Glazyev motivated to come up with an alternative. And like half of the people in the world are starting to pile in. Isn't this a big issue that we should be paying attention to?

Jim Rickards: Yes. And actually, this was the scenario I played out in, in 2009. I talked about this in my first book, Currency Wars. But I was asked by the Office of the Secretary of Defense to facilitate and help structure and then actually later participated in the first ever financial war game.

So, of course, the Pentagon's been doing war games for decades. They didn't need any help from me in that in general. But it was the first-ever financial war game. So, they reached out for some capital markets and financial expertise. And we did this at a top-secret weapons laboratory about halfway between Washington and Baltimore.

You had uniformed military, CIA, Treasury, Fed, think tank people. I said to the organizers, you know, wars involve a lot of deceit and deception and manipulation. So, you ought to allow me to invite some of my Wall Street friends in so we can make it more realistic. And they agreed with that. So, I got a couple folks from UBS and a Russian private equity fund.

Anyway, we played this out over a couple days. But the scenario that I launched in conjunction with some others was one where Russia and China pooled their gold reserves and put them in a vault in Switzerland. And then created a new London Bank of Issue that would issue a new backed by the gold in the vault in Switzerland. And the kicker was that henceforth, if you wanted Russian natural resource exports or Chinese manufactured goods, you had to pay for it in this new currency. Dollars were no longer acceptable. And if you wanted some of the new currency, you could either trade with them and run a surplus, and then you'd have some, or you could borrow some from this London bank, or you could deposit your own gold and then get some yourself based on the gold that you Now, we never thought this would happen the next day. And obviously, it was a stretch of a scenario.

But that's what you're supposed to do in war games. You're supposed to look over not just one ridgeline, but probably 2 ridgelines, and help the Pentagon think years or even decades ahead in terms of threats to national security.

We actually got laughed at by a couple of people in the room, some Harvard professors. One guy just laughed in my face and said, why are you wasting our time with this? Don't you know that gold's not part of the international monetary system? It never will be again. This just seems like Seems a waste of time.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Jim Rickards: like a complete waste of time to talk about this scenario. I said, well, let's just, you know, it's a war game. Let's just play it out and see how it plays out. And it played out in very interesting ways.

And again, I talk about those in my book, Currency Wars. Notwithstanding the ridicule, in fact, since 2009, Russia has increased its reserves, gold reserves, by more than 100%. They've added over 1,000 tons. China has increased its gold reserves 300% or 400%. They've added about 4,000 No one knows the exact number because they keep it a secret. They say they have 1,700 tons, but that's clearly not true. They have something closer to 4,000 tons. We know that from— we have reliable Hong Kong import data and geological surveys, mining output. So, we can do a pretty good estimate of how much gold China actually has. And I've also met with secure logistics operators, people who run vaults. I just got back from Switzerland and met with the head of The world's largest gold refinery.

He had great insights into, you know, who's selling, who's buying. We're talking about physical gold here. We're not talking about all this paper gold. But in any case, Russia and China are behaving exactly the way we warned the Pentagon in 2009.

Now, it doesn't mean the dollar is over tomorrow. But by the way, it's not just Russia and China. Iran, Turkey, other countries are buying gold. Kazakhstan has expressed interest in— Kazakhstan is adding to its gold reserves.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jim Rickards: So this is going on. Now, the Russian ruble and the Chinese yuan are nowhere close to being global reserve currencies. Because a lot of people get confused about the difference between a reserve currency and a trade currency.

Anything can be a trade currency. You can use baseball cards or bottle caps. It's just a way of keeping score in terms of trade deficits and surpluses, and governments settle up from time to time. And you've probably settled up in dollars for that matter.

But to be a reserve currency, you need investable assets. You need a bond market across all maturities.

Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.

Jim Rickards: Some 30 days to 30 years. You need repo mechanisms to finance them. You need a system of primary dealers. You need auctions, hedging tools, options, futures, settlement, clearance. You need all that plumbing of the bond market. You need a rule of law. You need a lot of things that China does not have and won't have for 10 years, and neither does Russia.

So they're not ready to be a reserve currency.

SDRs, institutional allocations and physical shortages

Jim Rickards: But there is another reserve currency waiting in the wings, which is the IMF Special Drawing Right, the SDR. And that's— look, that appears to be the play because that could be rolled out a lot faster. In fact, it will be rolled out in the next global financial panic because all the central bank balance sheets are stretched. You know, the Fed printed $4 trillion to deal with the last crisis, but they haven't taken it back. They haven't normalized the balance sheet. So what are they going to do in the next crisis? Print another $4 trillion, take the balance sheet to $8 trillion, leverage themselves 250 to 1? I mean, they look like a really bad hedge fund. on today. I think at that point they'd be at the outer boundaries of confidence limits and unable to do that. But there is one clean balance sheet left in the world, and only one, which is the IMF.

And functioning like a central bank of the world, they could issue these SDRs, these special drawing rights, and reliquify the world, which by the way would be highly inflationary and it would be very bullish for gold. So, you know, I look at all these scenarios, Erik, whether it's depression and deflation or reflation or Panic cured by massive money printing in the form of SDRs, the devolution of the dollar as the global reserve currency, the rise of SDRs, market uncertainty. It doesn't matter where you look. They're all bullish for gold in different ways. And my point is that don't go all in on gold. You never go all in on anything. You don't put 100% in anything. But investors who don't have 10% in gold are extremely vulnerable. Now, in In fact, institutional investor allocations to gold are about 1.5%. When I was— I was in— like I said, I was in Switzerland just the week before last, and I shared a limo from the airport out to the site where I was meeting.

And the other fellow in the limo was the head of the Colombian government of Colombia's sovereign wealth fund. Basically, they have a pension fund for the citizens of Colombia, but unlike our pension fund, theirs is actually funded. It has real assets in it, and he manages that.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Jim Rickards: It was about $60 billion.

And I just said to him, I said, how much gold do you have? And he said, zero. So, you know, I talk about 10%, but in truth, allocations are about 1.5%. If institutions simply move from 1.5% to 3%, you know, just forget 10%, forget 5%, if they just went to 3%, there's not enough gold in the world at anywhere near these prices to fill that demand.

So it looks like the setup is there. for a super spike in prices. I'm not saying it's going to happen tomorrow. I'm definitely saying it's going to happen over the next several years. And but the other problem is when it happens, you're not going to be able to get it. There are already physical shortages. Again, that's what I see that from a number of sources, but learned more about that when I was in Switzerland.

So I recommend investors get your gold today, because when the price soars, you're going to be watching it on television. You're going to be watching it go up on television, but you're not going to be able to get any.

Erik Townsend: So you, uh, you expect that there will be physical shortages that will not be resolved by price? Because normally for a commodity like this, if there's a shortage, the price just goes up, right?

Jim Rickards: But there are certain physical shortages that— yeah, I mean, the price, you know, bid $2,000, $3,000, $4,000, $5,000 an ounce, pick your price point. But if there's no gold, there's no gold. See, you do have gold coming out of weak hands going into strong hands. It could Where do you go? There's just no offer. I mean, the strong hands are China, Russia. What if they say we're not selling?

You know, U.S. can't sell. I explained that in chapter 1 of my book, The New Case for Gold.

The U.S. cannot sell for complicated reasons involving the relationship between the Treasury and the Fed and the need to maintain at least 8,000 tons of gold. Canada has no gold. The U.K. sold most of their gold. Switzerland just barely missed on a referendum to prevent future sales, but certainly The Swiss people have no appetite for selling. Germany's not selling. China's not selling. Russia's not selling. Mining output increases about 1.6% a year. So tell me where this gold is coming from. You know, look, maybe a central bank will be able to get some from the IMF. You know, the IMF has 2,000 tons, but retail investors are not going to be able to get any.

The New Case for Gold and close

Erik Townsend: Well, I have plenty more questions, Jim, but unfortunately we're out of time, so we're going to have to leave it there. Before we Before we close, The New Case for Gold is the name of the book. Is that available on Amazon now?

Jim Rickards: It's available on Amazon right now. It's actually ranked number 1, and Amazon has a lot of subcategories, but 2 of them I watch. There's a subcategory called money and another subcategory called commodities, and right now the book is ranked number 1 in both categories. But it's, it's, it's the official publication is Tuesday, but you can order it today. But that's an extraordinary ranking for a book that's technically not even out yet. It'll be out on Tuesday, but you can absolutely go to Amazon today and order it, and your copy will be in your mailbox or on your doorstep on Tuesday, and it'll be in bookstores on Tuesday also. But it's off to a good start, and thank you for mentioning it and inviting me on your program.

Erik Townsend: And I should mention for our listeners' benefit that this particular show was taped in advance, so the book is available right now. as you're listening to the program. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right after this.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik on gold, the dollar rally and sitting out

Nathan Egger: Erik, I loved listening to your interview with Jim. He's got this ability to weave together a cornucopia of topics, tie in a healthy dose of history, and make rational projections about the future. And my personal big takeaway from the interview was that the price of gold is going to be largely dependent on central bank policy. As you alluded to earlier, they're very likely to print money, which is going to be great for the price of gold. But in this interview, I had a hard time finding a mention of a scenario that would be bearish for gold. Maybe there isn't one, at least a bearish scenario in the intermediate to long term. Short term, sure.

We've discussed many times on the program your own skepticism pertaining to gold's impressive rally year to date. So I'm curious, did your discussion with Jim do anything to change your outlook on gold?

Erik Townsend: Well, my outlook on gold is evolving. Jim's I think your comments definitely had some influence, but I think it's really, you know, I've just reflected on the shows that we've done. I keep looking at the technical chart and it really looks bullish. And I say, that looks like a bullish chart, yet I'm still not buying it and I can't put my finger on why.

And I've done some just introspecting thinking about it and I've realized the answer is, I think that if you look back a few years, the most important thing to understand in macro was inflation or deflation. What's the What's the trend? What's happening?

The new inflation versus deflation is dollar rally. Are we looking at a dollar rally pause, or are we looking at a dollar reversal here? I think that that is the biggest issue in the entire market right now. I think it's driving everything, and I think that if Raoul Pal is right and we're looking at a dollar rally pause, and the dollar rally is set to continue— that, by the way, has been my view, although I'm starting to open my mind a bit to the Axel Merk view that it might be over.

If Raoul is right, I think gold is going to tank from here. I think that the low is not in yet. You know, if the dollar breaks notably above 100, I just don't see that we've got the reason for the recovery to occur yet. I do think it's coming. Your question was about intermediate to long-term. I don't know how we're defining those. Long-term, no question in my mind, bullish on gold. The question is short to intermediate term. I think short-term, we got to see what happens at the 50-day here from a technical standpoint.

But the really big question that I think you need to be most concerned about is what do you think about the US dollar rally? And I think my own take is I can't decide. If I don't have strong conviction, I'm going to stay on the sidelines. Once I've come to a more firm conviction position on whether or not I'm really on board with Raoul that the US dollar rally really is going to continue, If I get more conviction on that or go the other way, start to take Axel's view and think that the dollar rally's over, then definitely time to get long gold. But I'm just not feeling it yet.

Preview of Rick Rule, part 2

Nathan Egger: Gotcha. So, after hearing Jim Rickards' macro backdrop for gold, giving us a little historical perspective, talking about the long-term future, what are we going to cover with Rick Rule next week? Why are we doing a second part, and what's going to be different exactly?

Erik Townsend: Well, Jim Rickards is a lawyer by training. He's a brilliant guy, great macro thinker, obviously does a lot of thinking about the role of gold in the macroeconomy and how it fits into the central bank reserve system and so forth. With all due respect to Mr. Rickards, I don't think he spends a whole lot of time in Mongolia in gold mines talking to gold miners about their conditions there.

He is very much the city dweller, the macro thinker kind of guy.

Rick Rule is the opposite. Think of him as your Indiana Jones kind of character. Rick is the guy who is constantly off to the next natural resource find, looking at some investment opportunity in a junior mining company in East Overshoe, Zimbabwe someplace. So he brings a perspective which is very much boots on the ground, and it's about physical resources from a physical resource perspective, as opposed to from a macroeconomic argument as to why it makes sense in a portfolio perspective. I'm sure that Rick, who is a very smart guy, will also have plenty to say on macro, but I think of him really in terms of Mr. Boots on the Ground for natural resource investing.

Retiring the Peak Oil Investor newsletter

Nathan Egger: I'm really looking forward to that counter perspective. So before we close, I know some of our listeners are probably wondering what happened to the Q1 issue issue of your free Peak Oil Investor newsletter. Can you just give them a quick update on what to expect?

Erik Townsend: I think that what to expect is going to be a little bit of a moving target because we haven't decided yet. So, let's just open the kimono and be honest. I've got a limited amount of time. I've got a hedge fund to manage, is what I do for a living in real life. I can only spend so much time. I feel that MacroVoices is going very well, and I think that we've gotten a lot of very positive feedback. The amount of time it takes me to write the newsletter versus, you know, do another episode of MacroVoices. I think we're accomplishing more doing this. We are leaning towards retiring the written newsletter and replacing it with this podcast for that reason. And to be honest, folks, I didn't write a Q1 letter because I realized it was April and said, oh, Q1's over. Oopsie. We've been too busy launching this podcast. We're probably going to retire it. I think for now the policy statement is we're going to drop the Peak Oil Investor brand.

We may reintroduce a written MacroVoices publication to kind of keep this new brand together at some point.

But honestly, does anybody really still want my newsletter if you can get a weekly oral version, which is longer and more detailed? I know some people prefer written, but it seems like this is the better format. So I think our leaning is to retire the newsletter and just do the podcast, but we're definitely open to feedback.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Nathan Egger: So that's the plan, folks. And that's going to do it for That's going to do it for us this week. But don't forget to tune in next week for part 2 of our special on gold featuring Rick Rule. I think you're really going to enjoy that. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes. And if you have a spare moment, ratings and reviews are a huge help to us. You can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices.

And while you're at it, follow Erik directly @ErikSTownsend. Drop by our listener forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.

Nathan Egger: Forums where you can suggest future show topics, future guests, and pose questions for Erik, which we answer on the show from time to time. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management. LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

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MACRO VOICES is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented in MACRO VOICES should NOT be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making important investment decisions. The opinions expressed on MACRO VOICES are those of the participants. MACRO VOICES, its producers, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall NOT be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MACRO VOICES.

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