Art Berman — petroleum geologist (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone.

Episode preview: Labor Day oil special

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 29 was recorded on September 1st, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Labor Day weekend is upon us, and for oil traders, that means we're moving out of summer driving season and into shoulder season, with fall refinery maintenance fast approaching. So we've decided to bring you a completely oil-centric show this week, with petroleum geologist Art Berman returning as this week's featured guest. Art and I will discuss oil market fundamentals, including comparative inventory, oil price cycles, recent rig count growth in the Permian Basin in particular. And finally, we'll compare notes on long-range price forecasts. Art sent us a fantastic book of charts and graphs to accompany his interview today, and I highly recommend that you download them before listening to the interview. Registered users at MacroVoices.com already received the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you're not yet registered, you can register a free account at MacroVoices.com. And once you're logged in, you'll find the download in our research library.

After my interview with Art, #OOTT founders Lisa Ward and Samir Madani will be joining Aaron and me to bring us an update on the phenomenal growth of OOTT since we first introduced you to them several months ago right here on this program.

Market wrap: equities, crude oil and gold

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Finally, I get to open a show without declaring yet another week and another all-time high in the S&P stock index. Well, this week saw some softness and no new all-time highs and a close on Thursday of 2,168. So, Erik, what's the outlook here? And is the top finally in on this equity market?

Erik Townsend: Well, I don't know, Aaron. You know, seasonality speaking, it's about the right time of year. A lot of people subscribe to a belief that stock market crashes happen in October. And in reality, if you look at the historical data, usually if there's going to be that big stock market crash, the high is actually in August sometime, the volatility picks up in September, and then the worst of it is in October. So are we headed into something like that, as so many very smart people are predicting? I don't know. You know, I do think that all the economic signals tell me that this market is too overvalued. But the last time that you expect a market to crash is when everybody's expecting it to crash. And there's an awful lot of people that have expressed a very bearish view. At the same time, if you look at some of the data, you know, things like margin interest, it tends to reflect a very bullish sentiment among traders.

So I don't know what's going to happen. I definitely think that the economic fundamentals do not support these valuations and the market ought to go down dramatically. But frankly, I've thought that a lot since 2009 and the tape action has made a fool out of me each time. So the reason I'm not going short here and jumping on the short bandwagon is simply because each time I've thought the market ought to crash or substantially correct since 2009, you know, the Fed shows up with More artificially printed money and saves the day. And until we see something tie their hands so the Fed truly is out of bullets, which I don't think they are, I think they're going to continue saving markets. So I don't know what's coming. Looks like maybe we're seeing the beginning of a downside. We'll see what happens.

Aaron Chan: Well, speaking of bearish views, your call on crude oil looks to have been proven right as WTI finally looks to be rolling over this week. Obviously, we're going to have considerable expanded coverage of oil markets in our feature interview with Art Berman. But let's at least cover the inventory numbers and short-term outlook now.

Erik Townsend: Okay, well, 2.3 million barrel build on national inventory of crude oil. There was an expectation of a much smaller build, so we saw a bigger than expected build. And remember that seasonally speaking, we shouldn't be seeing big builds yet. They usually come in the next month or two.

Cushing, on the other hand, was a 1 million barrel drawdown, so that offsets the large build a little bit. Gasoline, 691,000 barrel drawdown. Distillates, on the other hand, a huge 1.5 million barrel build on inventories in distillates. There was a very small decline in production of about 0.7%.

So net-net, these things do come together between the huge distillates build and the much bigger than expected national inventory build on crude oil. Yeah, it's a bearish message, but I said last week you ain't seen nothing yet. I don't think we've seen anything close to the worst of it. We're getting to that turning of a corner from summer driving season into shoulder season. I think really big inventory builds are coming, and I think big Cushing inventory builds are coming. Hasn't really started yet, but we're starting to see it move in that direction, and already the market is tanking, testing $43 even earlier today. So you know we're looking at the market selling off rapidly. I think it's got a lot further to go to the downside, but we're going to need to see some more bearish catalysts. No real rhetoric out of Saudi Arabia or OPEC this week so far. I wouldn't be surprised after what. we've seen for them to come up with some kind of propaganda to tell us that the next meeting is going to, you know, supposedly have a production freeze or something.

I think the real key to understanding this market is to understand comparative inventory, not absolute inventory. Art Berman is going to have a very in-depth update on that topic in the feature interview. So what we need to see here, I think, to shock the market lower is some really big builds in inventory. And I think they're coming. We'll save the rest for our conversation with Art.

Aaron Chan: Right. And shifting over to gold, for the past couple weeks now, we've been talking about a technical consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377. Erik, you've been saying you were leaning toward the bear case until we get out of this consolidation range. And we actually saw $1,305 briefly on an intraday basis this morning. So is it time to declare victory on this bearish call on the resolution of this trading range?

Erik Townsend: Well, not quite yet. You know, what I've said is we need a daily close below $1,308. We were headed in that direction this morning, got down to $1,305 and saw that support level was rejected and a rally back up to $1,318 or something like that by the end of the day. So we have rejected that support level for now. I do think it will fail eventually, but it hasn't yet. It'll be the daily close below $1,308 that seals the deal for me and persuades me that I was right about the bearish call.

Aaron Chan: So thanks for the quick market update, Erik. Petroleum geologist Art Berman has been one of the most popular guests we've had on this program. So we're delighted to bring him back for our Labor Day weekend oil special. As Erik mentioned at the top of the program, we highly recommend downloading the excellent book of charts Art sent us to accompany this interview. Now, registered users at MacroVoices.com already received the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you haven't registered yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, where you can register a free account in just a couple of minutes. Once logged in, click the Research Library function on the black menu bar at the top of the screen. Then click on Guest Publications. There you'll see Art Berman's Book of Charts as a downloadable PDF file near the top of the list. Erik's interview with Mr. Berman is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right here at MacroVoices.com.

Art Berman: comparative inventory and the anomalous summer build

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Returning for our Labor Day weekend show is petroleum geologist Art Berman. Art, thanks so much for coming back with us. You know, as I look at the oil market, it's very clear to me, and I'm sure it must be to you as well, that you've got to get your head around comparative inventory in order to understand this picture. But for our newer listeners who may not have heard your explanation of what comparative inventory means in your last interview, please give us a quick refresher. Compared to what? What are we talking about? And why is it so important to understand this measure when we look at the inventory numbers?

Art Berman: Well, sure, Erik, and, and thanks for, for having me back. It's, uh, always so interesting and fun to, to talk to you and to get the feedback between, you know, me looking at sort of the technical fundamentals and you looking at markets. So, so we got 2 things going on, uh, inventory and comparative inventory, and the only difference is, is that inventory goes up And it goes down on sort of a seasonal basis as we're either restocking or destocking or going through plant maintenance, etc. And the important thing therefore is, although total inventory is interesting and important, is to try to normalize it and to look at, well, how does this particular level of storage compare to previous years that were also going through these seasonal shifts. And so that's all comparative inventory is.

We look at— I look at what's the level of storage right now compared to a 4-week moving average of the same week over the last 5 years. And it's just that simple. But as with many things that are simple in the world, It just works absolutely great. And if you look at any sort of historical picture of comparative inventory and price, you just can't get a very much better negative correlation in the world, the real world of oil and gas, than that. And so, what I've found over the years is that comparative inventory, if you can figure out which way the trends are going, and it's just data, you can pretty well understand price formation. And that's a big deal. I think it is to me.

Erik Townsend: Okay. So in other words, what we're doing is effectively tuning out the effects of seasonality so that you're looking at inventory in terms of what it should be doing this time of year. But, you know, before we even get into relative inventory, speaking of this time of year, Art, it's the 1st of September. That means that we are at the end of what historically is a destocking season because, of course, summer driving season consumes a whole lot of energy and a whole lot of oil. So the question I would normally ask you at this point is how much has the total stock decreased during this destocking season? But it's gone the other direction, hasn't it?

Art Berman: Right. And that is completely anomalous. What we've seen is that, is that absolute inventories have actually increased by about 6.5 million barrels over the last 6 weeks in what is supposed to be, you know, a total destocking. And so this has really been a surprising development for me and for anybody who looks at this. And this translates into really huge changes in comparative inventory. So we're, you know, we're adding millions of barrels a week, but in terms of comparative inventory, comparing it to years past, It amplifies that effect, and so I think in a lot of ways that that helps to to put the price the price the downward price that we've been seeing into some context. It also helps to understand how totally artificial this latest price rally you know has has been. It's more about sentiment and hope that you know maybe OPEC or somebody's going to do something than it is about.

any sort of reality.

Erik Townsend: I definitely want to encourage our listeners to refer to the book of charts that you sent us. If anybody cheated and fast-forwarded to this, we did tell you earlier in the program how to get the download and where to obtain that. So your first chart here is showing very clearly that 6.5 million barrels over the last 6 weeks, when we're supposed to be destocking, we're actually increasing inventory during the middle of summer driving season, which is pretty amazing. And the second slide, I think, shows That, that is actually dramatically increased when you look at it on a comparative basis. So what is the second slide telling us?

Art Berman: So the second slide, Erik, is, is looking at total U.S. commercial crude oil volumes. And, and I look at many aspects of it, but, but this is, this is the big picture. And so that 6.5 million barrels of increase translates on a comparative basis to 16 million barrels of comparative inventory increase over the last 6 weeks. And just this week alone, nearly 2.5 million barrels. So this is completely backwards to, you know, to what we should be seeing. We should be seeing, you know, at best very little change.

And just to give you some idea, this week we added 2.5 million barrels of total inventory. And a year ago on this date, we withdrew 4 million barrels. And if you look at the 4-week average of 2015, we were withdrawing 1.5 million barrels. So, so what's happening right now is anomalous. And it says that basically what I've been saying all along is true, that we're just really— we just got way too much oil in the system for prices to recover as people hope they will up to, you know, you name your price number, but $50-plus. There's just no basis. There's no basis whatsoever in the fundamentals. Now, markets move for many reasons, and the market is the final arbiter. And so just because sometimes Sometimes it goes in a direction that the fundamentals don't necessarily support. Eventually it all works out, but, but so there is that disclaimer that, you know, sometimes markets have their own opinion and personality and they're going to do what they do.

I can't argue with that.

Erik Townsend: I just want a sanity check. You know, the way I've interpreted this, I think a lot of people who are in this market are not experienced oil traders. They don't understand these comparative inventory concepts, and they're looking at the last couple of weeks and saying, yeah, okay, these are pretty interesting inventory builds as opposed to draws, but they're not huge ones like 5 million barrels a week or something as we saw in the spring a year and a half ago.

It seems to me though, if this just happened during the middle of summer driving season, holy cow, put your seatbelt on for what comes next. Would you agree with that, that we may be on the cusp of potentially some really big inventory builds as we move into the time of year when it should be building?

Art Berman: Well, anything is possible. That's exactly— that's certainly what I'm going to be looking for. You know, we're seeing some things developing here that break the paradigm of the past, and that shouldn't be too surprising in a way, because ever since

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: Ever since the price collapse, I've been saying and writing that we've crossed a boundary. And so many of the things that we used to think were kind of the rules of the game, or at least the framework, many of those we're not so sure about anymore. And so, you know, what I see going on here basically is that we're seeing relative— we're seeing inventory changes comparative inventory changes that, that are happening at such a high storage that they're not really changing the overall picture for price formation. And so we go up and then we realize the truth and we go back down. So my expectation is, first of all, I don't know because I, I'm not strictly speaking, uh, you know, a price predicting kind of a guy.

But if we're seeing inventories and comparative inventories building, you know, in August, then like you say, Erik, I mean, you know, buckle up because we could see some changes coming up that could drive prices, you know, down possibly, you know, below $40 again. So what I see is that what's happening is anomalous based on the fundamentals. And I'm curious, Erik, I mean, are you seeing any kind of commensurate anomalous reaction in the futures market? Because that's a little bit, you know, I follow them, but I'm outside of my expertise and purview.

Term structure, producer hedging and shale capital markets

Erik Townsend: Yeah, something really strange is going on, Art, in the last week or so. One of the things I follow very carefully is not just the absolute price, Price tends to be dictated by a lot of emotion and reactions to propaganda from OPEC and so forth, and there are wild swings in both directions. But the time spreads, the difference between price in one month and the next month, the contango in the market, is more of a reflection of how the professional oil traders are anticipating that we may come into a storage crunch in the fall. So what we were seeing during the sell-off in prices down to $39 was a dramatic widening of those time spreads. So people are basically saying the value of storage around fall maintenance season, refinery maintenance season, there was a lot of expectation building that we were going to have a real storage problem.

Now, as we've had this production freeze propaganda hope rally that has taken us from $39 back to $47. Of course, as the less volatile, longer-dated contracts are more stable in price, the front month is rising, you see some compression, some, some contraction and narrowing of those spreads.

And that's certainly to be expected in the environment of a rising front month price. But this week we've seen nothing but basically straight down in reaction to inventory numbers in terms of the front month price. But those time spreads, which you would expect to then start to widen again as a result of the front-month price dropping, they're not widening. They're still contracting, which says that the longer-dated contracts are being sold even more aggressively than the front month is. And the price is being driven down in those longer-dated contracts more dramatically than the front-month price is being driven down.

You know, how the heck do you explain that? Either somebody has decided that we're not really going to have a storage problem this fall after all, and that's very hard for me to reconcile how anybody could think that based on what we've just discussed in terms of inventory growing so dramatically at a time when normally you'd be expecting drawdowns. All I can think of to explain this is Producer hedging, that maybe the producers who are not fully hedged are looking at prices rolling back over and saying, oh crap, we thought this thing was over. It's not over. We're headed into another leg down. We better just sell at any price we can get in order to lock in at least a breakeven price where we can survive whatever comes next. Obviously, they should have hedged, you know, back when prices were $51.65 or whatever they topped out at. But they didn't do that. I can't find another way to explain it, but something very anomalous is happening this week with the front month dropping and the time spreads still compressing.

We also have had a month-end effect, and I notice as we're speaking today on Thursday, it's the first of the month, those spreads are starting to widen just a little bit, whereas they were narrowing over the last 2 or 3 days that the front month was selling off. So it may have been somebody trying to, you know, get their hedging done before the calendar month ended or something like that. I'm not sure, but something very funny is going on here in terms of the term structure of the crude oil futures market.

Art Berman: That's really— that's so interesting, Erik, because what I see on, on the, you know, the, the more mundane, uh, daily transactions just among the oil companies and their contracting of rigs and they're going to the credit markets is that I certainly expected that with the prolongation of relatively low prices into well into, into 2016, that, that the credit markets would just contract considerably relative to flow in capital into the E&P companies. And I was wrong, and I think everybody was wrong. And what we're seeing instead is that it's, it's as I wrote recently, it's a race to the bottom. That, that the private equity has said, okay, we've got a problem, we need to figure out who the potential winners are. The field is narrowing, and the result is that, that capital Capital is even more available to a smaller number of companies that are perceived as having whatever it takes to be successful in spite of lower prices. And so what I see shockingly is is that we've had a couple of weeks of rig count increases of you know twenty plus in the tight oil space.

And most of those are in the Permian scene. We had 2 companies last week, I think they were Parsley Energy and Diamondback Energy in the Permian Basin. They went out with secondary share offerings, got $1.6 billion in 4 hours, and they had to cut it off because people wanted to buy more.

So, what that says to me, if you're at all paying attention and you're producer is this thing ain't over by a long shot. The money is basically— the money is there for the right companies, and they're not just the Permian, but that seems to be the way of it. I think the companies are starting to say, oh, man, we thought we were over the edge on this. We better— I think you're exactly Right. We better hedge, better lock in whatever we can, because this thing isn't ending, at least in the domestic situation.

Saudi strategy, junk bonds and near-balanced markets

Erik Townsend: You know, I agree completely with everything you said, Art, and I would just observe too, you talked about private equity, but also going back to public markets, you and I both predicted last time we did an interview, we thought Saudi Arabia's goal was to cripple the funding sources, and we expected, you know, just a massacre in the junk bond market. And what's amazing to me is if I look at the oil charts, if I look at the inventory and comparative inventory charts, it's really clear to me this thing ain't over yet. But boy, if I look at the junk bond market, it's breathing a sigh of relief as if, you know, the worst has passed and the storm is over. So the other thing that seems to have changed here is a year ago, it was very obvious that Saudi Arabia was intentionally wanting prices lower because they were trying to damage their competitors.

Even though they're not willing to give up market share yet, they're not willing to consider a production cut. It seems like Saudi Arabia has shifted gears to where they are willing to talk up prices. And that seems to be a change. And I don't know if that's what's changed the junk bond market or what. But, you know, my, my short view on junk bonds, it's, you know, it's, it's getting kind of long in the tooth in terms of how long we've been waiting for a collapse in junk

Art Berman: Right. And, and I think that gets back to— I don't know what Saudi Arabia and OPEC, uh, what their feelings are, their strategy is, how it's changed, but I think it's clear that this thing has, has gotten away from, from everybody. And so, you know, we look at the global picture, and the global picture is that we have made real progress.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: We have made real progress. Towards market balance. I've been pointing this out now for a year. It may be slow, but we've been moving in the right direction. And for the last couple of months, we've really been about as close to market balance as really we ever get. And I did a study of this a month or two ago.

I mean, the market's never in balance, and we've been less than half a million barrels per day of liquids globally above balance. And compare that to the average overproduction or production surplus last year was over 2 million barrels a day. So we are very close to balance. We— the market should be responding differently than they are. We should see prices rising because overproduction Production is not the problem anymore, and yet prices are not responding. And that's got to be more than a little worrisome to a country like Saudi Arabia whose entire apparatus depends on oil price and their strategy.

Yes, I agree with you that that was where they were going. Let's cripple the capital inflow, grab market share. Drive these guys into the ground. Well, it seemed to be working, and now it's not. Now it's not. So there's something more fundamental going on here. It's not just a matter of getting market balance, global market balance in order. And that's got to be worrisome. And yeah, if they can talk the price up $4 or $5 by saying we're going to have some sort of a meeting and talk about a production freeze, that's, that's a lot of, that's a lot of revenue relative to what they were getting before. It's got to make a difference.

US production, six-month price cycles and the Permian rig surge

Erik Townsend: Now, the other thing that we predicted, both of us, I think, the last time we did an interview, was we thought by now U.S. production would be falling off a cliff. And it is declining, but really only just a little bit. So is that the reason that this thing is, is dragging on as much as it is? Because I think we had both thought that by now maybe Maybe, you know, the market would be in balance and prices higher. It seems like U.S. production is not falling off a cliff, and of course the rig count is rising again.

Art Berman: Well, that's exactly right. I mean, production— I mean, every, every month we have to revise it. It hasn't, you know, it hasn't fallen as much as predicted. And I think at this point what, what's happened is whatever it does, just about everybody who's in the business of predicting, including the EIA is saying, you know, pretty much September is the bottom.

And whether you subscribe to the, you know, the apocalyptic view of the drilled and uncompleted wells, or, you know, or it's just a matter of rig count, whatever, whatever your, you know, your, your theory is about that, I think we've gotten to the point where our expectation isn't— is That the U.S. production is not going to drop much more than it has.

That has to have a psychological effect. As long as we were 6 months out and it was dropping at several hundred thousand barrels a day per month, there's hope that maybe it'll drop even more than we think. Maybe we'll get down, but we're still less than 1 million barrels a day below the peak from April of 2015.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: So I think, I think the hope factor on that, even though we have cut out 800-some-odd thousand barrels a day, the hope factor has faded. It's gone. So, so what's, what's the next shoe to drop? Where, where are we going to find the solution, the silver bullet that brings prices back to normal? And I think we're running out of options.

Erik Townsend: I want to get back to your slide deck. I think the first 3 slides were all about comparative inventory, which we've covered. Moving on to the 4th slide, you're getting into oil price cycles, and you're showing that there's basically about a 6-month periodicity to these cycles. What do you see on the horizon? What's next?

Art Berman: This latest thing that just sort of came up out of nowhere, you know, which shows up as Cycle 4 on my chart, it was sort of— had a spectacular rise, and it seems to be dying off about as quickly as it began. Now, I'm not a believer in history repeating itself, but what we saw a year ago was a very rapid increase in the end of August. Surprise, you know, prices went up to $50-some-odd, rattled around, hit a few little shorts on

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: And then crashed down to $26 a barrel by the end of 2016. Now, don't get me wrong, I'm not predicting that that's what's going to happen, but it's hard not to remember that we saw something like this a year ago.

Is it important that it happened at the same time of year? Well, again, we're in refinery maintenance. Season, and as we discussed in the beginning of the conversation, we're seeing this anomalous build in absolute and comparative inventories that we didn't see a year ago. Oh my gosh, you know, could, you know, are people freaking out about the possibility that we're going to see another big slide?

All it would take, so, you know, is Is some more economic bad news about China, the OPEC meeting in Algiers this month doesn't produce any kind of meaningful results, which I think we agree it won't, and even if they say it does, it isn't going to make any difference. What's going to hold prices up through the part of the year that typically is not stellar for prices?

Again, I'm not predicting that. But certainly something to watch for. It's surprising to me, but hey, that's what the data says.

And what it's showing clearly in slide 5, and here I've broken out the 3 main tight oil plays, the Bakken, the Eagle Ford, and the Permian, is that we're in a cyclicity here too, in that, you know, every time the price starts to go up, the capital flows and the rig count increases. And what we've seen here just in the last couple of months, you know, since really April, is that this Permian rig count has just shot to the ceiling. I mean, it's like happy days are here.

And again, we're You know, a culling of expectations that Saudi America has now contracted the Saudi Permian. But the more the better, because for the capital providers, it means fewer choices to make. And so as prices, you know, got up to $51, The floodgates opened and we're just putting all kinds of rigs to work out there in West Texas.

Rig counts rising. And, you know, you factor that into growing inventories and comparative inventories and we're setting ourselves up, I think, for a big fall in prices potentially, or certainly a fall. And we're seeing a fall right now.

So if you think it's over, it isn't over. And I think it's It's just that the— it's the reach for yield that drives everything. I have no doubt that the people that are putting their money in this are smart people, and they wish they had somewhere else where they can get the kind of yields that they're finding here, but they can't find it. And so they continue returning to the same old, same old.

Show them a better option and they'll take it. Nobody can show them a better option. And, and let's face it, you know, if you put your money in one of these secondary offerings by one of these Permian Basin companies in the beginning of August, you made a ton of money. It's a stock play. It makes sense. I hate to say it, makes sense.

The $38 floor, Cushing storage and PADD 3 flows

Erik Townsend: On your next slide, you're showing essentially an analysis of the comparative inventory data suggests to you about a $38 price floor for now. Now, I'm curious about that number because you and I had both predicted much lower numbers were within the range of possibility, maybe as low as $20 a barrel the last time that we did an interview. Since that interview, I noticed an article by RBN Energy about a month, month and a half ago, and they opined that the world has kind of changed since 2012 because the reason you and I both thought that we could be in for an outright price crash was all that landlocked oil in Cushing, Oklahoma. That's where the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract is settled. If Cushing runs out of storage space, oh boy, anything could happen. And RBN's observation was, you know, pre-2012, all of that was true. Post-2012, there's a whole lot of outbound pipeline capacity from Cushing down to PADD 3 So they have the ability to allow themselves to get to 99% of their working capacity.

And then, you know, throw the valves and turn on the pumps and solve the problem where it was previously impossible to solve that problem. Do you think that that's contributed to prices not having fallen as far as we thought they might? Or do you think that, you know, the bottom is yet to be found below $26?

Art Berman: I see support for, for that opinion in the comparative inventory data. And so I look at I look at Cushing, I look at PADD 3 or Gulf Coast, I look at total US. And what I've seen evolving is that Cushing, when we talked a year ago, seemed to be driving the whole operation as far as price. What I see now, for instance this week, is that Cushing inventory and comparative inventory actually dropped.

And Gulf Coast went up. So what it seems to me has been happening, and I've seen this now for, you know, for at least a month or two, is that, you know, Cushing will go up a little bit, then Cushing will go down. They're just moving, they're moving inventories out of Cushing into Gulf Coast. And what this slide is meant to show more than anything else is that we're locked

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: We're locked in, in, you know, what I call Einstein's definition of insanity, which is to say you keep doing the same thing expecting a different result. And so what, what seems to be happening here is that, you know, we lower inventory and comparative inventory. Everybody says, oh, go— oh, great, you know. Uh, and, and so when you do that, the price goes up and The refiners say, whoops, price is going up, I don't wanna buy any more oil. So they stop moving it in the Gulf Coast.

Crudes go up, price reacts by going down. The refiners say, oh, happy days are here, let's buy some more oil. And we just keep going around and around in a circle. So that's why I didn't include it, but if you look at a 200-day moving average, Okay. Average of NYMEX WTI futures, you come up with about the same answer, that there seems to be a floor at around $37 or $38, and there seems to be a ceiling at $51, $52. And so neither of those things mean that it's a prediction of the future, but they're kind of supportive.

So that's the way I see it, that the changes in inventory Inventory and Cushing are— they're moving deck chairs around is what they're doing there. It's not reflecting fundamentals. It's reflecting the ability to be able to move stuff out and put it somewhere else. And so we see a reduction in inventory and an increase in product. But that doesn't mean that anybody's consuming anymore. It just means they're refining more product. And that seems to be the The real, the real phenomenon.

Permian breakeven costs versus the cost-cutting narrative

Erik Townsend: On your next slide, you're showing that this recent growth in the rig count seems to be very much centered in the Permian Basin. And I know off the air we've also had a conversation where one of our regular listeners, a hedge fund manager in Dallas, has sent me some information saying, you know, Art keeps saying that these guys cannot make money at $40 oil prices, and that might be true in the Bakken. But boy, there are a few operators in the Permian that have low enough operating costs that they're at least breaking even, even at $40.

What's your response to that? How do you react to those comments?

Art Berman: There's no support for it. I'd like to say it's true. I, you know, the— what I can tell you is that Permian plays have a lower breakeven oil price than the Bakken and the Eagle

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: But I promise you, nobody's breaking even at $40 oil prices. And so when, you know, when I reviewed that hedge fund manager's information, and when I routinely answer people's questions, what everybody's focused on right now, Erik, is cost reductions. Okay? Everybody's just, you know, just gaga over the fact that these these producers can somehow continue to bring down costs through all of their efficiencies and et cetera, et cetera. And, and I had a— I was on a conference call with South Africa this morning where they were asking me the same thing.

And I said, look, guys, we're dealing with an equation that has a number of variables in it. And, and cost is, is a variable. It's not the main variable. The main variable is EUR. It's reserve per well. Okay? So these guys have us focused on the thing that they have been successful. And I got to tell you, I mean, it might be a 15% gain, and that's gone. I mean, there's diminishing returns there. I think we're down to 1% or 2% a year gains in, you know, potentially in efficiency.

Okay. Is what kind of reserves are you associating with it, and where do you get your numbers? And so most of the— most of these companies out here, they throw out a number and people don't have any way of ground-truthing it.

Okay, but that's what I do. Okay, that's, that's what I do is I, I look at the production data, and if you plug in the, the correct well performance numbers, which is the big part of that equation, You just can't get there from here. You need at least—I mean—the best operators and the very best parts of the best plays in the Permian need about fifty bucks to break even, and that's a very, very tiny little area and small number of operators.

On average, the Permian guys need sixty bucks, maybe a little bit more, and that's WTI. They get about four.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: $4 or $5 less at the wellhead. So whatever WTI is, subtract $4 or $5, and that's what they're getting. So if today's price is, you know, whatever it is, and, you know, is it $43 or something like that, you know, what they're actually getting is $38.

And so even if, you know, even if you believe, which I don't, that they can break even at $40, they're not getting $40. But I'm telling you that the big unknown and the source of a lot of this confusion is that the numbers are— my numbers just don't agree with the propaganda that I hear in the conference calls.

And I'm not calling anybody a liar. I'm just saying I've been doing this for a long time. I've been in contention with those kind of numbers. since 2006 in the shale gas plays, and I think time has proven that in fact they were exaggerated for whatever reason.

Demand growth stalls at low prices

Erik Townsend: Now, another thing that seems to be confusing this market is expectations about demand growth, because, you know, EIA just recently revised their figures. They had expected a lot more demand growth in reaction to low prices. Your final slide here, you're, you're showing this, that consumption growth you would expect to be just going up in proportion to prices coming down, but that's not really what's happened.

Art Berman: No, and I— this is a, a very disturbing chart, Erik. Um, it's not, it's not what I want to see. But, but what this says to me, and, and so here again, let's be clear, we're talking about Consumption growth. Okay, so we're not talking about consumption, and demand is, you know, esoterically somewhat different from consumption, but it's, it's a reasonable proxy. And what this chart says to me is that if the price of oil is low enough, then consumption or demand grows.

But as soon as it gets to some relatively low low price compared to where it was a couple of years ago, which is to say, you know, $40, demand growth stops. And that's a scary thing. It's saying that, you know, the analogy is that, uh, you know, Titan— and, uh, I'm gonna do all my shopping at Walmart instead of, uh, you know, Safeway or Kroger or whatever.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: Even though they're fairly reasonable prices.

And so, what's happening here is, yeah, oh, you know, I'm never going back to Kroger. That's what it's saying. I don't have enough. I don't have enough money. The economy doesn't have enough to consume more except at rock-bottom oil prices.

Now, again, I hope I'm wrong. Wrong. But, but that's what the data tells me. And so we get back to this, you know, this kind of, uh, oil price floor and ceiling that we were talking about a little bit before that was coming out at us empirically from things like, you know, trends in futures prices and comparative inventory. And this is telling me the same thing. It's telling me that, you know, that there is a, there is a ceiling And this helps explain the inventory issue as well, that if, you know, that if people simply limit their consumption at some price level that's well lower than where everybody needs to break even, then where does it all go? Where does it all go? And at some point, it comes back to haunt us is where it all goes.

At some point, because of this, you know, these, these Einstein insanity cycles that we're going through, at some point there's not— we actually run into a supply deficit. And that's, you know, that, that may be the, you know, that's a scary thing to me. But, you know, maybe there's hope there for, you know, for somebody who needs much higher prices.

OPEC production-freeze talk as theater

Erik Townsend: Speaking of somebody needing much higher prices, we need to touch at least briefly on this whole OPEC meeting next month— I should say this month, it's the first already. Later this month, OPEC is meeting. There has been propaganda about a production freeze. I think you and I are in agreement that freezing but not cutting production when you're already at the maximum conceivable amount of production doesn't really make a lot of sense. What do you make of this latest round of propaganda? Is there any substance to any of this, or is it Or is it purely just political theater for the benefit of trying to talk the market up?

Art Berman: Well, you took the word out of my mouth, Erik. It's pure theater. The point is, first of all, I, you know, I said it a few minutes ago, market balance isn't the problem. Okay. And so by freezing production, forget for a minute, you know, what level that production may be. How in the world does that affect the market balance situation? It really doesn't at all. Okay. I mean, if we again, if we were if we were talking about two million barrels a day of production surplus, well, you know, maybe that maybe somebody thinks that helps. But what I said before, I'll say it again: that market balance isn't the problem.

And so, how in the world? And does a production freeze address something that isn't the problem? So I think it's theater. I think it's, as I said before, we're running out of ways to get out of this problem quickly. And so this is, you know, the deus ex machina, you know, back in the early days of the theater in Europe. The plot would get

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: And it would get so complicated that the only way to resolve it was to, you know, bring a— bring God or a Greek god down from the ceiling, and he would just tell everybody, okay, now you're going to do this, and you're going to do that, and you're going to do that, and now, now it's all fixed and it's okay. Well, you know, the, the god here, I guess, is OPEC, and everybody's waiting for OPEC to come down and set things in order. But I, I think the experience certainly of the last couple of years is they're not God and they're not in charge.

So we'll see. But yeah, this could be setting us up for a huge disappointment, is the way that I see it.

Erik Townsend: Well, and the thing too is Saudi Arabia has been crystal clear that they are not going to consider any kind of production cut. They're willing to talk about a production freeze, and I think they're willing to talk about it because they know it helps prices, and they know it's irrelevant and meaningless, but in terms of real-world supply and demand factors. But, you know, certainly they do have the ability to cause a lot of price volatility. This propaganda, as much as we might be able to recognize it as propaganda, it works on the market. You know, every time they come out with another statement, prices go through the roof, and until the next inventory report comes out and reality sets

Low prices now, a supply-shock moonshot later

Erik Townsend: in again.

So, I'd like to move on now, Art, to a little bit of an appearance of conflict. I know you and I have talked about this off the air, and it's really just a matter of understanding timeframes. But one of the predictions that you've made both on this program and some of your blog posts was that when we eventually resolve this glut of oil, we're going to end up with prices going to the moon because of all of the supply destruction that's occurred in terms of of deepwater and tar sands and so forth, once this glut clears itself. But then in a later post, you talked about the cost of energy crippling the economy and never getting to a full recovery. And those 2 things appeared to be in conflict with each other. I think that the question was really just understanding what timeframe we're talking in.

So, could you clarify for our listeners what was going on with those 2 posts and try to address that apparent conflict or change of view?

Art Berman: Right, and and and thank you for asking the question because several very thoughtful people have have approached me with the same question. So I appreciate the opportunity to clarify. I I haven't changed my views at all, but you're exactly right, Erik, and that is that we have time. And so my view. Is, as I just stated with the consumption growth issue, is that we're in a cycle of lower prices for some time to come, which is to say, you know, months or maybe even a year or a couple of years, certainly until we work through the inventory overhang of 140-some-odd million barrels. I mean, there's There's really no justification in history or in logic for a return to oil prices of $60, $70, $80 a barrel. Just, it's just, I won't say anything's impossible, but it just, it would, it would say we have to throw everything about the markets out the window from a fundamental standpoint. I don't think that's gonna happen.

So, so that says that we're gonna, we're gonna be in, you know, kind of this cycle of bouncing off of ceilings and floors at lower prices than the industry really needs to keep itself whole.

And that's because the economy is weak, fundamentally, in a simple phrase. But we're deferring. We're deferring investments. We're deferring investments in proven reserves. Okay? We're not talking about going out and exploring for more more oil. All we got to do is spend a couple of hundred million dollars or a couple of billion dollars to develop existing proven reserves. And we have deferred somewhere in excess of 20 to 30 billion barrels of proven reserve development here just in the last year and a half or two. And, and we continue to go down that road. And so So much of the world's supply comes from deep water. I mean, all the emphasis is on tight oil, and it has been a real source of oversupply, but the big reserves are not in the Permian Basin or the Eagle Ford or the Bakken.

There's maybe 10 or 15 billion barrels, which is not Not nothing, but I mean, that's half the size of a fairly big discovery in ordinary years, which by the way, we also aren't having.

So there's going to be a time that no matter how weak the economy is, no matter how much we can't change this, we're going to end up with not enough oil to meet our most basic fundamental transport needs. Transport and manufacturing needs. And when that happens, you will see a moonshot. Now let's, let's talk about the time frame of that.

When we look at history, what we see is, is that those big spikes upward in prices— and, you know, we saw them in the '70s and we saw them just leading up to the financial crisis in 2007, 2008— how long do those things last? Well, you know, they last anywhere from couple of months to a year, maybe 18 months. And, and some of that depends on, you know, whether OPEC cuts production or increases production or whatever. But when those prices spike— and, and, and I think we're talking, you know, we're talking about several years in the future, and I'm not going to predict how long, but, you know, some people think it could happen as soon as 2018 or so, other people Some people think, well, no, it'll be off into the early 2020s. But it's looming out there, and everybody knows it. And IEA talks about it every time that they talk. It's a big concern of theirs. And when that happens, prices are going to go up, and it's going to absolutely destroy the economy's ability to do much of anything.

So it's not a good thing. It's not a good thing at all. Okay. That's the affiliation that in the near term of months to a couple of years, I think we're stuck in relatively low prices. We look out past there to the point that our underinvestment in proven reserves and exploration catches up with us, and then we're going to see a big moonshot, if you will.

And it's going to be absolutely devastating to the global economy unless the global economy looks a lot better than it does today. And I sure hope it does, but I don't see how that's exactly going to come to pass. So that's the way I resolve that. It didn't seem like a contradiction to me, but I sure understand that people saw it as such. So I apologize for any confusion that created.

Erik Townsend: So the big picture is essentially for the very short term, months to maybe a year or more, we're looking at low oil prices as a result of the glut that we need to work off. Once that's worked off, moonshot in prices, and that moonshot in prices will have a crippling effect on the economy. As a result of that crippling effect, we end up with tremendous damage to the economy from high oil prices that results in both Both the price of oil as well as the general economy suffering a downside effect. Art, I would love to go much deeper into detail on this. Unfortunately, we're out of time, if not overtime, on this interview, so I'm going to have to wrap it up. But before we go, you have a fantastic blog at artberman.com. I cannot recommend highly enough. It's free. To not subscribe to that would be crazy.

So I recommend that very highly to listeners.

Art Berman: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: In addition to your blog, And your website. What do you do at Labyrinth Consulting Services, and what services do you offer that may be of interest to some of our institutional listeners?

Art Berman: I'm a working petroleum geologist, and I'm— I collaborate with working petroleum engineers and economists, and we are really, really good at evaluating companies as to their fundamental We do all sorts of valuations, reserve forecasts, and economic price analysis. So that's what Labyrinth does, but most of the time I make maps and drill wells. So yeah, get on my website and see what I have to say, and if you need something, there's a contact, you know, put in a shout, and if we can help you, we'll be glad to respond.

Erik Townsend: And your blog is a free subscription. Which I cannot recommend highly enough. Art, thanks so much for coming back and joining us for our Labor Day weekend show. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: negative rates, the war on cash and the Fed

Aaron Chan: So I always enjoy listening to Art Berman. And Erik, several weeks ago when we talked about Alan Greenspan's observations about the risk of a run on physical banknotes, notes in circulation in reaction to negative interest rates, you did speculate that the powers that be might actually welcome a situation where a premium develops for physical cash over deposits held in checking accounts. And it sounded pretty outlandish at the time, but I couldn't help but wonder if our listeners would think you'd gone off the deep end. But man, did you see that some professor actually gave a speech at the Fed's Jackson Hole conference last week promoting that exact idea, intentionally free-floating the value of physical currency above its representative value in deposit accounts for the sake of creating a financial disincentive to hoarding cash in reaction to negative interest rates. I mean, you joked with me when you first said it that you'd hope you weren't giving them ideas, but did you catch this development in the news?

Erik Townsend: I did see it. Professor Goodfriend was his name. I'm not sure if he's a friend of mine because I don't agree with his views, but, um, you know, I don't think he got the idea from us, but it was pretty easy to see coming, you know, and I think it It really speaks to me when people say the Fed's out of bullets.

They're mistaken. What they don't understand is the Fed is going to eventually go to all kinds of crazy extremes to try to keep this charade going. And, you know, Bank of Japan is already buying ETFs. At some point, I won't be at all surprised to see the Fed start buying equities, directly monetizing debt. Who knows where it's going to go? And I don't think it all really comes to an end until something ties their hand, and I'm not sure what that will be, but unfortunately, we're not there yet. So yeah, free-floating the value of physical cash above and beyond its intrinsic value for the sake of the war on cash. You know, what will they think of next?

Aaron Chan: Yeah, it's incredible. And I think Lance Roberts actually came out with a piece saying that Yellen speaks Japanese, and they'll probably go to even crazier extents than we previously thought.

Postgame: what #OOTT is, with Samir Madani and Lisa Ward

Aaron Chan: And speaking of trends, you heard about first right here on MacroVoices before they hit the mainstream. Longtime listeners to this program will recall that several months ago, we introduced you to #OOTT founder Samir Madani. But for our new listeners, Erik, please refresh our memory on what #OOTT is all about and explain why we're inviting the founders back for a follow-up interview this week.

Erik Townsend: Well, #OOTT stands for the Organization of Oil Trading Tweeters, and it's a community of oil traders who share research and trading ideas online. Twitter is their primary communication and collaboration platform. But they also use Google Shared Spreadsheets to publish an amazing wealth of research on oil tanker movements, economic data releases that will affect oil markets, and much more. When we first introduced you to Sam several months ago, he was basically a smart guy with a hashtag and a really great idea, but OOTT was brand new and had yet to gain much traction. Wow, how things have changed in a few months. So, we're bringing back Sam and the co-founder of #OOTT, Lisa Ward, to bring you an update. So Sam, welcome back.

#OOTT growth: impressions, journalists and audience

Samir Madani: Thank you very much for having us on the show.

Aaron Chan: Also with us today is #OOTT co-founder Lisa Ward. Lisa, since this is your first time appearance on the program, can you please tell us a little bit about yourself?

Lisa Ward: Um, yeah, I mean, I'm from the U.K. I live in the north of England. OOTT, now it's a hobby for us guys, so it's something that we've got involved in. I do work full-time as well, and so this is just part of the sideline, but the amount of hours that we put into it is unbelievable.

I've been trading for about 15 months now myself. I didn't actually get into the oil market until, uh, well, the fundamental side of it, uh, for since about May time, April-May time, which is when Sam actually realized and He found me on Twitter. I started posting out a few things and that's where he kind of saw me and was like, can you help out? So it was from there really that we kind of like teamed up.

Erik Townsend: Well, fantastic. We're delighted to have you on the show. And as I said in the intro, when we first met Sam several months ago, you guys had a hashtag and a great idea, but you were just getting started. And the progress since then has been nothing short of amazing. So please fill our listeners in on the growth of the OOTT community, the recognition that you're getting from the press and so forth.

Samir Madani: Yes, I ran a stats update on the actual hashtag, and we have over 3 million daily impressions on this hashtag. And that means news and views that are being circulated across Twitter with the hashtag included are getting that much attention right now. And I can also add that a large portion of the content is being delivered directly by journalists working with, for instance, Bloomberg, Reuters, MarketWatch, etc. And they are including the hashtag with every article that they post out now. And they know that this actually brings them an audience as well, because as I've encouraged over the past few months, people to click on the hashtag at least once a day and just follow up on the news that they missed out on. And this is, this is now grown to such an incredible base of followers. We're very pleased about that. And they follow real-time events of what's going on. And we have many stories to share.

And also, we have run a demographic check, and I was very delighted to see that 30% of our followers are female.

And this is very encouraging considering All you ever see in the news are a bunch of old men in this industry, and I'm also working very closely with everyone who's contributing news, and a lot of that is coming from the female side of of the community, and and I'm very pleased because they are also bringing a lot of original material by contributing technical analysis, fundamental watch on things, and I will also say that they're very. patient with rookie traders, including myself, I'd like to say. And I think that they do a really, really great job.

Women in oil trading on Twitter

Erik Townsend: I want to pick up on that specific topic of women participating in this because, you know, there is such an incredibly strong stereotype that trading is a male-dominated sport. And, you know, the chauvinistic view would be that women are incapable of, you know, handling such things. But boy, if you participate in the Twitter community, all the smartest people in the room are women. I mean, if you think about it, between Lisa, Heidi, Tracy, Brynn, there's just so many people that are so well-informed that are women, and it's so contrary to the stereotype.

Samir Madani: And Nicola, don't forget Nicola.

Erik Townsend: Oh yeah, Nicola Duke. Don't— we got to edit this one or we're in big trouble if she hears me forget her on that one. Nicola Duke obviously is a total veteran, so I knew I was missing somebody important. But I mean, and there's, there's countless others. So what's going on here? Why, why is it that, that we have this perception that women can't trade, yet they're the smartest people in the room on Twitter?

Samir Madani: Lisa? I have—

Erik Townsend: Oh, how clever, Sam, just defer to her.

Aaron Chan: You are the smartest in the room, so—

Samir Madani: Tough question. I can say from my perspective of having worked with them over the past few months is that I don't feel ashamed of asking them any question and actually getting a very nicely detailed response. And they're very patient. And I think the patience factor is something that they are much better at than us guys. We're too impulsive. We make mistakes far more often. They like to— I don't know if they like to, but they tend to stand back and look at the bigger picture before making a new move.

And many of us are just zoomed in on the chart for those specific few minutes, and we're just looking at what to do next. They have a whole different view on things. I chat with a few of them, and they all look at things like seasonality. They go back a year or two and study that and come back and say, oh, You know, in the next few weeks, it's going to be like this.

Erik Townsend: And what's your take, Lisa?

Lisa Ward: Yeah, I can agree with Sam. I mean, personally, I do look back over the charts as well, do a lot of technical analysis as well as looking into the fundamental side of it as well. We have tweeted out a couple of things using the hashtag #OOTT with a few different summary charts. Now, some of those contain the different effects that has happened when we had the QE increase.

With the strikes, we've had the Alberta wildfires. Obviously, those have all taken into account as well. Then obviously, we've got seasonality, all sorts. It's all affecting the markets. Of course, you've got your options expiry as well. So there's lots of different things to take into account. We can't just look at fundamentals, and we can't just look at technical analysis. We have to combine the two and obviously look into those different patterns. What affects the markets?

I guess it's just making sure that we don't focus on just one specific thing because everything affects it. With it being such a volatile market as it is as well, I think that's part of why I actually enjoy the market so much, just because there's so many different factors that's involved. There's so many different movements. And it's just— I just love the market, to be honest.

Global tanker tracking: OPEC, China and Russia

Aaron Chan: Right. And when Sam first appeared on this program, your tanker tracking activities were pretty much limited to just PADD 3 and the Gulf Coast. But now it looks like you've gone global. So can you please bring us up to speed on your tanker tracking efforts?

Samir Madani: Yes. What we decided to do was after a very successful run with not just PADD 3, but we included also PADD 1 and PADD 5, we came to— let's say we missed the EIA report by only 1.5% margin. So we were very, very accurate. But I must say it came at a cost, and that was the countless hours that we put into it every night. And it was done, yeah, every night for months. And we decided that now towards the summer, and given the fact that we have an OPEC meeting coming up, we decided to learn about tanker activity outside the US.

And we decided to focus on certain areas of interest, the big ones that move markets. So, we have China, We have OPEC, we have Russia, India, etc. And we really studied up on which ports to track. We looked at the maps, we looked at all the data that we could get hold of, and we plotted out everything.

And we have documented as much as possible and started tracking everything that we could. Now, initially, your ambition level is really, really high. You want to do everything as much as possible. And then the reality kicks in, and that's the hours that you put into it. And so, we decided that we would streamline and focus on certain areas at a time. Now, we can't do as many as possible, but we can do everything that we set out to do for the group, let's say OPEC, which we've been doing for the past week now.

And I'll say why we motivate our motivation for tracking OPEC is because of the coming meeting, and also because just yesterday we found out that Kuwait is the fourth country within the within the Gulf OPEC countries to have raised the price of gasoline. They removed subsidies, and the reason why countries have been doing that this year is because they want to. lower domestic consumption while— in order to increase their output of crude to the world market. Now, everyone wants to do that ahead of a meeting. They want to be at their very highest output level. So I shall hand this over to Lisa, who can talk more about our tanker tracking activities.

Lisa Ward: Yeah, like Sam mentioned, we've been tracking various different ports and countries all over the world. So we have tended to— we have focused more on China, Russia, and OPEC. So with OPEC, we're tracking over 100 different ports within the 14 different OPEC members, OPEC countries. Now, for the previous— well, the week that we've just almost completed, we tried focusing our efforts to try and find the best processes in which we can accumulate all the data the most efficient way, the most accurate way. Now, within the first 5 days of the week that we tracked the OPEC exports, the daily average that we managed to gather up was about 22 million barrels per day across the 14 different countries. Now, that has recently reduced over the last 2 days. We've now got a daily average of just under 19 million barrels. So we're thinking that that's obviously something to do with all the different issues with Saudi, all the different issues with, with OPEC. Now we're tracking currently 492 tankers, and we've got total barrel export of 150 million thereabouts for now.

Um, obviously this is ongoing.

So we've also been tracking China. Um, so across the, uh, across China we've tracked 47 ports. Now the 13 days that we tracked it, we started tracking China on the 2nd of August Now, that obviously had a major impact due to the typhoon. So we tracked 838 tankers. It came out at just short of 66 million barrels across the 13 days that we were tracking them. And it came out on average about 5 million barrels per day.

Obviously, we're tracking China due to the statistics of the bureau, because they tend to be published a little bit behind. So we thought if we can keep on top of those, we'll be able to track them more to give a more accurate view and perspective.

Russia, we've been tracking more to do with them dominating the Central and Eastern Europe crude oil market share. However, obviously the other OPEC countries are now wanting to get involved a bit more. So the results that we managed to get for Russia, we managed to— we're tracking 32 ports for Russia, which equated to 36 million barrels within the 7-day period that we were tracking. which was from the beginning of August to mid-August, and their daily average came out around 5 million barrels per day. So we're just trying to keep on top of everything just to try and keep things going, but our main focus is OPEC just because of the OPEC meetings coming up.

Where to find #OOTT research

Erik Townsend: Lisa, that's fantastic, and it's, it's really impressive if I look at the very famous American Petroleum Institute and how effective they are at predicting what's going to happen with inventory numbers versus the research you guys do. You guys do a lot better. So I'm sure a lot of our listeners will be interested in checking out the research that you do and finding out more about #OOTT. Please tell us where we can find more information, what we can find there, and how interested listeners can get involved with your project.

Samir Madani: The fastest possible way to find our research is by going to Twitter, typing in the hashtag #OOTT, And you will find myself and Lisa as one of the contributors there. And you just click on our pinned tweets and you'll find links to all the information that, that we work with. Yeah.

Aaron Chan: All right. So guys, don't forget to check out the #OOTT hashtag on Twitter. So thanks for the update, guys. But unfortunately, we're out of time for this week. Erik, anything to add?

Closing and Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: Well, it's the usual broken record. We need your help promoting the show. So we really appreciate If people could retweet us when we announce the show, tell your friends about it. We hope ZeroHedge will continue to cover us. They picked up the show a couple weeks ago, and it resulted in a dramatic increase in our listeners and registrations. Please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. The more registered users we have, the more able Aaron is to negotiate with the guests that you most want to get on the program for featured interviews. And as a result of registering, you will get our free Research Roundup email each week, which contains supporting materials for the feature interview, as well as the very best research that we could find on the internet. So, Aaron please tell our listeners what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Aaron Chan: All right. So off the bat, I want to draw your attention to the latest investor letter and market outlook from Morgan Creek Capital Management. Now, it's a lengthy and worthwhile read, and you'll definitely want to check it out before our interview next week with Mark Yusko, founder and chief investment officer of Morgan Morgan Creek. So there's your assigned reading.

Next, there's the latest interview of Jim Rickards with Sprott Global. Now, there's been a lot of talk about the war on cash, and in addition to claiming that governments have already won the war, Jim goes on to describe a possible war on gold once governments smarten up to the barbarous relic's reemergence as a true safe haven monetary metal. Now, finally, there is an excellent interview with Dr. Ali Alyami, founder and executive director of the Center for Democracy and Human Rights in Saudi Arabia. This entry talks about the growing social turmoil in Saudi Arabia, all within the context of global economics and geopolitical forces. This is definitely a great read if you want to understand what's happening in one of the biggest flashpoints in the world.

So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, Shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @_AaronChan_. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Gary Shilling — author of the popular Insight newsletter (as introduced on the show)

Announcer opening and episode preview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is. Bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 28 was recorded on August 25th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We've had quite a few listener requests for a feature interview with Gary Shilling, author of the popular Insight newsletter. Gary will be joining me as this week's featured guest, and we'll be discussing the U.S. dollar, Treasury yields and the long bond trade, why Gary's bearish on US equities, junk bonds, and crude oil, and much more. Aaron and I will also be discussing Triffin's paradox, the petrodollar system, and Russia's de-dollarization strategy after this week's feature interview.

Market wrap: equities, oil inventories and OPEC, gold, Treasuries, dollar

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P 500. Erik, I probably sound like a broken record at this point, opening each week's show with that same worn-out line, but hey, that's what the market keeps giving us, with E-mini S&P futures trading north of 2,191. at one point earlier this week, just a point or so higher than last week's all-time high, and closing on Thursday afternoon at about 2,171. Erik, has anything changed in your view for equities?

Erik Townsend: Well, not very much. I continue to very strongly agree with the chorus of bears who are saying, hey, the economic fundamentals just don't support these equity valuations. But frankly, I've been saying that for a couple years now, and I think I've got the, the argument right in terms of the fundamentals, but the tape just keeps on marching higher. So I think a lot of it is flight capital coming into the United States from Europe and China and Japan. But one way or another, you know, you can't fight the tape. So I'm on the sidelines here.

Aaron Chan: Right. Last week you remarked that oil prices were also higher than fundamentals dictated, but you said that they might stay there until next month's OPEC meeting proves itself to be a non-event. You went on to say a bearish inventory report was a needed catalyst to bring about a meaningful downside correction. So how did this week's inventory numbers fare?

Erik Townsend: Well, consensus expectations were calling for about an 800,000-barrel drawdown on national crude oil inventory. We got a 2.5 million barrel build on inventory, counter to expectations. That definitely was bearish. And frankly, we got builds on inventory across the board. 375,000 barrels in Cushing, Oklahoma, which of course is critical because it's where the WTI futures contract is settled. Gasoline, 36,000, pretty small build, but a build just the same. And distillates, 122,000 barrels, again a build. Slight decline in production, but you know, I think we haven't seen anything yet.

Build was against an expectation of a drawdown, so that sent the market lower when the news came out. But I expect these builds to pick up markedly as we get into shoulder season here, out of summer driving season.

Relative inventory is the key, not just what the absolute number is, but how it compares to historically the same week of the year, because oil prices are very seasonal. So we need to see some really big builds. I think they may be coming. That would shock the market lower. Or we need to wait for the OPEC meeting to come and go.

I don't expect that there's going to be really any meaningful change there. One scenario I have given some thought to, though, is that, you know, there is a change here, which is a year ago, it was pretty clear that Saudi Arabia was intentionally trying to talk down oil prices to damage their competitors.

Now, it seems like Saudi Arabia is willing to play ball at least a little bit. I don't think that they're going to decrease production in any way, but it seems like they're willing to make statements that are designed to jawbone the market higher. So, you know, there could be a scenario set setting up that might actually lead to a freeze. Now, keep in mind that a production freeze, when everybody's already producing at record all-time high production, really is meaningless in terms of supply and demand fundamentals. But it would have a very favorable propaganda effect. I think it would propel prices higher, at least in the short term.

And in the past, I've said it's just plain not going to happen because of Iran. And this problem is that Saudi Arabia doesn't want to cap its production while Iran is still increasing production. You know, they could spin that the other way. They could intentionally overproduce, which it certainly looks like they're doing. They're at record, all-time record output right now. They could overproduce a bit and then say, we're gonna put a cap on, when in reality they cannot possibly increase any further, and then make Iran out to be the bad guys that aren't playing ball with everyone else who is capping their production. So, you know, they could spin the propaganda another way. That's conceivable, but I don't think it's likely. I think the most likely outcome is no change from that meeting. There was actually a statement out of Saudi Arabia this afternoon saying that at current price levels they don't see any need to freeze production. So I think that really most likely takes it off the table.

But, you know, there's an outside chance that that could happen.

Bottom line, what we're really waiting for is a meaningful change in this trend of builds on national inventory. If we start seeing 5 million barrel weekly builds, that is going to send prices straight down. Hasn't happened yet. I won't be surprised if it does. We're definitely moving into a critical period for the oil market, though, as we come out of summer into the shoulder season.

And accordingly, we're going to be bringing Art Berman back next week. We're going to do an oil-centric program for next week's Labor Day weekend show. So you can look forward to that coming up.

Aaron Chan: Yeah, definitely looking forward to Art's interview. Now, broken record alert, we've been watching a technical consolidation range in gold between $1,308 and $1,377 for the last several weeks. Now, Erik, you've been saying you were leaning toward the bear case until we got out of this consolidation range. Now, we tested $1,321 this morning. So it looks like your bear case, or bear call, may be starting to play out. So what's your outlook for gold this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it is playing out, because not only did we test $1,321 this morning, $1,325 or so at the close, but this is happening in a weak-dollar environment. We've bounced up a little bit. I think when we taped the show last week, we were just barely over 94. Now we're up 94.71, but haven't even touched 95 all week. So we're still seeing dollar weakness. You would think that that would be supportive of the gold price, and gold is still selling off. Part of that could be colored by options expiration. We're coming into OPEX for gold futures. That may have an effect on it. It might explain some of the heavy volume that we've seen in the last couple days. But, in general, the way things are playing out is towards that bearish case. I won't be sold that we actually have sealed the deal until we see a daily close below $1,308.

But, for now, we seem to be trending towards the lower end of that trading range.

Aaron Chan: Okay. All right. That 1308 is the post-Brexit level. So shifting over to Treasuries, the 10-year Treasury yields edged back up a bit this week, printing about a 1.58 on Thursday. Any change in your outlook for Treasury yields?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's pretty much the same. I guess what I would say is maybe different. I've been saying for the last few weeks, you know, maybe what we're seeing in this bounce up in yields off of the Brexit low of 1.35, I think it was, maybe it's just a dead cat bounce. Well, it's been a couple months now since Brexit. So if it's a bounce, it's a bigger, bounce than a dead cat bounce. It's a dead tiger bounce. I don't know. But whatever it is, it is persisting. Unless we see a move above 170, it doesn't really change my outlook. I think we're going to muddle along here for a while and eventually see lower yields.

Aaron Chan: Okay. And the dollar index was at 94.09 when we taped last week's show. And that looks to be the low print so far with rebound this week, albeit a small one. We've yet to trade below 94 or above 95 since last week's show. So, Erik, what's your outlook here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm still watching it closely. I didn't really expect to get down to 94 here. I thought we were going to muddle along between 95 and 97 and eventually break out to the upside. I am still favoring that upside breakout scenario, but for the moment we're seeing some weakness here. I think Janet Yellen speaks tomorrow at Jackson Hole. That could, you know, obviously result in a huge move in either direction depending on what she says. I definitely think that the Fed is running out of ammunition to keep saying, hey, we're going to hike rates at the next meeting, really we are, trust us, and then not doing it. So, you know, there's a credibility question here. I think that either a decisive no rate hike or a rate hike, whatever happens in terms of a rate hike, obviously the dollar index is going to move in the opposite direction.

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Friday is definitely going to be interesting. So thanks for the market update, Erik. By popular listener request, this week's special guest is Dr. Gary Shilling, author of the Insight Investment Letter. Erik's interview with Dr. Shilling is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right here at MacroVoices.com.

Gary Shilling interview: the dollar as safe haven and the Triffin paradox

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Dr. Gary Shilling of AGaryShilling.com and, of course, the author of the very popular Insight newsletter. Gary, thanks so much for joining me on the program. I'd like to start with the U.S. dollar because so many other things hinge on the dollar view.

I know you have potentially a very bullish long-term view on the U.S. dollar. Something that I've found is that a lot of guests on this program have had that view, but they almost all seem to have different reasons for feeling that way. So, please tell us your views on the dollar and particularly why you see the potential for a long-term bull market in the U.S. dollar.

Gary Shilling: A lot of it has to do with the safe haven aspect. Now, you can say that we don't have Everything right in the U.S. economy. We're growing at about half the speed you'd expect after the deepest recession since the '30s. 2.1% real GDP average growth since the recovery started in the middle of 2009. And we certainly have a lot of other problems, a lot of political turmoil and so on and so forth, income polarization. But we're clearly the best of the bad lot. We're the slowest falling rock. We're the tallest midget, or the one I like. We're the valedictorian in summer remedial school.

There are a lot of other factors, and as a matter of fact, talking about currencies in our September newsletter Insight in some detail, but I think more than anything, it's simply the safe haven effects of the dollar, the fact that we have faster growth than virtually any other developed country, and you look elsewhere, The turmoil in Europe with Brexit, Japan just can't get Abenomics working, China slowing growth and potential problems there, a lot of things we can go into detail. But I think fundamentally it is the safe haven aspect of the dollar.

And also bear in mind that 87% of the foreign currency trades are in dollar.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: In other words, if you look at the trading for both trade and capital accounts, 87% of it involves the dollar. There's many, many transactions around the world between countries and investors that are in dollars that the U.S. has no participation in. It isn't U.S. exports, it isn't U.S. imports, it isn't U.S. investments, but the dollar is the international currency.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: And, you know, another thing, too, there's really a shortage of dollars. Our deficits have come down dramatically. They were $1.5 trillion back in 2010. They're now about $450 billion. That's still a lot of money, but it's a dramatic decline, and it means that there's a lot fewer dollars being pumped out there into the rest of the world. And the rest of the world needs dollars. When you have this tremendous dependence on the dollar, for trade and investment flows. If the dollars don't keep flowing out, the rest of the world is in trouble.

One of the interesting aspects of this is something called the Triffin Paradox, named after Robert Triffin. He was a Belgian-American economist, was at Yale for a number of years. And what he pointed out is that, yeah, we have a current account deficit now and trade deficit, and we've had that chronically.

But if we didn't have it, the rest of the world would be in big trouble, because when you need dollars to facilitate all this trading and investing, for those things to increase, you need an increasing flow of dollars, and that you need by a current account deficit. Again, if we achieve a national aim, which maybe Trump would prefer, of having a balanced trade and current account— current accounts, boy, the rest of the world would be in deep doo-doo.

The long bond trade: 2% target and convexity

Erik Townsend: Well, that's certainly a possibility. We'll get later in the interview to potential political outlooks. I want to move on, though, to the U.S. long bond, Treasury bond. You probably in many ways are the father of the long bond trade. You declared back in 1981 that we were at the beginning of the bond bull market of a lifetime. And of course, that was an incredibly unpopular view in 1981 with the 30-year Treasury yield north of 15% and a lot of people fearing that it was just headed to infinity from there.

But you got that call perfectly. I know that you are still bullish on the long bond. And I guess my question to you— I happen to agree, by the way. I think that yields have further to fall. But clearly, at just over 2%, if you're buying duration risk, you're not buying it for the yield. You're buying it for capital appreciation.

That means you've got to think that this bond bull market is not over yet. So, I guess my question is, you know, we're 35 years into this. It doesn't have another 35 years to go. So, how do you know when it's over or almost over, and what would cause you to start to think it's time to close that trade?

Gary Shilling: Well, first of all, bear in mind that I have never, never, never bought the long bond for yield. I couldn't care less what the yield is as long as it's going down. I bought it for appreciation. That's basically the same reason most people buy stocks. They don't buy them for dividend yield, although we might come back to that. That is pretty much the current investment theme. But I've always bought them for appreciation, and that means declining rates. Now, you can say, okay, you started off at 15.2% at the bottom in price, the high in yield, in October of 1981, and that's when I said, That's right. We're entering the bond rally of a lifetime, and now you're down to, you know, about 2.5%, and you say, wow, and my target is 2%, so you say you're almost there.

But there is something called convexity here, and what it means is that the increase in price for a given decline in interest rates increases tremendously as rates go down. It doesn't do that in the case of zero-coupon Treasuries. A 1%— 1 percentage point decline at where we are now in 30-year zero coupons is about 20% appreciation, and it's not much different going from 15 to 14 as it is from 3 to 2.

You get— but on the coupon bonds, you get a lot more bang for buck because of the convexity in the trade. So, I think that there's— I think there's still There's still life there, and as I say, it's been a tremendous investment.

I mean, if you— and we have a— I've got a chart that I love. It's my favorite because it's not only what I predicted, it's one that I personally participated in, and in our money management operations, our clients have enjoyed it, too. And it basically shows that if you bought the long bond, and we use zero coupons because you get more bang for buck as rates go down, of course.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: If you bought that in October of 1981, when you did have that high in yields and low in price, and then you rolled it over each year to maintain maturity or duration, the same for a zero, of course, and then you compare that with buying the S&P 500 at its low in July of 1982, and look at that on a total return basis, including reinvested dividends, what you find is that That the Treasury has outperformed the S&P over that period by 6.5 times. 6.5 times.

Well, as you say, that's history. I think we've got further to go. And if we go down to my target of 2%, you've got about another 15% appreciation on a zero-coupon bond.

Erik Townsend: Now, in order to understand when this might be over, we'd have to understand first what is driving it. So do you think it's flight capital coming out of Europe and China and Japan? Japan that's going to continue to drive yields down, or do you think it's just that yields need to go down because the yield spread is so high in, in contrast to other sovereign debt, or is there something else that's driving this?

Gary Shilling: Well, the fundamental driver for 35 years has been the decline in inflation. You look at the correlation between Treasury yields, Treasury bond yields, and year-over-year change in CPI. It's a very, very tight correlation, has been for this whole period. It was on the way up when yields were rising from right after World War II to the peak of 1980, and it's been on the way down. So, my forecast really was— my forecast of this bond rally of a lifetime was driven by my conviction, and that started in the late '70s, and I finally wrote my first book on that in 1981. My conviction that inflation was unwinding. And as you pointed out earlier, that was not a popular view at the time. I mean, matter of fact, that book published by McGraw-Hill, the title was Is Inflation Ending?

Are You Ready? And my answer to the first question was yes, it's ending. And the second one is no, you're not ready, because everybody had all kinds of tangible assets in their portfolio, which are the darlings of inflation. And they didn't have enough of either stocks or bonds, which would benefit from the unwinding of inflation.

And that was so little believed that the sales of the book were a dud. As a matter of fact, McGraw-Hill basically gave us the last 1,000 copies because they couldn't sell them. But, interestingly enough, in 1986, years later, the Seattle Post-Intelligencer and the Boston Globe business editors, both independently, ex post, exhumously reviewed the book. It was long out of print by then, but it was an empiric victory. But, as I say, it was not a popular view, and I think that's been— the reason I say that, it's been that way all the way down.

One of the interesting things about investing in long Treasuries is you've almost never had irrational exuberance. It's not like stocks, where things get really carried away, because the chorus

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: The herd has constantly bellowed, no, no, rates are going up, they're going up, they're going up. You read the media today, and so it's like, when rates go up, when rates go up, when rates go up, and they begrudgingly admit that Treasuries and other sovereigns, developed country sovereigns, have way outperformed everything else so far this year, and they have, obviously, over this whole time period.

You do have the advantage that you don't have a lot of fellow travelers in this, a lot of conviction. But I do think that we're going down further. Now, as I say, it's driven by the unwinding of inflation, and I think deflation now is an odds-on bet. That's what I've been forecasting for years. But there are other factors as well that you touched on. One is foreign demand for Treasuries. Like the dollar, this is a safe haven.

And another interesting aspect of that is, is the interest rate spreads between U.S. and developed— other developed country sovereigns. I've got a table using 10-years, because most countries, that's their standard, the 10-year. And the spreads, except for relatively few countries, almost every other country has lower yields than the U.S. So, a foreign investor can buy Treasuries with a yield spread in their favor, and, of course, if I'm right and the dollar rallies against their currencies, then they get a translation gain as well.

So, that's a further factor. Also, as I mentioned, they're making fewer of them, and as the deficit comes down and there's a, you know, there is this constant demand demand for dollars to basically fuel trade, trade and investment flows around the world because it is the dominant currency.

Hedging the long bond and why U.S. stocks are expensive

Erik Townsend: Now, you've got a big advantage over a lot of investors. You've been right about this trade for 35 years, so you've got a pretty good accumulated profit. But if I were looking at new money coming into a long position in the long bond, I'd think about hedging it with something just in case there were a turnaround in rates. Would you think that, you know, a short position in junk bonds to hedge that would make sense, or is the spread already too wide between junk and Treasuries?

Gary Shilling: You know, I've got to confess, I've never been all that fast and fancy on hedging trades. I've tried a number of them over the years in portfolios we manage, and boy, there have been times when I managed to lose on both sides. And I think a lot of the, you know, the fancy option strategies and the straps and straddles and all the really exotic things, you know, these may be great mental exercises, and maybe there's some guys who are brighter than I am who can carry them off, but I've just sort of had the straightforward view. If you believe in something, you invest in it. If you don't, you're on the sidelines. But, and I'll, by the way, I never invest against our fundamental views. I'm either in or I'm on the sidelines.

I would never, at least right now, I wouldn't short bonds if I felt that they'd achieved their objective or were momentarily set aside. I'd simply be out, but I wouldn't be short. But, you know, and again, if you look at it, if we're going to 2% on the long bond, I think that gain is probably better than most other things. And when you talk about hedging, shouldn't you hedge almost everything else now?

I mean, look at stocks. If you look at Shiller's P/E, it would take a 40% decline Uh, from where you are now on the, on the S&P, uh, to bring you back to its long-term 16.7 P/E that goes back to 1880. And in the last 15 years, that P/E has been above that average most of the time. So, if it still holds— and, of course, that's always a question, is the long-term average applicable? But if it holds, then you're gonna spend a lot of years below it.

And now, should you hedge stocks?

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Gary Shilling: You know, anybody's got a portfolio of long stocks, hey, that's been a great winner since March of 2009, and it's really been driven by the Fed. Stocks have floated on a sea of Fed money. You haven't had the economic growth. You haven't had the revenue growth of corporations to sustain it. You've had a lot of cost-cutting, but that doesn't seem to be sustainable anymore.

So, should you hedge stocks? I mean, what shouldn't you hedge, Stan?

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to stocks since you mentioned the dividend yield issue before. You know, it's striking to me there are so many incredibly successful and smart people, whether it be George Soros or Carl Icahn or Stan Druckenmiller, who have just come out with incredibly bearish views on U.S. stocks. But the market just keeps marching higher anyway, in amazement to everyone. Do you think that this demand for dividend-paying stocks is driving that? Is it something else? What's going on? here, and I know you have a short view on U.S. equities. What is your rationale for being bearish on U.S. stocks?

Gary Shilling: Well, I think overall U.S. stocks are expensive. We are not short stocks in our— in actual portfolios we manage, but it is a strategy that we're— that we certainly are thinking seriously about. But we are long— we are long defensive stocks in our portfolios. And principally consumer staples and utilities, and we have been for the last, last 3 or 4 years.

Now, what's interesting is we, we did that to be defensive because I felt stocks were expensive, and I also like the idea of higher-than-normal dividend yields that you tend to have on these defensive stocks as giving you some, some cushion. As it turns out, they've been the top performers in recent years, and of course we've gone Recently, I think sentiment has gone almost ballistic on the idea of dividends. And you know, you have this this kind of interesting situation of people buying buying bonds for appreciation and stocks for yields, and it's the reverse of what you normally expect. But there has been this rush for for dividend dividend-paying stocks, and you know, to to a certain extent, it's it's simply this. Right. It's this huge, what I call zeal for yield. It's this conviction that people have that they deserve, that God gave them the right to higher returns.

And you see that, for example, in public pension funds. You know, a lot of them still have 7.5% assumptions on their investment returns. I think that's way, way, way too optimistic, but they don't want to approach state legislatures and say, we're going to have to cut benefits. So they move out on the risk curve and they're moving into anything. And when they don't see the yields on fixed income securities, they move into private equity, into hedge funds, and are now retreating because hedge funds have been lousy performers in recent years.

And real estate, that's probably the latest darling, but also dividend-paying stocks. And, you know, not only in the U.S., but they're looking at that Junk bonds and emerging market debt and equities. I mean, it's a whole spectrum of things, but I mean, we benefit from it. And as I say, I didn't really anticipate this mad rush. We just said, hey, let's take a defensive position because stocks are going up, and I feel we needed to be aboard in some form, at least modest positions in defensive stocks.

Crude oil: OPEC price war and marginal cost

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to crude oil. You've been very bearish on crude oil. I think that some of your price targets are in the $10 to $20 range. What's your thesis there? How do you see it playing out? What's the timeframe, and what do you see coming?

Gary Shilling: Well, I spelled this out actually early last year, right after OPEC refused to cut production, and that's what they did on November 27th, 2014, when all of us were sitting down to our Thanksgiving dinners. Now, the reality is this: OPEC is a cartel. Cartels exist for only one purpose, and that is to keep prices above equilibrium.

So, that encourages cheating. Somebody wants more than their fair share, either in or out of the cartel. So, the leader of the cartel's job is to cut its own production to accommodate the cheaters; otherwise, prices collapse. Well, that's what's been happening for years. And if you look at OPEC, In the last decade, up until very recently, all the growth in world oil production was non-OPEC. OPEC was virtually flat.

Well, led by the Saudis back then, late November 2014, OPEC said enough is enough. We're getting tired of being the swing producer. We're getting tired of cutting back and seeing somebody else grab market share. So they basically said we're going to play a very

Erik Townsend: Right. Right.

Gary Shilling: We're going to play a very sophisticated game of chicken. We're going to see who can take lower prices the longest. And at that point, the Saudis had about $450 billion in foreign exchange reserves. They're running through it at the rate of about $100 billion a year, because their expenses are so high. They need to, to buy off the population. You know, nobody really works there. It's all the imported labor and so on and so forth. That's another story. But in any event, they basically said, we can take lower prices longer. We're going to see who's going to back out first. And of course, at that point, OPEC was producing 30 million barrels a day.

They basically took off all constraints. They're now producing over 33 billion dollars a million barrels a day. And of course, the Saudis are flooding the market, and they are competing fiercely with Iran, which is back in the act with the sanctions off, for markets in Europe and Asia.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Gary Shilling: Well, anyway, when you look at this game of chicken, and it's a price war, and you say, okay, where is the chicken-out price? Well, the chicken-out price is not the cost of meeting budgets. That's irrelevant. Now, in the case of the Saudis, it's $96 a barrel. It's $120 a barrel for Venezuela. It's about $50 for Kuwait. But whatever it is for whatever country, that's irrelevant when you're in a price war.

Erik Townsend: Mm-hmm.

Gary Shilling: Also irrelevant is the full-cycle cost, the cost of drilling a new well from scratch and getting the oil out and to market. What is relevant is the marginal cost. In other words, once the well is drilled, what is the cost of getting it out? The pipes are laid, the overhead is covered, and so on and so forth. And in the Permian Basin in Texas, that's $10 to $20 a barrel, and in the Persian Gulf, it's even lower. And so that was the The price target that I came out with early last year, prices then were about $65 a barrel. They had obviously come down from $100. They got down to $26 a barrel last February. They rebounded to $50, backed off a bit. I still think we're headed for that. Let me give you an analogy on this marginal price to make this absolutely clear. Let's assume that at an intersection there are gas stations on all 4 corners.

Now, one of those gas stations starts to cut prices in order to gain market share. Well, the others have to follow, because motorists can just drive across the street to tank up. There's nothing specific about— gas is gas. So they all start cutting prices, and they keep going, and then it's a price war. It's a gas war. And the prices keep going down. Now, where do they stop? They don't stop at the full cost of running that station, including the labor

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: The overhead, the rent, etc., etc. No, no, no. They cost it— they stop at the marginal cost. They stop at the cost of getting the gasoline off a tank truck, plus the required state taxes, of course. And in other words, it's the marginal cost. And that's what happens when you're in a price war, and that's what this game of chicken amounts to. We did have a rally in oil prices early last year. Everybody thought the Fed was going to That the American frackers were going to fade, that those are short-lived wells.

But guess what? Their cost has dropped precipitously, and they've gotten involved in this, in horizontal drilling, where they drill not one well with a rig, but they drill down, turn the drill dreads and drill bit, and they can drill 20 or 30 wells from one platform. And, by the way, that's the reason the rig count doesn't mean anything now, because the rigs they've taken off.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: Line of the old vertical rigs, and it's the horizontal rigs which they've tapped, and they're the ones that are the source. But anyway, even then, so you had that rally early last year, and then reality set in and we started to see the renewed decline as they got down to $26 a barrel on WTI last February. Then you've had another rebound. Now I think things are starting to sell off. Now I think it's the same thing. People realize that production is not going down.

And, of course, another interesting thing here is that— just keep your eye on marginal costs, not full costs, because what happens is, when you have a situation where you may be losing money on a total cost, on a full-cost basis, average-cost basis, There's still— there is actually more encouragement to increase production, because as prices go down, companies, and particularly very heavily indebted oil producers, desperately need the revenues if the alternative is bankruptcy. So as long as the price exceeds the marginal cost, they're going to produce, and they're going to produce even more the lower the price, because they need that money to service their debts. And, of course, then you get into the majors. And here these guys are paying out more in dividends than they are earning. And so they really have the same situation. They're encouraged to produce more, not less, even the Exxons and the BPs and the Shells of the world.

Oil storage, contango and timing of the low

Erik Townsend: Do you have a time horizon in which you anticipate the final low in the oil market?

Gary Shilling: Well, what I'm looking at there is inventories. Because production globally is now exceeding demand by 1 to 2 million barrels a day. It's about 95 million barrels a day, and it's an excess of 1 to 2 million barrels a day. And the storage tanks are filling up. 2 places to keep an eye on. One is Cushing, Oklahoma, which is one big tank farm. That's the farm— that's, of course, the delivery point for WTI.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: And where that price is determined, and those tanks are about 85% full. And then there is— then the— in Europe, it's Rotterdam, Amsterdam, Antwerp. That's really the— if you look at the map, it's the mouth of the Rhine River, and that's where oil comes in, and those tanks are filling up as well. Now, there are alternatives.

You can store— there's floating storage. Oil can be stored in tankers, even railcars, but it's much, much more expensive. It's about $1.50 a barrel.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: In a tanker versus 40 cents a barrel in Cushing. So, it gets much more expensive. But another interesting thing is going on there with a very steep contango in the futures curve.

It has been very profitable to buy physical oil, to store it, and sell forward, sell in futures And lock in a profit. Now, that— what that has done is it has increased inventories in the short run, but as those contracts mature and the oil is delivered, it means a lot more oil on the market. So, you've got another interesting feature there that suggests that we are headed for a top. How long is that going to take?

A rough guess, I'd say maybe another 6 months.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Commodities: China and excess capacity

Erik Townsend: Okay, obviously oil is the world's most traded commodity, but commodities in general have been very weak. A lot of people were declaring a year or so ago that the bear market in commodities is over, and obviously it's not over. We're seeing continued weakness across the board in commodities. What's driving that? Is it just deflationary pressure in the economy or something else?

Gary Shilling: Excess capacity, pure and simple. What happened was that I think that what happened is, and you really have to go back to China, globalization, probably the greatest economic development in the last 3 decades, basically amounted to the shifting of production, most of it in manufacturing, from Western Europe and North America to China and other developing countries.

Now, that didn't really change global production, it just changed the focus. But a lot of commodity producers, hard rock miners in particular,

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: Were dazzled by the tremendous increase in commodity use by China. And they account for, you know, over 40% of world demand for— annual demand for tin, lead, zinc, other nonferrous metals, huge amounts of oil, coal, iron ore, etc., etc. So, the feeling was that this huge explosion in commodity demand was going to last forever.

Well, what these guys weren't really thinking about is, what are they doing with those commodities? Well, they're not using them for internal consumption. No, no, no. They're turning them into exports. And where do those exports go? They go to North America and Europe. And if you've got slow growth in North America and Europe, which you have, you don't have inherent demand for those exports. Now, the Chinese covered up that problem for a number of years by huge infrastructure spending, but the result was a lot of ghost cities. Huge, huge debts. But in any event, Chinese growth is slowing.

Well, what happened, going back here to the 2000s, in response to this leap in commodity prices— and, by the way, it started in 2002, actually February 2002, and China joined the World Trade Center at the end of 2001, so it's no coincidence. It was really a whole China play.

What happened was there was tremendous investment.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: In all kinds of commodity production. And you look at some of these things like copper, copper mines, coal, etc., they can take 5 to 10 years to come to fruition. But then they— they're, you know, tens and tens and tens of billions of dollars each. But there was this huge investment and financed with very heavy leverage. And, of course, what happened was that when that production came in, came on stream,

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: You didn't have that rapid growth. The growth hasn't— global growth hasn't collapsed. It just has not— has not lived up to expectations, and the supply has been huge. And, of course, you have a very interesting situation here. It's back to this marginal cost argument. You get some of these big new commodity developments, and these guys have a tiger by the tail. They get into these and they're losing money, and they know that unless prices just went through the roof, they're going to lose money regardless. But they're going to lose less money if they complete the mines than if they cut and run.

So, you see this ironic situation where there is a pressure to complete them. And you look at some of the iron ore producers, and what do they say? They rationalize this by saying, oh, yeah, but we're going to produce iron ore at less than $50 a ton, and that'll be cheaper than the competition in India. And, you know, it's a nice story, and maybe they're going to be right.

Erik Townsend: Right. Right.

Gary Shilling: But I rather suspect it's more an attempt to rationalize what's really an inherently bad investment. But if you look at it, in the last 2 or 3 years, there hasn't been one major hard rock miner CEO that has not left, either saw the footprints on the ceiling or been shown the gate by the board. This has been a tremendous excess capacity situation, and with slow growth in the world, it's going to take years to eat it up.

Helicopter money and fiscal stimulus

Erik Townsend: I want to move on to monetary policy. A lot of guests on this program have predicted that we're headed for some form of helicopter money. Do you agree with that view? And if so, what form do you think it would take? Would it be infrastructure spending or just outright, you know, transfer payments? How would it happen?

Gary Shilling: Yeah, here's the reality. You've had zero or declining growth in real incomes for most people in Western Europe and North America for over 10 years.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: All the growth of what there has been has been the people on the top. But the vast majority, 90% or more, have had flat or declining real incomes.

And this has caused a lot of frustration. The example I like to use is that old movie Network, where this guy Howard Beale, he'd been fired as a TV anchor, and he gets out of his chair and runs to the window and opens it up and yells, I'm mad as hell! I'm not going to take it anymore!

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: Well, I think that's where voters are. And they've basically said mainstream politicians aren't delivering the goods, so we're going to go to the fringes. And they have. You look at the popularity of Marine Le Pen, head of the National Front in France, far right, anti-immigration. You look at Jeremy Corbyn, very much to the left, head of the Labour Party in Britain, far right, far left parties in Spain, Germany, Italy, Canada. You've now got Justin Trudeau, very much a leftist, replacing Stephen Harper, a conservative. And, of course, in this country we've got the likes of Bernie and Trump. And I think this is— in other words, people are saying, we're going to try something else, and it may be the lunatic fringe, but we're going to try something else.

Well, this, I think, is not going unnoticed by politicians. And regardless of who wins the election, I expect there's going to be a big push for fiscal stimulus. I actually wrote this up in March of last year in our newsletter, Insight. The title of the article, The Next Big Thing. And the next big thing is fiscal stimulus. In other words, I think when the new Congress and the president get back, whoever it is, in January, we're going to see a huge push to do something, because monetary policy is impotent. Monetary policy just has— and we can go into detail on why— but monetary policy has just not promoted real economic growth for, I think, very clear reasons. So now the move is, is to fiscal policy.

And that brings in the helicopter money idea. Helicopter money, it, it, it— what it really means is that there's big fiscal stimulus, and the resulting deficits are financed by By central banks. Now, you can say, well, what's the difference between that and quantitative easing? Eh, not much.

And you say, well, okay, isn't that what happens anyway? There are some important distinctions. In developed countries, and this is true of major central banks, the Fed, the BOJ, the BOE, ECB, they buy securities, but they buy them on the open market. In other words,

Erik Townsend: Yes.

Gary Shilling: The Treasury's issuing them, but the market gets in there, intervenes to determine the price.

In a banana republic like Zambia or Argentina, they issue the paper directly to the central bank, and, of course, so there's no limit on what they issue. There's no vigilantes in there, and you ultimately get a wrecked economy. Well, that's true most times. In other words, central banks are independent.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: But when you're in wartime, they're not. Matter of fact, in World War II, money supply in this country was growing at a 25% annual rate. Well, why? Obviously, they were doing their bit to help finance the war. In other words, in wartime, central banks are really arms of the government. They are not independent, regardless of what they want to say or believe.

Well, we're now in a war against slow growth, and so I think that this is what is going to happen: helicopter money. There's going to be big fiscal stimulus, and it's going to be financed by central banks buying the securities, not directly from the government. No, no, they don't want to do that. They're not going to act like banana republics, but there'll be pretty much a tacit agreement, just like there is in any wartime. Now, where are the areas where we might see this big fiscal push?

Well, in this country, there are 2 of them that we've identified and talked about in our newsletter for many, many months. One is infrastructure spending. That's something that both Republicans and Democrats pretty much agree on, and Lord knows we need it— roads, bridges, railroads, all kinds of infrastructure improvement.

And the second one, which would probably get more play if the Republicans controlled Washington, is defense spending. And they would point to China building these military bases in the South China Sea. artificial islands. They point to Putin trying to reestablish the Russian Empire, invading Ukraine, Japan coming out from under their post-World War II neutrality. So, these are the 2 areas that I think really are likely candidates, and I think we will see this big push. And helicopter money, all that means is that the central banks are going to be very, very cooperative in financing the deficits resulting from big fiscal stimulus.

Erik Townsend: Right.

The Age of Deleveraging and the Trump-Clinton question

Erik Townsend: Gary, you wrote a book back in 2010 titled The Age of Deleveraging: Investment Strategies for a Decade of Slow Growth and Deflation. And I'll summarize the gist of the book was, until the debt gets paid down, you anticipated that the economy was in for stagnation, slow growth, and deflation. And obviously, you have been exactly right in your predictions about stagnation, slow growth, and deflation. But at the risk of picking nits, I've got to come back to the title, The Age of Deleveraging. Clearly, that's what we need to be doing, but the opposite is happening. There's been no deleveraging since 2010. There's been nothing but an increase in the total amount of debt, both sovereign and private, since then. You know, is that out of sync with what you were expecting?

Gary Shilling: I disagree with you in your statement there, because I don't look at debt per se. I don't think it's meaningful. There are very few There's no economic measures which in themselves mean anything. It's always relative to something else. And if you look at, if you look at, for example, household debt, and this is total debt, mortgage debt, consumer loans, credit cards, auto loans, you name it, and look at it in relation to after-tax income, you've got to have a denominator on these things. That ratio started at 65% in the early '80s. That was the beginning of the big leveraging up. It got up to 130% in the mid-2000s. It's now down to 104%. So it has come down dramatically, and most of it because of mortgage debt. The same is true in the financial area. On a global basis, we've had deleveraging. You have to put a denominator under these things to make any sense out of them.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so you're deleveraging relative to income as opposed to an absolute term.

Gary Shilling: Yeah, I mean, if you had absolute— if you had absolute deleveraging in the sense that you were reducing debt in a growing economy, it wouldn't be a growing economy, it'd be a depression.

Erik Townsend: Okay. One more question before we close. You mentioned earlier the potential impacts of a Trump presidency. In general, what do you see in terms of Trump versus Clinton? How would that decision impact markets? What would investors want to be watching for?

Gary Shilling: There, I think you might have some ironic results. If Clinton wins, and, by the way, the recent breakout of stocks may be an indication that investors have, in effect, said that she is going to be the winner, and, yeah, she's moved further to the left than Obama, pushed there by Bernie, and that may be— that's not a favorable climate for investors. But it's sort of the devil you know versus the devil you don't know. But in any event, if you have— if Clinton wins, it's kind of more of the same, very much an income redistribution attitude, but no dramatic impacts.

Trump, on the other hand, is this loose cannon kind of image, and I think that could have some interesting results. Stocks would very well suffer, but ironically, you could have a run for the dollar and Treasuries.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Gary Shilling: That they are the ultimate safe havens in the world. And when people get scared, they head for the safe havens, even though, in this case, they're U.S. securities. Machiavelli said it's better to be feared than be loved, because if you're loved, people can fall out of love with you, but if you're feared, that's likely to persist. And I think that's the— I think that probably would be the case with Trump. So, ironically, if Trump wins, I think you could see a run for the dollar and Treasuries.

Insight newsletter and contact details

Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, unfortunately, we are out of time. Before we close, I know that a lot of people are interested to know a little bit more about you and where you can follow your work. Your firm manages money for both high-net-worth individuals and institutions. You also publish the Insight newsletter. And I think it's important for people who aren't familiar with that, it's not another 5-page newsletter. You're usually 30 to 40 pages of content there. Tell us a little bit about the newsletter, and is it possible for our listeners who might want a sample copy to obtain one.

Gary Shilling: Certainly. This is a letter that, that discusses economic and investment themes. It's not a tip sheet. We're not telling people buy this hot stock today, buy it tomorrow, etc., etc. We're talking about general economic things, what's going on in terms of interest rates, a lot of things that we've, we've discussed

Erik Townsend: Yes.

Gary Shilling: Today, we cover. It's a monthly publication, and we do discuss our specific investment strategy in there every month, and you really, obviously, were aware of that when you asked some of these questions.

We'd be delighted to send anyone a sample copy if they're interested, and we have a toll-free number. It's 1-888-346-4646. 1-888-346-7444. 1-888-346-7444.

Erik Townsend: And of course, your website is—

Gary Shilling: Website, yeah, it's www.agaryshilling.com.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, Gary, I cannot thank you enough for a fantastic interview. We really appreciate it. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues.

Announcer: guest requests and mailbag addresses

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for future guests. for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: Triffin's paradox explained

Aaron Chan: So Erik, Dr. Shilling mentioned Triffin's paradox briefly during today's interview. Now I know you've written quite a bit on that subject, so why don't we elaborate on that subject for today's post-interview topic? Give us some color on Robert Triffin and his paradox.

Erik Townsend: Well, it's interesting, you know, everybody who reads Triffin seems to have a different take on what the actual paradox was. As Gary described in this interview, Triffin observed that if you are the world's reserve currency issuer, there's a tremendous artificial demand from other nations. They need to have your currency, and that allows you to do things like get away with running a current account deficit. And the way that I interpret Triffin's writing, the actual paradox that he was writing about comes down to this: how do you decide what currency ought to be the world's reserve currency in the first place?

Well, clearly, it's got to be whoever's the strongest credit. And in 1944, at the time of the Bretton Woods Conference, Without a doubt, the United States was the strongest credit. You know, the whole world was laying in ruin. The United States had very little damage on its own soil, so it made perfect sense for the dollar to be selected because it's the best credit. Well, what happens when a nation is selected to be the world's reserve currency?

What it does is it basically gives that country license to get away with doing things that it could never get away with otherwise, and to borrow and spend with reckless abandon to the.

Aaron Chan: That's right.

Erik Townsend: To the point that the currency eventually becomes no longer worthy of serving as a reserve currency. And to my interpretation, that's the paradox that Triffin was talking about, is how does the currency become reserve currency? Because it's the best credit. What happens when you are the reserve currency? You can get away with doing things to your currency that make it the worst credit. And Triffin actually said after the gold— you know, a lot of people thought when President Nixon was forced to abandon the gold convertibility standard, that that resolved Triffin's paradox. Triffin's dilemma, because that basically proved Triffin right, that the U.S. wouldn't be able to stay the course because of its— what Triffin called military adventurism was his prediction. And of course, the Vietnam War resulted in a massive buildup of debt.

So, you would think in some ways that if the U.S. was forced to abandon the gold standard, that resolved the dilemma. But Triffin actually commented in an interview a couple years after that and said, no, it doesn't resolve the dilemma, because even though the U.S. was forced abandon the gold standard, the fact remains that the dollar is still standing as the world's de facto reserve currency, even though the Bretton Woods system broke down with going off the gold standard. It's still serving as the reserve currency, and that means eventually the U.S. will continue to borrow and spend recklessly, and eventually it won't be suitable as a reserve currency anymore.

Postgame: Nixon, Kissinger and the petrodollar system

Aaron Chan: So hang on. So President Nixon taking the U.S. off the gold standard was originally predicted by many people to mean that the dollar would lose its global reserve currency status, but it didn't. So what saved the day?

Erik Townsend: Well, Henry Kissinger had— who was Secretary of State at the time— was smart enough to recognize how important the dollar's reserve currency status is, and he knew going off the gold standard that that risked potentially losing that status. So he got on a plane and went over to Saudi Arabia, sat down with the Saudis, and basically made them an offer they couldn't refuse. He said, look, you guys, Guys, here's the story. We got this really big military. You're like a little country. You know, these little countries, they get overthrown. Our CIA sometimes makes that happen. We wouldn't want to see that happen to you.

So here's what you're going to do. You're going to take dollars only. I can't do the accent any longer.

Aaron Chan: Erik Montana.

Erik Townsend: Kissinger basically told the Saudis, look, we want you to make a policy that you're going to sell your oil for US dollars and no currency other than US dollars. You're going to reinvest the profits from the oil production that you make in U.S. Treasury bonds. So essentially, by making a deal with the Saudis, and that was in exchange for essentially protection in mafia terminology, that meant that the U.S. military would make sure that the current power regime in Saudi Arabia stayed in power and that the U.S. essentially had their back with military support if they were to run into any trouble in the Middle East, which of course in the '70s was a A very volatile place, as it is again today.

So, Kissinger basically architected this petrodollar system, as it's come to be known, where by requiring the Saudis to reinvest all of their oil proceeds into US Treasuries, you're getting the support in the US Treasury market that previously existed because of the gold convertibility. And you're also, by transacting all of the business for the world's biggest and most important commodity, which is crude oil, Right. By forcing that to be transacted in dollars, it effectively sets a de facto standard that international trade in general is going to be settled in dollars.

So, that's essentially what happened, was the petrodollar system has allowed the global reserve currency status of the US dollar to continue, even though the United States effectively defaulted on the original provisions of the Bretton Woods Treaty, which is that it was supposed to be convertible into gold at a fixed rate of exchange of $35 per ounce. Right.

Postgame: reserve currency status and Russia's de-dollarization plan

Aaron Chan: Okay, so what you're saying is effectively the reason the US dollar has remained the world's reserve currency for 45 years after Nixon took us off the gold standard is all about the petrodollar system of Saudi Arabia and other major Arab producers selling their oil for dollars and then, in turn, reinvesting the profits in US Treasuries. But these days, more and more producers are starting to accept other currencies for oil, be it yuan or rubles. And with the current supply glut, it's questionable whether there is even any profits to reinvest in US Treasuries. So what does that mean for the dollar's monopoly on U.S. reserve currency status going forward?

Erik Townsend: Well, in my opinion, there's a huge complacency that everybody just assumes that the U.S. dollar has been the world's reserve currency ever since Bretton Woods in 1944. It survived as the world's reserve currency despite the loss of convertibility into gold in 1971, 45 years ago last week. So people assume there is no other alternative, and it is absolutely true that there is There is no other bond market besides US Treasuries that is deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. So there is no alternative to the US dollar in terms of a global reserve currency.

I think people are very complacent in assuming that's never gonna change, because Russia, with Sergei Glazyev, who's an economic advisor to Vladimir Putin, has architected this de-dollarization scheme, which directly is designed to attack the dollar's hegemony And he's trying as hard as he can to persuade as many countries as possible, particularly in the BRICS countries, to stop accepting US dollars for oil and for other international commerce, and to conduct that commerce in rubles, in yuan, in other currencies. And the reason he's doing that is not because he, you know, loves rubles and wants to see them used more. He knows that the US has what was famously termed exorbitant privilege by the French finance minister, later President of France, Valéry Giscard d'Estaing. I'm sure I'm mispronouncing that. My apologies.

Aaron Chan: That's pretty good, Erik.

Erik Townsend: I'm trying. So, you know, basically, Glazyev knows that the U.S. enjoys this exorbitant privilege of being able to go into debt essentially for free without the consequences that other nations that are not reserve currency issuer would suffer if they were to try to do so. And he's sick of it, and he's doing everything that he can.

Aaron Chan: Sure.

Erik Townsend: Sergei Glazyev is not the most powerful man in the world. He doesn't have the ability to make this happen overnight. But the BRICS countries represent about half of the population of the planet. And yeah, it's not the well-heeled half of the population that gets to make up the rules.

But there is a growing international frustration with US dollar hegemony. And there are more and more voices around the world saying, hey, it's true that there is no viable alternative. alternative to the US dollar as reserve currency. That's a problem, and it's a problem we need to start working on solving.

And I don't think anyone in the United States takes this seriously. If you mention the de-dollarization plan, Sergei Glazyev, anybody in the US government is just gonna laugh you out of the room and just say, oh, they're just blowing smoke. Yeah, it might be true today, but there's growing sentiment, and there's more and more people around the world that are getting frustrated with the American hegemony over the world financial system.

Aaron Chan: Yeah, that's fascinating stuff, Erik, and it really makes me wonder what will happen geopolitically, whether the US will even allow this to happen in the first place without some major conflict. And I really wish we could continue this conversation, but unfortunately we're running low on time. So anything else you want to cover before we close?

Postgame: thanks to ZeroHedge and a call for listener growth

Erik Townsend: Well, I want to thank ZeroHedge publicly Thank you, Tyler. Last week we begged for help. We said ZeroHedge hasn't covered us in a while. And sure enough, they picked up last week's interview with Jeff Snider and did a really nice feature article for us, which resulted in a whole bunch of new subscriptions. So we welcome aboard ZeroHedge readers who are just joining us over the last couple of weeks, and thanks go out to Tyler for the help with promotion. And folks, we really need your help as well. The more that we can increase the name recognition and the number of regular listeners, and particularly registered users at MacroVoices.com, The more that helps us to get better guests on the program. I know, Aaron, you're working on one really high-profile guest that we might be able to get at the end of September. That's not booked yet.

Aaron Chan: Don't give it away, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I'm not giving it away. We'll keep it a secret. But it's not booked yet, so we'll wait to tell you who that is. But we're working on it, and what it takes, you know, if you retweet us, if you post links to MacroVoices on Twitter, on discussion forums, and so forth, The more that we can grow the listener base, the more we can bring you the guests that you want.

When you register your free account at MacroVoices.com, you'll automatically receive our free Research Roundup email, which is a weekly compendium of links to all the cool research that we could find on the internet, as well as anything in support of this week's feature interview. So, Aaron let's tell them before we wrap up what's in this week's Research Roundup.

Postgame: Research Roundup highlights

Aaron Chan: All right, thanks, Erik. So this week I want to start off by highlighting an article by Macro Ops, which details a new SEC rule set to go in effect on October 17th, which will require prime and muni market funds to float their NAVs and impose redemption fees and liquidity gates. Now, this is a big deal because companies and banks that get their day-to-day financing from commercial paper will soon encounter an even greater dollar shortage as investors pile into Treasury bills to the tune of possibly $500 billion in the next few months. So this is definitely something to watch closely going forward.

We've also got recent interviews from James Grant and Stephanie Pomboy. Mr. Grant reiterates his bullish views on gold and gold mining stocks and states that the former is a very timely way to invest in monetary disorder. Now, Ms. Pomboy doesn't pull any punches either and rips back the curtain on the struggling U.S. consumer. She also reiterates her bullish view on Treasuries and gold and expects spreads between investment-grade and high yield to widen. Finally, as a sort of prequel to last week's phenomenal interview from Jeffrey Snider, Snider of Alhambra Partners. He recounts Brazil's recent experience with dollar shortage and how bilateral credit arrangements with China saved the day. Well, for now. But what is clear is that monetary bodies of substantial mass are intervening in the Eurodollar markets, and this continues to pile up evidence for the persistent global shortage in dollars, and therefore a feather in the cap of the strong dollar thesis.

So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even Also, thanks to our listeners who've submitted their articles and content. If you'd like to share your work with our community, you can shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag. Don't forget to follow our main account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and episode releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend or myself @_AaronChen_.

For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Aaron. Chat with you next week.

Outro and disclaimer

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today. at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. And now back to the program. Only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Jeff Snider — Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners (Alhambra Investments at w70) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Episode preview and chartbook instructions

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. This is Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan. MacroVoices episode 27 was recorded on August 18th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Investments will be joining me as today's special guest. We'll be covering corporate earnings and why Jeff feels that equity valuations are rich to fair value. What Jeff sees is a chronic and acute dollar shortage, TED spread volatility, Eurodollar money supply, and why Jeff believes that all of this points to the need for a global systemic reset of the financial system. Jeff sent us a really fantastic book of charts that he'll be referring to in the interview. Normally, we try to produce MacroVoices so that you could listen to it at the gym or in the car or what have you. But for this week, I highly recommend that you download the excellent book of charts and graphs that Jeff sent us, because he's going to refer directly to them in the interview.

Registered users at MacroVoices.com already received the download link, and your Research Roundup email. For anyone who is not registered yet, you can register a free account at MacroVoices.com, and once you're logged in, click on the Research Library function on the black menu bar at the top of the screen, and you'll find the download there.

We also are going to talk about Bitcoin and why we've yet to do a show on that topic after today's feature interview.

Market wrap: equities melt-up and the famous bears

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P, with E-mini S&P futures trading north of 2,190 at one point earlier this week and ultimately closing on Thursday afternoon at about 2,184. So, Erik, has anything changed in your view for equities?

Erik Townsend: Not too much change from what we discussed last week. You know, we're still seeing this melt-up. I don't think that the economic fundamentals at all support these valuations. I do think maybe what's starting to happen here is people who have been very short for a long time are starting to give up. And I think we could see basically short-covering pressure pushing equity prices even higher. Certainly, the Fed minutes coming out a bit more dovish, quashing expectations of a rate hike have definitely added to volatility in the last couple of days. Dollar index has, of course, been very soft in the last couple days, and that, I think, has helped to push the prices of equities and everything else a little bit higher. One thing I do think very interesting, though— you'll remember my comment last week— was that although there is this chorus of bearish voices with very, very famous people between Carl Icahn and George Soros and Stan Druckenmiller, I observed that those are the old-school rock stars.

Those are the guys that are famous for their work in the industry back in the good old days before we had central bank liquidity driving markets. Well, this week I saw an analysis on ZeroHedge of David Tepper's 13F.

Now, Tepper is definitely a new normal kind of guy. He was the very first and most outspoken person to say back in 2009, hey, QE is unconditionally good for stock prices. You print money out of thin air, it's got to go someplace, it's going to go into asset markets. So, this is a guy who's definitely got the handle on this new normal world of central bank liquidity that we've run into. And even he is scaling back his bullish bets, according to the 13F analysis. George Soros, according to ZeroHedge analysis, has doubled his bearish put exposure to S&P 500 puts. Carl Icahn reiterated that he sees a day of reckoning coming and emphasized that he's more hedged than he's ever been before. So, you know, all of these voices are still selling a very Very, very bearish signal. My only comment is, you know, I've been saying the same thing for years, and what's happened is the market continues to march higher against the fundamentals.

And Jeff Snider is going to have a lot to say about this, about equity valuations and so forth, in today's feature interview.

Market wrap: oil inventories and OPEC

Aaron Chan: Right. And last week you remarked that OPEC propaganda would likely continue to boost oil prices, and that even though you thought they were already higher than fundamentals dictated, it would probably take a bearish inventory report to reverse a trend. And we certainly saw the exuberance continue with WTI trading north of $49 this afternoon. What did we get from inventory numbers from yesterday's DOE report, and what's next for oil prices?

Erik Townsend: Well, you're exactly right, Aaron, that what's going on here is the rally is basically being driven by OPEC propaganda. What it would take to turn it around would be a decisively bearish inventory report, and we didn't get that this week. The inventory numbers came in at a 2.5 million barrel nationwide draw on inventory.

So, you know, we're still at a time of year when draws are expected, but we've had a couple of builds on inventory for the last couple of weeks. So, 2.5 million barrel draw. And Cushing, Oklahoma, which is ever critical because it's where the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract is settled, again, a draw on inventory, making 724,000 barrels of extra space, bringing Cushing down to 86% of its working capacity.

And I'll point out, you know, there are several sources of these working capacity numbers for Cushing, and different people calculate them in different ways. The number that's now 86% at one point got to 97% back in the spring. Whereas if you look at something like RBN Energy's analysis, they say the real number never got north of 91% because they calculate it differently. So, it's a little bit of a subjective matter of opinion there. But at least one measure says we're down to 86% of capacity. Gasoline, 2.7 million barrel drawdown on inventory after several weeks of unexpected builds on inventory. We've got a much more characteristic drawdown. Distillates, on the other hand, 1.9 million build, that would be a little bit bearish. But in the context of the other numbers, the inventory information is definitely not a really bearish message.

Now, what I think the market has missed, quite frankly, is we also saw the biggest increase in US production in 15 months. We're also seeing increasing rig counts, and Saudi Arabia just announced an all-time record high level of production at 10.9 million barrels per day. So, I do see some significant bearish indications in these numbers, but the inventory numbers themselves were not markedly bearish. And I think that's what's allowed the exuberance to continue. I don't think it's supported by real fundamentals, but we didn't see big builds on inventory. That was a sigh of relief. And I think that's allowed this rally to really accelerate in the last couple of days. A little bit of a correction there. We did see north of $49 this afternoon, but there was also a contract roll there.

Aaron Chan: So the—

Erik Townsend: The September contract has not traded that high. It is still about 65 cents lower than that. It was the October contract, which is about to become the new front month, that actually traded above $49. So, you know, I think that the market is overvalued, but I think, again, what it's going to take to turn this around is a clear bearish inventory signal. For some reason, the increasing production, increasing rig count, and Saudi record production wasn't enough to do it.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And I think that we may have to wait this out until nothing of consequence happens at this OPEC meeting in September before we see a meaningful reversal, unless we get a very significant increase, build on inventory. I think those inventory builds are coming, but seasonally, it's still a little bit early for that. In the next month or so, I would expect to see them to start picking up. So, I do still expect a low to come. I don't think the $39 that we saw is the ultimate low. I think sometime in September or early October, we're likely to see see a lower number there. Whether it gets back down to the $26 range where we saw the low this spring, I don't know. It's all going to depend on what the numbers tell us in terms of inventory.

And again, I think that Saudi Arabia, the discussion about how they're going to take steps supposedly to balance the market— look, if Saudi Arabia wanted to balance the market, it takes 10 minutes. It's a phone call to Russia to say we're ready to make a deal where we mutually cut production by 5%.

That would cause at least a 30% increase in prices because the market would be rebalanced even though Saudi Arabia would be accepting less volume of production. They'd be getting paid 30 or 40 or 50% more for it. Their overall revenue would increase. At some point, Saudi Arabia is going to be ready to do that. They don't need to wait for a meeting to make it happen. When they're talking about taking action to balance markets at the meeting, it's propaganda. And I don't really think that this OPEC meeting has any consequence or significance, but it certainly does in terms of price. It has no consequence in terms of true fundamentals, but the propaganda is working and it could propel prices even higher.

Market wrap: gold, 10-year yields and the dollar index

Aaron Chan: Right. So, shifting over to gold, since late June, we've been watching a technical consolidation range in gold between $1,308 and $1,377, and it feels like Groundhog Day, Erik. And it looks like we're still stuck in this range. Do you have any new views on gold for this week?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's mostly same old, same old. We're looking at the same picture. We're still stuck in that range. What I would observe, though, is that we've seen a lot of weakness in the dollar index this week, which was there before the Fed minutes, was accelerated after the Fed minutes. We're back down to just barely above 94 right now, 94.09, as I look at the dollar index on Thursday afternoon. That is a post-Brexit low, but even with that weakness in the dollar, we still haven't gotten back up to the top of that trading range. So, even though we're We're at $1,357 on the gold futures chart as I look at it Thursday afternoon. That is, you know, on the top half of the range, but it's not at the very top of the range. And we're definitely looking at a low in the dollar index for 3 months. So, I still think that we're seeing overall kind of a weak picture here for gold.

I think it still has further to roll over and fall off to the downside. But that hasn't happened yet. And certainly, you know, there was Ukraine talking about fears of all-on invasion from Russia.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: If the geopolitical situation heats up, that certainly would be a bullish catalyst for gold. So, until we get out of that $1,308 to $1,377 consolidation range, I don't have a firm opinion, but I'm kind of just very slightly leaning towards the bearish side, that maybe there is still lower numbers to be seen in the gold market before this is over.

Aaron Chan: Got it. So, 10-year Treasury yields traded back up to the highs of the 150s, trading around 153 Thursday afternoon. Any change on your outlook for yields?

Erik Townsend: Well, again, no, not really. I think we're still in this post-Brexit bounce. If we were to move above 170, that would tell me, hmm, maybe my view is wrong. But I think that we're in a consolidation period, and eventually I expect it to resolve lower in yield, higher in price. And I am still expecting sub-1% Treasury yields eventually before this whole thing is over. Whether it happens this year or not, I don't know.

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, as you mentioned earlier, the dollar index is still treading water to maybe looking weaker, having traded on a low 94 handle briefly this week. So what's your take on the DXY?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, it's been this afternoon particularly weak and was accelerated. There had been some weakness. The Fed minutes clearly accelerated that. I don't know really where we're headed. I still have the view big picture-wise that probably this consolidation range, you know, from whatever the bottom was, 91 to 97. On a fundamental level, I still see the argument for a resolution to the upside above 97. But boy, you know, I thought we were going to consolidate between 95 and 97, and we're down to almost 94 now, 94.10 as I speak. So, I don't know where it's headed. We're watching it closely. And of course, central bank policy and what the Fed says next is going to be telling.

Something I find interesting, though, is the way the market reacts to Fed minutes as if they were new news. The minutes are a reflection of what happened in a meeting several weeks ago. And we had earlier this week a Fed commentator saying, hey, don't discount the possibility of a rate hike at the next meeting. I think they were trying to set expectations that maybe things have changed since that last meeting and not wanting people to interpret the Fed minutes as being too dovish. But the Fed minutes come out after that statement and people act as if it's new news that happened after that, when in reality it's just a release of news from weeks ago. So, you know, I wonder what the next message is going to be out of the Fed, but I'm actually surprised that the dollar index has fallen as much as it has in the last couple of days.

Aaron Chan: Right. So, it's like no news is good news. So, thanks for the update, Erik. This week's special guest is Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners. And as Erik mentioned at the top of the show, we strongly encourage you to download the chartbook that accompanies this interview. Registered users at MacroVoices already received the download link in your Research Roundup email.

For anyone who didn't receive it yet, you can register a free account at MacroVoices.com. And once you're logged in, you can find the download under the Research Library tab on the black menu bar at the top of the screen. Erik's interview with Mr. Snider is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Corporate earnings, profits and cash flow

Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is Jeffrey Snider from Alhambra Partners. And Jeff sent us an absolutely fantastic book of charts that he's going to be referring to. We told you earlier in the program where you can download the chart book. Jeff, I can't thank you enough for sending us so much information. You've gone well beyond the call of duty in terms of what we expect from most of our guests. I want to dive right in because it's going to be a challenge to get through all of this. So, the first few charts that you sent us focused on corporate earnings, and your research suggests that equity prices are considerably rich right now to the value imputed by earnings. Please give us the big picture here. What are these charts telling us, and what's the story on corporate earnings?

Jeff Snider: Sure, Erik. And first of all, let me thank you for having me on, and I appreciate the opportunity to deliver as much information as I possibly can. As far as the stock market goes, and earnings in particular, what we see is a dramatic deviation from what was supposed to happen.

We were supposed to have a full-blown recovery based on, you know, You know, the idea that QE would create a successful and sustainable economy. And in the middle of 2014, that the trend in earnings deviated sharply. We saw an actual contraction in earnings to the point where what was supposed to be about $145 in 2015 trailing 12-month earnings turned out to only be about $87.

So, it was a massive deviation between what was supposed to happen and what did happen. And that's, you know, that's always the danger with forward earnings. There's the risk that they don't actually show up.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, your charts are showing pretty clearly that earnings keep getting revised lower time after time after time, and that would seem to suggest that the earnings recession that we're in is dragging on much longer than almost all analysts had initially expected. So what's going on? Why is it dragging on so long, and how long do you expect it to last? And when will it eventually— and how will it end?

Jeff Snider: Well, how long it lasts is, you know, obviously very difficult to discern ahead of the time. But I think the big problem is the fact that the economy itself is not getting better, is certainly not at the pace that would generate a return to earnings growth. So, that's part of the problem is the fact that I think a lot of analysts and a lot of economists certainly have underestimated the degree and the depth of the problems that are existing, and they are dragging on further than anyone anticipated. And so, we have this process where They keep expecting earnings to recover rather relatively quickly, rapidly, but they don't. Quarter after quarter, they get marked down significantly.

So the fact of the earnings recession is there in 2015, but 2016 has yet to become the recovery. In fact, we're still seeing earnings that are about the same as they were toward the end of last year.

Erik Townsend: You're also including a couple of charts in addition to the earnings projections, which are showing corporate profits and cash flow. How do they fit into

Jeff Snider: Well, it's always good to look outside of, you know, I think we have a tendency to focus maybe too narrowly on the stock market, S&P 500 large-cap companies. And so, it's always good to look outside to maybe some broader pieces of information. And the Bureau of Economic Analysis, which is the agency that produces GDP, produces the other side of GDP, which is gross domestic income. And within that side is corporate cash flow and corporate profits. Across the entire corporate sector and the entire business sector.

What we find in this segment of data largely corroborates what we see in the S&P 500 earnings, that cash flow and profits are declining, and they have been off pace for quite a significant amount of time, which again ties back into the idea that the recovery has been inordinately shallow and unusually so.

So, there is much— there's a lot of evidence that shows And that really underscores how the corporate sector has been struggling for many years, not just the last few years. And that puts into context why, why the earnings environment might be so rough and so off in 2016, because it's not something that's new. It's just a relatively weak environment getting much weaker.

Is QE liquidity? Bank reserves versus money

Erik Townsend: Now, before we move on from equity prices, I'd like to get your feedback on something, because several past guests on this program have shared the view that I've held, which is that the principal driver of of this whole equity rally since 2009 has been central bank-provided liquidity. So, the thesis is basically that if you conjure trillions of dollars out of thin air, that money has to go someplace, and a lot of it ends up in asset markets. Frankly, though, we're way past overdue in terms of having a contradictory viewpoint.

I know that you have one, so please don't be shy. Tear my view apart. What's wrong with that view, and how do you see it?

Jeff Snider: Well, let me start with, uh, partially by agreeing with you. I think there are effects from what the Federal Reserve has done, particularly in quantitative easing. The Fed does buy bonds from the marketplace, primarily dealers, and it does have portfolio effects, which pushes investors into things, riskier things like stocks. So, there is some effect from what the Federal Reserve does. However, I would disagree in calling that liquidity, because what the Fed does through quantitative easing is create bank reserves.

And bank reserves, in my view, aren't the same thing as dollars. It's not the same thing as money printing. And so I think there's a great mainstream misconception about what the Fed actually does. Because of that, I think there's a tendency to discount liquidity risk overall, which is something that we'll get into a little bit later on.

In fact, I think what happens in stocks is more a myth than actual reality. Investors in stocks are buying into the idea that the Fed does create liquidity And so that's one reason why you see valuations stretched, because it's the idea that because the Fed does create liquidity, that risk is very low. And so investors are buying shares at ridiculous valuations based on the premise that the Fed can create a recovery through liquidity. And what 2014 showed and 2015 was that wasn't true. The earnings that were supposed to justify the valuations based on the idea that QE work never happened, and they still haven't happened.

And so the longer the earnings recession lingers, the greater the risk there is that stock investors will eventually realize that they have been following the wrong story all along, that what the Federal Reserve does do is not money printing, it's not creating dollars, it's creating only one form of bank liability, and that I would argue isn't even a very important form of bank liability. Bank balance sheet construction on a liability has far more important factors that are more relevant to the global economy and the marketplace.

Eurodollar contraction, TIC data and the interest rate fallacy

Erik Townsend: Speaking of following the right story, a theme that we've really focused on in this program is the US dollar rally and where the dollar is headed. The next section of the chartbook that you sent us addresses what you're calling a chronic and acute dollar shortage. And you've got some great charts that show everything from Treasury international capital flows to the 2s-10s yield curve flattening to inflation breakevens to repo fail rates.

Give us the, the big story here. How do all these things come together, and what are they telling you that leads you to conclude that we have a chronic and acute dollar crisis?

Jeff Snider: Well, first, you know, you look at the TIC data, for example, and a lot of people are confused about what that actually represents. It's essentially buying and selling of US Treasuries and US dollar-denominated assets by foreign actors. But in a, in a more general sense, what it shows is the offshore Eurodollar system, which is the global reserve, the actual global reserve currency.

And before 2007, it was a rising, almost flourishing system. And after 2007, it has been the opposite. It's been a decay, a constriction, a contraction in global money supply that isn't a straight-line contraction, that's uneven and Produces quite a crisis here and there, but overall there's a bright demarcation that sits with August 2007 where the global eurodollar system is no longer able to be, to be a stable platform of monetary growth and therefore economic growth.

Erik Townsend: On page 9 of the chartbook, you've got a chart that shows a frightening decline recently in official holdings of US Treasury debt. What does that tell you about what central banks are doing and how they play a role in this

Jeff Snider: Well, what it tells me is that, again, with the TIC data and the idea that the global eurodollar system is contracting, it shows that in the last couple years especially, that contraction has become so severe that central banks have been forced to try to deal with it as best they can. And we know this, you know, a lot of people know about how China has been selling their Treasuries, and that plays into part of what we're talking about here. Right. Which is that central banks are trying to fill a funding gap in dollars that they just can't fill.

And a lot of central bank programs are temporary in nature, and they're just done and designed for immediate relieving of pressure. And what that chart shows is that central banks aren't able to actually fix the problem. They're constantly intervening and constantly trying to deal with what is a chronic issue.

And so the chart tells me that the chronic issue has become more and more severe to the point where you see enormous interventions in dollar markets.

Erik Townsend: On pages 10 and 11, you allude to an interest rate fallacy. What's the fallacy? What's the story there?

Jeff Snider: Well, Milton Friedman, back in the late 1990s, talked about the interest rate fallacy. He was speaking specifically about Japan. And what he said was, and he was absolutely correct, Was that low interest rates do not tell us that the economy is being stimulated. Low interest rates actually show a tightness of money supply in the real economy.

And you know, he made mention of the fact that that's what we saw in the United States in the 1930s was low interest rates throughout that decade. And conversely, in the 1970s during the Great Inflation, interest rates were high. And so when we think about low interest rates, we need to think about the them in terms of more than just short run.

Long-term low interest rates are again a signal of tight money, which is what we've just been talking about with the eurodollar system.

Repo fails, eurodollar futures, LIBOR and the TED spread

Erik Townsend: Now you go on in pages 12 through 17 to focus quite a bit— 5 slides— just on repo imbalances and repo issues. Where do repos fit into this story and why are they relevant?

Jeff Snider: I think it goes back to what we said about the central banks and chart Page 9. Page 9. It's the fact that the chronic dollar problem has become more acute, especially over the last couple of years. What we call the rising dollar is really an increase in pressure and tightness in the eurodollar contraction.

So, in the repo market, that's exactly what we find. You find an increasing— a whole variety of ways in which there is disorder and— I don't want to say chaos, but problems in normal and flexible funding. So, you see everything from dealers hoarding of US Treasury collateral, which will then create problems in overall funding where it breaks out into repo fails, rising repo fails. You know, back in March, we had the largest 2 weeks of repo fails since the panic in 2008. And these are all tied together with the fact that the dollar pressure is rising to the point where it's becoming a very acute problem.

That's the reason why we've got currency problems all over the world. It's the reason why we had the market crash in August and then another liquidation again in January and February. It's because these funding issues are becoming more and more serious. They're not being alleviated by anything that any central bank is doing, which includes the Fed, which ignores that it has any problem to begin with and denies that it has any problem.

Erik Townsend: Starting on page 18, you shift gears back to eurodollars and you focus on eurodollar futures. What's the story there, and what does it tell you about interest rate expectations?

Jeff Snider: Well, yeah, eurodollar futures are kind of the cross-section or intersection between the economy and monetary policy and forward views on monetary policy. And over the last year, eurodollar futures have signaled an immense amount of bearishness about future— the future trajectory of short-term interest rates. And so, what you find is a contradictory narrative to what the Fed is trying to say. LIBOR is supposed to be a reflection of monetary policy at the very least.

And so, if the Fed is going to be raising rates, we would expect to find eurodollar futures to decline in value, which means rising interest rate expectations in the future.

But what we've seen is, again, an incredible amount of the opposite, where eurodollar futures are being bid up, which is a very bearish expression about what the market is expecting the future path of interest rates to be. It's nothing like what the Federal Reserve is saying. And so it's, again, it's a reflection of the Eurodollar system not buying into both the quantitative easing being liquidity and also the effect of that on the economy, which is quite negative, getting back to Milton Friedman's interest rate policy. It's again a reflection of tight money in the real economy in the area, the Eurodollar area, where it actually matters.

Erik Townsend: You've also got some charts that address a rising trend in LIBOR as well as the TED spread, which TED, of course, is the difference between Treasury yields and eurodollars. That is viewed by a lot of people as kind of a gauge of how much banks trust each other. But you've pointed out not only the rising trend in the TED spread, but also a very marked uptick in terms of volatility in the TED spread. So, what, what are both of those things telling you? Why is the TED suddenly so volatile?

Jeff Snider: I think the volatility is, again, a reflection of the fact that the acuteness of the funding environment has become that much more problematic. And so, while you see the same volatility in GCF repo rates, for example, if you go back to page 16, it's the same thing. The fact is that the funding markets, whether it be repo, whether it be unsecured LIBOR, whether it be any other format, including derivatives, I would add cross- currency basis swaps, interest rate swaps, any number of wholesale financial factors have become much more volatile because of the uncertainty that goes with a tighter monetary environment, but also the, uh, the idea that the Federal Reserve and indeed central banks around the world might be losing control of the system as it goes in the wrong direction.

And going back to the stock market, the idea was prevalent that that this kind of thing wasn't supposed to happen. It wasn't supposed to be possible under especially conditions where the Federal Reserve increased their balance sheet by some $4 trillion. These kinds of things were not supposed to be possible, yet here we are. We see it as a global problem.

You know, if you go to page 21, for example, you see that the relationship between 12-month and 1-month LIBOR and the Chinese yuan exchange rate, which is, you know, CNY is a very good reflection of eurodollar tightness.

And so the idea in the TED spread, and again, I think there's some misconception about what that tells us too, is that it's not just credit risk in interbank markets, but also liquidity risk. And that was, I think, the lesson, the primary lesson that it, in eurodollar system in 2007 and 2008, wasn't so much that there was fear over credit between interbank participants, So much as there was fear over illiquidity turning out like Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers.

So again, I think in the TED spread in particular, what we're seeing is rising liquidity risk as dollar tightness continues to create further problems that nobody seems to have any answer for.

Why QE could not work

Erik Townsend: One of the assertions you make, I think it's on slide 23, which is one of your title slides, is the reasons why QE did not work and cannot ever work Please elaborate on that. Why do you conclude that QE has not and cannot work?

Jeff Snider: If you think about the Eurodollar system as the global money supply, what that does is it gives us a basis of comparison. And if you, uh, first of all, you have to understand that the Eurodollar system is largely hidden and opaque, and we have no idea the exact nature of it. We have no ability to actually measure the full extent of it. So, a lot of what we're left with is inference. However, there are some ways we can at least put together a picture, a solid picture of certain parts of it.

And that includes things like federal funds, repurchase agreements, repos, commercial paper. And just the contraction in those 3 categories in 2007 was far more than the Fed ever did in balance sheet expansion. Worse than that, however, is as those things contracted in 2007 and 2008, They never came back, and so what you do is you compare what the Fed might have done through balance sheet expansion to the contraction in just what we can see of the eurodollar system, and the difference is still where the Fed hasn't done nearly enough, assuming that bank reserves are a substitute to all of those eurodollar factors, which they aren't.

So there, the Federal Reserve every time it did an additional round of QE. Instead of trying to get the system back to where it was, it was only falling further and further and further behind each time. Monetary contraction is therefore much bigger than what the Fed could do. Again, assuming that it could do with bank reserves what was necessary.

So the fact of the matter is, just on a quantitative basis alone, the Fed just could not keep up with the pace of contraction, and that's why we see all the things, things like. TIPS and things like repo market, eurodollar futures, and it all adds up to Milton Friedman's interest rate fallacy.

Erik Townsend: I want to talk specifically about Chart 24. You're showing a really excellent visual history here of yield curves, and the yield curves that we're seeing now are not the ones that were promised to us when quantitative easing was first introduced. So, what is this telling you? Give us the whole picture of of what slide 24 is about?

Jeff Snider: Well, you know, even Ben Bernanke and Janet Yellen would agree that the way to rising interest rates is for actual economic recovery. That's where you see steeper yield curve, so you see nominal rates at more normal levels and not, not, uh, completely depressed levels. And so what that shows is the fact that there is something wrong overall in the economy over the long run. And it's not just the economy, it's the monetary system in general.

And what we find is the fact that the yield curve is shrinking, nominal rates are falling rather than rising.

And so what that does, especially with the US Treasury curve, is it shows exactly what we're talking about in terms of the Eurodollar system overall. It is an expression in very simple terms of the fact that there has to be monetary contraction. There has to be. There's only way to explain how the yield curve can go from where it was in 2006 and before to where it is in 2016, which is barely a curve. And then by the way, this is not just the United States either. It's not just in dollars. We see these distorted scribbled curves all over the world, whether it be Europe and negative rates, Japan, the same thing.

It's a global problem. It's a global monetary problem. The fact that the economy doesn't grow because it's cut off and strangled by monetary decay that is just ongoing and so far unsolved.

And it's a process that is by far more than any central bank can deal with in terms of just raw balance sheet expansion through quantitative easing or whatever other format. And so what the yield curves tell us is that these myths that continue to be believed about what central banks can and cannot do are in fact wrong. They are Myth.

There is no liquidity in central banking. There is only monetary decay in the eurodollar system, and that's all that really matters. And so, getting back to where we're talking about with stock market, the stock market is overvalued based on a belief in a myth that is increasingly being proved as a myth by credit and dollar markets. So it's a it's a big risk to take, especially when these the acuteness.

And the dollar shortage is as recently becoming more and more of a problem.

Erik Townsend: Slides 25 and 26, you're talking about financial business liabilities, and then you're overlaying monetary authority behind it. It's a very impressive graph. Tell us about these slides. What do they mean? What's going on here?

Jeff Snider: Again, it shows the fact that even if we assume the best about what the Federal Reserve did, that quantitative easing and bank reserves are actual substitute liquidity, It still, on a quantitative basis alone, wasn't enough to offset the decline in just these areas. And again, these— what I'm showing here are just federal funds, repo, and commercial paper. And these are only the segments of the Eurodollar system that can actually be measured. So, there's much more that is not seen beyond the chart. So, we really don't have any good idea of how much of monetary contraction occurred in 2007.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jeff Snider: Really, beyond 2007, again, because it's ongoing.

So, the Fed, even though it sounds impressive, you know, a $4.5 trillion balance sheet, by account of just these areas of the wholesale system alone, it wasn't enough to offset the decline just in 2007, let alone the ongoing decline in these areas and further.

A permanent break: shrinking derivative books

Erik Townsend: Slide 27, you're showing what looks almost like an output gap type of chart, basically, we're just not tracking the numbers that we're supposed to be. What's this slide about?

Jeff Snider: If we plot the baseline growth in, again, the wholesale eurodollar system of commercial paper repos, federal funds, these kinds of things, that is what was required in order for the economy, through credit and debt growth, to continue growing as if the Great Recession would be a recession. What you see, in fact, is not only did the Fed not offset the contraction in 2007-2008, they haven't come even close to bridging the divide to what growth in those monetary areas should be or should have been had the system actually been rebuilt as it was prior to the crisis.

I think that's primarily the problem here is that we need to realize that what happened in 2007 was not a cyclical temporary deviation. It was in fact A permanent structural problem, which is why we have, you know, again, monetary contraction, which is why the economy has been so lackluster globally since the Great Recession, why there is essentially a lack of recovery, because the financial system as it was, the Eurodollar system as it was before August 2007, has never been restored, and it never will be restored. And I think that's the main picture. here, the main interpretation here, is that this is a permanent disruption in monetary supply throughout the world.

Erik Townsend: And why do you think that that permanent disruption occurred? Is it a matter of we just hit a debt limit, there was too much debt, and, you know, you can't fix it with QE? Or why was it permanent? What happened in 2007?

Jeff Snider: Well, first of all, it was based on faulty premises, which we all know. I mean, the subprime mortgages, all the assumptions about that And it was based on essentially a need for exponential growth. And so when we hit the limits in 2007, where all of those faulty assumptions were exposed as faulty, it could no longer grow exponentially. And because of that, banks, which are the central axis of all this, their balance sheet capacity and construction, they realized that without exponential growth, there's far too much risk and very little reward. For actually doing these money-dealing activities.

And so it's just a matter of banks deciding in long-term type decisions over time that they were no longer willing to do the same kinds of things they were doing before. If you get— if you look at page 28, for example, credit default swaps are a perfect illustration of this point.

You know, prior to 2007, the growth in credit default swaps was enormous. I mean, it was unquantifiable, it was so rapid. Afterwards, however, you can't get any bank to write a default swap policy. In fact, what you see on that chart is leftover credit default swaps from before 2008 that are just being run down in every derivative book.

And the reason is, again, because banks— there's too much risk and not enough reward in doing these types of money-dealing activities. And so, that is the basis for money contraction.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Jeff Snider: is the fact that banks are exiting the FICC businesses because there's just, there's just no reason for them to do it.

Erik Townsend: And let's go ahead and cover slides 29 and 30 as well.

Jeff Snider: Slide 29 is just the companion to credit default swaps, which are interest rate swaps. Same thing there. The realization to get out of that, that market was a little bit later, more related to the 2011 crisis. Crisis in 2007, but the effect is the same. Over time, you see gross derivative books in each of these banks shrinking, not growing.

And same thing with slide 30, which puts together all of the derivative books, which are contracting, and noticeably so. Again, it gets back to the point where banks are shrinking in their money-dealing activities, or what we call money-dealing in the Eurodollar system.

And they're doing so in a manner that is highly disruptive. Again, it gets back to the interest rate fallacy. Here we have these, these various elements of the Eurodollar system, and each and every one, what you find is exactly what you would expect under Milton Friedman's terms. It's contracting money supply and contracting in a way that is economically harmful and increasing financial and market risk.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Where this ends: a systemic reset and central bank denial

Erik Townsend: Okay. I wanted to start by giving you a chance to get through your entire book of slides because it's so fascinating. And I think, frankly, it's probably the most compelling presentation that I've seen to really make the case that the system has not been fixed. We have not structurally fixed anything since 2008. What we've done is paper over our problems and address symptoms on a short-term basis. But something broke, something broke badly, and it hasn't been fixed yet. And I think you do an incredibly compelling job in this chartbook of making that case. But that obviously begs the $64 trillion question, which is what's next in terms of forward-looking? It seems like a lot of things are very seriously broken. You've, you've made that case extremely well.

I don't think that current policy is really focused on on solving anything. I think that we've mostly been stuck in addressing symptoms. Where do you see this heading from here? You know, we have a very large growing chorus of very, very famous and successful people, from George Soros to Stan Druckenmiller to Carl Icahn, all really, really starting to get nervous about equity valuations and what could be next. Are we setting up for a 2008-size or bigger crash, or are we looking at a melt- up, which frankly is a scenario that I've given a lot of thought to because, you know, you, you just look at how things have gone. If the, the short interest here gives up, the short squeeze could take us another couple hundred S&P points higher. Where are we headed and how is this crazy situation that the world economy has gotten into ultimately going to resolve itself?

Jeff Snider: I think we're headed in the long run, you know, it's difficult to say, you know, obviously short on what's gonna happen tomorrow or even next month. But I think longer term, what we're heading toward is the systemic reset. And that conjures all sorts of scary images, and they don't necessarily have to be so. But a systemic reset is simply the realization that what is happening in the current structure of the system now just isn't working, and furthermore, it cannot work.

And if you look at, again, you're absolutely correct, Erik, that the central bank policy, the main policy levers throughout the world, since 2007 has been, how do we rebuild the status quo? How do we bridge the divide of what do we think is essentially a cyclical problem? What is— what we find now in 2016 is that those were faulty premises to begin with. It was never a cyclical problem. So status quo type policies aren't going to work. And in fact, they're actually harmful because they prevent the rest of the system from identifying actual useful strategies for that systemic reset.

So, what does a systemic reset mean? And it's— that's even difficult to tell, too, because it's more than just the financial element. There's social unrest to consider. There's political unrest to consider, not just the election here in the US, but you think about things like Brexit, the political situation in Brazil, China, Japan.

It's a global problem of of where the economy just doesn't work anymore. And so at some point it's going to be forced to deal with that fact, whether that means a financial event and actual monetary reform, or whether it's gonna be dealt with the worst kinds of systemic resets, which are things like the 1930s, where prolonged economic decay led to complete social disarray and disorder.

So we have to hope that there is more of the, more benign types of resets, which could be anything from just redesigning the eurodollar system into something more stable, to maybe the worst type of scenario.

Erik Townsend: If you were in a position to advise central bankers, if Janet Yellen came to you for advice, would you even be able to tell them what to do next? And if so, what would it be?

Jeff Snider: I don't think I would, because, you know, the eurodollar system is not a mystery to these people. They decided 50 years ago that it wasn't money, and so there's been decades of denying the fact that these things are actually monetary in nature, and therefore the Federal Reserve is absolutely certain that what it does is monetary.

The real truth of the matter is the fact there is no money in monetary policy anymore, even though during the 1990s people like Alan Greenspan would would often allude to the fact that they didn't know what money.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Jeff Snider: Financial innovation along these lines of the wholesale Eurodollar system were completely upsetting the economic order and the order of monetary policy. Yet the Fed decided that it didn't need to study these things. It didn't need to appreciate these things.

We know that very well. And, you know, they discontinued M3 in 2006, which was kind of the last admission that the Fed wasn't ever going to consider the Eurodollar system as part of the monetary regime. And so there, I don't think there is under the current central bank format an answer because the central banks are dedicated to a monetary system that hasn't existed in 50 years. And they have proven time and again that they're not going to change their ways. They're not going to grow in how they manage the economy. They're not going to change in how they intellectually believe in how these things work. They're going to keep doing the same things over and over Again, and they have proven that much. I mean, how many, how many QE programs has there been around the world? And none of them work, yet then it's not— that's what they still talk about.

Erik Townsend: Well, and they're still talking and talking, and I guess between euro exit contagion, China, Japan, it just feels like a whole lot of things in the world are, you know, about to break. If you were to talk to the conspiracy crowd, they would tell you, you know, the governments never let a good crisis go to waste. When the shit hits the fan, they're gonna try to use this for who knows what. You know, do you think that there's a possibility that we get to a point where a major crisis breaks out and it becomes we have to have a global currency or a global central bank or a global government? Do you think it's that magnitude of crisis that we're talking about that could be potentially around the corner?

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and again, that's definitely a possibility in terms of a systemic reset. And I would agree that that will probably be their solution to it. It's the idea that we need more control, more centralized control, a single currency, a global currency. Of course, it's completely unworkable, but that won't be the message. The only solution to that, or the only pushback against that, will be whether or not anybody believes them anymore. Because that's one of the things that you look at in these marketplaces, especially the repo market, the Eurodollar market, LIBOR, TIPS, all these other things, What they what they can be classified as is growing mistrust of central bankers and central bank programs.

I think there's also a populist revolt against this type of elite answer. The idea that they keep saying the recovery is coming, or the recovery itself is actually pretty good when everybody knows it's not the case. So I think there is a growing revulsion to that type of solution.

Whether or not it's enough will remain to be seen. But there has to be some kind of answer at some point because the current Eurodollar system, the current global monetary system, is unworkable. It cannot go on forever as it is. It's an unstable system that will reset somehow.

Politics, populist revolt and Bretton Woods

Erik Townsend: And it would occur to me that, you know, you're saying there has to be some kind of global reset. What you need in order to achieve a global reset of anything is really strong and open collaboration and cooperation between nations. But honestly, Jeff, if I look at the political situation without taking any sides in this election, you know, if Hillary Clinton is the next president, she's not ready to be friends with Russia. If Donald Trump is the next president, he's not ready to be friends with China and Mexico. It doesn't seem like we're in an environment where the next leader of the United States is going to have the personality type for a lot of collaboration and cooperation.

And at the same time, you know, we could be on the verge of the European Union potentially facing some pretty serious turmoil. Do you think that the political backdrop plays a role in this story, and how do you see it?

Jeff Snider: Oh, I would absolutely agree based on current conditions. However, I would, I would add though, we don't know how these people would act if they're forced act more responsibly. Put it that way. If we have another crisis, that may sharpen resolve to get along, as you put it. And so, you know, that might be a possible optimistic scenario where something bad really does happen and forces people of the world to get together and actually put together constructive solutions. You think about something like the Bretton Woods Conference back in 1944. Something similar, though, actually worked for might be possible under those kinds of conditions. And, you know, that's basic human nature.

Humanity doesn't revolve or reform until there is a crisis, until people are forced to. You know, that's one of the saddest and most frustrating parts of 2008, was that was a perfect example to do actual reform then, but because economists and central bankers are so set in their ways so set in their view of monetary system, they decided that they were just gonna treat it as any other recession rather than the structural break that it was.

So, we lost an opportunity where people around the world were probably willing to cooperate and work together to put together an actually stable monetary system. And instead, we've been wasting, what is it now, almost a decade on things that just cannot work. It's not that they won't work, they just cannot work.

So, that might be the optimistic answer, is if this does end up being something more of a serious crisis, whether that means a 2008 rerun or not, I don't know, there's at least the potential for people to set aside their petty differences and actually work together for something workable, or face an even worse future.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I think that a point that you made earlier really resonates for me, which is not only have we wasted the time since 2008 in terms of monetary policy and actually doing something to address the core problem as opposed to treating symptoms. But during that time, we've gone from an environment where people were mostly supportive of governments and ready to allow governments to fix things if governments would have done so, to— I think we're getting very close to a point where, you know, the world is just boiling over with discontent with elites. And unfortunately, Unfortunately, when people get to the point where they're just fed up and they've had enough of the global elites and the power structure, they don't respond en masse by saying, we need to completely redesign the Eurodollar system. They respond by throwing Molotov cocktails at central banks. And unfortunately, I think we're in an environment where people are probably not going to be tolerant of giving governments a whole lot more time to get their act together.

Jeff Snider: Yeah, and I think I agree with you. That's the kind of the downside of a systemic reset that gets out of control. So, the hope would be that somebody somewhere gives in to common sense and actual intellectual growth and stops it before it gets that far.

Because you are right, that's, that's the history of the world, especially with prolonged economic crisis. Eventually, the population gets fed up to the point where there's no amount of reason will talk them back from ledge. And so we have to work and we have to hope that we can arrest that process before it gets that far. And again, you know, as you said, the wasted years since 2008 have increased that risk, not decreased it. The fact that we see it all over the world, there's massive discontent and reasonably so. And that's part of the problem too, is the fact that the elites, the central bankers, the economists around the world keep telling us there's nothing wrong. And it's just, it's plain obvious that that's not the case.

Even their own markets don't believe them.

Erik Townsend: Do you think that they believe that? Do you think that, uh, when Janet Yellen tells us that the economy is approaching liftoff and everything is fine and the policy has worked, do you think that they're just blowing smoke because they're scared, or do you think they're buying their own BS?

Jeff Snider: I think they believe it because they want to believe it, but they also know that It's tenuous. I do believe that there is far more doubt probably expressed internally than they would ever allow publicly, and I think that comes out at certain points. But yeah, I don't think that they're as convinced as they might sound in public. We know that because they would have raised rates more than once already. So there is definitely an idea within the professional official circles that something is wrong. Whether or not they know exactly what might— what that might be is a different story, but they are not— they are not completely shut off from the world as it actually is.

Close of interview: where to follow Alhambra

Erik Townsend: Well, unfortunately, Jeff, I would love to go on for another hour about this. It's a fantastic conversation, but unfortunately we are running out of time. I cannot thank you enough for sending us such an excellent book of charts. I strongly recommend to our listeners that they download them and look at it, and And I sure hope that central bankers are listening to this program, because, frankly, they need to.

Many of our listeners already know you. You're a very prolific writer. Your work is very frequently featured on ZeroHedge But for people that are just joining the fan club, please tell them, what does Alhambra Partners do? What business are you in? Where can people follow more of your work?

Jeff Snider: Well, we're a registered investment advisor based in Florida with offices throughout the country. My work is posted at our website, alhambra.com. AlhambraPartners.com. It's also syndicated at quite a few places around the web, including Newsmax and David Stockman's Contra Corner. I have a regular weekly column at RealClearMarkets and many other places around the web that you can find relatively easily.

Erik Townsend: Well, Jeff, this interview has been a real pleasure. I cannot thank you enough. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.

Announcer promo

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: reaction to Snider and why no Bitcoin show

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, that was a great interview, and I really appreciate Mr. Snider's take. What did you think about that?

Erik Townsend: I think that it was a fantastic interview, and, you know, I, I don't really like the conspiracy theory guys that say the sky is falling and then they can't back it up with hard evidence or persuasive, informed arguments. Jeffrey Snider is in a whole different league. You know, he has a very bearish view He thinks that the global monetary system eventually has to fail and be reset. I agree with him, by the way, but he articulates a very compelling and persuasive argument, and he backs his statements up with hard data and graphs and charts. So, I really appreciate his style, and I want to thank Jeff again for an excellent interview.

Aaron Chan: Yeah, likewise. And on a different note, we've received several suggestions that we should do a feature interview about Bitcoin. Well, the cryptocurrency that has become quite popular in recent years. So, Erik, can you please explain why we haven't done this topic yet?

Erik Townsend: Well, to be brutally honest, the short answer is because I personally think that Bitcoin is way overhyped, and I don't think that it is likely to ever gain the prominence as a currency that most of the fan club is expecting. Now, before going on, we should probably explain what Bitcoin is for anyone who doesn't doesn't already know about it. It is a very, very impressive technology. As a technology guy, and for anyone who's new to the program or doesn't know my background, my first career was as a software technologist. I ran a software company. That's what I know about. Bitcoin, from a techie standpoint, is way cool stuff. I love it.

What it does is it acts effectively like digital cash, not a digital It's not a check that has to clear through a bank, but truly digital cash. So, it allows anonymous, secure online payments. There is no central overseer. There's no central database of all the Bitcoin accounts. There's no place that could be hacked, no central point of control. And that is the principal technology innovation behind it. There's no way, therefore, to dispute transactions similar to a cash transaction. Once you give somebody your cash, it's a done deal. It can't be rolled back.

There's no way to—

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: There's no way to dispute the charge on your credit card statement and have some authority that overrides this whole thing, unroll it for you. Once it's done, it's done. That also means that there is no way for governments to control or trace transactions in Bitcoin, and that is one of its biggest features according to its proponents.

I love this stuff. And again, folks, don't get me wrong. Bitcoin is way cool. But what does Bitcoin actually achieve? It takes power away from governments and gives financial privacy and autonomy back to the people. Folks, I love it. I'm all for it. I like these values and principles as much as you do. But the fact of the matter is that most people on the planet support their government's supposed need to fight terrorism and And fight tax cheats and to have a whole lot of control over people's finances. So, I think that as soon as Bitcoin gains any more traction than it already has, it's very likely to be outlawed or severely restricted. And in fact, that's already happening. In the EU, there are already calls for a central Bitcoin owner registry where in order to have Bitcoins, your identity and how many Bitcoins you have and so forth would have to be cataloged in a central database.

And of course, that fundamentally undermines the whole point of what Bitcoin is designed to do. So, governments are already onto this. They will blame it on terrorism. They'll tell us that if you have Bitcoins, it's going to help terrorists to finance their operations. They'll tell you it's necessary to prevent tax fraud. In reality, the government wants to control our finances.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And the value that a lot of libertarians have, which is that people have the right to financial privacy and it's none of the government's business to be able to see what's in your bank account. Unfortunately, most people don't agree with that view, and the government is not going to allow Bitcoin to take off in any way.

So, as a technologist, I think it's absolutely fascinating. I think it would be irresponsible, though, for us to promote Bitcoin as the way of the future, as a lot of people have been doing. Right. Doing in podcast interviews. I just don't think that's realistic. I wish it was. And it, to me, it hearkens to a few years ago, a lot of people were saying, okay, it's unavoidable. We have to go back to a gold standard. Well, sure, a gold standard would enforce monetary responsibility. It would take the most powerful people in the world, central bankers, and it would take a lot of their power away from them because under Under the discipline of a gold standard, you wouldn't have the ability to conjure money out of thin air with no backing behind it, and central bankers wouldn't have so much power. Well, guess what? The people in power want to keep their power. So, short of a revolution or something, I just don't see how governments would ever allow Bitcoin to seriously take off.

And, you know, Bitcoins also can and have been stolen, even though it's a really cool system. Think of it like an account and a password. You know, if somebody steals your password, they They can steal your account. And it is possible. There was already one of the exchanges for converting Bitcoins between Bitcoin and dollars basically had a bail-in. They were hacked. Somebody stole a whole bunch of Bitcoins from their database, and that resulted in them having to impose a 36% so-called shared loss. In other words, a bail-in where everybody who was on the exchange or had Bitcoins on the exchange lost 36% of their value because that's how much got stolen by somebody. So, you know, the technology is not totally refined yet. I think the technology can be refined so that those kinds of problems can be overcome. But I really, frankly, I think people are missing the point. Now, the underlying technology that makes Bitcoin possible, which is called blockchain, I think it's one of the most important technological innovations ever.

It is way cool. But I think the story is blockchain, not Bitcoin. I think Bitcoin is a flash in the pan, and not because it's not a good idea, not because I personally wouldn't love to see a secure online cash system that is impervious to government tampering. The thing is, the governments make the laws, and they don't like that idea. And in this environment where they can basically get away with telling the people that anything Anything is supposedly in the name of fighting terrorism, and they'll get public support for it.

So, I don't think governments are going to have any difficulty at all preventing Bitcoin from ever gaining traction as a currency. And that's the reason that we've never done a show, and I'm not particularly inclined to do a show on Bitcoin as, you know, the way of the future as a new currency. For people who disagree with that view, hey, there's plenty of podcast interviews that have been done with Bitcoin experts who do think Bitcoin is going to replace cash and replace money and so forth. If you want to hear that viewpoint, there are plenty of places to find it on the internet.

Postgame: blockchain as the real story

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, I completely agree with you. It sounds like Bitcoin is just the medium, whereas the fundamental technology is the blockchain. And it's also evidenced by the fact that a lot of commercial banks are trying to figure out how to use blockchain. But before we move on, what exactly is blockchain for those people who don't know, and why do think it's more important than Bitcoin itself?

Erik Townsend: Oh, I think it's profoundly important, and I think that we have yet to even figure out how important it is. And just as a little bit of history for people who may not be aware, in 1980, when the personal computer was introduced, it was widely ridiculed by almost everyone in the computer industry. And we called them toy computers, which was originally a reference— most people don't know— to the Intel 4004 chip, which the first personal computers were based on. It was originally designed for electronic toys. That's where the phrase toy computer came from. But it came to take on more of a pejorative meaning of these silly little computers. And if you look, you know, it was introduced around 1980. 2 years earlier, in 1978, Digital Equipment had introduced the world's first true page fault virtual memory operating system on a minicomputer, which was just Way cool stuff. And I'm getting a little bit technical, so I won't bother to elaborate on what that meant.

But we had really, really cool things happening in the computer industry. And these PCs, you know, an application program could overwrite the operating system with a corrupt address pointer. It was a joke in the eyes of almost any programmer or software developer back in 1980. We just made fun of those things. Well, the reality is we completely, totally missed the Because the profound paradigm change, the game changer, is that a fully programmable electronic computer was suddenly affordable enough that everybody could have one on their desk. And of course, the first version of it was extremely primitive. The first version of anything is extremely primitive. But we all know how quickly technology advances. And sure enough, MS-DOS, which was a joke, only lasted a few years. And eventually, Actually, ironically, it was the same guy who did that virtual memory operating system for Digital Equipment who architected Windows NT, which was the first real operating system for Microsoft, and which everything since then has kind of grown out of.

So, this is that kind of game changer. And the reason it's a game changer is as follows. Until now, there have only been really 2 chapters in terms of where information gets stored in the history of information technology. In the beginning, it was on Hollerith cards. Those are the little cardboard rectangle-shaped cards where they actually would use a punch key system where it would physically knock little holes out of them that light would shine through. And the way that data processing occurred was not with programmable computers, but with card sorters. They actually took big decks of these cardboard cards and sorted them in order to get information.

The next big advance from that was the idea of a centralized database system, where all of the data is stored on a disk drive someplace on some computer. In the beginning, it had to be a great big mainframe computer that would allow lots and lots of users to log into it.

In the '80s and '90s, we advanced to distributed systems, client-server computing, and eventually the internet, where you can have people on a lot of different computers all over the network.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: network accessing a central database, which is centrally located on some computer someplace. Now, the most modern versions of these central databases are actually replicated, so it's not physically in one place. There'll be multiple data centers in, in different places, so if there's an earthquake or something, it automatically fails over and uses the backup. But still, from a design standpoint, logically speaking, it's one big central data database that has all the data for some system of record. So, for example, if you do your banking with Citibank, Citibank has a database in a data center someplace, replicated in another data center, and that's where everybody's information is. And if you're really smart and you can figure out how to hack that database, you can steal money from the bank, because that's where your account balance and your transaction history ledger are all stored.

So, this idea of central database, has basically persisted in the computer industry ever since the days of punch cards.

Now, blockchain invents the notion of essentially a secure distributed database where there is no central database. There is no central point of control. So, the reason that Bitcoin is so cool is, you know, you think, oh boy, this Bitcoin system, what if somebody hacked that central database that has everybody's Bitcoin balances in it and stole my stuff? Well, it's impossible because there is no central point of failure. There is no central location for the data. It's distributed across a network and they use this really cool system that's based on timestamps to make sure that it is secure and cannot be hacked. It is incredibly cool. So, if you think about every application of storing information in an information system of some kind. Primary systems of record, they're called in banks, which is, you know, the system that has your checking account or your brokerage account or whatever.

These things could all be re-architected to rely on a completely different architecture. So, you might have, for example, the notion of shipping something. You're shipping a pallet of product to somebody somewhere else in the world. Well, it comes attached to it with an electronic invoice, which is stored in a distributed fashion using blockchain. Somebody can just pay that invoice like COD. It doesn't have to go back to a central server. It doesn't have to clear the bank. The idea of whether or not the product has been paid for and whether or not the obligations under the invoice and contract have been satisfied could be securely stored in a distributed fashion so everybody can access it. It, without exposing it to a whole bunch of security risk. It is a fundamental, game-changing paradigm shift for how information is stored.

The way that it's been used for Bitcoin is to make it possible for me to have a Bitcoin and give it to you, or you to give it back to me in this secure transaction mechanism, and nobody can hack the central database in order to change the history of what happened, because That central database doesn't exist. That's just one tiny application. And it's like back in the day, in 1980, people would ask the salesman at the Radio Shack store, well, this personal computer, you know, what would I use it for? Why would I want to have a computer in my house? And the usual answer was, well, I mean, you could balance your checkbook with it. You could edit a text document with it. We didn't have email yet.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: Then. But, you know, you could use it to write your English homework and print it out on a printer so that you don't have to type it on a typewriter. That was about all they could think of as applications for PCs in the earliest days.

Look what's happened since. So far, blockchain has been used most notably by Bitcoin, but there's a lot of people around the world that are investing in think tanks and trying to figure out what other applications are there for this secure distributed database technology? And I think in finance in particular, there are just myriad applications. It will take years for smart people to dream up all of the cool ways that you could use this. And I think that that's really where the story is.

Looking for a blockchain expert

Aaron Chan: Right. So, Erik, perhaps we should be shopping for a blockchain expert rather than a Bitcoin expert per se for a future

Erik Townsend: Oh, I would definitely welcome suggestions of that. The reason we haven't done that show is because we don't know who that person is or where to find them. Honestly, to do an interview with one of the Bitcoin guys, and there's quite a few Bitcoin experts out there, Real Vision Television has done a couple of excellent interviews on Bitcoin with some well-established experts. You can find that content. It's already been done. What we should do as a courtesy to our listeners is look for one of those Real Vision Bitcoin interviews and see if we can put it on our Sunday Real Vision TV rebroadcast.

But the interview I'd love to do is not with somebody about Bitcoin. It's about somebody who's in a think tank someplace trying to figure out all of the different cool applications of blockchain technology. And it's really distributed secure database, whether it's the blockchain design or the next generation Obviously, in the beginning, MS-DOS seemed to be the center of the computer world. A few years later, it had been replaced with something much better. I would guess that blockchain is the cool thing for now, and somebody at some point invents an even better idea or a better implementation of some of the same concepts. So, the idea of secure distributed databases with no central data repository, how that might change the world of commerce, finance, investing, Testing, et cetera. That is a way cool topic. I don't know where to find the expert for that interview.

Aaron Chan: Right. I think it's a good idea. Maybe we can see if there's anything we can find on Real Vision TV. So, Erik, unfortunately, we're out of time for this week.

Spreading the word and this week's Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Is there anything else you want to cover before we close?

Erik Townsend: Well, I probably sound like a broken record, but regular listeners know my spiel here. You look at an interview like we did with Jeff today, this is on a different level, folks, than you find on your retail focused financial podcasts. We really deserve the recognition that we're doing something special and different here, and I don't say that to just toot our own horns. It's because we need that recognition in order to be able to recruit the guests that you really want. There's still a long list of people that don't reply to our emails because they never heard of it. Things that you can do to help us: certainly tell all your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices. You know, we used to get covered on ZeroHedge a bit when we did our first few shows, Aaron, and they haven't picked us up recently. I hope ZeroHedge will pick up on something. I mean, they do a lot of coverage of Jeff's work.

I think this was a fantastic interview. I think Jeff's presentation is incredibly compelling here. So, you know, we can't be the ones to sell them on that. If you're a regular ZeroHedge reader I hope you'll send an email to Tyler and suggest that maybe they should pick up coverage of this. In general, help us spread the word, folks. Follow us on Twitter, post links on finance and investing, you know, bulletin boards that you might participate in. Anything that you folks can do to help us expand the show, get a larger following, get more name recognition for MacroVoices, that all directly helps us to bring you the guests that you want on future episodes of the program.

And of course, when you register at MacroVoices.com, that helps us because it increases our count of registered users, which we use as a selling point to try to recruit our feature interview guests. And as a benefit of registering, you get our free Research Roundup weekly email, which provides both the supporting information, such as the presentation for Jeff's interview today, as well as whatever cool research that we could find in a particular week on the internet. Aaron, why don't we tell people what they can expect in this week's Research Roundup before we

Aaron Chan: Right. So, in addition to Jeff's excellent and detailed chart book, from our listeners, we're back with great posts from Michael Medici on oil, stocks, and addressing biases, and Michael Seiding with an introspective post on how to find your purpose. In all the research from around the web, we've got an excellent article from Jesse Felder on how to hedge tail risk, Dr. Marc Faber's recent appearance on CNBC in which he prognosticates that the S&P is set to fall 50%, Dr. Ben Hunt's latest Epsilon Theory blog wherein he proposes a new A new metaphor for the world as a narrative machine, gold articles from Frank Holmes of US Global Investors and Eric Bush of Gavekal Capital, and much more.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for this week's edition. We appreciate all the support and feedback our listeners have provided and continue to welcome your opinions and suggestions on how we can make this program even better. Articles from our subscribers continue to be well received, and we encourage our listeners to submit their own writing for inclusion in each week's Research Roundup.

If you're interested in submitting If your own articles, you're please visit us interested, at MacroVoices.com. shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com, or if you're Twitter inclined, tag your article with the #MVRR hashtag. Again, the best way you can help us is by retweeting, following, and sharing MacroVoices with your family and colleagues. Also, don't forget to follow us on our main account @MacroVoices. And you can also follow Erik and myself @ErikSTownsend and @_AaronChen_ respectively. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Aaron. Chat with you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents. From our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register Register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to Mailbag@MacroVoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our Mailbag segment.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices is sponsored by Charles Biderman's MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.

MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Paul Brodsky — Macro Allocation Incorporated (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. MacroVoices episode 26 was recorded on August 11th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. We'll be discussing why Paul believes that the global financial system needs a reset, the staggering mountain of debt around the world, an in-depth discussion of Treasury yields, and much more. We're also going to experiment with a format change this week, adding a discussion between Aaron and me about a listener-requested topic after the guest interview.

Equities: record highs and melt-up risk

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Another week and another all-time record high for the S&P 500, with E-mini S&P futures trading just north of 2,185 at one point just before Thursday's close. Erik, has anything changed in your view on equities?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's basically the same. You know, the chorus of bearish voices is growing. Goldman had a note out this week. I saw an analysis saying that Carl Icahn is still 150% Net short the S&P. And of course, the big boys like Carl don't disclose their positions publicly. People analyze their public filings to try to deduce what their holdings are. As of his latest public filings, it looks like Carl is still super short.

You know, as much as I don't dare to go short, because as I've described in previous shows, I think that there is a real risk of a melt-up here as a result of flight capital and U.S. dollar appreciation, I wouldn't really want to be long either. So I hope, as I've described this melt-up, that it's not been perceived by anyone as my recommending new long positions. To the contrary, I would suggest anyone who's fully invested and has been for a while might consider taking some profits here because there's some really, really smart people that are joining the chorus of bears that are saying that this market is seriously overbought and due for a major downside correction. The one caveat I would add to that, though, is a lot of the people saying these things

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And a lot of these guys are absolute rock stars of the industry, but they're old-school rock stars. Stan Druckenmiller himself said in an interview not too long ago that the reason he shut down Duquesne Capital and turned it into a family office just running his own money is because his skills at producing outsized returns worked in the old normal where economic fundamentals were the primary determinant of asset prices.

And in this new normal where it's all about central bank policy, you know, a lot of these guys' skills don't work anymore. I wonder if there's a possibility that even these super-smart people will be proven wrong, and boy, if that starts to happen, there is a lot of short exposure here. That means there's risk of a big short squeeze developing. So I see more and more reasons that I think the bears are right in terms of economic fundamentals, but I think that we could see a surprise in the opposite direction. If there is a trade here, I'd say it would probably be a straddle, thinking it's not going to stay where it is. The problem with the straddle is that the cost of the VIX is super cheap in the short term, but Once you start to get to longer-dated options, all of a sudden, that volatility costs through the nose. So unless you have a reason to think something's going to happen real suddenly, it's hard to justify that trade.

So I'm still on the sidelines as far as equities are concerned.

Crude oil: inventories, OPEC jawboning and spreads

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, that sounds consistent with your melt-up, crack-up, boom hypothesis. Well, last week you said crude would continue to bounce on last week's inventory numbers, but you predicted the exuberance probably wouldn't last beyond this week's inventory report. Well, looks like you got the call right on, and we saw WTI trade as high as $43.50 on Tuesday before inventory came out. But after Wednesday's inventory report, crude oil took a nosedive, trading as low as $41.10 Wednesday afternoon. But then on Thursday morning, WTI prices shot right back up to even higher than they were before the inventory data came out, trading as high as $43.86 on Thursday.

Erik, what the heck is going on with oil prices, and what's your outlook for crude from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I guess to correct you a little bit, I did get it exactly right in the sense that I thought that I was expecting once the data came out, the inventory data, that it would be over. And sure enough, after the data came out, prices went straight down. I didn't expect them to go straight back up again. So I got that part of the call wrong. And I guess maybe what we need is another week of reality here. And to answer your question as to what's going on, you can divide what drives the oil market into 2 categories of things. The first I'll call reality. And that, of course, is the hard data that we get on inventory. And we've got some very bearish numbers, which I'll get into in just a minute.

But the other side of And the other part of this, which tends to drive a lot of this market, is propaganda. And oh boy, the OPEC jawboning, it's exactly what got us up to $43.50 the first time around. The inventory report introduced a little bit of reality into the market that got us down to $41.10. And we're back up to— what was the high today? $43.86. I think that was entirely based on this jawboning about supposed production freezes and so forth. And I think this is nonsense. I think that it doesn't have anything to do with reality. But, you know, I made that call this spring and I said this Doha production freeze thing is nonsense. There's not going to be any production freeze. I suppose you could say that I got that call right in the sense that there was no production freeze. But oh boy, it didn't stop the price of oil from doubling in the meanwhile on propaganda. And I think that's what's been affecting this market.

As far as inventory is concerned, expectations were for a 2 million barrel drawdown here in the middle of summer driving season against national crude oil inventories. Instead, Instead, we got a 1 million barrel build on inventory. So that is definitely a very bearish sign. We would normally expect, as we get into the shoulder months after summer driving season is over, to start seeing builds in crude oil inventories. Seems like those builds are happening sooner than expected, and I predict that they're going to happen bigger than expected as we get further into the shoulder season here. We also had a 1.2 million barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventories, and again, Cushing, Oklahoma is critical because that's where the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract is settled.

Gasoline, on the other hand, 2.8 million barrel drawdown, and likewise a 2 million barrel drawdown in distillates. Well, a lot of people saw that as very bullish initially. I don't really think so. You know, the fact that in August you're seeing big drawdowns in finished products because people are driving doesn't really surprise me. I think that the fact that we're seeing crude oil building in inventory a little earlier than it normally would, with significant increases in the last 5 weeks in relative inventory. I think that's the bigger story. U.S. production was off slightly. That may have something to do with it. Also, Oman said that they would not attend the OPEC meeting. I think that that probably had as much as the inventory did to do with Wednesday afternoon's sell-off.

The thing that I've been watching very, very carefully, though, is the time spreads, and that is, again, the difference in price from one delivery month to the next. My curve steepener trade was performing beautifully until last week's inventory numbers. Then those spreads started to contract a little bit. Well, as soon as Wednesday's inventory data came out, the spreads started expanding again, which is exactly what I would expect. It confirms in my mind that the reason that the spreads have been expanding is because of fears of a storage crisis as we get further into the fall. Now, on Thursday, when we had this big run-up in front-month oil prices, we didn't see the contraction. We went to a higher price on Thursday afternoon than we had seen on Wednesday, but we didn't see anything close to the narrowing of spreads. What that says to me, I tend to feel that the spread traders or the professional oil traders, where a lot of the speculators, the directional traders on the front-month futures contract, are just hot money hedge funds that perhaps are not as well educated on energy markets.

It seems to me like the smarter money is concerned about a storage crisis. So it all portends an outlook to me for lower prices. I think we're headed at least down to $35 or so. Does it go lower than that? Maybe even a test of $25, you know, below the previous lows of $26 that we saw this spring? I don't know. That's going to depend on the inventory numbers that we see over the next few weeks. The Saudis are pedaling as fast as they can. They just announced another all-time record high. They are clearly producing as fast as they can, but still jawboning, oh well, there might be a meeting that might include some discussion that might involve stabilizing prices. And that's causing, I think, a lot of panic buying on Thursday. I don't think it's going to last, but frankly, I didn't think it was going to last past this week's inventory numbers.

Maybe we need another week of bearish inventory numbers before it takes hold, but I think we're going to see lower prices here before this is over.

Gold: consolidation range and Joshua Hall's article

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, definitely seems like they're loosening up their jaw muscles. So pivoting to gold, there's going to be plenty of discussion on that in the interview, but we've been watching a technical consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377, as we said last week. And it looks like we're still stuck in this range, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're still stuck in that range, 1,342 as we're speaking late session on Thursday afternoon. And, you know, I think as far as the short term is concerned, we're in that consolidation range. We've covered that in past shows. I don't think that we need to elaborate any further on that. We've got to wait and see which way we break out of that range. As far as the bigger picture, longer term, though, I read an excellent article this week by one of our regular listeners, Joshua Hall, who is an independent financial advisor. Joshua's basically taken a look at supply and demand fundamentals in gold. He points out that really only about 31% of demand for gold is coming from investment at this point. And basically, to summarize his contentions, he's saying, you know, between Brexit and, you know, negative interest rate fears and so forth, there's been this run-up in gold, but he doesn't think that the supply-demand fundamentals are supporting it going much further.

He thinks that there's a good chance of it rolling over to the downside. And that's very, very much in line. You know, he's done more research than I have on the supply and demand fundamentals. But Joshua's views and my views are remarkably similar. And I agree with him that I think there's room for gold to trade lower here before this is over. I don't know whether there's a lower low than the $1,050 or so that we saw at the end of last year, but I do think it's still possible, especially if the Fed continues on their rate hike agenda that they've been talking about.

One caveat to that, though, is that Joshua and I share the same macro outlook. He's very careful in his article to disclose that he's dollar bullish and believes that we're going to have a deflationary backdrop for the short-term future. And that's very much my view as well. If Joshua and I are proven wrong on those things, we'll be proven wrong on gold, too. So, you've got to think about what you think about the U.S. dollar and what you think about inflation versus deflation. But if you share our views, then I think there's room for maybe that I would expect that trading range to resolve lower, below 1308. A closing print below 1308 would be the indication that maybe the sell-off is on.

10-year Treasury yields and the dollar index

Aaron Chan: 10-year Treasury yields traded in the high 150s early in the week, traded back down to 150 on Wednesday, and they're now back to 156. Erik, what a roller coaster ride. So any update on your views for the Treasury?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's definitely been a roller coaster this week. As far as my view, it hasn't changed very much. I think that we are in, you know, a bounce process, and it remains to be seen Whether it's a dead cat bounce or not. Above 1.70 would tell me that maybe my view needs to be changed. But right now, I'm expecting that we are headed towards lower yields. I expect eventually to get to a 1% yield on the 10-year. How long that takes, does it happen this year? I don't know. But 1.35, which was the previous low, it would be the low end of the range. 1.70 would be the high end of the range. And a breakout in either direction would tell me that it's likely to continue in that direction.

We're going to get into much more detail with Paul Brodsky in terms of Treasury yields in today's feature interview.

Aaron Chan: Right. And the dollar index looks to be rolling over again, trading on a 95 handle. Any update on your dollar outlook?

Erik Townsend: 95.87 as we're speaking. And no, you know, we're kind of consolidating along here. I don't really have a strong view in the short term as what's going to happen. I continue to think that the most likely resolution of this consolidation is going to be to the upside, but I'm waiting for a decisive breakout above 97 to really confirm in my mind that that's on. So, for now, we're kind of in a holding pattern.

Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update, Erik. This week's special guest is Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated. Erik's interview with Mr. Brodsky is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Paul Brodsky: global debt mountain and the need for a reset

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Paul Brodsky from Macro Allocation Incorporated. Paul, thanks so much for joining me on the program. You've recently kind of been in the press a bit. ZeroHedge had picked up on an article and an interview that you did for Epoch recently. We've got a link to that included in our Research Roundup email this week for our registered users. One of the things that you said that seems to have gotten a lot of attention is that there is a global mountain of debt forming, and you think the global financial system is going to need a reset.

What do you What do you mean by that? What reset are we talking about?

Paul Brodsky: Well, first, Erik, thank you very much for having me. It's a pleasure to speak to you and, uh, and your listeners. The mountain of debt is not a new— is not a new thing. I think your listeners probably are very well aware of that. Where I come down on this whole thing is with the insurmountable leverage that has been built not only within Treasury ministry debt, sovereign debt, but as well as private sector debt, household debt, corporate debt. And it's not the debt per se that I define leverage with. I won't get too into the weeds with this, but it's the actual amount of money that's available to service and repay it. That's where I see the ultimate problem arising from. Money, and very quickly, I'm referring to base money, which simply is cash in circulation plus

Erik Townsend: Yes.

Paul Brodsky: Bank reserves that are held at central banks.

And if you were to take the big numbers, you come away, depending on how you look at it, with there is much, much more credit and broad money aggregates than there is base money. So eventually, that has to start eating into the production of goods and services and the incentives that producers have to work for that money. Because they have to service more and more debt. And so I think that's one of the reasons we've seen interest rates drop dramatically and even go negative in parts of the world, in Europe and Asia.

And it seems to be biting, taking a pretty significant bite out of global output, i.e., GDP. So that's, that's kind of where I, uh, I'm starting this from, looking at money outward into what that means for global credit growth and demand growth and good and service growth and economic activity, and then bringing it back and figuring out— trying to figure out what it means for the future of global growth and obviously of asset prices.

Long Treasuries, exit signals, TIPS and Europe

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to tie this in, though, to the trends that we're seeing, because obviously what you've just described is kind of a longer-term, big-picture view. In the shorter term, I know you've recently expressed a bullish view on long-dated U.S. Treasuries. You were kind enough to send us a sample of one of your investor newsletters. And I know you're bullish on long-dated Treasuries, and I agree with you very much. I think yields are headed lower. But in the grand scheme of things, you know, consider this in context. You're talking about loaning money to what I think, by your own description, is an arguably insolvent borrower, because you think somebody is going to buy that loan for you later on when yields are even lower than they are.

Paul Brodsky: Right.

Erik Townsend: Even though in real terms, it's probably impossible for this borrower to ever repay that loan. What kind of crazy world are we living in where— I think you and I both agree, by the way, on that trade. I think from a tactical standpoint, it's very likely that yields are headed lower and there's capital appreciation opportunity in long-dated Treasuries. But holy cow, what does it come to that we both think it's a good idea to loan money on an unsecured basis to an arguably insolvent borrower for 20 years at 1.5% interest?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: I mean, this is just crazy.

Paul Brodsky: Well, I wouldn't— I do think we're on the same page. You mentioned tactically, and I think that's what we have to keep in mind. I don't think we have to get too cute at this point and saying, well, we're— you and I are going to be able to time this thing better than everyone else. I think there is going to be enough time to, in my view, generate a good amount of capital appreciation from long-duration Treasuries.

What goes into that is a strong dollar. Secularly, over time, I think the dollar at least will be stable, certainly in an environment where output growth is contracting and where we may see contraction itself, certainly in real terms. As you brought up, I think the remedy to that is central bank money printing, or you alluded to the— and that certainly takes away the real purchasing power of currencies. I think the Fed will have less of that to do than other central banks, and so I think the dollar will be on a relative basis strong.

We have to be out of our minds if we think that That it's a good deal to get 1.5% or 2.3% on long bonds over 10 or 30 years, and if we're buying these assets for their coupons and annual income. That is not the trade as far as I see it. I see a period of 6 months, a year, 2 years, maybe 3 years or 4 years even. Where their prices are going to appreciate markedly.

Also involved in that trade is the fact that there are all sorts of buyers in the market for sovereign debt. They're not all rational actors when it comes to the— when it comes to income. For example, there are central banks that need to buy sovereign debt around the world. There are banks that don't get capital charges if they own Treasuries, and all they care about is spread between their funding levels and whatever else they go buy— they go out and buy on the other side so they can collect 1.5% to 2.3% pretty much and lever that that up all they want.

And then again, you have, uh, all sorts of hedge funds and sovereign wealth funds out there that could put on an arbitrage where they would short, let's say, German Bunds, 10-year Bunds, and buy U.S. 10-year notes and take out the spread and leverage that up. So all trades are not the same to For the investor that just looks to buy bonds and collect a coupon, yes, it's absolutely an irrational trade. But I think given interest rate differentials around the world, there, there could be a ways to go for sovereign yields, for Treasury yields to drop.

Erik Townsend: I couldn't agree more with everything you just said. And I would even add to that that if things get worse in Europe, if there's an exit contagion, that just adds to the flight capital coming into U.S. Treasuries. So I think it definitely supports the I appreciate the arguments you've made in favor of this tactical trade, but it begs the question, how do you know when it's time to get out? What would you be looking for? What would tell you that it's time to close that long position or even consider a short position?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think one of the things to look for would be a significant narrowing, narrowing of the spread between sovereign interest rates on sovereign debt. So the interest rate differential snugging up, and who knows what the number is. That. But hopefully, we'll know it when we see it. And one of the ways that I'm comfortable operating in the markets is scaling in and scaling out.

And one of the things, for example, that I did in my— in our model portfolios, our tactical model portfolios for MAI, was to take a very significant position down by a So I think we had 20% allocated to the long Treasury position, and we took it down 15% at the end of last quarter. And as we backed up a little bit, meaning higher yields, we're looking maybe to put that back on again.

Or if we, you know, drop down dramatically, we may take some off again. So, and maybe then— and what we did on the other side of that was we took a bit higher position And TIPS and Treasury inflation-protected bonds.

So we're kind of transitioning as yields drop to put on the trade where we benefit once the reversal happens that we see coming. But there's no way to time that, as you know, Erik, and all we can do is try our best to scale in and scale out.

Erik Townsend: Now, I think that you've also expressed a view that Europe is probably closer to the endgame of of this whole debt situation than the United States is. Does that create an opportunity for either a hedge or pairs trade that would be, say, long US Treasuries and short European Treasuries?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I have an admission to make. I have, I have, after great study and after having been at this a long time, I'm having a very difficult time with Europe, understanding how it may play out. And in large part, that's due to the currency issues that they have, that being, you know, they, they obviously have a common currency, but they don't have common fiscal measures. And I think that brings into play, and just in a very broad sense again, it brings into play the potential at any time for the euro to begin to fray. And I think Brexit was a shot across the bow for that, even though they're not in the euro.

I think it shows that at the first sign of trouble or weakness, you might see countries figuring out that are a part of the euro figuring out that they might be able to get out. Because I don't have a great sense of the currency undermining the entire debt structure across Europe, I'm a bit hesitant to take a stab, even a tactical stab, if I see something out of place.

We do that, but I have an issue there. So I'm just not playing. It's not as though I'm— I am not short the euro per se, but unless something just stands out as being overly, way too out of line, not Not to take, not to take a stab at it. I don't see the need to be involved in Europe right now.

How money printing ends; debt versus base money

Erik Townsend: Something that you've written quite extensively on and spoken quite a bit about in recent interviews is the trend that we've been in for several years now of essentially the central bank money printing is going into supporting the financial economy as opposed to the real economy. And, you know, some people have said that's immoral and shouldn't be and so forth. But it keeps on going. So my question, and something I've been puzzling on quite a bit lately, is how does this eventually end? And I don't think it does end until something ties the central bankers' hands and they're not able to just keep printing money with reckless abandon anymore. Runaway inflation would tie their hands, but we have no sign of that at this point. What other factors might tie their hands, or how would you see this trend of money printing supporting the financial and not the real economy?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think what we have now is, is kind of a water torture effect where the longer that the financialization of our economy plays out, the greater the wealth and income gaps are becoming, the more it is eating away at production and at middle-income earners. Class wealth production. And it's happening slowly, in my view.

And that is already occurring. So the first thing I would say is that natural economics may serve to provide the impetus behind the final, you know, push towards some type of reconciliation.

I couldn't tell you what the catalyst would be if that If that were the case. But it's certainly a dynamic that we're all witnessing happening right now. You see a lot of political economists pointing fingers at each other saying, well, this is the reason why, and this is the solution to it. We have to raise the minimum wage, or we have to do something else, and that would jumpstart the economy. And I think everyone knows that they're really— that none of these things are solutions at all.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Just putting Band-Aids on a bigger problem, which, as I mentioned up front, is the leverage that is starting to eat at production.

So it could happen organically like that. Or I think more of a flashpoint might be if banks, the banking system starts to have difficulty with profitability.

I think one of the main reasons why the Fed in the United States is desperate to raise rates isn't necessarily because they feel they're going to surpass their 2% inflation target, but because they want to see banks be able to remain profitable in a low and zero interest rate environment.

And so that is a real issue, I think, that could get in the way of and force the hand of policymakers To take action and let the markets get to what they think are fair value or more fair value, take a laissez-faire approach if you will.

That in turn would catalyze some action. I think what you have to have is some type of crystallization of public opinion around having someone fix the problem that I spoke about being this organic move away from production. And that would probably take some type of market event, I feel. So, you know, if, if policymakers backed away from the markets, from supporting the markets— and we know they do, that's nothing conspiratorial, they— we know they do that in the foreign exchange markets. We know they do that in the sovereign debt markets.

And in Japan, they're doing that in equities. So, if they back away from this quantitative and qualitative easing and let the markets find right pricing, I think it would be lower. And in that case, I think you'd find once stock markets decline and maybe real estate markets decline, then it would put It would create public pressure for someone to come in and save the day. And that, of course, has always been the role of policymakers and government.

Erik Townsend: One of the things that's fascinated me is the number of so-called experts that you'll see on the cable channels talking about the deleveraging which has occurred in the economy since 2008. And I just— I wonder what chart these guys are looking at, because I was just looking the other day at a total U.S. debt chart showing both corporate and sovereign debt in aggregate.

And we've got almost $10 trillion more debt in the United States than we did in 2008. So, you know, there was a very, very brief deleveraging into 2009, and we've just piled on more debt. I think, though, in some of your recent writings, you've actually opined that the relationship of debt to base money is more important than the total amount of debt. Can you elaborate on that view?

Tell me if I've gotten it correctly, but elaborate on what you're talking about?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah. Yeah, um, that kind of goes to, to what we started with up front with the leverage. I think the, the way— when you— if you look at purely pure accounting identities, uh, leverage is credit and/or bank assets over base money. Base money, as I said before, is, uh, is cash, currency in circulation, and bank reserves held at the Fed in the United States.

And so, if you look at the amount of credit out there, depending— in the U.S., what the Fed acknowledges is it's about $70 trillion, 7-0 trillion. Base money is about, depending on what you're looking at, but it's about, let's call it $4 trillion or so. So, credit over actual money is a big multiple.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Even if you look at M2, which is the broadest measure of money in our bank accounts and money market funds and so forth, that's about $13 trillion. So there isn't enough money with which to service and repay the debt.

Now, all the debt doesn't have to be repaid, but what comes into play here are demographics, which obviously in the United States, we're getting older, and many of us would like to retire, and we're shifting, and, and we— so we can't settle our assets with cash. In other words, we can't extinguish the debt because it's overleveraged.

And so you— we either have to make more base money with which to service and repay the debt, or some of the debt, Or we're going— the natural thing is to see something called debt deflation, which is we'll see the value of the debt go down.

And that could be workout situations, cram-downs, or just outright failure to pay and marking them down to zero. Now, that can't really happen in the country because Because one person's debt is another person's asset. That's how we work. That's how we work. So that would put great pressure on the banking system. And of course, the Fed can't have that. So to keep the banking system liquid and solvent, it would have to print the money with which debtors can service their debt so that credit Creditors will not have to mark down the value of their assets.

And that, I think, is the dynamic, how it all has to play out. And I think that goes to the whole notion that we've been discussing roundly here, which is how that impacts economies and assets.

Fed buying gold at a fixed price; why not helicopter money

Erik Townsend: I know that you also have a view that one of the ways that governments might respond to this situation, essentially If all of this debt is too big to be repaid in real terms, you have to inflate it away. And you've described a scenario where central banks might use more quantitative easing, but use the money to buy gold. Could you explain first that view, and particularly something I didn't hear in another interview recently, why do you think they would do that? I mean, I love the idea, but why do you think central bankers would consider that?

Paul Brodsky: Yeah. Well, I don't think they want to do that. I don't think it's in, it's in their big picture idea of how to proceed and how to maintain confidence in their currencies that they are responsible for. But we have to keep something in mind. There's only 2 assets on, on the books of central banks. One is reserves, and the other is liabilities.

One is the debt that they're buying through quantitative easing, and the other is gold. And that's it. And a few years back, I don't know if you remember, but Ben Bernanke was asked in front of Congress why the Fed still had gold on their balance sheet, and he said tradition.

And it had no economic merit, and he wasn't quite sure why. I'd like to take a moment to say that, well, that's not true. That was a bit disingenuous, because there's a very good reason why not only the Fed, but other central banks around the world hold gold on their balance sheets, and parenthetically, are buying a lot more around the world.

If you look at China, if you look at Russia, their official bodies, their central banks are buying a lot of gold as we speak, hand over fist. And that's because they're buying it for reserves. So, the reason is because if a currency board has to devalue its currency, it has to do it against something.

And the historic item against which currencies have been devalued has been gold. And so they keep gold on their balance sheet in the event that they have to do that. That and then fix it to an item.

And so the process by which a central bank would do it— and I think it would have to be the Fed because, uh, that's, uh, you know, US dollars is a hegemonic currency around the world, and so the Fed would have to be involved— is, for example, the Fed would say, okay, we are going to purchase or tender gold at X price an ounce, and call it $5,000, $10,000, $15,000, something high enough to attract gold sellers and high enough to be inflationary, because the purpose would be to inflate the currency, which is devalued, which is the same as devaluing the currency.

So, if they said, for example, okay, we're going to buy gold at $15,000 an ounce, we'll tender all your gold. The process of announcing that would not be inflationary, but the process of, of actually creating the money out of thin air with which to then purchase the gold at $15,000 an ounce, that would be highly inflationary. It's the same process, by the way, that quantitative easing is, which is creating the money out of thin air with which you would— you then buy debt.

But instead of debt, you would be buying gold.

What we're seeing now in Japan is they are doing something called qualitative easing, which is buying riskier— well, let's not say riskier, but credit and even equity-related instruments rather than just, you know, JGBs, rather than just Japanese bonds. So instead Instead of creating the money to buy financial assets, you would be creating the new money to buy gold and thereby devaluing your currency.

One of the things this would likely do is give dollar holders pause, because obviously their savings is being diminished in purchasing power value.

So, what might have to happen is the Fed would have to say, okay, we're buying your gold at $15,000 an ounce, and we're going to then maintain that level. That would be the fixed exchange rate, then, at which the Fed would buy or sell gold. And that, in effect, would revalue gold at— or revalue gold, but revalue US dollars at that fixed exchange rate.

The benefit that would have— there's pros and cons, obviously, to doing this. The pro, the biggest pro would be it would create more dollars with which to service and repay debt. The inflation would obviously raise wages dramatically, raise consumer goods and It would raise consumer goods and service prices dramatically. But what it would not do is raise the value of the debt. In other words, your mortgage would still be, let's say, $300,000, even though your salary, your income would go from $50,000 to, let's call it, $150,000. So it wouldn't take away the balance sheet item of the obligation, but it would—

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: Decrease the burden of repaying it. And that's what inflation does.

That would be the great benefit to inflating away the purchasing power value of our currency.

Obviously, the biggest con to doing this would be it diminishes all of our savings held in dollars or dollar-denominated assets, that the purchasing power value of all of our savings, and it would really kill pensioners and people on fixed income. And so it's a solution to our leverage problem, but it does have a significant impact on the other side.

Erik Townsend: Obviously, gold bugs would love this story because anyone holding gold bullion would suddenly be able to sell it for $15,000. But I guess to me it begs the question, if the goal here is effectively to devalue the currency by forcing inflation so as to reduce the real value of all of that debt on the books. If one option is to buy gold, as you've described, which benefits a handful of people who own gold, and another option is to print up a whole bunch of money and either, you know, use it as helicopter money or use it for infrastructure spending or some other more politically popular use of the money.

How would it end up in a gold scenario as opposed to something that's maybe more politically viable? Am I missing something about the mechanism of those other types of spending not accomplishing the same thing?

Paul Brodsky: Well, a central bank really can't print money unless they do something with it. I guess, you know, they could go to their printing presses and print out a bunch of currency and drop it from helicopters, But then you wouldn't have any confidence at all in the currency itself. You'd have a Weimar situation, 1922 Germany, where people were walking around with wheelbarrows full of money.

It would be the end of the currency in short order. I think you would need to— and you would also have issues with credit. Pricing. You couldn't, you know, you'd never be able to price a good or a service if you did that. So there has to be some methodology to it. There has to be some sense of order if you are to do that.

So again, I think there's good precedent for devaluation, how to do it. One of the ways that countries, you know, if you're Venezuela or some other third world world economy, you know, they have always been able to devalue their local currencies against, uh, dollars or rands or, or whatever, or euros or whatever, whatever else is close that, that their societies can get their hands on.

If the dollar were to have a problem, there probably wouldn't be another currency because the dollar is hegemonic. So, that's when gold would have to come into play. And you really couldn't lop off a couple zeros, or pardon me, add a couple zeros to everything, because, you know, just on balance sheets and call it a day and say, okay, so the value of your pension fund, the value of your 401 or IRA is now worth $1 million.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: worth 10 times as much, for example, but your purchasing power is worth 10% of what it used to be, it really wouldn't do you much good as a society. So they've got to follow protocol and go through the channels of actually overseeing a currency.

So you really couldn't print the money and shovel it out there. the way they tried before and failed, always failed.

Gold miners, petrodollar and hyperinflation

Erik Townsend: Well, obviously the scenario you've described would very much benefit anyone holding gold bullion. But if I'm not mistaken, in some of your model portfolios, you're preferring gold mining shares over the bullion. Is that a leverage argument, or is there more to that? Why the shares instead of the bullion?

Paul Brodsky: Well, in late 2015, we took a decent-sized position in gold miners because they had been beaten up so much. And obviously, I'm predisposed to like gold. And so that was, as you say, a levered play. Since they've run up dramatically in the first half of 2016, we've actually scaled out of them.

I have a love-hate relationship with gold miners. I love their resources. I love the fact that they're sitting on holes in the ground full of an item that might be revalued higher by, who knows, 5 or 10 times. We have no idea. However, I don't like their operations. I think they've been— generally speaking, there's always exceptions.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Paul Brodsky: But I don't like— I haven't liked their operations. It's been very frustrating the way they've allocated capital to mining projects and to exploration, things like that. And so I've been using their strength so far to scale out, which is, you know, which means I may give up a bit down the road if they continue to rise. The way I think about gold miners miners is that, at least I did last year, was that it was a, on a risk-adjusted basis, a very positively skewed trade.

And I think that has become more equal now. And from here, it would take a further rise in the price of gold to see them outperform bullion. And so, So, I don't mind scaling out a little. I still own gold miners, but I'm lightening up on that position.

Erik Townsend: You mentioned earlier the hegemony of the U.S. dollar. Now, if we go back to 1971, when President Nixon took the United States effectively off of the gold conversion standard, you know, there was a lot of hype and hoopla about, oh, no, this is going to bring hyperinflation. And, of course, the hyperinflation never came. A lot of people would say the reason is that the petrodollar system saved the day, the deal that Henry Kissinger made with the Arabs to essentially reinvest their oil profits in US dollars and US Treasuries.

What does the current oil situation mean? Is there a risk to the petrodollar system collapsing? And does that put the US dollar's hegemony as a reserve currency at risk? Or do you think that it just has so much de facto acceptance at this point that there's no real other alternative?

Paul Brodsky: Well, I think there's a lot of moving parts. I think, uh, what Nixon did in '71 and what occurred officially in '73, which at that time was 2 years too late, where they, they actually officially took Bretton Woods out of play, was then manifest ultimately in hyperinflation in '79, '80, '81.

Hyperinflation, in my view, is a politically administered thing, not a force of demand overwhelming supply, but rather what happened back then, and I think could happen again and has happened more recently, is you have oil producers suggesting that they're not going to satisfy the demand in the marketplace. Place. And that's more of a political catalyst than anything else, or supply-driven.

Having said that, I think oil is a large influence, but not the only influence, that will generate inflation looking down the road. I think we could have continuing disinflation and even deflation. Looking forward, where the prices of goods and services drop generally, I think the countermeasure to that because because the way we're structured in this global monetary system, we cannot have deflation or else our banking systems would collapse and our our household balance sheets would collapse. But I think that in itself would prompt a politically administered inflation or or hyperinflation.

And you could do that by, as we talked about before, devaluing the currency. Oil may play into this, but again, I think there's a lot more at stake. And the good news is I don't think wars are going to be a catalyst around this. I don't even know if trade is going to be a catalyst around this hyperinflationary scenario that I see, as it was in 1979, where you had oil embargo, the oil embargo.

I think more than that, because countries and trade pacts seem to be pretty solid So what I see happening with oil, it's not a sideshow. It's a point of leverage, certainly. But I think recent discoveries of shale and new technologies in the United States have really evened the playing field there.

And so I'm not so sure that that's going to play into this as it once did.

Capital overmarked versus production; hedge fund rumor

Erik Townsend: I think we could go on for another hour, and I would love to do so, about how How the current deflationary backdrop will eventually transition to inflation. But unfortunately, we're out of time for today's interview. Paul, you were kind enough to send us a sample of the type of research that you send to your paying subscribers at Macro Allocation Incorporated. We're going to include a link to that in the Research Roundup email, which our registered users at MacroVoices.com should receive at the same time as this interview. Paul, could you give us a sense of what is in that sample piece so people know what they can look forward to.

Paul Brodsky: Well, I'd be delighted. It seems to me that diverging capital and output growth over a 45-year period implies that either capital growth of the past was not actually capital growth at all— I'm talking about capital growth, that's the capital markets— because it consistently surpassed production growth. Or, and maybe this is getting too in the weeds, but it's explained in the piece. The value of capital today is is overmarked relative to the means of production that ostensibly uses it. By that, I mean the market itself might have a ways to drop so it can reconcile things. So I think I point out that there's there's a sign that. We're looking at that may say this is the case.

That should be enough of a tease.

Erik Townsend: Okay. And again, our registered users at MacroVoices.com will already have received a link to that piece. For anyone else who wants it who's not registered, you can just register at MacroVoices.com and then look to the Research Library tab on the menu, and you'll be able to download it there. I want to cover one One more thing before we close, Paul. There are rumors circulating on the street that you may be launching a hedge fund, perhaps around the beginning of next year. I know from a regulatory compliance standpoint that you're not at liberty to make any specific representations about the fund other than to accredited investors. But can you confirm or deny that rumor? And if our accredited investor audience wanted to contact you to find out more about what may be happening, how would

Paul Brodsky: Well, as you may be aware, Erik, from being in the business, I cannot confirm or deny such a rumor, but I'm happy to talk to anyone about anything at any point in time. And just contacting me at pbrodsky@macro-allocation.com is the best way to do it.

Erik Townsend: Okay, fantastic. Well, thank you so much for your time. Well, thanks so much for a great interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

New format: listener-requested topic

Aaron Chan: Erik, you mentioned at the beginning of the show we're going to experiment with a format change this week. So can you please tell our listeners why the change?

Erik Townsend: Well, we really like the format of the first part of the show where we do a market wrap. We usually aim for 10 to 15 minutes there, went a little bit over it this And then we do, of course, our featured interview, which is the highlight of the show. What we had been doing previously is you, Aaron have been asking me questions about that feature interview. And, you know, as I listened to a few reruns of the show, it just seems like we're rehashing the same stuff. Our featured interview guests are experts. They know what they're talking about. For us to rehash it felt a little bit redundant. And meanwhile, we've had listener requests to cover specific topics.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: that we could cover ourselves. So what we're going to try is a little bit of a change to format where after the guest interview, we're going to do a listener-requested topic each week. And we'll set up a thread in the listener discussion forum where you can request specific topics you'd like us to cover. And similarly, by all means, give us feedback on how you like this format compared to the old one.

Is US dollar hyperinflation a risk? Hyperinflation versus high inflation

Aaron Chan: Right. So in that vein, listener discussion forum user Pepi Lamoco— sorry if I butchered

Erik Townsend: Appreciate that.

Aaron Chan: Posted a question this past week asking whether we're intentionally avoiding discussing hyperinflation risk in our conversations with guests about the monetary policy endgame. And Paul Brodsky mentioned hyperinflation in this interview. So, Erik, let's start with the subject of hyperinflation.

Well, what's the big picture? Do you think there's a real risk of US dollar hyperinflation at any point in the future?

Erik Townsend: No, I don't. But we've got to clarify what that means. It's kind of ironic, actually, that it worked out the way that it did. We picked this topic of hyperinflation. I didn't know Paul Brodsky was going to end on that point. So, it looks like it flows together very nicely. That was actually a coincidence.

The thing is that people use this terminology differently. I do not think there's any risk at all of hyperinflation in the strictest definition of that term. However, I do agree with Paul Brodsky when he is predicting something, you know, at least as big as the late 1970s. I don't call that hyperinflation. I call that high inflation.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And they're not exactly the same thing. So I think we need to clarify the terminology before we go too far.

Aaron Chan: Right. Then why don't we clearly define hyperinflation and then contrast that with high inflation, as you've described, so we can speak clearly about what the difference is?

Erik Townsend: Well, you will hear some people, including Paul Brodsky in this interview, use the phrase hyperinflation, and they'll say like we had in the 1970s. And there, in that case, I think just, you know, the prefix hyper means a lot of something, and a lot of inflation, you might call it hyperinflation.

But the strictest definition, if you look in a macroeconomics textbook, of hyperinflation is a little bit different than that.

So let's talk first about what is inflation. Inflation is when there is excessive money in the money supply, and that is driving up prices because there's more money chasing a fixed amount of goods and services. That drives the price of those goods and services up, and it sets up kind of a self-reinforcing vicious cycle. Where the increase in the price of goods and services causes workers to demand higher wages so that they can maintain their standard of living. Those higher wages then in turn increase the cost of delivering those products and services. That causes the producers to increase their prices, and that again begets more wage inflation because again workers are demanding higher wages. So it's a self-reinforcing process. But it's all about available money in the money supply that's chasing and driving up prices.

True hyperinflation, or perhaps I should say in the narrow definition of that word, hyperinflation, is not about prices going up. It's a wholesale loss of faith in a currency. And so it appears that prices are going up because there is a rapid increase in prices, but what's really happening is the value of the currency itself is collapsing.

Now, there are several different definitions of hyperinflation, depending on which textbook you look at. One common one, though, is 50— 5-0% per month of price inflation. So, what is that annualized to? 1,000% plus annualized. By that definition, even the early 2000s Argentina inflation event wouldn't qualify as a true hyperinflation, because that was about 80% annualized, not 1,000%.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: 1,000% annualized. So it really depends on who you're talking to as to what definition you're using. In that strictest definition that I use for hyperinflation, no, I don't think that's coming in the US dollar at all. On the other hand, if you want to say the kind of inflation that we had in the 1970s, I think it's going to be worse than that before this is over.

So one of the characteristics of a true hyperinflation is a phenomenon that economists call dollarization, and that's where people lose faith in the currency. This happened in Weimar Germany. This happened more recently in Zimbabwe, where they were actually trading telephone calling cards as currency because nobody believed in the local currency. But the reason economists call it dollarization is because the US dollar is the most likely thing.

You know, the Argentinian merchant says, I won't take pesos anymore, even though the law of the land says I'm supposed to, I don't care. I trust US dollars. I don't trust my own country's currency. I'm only going to sell you the potatoes you want to buy if you'll pay me in US dollars. Well, how could you have a dollarization of the US dollar where people abandon US dollars and use US dollars instead? You know, that doesn't make sense. Would they use Canadian dollars instead? And for that matter, how is it possible that people could abandon the dollar if the dollar is the world's reserve currency?

Which is the preferred denomination of central bank reserve assets.

Almost by definition, you can't have a hyperinflation of the reserve currency. It would have to lose that reserve currency status in order for a true hyperinflation to occur. And history teaches us, frankly, that big systemically important currencies like the US dollar don't hyperinflate. It's a phenomenon that is unique to small systemically non-critical currencies like the Argentinian peso. So again, I'm using the most strict definition of the word hyperinflation in that narrow definition that refers to the collapse in the value of a currency. I don't think that that's possible for the US dollar, or I should say profoundly unlikely. It would take extraordinary circumstances. But I certainly do think high inflation, higher than the 1970s, is quite possible and quite

Aaron Chan: Okay. Given an accurate definition of hyperinflation, you think hyperinflation is extremely unlikely, but that a period of several years of high inflation is almost inevitable. But before we move on to talking about high inflation, why don't we cover what it would take to actually get a true US dollar hyperinflation, just for the diehards in the audience?

Erik Townsend: Well, I mean, to truly get the kind of hyperinflation where we're talking about the definition that means a collapse in the value What would have to happen to devalue the currency? I don't know. President Hillary Clinton starts World War III with Russia and loses. That would do it. Russia— and maybe a more realistic one— Russia and China persuade OPEC at some point to stop taking dollars for oil and to only accept gold or some gold-backed currency. Some people have suggested that Russia and China might someday try to introduce a gold-backed currency. That's Sergei Glazyev's De-dollarization strategy. So far, it hasn't gained much traction. If something profoundly changed in world politics, where the United States hegemony over the world economy wasn't there anymore, that's the kind of change it would take. You would have to have a massive change of sentiment that caused central banks around the world to stop preferring US dollar-denominated reserve assets.

Right now, the US Treasury bond is their favorite reserve asset.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And you've got to remember, there is no other bond market in the world that is deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. So there is no alternative right now. You'd first have to have an alternative, then you would have to persuade other central banks around the world to lose faith in the US dollar. You know, the US losing a nuclear war would be the level of event that it would take for that true hyperinflation scenario to really play out.

Aaron Chan: So the US dollar hyperinflation Hyperinflation is clearly possible in the wake of nuclear holocaust or an utterly profound change of sentiment around the world about the role of the US dollar in the global economy. But it sounds like short of that, it's just not going to happen. So, that brings us to the sustained period of high inflation. So, why do you see that on the horizon and what could it actually bring?

Erik Townsend: Well, and again, we should point out that a lot of people, including Paul Brodsky today, will use the word hyperinflation to describe this scenario, which I call high High inflation. And basically the problem is that the global debt is unrepayable in real terms. There is so much debt, it is mathematically impossible for it to all be paid back in real terms, meaning while preserving the value of the currency. So there's really only 2 ways to make that debt go away. Either you have to forgive it with some kind of debt jubilee, and as long as the people with the money are still in power, which for now appears to be the case, In this case, that ain't gonna happen.

The other option is to inflate it away by intentionally having central bank policies promote inflation. And sure enough, we've seen the Fed wants to promote inflation. Now, they wanna get to 2% inflation. I think that they run the risk of overshooting that dramatically, and we'll talk about why that's true in just a minute. But the scenario is basically that central banks are trying to promote a small amount of inflation. They're fighting a deflationary pressure that allows the central banks to get more and more complacent about conjuring more and more money out of thin air because they convince themselves that they can get away with it without it resulting in inflation. And the more that people predict inflation, as has happened, and it doesn't happen, the more cocky they get. And eventually you get to the point where that deflationary pressure exhausts itself and inflation returns. And It could potentially run away very quickly and go out of control.

Now, that doesn't mean a true hyperinflation in the strictest sense of the currency collapsing in value, but I think 5 to 10 years of 20% per year price inflation in the U.S. dollar is entirely possible. And, you know, the way that that happens is the Fed is aiming for that 2% inflation, and it's not happening, it's not happening, it's not happening, and they keep printing more and more Eventually, it starts happening, and all of a sudden, it's 4%. And they say, oh, well, it overshot by a little bit, but that's nothing. We won't worry about it. And then it's 6%, and then it's 8%.

You want to buy your gold before that happens. The question, and it's always very difficult to time markets, is, you know, is the bottom already in in gold? Is it time to really back up the leverage truck and buy all the gold you can? Because we know that's coming someday. Or could it be that the deflationary trend in the economy Hasn't run its course yet, and there's room for gold to sell off even further to new lows, perhaps below $1,000 an ounce, before it's over.

I am very, very confident of the scenario that we eventually get a period of several years of extremely high sustained inflation in the U.S. dollar, because it's the only way short of a debt jubilee to resolve this excessive debt The question is, when does that happen, and is there more deflation first? That's the $64 trillion question.

Six-month milestone and Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Well, unfortunately, we're out of time for this week, Erik. Is there anything else you want to cover before we close?

Erik Townsend: Well, MacroVoices is officially 6 months old. This is our 26th episode, and that's about the point where my talk radio mentors tell me that a show really starts to gain traction and market share. And we're really hoping that that will happen because that's what will allow us us to bring you even better guests. The more listeners that we have, the bigger and better of a reputation that we have, the more that people have heard of us, the easier it is to recruit the Kyle Basses and the Hugh Hendrys and those other difficult-to-get guests that we haven't been able to get on the show yet. So you can help us out by telling your friends and colleagues about MacroVoices. Register at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already, especially you accredited Because that's what our hedge fund managers love to hear, that they, they have people that are qualified to invest in their funds that are listening to the program.

And of course, as a benefit of registration, you'll get our free Research Roundup email, assuming you want it. You don't have to. You can opt out by clicking the safe unsubscribe link at the bottom. But so far, we've had an extremely, extremely low opt-out rate. People seem to really like it. And I know, Aaron, you've got a loaded Research Roundup. This week, it looked like it was a page and a half long of links to free stuff. What do you got for us?

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik. So with the topic du jour being negative rates and the thirst for yield, we have an article on James Grant's recent keynote speech at the annual Benjamin Graham Conference, where he offered his prognostication on negative interest rates. We've also got the latest from Jesse Felder on how the search for yield has led to utility equity valuations trading at 3 sigma, meaning standard deviations, above their historical averages, which is statistically similar to residential real estate at the height of the last housing bubble. Finally, Artemis Capital Management introduces Rodman's Paradox. Yes, that's Basketball Hall of Famer Dennis Rodman, which describes hidden and nonlinear benefits when adding a nonconformist but negative-returning asset to your portfolio. And from our listeners, we've got the latest gold price forecast from Joshua Hall, as you said, Erik, Andrew Levine's defense of Elon Musk's subsidies, and Michael Medici's take on last Friday's nonfarm payrolls.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic.

Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for us for this week's edition. Thanks again for your support and feedback. We're really excited about the listener content that's coming in, and please keep sending in your submissions. If you'd like your article to be featured in an upcoming edition, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter. Again, if you find value in this podcast, the best way to help us is by retweeting and following us on Twitter and sharing MacroVoices with your friends, family, and colleagues. Thanks, everyone.

Colleagues. You can follow Erik at Erik S. Townsend or myself at _AaronChan_ for the latest news on MacroVoices or general market commentary. Also, don't forget to follow our main account at MacroVoices. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Economics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional. Before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Charles Biderman — TrimTabs (as introduced on the show)

Announcer open and episode preview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 25 was recorded on August 4th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We're back to our usual macroeconomic focus this week with Charles Biderman from TrimTabs joining me as today's feature interview guest. Charles and I will be discussing the U.S. dollar rally, the general economic outlook for the U.S. and abroad, Brexit contagion risk, Treasury yields, and much more.

Market wrap: equities, GDP and Trump's sell call

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. This week, equity markets retreated briefly from last week's all-time record highs, with E-mini S&P futures trading as low as 2,141 at one point on Tuesday after Donald Trump told his supporters to sell stocks. But equities have since bounced back, and E-mini S&P futures closed at 2,159 on Thursday afternoon. Erik, any update on your outlook for equities?

Erik Townsend: Well, the big news, of course, was Friday's GDP print, which was much lower than expectations. That pretty much nailed any expectation of a rate hike at the next FOMC meeting, that caused the dollar to take a nosedive. And I think that's really the cause and effect here, was the dollar took a nosedive on GDP, that caused everything, whether it was equities, gold, oil, whatever, to rally on the dollar weakness. In terms of my overall view, it's not very much changed from last week. As I described it, basically, I think that economic fundamentals definitely do not support anything close to the valuations that we see in asset markets right now. But I also think that the The rest of the world is looking a whole lot worse than the United States, and the risk is to the upside that we could have a bunch of flight capital from other countries coming into the United States, strengthening the US Dollar Index and strengthening US equity markets, just because there's no other alternative.

So it's not a case of I think the economy's great and I'm bullish. It's rather I want to be short, but I don't dare to be short because I think that anything is possible here. So I'm on the sidelines. As far as Donald Trump, I think he's just trying to set up an I told you so moment.

He says when equities are fairly richly priced that people should sell. He was very careful to say the reason that they're as high as they are is because the Fed is printing money and the easy money policy is leading to this. So he sets himself up if equities go down dramatically before the election to say, I told you so. And if they don't go down, he can say, I told you so, it's central bank money printing that's keeping them up at these levels. So I think it's just political posturing in terms of his comments.

Market wrap: crude oil inventories and storage risk

Aaron Chan: Yeah, this is definitely the first time that I've heard a presidential candidate offer some kind of financial advice, which is pretty interesting. But 2 weeks ago on this program, when WTI crude oil was trading around $46, you predicted it would soon take out key support just above $44. And you also said that from there it would be a quick ride down to $40. Well, you sure called that one right, Erik, and WTI traded as low as $39.20 this week before bouncing back above $41 after Wednesday's inventory numbers were released. So what's next for crude oil?

Erik Townsend: Well, let's start by covering those inventory numbers because they're actually very interesting. Expectations were for a 2 million barrel drawdown on crude oil inventories nationally because that's what's supposed to happen this time of year in summer driving season is drawdowns on inventory. We got a 1.4 million barrel build on national crude oil inventories. That caused the market to instantaneously nosedive. That's where we got the print. I think it was actually $39.19 was the low print just seconds after the inventory data came out because people were reacting to the headline number. But then they turned to page 2 and said, wait a minute, critical Cushing, Oklahoma inventory was a 1.2 million barrel draw. So we saw a 1.4 million barrel nationwide build, but a 1.2 million barrel drawdown on Cushing inventory.

Much more importantly, though, gasoline inventories, which, as you'll remember, have been building for the last several weeks in a row, which is Which is not supposed to happen this time of year. Well, we did get a massive 3.3 million barrel drawdown on gasoline inventories when only about a 200,000 barrel drawdown was expected. That really is what I think caused prices to instantly rebound very, very quickly, retracing the loss on the headline number. Distillates— distillates again is diesel fuel, jet fuel, kerosene, other stuff that they make from crude oil in addition to gasoline— that was a 1.2 million barrel build on inventories.

Wow. So I think the combination of the 3.3 million barrel draw on gasoline inventories— remember, it is, you know, the beginning of August, it's summer driving season— a drawdown in gasoline inventories is very much to be expected this time of year, although this was certainly a larger one than anyone expected. It also comes in the wake of several large builds on gasoline inventories. I don't think it's that big of a deal, but that seems to have been what propelled crude oil to rally massively back not only above $41, And as you said, briefly above $42. The high print was $42.08 on Thursday afternoon.

I don't think this is going to last. And the reason I say that is the gasoline drawdown was not that big of a deal. Distillates building, national inventories building. Yes, Cushing was a drawdown. That's helpful. It makes a little bit of space. But we needed a much bigger drawdown than what we saw. And the nationwide number was a build. And, you know, that's not supposed to happen this time of year. We are moving now out of summer driving season.

That sounds very counterintuitive because obviously from a consumer standpoint, hey, it's the first week of August, it's the middle of vacation schedules. What you have to consider though is that from a refiner's standpoint, there is a long lead time from the time that it takes to process the crude oil through the refining process. Then it has to be distributed to a regional distribution point where a truck eventually carries it to a filling station. Put another way, All of the gasoline that is needed to supply American drivers through Labor Day weekend, the crude oil to manufacture that gasoline has already been purchased. It's in the refining process. So in terms of crude oil demand, summer driving season is basically coming to an end right now. That means that we should be looking for a return from drawdowns on inventory to builds on inventory. Well, wait a minute. We haven't been having significant drawdowns on inventory. We've been having builds, and now we can expect those builds to get larger.

I also think, if I look at the action in the time spreads, I've talked about this a lot in previous shows, where the time spreads had been widening. So my curve steepener trade that I've talked about on the program before has been just performing beautifully until that inventory number came out. Now, what I've said in the past is I think the reason that the time spreads are widening has to do with expectations about a storage crisis being a potential risk around fall maintenance season. I wasn't 100% certain of that. Well, I'm with you. I'm a lot more certain of it now because the confirmation came immediately in the wake of that inventory report. Those spreads narrowed considerably. They're starting late Thursday afternoon to widen again as I look at my screen here.

So what we're seeing, I think, is confirmation that this spike up is really about expectations that we could have a storage problem this fall, and that means all eyes are moving to storage crisis risk. I don't think— again, we could talk about technical levels here. We're just— we had broken down below a channel. We're just on the verge of testing again from the bottom. A lot of times in technical analysis, when there's a significant breakdown, you'll see a rally back up to just kiss that line. That seems to be what's happening, but frankly, I don't think the technical analysis is what's important here. I think it's all going to be about the next 3 or 4 or 5 inventory reports. If we see, as I think we could, some really significant builds on national inventory, and particularly builds on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory, it really could spell much lower prices. There are now some mainstream analysts that are starting to predict a retest of the February lows.

I don't know if that's going to happen or not, but I think that it's going to be the fundamental data, the inventory data, that's going to decide that.

Meanwhile, I notice Venezuela is still deteriorating badly. News out this week that they have decided to accept food instead of cash for payment for oil from Jamaica. Jamaica. So I didn't know that Jamaica grew enough food to export it. It seems like things are getting really desperate there. Now, Venezuela has, to a lot of people's surprise, not really seen any dramatic decrease in crude oil production despite all of the horrible things that are going on in that country. Now, how long can they continue to hang on if they're at the point where they have to take food instead of money for payment from Jamaica? You know, it sounds to me like the situation there is pretty darn dire. Yeah.

Market wrap: gold

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, it sounds like an absolute tire fire there. Now pivoting to gold, I've been watching a technical consolidation range between $1,308 and $1,377, let's call it. And we've seen the market test both the high and the low ends of that range in the last couple of weeks, with the high end coming into view this week as the yellow metal traded as high as $1,373 early Wednesday morning. So Erik, what's on the horizon for gold here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that the low GDP print and therefore expectations that a rate hike is unlikely, that's the reason that we're back back up to the high end of this trading range. You know, people are thinking that if the Fed doesn't hike, it potentially means more dollar weakness, and that could be good for gold. But we're still in that consolidation range, and I don't think until we've seen a decisive breakout one way or the other that we really know where it's headed. And I also think, again, similar to what I said about crude oil, it's not that you can look at some chart pattern and say, oh, okay, I see a, you know, a reverse inside-out head and shoulders here. It's going to be about the fundamentals. If we continue to see economic data that leads us to think that the dollar index is going to be weaker, I think that's going to be very strong for gold. If the dollar index bounces back off of the 95 or so low that it just tested, and especially if it breaks out above 97, then I think that we're going to see, you know, a nosedive in gold.

I don't really know where it's headed yet, and I think we have to wait and find out.

Market wrap: Treasury yields and the dollar

Aaron Chan: So, 10-year Treasury yields are back above 1.5% this week after testing the mid-140s late last week. So, Erik, what do you see going on in the fixed income space?

Erik Townsend: Well, you said above 1.5%. They were in the low 150s. It's back to 1.50% now as we're recording on Thursday afternoon. And what I would say, similar to the last couple, I don't so much have a strong opinion about I don't know where it's headed in the short term, but I do have a very strong opinion that we're in a consolidation range, and it's going to be very telling if we break down below that 1.35 level that has been the low so far in yields, high-end prices. That really tells me, okay, this was not just a short-term temporary Brexit reaction thing. This is what I have been predicting, and also our future guest today has been predicting for years now, which is that we would eventually get All the way down to 1% yields on the 10-year. Is that happening? Was this just a dead cat bounce after Brexit? Is it going to roll over? I think if I see a move north of 1.7%, okay, that tells me it's not time for my thesis to play out yet.

If we see a drop below 1.35%, I think that the cards are on the table and the train has left the station. We're headed for 1% yields. Whether or not that's going to happen by the end of the year, as Charles Biderman had once predicted, I don't know. But I do I do think that those 1% Treasury yields are coming.

Aaron Chan: Right. The dollar index has been trying to break through the key resistance around 97 for the last couple of weeks, but it looks like it has softened this week. So what's going on with the dollar?

Erik Townsend: I think that the big softness in the dollar was entirely a reaction to the very weak GDP print. I think that the reality that the United States is very close to recession and would already be in recession if not for overly accommodative monetary policy is becoming much clearer now.

You know, maybe I should be kicking myself. I've been telling myself for the last couple of weeks, boy, if we get another dip down to 95, I'm going to buy dollar index futures because I really do lean towards the bullish case that the dollar rally is going to continue. I saw it and glanced at my screen and I saw 94.97. I thought, boy, should I buy this? And, you know, I chickened out. I didn't pull the trigger. And the reason is just because I think it's a timing thing.

If we see a lot of shit hit the fan around the world, Japan, China, Europe falling apart, as I think a lot of risk exists in those economies, that's going to strengthen the dollar. But if the U.S. falls into recession first before those things happen, that's going to be very weak on the dollar. So, you know, I think it's— I do lean towards the bull case for the dollar index, but I didn't buy that dip to 95. It is now Almost back to '96. And I think the 94.97 may have actually been the exact bottom tick so far. But I don't really have any regrets that I chickened out of buying it there because I just don't have the conviction that this game is over yet. And I think we really have to wait and see. Listen to how many things we just talked about, whether it was the price of gold or the price of oil or the Treasury yield.

A lot of things are in consolidation ranges and we don't have signals yet as to which way they're going.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: I think we need to wait until there's a clearer, more decisive indication from markets before I would be comfortable actually putting a trade on here.

Aaron Chan: Right, so holding pattern. Thanks for the market update, Erik. This week's special guest is Charles Biderman from TrimTabs Erik's interview with Mr. Biderman is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Interview: politics of fairness and the economics of hopelessness

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is TrimTabs' own Charles Biderman. Charles, thanks so much for joining me on the program.

Charles Biderman: Thanks for having me.

Erik Townsend: It's a real pleasure to get you on, and we've gone a couple weeks now without doing macro interviews. We thought we could take a break because it would be dog days of summer and there'd be nothing to talk about. So much for that idea. But before we get into it, I'd like to start with the big picture, not just the outlook on the economy, but where do we stand in this whole story of central banks and the economy and everything? How did we get here? And what's the context for where we are before we start to look forward?

Charles Biderman: Well, that's the perfect question to ask. And to me, it all starts with our basic political philosophy post-World War II is that life should be fair. I call it the politics of fairness. So it's unfair— it's only fair people should have all their healthcare costs paid for by the state.

It's only fair education. It's only fair everybody should have big pensions. You shouldn't be able to get fired. All these type of things is like the politics of fairness. And if you look at the so-called progressive agenda, liberal agenda, or whatever, the agenda that's been passing laws in the West, it's all about politics of fairness.

So the politics of fairness has created Unfortunately, the economics of hopelessness. And what do I mean by hopelessness? You've created such headwinds to growth that with no growth but a lot of fairness, you have— there's no hope for the future for the participants in the economy.

On the other hand, the headwinds to the economies of Europe and the United States are being ameliorated, so to speak, or attempted to, by the very smart people from academia who've never done anything in terms of creating jobs or running anything other than, well, I have a great idea, let's flood the world with free money and we'll levitate asset prices and hopefully there'll be a trickle-down effect.

So the economics of hopelessness You know, it's not been working to create growth. And the end result of the economics of hopelessness is Donald Trump and radical Muslim activities. Because, you know, these European— these Muslim kids in France or Belgium have no hope for the future. They're in a cradle-to-grave protected economy where they get everything handed to them so that they will survive, but there's no hope.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Charles Biderman: So, you know, when an ISIS recruiter says, come to Syria, we'll pay you money, you can rape women, kill people, have fun, and/or you could stay in France or Belgium and, and be on the dole for the rest of your life with no hope for the future.

In the United States, we have the jobs were hollowed out, but there's nothing to replace them. Why is there nothing to replace them? Because the laws

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Charles Biderman: The regulations are so— now that it's very hard to start a new business. Instead of creating— let's— okay, this company moved their staff to Asia to produce widgets. Let's take that space and create an incubator. Let's have no taxes for the first year for anybody starting a business, no withholding taxes. Let's give them free internet, free this, free that. No, let's make it harder to start a business. If you start a business, you have to make sure everybody can get their healthcare benefits if they work certain hours. And you need licenses to start a business that could be impossible to get through a bureaucrat. That's why bribery is so endemic outside the United States, because that's the only way you can get through the bureaucracy is with bribes.

So anyway, that to me is the big picture, that headwinds to growth— look, growth occurs when something more new happens More new ones than old shutters. Unfortunately, in the United States, the last couple of years, for the first time in the United States history, more companies are closing their doors than opening— than new companies starting up.

That is not growth.

Interview: US economy, dollar and Brexit

Erik Townsend: And where do you think we are right now in this story? I mean, we just had a dismal GDP print last Friday. A lot of people think that we're headed towards a recession, but I mean, look at the stock market. So what's your take on the economy?

Charles Biderman: Well, I'd say if it wasn't for zero interest rate policy and helicopter money, we would be in a recession. The best that they can do with free money is to get us just above the flatline. And you have to keep levitating stock prices and bond prices to do that.

So how long will they be able to do that? Not forever. What will be the catalyst? We'll know after the catalyst happens. You know, it's like you have tinder. Something is going to light a match and burn, you know. But what will that be and when will it occur? It could be sometime later this year, could be— I don't know, could be another year.

I've given up predicting when foolishness will stop. If that makes any sense as an answer.

Erik Townsend: It does. Let's talk about the U.S. dollar rally. You know, we've heard every view on this program from the top is in and it's all downhill from here to it's just getting started. Do you think that there's room for more dollar appreciation as we see more flight capital coming into the United States?

Charles Biderman: Well, I would say, you know, Japan and the euro will probably decline against the dollar. But I would say the dollar is going to decline against foreign emerging market currencies because, other than China, which is probably as bankrupt as the West in terms of— when I say bankrupt, I mean mark-to-market bankrupt.

To me, if the United States marked to market all our obligations, we'd be trillions of dollars in the hole. And if we were a public company, the auditor would never sign saying that we had any chance of survival. You know, and the same with the European, except for Germany, and England is also bankrupt. You know, the future obligations that our politicians have committed us to, there's no way, you know, the present value that you have to— if you're a public company, you have to include your future liabilities, your best guess as to them.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Charles Biderman: The present value of them, and they're way in excess of any— you know, incomes would have to grow by 8%, 9% a year, national income, all the entire income that the United States generates, 8%, 9% a year to even begin to be able to cover the future expenses.

Erik Townsend: Speaking of Europe and the situation there, we've heard views on Brexit that have ranged from it was just a flash in the pan to the end is nigh and the European Union is doomed. What's your take? Is exit contagion going to be a serious risk, and what would it mean to the rest of the global economy?

Charles Biderman: Well, I hate the euro government personally. It's atrocious how a free market or free, you know, free trade between members of the common market has become a regulatory nightmare where they have people telling them how— what the Parmesan cheese should be like, what the size of this, you know, egg shape, egg color. I mean, it's ridiculous. The headwinds to business are outrageous based on all these do-good decisions. You know, it's only politics of fairness is creating incredible bureaucratic inertia nonsense. So on the one hand, I'm totally in favor of free and open trade.

On the other hand, I think the euro experiment is doomed, and I think England was smart to get out. And hopefully they'll be able to keep a free trade or reciprocal trade or, you know, something the way Switzerland is doing. So I think it's probably a long-term benefit for England.

Interview: Treasury yields and negative-yielding debt

Erik Townsend: In the wake of the Brexit referendum, the U.S. 10-year Treasury recently retested its 2012 low. Actually, I think it set a new series record in the process. And, you know, you and I have both predicted that we'll eventually see 1% yields on the 10-year, but there's quite a few notable people. Jeff Gundlach from DoubleLine was out recently saying, okay, it's time to short Treasuries here. This is it. The bottom is in for yields. I don't think so. What's your take in the short to intermediate term? Have we seen a bottom here, or do you think that we're going to see even lower Treasury yields?

Charles Biderman: Well, I'm still long leveraged 10-year Treasuries, and I have no intention I don't think they should be thinking of selling anytime soon. I mean, there's no growth in the world, and the only real yield in 10 years is in the U.S. And if the economies of Europe are not rebounding, there is no growth on the continent outside of Germany.

So, you have, you know, Italian banks. I mean, banks are broke, and the question is, how do you save them? And no one seems to care.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Charles Biderman: Because the ECB is buying all the sovereign debt from Italy, and Italy can then guarantee all the you know this is insanity. So that can't be good longer term. Will the ten-year break one percent by the end of this year, which is what I predicted? Could be maybe you know might be a little longer, but the only the flight of money to some positive yield. And safety to me says that the 10-year will go below 1%.

Erik Townsend: Now, if we kind of take this picture global, you know, already around the world we literally have tens of trillions of dollars worth of negative-yielding debt. And it just, it blows my mind that we could have negative-yielding Treasury debt around the world. So how is that even possible, and where is this headed? Do you think we're eventually going to get to negative interest rate policy in the United States and negative-yielding US Treasuries?

Charles Biderman: No, it's just avoidance of the reality that Europe is broke. There is no way that the EC— countries of the ECB can generate enough income to pay its debts. So if you can't generate the income to pay the debt, how about making the interest rate that you owe negative so that Negative interest rates allow central banks to print more money, an infinite supply of money.

Pay, you know, I'd like to pay my bills. I'll print money at a negative interest rate. Wouldn't that be a nice world to live in where I know here's how I'm going to pay my debt? I'll print paper and I'll— and you pay me to buy the paper.

Interview: the endgame is government bankruptcy

Erik Townsend: How do you think this story eventually ends, Charles? Because, I mean, if you—

Charles Biderman: Bankruptcy. They're avoiding bankruptcy. Look, when you lend money and you can't pay it back, either you go bankrupt or you inflate the heck out of it. But I don't think Germany will allow a repeat of the Weimar experiment. And at some point, there's going to have to be massive adjustments.

Look, we have— there's a strange divergence occurring globally. We have an incredibly powerful, robust broadband internet global network where every email address is the equal of every other email address. Sex, age, money doesn't mean anything. You know, the only thing that means anything is government control of the internet in that region. And assuming there isn't, except, you know, in only a handful of places, or maybe not Not small handful, but thinking about China particularly, it's a very robust worldwide phenomenon.

On the other hand, we have this rotten superstructure called government bureaucracy, and all the loans, and all the pension obligations, and all the future promises that there is no way in heck can be funded by the economies. So if you can't pay your obligations, you have to restructure your obligations. Restructure your debt, and it's called, in essence, it's government bankruptcy reorganization. That has to be where we're headed, and we're slowly realizing it. Right now, the problem is the powers that be think they really know what they're doing. You know, Paul Krugman thinks he's a smart guy. He got an award. He got a Nobel, you know, I mean, look Look at central bankers. I mean, they're central bankers. They have to know what they're doing, right?

But they don't. It's all these— so the smart guys have to be debunked and people have to realize, and I think they're beginning to. You know, that's part of the Trump movement, that the guys in charge really have no idea what the hell is going on, and yet they make these claims that they do, and they make predictions based upon—

Erik Townsend: Predictions.

Charles Biderman: on how smart they are and how smart the models they've created, and it never works.

Erik Townsend: So what does the endgame look like? Because if you had told me 10 years ago that, look, what's going to happen is investors all around the world are going to be so excited by the opportunity to lend money to insolvent borrowers that they're going to bid the price of bonds up to the level where they have negative yields, and they're going to be satisfied and keep buying them, I would have told you you're nuts. But that's what's happening. So does it— do bond prices eventually crash when people wake up? How does this end?

Charles Biderman: Well, it ends in bankruptcy and reorganization of governments. I mean, it's gonna— you know, you have a robust global internet world and you have geographically restrictive government entities that create laws, pay money to entities That, you know, they pay to the powers that be, the interest groups that, you know, so you have this like whole superstructure and they— how do they pay for it? They're just printing money and they're losing total relationship to the underlying economy.

And at some point, you know, you just sever that from the bottom. And cents on the dollar, you pay, you know, the bonds are worthless. Those zero-coupon bonds, negative interest, you know, so the people who bought them, they're going to lose a lot of money if they hold them to, you know, a long-term bond.

There's no way that those bonds will be paid off in 10 years. They'll either be refunded with more garbage debt if people— or they'll have to be sold at a tremendous discount. And again, you know, I'm talking about Unfortunately, in the next 6 months, who knows? You know, the markets are still likely to go up until people recognize the emperor is really naked.

But right now, we believe, you know, we're still willing to think the, you know, the emperor knows what they're doing and they're not walking around— but they are naked. But, well, no, but they know what they're doing. Is the, you know, I mean, if a central banker talks, people listen.

Erik Townsend: Why? Well, but I mean, you're a smart guy, Charles. You understand this problem, but you're levered long U.S. Treasuries, so you're rushing to lend extra money to the U.S. government knowing that they can't pay back.

Charles Biderman: I'm trading to make money.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so, but it is a greater fool trade, isn't it? You're trading because you're going to find a greater fool to sell those

Charles Biderman: Yes. Unfortunately, I've always been early. You know, in December of 1999, using a modest cash flow analysis of the amount of unlocking IPOs from the '90s and option conversions given to insiders, that about $70 to $80 billion a month of new shares would need to be bought going into 2000. to keep the merry-go-round going, and there just wasn't that money around. So I predicted the market would crash in February, early February, after the year-end money went in. And in February, I watched it keep going higher and higher through April when it finally broke, and it was painful.

Interview: equities in a global meltdown; who runs central banks

Erik Townsend: Well, speaking of crazy markets, I want to run an idea by you because I know that you think in terms of pure supply and demand and cash flow for shares. And, you know, when I look around the global economy, I think we're in real trouble. I think the U.S. is one rate hike away from being pushed into a recession. I think the European exit contagion is very real. I think that Japan and China are maybe set to go from very bad to even worse.

I can't believe I'm saying this, Charles, but I'm actually having a hard time deciding whether that's bullish or bearish for U.S. equities. Because obviously in the old normal where economic fundamentals Then that would be a very bearish view. But, you know, all it's going to result in, if I'm right about the things that I just said, is more accommodative central bank policy, more money printing, more easy money. And I think it's also going to lead to a whole lot of flight capital coming out of Europe, Japan, and China into the United States. And that appreciates the dollar and it appreciates U.S. risk assets. So, I think it could actually be bullish for equities if the whole world, especially if it's the rest of the world before the United States, starts melting down. Am I right? Is that crazy to think about it in those terms?

I mean, it's obviously backwards.

Charles Biderman: I agree with you with one significant caveat, and that caveat is it appears that the smart money is realizing that the central bankers can't do anything, and their actions— I mean, look at what's happening in Japan. They're making, you know, they've gone as far as they could go, and they're trying to go So, you know, even further, I mean, listening to that nitwit Krugman, and it's not working even on the markets anymore.

Even with the government Japanese Central Bank buying Japanese ETFs, the markets are not going up anymore. So, they realize, the markets realize that the Japanese Central Bank is really powerless to do anything.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Charles Biderman: There's still, you know, as long as the ECB is buying government bonds and keeping, you know, and there's no endgame yet for the Italian banks and the Spanish banks, there's still this myth that some fantasy world lender will make everybody whole, even if the banks can't collect the debts, that the caveat really is when, as more and more smart money realize that the central banks can't do anything and, and their actions are useless, as that be— you know, I'm saying there's less and less oomph going to be, less and less push on the helicopter money, to at some point they'll do a helicopter raise and the market will go down, and that's the endgame.

Erik Townsend: Do you think there's a catalyst that ties their hands so they can't print the money, or you think they do print the money? They do the helicopter drops.

Charles Biderman: It's just, you know, when you set the stage for a blaze, a big fire, it doesn't take much to eventually set it off. And yes, the media will say whatever that was that set it off was the key, but real— no, it's the, you know, the central banks are talking through their hats. You know, look, you got to understand who runs central banks— mostly bankers and economists, right? Right. Now, when I went to Harvard Business School a long, long time ago in a galaxy far away— no, the smart guys went to McKinsey, First Boston, top consulting firms, or they went to Fidelity or Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley. The guys who couldn't get those type of good jobs next went to the banks.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Charles Biderman: So, the smartest guys don't go to the banks.

And also consider that people who become economists never do anything. I mean, they get paid for talking, but they never make any money. They've never made any money. If they could make money, they wouldn't be an economist, they'd be a trader.

So, you have economists and bankers, not the smartest people, not the most accomplished But they're running the central banks. Isn't that crazy? You have, you know, nitwits, and they've never really done anything, and they make these pontiffs, you know, they talk about how they're going to do this and how they're going to do that, and so what? Nothing works.

Interview: markets as governor of the Fed; the endgame signal

Erik Townsend: One of the views that I've had is, you know, if I look at the— history tells us that the central bankers are going to continue to be reckless in their policy as long as they can get away with it. They're not going to suddenly wake up one day and say, hey, it's time to be prudent.

Charles Biderman: The markets are going to stop them.

Erik Townsend: And I guess that's the question in my mind, is how the markets stop them. You know, clearly, if we suddenly had runaway inflation, that would stop them. It would tie their hands. But we don't have anything close to that now. What are the other catalysts that would do it?

Charles Biderman: The market has been stopping them. You know, they talk about we want to raise rates.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Charles Biderman: They say they're going to raise rates, but then the markets, the smart guys in the short-term Treasury markets, don't bid up the price. So, historically, the Fed doesn't move— they say they're going to raise rates, but they never do it unless the market predicts it. In other words, traders really think, yeah, the Fed's going to do it this time, and the underlying is this way and that way, and so they bid up yields.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Charles Biderman: And so, they have to raise yields, bid down price, or sell, whatever, to get the underlying trading instruments in line with the future rate rise.

But they keep talking about September and year-end, and the markets have— and so, they've never moved when there's less than a 60% probability within 3 months. And right now, it's like a 30% probability. So, they keep talking about they want to raise rates, but the The markets say they're not, and they're not. So the markets are now, in essence, determining the Fed's ability to raise rates.

Now, as I said before, when the Fed cuts rates, it does some kind of easing, and the markets sell off. That's the endgame. That's when things are going to get really nasty.

Erik Townsend: So I take it then that you're explaining— if I were to pose the question, hey, the Fed had signaled a rate hike was coming, S&P was at basically all-time highs. We hadn't had this negative GDP data at that point. It seemed like they had no excuse for not raising rates, but they didn't. And it sounds like you would answer that question by saying the answer is because the market didn't predict it. The market hadn't bid the rates up.

Charles Biderman: Yeah, the market's looking and seeing that things are weaker than, than the Fed is. You know, the market— look, we're growing 1%, 2%. And the only reason we're growing 1%, 2% is because we We have zero interest rate policy in essence, that if they start hiking it, the economy is going to tumble. And the traders— the Fed can't do that. So they don't believe the Fed's going to do it.

Erik Townsend: We've already gone longer between the first hike and supposedly the second hike is still coming than ever before. So they're already teetering on loss of credibility. Do you think we're ever going to see that second hike?

Charles Biderman: Teetering? Teetering?

Erik Townsend: Well, it depends on— I think they lost credibility 10 years ago.

Charles Biderman: Yes. The nitwits on CNBC who, or Bloomberg, who tout everything as, oh, the latest flash number says the economy is rebounding, or real estate or auto sales definitely show an improvement in the economy. I mean, those guys, they're teetering, maybe. You know, like, their ratings depend on a bull market. In bear markets, those guys don't make money.

I think more, you know, Bloomberg sets are getting turned off now given the shrinkage in the buy side, as, you know, people are taking money out of hedge funds and buying passive. So Bloomberg is definitely bullish. They need more machines sold.

Erik Townsend: In terms of your own view, though, do you think that the Fed is going to stay the course and get at least to a second hike in the so-called rate normalization cycle, or you think it's just a question of time before the U-turn in policy and they start to ease again?

Charles Biderman: Well, I just don't see any improvement in the economy. I mean, we're seeing a little pickup here. To me, it's a bounce from the Brexit reaction pullback by companies. You know, Brexit happened, and for a month or so nobody did anything, and they were, you know, held back. And now that they see it's really a much of a non-event. The world is not going to collapse, they went. So there's a little pickup, but it's not a— it's not a sustainable recovery. And so I just don't see what's going to take, uh, you know, considering the headwinds to growth we have, I don't see how they're going to have any economic growth in the economy other than specific areas like broad, you know, internet or social media

Erik Townsend: Well, and you could also argue, you know, Bank of England just eased again yesterday. So you could argue that as more capital goes into the U.S. out of England, that's providing some support for the U.S. dollar. They don't need to hike right now.

Charles Biderman: No, no, they don't need to hike. I mean, they want to get out, but they box themselves in. And like I said, the bad times are going to come when They boost money supply or do some kind of easing and the markets sell off. That'll be when even the conventional wisdom types realize that central banks can't do anything.

Erik Townsend: And so that really is the signal then for the endgame. From an investor standpoint, how do you respond to that signal? What do you do at that point?

Charles Biderman: Sell.

Erik Townsend: Would you close your long positions in Treasuries too, expecting that the bonds follow the stocks down?

Charles Biderman: Not initially. First equities. But here's, you know, but then again, let me say that I would— when I said sell, I would only sell companies, uh, long-term. I still think the globe— we're in a global expansion based on the internet. So companies that are capable of growing free cash flow and are growing free cash flow I would not sell, but I would look to average, to, you know, average in as the markets collapse.

I'd be a buyer over time. Companies that need funding or are, you know, interest rate driven as buys, I would not want to be long those.

Interview: TrimTabs fired from the Float Shrink ETF

Erik Townsend: Well, I do want to change the topic completely. We didn't know this when we booked you because Because it's new news, but your company, TrimTabs, is suddenly in the news. You and I both know in this business of fund management, if you deliver crappy performance on a consistent basis, you get fired and replaced by somebody else. That's just how business works. But your story is quite a bit different than that. You conceived the investment strategy, you yourself personally, as I understand it, conceived this float shrink strategy, which I want to talk more about in a minute, and this TrimTabs FloatShrink ETF is actually managed by another firm which had contracted your firm to run the, the money, to be the sub-advisor that makes the investment decisions, until very recently when you were very publicly fired from that role. But you had been delivering spectacular performance, like 19% plus annualized returns as of the end of March. That earned TTFS a Morningstar 5-star award.

That's the highest there is. And I believe you were actually the best-performing active-managed ETF in existence according to some measures.

Charles Biderman: Equity, yeah.

Erik Townsend: Equity ETF, okay. So in a year when a lot of hedge funds that have much, much higher fee structures are underperforming the major indices, how in the world could that be construed as lousy performance? And I mean, what's going on here? How is it possible that you guys got fired from this management position?

Charles Biderman: Again, let's take a bigger picture approach. Look at AdvisorShares, who we were a sub-advisor to. They had the brilliant idea that they could pick individuals or sub-advisors who could manage a portfolio and outperform the sub-index. And we were the only one that did that. So, the problem that AdvisorShares has is that they have a faulty business model and they were losing money. And they're losing, you know, they have shed assets for the last 2 years.

And when you shed assets and you get paid as a percentage of assets, you know, your revenue is declining. So, somehow or other, Wilshire offered them some kind of deal. And they replaced us with— the fund is now called the Wilshire Buyback ETF, and it's underperforming us. You know, if we have a— we kept the format of the original TTFS.

I mean, the Wilshire Buyback Fund, they're keeping our ticker symbol, which is not nice of them, but they have the right to. We're launching a new fund called TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF sometime in the next couple of months or less. And we have the— to keep the performance line going, we have a portfolio, a specialized, special managed account in existence that invests the same way that TrimTabs Float Shrink ETF invested.

And that's outperforming the Wilshire Buyback by 100 basis points in July.

Erik Townsend: 100 basis points annualized or 100 basis points in July?

Charles Biderman: In July. In one month, we outperformed by 100 basis points. They changed the— instead of 100 companies at 1% each, they went more big cap. They're not necessarily looking at free cash flow. They're not necessarily looking at a debt-equity ratio. You know, the guy who runs it thinks he knows what he's doing. And the 2 prior funds he managed that we could find were both for AdvisorShares, and his results for both of those— he received a 1-star Morningstar rating, which means the bottom 10% performance. And given the July performance, now we understand why he got a 1-star. Because he thinks he's smart. And so anyway, they've lost since they kicked— you know, the amount of assets they have is shrinking.

And hopefully the people who are taking their money out will put it into our new fund when— after we launch.

Interview: how float shrink works and new funds

Erik Townsend: I want to— before we get to your new fund, I want to talk about the strategy itself, because frankly, you know, it's very creative for an ETF. Usually you don't see that innovative of a strategy, you know, other than in a hedge fund So how does this float-shrink strategy work? What does float-shrink mean? What is the strategy for this active management scheme?

Charles Biderman: Well, in essence, it is— we offer hedge fund results at an ETF price. And prior to the Volcker Rule, TrimTabs Investment Research the company that provides the research, and it's— our clients are basically institutions, we were 25% of Our minority shareholder was Goldman Sachs, and when the Volcker Rule happened, which said that firms like Goldman Sachs could no longer trade for their own account, we lost 40% of our revenue that day as all the prop trading desks on Wall Street got our float shrink and cash flow data, or were clients of ours, I should say.

And so we decided to launch our own fund. And we launched on October 11th. And the basic premise is that if a company is growing free cash flow over a 6-month period and they're using a portion of that free cash flow to reduce the share count and they're not borrowing to buy— in other words, there's no change in the debt-to-asset ratio— the value of the remaining shares should go up. up by at least the float shrink.

Does that make sense?

Erik Townsend: So basically you're saying if I'm running my public company and you're running your public company and I'm spending my profits on dividends or whatever, but you're spending yours on buybacks, there's going to be less availability of your shares. You're consuming them and you're going to continue consuming them, and that's going to keep the price up. And it happens a lot because these corporate buybacks are often motivated by management compensation. You know, the CEO is going to be commissioned on the, on the share price. He's going to do whatever, whether it makes sense long term or not, he's going to boost the share price. So you're basically—

Charles Biderman: Yeah, if they take— but if they only take a portion of their free cash flow to reduce the share count, so meaning that they have more cash on the balance sheet at the end of the 6-month period and less shares, Then I would say that the value of the company should not be changed, because— but if there are less shares outstanding, the price of the remaining shares should go up to equal the float shrink.

And in point of fact, what we've discovered is companies that reduce the share count using free cash flow trade at a premium to the float shrink. So, in other words, if they're doing a 4% float shrink a year, they might trade at a 6% premium, or 2%— they might be up by 6% instead of 4%, 4% accounting for the float shrink and a 2% premium. And if you think about it, companies growing cash and giving a portion back to shareholders, you know, so it's like if you own— as a result of float shrink, existing shareholders own more.

Erik Townsend: And of course, I think most of our listeners are familiar with the float refers to the number of shares that are available, not in hand that don't sell, the long-term holders. And float shrink is the reduction of that.

Charles Biderman: I have no— you know, we look at share count. I'm not interested in buybacks. If a company does a buyback on one side of the desk and then sells options or convert or sells shares on the other side, to me, that's— I don't care. I just want to know the net change in shares outstanding.

Erik Townsend: For something like this, obviously you've backtested this, you've figured out some trade.

Charles Biderman: Well, we've been going for over 5 years. So we're— and our results equaled our backtest.

Erik Townsend: But you, you— I guess what's interesting to me about this story, normally when somebody finds, you know, a secret sauce, a strategy that will work, that backtests well and actually works in real life, what they usually do is they hide it in some super-secret black box. They won't tell anybody how it works, and they structure it as a hedge fund so they can get a 2-and-20 fee structure.

You've chosen to go the total opposite direction. You're doing it as an ETF with a much lower fee structure. And you're telling people in an interview like this one and many others that you've done publicly exactly how it works, which means they could copy your strategy. Why that approach?

Charles Biderman: Well, believe it or not, over the years I've discovered that investors are not as smart as I think they— as I thought they were, because I've been talking about this for 5 years, as you said, and I don't know anybody else who does it in a public vehicle. So my question is why no one has copied me. I don't know.

So, if no one's copying me, there's no problem in talking about it. And even if they do copy me, fine. That would create more credibility for the method. There's plenty of shares outstanding. I mean, obviously, if there was $20 billion investing in FloatShrink, it'd probably eat up all the advantage, if you know what I mean. But this— hey, if there were some more people doing it, it would be better. I think that's a good point. It would just add credibility to the process. It's such a small amount of money in— I mean, our old fund peaked at $250 million. Now, after the redemptions that these nitwits have received, thank God, you know, they're down to $140 million, I think, in assets.

So there's not a whole lot of money in FloatShrink but we're starting other funds.

Erik Townsend: It's refreshing to see, you know, an innovative strategy like that. through an ETF, so it's available to retail investors and not restricted to accredited investors.

Charles Biderman: Well, and also, I mean, if I could tout my own horn, so to speak, the brand is really free cash flow. So if you had just invested in companies growing free cash flow over the years and avoided companies with negative cash flow, you would have made money. You would have outperformed each year.

And why people don't have free cash flow as the key metric I don't know. I mean, earnings— billions of dollars of computer time have been spent analyzing earnings and sales and investing on, you know, trying to predict earnings, trying to predict all that stuff, and no one's ever come up with a model. Or maybe because so much money has gone in there that there's no differentiation. You know, without knowing something ahead of time that you shouldn't know, using earnings as an investment model doesn't work.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Charles Biderman: Work or sales, but free cash flow does. So we're coming up— we have an international fund, TrimTabs International Free Cash Flow, FCFI, that's been out for close to a year.

It's been out a year. We're planning on launching other funds, small-cap free cash flow, tech, emerging market, all kinds of stuff like that. And we have in the pipeline, we're planning on— we have nothing And no Fed paperwork, so I can talk about that.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, thanks so much for sharing the strategy openly with our listeners. I know that— I'm sure you don't have a ticker symbol yet for the new ETF, but when you do, I imagine it will be at trimtabs.com. Is that— I know when you're not busy recovering from being fired for no apparent reason, you also do quite a bit of writing on markets. So before we close, for our listeners who want to follow your work, is that at trimtabs.com or

Charles Biderman: Well, TrimTabs.com, and also, I also do, because of all the new stuff and I've been doing less writing, I no longer do the daily or the videos and the blogs, but on my Facebook page, I have all the times I go on. I'm on regular with Rick Santelli once a month, and other times there are other articles I write are on my Facebook page. So, if you don't mind looking at pictures of me in Hawaii, walking on the beach.

In between those, there are links to the articles I've written or written about me and my TV appearances.

Erik Townsend: Okay, well, Charles, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Aaron Chan will be back with me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break: guest requests and suggestions

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: what ties central bankers' hands

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, I agree a lot with what Mr. Biderman said there, and I'm constantly thinking about the catalysts. And I noticed you're asking not only Mr. Biderman but several of our past guests about what could bring this all down, like what could tie the central bank's hands around their back. So besides runaway inflation, what else are you seeing in terms of catalysts?

Erik Townsend: Let's look at the overall picture here, Aaron, because what Charles Biderman said is something that I've said in the past, which is that the thing to watch for is when central banks continue to print money, continue to be accommodative, as they continue to conjure more money supply out of thin air with the printing press. When they do that and markets go down anyway, that's the thing to watch for. Now, I couldn't agree more with Charles that if that happens, absolutely, it is a huge, very important signal, and it means that the market has lost confidence in the Fed. And even more printed money is not going to save the day.

The view that I've come around to in the last couple of years, though, because I was saying that since 2009, the thing that I've come around to is, boy, in this crazy world that we live in, if you print money out of thin air, it has to go someplace, and it goes into asset markets. And that means that this charade is going to continue, I think, until something ties central bankers' hands so they can't get away with printing money out of control. And to my thinking, the most important question— and to be sure, again, if what Charles Biderman described happens, which is they're printing money like it's going out of style and it's not helping, asset markets are going down anyway— that is a huge signal. I'm afraid that that might not happen. I think that maybe we can just keep on inflating asset markets until this thing gets to the point where something ties central bankers' hands.

And so, to me, the $64 trillion question That I think is just the most important topic right now in finance are, what are the things that could happen that would prevent central bankers from being able to print money out of thin air and use it to prop up the economy and asset markets?

One thing that we've discussed before on the program is inflation. If we had runaway inflation, which we definitely do not have right now, although Alan Greenspan actually commented this past week that he thinks that we might be coming—

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: I mean, back close to it. If we got runaway inflation, then central banks would be forced to hike rates in order to prevent the inflation from turning into hyperinflation. So, that would tie their hands. They wouldn't be able to exhibit this recklessly accommodative policy that we've seen for the last few years.

The only other thing that I've been able to think of so far that would tie their hands would be political backlash If there is some kind of frustration where let's say a political candidate really takes a strong position and gets the country united around the idea that, hey, all of this money printing is not for the benefit of we the people, it's for the benefit of Wall Street. What we've accomplished with quantitative easing has been to prop up asset markets which help rich people and they don't help the common person. What we need to do is from now on not We cannot spend any central bank money on propping up asset markets. If we're going to print money out of thin air, it can only be used for, let's say, infrastructure programs or helicopter money.

You know, just giving a check to everybody in the country or something. If they go in that direction, and now the mechanism of transmission of this newly printed money cannot, because of some political resistance, go into asset markets, it has to go into poor people's pockets instead. Well, that would certainly completely change this picture we have. Short of those 2 things, it seems to me that as long as we have a deflationary backdrop, the central banks can get away with continuing this. And the more that they get away with it, the more complacent they become.

And if you look long-term at history, what history teaches us is that major, massive inflations like the Weimar Germany event were preceded by significant rounds of deflation. And I think the, you know, my logical model for this, how it works, is in a deflationary backdrop, you print money, a lot of people raise their hands and say, this is not smart, this is not good, it's going to cause massive inflation. And then that inflation doesn't happen immediately. And so the central bankers become more and more complacent, and they print more and more money, and more and more money, as Rudi von Havenstein did in Weimar Germany.

Aaron Chan: Mm-hmm.

Erik Townsend: Eventually, that deflationary backdrop transitions into inflation, and you've printed so much money at that point that the inflation runs away and you have a hyperinflation risk. I don't think we're there yet in this story. I think we have a ways to go. But as I see it, until you get the adverse effect of this, central bankers can get away with continuing to do this. And even as much as I don't like I don't like it, and I think it's immoral because it's causing such an incredible risk.

The longer this thing goes on, the longer they prop things up, and the longer this charade is allowed to continue, the harder the eventual fall will be. There can be no free lunch. As Ludwig von Mises so famously said, there is no way to avoid the adverse consequence of a massive credit expansion as we've had. The question is whether or not to be a grown-up about it and deal with the problem head-on, or wait until there's a colossal crash. And what history has taught us is central bankers wait until there's a colossal crash. I don't think that we have any imminent risk of that. I think they can continue to print trillions of dollars and prop asset markets for a while longer here. And yes, it is setting us up for a much worse than 2008 kind of event someday.

But I don't think it happens until something ties their hands. I would be delighted if markets could be the governor, as Charles Biderman suggested in this interview, and the central banks are printing money recklessly and irresponsibly, and markets say, no, this is crazy, this doesn't make sense anymore, we're going to allow asset markets to sell off even in the face of all of this easy money policy. So far, we haven't seen that, and I don't think we're going to. Wall Street is a very short-term, you know, short-sighted kind of culture. And if there's free money for the taking, people are going to invest it in asset markets and continue to blow this bubble bigger and bigger.

And I think that we have to look— so, you know, what I'm trying to ask as many of our guests as I can is, I've thought of one clear trigger, which is if we had runaway inflation. Let's assume that that's still a ways off. What are the other triggers that would tie the central bankers' hands so they couldn't continue this charade? Because Because when something happens to take away their printing press, look out below. It's going to be an ugly picture.

Postgame: Greenspan, negative rates and cash hoarding

Aaron Chan: Right, Erik. And I don't know if you've seen that chart, but you can— the deflation and then followed by the hyperinflation that you talked about in Weimar Germany, there's actually a really nice chart of that that shows how the inflation goes down, or you have disinflation, then massive inflation afterwards. So it seems like one of those things that happens slowly and then all at once, just like bankruptcy. But interesting you bring up the Greenspan interview on Bloomberg. We were talking about this last And Greenspan actually talks about the introduction, or the possible introduction, of negative interest rates in the United States and what that would lead to in terms of a run on the fractional reserve system here in the United States and people packing currency into their vaults. But there being a limited amount of currency for this to happen. So would you want to expand on that a little bit, Erik?

Erik Townsend: You know, I felt so validated to hear Alan Greenspan saying these things. You know, I've been talking on this program for a long time about my view which is that as we get to negative interest rates, there's a huge systemic risk which central bankers are not taking seriously enough. And that is that by having negative interest rates, you create a financial incentive for people to hoard cash instead of keeping it in the bank. And if people are hoarding cash and putting it in safe deposit boxes, that means that the fractional reserve banking system could potentially be at risk of Of failure, because all of a sudden, if people are taking all this cash out to put it in a safe deposit box, the banks are under-reserved, and they don't have the ability to service their other accounts, and you get a huge systemic risk.

Now, admittedly, for that to happen, you'd have to have a whole lot of cash hoarding, because, you know, you'd have to draw out all of the reserves from the fractional reserve banking system. Something I hadn't given enough thought to, and I can't believe, It's an ex-Federal Reserve chairman who woke me up to this risk, as I thought, you know, this is about the size of the reserves that banks need to hold. How much cash hoarding would it take before you actually had a risk systemic level to the whole fractional reserve system falling apart? And it's a lot of cash hoarding. What Alan Greenspan himself pointed out in this Bloomberg interview is even though the money supply Which is trillions of dollars, is not going to get used up.

There's only so much physical banknotes, actual cash dollar bills in circulation. And if people start to hoard cash, what you'll have is a run and a shortage of physical currency. It's not a question— I think the way I would describe this, I was thinking about something that would have to happen further on before my scenario even begins to play out. You get to where there is a shortage of physical banknotes just because people are hoarding them and putting in safe deposit boxes. Now, that's what Alan Greenspan said in this interview, and I thought it was tremendously validating because I couldn't believe a Federal Reserve chairman would confirm my views on this particular subject.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: But it got me to thinking, Aaron. I thought, wait a minute, there's a whole angle here. You think about George Soros and reflexivity. What happens if what Alan Greenspan said starts to play out, which is you start to have a shortage on physical banknotes.

So, there's plenty of money supply in the banking system, but there's not enough actual pieces of paper for people to put in their vaults in order to hoard cash as they're taking it out of the bank. Well, you know what governments very much want to do, which is to outlaw cash. And they would like us to believe it has something to do with terrorism. I think that's nonsense. I think it has to do with governments having more control, people having less privacy, And being able to tax people and control their finances and not allow people the economic freedom that they used to have. Well, let's suppose that Alan Greenspan's scenario plays out and there's not enough banknotes. Well, you might say, well, that's not a big deal because they could easily just print up a bunch more physical banknotes in order to replace some of the electronic money supply that exists in the banking system.

Well, why would the government do that if they don't like people having cash? They would like to ban cash, but it's very hard to do because it presents all kinds of constitutional legal challenges and so forth. Well, it occurred to me, you know, the gold bugs like to talk about the decoupling of the price of physical gold from paper gold. What if there was actually a decoupling of the price of physical cash from cash in your bank account? So, what if all of a sudden the bank said, Look, there's a shortage on physical banknotes. We can't get enough of them because they're being hoarded. The government, of course, would tell people it's terrorists that are hoarding this. It's all a result of terrorists. We can't print more banknotes because we don't want to help the terrorists. So the new policy is, if you want to take $20 out of your bank account by writing me a check for $20 and I deposit it into my bank account, that's fine.

But if you want to take a $20 bill out of the ATM, They're gonna charge you $21. There's a 5% surcharge for taking physical cash out of the system. Now, you haven't legally banned it. You've just put a cost premium on it.

That means you don't have to deal with the constitutional challenges and all that stuff. I hope I'm not giving anybody in the government ideas here with this interview. But I realized it would be very much in the government's interest, if you believe their agenda is what I think it is, to allow a premium in the cost of physical paper cash to develop over the cost of money in the banking system, because it just creates a disincentive for people to hold physical cash. And I can't believe it's Alan Greenspan who prompted me to come to this theory.

Postgame: negative rates and the thrift question

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, the question that pops up in my mind, and I understand what you're saying about the premium over cash, but in the situation where people are actually hoarding cash and putting in their vaults, or I guess for many people putting it under their mattress, It probably belies some sort of mistrust in the system. So, how do you keep things going after that? I mean, is it some kind of digital currency? How do you get people to trade and to participate in commerce again when there is this giant, as you say, premium on cash?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that it's a question of when we get to negative interest rates. What happens is when you have negative interest rates that are significant enough that large financial actors Depositors can say, hey, we've got, you know, $1 billion in the bank. It makes much more sense to have $1 billion in cash and put it in our own vault so that we don't have to pay a privilege in a negative interest rate for having it. The vaulting is cheaper. Well, you've got to pay for the vaulting, you've got to pay for the security guard. So, it has to be not just, you know, a 3 basis points negative interest rate. It's got to be a significant negative interest rate. But if we got to the point where deposits in banks cost you 1%, somebody with a whole lot of money would say it's better to take cash.

As a few people with a lot of money take it out and you have that draw on the system, the government could easily print more physical banknotes, but my contention is they might not want to. And I think that it is very much, if you listen to a lot of politicians, we've gone from a society where it was the job of government to teach people social responsibility and financial maturity. You should have savings and investment, and you should protect yourself by saving some money for a rainy day. We've actually gotten to the point where the government is trying to prop up the economy by encouraging spending, including encouraging people to spend beyond their means on borrowed money in many cases.

So it's actually being viewed as, as socially irresponsible to have savings, because if you're a rich guy, You owe it to the rest of society to spend that money. And there have even been proposals from some politicians saying, you know, what we should be doing is creating some kind of debit card system where you have to put your money in this card that has an expiration date, kind of like airline frequent flyer miles. If you don't use them by a certain date, then they're going to expire.

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And so they're encouraging irresponsible economic behavior from citizens, and there are people in charge of the government think that's a good idea. So as long as those people are in charge, I think we're going to see this continued pressure that anybody who has savings ought to be spending it to support the economy. And things like negative interest rates, which create a disincentive from saving and encourage consumption, are going to be favored by government.

So I think it's a pretty nasty picture. And what it really comes back to is the viewpoint of government has gotten pretty crazy. You know, when I was a kid, you went to the bank, you talked to a politician, whatever, they would say, young man, you need to learn responsibility. You should have a piggy bank. You should learn to save for a rainy day. You know, people who went through the Great Depression learned a big lesson about debt, and there was a whole generation that wouldn't touch debt after that. We've forgotten those lessons, and we're going completely in the other direction. And I think we are headed towards negative interest rates. We've already got them in a lot of places. in the world. I don't see any reason why we can't get there in the United States unless the runaway inflation happens. Then you have to see some monetary policy tightening. But, you know, when we had 4% 10-year Treasury yields, everybody thought it was crazy and they couldn't possibly go lower.

Now, you know, we're below 2%, and I think we're headed below 1%.

Postgame: gold versus real assets

Aaron Chan: Yeah, it seems— it may seem a little extreme, but I can almost imagine this dystopian future where Where you have these Uncle Sam posters saying, I want you to spend, right? And it's really crazy because when you think about capitalism, what does capitalism require? Capitalism requires capital. And how do you get capital? You get capital through savings. But you can't be saving if there's negative interest rates. So it's like a Looney Tunes universe to me. But Erik, you mentioned the gold bugs earlier, and I know that a lot of our listeners are interested in gold. I mean, where do you see gold in this context or in this situation?

Erik Townsend: Yeah. Well, I definitely think that gold will be a benefactor for sure. When, when this stuff starts to happen, as you get to negative interest rates, one of the obvious ways to protect yourself from negative interest rates is going to be to buy precious metals, because it's accomplishing something similar to the idea of hoarding cash in a bank account, but you're putting it in a store of value that even if the currency itself were to lose value, Which, if we get to massive inflation, it will. And I think that that big inflation is coming someday. I don't know how far off it is. The hedge against that massive inflation is precious metals. The thing you've got to realize is that precious metals, in terms of their capacity to absorb massive capital flows, can only happen with a huge change in price.

And of course, the gold bug community loves to predict that massive change in price with so much savings coming out of the fiat money system going into gold, it would result in a dramatically massive increase in price. Well, that's true, but as that starts to happen, people realize, you know, it's already— the price has already moved too much. It's no longer a bargain to be buying gold when it's $5,000 an ounce, or who knows what it will get to someday. I think also that the mistake that a lot of gold bugs make is they assume— they hear these predictions, and they are credible predictions.

People who are saying that we will eventually get to $5,000 to $10,000 per ounce gold prices, I think that's absolutely realistic. I think it's going to happen. It's going to happen in our lifetimes, for sure. But the thing is, that doesn't mean you're going to get rich because you bought at $1,000 and the price goes to $5,000 and now you have 5 times as much purchasing power. What's going to happen is you're going to have the same amount of purchasing power. You're not going to lose purchasing power because the value of the currency went down like the people around you did, but you're going to preserve your purchasing power. It's not a get-rich asset. It's a stay-rich asset to preserve your wealth in the face of a currency depreciation. We don't have that in the United States right now. We have appreciation of the US dollar.

I think that's set to continue for a while. Eventually, we'll get into a dramatic depreciation.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: Gold will be a fantastic hedge, but it's not a get-rich asset. It's a stay-rich asset.

Aaron Chan: Yeah. And one of the things that I remember most from your interview with Raoul Pal from Real Vision is that we have to try and understand these assets on a relative basis. So gold relative to everything else. And when basically gold has a positive carry relative to Treasuries or, say, Bunds, it's really fascinating to think about where that might be headed in the future. And Erik, I guess the smart people will get into precious metals, but the even smarter people will be converting their precious metals and the gains that they're getting on precious metals into real assets, be it like agricultural land or real estate or means of production. Wouldn't you say so?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, I mean, the trade-off you have to understand here— first of all, real assets are going to be the place to be when we eventually get to the big inflation. We're not there yet. Where you're going to want to be when the inflation happens is in real assets, but the trade-off is precious metals are are the ultimate preservation of purchasing power, but they are not productive. They don't make anything. Something like a farm that is producing agricultural products that are essential to feed the people around you, that is actually producing wealth. Now, it has the downside that unlike precious metals, you're potentially exposed to the monetary system and the economy, and you know, you, you could lose a lot of value if some big depression happens, whereas you might be hedged against that in precious metals. But the precious metals are not going to create new wealth. They're only going to preserve purchasing power. So it's just a matter of understanding the difference between productive assets versus hedging assets.

And I think it's a question that a lot of people haven't given enough thought to.

Postgame: fall guest wish list

Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, I don't know too much about gold's nutritional content, but I think you're right there. So I think that's all the time we have for this week. Erik, is there anything you'd like to add before we close?

Erik Townsend: Well, folks, what if I were to tell you that Aaron is working on a fantastic fall lineup of rockstar guests featuring Mark Hart, Sam Zell, David Hay, Neil Howe, Martin Armstrong, Russell Napier, Jeff Gundlach, Felix Zulauf, Nouriel Roubini, Art Cashin, David Rosenberg, Stephanie Pomboy, Dylan Grice, and yes, even our most requested guest, Kyle Bass. Are you as excited as we are about that lineup? Well, don't get too excited yet because actually those are the names of people on our wish list who are currently ignoring our interview invitations as much as Aaron is trying. And it's understandable why, you know, these are super famous, super busy people, and there are dozens of financial podcasts now. A few years ago there was only 2 or 3.

And unless they've heard of us or someone has put a good word in for us, their handlers are going to just ignore our emails, which is what's been happening.

So folks, we're not asking for your money, but we really do need your help. If there are people in our audience who either know these people personally or know someone who knows them or know how to get a message in their ear, please put in a good word for us, particularly if you are a client or investor in one of their funds or something like that. We just had one of our regular listeners who is a client of Gary Shilling hook us up with Gary. And of course, if that introduction comes from a client, it gets a very different reception than a cold call. So we're very excited to have Gary coming up later in August. And we really could use your help, folks. Those of you who are in the business and are on the Bloomberg platform, you know that a Bloomberg message carries more weight than a regular email with a lot of people in the finance business.

Right. So if you can help us persuade these folks that MacroVoices really is worth their time, we'll be able to bring you that fantastic lineup. Couple of selling points that might be helpful if you're putting a word in for us: we are one of the very few podcasts on the net that is fully professionally produced. We have an audio engineer in a studio, professional recording studio, that produces talk radio essentially, that does all of our production and editing. It's not just a Skype call that's been tape recorded and played back. back on a podcast someplace.

We are hosted by an active macro hedge fund manager, yours truly. A little bit different from most of the programs on the internet. And this next one is particularly important if you are talking to hedge fund managers, some of the people we most want to get on the program.

We now estimate that we have in excess of 2,000 accredited investors who are regular listeners to the program. In the interest of full disclosure, I should tell you that where that number comes from is we actually have just over 500 of you who have registered at MacroVoices.com and told us that you are accredited investors. But we also have about a 4 or 5 to 1 registration ratio. If we look at our download statistics versus our total registration statistics, only 1 in 4 regular listeners has so far registered at MacroVoices.com. So if you extrapolate from that, we think there's about 2,000 accredited investors listening to the program.

And of course, that's so important to a fund manager. Because those are the people that are eligible to invest in their fund, potential customers. So I'm going to read the list one more time: Mark Hart, Sam Zell, David Hay, Neil Howe, Martin Armstrong, Russell Napier, Jeff Gundlach, Felix Zulauf, Nouriel Roubini, Art Cashin David Rosenberg, Stephanie Pomboy, Dylan Grice, and of course, Kyle Bass. We would love to get any or all of these people into our fall lineup on the program. They need only to email Aaron, that's aaron@macrovoices.com, to book their interviews in October and November. I think we're already booked through the end of September.

Aaron Chan: Actually, Erik, I just heard back from Russell Napier yesterday afternoon, and he sounded sincerely interested in appearing on the show at some point, but said that he was busy right now and asked me to get back to him in a couple of months.

Erik Townsend: Dude, that's fantastic news. Russell Napier is one of my all-time favorite financial commentators, so I really hope We hope that you can close that deal. Still, listeners, if you know Russell, please feel free to still put in a good word for us. It sounds like he's not quite committed yet, but he's interested. And as far as everyone else is concerned, if you know the other people on the list, please help us persuade them that MacroVoices is worth their time.

Postgame: register at MacroVoices.com; Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: The other thing you can do to help us is please register your free account at MacroVoices.com, especially you accredited investors. The more people we have registered, it's a statistic that we can give to guests and say, Look, we've got this many people listening, we've got this many accredited investors listening. The hedge fund managers love to hear that, and that helps us get the most desirable guests recruited for the program. And of course, when you register, you get the benefit of receiving our free Research Roundup email every week, which gives you all kinds of interesting information about supplemental materials from our featured guest— charts, graphs, so forth— as well as all of the coolest free research that we could find on the internet every If you don't want it for some reason, it's no problem. There's a safe unsubscribe link. You only have to click it once and you won't get it ever again. But we found that everybody that's been getting it so far, we have an incredibly small number of opt-outs from the Research Roundup and everybody seems to be really enjoying it.

So, Aaron, why don't we tell everybody what's in this week's Research Roundup?

Aaron Chan: Yeah. So we've linked the Greenspan Bloomberg interview that Erik and I were just talking about. And we've got commentary on the latest Q2 US GDP print from 720 Global. And Gavekal Capital, as well as Art Berman's latest thoughts on oil. Finally, and I'm sure many of our listeners will be familiar with Jason Zweig, notes that the search for yield is now becoming reckless. And from our listeners, many of you may also be familiar with Michael Medici, who is a regular contributor in the listener forums, as well as one of our biggest proponents on Twitter. He's got an interesting article about what it means to be the guy on the other side of the trade. So expect that and a lot more in this week's Research Roundup.

Outro and disclaimer

Aaron Chan: Well, that does it for this week's edition. Our goal is to bring you the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics, and our subscribers play a massive role in helping us recruit such guests. As Erik mentioned, we're working diligently on an all-star lineup, and we continue to seek your help. Be it a retweet or follow on Twitter, or simply sharing the podcast and forwarding the Research Roundup newsletter, every bit helps us grow our community and to reach industry rock stars like Kyle Bass, Jeffrey Gundlach, Mark Hart, Stephanie Pomboy, and Martin Armstrong, just to name a few.

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.

Aaron Chan: Finally, we have a lot of smart people in our pro finance community, and a lot of you also do your own writing and analysis. If you'd like your article to be featured in an upcoming edition of the Research Roundup, feel free to shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter.

You can follow Erik @ErikSTownsend or myself @_AaronChan_ for the latest news on MacroVoices or general market commentary. Also, don't forget to follow our main account @MacroVoices. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.MacroVoices.com. Once registered, You'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library. And the more registered users we have, the more we're able. To recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com.

And we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants. And do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, Visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Consider a Donation

Looking for the Downloads?

MACRO VOICES is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented in MACRO VOICES should NOT be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making important investment decisions. The opinions expressed on MACRO VOICES are those of the participants. MACRO VOICES, its producers, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall NOT be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MACRO VOICES.

Go to top