Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen, head of the School of Economics, Policy and History at Kingston University in London (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. MacroVoices episode 20 was recorded on June 23rd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Professor Steve Keen is back by popular request as today's feature interview guest. I'll be talking to Professor Keen about Brexit, alternative currencies, negative interest rates, and the inevitability of another financial crisis.

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. The big news of the week is clearly a result of the Brexit referendum in the U.K. We're recording this week's show at about 8:00 PM London time on Thursday evening, and the polls will remain open for another hour.

Brexit referendum and equities

Aaron Chan: Now, while the result of the referendum vote isn't known to us, tape action in the pound sterling, which has been hovering near 2016 highs this afternoon, suggests that markets are pricing in relatively high confidence that the result will be a decision to remain in the E.U. Erik, while we're on that topic, what's your take on the Brexit issue in general before we move on to specific asset classes and how likely it'll be affected in either outcome?

Erik Townsend: Well, clearly, this has been the risk event of the year in terms of its significance. Everybody has been scared to death as to what the financial market reaction could be to a leave vote. But I agree with you, markets are pricing in a stay outcome. I think that there might be a little bit of excessive confidence in that outcome because, frankly, the polls have been back and forth for the last few days. The undecided component is large enough that I don't think it's really close enough to call anything. However, some of the big banks have commissioned their own exit polls, even though there's no official exit poll. So I suspect that what we're seeing in terms of today's market action is a reflection of the big banks having better information than we do, and probably having good information that allows them to conclude that Leave is unlikely, and that staying in the European Union is the more likely outcome.

If we were to have that outlier event, though, if there was a Leave outcome, to this vote. That, again, starts an unknown process that nobody's ever been through that takes at least 2 years and involves the other countries in the E.U. voting as to whether or not the country that wants to leave is allowed to leave. It's very complex and it's never been done before. A stay result would likely result in a pop in asset markets, but I don't see it as much more than that.

Aaron Chan: So, we've seen a fair bit of volatility in the S&P over the last few weeks in the lead-up to the Brexit vote. Markets are still trading as we're recording this program on Thursday afternoon, with E-mini S&P futures trading just above 2,100 just before Thursday's close. Where do you see stocks headed from here in the case of either result?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that there is a pop in equity prices that likely comes from a stay result, which is most likely. And remember, we were trading as high as 2,120 before the fear of an exit vote started to come into the system. So probably back up towards that number over the next couple of days. Maybe even higher. Does it take us to new all-time highs? I don't know. It's possible. But I don't think that the question is so much what the short-term reaction is as much as it's will it last.

You know, there's really nothing that has been corrected or solved or whatever. There's a fear that was we didn't know what could happen if we had an exit vote, a leave vote. Assuming that that doesn't happen, I think that we probably get back to where we were. Does it take us to all-time highs? I don't know. If there is a leave vote, I think that is definitely not priced in, and what would happen is a very sharp move to the downside. Then, of course, politicians would try to contain it by saying, well, this doesn't mean we have to leave; it just means Parliament will take this referendum under advisement. And that would probably result in a bounce. And then, you know, the UK Independence Party would come out and say, no, this is the will of the people; we need to proceed with leaving. And I think it would induce a huge amount of volatility, mostly to the downside.

I don't think that's likely to happen at this.

Crude oil: inventories, time spreads, Nigeria

Aaron Chan: Pivoting to oil, WTI crude was trading on a $45 handle briefly as we were taping last week's show. Since then, it recovered back above $50 before running into some volatility when this week's inventory numbers came out. What do you make of the action in crude oil generally, and what would the effects of either Brexit outcome likely be?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's been fascinating this week. The big inventory number is Wednesday morning reported by the EIA, which is the official U.S. government agency. The American Petroleum Institute, API, reports on Tuesday afternoon, and that report is given a huge amount of credibility by traders as an indication of what's going to happen with the EIA data the next morning. Now, why they give it so much credibility, I don't know, because API is frankly wrong more often than they're right. In this case, it was definitely no exception to that rule. API reported a 5.2 million barrel drawdown in national crude oil inventories. Not that unbelievable for this time of year. Because we are in the middle of summer driving season. But then the next morning, EIA reported, actually, no, the number is really only 917,000 barrels, less than a million-barrel drawdown, and really pretty darn small for this time of year.

Even more interesting and disturbing is you normally expect to see drawdowns in gasoline and distillate inventories, the finished products that are manufactured from crude oil. They both saw builds this week, 627,000 barrels of gasoline added to inventory, 151,000 barrels of distillates added to inventory. That adds up to 778,000 barrels. Well, if you take that out of the total 917,000-barrel draw, the net drawdown is only 139,000 barrels of petroleum-related products, both crude oil and, you know, net of the build in finished product inventories. This is Right in the heart of summer driving season, and that's not what's supposed to happen this time of year. So as much as I had kind of given up on my bearish thesis, where I had earlier in the year thought that we were headed towards a storage crisis in the springtime, well, we can't get through fall maintenance season until we start to see some bigger drawdowns than this. And so far, they're not happening.

To give you a sense of the scale of this, in order to get to normal inventory levels by Labor Day, we would need to see 12 million barrels per week of inventory drawdown. drawdowns on national crude oil inventory. If you look at the 917,000-barrel drawdown, that's only about 7.5% of that 12 million barrel figure. If you take that 917 and net out the effects of the builds and finished products, then you're only at 1.1% of the required number. So, we're not seeing anything close to the drawdowns that we need. The question is what happens over the next 2 months. So, I'm going to be watching those inventory numbers very carefully. What is very interesting, though, and a sigh of relief in terms of the risk of a storage crisis, is Cushing, Oklahoma, which is the most important number, saw a drawdown of 1.28 million barrels. That takes us down to 87.5% of Cushing capacity. Remember, we got to 97.5% just a few weeks ago.

To my own astonishment, the market didn't panic at 97.5%, so it's certainly not going to panic here at 87.5%.

Another thing to consider in terms of the price rebound that we have seen since that $45 handle we had taping last week's show, that was very short-lived. We're back up to just above $50 as we're taping. But about 50 cents of that came from the contract roll. The July contract expired this week. August is the new front month. August has been trading at least 50 cents higher than July all along. So that $50.11 number, if you corrected it to what the July number would have been if that contract was still trading, would be about 50 cents lower.

Fascinating action this week in the time spreads. That's the difference in price from one month to the next. When we saw the API inventory number spike prices higher, normally what happens if the front month gets spiked higher, it moves up. The longer-dated contracts are normally less volatile, so you would expect compression in those time spreads. They went the other way. Then on Wednesday morning, when we saw the EIA number come out with a much smaller drawdown of only 917,000 barrels as opposed to API's 5.2 million, that caused the front-month price to go straight down. You'd normally expect that to widen the spreads because you'd expect the longer-dated contracts not to go down as quickly, but the opposite happened again. Well, how is that possible? My hypothesis is that what's going on is when they see a number like API saying, okay, we've got a very bullish result here, I think that the producers that we're hedging are starting to slow down their hedging activities, and that's what's resulting in the spreads widening in reaction, opposite of what you would normally expect.

Similarly, when EIA came out the next morning and said, no, it's the other direction, now what happens is the producers start to say, uh-oh, I missed the boat. I really do want to be hedging here, and they start selling the long-dated contracts more. That's the only explanation I can come up with for this sort of backwards price action in the time spreads.

As far as what could happen in terms of the referendum, there's really no reason for the U.K. leaving the European Union to have any direct effect on the price of crude oil. But pretty much everybody expects all asset markets to be affected by this in the sense that a leave vote would result in everything selling off, and probably there's at least a short-lived pop-up in the result of a remain vote. Would that take us back to that $51.90 target that we haven't hit yet, that a lot of technicians have targeted as a major retracement level?

Aaron Chan: Yes.

Erik Townsend: Is that a significant level that might mark a top in this market? I'm not sure. We'll probably find out tomorrow.

The other issue that's affecting crude oil this week, Nigerian government has announced, ta-da, we have a ceasefire with the Niger Delta Avengers. Shortly after that announcement, the Niger Delta Avengers announced, no, we don't. So it's not really clear. And then there was another report that said maybe they do. So is there really a ceasefire on the table that's agreed to in Nigeria, or is that wishful thinking? I think it remains to be seen. In any case, look for more volatility as a result of whatever news flow comes out of Nigeria.

Gold outlook after the Brexit vote

Aaron Chan: So you opined last week that gold would be the most likely benefactor of a leave vote, but the shiny yellow metal has been pretty soft this week, even as other asset classes were falling on Brexit risk-off fears. So what's on the horizon for gold in the face of either outcome?

Erik Townsend: Well, CPM Group had a research note out this week, which registered MacroVoices users will find a link to in your Research Roundup email. I mostly agree with it. What they're saying is they think gold moves lower from here regardless of the outcome. I would disagree slightly, saying I think that a leave vote at this point would surprise everybody and there would be at least a short-term up spike in the price of gold. But I definitely agree with them in the more likely case of a remain in the EU vote. In that case, I think that basically what CPM Group said is there's been a lot of buying of gold in anticipation of this. The risk is over and it's probably gonna sell back off to $1,200, maybe even lower.

Aaron Chan: Okay.

Erik Townsend: If that happens, I think it's a buy down there because although a U-turn in Fed policy maybe hasn't come quite clearly into view yet, I think it's coming eventually. I think we're seeing that the Fed is realizing that this rate normalization strategy they have is not going to work and that the economy is going to need more central bank easing and accommodation. So I think that if CPM Group is right and we see maybe a trade down as low as the 200-day moving average, which right now on the futures chart looks to be at about 1177, 1,700 or so. If we got back down to that kind of number, I think gold is definitely a buy.

Remember, though, in the unlikely event of a leave vote, where the U.K. leaves the European Union, or at least initiates that process, if that really and truly led to a major crisis in asset markets, as some people have predicted, remember what happened in 2008. At first, gold spiked up, then it sold off hard with everything else, and eventually did very well.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: So, if we really got into a major sell-off event across all asset classes, I think gold would be taken down with it in the short term, and maybe the buying opportunity would be further along. More likely scenario though, I think, is the remain vote. And in that case, I think CPM Group is right. Probably the party's over in the short term, and I would look for the buying opportunity that's created by that.

US Dollar Index and the Fed

Aaron Chan: And what about the US Dollar Index, both in terms of Brexit effects and also with regard to the monetary policy?

Erik Townsend: Well, my view on the dollar is evolving for sure. I think, first of all, we'd seen a fair amount of strength in the U.S. dollar over the last several weeks. It looked like, hey, the rally is back on and the dollar's headed higher from here. What I think we're seeing is that a lot of that dollar strength was coming from people fearing the possibility of a leave vote, and a lot of people were selling pound sterling and buying dollars. That appears to be over, and we're back down to, you know, 93 or so on the Dollar Index, a little higher than that, tested below 93 today, closed above it.

I think that maybe what we're seeing here is that the market really is discounting, hey, wait a minute, the whole argument that a number of guests on this program have made is that the Fed is still on this rate normalization strategy, even if we don't believe it's gonna work out. That's the story they're telling publicly. The mainstream is buying it, and that's the reason the dollar was set to move higher, Because, at least in my opinion, the reason the dollar's been so strong for the last couple of years is the ECB and the BOJ are in easing mode, while the Fed is, at least supposedly, in a tightening mode, in a rate normalization cycle.

If the market is losing faith in the Fed's ability to follow through with its rate hiking program, that could mean that the party is over for the dollar. The big number I'd be looking for is a move below 92 on the dollar index. That was the previous low from a little over a month ago. 6 weeks ago. or so ago. If we were to go below that, I would really start to get worried that the dollar rally is over, and that changes a lot of things.

10-year Treasury yield and Fed credibility

Aaron Chan: 2 weeks ago, you said 1.7% could be a credibility level for the US 10-year Treasury, below which you thought it would be hard for the Fed to justify continuing their rate hike schedule. We've since seen it fall almost as low as 1.5%, but as of Thursday afternoon, it's recovered back to 1.73%.

So, Erik, what is the 10-year yield telling you about what's on the horizon for monetary policy?

Erik Townsend: Well, when we saw the flow into Treasuries and therefore the yield moving down, I think it was down to 1.52% or so at one point, some people were saying, okay, this means the Fed has lost credibility, that this is a major sign of a policy reversal on the horizon. I think that was a false alarm. I think the reason that we saw Treasury yields dipped so low was just people were panicking out of pound sterling, buying US dollars and buying US 10-year Treasuries with the proceeds of those sales. So I think that that's what did it.

Now that the Brexit— certainly we don't know the outcome yet as we're taping this show, but markets are assuming that we're going to have a stay vote, a remain in the EU vote. Assuming that that happens, We're back above that credibility level. And I think it really means all eyes are on the Fed.

What they've been saying, what markets have been saying, what observers have been saying are all different things. You know, the story from the Fed is still, hey, we are on our rate normalization cycle. If they were to, at the July meeting, say, okay, we didn't hike rates in June because it was a week before the Brexit referendum and we didn't want to take that chance, but Brexit is behind us now. Let's assume, for the sake of argument, that there has been a remain vote on the Brexit referendum.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: And so, we're gonna go ahead and hike now in the July meeting. I think that would shock everybody and would change everything. On the other hand, if they chicken out and it seems like they really are showing more signs of capitulation, then we go in the other direction.

So, what happens with the dollar, what happens with the 10-year Treasury yield, I think is very much a function of what the FOMC does next and whether or not Janet Yellen blinks. Are they gonna stay on their story or are they going to capitulate and throw in the towel on this rate hiking cycle?

Aaron Chan: Right. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Well, this week's featured guest is Professor Steve Keen, who heads up the School of Economics, Policy, and History for Kingston University in London. He's also one of the very few mainstream economists who saw the 2008 crisis coming and accurately predicted what would occur.

When Erik interviewed Professor Keen 6 weeks ago on MacroVoices episode 14, he mentioned in passing that he could do an entire interview on the subject of alternative currencies. So listener response was overwhelming. So by popular request, Professor Keen is back with us this week to discuss this subject, the Brexit referendum, negative interest rates, and more.

Erik's interview with Professor Keen is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Keen on the Brexit vote: why he expects Remain to win

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: I'm delighted to welcome back Professor Professor Steve Keen, who offered so kindly to come back and talk to us about alternative currencies. Before we go there, obviously the topic of the day is the Brexit referendum. We are recording this interview at about 5:00 PM London time. The polls don't close until 9:00 PM. It appears just from looking at the tape action, Steve, like markets are expecting that a remain outcome is most likely. Your boots on the ground there in London, what are you seeing? Where do you think things are headed? And what do you think comes next?

Steve Keen: Well, I think the market is Well, I think the expectation I have is that the Remain case will win as well, mainly because first of all, it's been so finely balanced when they do the overall polls. So all the way through, people have been saying in recent surveys, like 53% for Leave and 47% for Remain. So you could have seen a line ball going for Remain. Of course, a large number of voters were in the undecided category. And when you— when you— what they normally do is proportionally allocate them to either the The remain or leave case. That's where you get the 53-47 type numbers from. But the reality is there really is a don't know category, and they might be 20% of those who vote.

And of course, also, it's an optional vote. You don't have to vote.

So given all those situations, little things— not little things— little things like the weather in London could be enough to swing the vote. Because if it's a miserable day, which it is, and raining a lot, which it is, then the people who aren't committed might decide, I won't bother voting, I'll wait, sit back and see what happens.

So that's something that could actually favor the leave case.

In the other direction, and far more important, of course, the murder of Jo Cox last week by a lunatic, apparently a member of the Britain First group, and certainly influenced by them. That's the first politically motivated murder in England for 25 or 30 years. That is such a horrific event that people who would have been wavering and wondering which way do I go, I think when they get to the ballot might have that in their mind and go, I'll vote Remain. So my overall expectation is Remain is going to win as well.

Economic impact of Brexit and the Groucho Marx question

Erik Townsend: And what is your view in terms of what should happen? Obviously, as an economist, you have a much deeper view of the effects on Britain's economy, as well as the knock-on effects to the rest of the EU and the rest of the world. What's your view on this?

Steve Keen: Yeah. Well, in terms of what's the impact on the economy, I'm actually siding with Richard Werner on this front. Richard wrote a very well-argued blog post a couple of days ago saying that— of course, I agree with him on this front— the fundamental thing that determines the level of economic activity is the creation of money in your national economy, whether that's by credit-created money by the banks or government money created by fiat with central bank-created money backing the government deficit.

And it's really what happens with that number that's got the main impact whether the economy is going to rise or fall in size. And if, and of course, if Brexit occurs, and there's therefore, as a result, there's a significant and sustained devaluation in the pound, that is going to initially cause an increase, but then ultimately cause a potential decrease in Britain's extreme trade deficit. And if there's any attempt by the EU to whack on controls to actually use as a tariff policy to try to punish the British for leaving, and I wouldn't put that past Schäuble, pushing that sort of policy through the European Union, all those factors are actually going to help to some extent British industry, even though they might cause a downturn in the economy for a short while.

So it simply isn't possible to make the definitive argument that some people are making based on standard style linear extrapolated econometric estimates. So I don't think you can make a case one way or the other. And he affirms the idea is which is better for Britain, staying in or leaving.

What I've really focused on is what I called in my Forbes column the Groucho Marxist question I posed myself. I'm in a club. Do I want to belong to this club? And frankly, the euro is such a disaster of a club. The eurozone more so than the European Union itself, of course. But it has been such a disastrous club, so badly managed. If I'm given a chance to leave, I voted for out, so I actually voted for breakfast at Brexit today.

Unintended consequences and contagion in Europe

Erik Townsend: And do you expect any unintended consequences or unexpected effects other than the ones that we've heard about? Obviously, everyone expects if Brexit were to be approved, the most likely outcome of that would be sudden and extreme turbulence in financial markets. Is there anything beyond that that you see that perhaps hasn't been covered by other pundits?

Steve Keen: Well, I think sudden and extreme turbulence in finance markets is basically a daily activity these days, isn't it? It's not as if we've had nothing but stability for the previous 50 years and suddenly we're throwing ourselves into uncertainty. I think the last 10 years have shown to people, anybody except somebody who's been infected with the neoclassical economic virus accepts that capitalism is a pretty unstable system. This is just another form of instability there. I think there are plenty of potential unintended consequences.

For example, a lot of people are voting for Remain on the basis of the racist campaign that's been run for Leave by groups like UKIP, Britain First, and so on. They're saying they don't want to give in to the racists. That's a huge political factor. Of course, that's all caused by the refugee crisis, the timing of that being independent in many ways of Britain's own reconsideration of its membership.

You could be strengthening the hands of racists here in this country. On my perspective, it is. Well, the EU and the EU's policies and the mishandling of its own refugee waves, and the idea that you can blame what's happening in England on decisions made in Brussels about refugees, has been a strong basis for the political support for groups like UKIP and Britain First in Britain. If they suddenly can't use that as an excuse anymore, they may well lose support here. So again, you really can't pick which way these things may go. But the real impact that I think Brexit would have is emboldening groups in Europe to also consider exiting. And of course, I believe that certainly France and Italy should leave the euro. They're big enough to survive the very obvious shock that would cause them changing one currency system to another, but to get out of this straitjacket and go back to nationally managed currencies where they have some sense of sovereignty and some capacity to manage their own affairs in ways that the Maastricht Treaty doesn't allow them to do at the moment.

So that could actually mean that Britain's departure from the European Union could weaken racist forces here, but increase them on the mainland. So it's one of those things where you simply— you can't make a definitive case one way or the other about what's going to happen as a consequence of this. But my feeling was I believe that Brussels has become so dictatorial. So anti-democratic in their behavior that it's about time they were forced to negotiate from a position of weakness rather than a position of strength. And of course, with Greece, they steamrolled Greece by having the complete position of strength that they controlled the currency, they controlled the banking system, they controlled the central bank of Greece. Greece was completely emasculated in that argument, and the Germans and the French could ride roughshod over the rest.

Now, in this particular case, they wouldn't be able to ride roughshod over anymore, and I think it's about time they learned some humility. So that, that to me is the main benefit of the European— of a British exit should it occur. But as I said, I think we're going to wake up tomorrow and find we're still inside the European Union.

Why the euro fails: the Le Pen scenario

Erik Townsend: Now, you've described a contagion effect if a Brexit were to happen. Let's suppose that it doesn't happen. You wake up tomorrow and you do in fact find that you're still in the European Union. It seems to me like the problems that the EU faces are not going away. So do you think that Britain staying in is going to save the day for them, or does it just delay execution by a few months or years?

Steve Keen: It delays execution. And the euro is an utterly flawed concept, and the countries in the euro— of course, you got Germany benefiting out of it because they effectively have a captive trading bloc that can't devalue again. Against them. But most of the European Union is losing very badly out of the euro, partly because of the fact that they can't devalue against the Germans, but mainly because they also can't run compensating fiscal policy and stimulate their own economies as they would be able to do if they were sovereign nations. So that's leading— that's fed the growth of Marine Le Pen in France. It's fed the growth of Beppe's party, thankfully rather more acceptable for social socially acceptable party in Italy. It led to Podemos in Spain. It's led to the rise of Sinn Féin in Ireland again.

It's what lives behind the failed attempt at liberation in Greece under Tsipras. So all these pressures, it's going to get worse. And as they get worse, everything that's identified with the European Union gets tainted as well. So as well as having the economic policies, which have been catastrophic and conservative— if I want to use the word conservative versus progressive, it's conservative in the sense that it believes the world should look like a first-year economics textbook.

That force has been running in parallel with arguments about human rights, good rights for refugees, all the other elements of the European agenda for a decent society. And of course, the failure of the economic program has tainted all those other elements of the program. So we're getting a rise of racist parties, a rise of nationalism. All that stuff, I think, is a direct consequence of this catastrophic system the Europeans created.

So it has to fail at some point. And it'll fail when a group gets in power that quite enjoys breaking rules and enjoys doing things that aren't allowed by treaties. And enjoys machismo-type events. And that's why the right normally does this sort of stuff when they get into power. And so to me, the most likely scenario is Marine Le Pen getting in, trying to negotiate to some extent inside the euro, potentially facing the iron will of Schäuble that it won't be changed, and then announcing overnight that the euro is now the franc, all debts are canceled. And we're going to go forward and build our own national currency again. And if they do that and they eliminate all private debts by writing off the debts that are denominated in euro, which is quite feasible, the French economy could boom.

And that would then legitimize the rest of Marine Le Pen's program. Now, this is very similar to what happened some years ago with a funny little bloke in Germany, whom you're not supposed to mention. But frankly, if you continue deciding not to learn from history, then you're doomed to repeat it. And I think that's what the Germans have set themselves up for this time around.

Giving up on economics; entrepreneurs and private currencies

Erik Townsend: So your prediction is regardless of Brexit, eventually the euro fails. And that is a perfect segue to the topic that we want to discuss today. I was quite taken aback last time I interviewed you about 6 weeks ago. You know, if I consider your background, Steve, you are a very well-accomplished, formally accredited economist. You're not only a professor of economics but a department head at a well-respected London university.

All expectations in your field, the natural thing to expect would be you would be writing, publishing your work into the peer review process. And just as John Taylor's career was advanced with the Taylor Rule being adopted and believed in by central bankers, we'd expect you to be working on influencing public policy, you know, creating the Keen Rule. You told us in your last interview you've become so fed up that you're not even trying to influence influence public policy. You're working with entrepreneurs on alternate currencies.

How did you get to the point where you were ready to give up on the system? How— what's this journey been like for you personally?

Steve Keen: Well, it starts from giving up on economics itself, realizing there's no chance of persuading neoclassical economists to change their minds. It's the same as trying to persuade somebody, trying to persuade a pope that there isn't Good luck. They will just not listen even if you have the evidence. If you deposit the body of Jesus Christ at the Vatican, they still won't believe you. So there's that resistance to change. And that's not just something that economists are guilty of. It's a human trait, I think. I see us being a species that believes something. We're not really logical creatures. We're believing creatures. And we believe despite the evidence until such time as it becomes absolutely overwhelming. Now, in the case of sciences like astronomy or chemistry or physics and so on, because the evidence itself can be reproduced by anybody in a laboratory, you ultimately get to the stage where the evidence overwhelms and they are forced to change their beliefs and you get progress that way.

But economics is so far removed from actually being able to touch this thing they call the economy and observe how it behaves and moves. Make definitive tests, that myths can be maintained just not just for decades but for centuries. And that's been the state of economic theory. So I don't try to persuade economists. I try to persuade new recruits to economics not to accept the way of thinking that they'll get taught by their standard professors. And when it comes to policy, there is some movement.

I have seen some substantial movement since I've been in England, and I've got a lot of respect for the Bank of England intellectual flexibility on that front. And even just recently, the Economic and Social Research Council, which funds academic research over here, has realized that they need to provide a means by which the sort of non-orthodox work that I do gets funding from the government, because they've realized that the refereeing channels inside economics work against anything outside the orthodoxy. So they've opened up a £4.8 million, what they call Network Plus Fund, just recently. So there is progress. But I think that to get the policymakers to realize they've made a complete botch of it by following the wrong theory, and then to reverse their direction and follow a different theory, that might take 10 to 15 years. And in 10 to 15 years, a lot of people frankly are going to die because of this situation we're in.

Certainly, people in Greece and Spain are dying courtesy of these policies on a substantial scale already. It'll just get worse.

So in that situation, you need a credible threat. You need something which is going to focus their minds on the need to change. And one would be the evolution of private currencies created by entrepreneurs and backed, of course, not by state fiat, but by some other means to give people capacity to trust the currency for conversion, for sale purposes. We need something like that. And frankly, entrepreneurs learn faster than economists do. I've seen entrepreneurs go through this experience, be hit by the financial crisis, see their fortunes wiped out, think, what the hell hit me? Where did that come from?

See an economist saying it's an exogenous shock and say, you've got to be kidding. It's something inside the system. Learn about the system and then realize how it functions. Okay, not only is this what wiped me out, this is a potential commercial opportunity because there are many, many people who would like to make make business transactions right now who can't make the transactions simply because of shortage of credit-based money or government-based money, let's create a private-based money instead.

So in that sense, I've always had great respect for entrepreneurs. It's made me very different to a lot of critics of capitalism who normally deride everybody in the system. I have a lot of time for people who innovate. And that's here yet again, innovation at the level of the financial sector is now necessary And it's far more likely to come from commercial sector entrepreneurs than it is from the finance sector, and certainly from governments and economists.

Alternative currency models: Bartercard, IEX, nursing dollars, Brixton pound

Erik Townsend: Now, 100 years ago, the in thing was gold-backed currencies. That's what most of the world used. And ever since the 1970s, we've moved to fiat currency, where— and actually, the proponents of fiat currency would say its principal feature is that the government gets to just decide what the size of the money supply should be, or increase it or decrease it at the push of a button, without having to have any gold backing behind it. So when you talk about moving away from the current system to something new and better, what kind of currency system should we have? Should it be another fiat system that's run by someone other than the government, or should it be gold-backed, or should it be backed by some other kind of asset? What are we talking about in terms of the nature of the currency itself?

Steve Keen: Well, look, there's still— I still think the best system is one which is a combination of fiat and credit-based money, but where we're aware of the failings of both those systems. And the failing of the fundament— when you have a mixed system like we have right now, the government might not create enough money, might make the wrong decisions. They've been doing it ever since Wachler.

And the credit banks, money-creating banks, might create credit for the purposes of speculation rather than production. And even beyond that, you have an inherent tendency, as Minsky argued, for capitalism to generate too much debt and have a debt crisis. Even if the money's all been used for productive purposes. So there's all those sorts of limitations, but if you're aware of them, it is a system which is very flexible. If we can get the money to entrepreneurs and to firms for working capital as our first priority, then it works very, very well. And the elasticity of that money system is partly where capitalism's capacity to innovate occurred compared to the stodgy behavior of the Soviets, for example, back in the day. than the days when we had central planned economies as well. So that's still, I'd say, is a preferable system.

But if you have this type of intellectual paralysis now that features with both central banks and private banks, then you need an independent group to come forward. And private entrepreneurs can create money systems based on, for example, one of the systems I know called Bartercard, which is based in Australia, is people have to join, you have to be a tradesman. And as a tradesman, you can be paid to work for another person who's part of the whole system, therefore another tradesman, in what they call trade dollars, which are basically valued dollar for dollar, Australian currency dollars to these currency dollars. But they value it in terms of your labor at $10 per hour of labor.

So in that situation, tradesmen who would like to, for example, get their house plastered can go and say, I'll be an electrician, I'll work on your electrical project, get paid half in dollars and half in trade dollars. And then that's built up a credit that you can then send to this person and say, I want you to come do plastering in my house at 10 trade dollars an hour. And that has enabled quite a substantial amount of commerce to occur, particularly in the Australian state of Victoria where it began. So systems like that are backed effectively by the labor of the members.

Erik Townsend: The system that you've just described works for people who are tradesmen and are sharing skills, but the rest of the economy obviously can't participate in something that's that focused. So when you talk about entrepreneurs generally offering currency systems on a competitive basis, what would it look like? How would this work? What are the mechanics? Are these things backed by something? If so, how would they be redeemed? And so That's—

Steve Keen: it has to be backed by something that people trust to some degree, in the same sense we currently trust banks. Because of course, if you got a check deposited in your account by Barclays Bank, for example, you wouldn't tear it up. You'd think that that is now your— you just accept the bank's crediting of your account as a form of money. And that's because you trust that the bank has the backing to enable this to happen. Okay. And it's only when we lose trust in a bank that runs on banks actually occur.

Now, you therefore have to find something else that people trust. And that's why gold always comes forward as something people think they trust the value of gold. So a gold-backed currency is one particular way that this could be achieved. But that is not what people are putting forward in these various parallel currencies that I know about. So one, of course, the backing I've just explained is based on the labor of the members.

Another one that I know, which is called IEX, it's about to start, I think, on the 1st of July. It's been launched in about 30 or so countries around the world. And that is based on the wealth of high net worth individuals who have assets they want to sell. And what this system does is say, I'm going to get a valuation. By the way, I better say I'm consulting to this firm and being paid by them. So I have to state that upfront. But I'm doing it because I think I think we need something, and I think this is a potentially successful avenue.

But back to the explanation. To become a member, you have to have at least $1 million worth of assets. The assets get valued by an auditing firm. Of course, they're verified at current price levels. Then you get a certificate, which you can then use to buy assets owned by any other person in this whole network. So effectively, it's backed by the wealth, not the labor of the individuals as it is with the barter currency. Card, but it's backed by the wealth of the individuals in this system. Then that's to enable people to sell a yacht. There's not enough monetary demand for a yacht, but they can find IEX certificates for it. A hotel chain could use that as a way of— they could value the notional value of the rooms that currently aren't being used and produced, get an IEX certificate backing that, which would then enable them to make a sale to A retail chain, and the retail chain— again, it's a parallel form of exchange.

So this is another clever way to say, what can we use as a way of backing a currency that people will trust to enable an exchange to occur? So those are at least 2. Another one I know from— and I'm not being consulting for this group, I just mentioned its system.

I know an Israeli company which has developed a system of hierarchical private currency systems. For example, the first one they did was with nursing mothers, and the nursing mothers would notionally create nursing dollars, and then with those nursing dollars, one could pay another to take care of their kids at different times. And there was a central bank within that system, which is an overall administrator who kept track of all the accounts of the nursing mothers. Then there was another one for students, I think this is first-year university students, and that was then for buying textbooks and things of that nature. And again, there'd be study assistance tied up with that group. So each of these had a system of accounts stored at a central individual who was the administrator of the system. And then they had worked out a software package to enable transfers at the central bank level, effectively, from the nursing mothers across to the students and so on.

That's another effectively based on the trust within these smaller communities, which is then extended to links between the managing agents of those systems. And the central bank notionally in the system has the capacity to create additional credits to enable more transactions within their own pyramid, and they can be linked up to another pyramid. So that's another system. Again, it's like a hierarchy of trust. So there's many, many ways that people are inventing.

The simplest way is things like councils, like Brixton Council here in London, for example, has the Brixton dollar. Now, that is actually backed by money which is deposited, bought from the central bank, deposited in an account on a £1 for 1 Brixton dollar, or Brixton pound, I think it's called, basis. And then the Brixton pounds are accepted by businesses in the Brixton community. And partly to back that, you're able to pay your council rates in Brixton dollars or Brixton pounds as well as paying in English pounds. So something like that, those are some of the sort of notional systems that are around there, and these can provide commerce that wouldn't otherwise occur because of a lack of money.

Gold-backed and energy-backed currencies

Erik Townsend: You touched on gold-backed currencies, and there are in fact some private gold-backed currencies. There's one service where you can open an account denominated in gold but it provides a credit card that allows you to use it in other currencies and automatically converts. But when I think about gold-backed currency, certainly historically for thousands of years it's been the standard, but in modern times gold is really just shiny yellow metal that doesn't have a lot of practical application. On the other hand, energy is absolutely central to the economy. So something I think about a lot is, is it possible to somehow conceive an energy-backed, say a crude oil-backed currency. The obvious problem is, you know, unlike gold, which you can store fairly easily in a vault, you'd have to have a lot of really big tanks to physically back that currency. So is there some other way to do that, to achieve an energy-backed currency?

Steve Keen: It's feasible to issue certificates that are based on the energy stored in some particular country or or like going back on, say, Saudi Arabia oil and things of that nature. The fundamental thing that backs currencies is trust. The reason that gold worked is that people trusted that gold couldn't be fabricated, which of course we know can't be made, couldn't be destroyed either, could be lost, but that gave you a sense of solidity. And we would trust that anybody who said they were using gold as a certificate that the gold actually existed. So again, trust is always that foundation. Now, whether you can convert that across to energy, I'm just not sure.

I think we have to— one thing we're going to realize, I think, is the crucial role that energy actually plays in our economy, which is ignored by mainstream economic theory and not handled well by non-orthodox theory either, I might add.

We therefore ignore the role of energy in production, but you can't produce anything without it. Now, once we realize we're in a serious ecological crisis, and that therefore means that using energy now becomes something you need effectively public allowance for, you can't just burn coal anymore. There'll be controls on that and for good ecological reasons, whether whatever Austrians might think about those sorts of government controls, they'll become vital. Since we've overloaded the planet so much. In that situation, you might then be able to say, well, I'm now going to base the currency itself on the energy, or maybe even on the waste impact of that energy on the biosphere. So, I think it's feasible. But again, I can't say that I've thought about it in enough detail to know how to go about doing it.

Risks of private money: Rothschild versus Schäuble

Erik Townsend: Now, with respect to this idea in general of entrepreneurs introducing competitive currencies, I personally love the idea of less government control. But if I put my journalist hat on, I have to ask the opposing question, which would be, you know, Baron Rothschild very famously said, let me control the supply of a nation's currency, and I care not who makes its laws.

Is there a huge risk of— you know, we've watched stock exchanges abuse the power that they have by selling information to high-frequency traders that, frankly, they shouldn't be selling. But that's what entrepreneurs do. So, is there a risk here that by putting the creation of currency in the hands of entrepreneurs, We're potentially inviting fraud and a lot of other problems.

Steve Keen: We are. There's no doubt about that. So that's the reason why we've normally stuck with fiat currencies or with the banking sector, where the banking sector needs to be licensed to be able to actually have banks created in the first place. So then that's why I largely favor the mixed fiat and credit system if it's handled properly. But the trouble is it's not Baron Rothschild we need to worry about anymore. It's Baron Schäuble. Krugler that now controls the money supply. And rather than creating too much or doing fraud, they're creating too little and causing economic chaos. So we've got ourselves the wrong Baron Rothschild. And that really is a product of economic theory. This is why I'm such a battler on economics in general. Economic theory is so misleading about the nature of money and the nature of capitalism that it's led to people believing total myths about the stuff. And yet, to get a job running a central bank, you have to have a PhD in economics.

Well, that's where this paralysis is coming from.

So I don't see private currencies as a permanent solution. I see it as something we need for a while until central bankers are no longer trained in neoclassical economics and learn something realistic, and then understand how the system they operate actually works rather than believing myths like the money multiplier, for example, or believing in negative interest rates. And we can finally move forward with a sensibly managed monetary system. But that, that day could be 15 years away, maybe even more, on the record of what happens in Japan. So in the meantime, I'd like to have private entrepreneurs come in not as a permanent replacement but as a disruptor.

Negative interest rates and bank runs

Erik Townsend: Now, you mentioned negative interest rates. Unfortunately, that is not 15 years off. That's right now, amazingly to me. And, you know, we're seeing the, the German Bund now beyond 10 years on the yield curve Negative yields. What is all this going to mean? Because I'm concerned, frankly, as I listen to central bankers and neoclassical economists, they all seem to say, oh, no worries, the fact that we've completely turned the system upside down from what everybody thinks is normal is no big deal.

What's your view on negative interest rates and the potential knock-on effects that they could have?

Steve Keen: I think it probably wins my award for the stupidest economic policy dreamt up in the last 100 years. There'd probably be a few other larger candidates, but in terms of widely agreed by central banks, it shows how little they know about the system. Because they think that by putting negative rates on the reserve deposits that the private banks have at the central bank, that will then lead to private banks putting negative rates on the deposit rates they pay to their depositors, you and me at local banks. And that will then stimulate you and me to spend more money, which will cause the economy to Start increasing in size. Give me a break. That is so asinine and childish.

When you actually know what's going on, you think about it in double-entry bookkeeping terms, which is the way I think about money fundamentally now, is that if central banks are proposing negative rates on the huge excess reserves that banks currently have, that means that that particular asset is now a negative asset for private banks.

They know that if they tried to make a negative yield on the liabilities as well to balance it, their depositors would leave that bank and go to another one or take the money out in cash. So they're not going to give negative rates for depositors. What they'll do instead is increase the rate that they charge to their current borrowers. Anybody who's taken out a loan from a bank will find the bank is putting up the rates, making the rates you and I pay higher in response to the negative rates being imposed by central banks.

We've already seen this in Switzerland. I think Switzerland's now got what, -0.75% is the rate they're charging on excess reserves. And Swiss banks in general have put up the rates on mortgages to compensate. And that's all you need to think about this is just thinking double-entry bookkeeping terms. You can't do anything about your liability side, but you can— if one asset turns negative on you, you can make the other assets more positive by increasing the amount charged for that asset. So it just shows how little the central banks actually know about the the monetary system they're supposed to manage.

Erik Townsend: Do you think that there is a risk that the fractional reserve banking system obviously can only exist if people don't take their money out of the system? And, you know, negative interest rates create an economic incentive for hoarding cash and just putting it in a safe deposit box or under the mattress.

How far negative do rates have to go before there's a run on the banking system?

Steve Keen: Yeah, I don't think it's going to happen With depositors directly, but it certainly could happen with corporations making that decision. And of course, if you start— I mean, we don't have a fractional reserve banking system. We have a credit system where the banks are required to keep a certain amount of reserves in case there is a run on the banks. That's what really exists right now. But the amount of money they're required to keep, like in America's case, is 10% of household deposits only, which is about 2% of the money supply.

Now, if you then have the household sector deciding that they— if you have the corporations or the household sector deciding, I'm not going to get negative— if the negative rates actually got passed through to the depositors, then they could easily demand more cash than the banks currently have, which would force the banks to go to the central bank to ask for loans of money and so on.

It's a source of potential breakdown. And the difficult thing for banks is they actually need a decent margin and they need also a decent volume of new debt. Now, the volume of new debt has dried up completely. The margin's being squeezed at the same time. So there could well be banks that look like they can't survive and people then go and take their money out and we have a crisis that way. And the ironic thing is this is being done by people who are trying to make the financial system more stable.

QE, asset prices and where the next crisis comes from

Erik Townsend: Finally, before we close, I have one question that's really been on my mind for you because of your reputation for having called the 2008 event in advance and accurately describing what would happen and when it would happen. And I think back 7 years ago to the summer of 2009 after QE1 was announced, what I said— and boy, did I ever get the call wrong— I said, Look, they're not solving any problem here. The problem is too much debt. The government solution with QE is basically to create more debt. That exacerbates the problem. They are grasping for straws. This is an act of desperation that the market will see through, and this rally won't last.

Now, of course, I was proven completely wrong. If central banks print money out of thin air, that money has to go someplace. It went into asset markets, and the rally did last. It's lasted for the last 7 years.

Steve Keen: Right.

Erik Townsend: Now I finally see that even the mainstream, even Steve Liesman on CNBC, is questioning whether or not the Fed is losing credibility at this point and is about to lose control of asset markets. Have we gotten to that point? I mean, you've got the track record here for getting the timing right. Are we getting to the point where George Soros and Stan Druckenmiller and all these other heavyweights are going to be proven right and we're going to have another perhaps bigger than 2008 financial crisis, or can we go on for a few more years of printing money out of thin air and having it just work somehow? Which, it astonishes me that it's worked for the last 7 years.

Steve Keen: I can continue working, but what you get is asset price inflation. You don't get much output in the, in the domestic economy. And what's— if you think about the QE when it was done by the Federal Reserve, they committed themselves to buying $85 billion a month, which is effectively $1 trillion a year. Worth of bonds off the private sector mortgage-backed securities and stuff like that rather than just relying on Treasuries.

Now, that means that, of course, they're doing repo agreements all the time and you've got the open market operations, but it means that the central bank is saying that in the aggregate, we're going to be on the buy side at the tune of $1 trillion a year.

And of course, when they're doing that, they're buying assets off banks. When banks suddenly have Yeah. They have a mortgage-backed security, which is dodgy as it might be. They've now sold to the government. So the income stream for that mortgage-backed security is now going to the central bank, not going to the private bank.

And they've got— in its place, they have in the aggregate $1 trillion worth of cash, which is stored as reserve assets at the central bank. And so their attitude is, well, let's actually use this to buy some shares. And of course, when they buy the shares, the money comes right back in again because the people they buy the shares off deposit the money they get from the banks at the So they can't get rid of the reserves, but that helps both drive down interest rates and drive up asset prices.

And that is what's caused this inflation. If the central bank's willing to stay on the buy side to that scale for that length of time, they'll keep that upward pressure. So they can keep on doing it, keep asset prices high. But of course, if they decide to pull out, that's the only thing keeping asset prices high. So any attempt to unwind QE causes a crash in the market.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: And they're stuck. It's in that sense they've made a pact with Mephistopheles that they can't actually pull out of. So they could keep it going for some substantial time, but they can't stop financial crises happening in the real economy. And I see about 18 countries, I think, in total that have managed to avoid the crisis in 2008 by continuing to borrow. Of course, the most obvious one is China, but also Australia and Canada are well and truly up on that list. So has Norway to some extent, Sweden and Korea, and also Malaysia, to mention a few that have done that. Now, that means that they've all got high levels of credit. So in the case of Australia, for example, the increase in private debt every year is running at 15% of GDP, meaning credit is 15% of GDP. So total demand is like 1.15 times GDP. Credit is now starting to plunge in the Australian economy.

The rate of growth of debt slowing down dramatically. Same thing happening in Canada. That means those countries are going to have the type of financial crisis they avoided back in 2008.

Now, when you look at China being one of those countries, China alone, its slowdown in the rate of growth of its credit, which is running— its credit's running at 25% to 30% of GDP per annum. If that falls back to zero, so if debt growth stops, that's equivalent to 5% of global GDP disappearing.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Steve Keen: So we're looking at that sort of scale of shock coming to the economy from these countries that managed to evade the crisis. After it happens, of course, after those credit collapses occur, they'll be in the same situation as America and England and much of Europe of being debt zombies.

And in that situation, we've all turned Japanese, but we don't have the advantage the Japanese had of being able to export to the rest of the world. So I think a crisis is inevitable. It's not going to come from America or England. It's going to come from China and the other countries that have managed to evade the crisis last time around. But there's nothing that the central banks can do to stop that. The only way you can stop it is by encouraging people to continue borrowing at a rate of 15% of GDP per annum forever. And that was possible when debt levels were down at the 20% and 30% of GDP. It's not possible when they're at 2.1 and 2.2 times GDP as they are now. Okay. Now, in most of those vulnerable countries.

Inflation versus deflation as the catalyst

Erik Townsend: Now, a view that I've come around to is that central banks can almost indefinitely continue to prop up asset prices until something ties their hands so that they're not able to be accommodative. And it seems to me like the big thing is runaway inflation hitting the stage. At that point, they're forced to tighten in order to stop the inflation, and that crashes asset markets. So what I've been watching for is when do we see inflation come Would you agree with that view, and are there other catalysts?

Steve Keen: No, the real catalyst is deflation, because the real dynamic behind all this is the growth in private debt, which is credit. We're getting to the stage where it becomes excessive, so credit becomes negative. That whole process ends up causing a slower rate of growth and a higher level of unemployment, which reduces the capacity of workers to make wage demands, and that's actually the main source of inflation.

So that's why we're ending up in deflation right now. And then if you have financial crisis on top of it, then you can have firms deciding to cut their markups to try to sell more goods. And that was what really happened in a huge way during the Great Depression. That gives you deflation. Now, in that situation, the central banks are forced to do something about the real economy rather than the Wall Street economy, which is where all this money has gone so far. So it's more the threat of deflation.

But because it hasn't bitten as heavily as it did back in the Great Depression when it was running at 10% per annum— prices were falling by more than 10% per year for the first 2 really deep years of the Great Depression— because that hasn't happened, they've been fudging around with stupid policies like negative interest rates.

But inflation requires them to succeed at what they've been failing at for so long. And the only way you're going to get inflation is to increase workers' wages. Wages, which is the last thing conventional economists want to do, and increase the bargaining power of workers, again the last thing they want to do. So we're just not going to see inflation.

Where to follow Keen: Twitter, blog, new book

Erik Townsend: Well, unfortunately, as much as I would love to continue this conversation, we are out of time. Fantastic interview again. You've been extremely popular with our listeners. For people who want to continue to follow your work, I know you've got a book coming out, you're very active on Twitter. Give our listeners a sense of where they can follow your work.

Steve Keen: I guess the 3 places would be my— Twitter's probably the best way to follow me because I'm addicted to Twitter, so I continue using it all the time. Then my blog, which is— I publish on Forbes and then also cross-publish a part of that on my debtdeflation.com/blogs website. And I've got a new book coming out, which is called Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? And I'm hoping that'll be out by the end of the year from Polity Press. So that's probably the best way to get a concise statement of my views— 25,000 words rather than just one.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so we have @ProfSteveKeen on Twitter and DebtDeflation.com are probably the best places to start, and they can find links to the information about the book and other— the Forbes blog and so forth— from those sources. Thanks again so much for joining us on the program, Steve. Aaron Chan will be back with me as MacroVoices MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for future guests. suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: Erik clarifies the inflation question

Aaron Chan: I'm Aaron Chan, back with you. So Professor Keen always gives a great interview. So I'll take this opportunity to remind listeners that Erik interviewed him 6 weeks ago on MacroVoices episode 14, where the topic at hand was a comparison of prevailing schools of economics, and particularly Professor Keen's criticisms of neoclassical economics. That interview is still available free of charge on our homepage at MacroVoices.com. So let me get right into the questions, Erik. You and Professor Keen covered a lot of meaty topics, but I want to first touch on your last question about inflation potentially backing central banks into a corner and ultimately being forced to stem credit expansion, essentially pricking the massive asset bubble we have. Now, Professor Keen thinks deflation is the more likely scenario from falling economic activity due to slowing private credit growth, lower wages, and an eventual reduction in price Basically, the 1930s.

So, Erik, what's your reaction to that?

Erik Townsend: Well, for the most part, I think the reason it appears that we disagreed there is that I botched the question. I didn't phrase it correctly. I agree with Professor Keen that the current environment is very much conducive to deflation, not inflation. The question I intended to ask is, irrespective of the current environment, what are the things that could happen that would tie central bankers' hands to the point where they couldn't get away with propping up asset markets anymore. And when I said that I thought a return to runaway inflation was the thing that would tie their hands, I do very much believe that would do it. I don't think that's coming right away. I didn't mean to forecast that that was about to happen, and I think he took it that way. And I agree with him disagreeing with me because I don't think inflation is right around the corner. I do think that it would tie their hands.

So I probably should have asked that question a little bit differently.

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Postgame: where the next crisis comes from

Aaron Chan: So now, Professor Keen thinks that the next domino to fall could be one of the 18 countries he mentioned who managed to escape 2008 by going further into debt, be it Australia, Canada, or China. On the other hand, our guest last week, John Llewellyn, said that the next catalyst could be a Lehman-style event in the European banking system. So which one do you think is more likely?

Erik Townsend: Boy, that's a tough one. I would say all of the above. And the way that I look at this environment right now, this overall macro backdrop, I think that the system is very fragile, and it is waiting for a Lehman-sized catalyst to start an avalanche that could be really scary. Does that mean that I know where it's going to come from? No, I have no clue. Brexit was a good candidate. The most likely outcome is that Brexit is off the table, although we don't know that for certain as we're taping Thursday afternoon.

Assuming that Brexit is off the table, where's the next one come from? I don't know. I think those are all possibilities. I definitely agree with other aspects of what you said. What Professor Keen said in this interview, which is once the Brexit is off the table, that doesn't mean the E.U. is out of trouble. The E.U. still has massive problems between the banking crisis— look at what's going on with European banking stocks right now, look at the predicament that the ECB has gotten itself into, look at the refugee crisis, look at the just ridiculous negative interest rate situation that's going on with German bond yields right There's all kinds of things that could provide a tipping point or a catalyst, and I really have no idea which one it's going to be.

Postgame: fractional reserve versus credit system

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, when you mentioned that we have a fractional reserve system, Professor Keen took another view and said that we instead have a credit system where banks are required to hold 10% of household deposits for withdrawal. Now, that sounds like fractional reserve banking to me, but was there something I missed?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think the distinction that he was trying to make is it's not just a fractional reserve banking system, which means people have their savings, they put it in the bank, and the bank does The Fed doesn't really have the money. They only have a fraction of it, which is what fractional reserve banking is. I think his point is, it's not just that. It's, we also have a credit system which is providing the bulk of the money that people are spending into the economy. So, it's not just the question of fractional reserve banking, but also the question of what happens to the overall credit system, which we are so dependent on. Right now, with all of these easy money policies, we're supporting the economy by allowing people to borrow and spend beyond their means. What if we can't do that anymore?

Postgame: alternative currencies and the Twitter analogy

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, let me pivot to the alternative currencies. I thought that conversation was fascinating, and Professor Keen mentioned currencies I hadn't even heard of before. And perhaps our listeners are aware or even using some of these currencies, and it would be great to hear more about them. So on to my question about them. From my understanding, for something to be money, it must serve numerous functions, and one of which is for it to be fungible, meaning the money in my account has to be the same in your account. I noted Professor Keen saying that it might take central bankers 10 to 15 years to transition to more applicable or practical theories, and entrepreneurs could do well and promote commerce by introducing new currencies, be it backed by gold, labor, boats, you name it.

However, it seems sort of paradoxical to me because on the one hand, we are advocating decentralization, but to alternatives that are inherently centralized. So do you see anything at odds here, and do you think a transition to alternative Do you think that these alternatives could promote commerce, as Professor Keen said?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's a question of purposes and timeframes. I don't see any of the currencies that he mentioned changing the world starting tomorrow or next week or really anytime soon, frankly. But if you look at his perspective, what he said is he sees the big picture of we have this fiat money system which is destined for eventually a failure, as all fiat money systems in the history of the world have eventually failed.

And what are the alternatives? What are we going to have in order to replace them? There's not a lot of good possibilities.

And I would draw an analogy to say something like Twitter. The guys that designed Twitter literally had no idea what the purpose of the thing was going to be. They were experimenting with this idea of microblogging and trying to find an application for it. I'm told that one of the thoughts they had was maybe people would use it to communicate with taxi drivers in San Francisco in order In order to find a taxi that was close to them.

Well, look at what Twitter has evolved into. Nobody ever guessed what it would become. I think— I don't want to speak for Professor Keen, but my perception is the reason he's spending his time on these things is he knows that the world needs to be exploring other alternatives to a continued central bank-administered fiat money system.

And I think that what he's saying is eventually that central bank-administered fiat money system going to fail, and the more work that we do to explore possibilities for alternatives, the better off we are. I don't see any of the things that he's talking about now suddenly taking over and becoming the new currency. I think that he's looking at them in terms of having more options on the table when we eventually get to the point of what Raoul Pal has called the reset, when the existing system of fractional reserve banking and central bank administered fiat money breaks down at some point in the future.

Research Roundup, next week's guest and sign-off

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that's all I got for questions.

Erik Townsend: Okay. And for our registered users who have registered at MacroVoices.com, what can they find in this week's Research Roundup email?

Aaron Chan: Well, we've once again got a stacked lineup for our subscribers. And this week's Research Roundup is headlined by Raoul Pal's latest presentation on Real Vision TV. This was an excellent presentation, and I highly recommend our listeners to check I've already watched it twice and have it bookmarked because Mr. Pal goes through his macro and business cycle framework. We've also got excellent articles from listener favorites like Axel Merk, Satyajit Das, and Art Berman. So stay tuned for that.

Erik Townsend: And I definitely want to echo your comment, Aaron That video with Raoul Pal was absolutely outstanding. And that is a free link. You don't have to be a Real Vision subscriber in order to watch that one. I recommend it very, very highly. And again, for anyone who has not registered yet, it is completely free. Just go to MacroVoices.com, register a free account with your email address, and you will receive our weekly Research Roundup email with the best that we can find in free research on the internet. Aaron who do we have for next week's show?

Aaron Chan: Well, next week we are bringing back another all-time favorite MacroVoices guest, Grant Williams, who's the publisher of Things That Make You Go Hmmm and co-founder of Real Vision TV. Mr. Williams is both a Brit and has a brilliant mind for macro, so I'm sure he'll have plenty to say about Brexit regardless of the outcome.

Well folks, that about wraps it up for this week's episode. We continue to receive a lot of positive feedback, and Erik and I look forward to continue bringing you premier content with the sharpest minds in finance. But we also need your help in order to bring you the biggest names like Kyle Bass or Stanley Druckenmiller. So if you're on Twitter, give us a retweet and mention it to your followers. You can also follow our main account @MacroVoices. You can follow Erik and me @ErikSTownsend and @_AaronChan_.

If you know others who would enjoy the Research Roundup and the content we bring you there, please forward it to them as well. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. See you next week.

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John Llewellyn — Llewellyn Consulting (as introduced on the show)

Announcer open

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 19 was recorded on June 16th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. John Llewellyn of London institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting will be joining me as today's featured guest. The focus of our feature interview Will be next week's so-called Brexit referendum, and we'll be discussing the implications of the U.K. leaving the European Union in terms of how such an exit, if it happens, would affect the U.K. economy, the rest of the European economy, and knock-on effects for the rest of the global economy. MacroVoices volunteer research team captain Aaron Chan will also be joining us again at the end of today's show, and we'll have a special announcement about Aaron's rapidly growing role in the MacroVoices team.

Fed holds, Yellen's tone and the S&P selloff

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Before we even get into the equities, let's talk about the Fed, who did not hike rates on Wednesday, as pretty much everyone expected they would not. But Janet Yellen was a little more dovish in her remarks than some would have expected. So, Erik, what did you make of the FOMC press conference Wednesday afternoon?

Erik Townsend: Well, definitely, as I said last week, no hike was not news. Everybody knew there was not going to be a hike. The big question was going to be what stance Janet took in the press conference and would she continue to hold up the story That, hey, we're in a rate normalization cycle. We just didn't do it this month, maybe next month, and so forth. And as I have predicted for years now, when everything changes is when the mainstream figures out that this whole rate normalization story from the Fed is a fantasy, which I'm convinced that it is.

We had a problem in 2008 that was entirely about too much debt. And what we've responded with is creating more debt on the idea that the Fed can somehow boost the economy like jumpstarting a car, and somehow it's going to gain momentum and suddenly Suddenly take off with its own organic growth.

I don't think we're quite there yet, but I think we're getting to the point where the mainstream is figuring this out. Even Steve Liesman, who frankly is usually a cheerleader for the Fed, from CNBC, was asking the same question that I posed last week on this show, which is, what happens when the 10-year Treasury yield keeps going down and keeps signaling that there's a problem? Now, when Janet answered that question, she kind of reframed it and talked about what would What would happen if the Fed wasn't able to make enough money from its assets in order to cover its expenses? But the real question is, when do we get to a credibility problem? When does the Fed lose control of asset markets?

I have continued to feel that it probably isn't until inflation hits the stage that the Fed can't do anything. Right now, they're not admitting that they're ready to make a policy U-turn. I think that will eventually come. But the thing is, the Fed can print a bunch more money out of thin air and can come to the rescue once again. It's when we get to runaway inflation that suddenly their hands are tied. And I don't think we're quite there yet, although certainly somebody like Julian Brigden that we recently had on the program is saying that that might be closer at hand than even I thought.

Nathan Egger: And when we spoke last week, the S&P was flirting with all-time highs, trading just a week ago as high as 2,120. We've since traded as much as 80 points lower on Thursday morning, which is a pretty big down move for a single week, at least. Erik, is this the beginning of that huge move to the downside that all the prominent bears like George Soros, Carl Icahn and Druckenmiller have predicted, or just a little market temper tantrum leading up to Wednesday's FOMC press conference?

Erik Townsend: Well, consider that in the past, what the program has generally been is that temper tantrum before FOMC is for a few weeks leading up to it. Then as soon as the FOMC meeting is over, we get the recovery. This has been the opposite. It's kind of gotten worse since the FOMC meeting. So the no hike and softening message from Janet Yellen apparently is not Not enough, even after confirming expectations there would be no hike, being more dovish than expected, we still see asset markets headed lower. I think the Brexit referendum polls are probably driving a lot of that. So, where it may appear that markets are selling off even further after the FOMC, as if Janet sent the wrong message, I think it may be the message from Europe that is driving a lot of that. But definitely, we're seeing weakness here.

You know, obviously, it would have been nice to predict this at 2120 when we recorded the show last week and go short the S&P. But as I said, you know, you never know how markets are going to react.

If Janet had come back and said, this is confirmation that the rate hiking cycle is definitely over, I think we might have seen even more exuberance. Eventually, I think that Stan Druckenmiller and George Soros and Carl Icahn and the rest of these guys are going to be proven right. But it's a question of when the right catalyst comes. And I think that potentially the Brexit, which we'll talk about in our feature interview today, might be a bigger catalyst than a monetary policy event from the Fed.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

WTI top and Cushing storage at 93%

Nathan Egger: And when we recorded last week's show, WTI crude oil was trading at $51.60, and you were saying that it looked like a top. Well, we've since traded as low as $46.25 on Thursday, more than 10% drop from that high. So good call on the top, Erik. And do you still think that this is a top? And if so, how far down do you expect to see oil go from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, even in the short time since you wrote down that $46.25, which I think was the close on the futures pit, the market has reopened just in the few minutes that we have been recording show, and I'm looking at $45.85 now. So we're seeing a lot of weakness, more than 10% lower. In fairness, I suppose I did say that it was looking toppy. I also said I thought we would likely hit that $51.90 technical target that a lot of analysts were talking about. We never got there, got within 25 cents of it. So I think for all intents and purposes, we made the top. But, you know, the thing is that we don't know what's gonna happen with Venezuela. So I didn't trade that top, even though I thought it was a top, because I didn't know whether or not Venezuela is falling potentially into total societal collapse, which seems to be very possible, could be a catalyst for a move to the upside.

Now, that's not happened this week.

Meanwhile, EIA data was a little surprising. We had a 930,000-barrel draw on national inventory. That's, you know, to be expected, a draw. But I would almost expect a larger draw this time of year. We're in the end of June. We're right, you know, in the the heart of summer driving season from a refiner's standpoint. 2.6 million barrel draw on gasoline inventories kind of made up for the build last week, so that was good. But a 786,000 barrel build on distillate inventories. Distillates again are the collection of diesel fuel, home heating oil, jet fuel, and other similar products.

The big one though, 904,000 barrel build on Cushing, Oklahoma inventory. Now despite the fact And despite the fact that the Canada fire situation is more under control than it's been in recent weeks, and despite the fact that seasonally we would be expecting large drawdowns this time of year, we're not. We're still seeing builds on inventory in Cushing. And of course, Cushing, I've stressed many times before, is so critical because that's where the WTI futures contract is settled, and it's storage in Cushing running out that could result in a panic in the markets.

So we can't make it through fall maintenance season unless we see more drawdowns. And I thought that the fall maintenance season would be a seasonal period of builds on inventory. We're already at 93% capacity. Even though I thought that the storage crisis would be averted by the second half, I'm now starting to think, boy, if we don't see some drawdowns of consequence or of significance in Cushing pretty soon, we're going to be really looking at a difficult situation as we head towards fall maintenance season.

What's surprising to me, though, despite the fact that we have a very difficult storage situation, 93% of capacity, a build Sold on inventory this week, so that 93% number is getting worse. The July-August spread closed at only about 52 cents, up to about 55 cents as we're speaking late session, actually in the beginning of the overnight session on Thursday evening, as we're taping the show a little bit late this week. So, you know, 55 cents is nothing close to the $2 front-month contango spreads that we saw when everybody was worried about a storage crisis back when we were at 85% capacity. Now we're at 93% capacity. And that contract— today was options expiration. The contract expires the beginning of next week. This is that crush period where you would expect potentially that spread to blow out if people were worried about a storage crisis. It seems that they're not too worried, at least from what the numbers are telling us.

Gold, the dollar and the 10-year yield

Nathan Egger: And gold was strong last week and got even stronger this week, finally broke out above $1,300 and tested $1,315 the day after the no-hike announcement from the Fed. Before closing lower, just above $1,285. What's your take on where it's headed from here, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that Janet, she didn't capitulate, she didn't admit that the rate normalization process is not working. But, you know, even Steve Liesman can figure it out. So, we're at a point where I think that the Fed's credibility is coming into question, and it definitely is being reflected in the price of gold.

As a number of guests have commented on the program, in many ways what gold serves as is a hedge or an insurance policy for central bank policy error. So, I do think that probably the bottom is in now on the gold market. At the same time, you know, we're also kind of at the top of a trading range here. I haven't bought it yet. I think I would probably wait for a pullback towards the 50-day moving average, which is still down at $1,250 or so.

But, you know, it's a question of what the news flow tells us. The Brexit situation could also be very positive for gold, and I think that if there is a vote to leave next week, that probably Probably could boost gold even further. So I think the gold chart is looking already very strong, and there could be some more upside catalysts. But again, we are kind of on the, the top of a trading range here, and I'm not sure that it's quite time to be buying hand over fist, but maybe starting to average into a long position in gold is something that would look attractive here.

Nathan Egger: And it came as no surprise to anyone that the dollar index took a big hit on the no-hike news. What do you see on the horizon for the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, it took a big hit on the no-hike news, but then it went the other way, I think probably in reaction to Bank of Japan not moving and then sort of corrected back. So we're seeing a lot of volatility there. In general, though, where it appeared from a few weeks ago like, boy, maybe there's a lot more softness than I thought in the dollar, we are seeing overall strength. We're not quite up to the previous cycle high, but we got pretty close to it, at least intraday on Thursday. And I think that in general, the dollar rally is still intact.

Nathan Egger: And you said last week that 1.7% on the 10-year Treasury yield could be something of a credibility level for the Fed, and that a move below that level could make it hard for the Fed to justify continuing its rate normalization theme. Well, I saw a 1.53% print on Thursday morning, back up to 1.57% by the end of the day. What does this mean for monetary policy and Fed credibility, for that matter?

Erik Townsend: Well, to my astonishment, this is the question that Steve Liesman asked Janet Yellen during the FOMC press conference, which Which is, hey, look at the 10-year Treasury yield. It's kind of sending us a message here. What is this gonna mean for the Fed? And I think she first kind of ducked his question, and then later in responding to another question, she made some comments about how if the Fed did not earn enough income from its other holdings in order to be able to pay its expenses, that there were other tools available to remedy that problem. Well, that's all interesting, Janet, but that's not what everybody's worried about. Everybody's worried about the fact that the 10-year is sending an outright recession signal, and how can you justify continuing a hiking cycle in the face of that?

Steve Liesman, who is usually a Fed cheerleader, as far as I'm concerned, came out afterwards saying he was shocked and felt this is the closest the Fed has come to capitulation. So, I think the mainstream, which, in my opinion, Mr. Liesman is a good proxy for, are waking up and recognizing that, hey, this story, this narrative that we've been on, which is the Fed's going to make everything better and the economy is going to return to organic growth is not working out.

As far as where we're headed, I have predicted for a couple of years now that the 1.36 low print on the 10-year Treasury yield from several years ago would probably be tested this year. And I wouldn't be surprised if— I don't know if it's going to happen this year in 2016, but before this is over, I wouldn't be surprised if we see 1% 10-year Treasury yield on US Treasuries. Seems like we're headed in that direction. And I do think that at some point we're going to maybe get one more rate hike out of the Fed before they They admit that this so-called rate hiking cycle was basically over after just one token hike. And indeed, it does— Janet Yellen's own comments acknowledged that they needed to create a little bit of buffer so that they would be able to respond with easing if an economic situation warranted it. I think that economic situation that warrants it is probably coming faster than Janet is ready for.

And I would guess that the Fed regrets not having started hiking sooner so that they could build in more buffer and give themselves more room to respond.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: But that's the situation that we're in.

Feature lead-in and note on the Jo Cox murder

Nathan Egger: All right, well, thank you for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest is John Llewellyn of London-based institutional advisory firm Llewellyn Consulting. We're going to focus almost entirely on next week's Brexit referendum, where U.K. citizens will decide whether to initiate the process of leaving the European Union.

While the interview you're about to hear was being recorded, Jo Cox, a member of the British Parliament, was murdered in cold blood and in broad daylight. And early reports indicate that this horrific murder may have been motivated by this issue, that being the Brexit referendum, with one witness claiming that the assailant yelled, Britain first, during his attack.

This brings into question the possibility that next week's referendum vote could be postponed. Needless to say, our thoughts go out to Ms. Cox's family in this very difficult moment. Erik's interview with Mr. Llewellyn is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

How the Brexit process works: Article 50

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: One week from now, on June 23rd, U.K. citizens will vote on a referendum whether or not the U.K. should leave the European Union. For today's feature interview, we wanted to find a guest who could really speak with authority on this subject, and Nathan really came through for us.

Joining me now is John Llewellyn, managing partner at Llewellyn Consulting. John worked for the OECD in Paris, working on forecasting policy for OECD, went from there to become Global Chief Economist at Lehman Brothers, and following the collapse of Lehman Brothers, John has formed his own consulting firm where he provides advisory services to institutions. He is a New Zealander, so he has no emotional skin in this game, but he does live in London and has a very ideal perspective on the Brexit issue and what it will mean for the U.K. So, John, thanks so much for joining me on the program.

I'd like to start with what is actually on the table, because this referendum doesn't necessarily dictate that the U.K. would leave the European Union. It actually begins a very complex process. Tell us how it works.

John Llewellyn: I don't think anybody knows how it works, as a matter of fact. I mean, the question on the ballot paper is, do you want to leave, uh, the European Union, or do you want to remain in the European Union? And that seems, of course, very clear, but it's not, because nobody has ever left the European Union. No country has ever left the European Union.

And all there is on the statute books about this is a provision in the EU treaty which says that a country can leave the EU 2 years after giving notice of its intention so to do.

So we don't even know the very first thing, which is, were there to be a decision in the referendum to leave, when would the European Union be notified? You see, it's Parliament that has to pass a resolution saying we intend to leave the EU. And would Parliament do that straight away? Would Parliament Wait, or would Parliament possibly seek some other way of leaving the EU than simply the notifications envisaged in the so-called Article 50? So it's not clear, and I'm sorry I can't tell you that it would be a set of cut-and-dried steps, but that's the reality.

Poll swing and the near-term UK economic hit

Erik Townsend: Well, and of course markets don't like uncertainty, and it sounds to me like if this referendum has a leave result, what it does is it introduces the beginning of a process that, as you said, nobody fully understands, and that's the last thing that markets like is when nobody understands even what's happening.

As recently as just a week ago, this was considered an outlier risk. Everybody thought, based on early polling, that it was extremely unlikely that a leave vote would happen. In the last few days, we've seen these polls turn around to where it appears that a leave result is more likely. What is your sense, being boots on the ground there in London, as to where this is headed? Do you think that it is quite likely as some of the polls are suggesting, that we could have a leave result? And if so, what does it mean, first of all, for the UK economy?

John Llewellyn: Well, first of all, on the, on the polls, I think you have to say now that it's distinctly possible. Only 7 or 8 days ago, the majority of polls indicated a majority differed in size from poll to poll for remain. But over the weekend, there was a massive swing in the polls, probably of the order of 10 percentage points for leave.

Now, there are some curious features to this. There always are. The polls that are conducted by interview and the polls which are conducted by telephone have been giving different results, although they've been narrowing. The gap between them has been narrowing to some extent. And one reason for this is probably that there are a lot of undecideds.

There are at least 10% and perhaps 20% of those voting are undecided, and nobody knows how they will swing.

A second thing to be said about the polls is that, of course, recently there was a referendum in Scotland on whether the Scots wish to remain part of the EU, and the polls got that wrong, mainly because, again, the undecideds came out to vote. And of course, the polls got the previous British election wrong too, and nobody was more surprised by that than the Tory government which came into power. So the polls, for whatever reason, have not had a good track record of late in the United Kingdom. But nonetheless, the fact is there's been a shift in the polls, and now there's nothing you can say other than that it's a distinct possibility that they will vote on balance to leave.

What does it mean for the British economy? Here there's a huge disparity of opinion between the two sides, and frankly, I'm just going to give you my own opinion. As you said, I'm disinterested. I'm not—I'm a New Zealander, and therefore I'm just living in London. But in my judgment, and partly based on my own country's experience, the near-term negative consequences for the British economy would not only be greater than are claimed by. By the people who want to remain and say if we, if we leave it would be a bad result. I think the results would be even worse than that.

And I think the reason for that is the following: the people who want to leave, of course, have a vested interest in claiming that there'd be no problem. And that, I think, frankly, is absurd for reasons that I can go on and explain to you.

Those who want to remain have to be very careful not to overclaim the negative results which come out from virtually all economists, from 9 out of 10 economists. And so they tend to be very careful about the assumptions that they make, about the models that they use, about the inputs they put into their simulations, and so on. And the result is that, in my view, the economic consequences in the first 5 years could be even more severe, probably would be more severe than those suggested by, for example, the Treasury, Her Majesty's Treasury, or the National Institute of Economic Research, or the OECD, or the IMF.

So I think the results would be very, very negative in the near term for the British economy, and on that I have really very little doubt.

Foreign investment risk and years of trade renegotiation

Erik Townsend: Now, you said earlier that what is actually on the table here is the beginning of a process that takes 2 years, and that means that if there are short-term adverse negative consequences that could lead to yet another referendum, a change our mind referendum. So there's just so many possibilities here in terms of what could go wrong in the short term. Please give us a little bit more color. What are the downside risks if a Leave vote were to occur next week?

John Llewellyn: Well, I think there are 2 downside risks. I think the most likely would be a very sharp decline in the level of foreign investment in the United Kingdom economy. Now, this This is denied by the Leave campaign who say no, investment would continue to flow into us because we are, after all, the 5th biggest economy in the world. And that phrase, the 5th biggest economy in the world, is true and it's been repeated a very great number of times.

But what's also true is that the UK is only about 3.5% of world GDP, world gross domestic product.

A substantial proportion of the investment coming into the United Kingdom, but I have no idea, and I don't think anybody can, what that proportion is, comes in because the United Kingdom is a very good place in which to do business, has a very good legal system.

You can settle your agreements under English law, which is commercially highly competent legal structure. But the motive in many cases for coming in and making that investment investment is access to the whole EU, not just access to the United Kingdom.

I was talking, for example, recently to a drug company, and they were saying that they were about to put down a distribution sector for Europe. Now, they were going to put it down the UK, and for all I know, they still may. But the question on their minds, of course, is if the UK were not in the EU, what would the UK be the right place to put it? And I said absolutely not, because you not then know what the trading arrangements would be between the UK and the EU.

And that takes me therefore to my second point, which, which links with the first, which is it's being claimed by the Leave campaign that you don't need trading agreements in order to trade. But that really isn't true. It is true that you can revert to the World Trade Organization and there's a default set of Arrangements there, which cover principally the trade in goods and provide for the maximum level of tariffs that countries can set against on your exports.

But that doesn't remotely cover the sort of access to the EU, for example, which the UK currently has by way of being a member.

Secondly, of course, not only does the UK have a fully worked out trading relationship at the moment with the EU. But it also has fully worked out trading relationships with the other 53 countries in the world with which the EU has negotiated a trade agreement, and which the UK rides on as being part of the EU.

So all of those trading arrangements, those 53 plus one, and the plus one of course is with the UK's biggest trading partner by far, would have to be renegotiated.

Now how long does that take? The Leave campaign has been saying, "Oh, I see no reason why this shouldn't be completed within the next two years." In my judgment and my experience, that is highly, highly unlikely. I spoke recently to a New Zealand friend of mine. I went through university with him, and whereas I went on to do one thing, he went into the New Zealand Treasury and was heavily involved in the New Zealand Treasury at the time that the UK went into the EU, and New Zealand as a result. Had to renegotiate its relationships with the EU on the one hand and the rest of the world on the other.

And I said to him, how long did that take? And he said it took 7 years to negotiate. It then had to be ratified by all of the EU countries, and they were very quick at doing that. They did that in the 8th year, and it became operational in the 10th year.

And New Zealand's is a fairly simple structure of trade, a fairly simple economy.

Canada has just completed a trade agreement with the EU that took 7 years to complete, and importantly, it does not contain any agreement on services because that's not something which Canada has been particularly concerned to press with the EU, whereas in the UK, of course, services are a major part, the major part of its exports, including to the EU. So I think to sum up my point, The trading agreements would be highly uncertain for many years. And in that context, there'd be, in my judgment, very likely a substantial weakening, perhaps even a collapse of foreign direct investment into the United Kingdom.

Will the City of London lose business?

Erik Townsend: Now, for as long as I can remember, I think for all of modern time, the City of London, at least in the world of finance, the City of London has been second only to New York in terms of being a major capital market center where most investment banking and investment management decisions occur.

So are you suggesting that the hegemony that the UK has through the City of London in the world of finance is at risk and the City of London might be displaced if the UK were not to remain with the EU?

John Llewellyn: Well, I certainly think it's impossible to envisage everybody in the City of London or everybody in the financial services industry just up sticks and going to Paris or Frankfurt? Of course not. But there are substantial parts of activity which would be in jeopardy. I mean, one of the curious features about this, there was a move which came out of the European Central Bank, the ECB, to say that trading of foreign exchange had to take place within the geographical boundaries of the EU.

Now, the UK is the world's largest, larger even than New York, trader of foreign exchange, and this would have hit the UK quite hard. The UK appealed against this to the European Court, which found in its favor. Now, of course, the irony of this is that if that move were to take place again and the UK were not in the EU, it would have no access to the European Court, and it would presumably simply go through.

I think also in terms of a lot of trading of securities and so on, one of the indications that you can get of what it would be like would be to look at Switzerland, which for example isn't able to trade itself at all in the EU directly. It has therefore to set up an office somewhere, and it's chosen to set up offices in London in most cases, so that it has an office within, a branch within the European Union, and therefore can trade within the European Union from there.

All sorts of banks, and they've told us this, the American investment banks have said we would have to set up offices or expand our offices and hence our activities on the continent of Europe. So no, it would be absurd to pretend that the City of London would disappear overnight. And of course, it's not all about trading financial securities. It's also about insurance services and many others.

But in my view, it would, it would make a dent. And we've already been told by, for example, the French that they would welcome the chance to eat some of the City of London's lunch.

Missing trade negotiators and a split Tory party

Erik Townsend: Now, you have opined in the past that although it is conceivable that leaving might be good for the UK economy in the long run, the problem is how they get there from here, because there would be short to intermediate term challenges that would be very difficult for the UK to overcome.

Give us a sense of what those challenges are. What's on the road ahead if we do see a leave decision next week?

John Llewellyn: I think there's 2 classes of problem, really. There's the economic problems which, which I've alluded to. The fact that I think there'd be a weakening, perhaps a collapse in foreign direct investment, and a huge amount of uncertainty for a very long time over the trading relationships. I mean, let me give you a figure there which I find interesting. The UK at the moment has no trade negotiators, no people versed in the negotiation of trade agreements with other countries. And the reason is obvious, and that is ever since the joined the EU back in the '70s, all trade negotiations for the UK have been conducted by the EU, which is regarded by trade negotiators all over the world as having a very competent body of negotiators.

Now, there are 5 apparently people of British nationality in the EU team. So let's suppose they came back to the UK. I don't know if they would, but let's suppose they did, would that be enough? No. We were told recently by a senior official in the WTO, the World Trade Organization, that by their estimate, negotiating those trade agreements, which I've discussed with you, the one with Europe and ones with the 53 other countries that Europe has trade agreements, would take something like 500 trade negotiators 10 years to do.

Quite extraordinary.

So Britain would have to train up 500 trade negotiators or some number, something like that, and they'd be at it for 10 years, which is 2 parliamentary terms. So I think that's one of the things which one notices straight away, and that is that Britain's legislative capacity would become— and trade negotiating capacity and civil service capacity would be taken up probably for at least 2 full parliamentary terms by negotiating all of this. So there's a lot of things like that on the economic front, riddled, of course, all the time with uncertainty, which, as you have said, financial markets don't like. But I would also add people thinking of investing in material plant and equipment don't like.

So that's one class of problem. The other class of problem, and to some extent, the UK is going to be faced with this whatever the referendum goes now, and that is that the Tory Party is now absolutely split. It's riven by this debate, which has turned really nasty from the level of the Prime Minister David Cameron and one of his closest friends Michael Gove right the way down. The party has been cleaved by this, and neither side is going to be happy whatever the result.

And so there's going to be a very, very fractious party And at the same time, in a situation where you might in previous epochs have expected a Labour government to be— a Labour opposition, I'm sorry— to be strong and critical and to capitalize on this, it's got a leader who seems curiously quiescent, not only on this issue but on a range of others, and certainly is failing to capitalize politically on it.

So we're looking, I think, at a period of weak governance for the UK. As well as a period of economic and financial uncertainty. So it's, it's, it's, it's quite a contrast with where the UK has really been over the last 20 or even arguably 30 years.

Pound, euro and dollar outlook

Erik Townsend: From a currency perspective, what do you think this will mean for the pound sterling and for the euro, both with respect to the cross between those 2 currencies, but also as those currencies relate to the rest of the world, to the US dollar and other currencies?

John Llewellyn: I have to say that forecasting currency movements is something of a mug's game, but you have to have a view. I'll offer you a view, but without a great deal of conviction. But if what I'm saying is remotely right about the UK economy being weaker in GDP terms as a result of a vote to Brexit and being weaker as a result both of weaker foreign direct investment and weaker trade, then you would expect to see the pound depreciate against virtually all currencies.

I think it's worth recognizing that in that respect, the United Kingdom doesn't start from a strong position. In fact, quite the reverse. It has a current account deficit, in other words, an excess of what it imports over what it exports, taking goods and services together, of about 7% of GDP, which is a truly enormous number.

We operate in many times with what we call the rule of four, which is that any country which has a public sector deficit of more than four percent, a current account deficit of more than four percent, or even so if it has both, normally has some sort of financial crisis within a couple of years.

So when you look at the UK's current account deficit at seven percent, that would seem big enough to do a. Job on its own. And I think that what will happen if there's a Brexit is that the hawk eye of investors will then zero in on that number and say this is a country which has now got a seriously overvalued currency.

Now, who knows by what amount the pound could depreciate, but numbers of the order of 10% to 15% don't, to me at any rate, sound crazy. Now, much of that would be vis-à-vis the euro, perhaps more than that would be vis-à-vis the United States economy.

Because although the dollar has not been particularly strong of late, the U.S. economy has no real major problems as you look look ahead other than rather soft aggregate demand. It's a it's an energy self-sufficient economy. It's an economy which adjusts to structural change probably quicker and better than most other economies. So if you take any sort of medium-term prognostication. I think the U.S. economy is the best placed in the world and probably will have the strongest, strongest currency. So I'd probably place them in order of strength: U.S. first, euro second, and then sterling under these assumptions a comfortable third.

ECB and European policy response

Erik Townsend: And what would you expect from the ECB in terms of policy response if there is a— let's say there is an overwhelming landslide vote to Brexit? Would the ECB be expected to respond immediately to try to shore up the financial system, or do you think they would take a stand off and say this is a problem the UK has created for itself?

John Llewellyn: It looks unlikely that the ECB or indeed European policymakers more generally would simply stand on the sidelines. Europe is in an interesting position, which is that its economy is recovering now, but rather painfully slowly. The policy responsibility for ensuring that there would be an economic recovery has been left almost exclusively to the ECB because the budgetary position, the fiscal position has been kept quite tight in the majority of European countries, although it's easing a bit now.

And so the ECB, quite rationally in my view, has been taking the position, now that we've got a modest recovery starting and given that we've got no inflation, we really must make sure that this recovery becomes self-sustaining. and starts to induce the corporate sector to invest in capacity expansion again.

So we've seen not only the quantitative easing policy of the European Central Bank purchase government bonds, but it's now moved into the purchasing of corporate bonds as well in really quite an aggressive way, perhaps somewhat more aggressive than had been expected by the market. So you can tell from this that the mood of the ECB is to really try to make sure that this recovery is not jeopardized. In fact, that this recovery gathers momentum. So they would regard a Brexit, I think, as just one more annoying thing which would reduce or damage or dent or hinder, whatever word one should choose, confidence in some way.

And I would guess that it would just lead them to be even more aggressive, if anything, at the margin in their policy of quantitative easing.

I think it would have wider repercussions than just the ECB, however. I was in France yesterday and Berlin three days before that, and there's a very great deal of concern at the policymaking and political level at this because, of course, there are countries in the EU in which there are significant populist constituencies which are hostile to the EU in the same way as they are in the UK.

Denmark is one, the Netherlands is another, Poland is the third. And there's no doubt that policymakers would not want to see those countries receive any greater support than they would do from the fact that the UK was breaking away.

And so, of course, one of the consequences of that is that they probably would not feel that they could be any more accommodating to the UK. There'd be a lot of emphasis on the notion if you want to stay in part of our market, you have to play by all of the rules and don't think you can do otherwise. So I think there'll be a political response, perhaps a policy response, and the monetary policy response would be, as I say, an intensifying, if anything, of the present regime of quantitative easing.

Erik Townsend: So the last question pertained to policy response.

Contagion, confidence effects, Lehman analogy and Asian dollar debt

Erik Townsend: Going back to your own views as an economist, we've talked about the UK economy. What would you see as the likely knock-on effects and consequences on both the rest of the European Union and on the global economy, for that matter?

John Llewellyn: I think the further you get away from the UK, the less certain it's possible to become. I think one of the things which I've learned over my lifetime of studying economics is, of course, that sectors of economies are linked to one another, and in turn economies are linked to one another.

As you said in the introduction, I was for many years in charge of international economic forecasting and policy at the OECD. And one of the things that we really used to, to be there for was to see how much a change in the level of activity or any other shock in one country transmitted to another.

Now, of course, one way in which shocks are transmitted is the straightforward one through trade. If a country goes into recession, it imports less, and therefore the countries which are exporting to it, export less. And I think that's a fairly well-understood mechanism. People forget it sometimes, but it's fairly well understood.

What I think is less well understood is that confidence effects are transmitted from economy to economy. One of the really interesting things is that whenever you get a slowdown in the United States, which of course is the world's biggest economy, you then tend to find there's a slowdown in other countries like the U.K. or the continent of Europe.

But if you quantify that slowdown, you find that the slowdown in the UK or the US is about twice as big as you would have expected through the direct trade linkages. In other words, there's a psychological effect.

You could call it the CNN effect, call it what you like. The point is, you can see how it works, that if you're somebody who's planning to undertake some investment on the continent of Europe or in the United Kingdom, And then you see that the leading indicators in the United States are slowing down a bit. You think, oh, there's a slowdown coming. This is not the right time for me to be laying down new capital investment.

So you don't. And if this happens across your whole economy or across the whole of Europe, that compounds any slowdown that was coming anyway.

Now, that's the transmission from the United States to the United Kingdom or to Europe. And I would— it would be absurd to pretend that the United Kingdom is that important in the world that a Brexit in it would necessarily induce huge slowdown in Europe, let alone in the United States. But the confidence effect can be important because that affects countries' own investment levels, of course. And I think that's the thing that we're all most worried about.

I don't want to overstate it, but at the same time, I want to— I want us to remember that if you go back to 2008, if you go back to say September 12th, 2008, it was the judgment of the US Treasury that, well, if Lehman Brothers collapsed, it would collapse and it would be serious, but it wouldn't be a tragedy.

And as we now know, with the benefit of 20/20 hindsight, the linkages, both direct financial linkage and psychological linkages between Lehman Brothers and the rest of the financial community turned out to be much larger than had ever been guessed.

And probably with the benefit of hindsight, the people in the U.S. Treasury took that decision might have said, I wish we hadn't taken that decision now, or I wish we'd handled it differently. So again, without overstating the importance of this rather small economy of the U.K., which is only 3.5% of world GDP, as I said, I think the psychological effects of its deciding to leave its major trading partner on grounds which are yet to be worked out could be rather shocking.

Certainly on the European level, they feel that very strongly. And for what it's worth, we've seen in the speeches of Janet Yellen over the last couple of days that she regards this as an element of uncertainty which is affecting even at least the pace of the rate change behavior in the United States. So I don't want to overstate it, but I've seen a couple of cases where policymakers have understated apparently small shocks which turned out to be bigger than what they

Erik Townsend: Well, now, you said earlier that the effect of this would likely be most depressive from a currency standpoint on the pound sterling, euro in the middle, and U.S. dollar benefiting the most. I'm a little bit concerned that a lot of economists have opined that a U.S. dollar rally resuming and new highs above 100 on the dollar index could create the risk of an emerging market debt crisis. Do you agree with that view, and do you think Do you think that this Brexit situation could exacerbate that risk?

John Llewellyn: Yes, I'm afraid I do. I don't know how much, how much quantitative weight to place on that, but it's certainly the case in a lot of countries in Asia, for example, that there is considerable dollar indebtedness and a rise in the rate of the dollar would make that more onerous.

It's worth recognizing that the situation is quite different from the Asian crisis in '95 and through to '98. That was a case where their banking system had been engaging in arbitrage between the low rates at which you could borrow in United States dollars and the high interest rates that most of those countries— Korea, Thailand, etc.— had at home.

So the banks borrowed cheap, lent expensively, and that was fine. Until their currencies sank, and then they were left with a hugely increased domestic currency cost of servicing that dollar debt. That is not the situation now. It's not the banks which are at risk.

We, by and large, in our macroprudential work around the world, don't get caught the same way twice. Now it seems that it's the corporate sectors which have been borrowing abroad because rates are much, much lower than they are at home. Home, and they are now exposed if that happens.

I haven't seen convincing estimates of the scale of this, but it seems pretty clear that they're not trivial. And people I speak to in Asia who try to put these numbers together say that this is probably their number one Asian risk now and that it's not trivial.

Oil: renewables, $10-$40 history and OPEC's weakness

Erik Townsend: As we continue to move further out on this, where do you see the energy price that we're dealing with, particularly the oil Where do you see the oil price headed from here? And how do you think— you know, we've actually seen quite a bit of weakness in the price of oil in the last few days as the polls have turned around. So do you think that Brexit fears are fueling this sudden weakness in energy prices? Do you think energy prices are headed to the moon from here, as many people think? Or do you think we've seen a top recently?

John Llewellyn: It's a good and it's a very important question because of course there's no doubt that hydrocarbons in general and oil in particular have for decades been the fuel of our economies, literally and figuratively. So where the oil price goes is extremely important, not only for the fate of the rich OECD economies, but of course also for a number of the emerging market economies who specialize in oil, not least also in addition Russia.

So I think the oil price is terribly, terribly important. It always has been and it still is, but it's getting less so. If you permit, what I think the true story is, is this: it's a mistake to start thinking about the supply and demand balance for oil. The right thing to do is to think about the supply and demand balance for all energy, of which oil is an important but not the only component.

And I think what's been happening over the last few years is that after a period of very rapid growth of demand for hydrocarbons, both coal and oil, on the part of China, which has been growing, as we all know, extremely fast and in a highly energy-dependent way, first of all, China has slowed.

But secondly, there's been a big increase, and there's going to be a further big increase in supply of mainly renewables. If you look at the past 5 years and see how much increase in energy demand China has represented, and then you look forward to the next 5 years, you find that renewables, solar and wind, are going to add as much to world supply as China added to world demand in the previous A decade.

So no surprise in that circumstance that as China slowed, and as China's growth became somewhat less energy intensive, and at the same time as the prospects as well to some extent already as the reality of a big increment in supply, mainly from renewables, has come on, that the price of energy fell from something around $110 a barrel at its peak. To something like $30 at its trough and now hovering around $50-odd.

That's what explains what's going on with one added wrinkle, which is the world is starting to become more economical in its use of energy. Until about 2 decades ago, world energy use grew at almost exactly the same rate as world GDP growth. They were almost one-to-one tied together in lockstep. 10 or 15 years ago, energy use started to grow a little bit less rapidly than GDP, about a percentage point less. Last year it was over 2 percentage points less. So we're seeing in total what you normally see when you've seen something, in this case the price of oil, be unnaturally high.

You find 3 things going on: conservation or substitution for other forms of energy, energy and discovery of new forms of energy.

So if you then take, say, that's the world global energy scene, and if you say looking forward, we think the world economy is going to continue to grow, but China is probably never again going to grow at that breakneck 8% or 8.5% growth that it did, and furthermore, it's not going to be as energy intensive as it was, the question you have to ask yourself is, well, then in what range will the price of oil settle?

Now, it's very interesting that if you look back all the way through past history, right to where Pennsylvania oil industry started, for 118 of the last 156 years, oil has oscillated at a price of $10 to $40 a barrel in today's prices. It even went back into that channel after the first oil shock and before the second one, which was caused by China's rapid growth after joining the World Trade Organization. Now, it's sunk back to, as we know, to around $50 today.

My guess is that barring a shock, of course, and you can never predict a shock by definition, But the normal supply-demand balance will keep oil probably oscillating in the $10 to $40 range. Now, I would be the first to admit that there's a different school of thought which has diametrically opposite view.

It says no, oil is a scarce resource, and the price of any scarce resource will rise inexorably at or around the real rate of interest in the economy. Until it finally is nearly exhausted. That's the scarce resource or the so-called Hotelling view after the economist who posited the theory.

But I think it's unlikely. It's unlikely that we'll ever use all the oil that we have under the ground.

Now, you don't need to take my word for that. What I think is much more revealing is that the Saudi government, the Saudi oil minister explicitly says, we recognize now that we're never going to sell all the oil that's under our ground. And I think rather tellingly, he uses the aphorism that the Stone Age did not come to an end because of a shortage of stones.

And I think that's the point, that we're— we've reached— we're on the cusp of a change in the world energy market in which renewables of various sorts fuels fueled by technology ultimately, which is, which is making great breakthroughs, is going not to destroy the demand for oil. It'll always be useful with places where you need a high energy demand, a high energy intensity of a fuel, like for example in aircraft.

But increasingly in other applications, I think it's going to be electricity coming from renewables, and therefore we're going to be staring at low oil prices for a very long time, and that countries like— ranging from Russia to Venezuela to the Middle East are going to have to adjust to a new reality.

Erik Townsend: Of course, the other counterargument that's been posited is that the collapse in oil prices was a man-made event that occurred when OPEC decided not to cut production in order to support prices, and that it is possible once they achieve their objectives of damaging the US shale industry and perhaps coercing Russia to either join OPEC or to cooperate with them, that They might cut production in order to support prices. So is your view that that's not likely to happen, or is it your view that they're not able to support prices by that kind of mechanism?

John Llewellyn: I think it's that they're not able. That's right. I think it's the latter. You see, if a country is to act unilaterally by cutting— and cut its oil production in order to raise prices, for it not to be worse off in terms of its oil receipts, the fall in revenues that results from the decreasing volume of sales has to be more than offset by the rise in price.

Now, roughly speaking, you need to have— it's recognized, it's reckoned that a 1% fall in production causes about a 10% price in— rise in price in the first year for oil. So what that means is you can affect your revenue by cutting back production only if you've got a 10% share of the market or more. That's in the first year. After that, the effects get smaller again.

Now, only Saudi Arabia amongst the oil producers has that share. Now, in principle, of course, it could join forces with another country, and the natural one would probably be Iran. But OPEC has never really been able to do that because the temptation in any such agreement is for both countries or 3 countries or more to sign up, but then to cheat and say, well, I'll rely on the fact the others have cut back and I'll sell more at the now higher price.

I think barring some huge geopolitical change in the world, OPEC is from a price-setting point of view now a busted flush. And of course, the big new supplier at the margin, as you alluded to, is the US with fracking.

Now, frackers, you don't by and large drive out of business because the fascinating thing about fracking is the marginal cost is coming down all the time. Nobody knows quite what the marginal cost of a new hole drilled in the United States is, but it's come down a long way. Is at least fallen to $50 and quite likely to $40.

What, of course, you've got in the United States is something like 40,000 holes which have been dug but haven't yet been exploited, and they're ready to come on and be exploited as soon as the oil price rises much above, shall we say, $50. It's likely there that we've got a highly elastic supply of US oil. For really quite a long time.

So I doubt the operative ability of OPEC to cut back supply and achieve that. And it is notable that all of the meetings that they've had so far have singularly failed to reach any agreement.

Populism, social media and 'tired of experts'

Erik Townsend: It's fascinating how many different facets of the global economy this Brexit conversation has taken us to. We're starting to run out of time. I wonder if there's any question I've missed. Is there any aspect of Brexit or what it could mean in terms of knock-on effects Contagion to other countries in the European Union, perhaps also wanting to leave. What have I missed, and what else might we want to consider with respect to this potentially historic event coming next week?

John Llewellyn: Well, perhaps I could leave you with one high-level thought, and that's the following: I don't think very many people in the United Kingdom thought that this Brexit campaign would ever reach the sort of intensity that it's reached. Reached, that it would descend into the type of bitterness that it's reached.

And one of the questions that people are asking themselves is, how is, how is it possible? What has changed? And of course, as a professor of mine used to say, when something changes, look for something else that changed a bit before.

And of course, what's new in this debate is the role of the social media, the fact that people can form constituencies with other people whom in previous epochs they would never have been able to meet. They would never have known them. But now you can find them on the web, you can talk to them, you can— in other words, I'm talking, if you like, about the rise of populism.

And however important or unemployment— however important or unimportant the UK is, it might be a harbinger for the much more important phenomenon of the US economy and US society. And when you look across the Atlantic at Donald Trump, you realize that there's a rise of populism there too. I don't want to comment particularly on the United States. I think that should be left to people who understand it better than I do.

But it was very noticeable that probably the man you'd have to call the intellectual leader of the Vote Leave in the UK, the man called Michael Gove, who was a close friend of the Prime Minister and Cabinet colleague of the Prime Minister. One of his most revealing comments, I think, when told, "Look, nine out of ten economists think that it would be a bad thing for the United Kingdom." You've been told by the IMF, the OECD, the National Institute of Economic and Social Research, the Institute for Fiscal Studies, President Obama, former Secretaries of the U.S. Treasury. His reply was, "The British people are sick of." Experts, tired of experts.

And that is the phenomenon which we're noticing: that that somehow something has changed. That even those whose business it is to study these matters, and however carefully they phrase their their policy, are simply dismissed. They're dismissed as scaremongers. I would be the last to pretend that economists understand everything or get it right.

But they're dismissed out of hand, and I I think I end with a question to you: To what extent is this going on in the United States? To what extent is Donald Trump appealing to people who formed constituents who just say, "I'm sick of experts," or "I'm sick of elites," or "I'm sick of the ruling class," or "I'm sick of Washington D.C."

And in that respect, I think what's going on in the United Kingdom raises a very interesting specter for what might go on in the United

Erik Townsend: Well, I could not possibly agree with you more on that. I think that this election in the United States is all about the American people waking up and recognizing something is very, very wrong. And they don't know what it is. They don't understand it for the most part, but they've figured out that something is very wrong. And I think this is the first election I can remember where I don't know anybody who's voting for anyone. Everyone is voting against someone. And it scares me.

John Llewellyn: I think you would You've just described what's going on here. The extent to which people are really voting to leave Europe or to what extent they're just expressing a high level of discontent is a really moot question.

About Llewellyn Consulting

Erik Townsend: That's very perceptive indeed. As we've pretty much run out of time, I just want to close by asking you to tell us a little bit more about Llewellyn Consulting. What services do you offer to your institutional clients?

John Llewellyn: Well, that's very kind. Well, whereas you couldn't tell from my comments We're a top-down macro firm. We we offer macroeconomic services, but we also define macroeconomic to include all the other big macro drivers like demography, technological change, climate change, and so on. So we tend to offer services to some of the big investment managers, no names, no pack drill, and also to some governments and to some large corporations. Corporations about the big things which are shaped, which are in, are going to drive their future. We, we call economic drivers powerful, inexorable, and long-lasting forces.

And companies and investment managers tend to come to us when they want to see how those may play out. And that's what we do.

Erik Townsend: Well, John, thank you so much for joining us on the program. I really appreciate it. I think you've given our listeners some fantastic perspective on what next week's vote Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Nathan hands co-host duties to Aaron Chan

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger, back with you. Last week, our MacroVoices research team captain, Aaron Chan, was kind enough to help me co-host the final segment of the show because my travel schedule didn't allow me to listen to the feature interview before we taped the final segment. Well, we ended up getting a lot of positive feedback from listeners who enjoyed Aaron's fresh perspective and the questions that he brought to Erik and said they'd like to hear more of him on future shows. This comes as a blessing to me because, as regular listeners will know, MacroVoices is a part-time job for me. I have a lot of personal travel planned this summer, and to be honest, I wasn't that excited about having to carry my studio microphone with me and having to organize my travel schedule around taping the show from afar every Thursday afternoon. So I'm pleased to announce that Aaron has agreed to take over co-hosting responsibilities for the rest of the summer, starting with next week's show.

And I'll be back when my travel situation permits. Meanwhile, Aaron, thanks for agreeing to help us out as co-host. Thank you, Patrick.

Aaron Chan: Hey, Nate. It's really my pleasure, and I'm looking forward to it.

Nathan Egger: So you did a fantastic job with the follow-up questions for Erik last week, so please take it away from here.

Is Brexit a big deal? Erik vs Ben Hunt

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. So Erik, we got John's perspective on so many aspects of Brexit and its economic implications. And I notice his view is decidedly different from last week's guest, Dr. Ben Hunt, who really— who opined that the impact of a Brexit would be minimal because the U.K. is part of the E.U. and not the EMU, meaning that they have their own currency and don't use Now, I'm curious, what is your view? If the Brits vote to leave next week, is it a big deal or not for the global economy?

Erik Townsend: Oh, I think it's a huge big deal, and I respectfully disagree with Ben Hunt on this one. I think he made a very valid point that the fundamental impact in terms of what could happen certainly would be worse if they were also leaving the European Monetary Union, which could disrupt the currency.

But the thing is, as John Llewellyn correctly pointed out, It's a good point. What is being voted on next week is whether or not to begin a process which no one has ever experienced before, because it's never been done, which the rules— if you look up the Brexit referendum on Wikipedia, there is an analysis there of what's involved, and it's hard to even figure it out. It's this 2-year process. There has to be a vote of other members to approve the nation that wants to leave. It's not as simple as the The U.K. just saying, we're gonna take our marbles and go home. Thanks a lot, guys.

So, markets don't like uncertainty, and you're potentially inviting a 2-year period of nobody knowing which way is up. And I think that if you look at the breakup of Lehman Brothers, as John said, should not unto itself have been the catalyst to start the 2008 financial crisis. But it was a big enough catalyst to start something that was ready to happen already because of excessive of debt. Now, look at all of the smart people in the room, the George Soros's and the Stan Druckenmiller's and the Carl Icahn's and the Andy Xie's and the David Rosenberg's, all saying, we're in a situation where if a catalyst came along, you could see things really seriously fall apart.

Could the Brexit be the catalyst that brings that on? I don't know. Entirely possible. Just as you couldn't have possibly predicted Lehman. Would have been the catalyst. Nobody knows ahead of time, but the pump is primed. The economy is in a situation where it's waiting for a catalyst to cause this whole house of cards to come crashing down. And I think it's entirely plausible that this could be that catalyst.

Safe havens: gold, silver, yen and Bitcoin

Aaron Chan: So, my next question is about currencies, and it's really a 2-part question. John discussed sort of the safe haven move from pound sterling into euro and the dollar. But what about the yen? The yen got pounded by a weaker dollar, I think up to around 150. And what other beneficiaries of a flight from pound sterling do you see? Possibly gold? I mean, Bitcoin's at $700. So what other lifeboats do you see people running to from pound sterling?

Erik Townsend: I think that probably gold and silver will benefit. And I don't think it's so much as the gold bugs would tell you that everybody is going to prefer them. It's just a question of liquidity. There's a lot of money involved. And the gold and silver markets are relatively small in terms of their capacity to absorb large capital flows. Flows without large price moves. So I think it's quite possible that this could be a major move to the upside for precious metals.

As far as something like Bitcoin, I think probably China is driving the Bitcoin situation more than anything else. Bitcoin is particularly attractive to Chinese that are trying to hide wealth and figure out ways of smuggling it out of their country. You don't really have that problem I don't think there's a problem in terms of capital controls per se in Europe. So I wouldn't see Bitcoin as being as big of a benefactor from this situation. The yen, I think, probably, you know, Japanese BOJ monetary policy is going to influence the yen. So yeah, of course, flight capital coming out of the pound sterling could wind up in the yen. But I think the size of that effect would probably be dwarfed by the size of monetary policy effects out of the BOJ.

So if I were trying to bet on some asset benefiting from a Brexit, I would think precious metals would be the first place to look.

Oil outlook and the Saudi-Russia cartel question

Aaron Chan: Great. So we've covered crude oil quite a bit on MacroVoices in the past, and it was really interesting to hear John's take on Brexit's impact on oil prices. And he said that we'll probably likely see lower oil prices for longer. So, Erik, how do you factor Brexit into your outlook for oil?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the Brexit event likely causes a lot of people to sort of panic about everything, and I do think that we, just from last week's 5160 or so high, you know, we're probably at a cycle high, and certainly Brexit could take us back down to the bottom of the trading channel, maybe lower than that, I don't know.

But as far as the longer-term view, the one place I would respectfully disagree with Mr. Llewellyn is I really think that, although I agree that OPEC's cartel pricing capability is pretty much compromised at this point. I think they want very much to get it back. And I think that, you know, his comment about Saudi Arabia and Iran, well, that's not going to happen because, I mean, on every level— religious, philosophical, ideological— Saudi Arabia and Iran just don't ever want to be friends. Saudi Arabia enticing Russia to play ball with them. I think Russia was ready and has now stepped back, but could probably be coerced again Once the situation with Iran stabilizes and Saudi Arabia is able to contemplate a cut without it looking to their citizenry as though they are cutting at a time while Iran is increasing production, which I think is what made it untenable for them to accept Russia's offer. At some point, I think Russia and Saudi Arabia could come together and maybe, not for certain, but maybe that does restore a cartel pricing ability where they could move prices dramatically higher.

I would agree that if that doesn't happen, then I think that John's arguments for why oil prices could stay depressed for a long time, I would agree with. But I think he's maybe not giving as much credence to that possibility as I would— the possibility of Saudi Arabia joining forces with Russia and recreating the former cartel pricing capability that OPEC once had.

Populism, Podemos and EU contagion risk

Aaron Chan: That's fascinating. It'll be interesting to see that play out in the future. So my last question is about the psychological contagion that John talked about. So there was a fascinating discussion about the trade channel and the psychological channel in terms of influences between economies and industry. I thought a telling quote from Michael Gove is that the British people are tired of experts.

And right now you can see that the venom is directed at politicians, but the experts running the global economy, Erik, you and I know know, are the professorial central bankers. So do you see the populist gaze turning towards the central bankers anytime soon?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the real question is going to be the populist response of Europeans in general to staying in the E.U. In addition to the Brexit referendum, you've also got this Unidos Podemos group in Spain. Now, ironically, translated from Spanish, that means united we can, yet they appear to be favoring withdrawal of Spain from the EU. So being ununited from the EU seems to be on their mind.

Right now, Greece is sort of out of the news, but do we have another Greek crisis? I think that there is a risk at some point that if other countries are doing it and are fed up with the European Union, it could cause a contagion where several other countries exit. Once those— it's sort of like a bank run. It doesn't make sense until everybody else is doing it, and then it kind of doesn't make sense not to participate in it. yourself.

And as I think Ben Hunt very accurately opined, the Brexit exiting the E.U. was not that— it was not as big of a deal as it would have been if the U.K. were also in the EMU. In other words, participating in the euro currency.

If you were to have some of the larger countries like France and Spain, which are in the E.U., exit the E.U. and go back to their own currencies, that could have catastrophic implications for the That could lead to a Europe-wide banking crisis, which then becomes self-reinforcing. As that crisis is falling apart, the euro is devaluing dramatically. Now Europeans lose confidence in the euro system, and they want out. They want to go back to their own currencies. That would take at least ten years to clean up the mess if that happened. Now I'm not predicting that, and I don't think that that's likely. But I think that kind of contagion effect is entirely possible.

And these things are like avalanches. You know, it takes just a tiny little bit of snow falling in just the right spot to get it started. And once it gets started, it can't be stopped. So I don't think it's possible to predict it. But if it were to start to happen, it could be huge.

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Erik. It really sounds like it's gonna be spicy next week.

Nathan Egger: Aaron, I know Erik very well. And I can tell that you're really putting him to the test, and we're getting the best out of him as a result of that. So I really can't tell you how much— well, first of all, that I'm comfortable passing the baton to you for the summer and how much I appreciate you stepping up to help out with the co-hosting on MacroVoices.

So I'm really looking forward to Professor Steve Keen coming back to talk to us about alternative currencies on next week's show. But I should let you, Aaron, do the show wrap as our new co-host.

Show wrap and Research Roundup preview

Aaron Chan: Thanks, Nate. It's time to put on the big boy pants here. So before we close, I wanted to update our listeners on what to expect for this week's Research Roundup newsletter. We've got a great video of Jim Grant speaking at Google about his book, The Forgotten Depression of 1921. We also have Shane Obata-Muzarich's extensive paper, which reviews industry and academic research about the unconventional policies and their effects on financial markets.

And finally, for those of you who might be a little bit more research or data inclined, there's a really interesting academic paper called Lazy Prices that explores a quantitative connection between changes in corporate earnings language and financial returns. The reception for Research Roundup so far has been really positive. And again, we continue to welcome any feedback or submissions to researchroundup@macrovoices.com.

So that about wraps it up for this week's program. Nate, you're going to be missed, and I hope you enjoy your travels. They're very well deserved. But I'm really looking forward to working with Erik and to continue bringing great content to our community. Again, the best way to support us is by leaving a review on iTunes. And don't forget to subscribe on MacroVoices to get the latest episodes and Research Roundup newsletters straight into your inbox. If you're Twitter inclined, you can follow Erik @ErikSTownsend. It's Erik with a K.

And myself @AaronChan_. For Erik and Nathan, I'm Aaron Chan. Till next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management. LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Ben Hunt — Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 18 was recorded a day early this week to accommodate travel schedules on Wednesday, June 8th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Salient Partners Chief Risk Officer and Epsilon Theory author Dr. Ben Hunt Will be joining me as this week's featured guest. Dr. Hunt and I will be discussing the U.S. dollar, the upcoming Brexit referendum, U.S. monetary policy, negative interest rates, and much more. And MacroVoices' own volunteer research team captain, Aaron Chan, will be joining us again at the end of today's program.

Market wrap: equities, bad-is-the-new-good and the Fed

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's talk equities, Erik. By midweek, the S&P had already traded above 2,120, nearing those all-time highs. And all of this in the face of economic data that has been just awful, including last Friday's nonfarm payroll report coming in at only— it was 38,000 new jobs created. Erik, what's going on here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think it's exactly about the awful data, and it's— we're going back to this bad is the new good doctrine. And it's crazy that this is happening because just this week, you know, last week we talked about Andy Xie joining the chorus of bears along with George Soros and Carl Icahn and Stan Druckenmiller and all these, you know, rock of finance who are just saying, this is crazy. Asset markets are way overvalued. Rosenberg came in this week. He has a new 106-slide PowerPoint presentation, which I thought was excellent. We've got a link to that in this week's Research Roundup, which has already been emailed to our registered listeners here at MacroVoices.com. And for that matter, Goldman Sachs was out Tuesday evening with a bearish note predicting a significant drawdown in equities. So how are all these things possible? In that we have the market almost flirting with all-time highs in the face of the smartest guys in the room all saying that the economy is headed for the toilet?

And the answer is because we're back to this bad is the new good doctrine, which really has existed since 2009, where it is expectations of Fed easing that are driving things more than actual economic data. And of course, the effect of the nonfarm payroll report on Friday was to virtually guarantee that there will be no hike at next week's FOMC meeting.

So if we're not going to get a hike in June, a lot of people seem to think a hike in July is impossible because there's no press conference. Now, the Fed has been pretty clear that the July meeting is a live meeting and there could be a hike then. But there hasn't ever been one, at least in recent times, before when there was no press conference. And so a lot of people think that that is not possible. I said last week that no hike could ignite a rally towards all-time highs. And that's exactly what's happening. But it's happening early because people are basically assuming it's a foregone conclusion after this nonfarm payroll report. And Janet Yellen's emphasis on being data dependent, that, well, gee, the data really does not justify a rate hike at this point.

So it remains to be seen whether or not this rate hike is going to be a buy the rumor, sell the news event where we see a top in equities, which would be, say, a double top testing those all-time highs. And maybe that's where the top is in and it's downhill from there and all these smart guys are proven right. Or maybe we see an actual breakout above those prior highs. If that happened, it would definitely be self-reinforcing because pretty much any technician will tell you that a breakout to new all-time highs is always a bullish buy signal. Now, a disciplined technician would also tell you that you have to wait for that breakout to be qualified as a legitimate breakout. In other words, it needs to stay above those all-time highs for more than just a few days, and it also needs to significantly move well above the prior highs.

In this environment where there's so much irrational exuberance and very strong bullish investor sentiment in the system, I think as soon as we see a couple of points above the previous high, a lot of people are going to be buying hand over fist in what I think is really more hysteria than sensible risk-taking.

But, you know, I think the biggest mistake that you don't want to make here is say, oh, it's impossible in the face of this economic data for the market to move higher. It's not impossible if the majority of market participants think that a U-turn in policy is coming.

In other words, not only is there no hike at the June meeting, But there's no more hikes. We're not gonna have any more hikes. The attempted hiking cycle is over after only one hike. If that's what happens, or if expectations in the market are that that is what happens, that the rate normalization narrative that we've been living under is over, then we're back to the same kind of craziness that's happened since 2009, where people start expecting the next round of quantitative easing and so forth. So now that's not what Janet Yellen is saying. She's saying that we are in a normalization process and that if it doesn't happen at this meeting, Well, then maybe it'll happen at the next meeting. I think a lot of people are starting to assume that maybe the rate normalization attempt is over. And the reason a lot of them are saying that is that if we don't have a hike at the June meeting next week, which seems almost certain that we will not, well, then it's been too many meetings between rate hikes.

And if you look at prior precedents, normally a rate hiking cycle, you don't go that many meetings without having a hike. So that sort of implies that it's over. I think that's misplaced logic, frankly, but a lot of people think that. And what we're seeing right now is a lot of exuberance. Let's suppose this thing does break above the previous all-time high and starts to gain momentum and moves even more to the upside.

You know, at some point, what does this mean? You know, is it bad is the new good forever? So if we had another Great Depression, that would send the S&P to 5,000? Obviously, this can't go on forever. So the question to ask yourself is, what breaks this bad is the new good doctrine?

And I think it's one of two things. Number one, when inflation hits the stage again. The Fed can get away with accommodating asset markets and boosting asset markets to create wealth effect. We had an article in, I think, last week's Research Roundup from Jesse Felder describing why he feels that the Fed is entirely Dow-dependent rather than data-dependent.

The thing is, they're getting away with that because of the current deflationary backdrop. When inflation hits the stage again, whenever that happens, all of a sudden the Fed's hands are tied. They're forced to hike rates. rates in order to combat inflation, they can't support asset markets, and then you potentially get a really abrupt sell-off, if not a bigger crash than 2008.

Now, a lot of people have said to me, Erik, you're crazy to even bring up inflation. Look at what's going on. Very, very clearly, the macro backdrop here is deflationary, not inflationary. Well, they're right about that, but if you look at your history, every epic inflation in history has been preceded by a whiff of very strong deflation. And usually what happens, the Weimar Hyperinflation is a good example. There's a deflationary backdrop that allows central bankers to become overconfident and think they can get away with printing unlimited amounts of money, which of course Rudolf von Havenstein did back in Germany in, in the Weimar hyperinflation. That works for a while until it doesn't work and you get runaway inflation, and then you've got a really crazy situation. I didn't think that there was any sign of inflation on the horizon. I was very surprised when Julian Brigden a couple of weeks ago said Hey, you know, I think by the end of the year we could be looking at inflation and inflation expectations starting to take off.

I'll be surprised to see that, actually, but boy, I'll be watching carefully for it, because when you start to see inflation take off, that's where I really get concerned.

The other way that this bad is the new good doctrine could come to an end would be if we start to see the Fed moving back to an accommodative stance, maybe another round of quantitative easing, and there is a public outcry. And I think in the current political cycle, it's very possible that this could happen, where the people say, look, if we're going to do more money printing, it should support Main Street, not Wall Street. This business of propping up asset markets is immoral because it helps only a very small part of the population. If there's going to be more money printing, it should go into infrastructure or some other kind of spending which is much broader based. That could be what short-circuits the Wall Street expectation of the Yellen put, that the Fed is going to be there to bail out Right.

Until one of those things happens, though, I think if we are indeed going to watch the Fed abandon its attempted rate hiking cycle, or rate normalization cycle, as they call it, that could lead to another big round of irrational exuberance and more upside in asset markets. I don't think it makes any sense in terms of the economic backdrop. And I'm noticing that some of the smarter guys, you know, Rosenberg is not saying that he thinks the stock market is going to crash. He just thinks that the broader economy is in big trouble. And I think I think Andy Xie said the same thing about the global economy. So maybe what we're looking at is a period, at least, where we were kind of like the Austrian concept of a crack-up boom, where asset prices continue to rise as the economy falls apart. I don't know, but I think the fundamental backdrop looks awful.

Asset prices are still moving higher and may continue to move higher if there is an expectation of more accommodation from the Fed.

Crude oil, Cushing storage and spreads

Nathan Egger: I often wonder who exactly it is that's waking up every morning and deciding they need to buy more equities. But we saw crude oil We saw crude oil last week, Erik, meet considerable resistance around $50. And we've seen a lot more strength in crude oil. We got back above that $50 level, and we've been able to trade there for a bit. Saw WTI trading above $51 on Wednesday. What's your outlook for the crude?

Erik Townsend: Well, we had a couple of things happen this week. As you said, we couldn't get above $50. There's a psychological barrier there. But I think most technicians have said the more important technical level is not $50, which is a psychological number, but more like Like $51.90, just below $52. And that shows up in the longer-term charts, in the weekly charts, as a major retracement level.

And as we speak, just after the close on Wednesday, we're almost there. We're 30 cents away from it at $51.53 as we're speaking late on Wednesday. I think we're probably going to get to that $51.90 number. That also coincides with what looks like it could be the final reaction high on an ascending wedge pattern in both the CL and the Brent crude oil charts. So it does look like we're maybe on a high here, but with all of this Fed exuberance, I'm not sure I dare to short it just because everybody's buying everything hand over fist. A couple things happened this week.

Tuesday, EIA's short-term energy outlook reported a much larger drop in production in May than we had seen previously. Remember Art Berman last week on the show saying, you know, we were seeing these 50,000 barrel per day drops in a given month, and it maybe got as much as 100, but it's not enough. We need 150 before it's really going to make a difference in terms of allowing higher oil prices. Well, guess what? We've got that north of 150 now. Also, relative inventories, both in absolute and in relative terms, inventories are falling. I'm not going to spend a lot of time on that because Art Berman does have an excellent new blog post out on that exact subject. We've got a link to that post in your Research Roundup email this week.

EIA inventory came out Wednesday morning. Drawdown in national inventories of 3.2 million barrels, about in line with expectations and entirely consistent with what would be regular and normal at this time of year. We are in drawdown season. It's summer driving season. Cushing, Oklahoma, drawing down 1.4 million barrels. 1.363 actually was the number.

That's a little bit bigger than analyst expectations. Doesn't really surprise me, though, because of the Canada wildfires, which are affecting supply of Alberta oil into Cushing. That is a major stick save, though, for the storage crisis. We got as far as 96.42% of operating capacity in Cushing, down to about 92.5% as of today. 92.5% is still a huge number, but in terms of how much spare capacity is available, we've gone from 3% to 7%. So we've got, you know, twice as much buffer as we had before. The surprise, though, was gasoline and distillates. Distillates, of course, is a collective term for diesel fuel and jet fuel and all the other stuff that's made from crude oil, types of fuels other than gasoline. A build in inventories of 1 million barrels of gasoline, 1.7 million barrels in distillates. Well, hang on. That 3.2 million barrel crude oil drawdown is about right for this time of year. But if you consider that there was a buildup of 2.7 million barrels of finished products, they're processing the crude oil, they're refining it into refined products that apparently are not selling.

So it almost mitigates or cancels out most of that 3.2 million barrel drawdown. The $51.90 retrace target that I mentioned is definitely in the crosshairs. I'm noticing a lot of technicians, whether they're talking about that number or they're talking about the ascending wedge pattern or they're talking about just prior levels that existed, for different reasons, different technicians are talking about tops here. So I do think that we may be at a cycle high at $51.90, which I expect that we'll test before the week is out.

Nathan Egger: Okay. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: I'm also watching carefully the front-month spread. That's the difference between the July and the August contract. Because as I've described in previous shows, the place where you potentially get downside risk in terms of storage capacity being a problem is if the speculative longs— and remember, even if the longs want to stay long, they're still forced to sell that expiring July contract. Who are they going to sell it to? They can't sell it to other speculators because other speculators have to be into the next contract, the one that It does not require you to take physical delivery if you trade beyond the 21st of June, which is when this contract expires. So if they're forced to sell that and there's nobody to sell it to, you could see that spread dramatically widen out. Now, back when we were at 85% of capacity, we were seeing $2 contango spreads near expiration. We're not seeing anything close to that.

It moved from $0.45 a week and a half ago to $0.61 as we're speaking now on Wednesday. So we are seeing a widening of the spread, which is not unusual. If there is tight storage, as we have, but it's nothing out of bounds. It's nothing to suggest a panic. So it does not look to me like there's any storage crisis that's going to happen. I think the market, even though we're above 90% capacity, is saying, "Hey, the trend is reversed. We're seeing drawdowns. We're also seeing a lot of supply destruction around the world." I think the market is breathing a big sigh of relief.

I have noticed also. You can see also that there's been temporary compression in those spreads, spreads across the board, not just the front month. Each time the market moved above 50, there was a temporary compression of spreads that lasted for several hours and then came back out. What that says to me is each time the market moved above 50, there was another wave of producer hedging. And again, producer hedging means that oil producers are selling the long-dated contracts as speculators are buying the near-dated contracts. That flattens out the curve.

If you think, as I do, that that is not sustainable long-term, that either the front month moves down or the back months move up, one or the other, then that curve steepener trade that I've talked about in previous shows ought to be profitable.

Gold and the FOMC test

Nathan Egger: And the gold chart was looking awfully bearish last week. We saw the yellow metal struggling to stay above $1,200, but the upward price spike in reaction to the weak jobs report on Friday was dramatic. It was instantaneous. What are you seeing in the gold market?

Erik Townsend: Well, it was not only dramatic and instantaneous, it took us right back to a critical level, which was around 1,250 or so, and the 50-day moving average. To see a data report like that jerk the market back to a key technical level such as a moving average is really not a big deal as long as it stays below that moving average. And for a couple of days, it looks like it was going to stay below the 50-day moving average. I thought that might be kind of a False up move and it might roll back over as the, the news from the payroll kind of faded out of traders' minds. Today on Wednesday though, we saw a very aggressive breakout up above the 50-day moving average, testing $1,267 at one point on Wednesday. So that's $12 above where the moving average was. What this all says to me is we're seeing some pretty darn good strength here. I had said last week, I think, that what we might see happen with Gold is if we got to the FOMC meeting and there was no rate hike, that might mark a bottom.

I think that could be what is in play here, but it wasn't the FOMC meeting, it was the payroll report, which basically guaranteed the outcome of the FOMC meeting. And that clearly, at least on Wednesday, is showing a lot of strength. So I think maybe we are seeing the beginning of another move higher. The next big test, of course, will be can we get above $1,300, above the most recent high, and start to move higher from there.

It's still a matter of watching, and I think that next week's FOMC press conference is going to be absolutely critical, because if Janet Yellen reinforces the message of, hey guys, we are in a rate hiking cycle, we've decided to pause here, we're not going to do it this month because of data, we're going to wait for next month and see if the data looks good, but don't be surprised if a rate hike comes next month, boys and girls. If Janet Yellen were to express that sentiment, I think gold would be turning right back down just as quickly as it went up.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: But more consistent with her recent statements, if she kind of said, yeah, well, maybe we don't have to do any more hiking, and we're not going to perhaps do any more hikes this year, and maybe that's it. If she continued to send a dovish message, as she has, that could very easily shock both equity and precious metal prices much higher.

So I think that the tell is probably going to be what happens at next week's FOMC meeting, which of course is Wednesday afternoon, the 15th of So, we're seeing buying in gold in response to weak economic data and statement from the Fed.

US dollar index weakness

Nathan Egger: How's this been affecting the US dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, obviously, the big move was way down in reaction, again, to the jobs report. Everybody knew that that was going to take the rate hike off the table. And of course, if the rate hike is not there, that was— it was the expectation of the possibility of a rate hike, or at least the fact that we're still in a hiking cycle, that was providing strength to the dollar. When I saw that massive downside spike, I said, I sort of thought to myself, okay, markets tend to overshoot and overreact to data points. Maybe this is a buying opportunity here. Maybe it is going to be uphill from here and this is a buying opportunity, but I'll watch it for a couple days before I buy anything.

Sure enough, what's happened in the last couple days is we're seeing continued weakening. We've dropped almost another full large handle on the dollar index since that jobs report. And what it says to me is the market is starting to say, hey, wait a minute.

Nathan Egger: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: If the Fed is not really going to follow through with this rate hiking program, maybe that wasn't the low that we saw back at '92 or so on the dollar index. Maybe this was a false move to the upside and actually there's a much lower. So I see continued selling this week following Friday's data. It's not just the crazy reaction on Friday, but it's continuing. That says to me that there are growing market market expectations that the hiking cycle, the rate normalization cycle, is over and about to be abandoned by the Fed. I think they'll probably be proven wrong by that, but it won't be till Janet Yellen's press conference that we get a better indication of what's going on.

Treasury yields

Nathan Egger: So, equities up, gold up, dollar's getting crushed. Why are we seeing bond yields getting crushed with Wednesday's 10-year reopening printing a 1.7 yield? What's going on here in fixed income?

Erik Townsend: Well, of course, what's going on is the, the same thing. The jobs report is pretty much assuring that there's going to be no hike of short-term interest rates. And so as a result of that, long-term interest rates are starting to drift down as well. 1.7 is kind of a key level in a lot of technical charts, and I think that a lot of people are perceiving it as sort of a credibility level. In other words, we were seeing increasing 10-year yields So, if we continue to see higher yields, that's an indication that market participants are expecting improvement in the broader economy. But if we start falling below 1.7%, how does the Fed justify a hiking cycle if we're seeing really what is a pretty strong oncoming recession signal coming from longer-dated Treasury securities? And how does the Fed continue to justify staying on its rate normalization cycle in the face of that?

So, what happens here?

Nathan Egger: Lower?

Erik Townsend: We'll see. I think, again, it's going to depend very much on Janet Yellen's comments next week. If she reinforces the message of, hey folks, don't forget, we are committed to a rate normalization cycle, it's just a question of taking pause until the data supports it, then I think you'll see things turn around. If the Fed backs away and says, oh, maybe we're done with this rate normalization cycle after only one hike, then I think it's a whole new ballgame. And I think you could see lower bond yields. I think that you could You'll definitely see asset markets in general going crazy.

Nathan Egger: Thank you for the market update. This week's featured guest is Dr. Ben Hunt of Salient Partners. Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Ben Hunt: Dollar outlook and China's devaluation pressure

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Dr. Ben Hunt, Chief Risk Officer at Salient Partners, and of course, author of the very popular Epsilon Theory blog. Ben, thanks so much for joining me on the program. I want to start with the US dollar because, as you know, everything else hinges on that. We've had some guests on the program tell us the tops are in and it's all downhill from here on the dollar. Others have said the pause is over and it's all uphill from here. What's your perspective?

Ben Hunt: Well, it's great to be here, and you're right that this is the topic that we need to be discussing first and foremost. So, so, so here's my view. My view is that the dollar is not a, um, let's call it an independent entity or security like a, a stock would be. It doesn't have its own independent cash flows or anything the like.

What the dollar is— what, and by the dollar, what we mean is the exchange rate of the dollar versus our trading partners— the dollar is a reflection of monetary policy.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: Not just to the Fed, but a reflection of the strategic interaction, the game that's being played between the Fed, People's Bank of China, the ECB, and the yen. So I'm not perplexed, because I understand that that's what we do in this world. We try to predict if something's going up or down. But what I'll tell you is that when you're dealing with something like the dollar today, that is driven

Erik Townsend: That's right.

Ben Hunt: That's driven by game-playing, that's driven by strategic interactions.

It's very different from trying to predict whether something that has fundamental causes will go up or down. That is, whether the dollar goes up from here or down from here depends entirely not just on the decisions that the Fed makes, but on the interplay, the interaction between the decisions that the Fed makes and particularly the Chinese So I'll tell you, if I'm a betting man, I say that the dollar goes up from here because I think it's an existential issue, political issue in China, that they have to keep devaluing their currency. It's massively overvalued today for reasons we can discuss, but I think that the political dynamic is going to be driven by this existential issue in China. to devalue their currency, to continue to promote industrial production and exports.

Erik Townsend: Okay, why don't we go ahead and pick up on the China overvalued argument?

Ben Hunt: Yeah, sure, sure. That— I mean, this is the, uh, you know, I, I try in my, my blog and the notes that I write to try to apply the lenses of, of game theory, which we just kind of touched in passing, but also of history. And, you know, the last time we had such overwhelming debt in the world was in the 1930s. And I think people are kind of familiar with that dynamic.

But, you know, what I think is most interesting about China, the historical comparison I would make with China, is that I think they're very similar to Germany before World War I. You know, what do I mean by that? What I mean is that As Germany was in, say, 1910, 1912, they are the up-and-coming challenger in the global economy.

They are also a country that is, let's call it, more authoritarian than their neighbors, the European neighbors in the case of Germany, and of course, their Pacific neighbors in the case of China.

And they're also responding to their new position as the challenger for the largest economy in the world in a very similar way. And what I mean by that is they're printing a lot of money. It's something that one does as a government or a country in this sort of position, because what you're trying to do is you're trying to Well, let me back up a second. You've built this position of being a challenger in a tremendous economy by trading with the world.

And what you need to do now is what— or what you think you need to do now is you need to develop internally. And that's what China's trying to do too, just like Germany tried to do before World War I. They're trying to build out their own domestic— they didn't call it consumption in 1910, But they, they, because they're trying to build out their own domestic, particularly financial system. It's the same in China.

So what do you do when that happens? When you have shocks that are occurring in the world, as you did in, you know, in the early 20th century? Well, you print a lot of money.

You print a lot of money because you don't want to be tied, you don't want to be vulnerable to what's going on in the, in the, in than the rest of the world. And the way this played out with China was that in the Great Recession, 2008, they flooded their country domestically with credit. It's a very sensible thing to do, right? You can, in a sense, inoculate yourself from the enormous recessionary, deflationary pressures that are washing up, in that case, on China's shores. From the financial crisis in the US and Europe by just printing a lot of money. That's what they did. So, to give you a sense of this, in the US today, when we talk about M2, the broad-based monetary supply, it's about, I don't know, 75%, 80% of US GDP.

In China today, it's about 250%, 260%.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Ben Hunt: Of their GDP. It's a tremendous difference, and almost all of that difference has occurred since 2008, where they've just printed lots of money. Now, that's fine. Like I say, it's a very sensible thing to do to try to protect yourself as a big growing economy.

You want to— you don't want to get knocked back by whatever's happening in other countries. But here's the downside. The downside is That because you've printed so much money, your currency should be worth less, right? I mean, if you now have to exchange that currency that you've printed 10 times of over the past few years, it means it's going to be worth less when you're exchanging it for dollars.

But that's a problem. It was a problem for Germany when they were on the gold standard, and it's a problem for China today when they're effectively on the US dollar. Dollar standard, because they haven't been able to devalue their currency. All right? So why is that a problem? It's a problem because then it makes their goods and— not so much services, but the things they make, the industrial output that they have, it makes it more expensive to sell abroad.

And for the next decade or so, as much as they're trying to develop that internal market, China is still going to be an export-led economy. Exports to the United States for sure, but also to Japan, to the emerging markets of Russia, India, Brazil, and particularly to Europe. And when their currency is overvalued, they can't sell as much stuff, and so their industrial production goes down.

Why do I call that an existential threat? Because ever since Donald Deng Xiaoping really reformulated the legitimacy of the Chinese state from Mao and the Gang of Four, and that legitimacy was based on the idea of, you know what, we can all get rich together. We can develop the economy. It's glorious to be rich, and that's going to be the driving force of the Chinese state.

So, So in this world that Deng Xiaoping created 35 years ago, they, meaning Beijing, the Chinese Communist Party, have to have real people making real stuff in real factories that they can really sell. They don't care if they sell it domestically or internationally, but for, let's say, the next decade, most of it's going to have to be sold internationally.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Ben Hunt: So they have to export. Their exports are declining, declining precipitously. And that's the existential risk that China has, and that's what I think will continue to press them to devalue their currency so they can keep selling stuff to the rest of the world.

Brexit, the euro and Humpty Dumpty moments

Erik Townsend: Let's go back to Europe, but perhaps to the part that is not sure if it wants to be in Europe, which of course is the upcoming Brexit referendum on June 23rd. Most of the interviews I've heard on this topic are with British economists who seem to have a lot of political capital invested personally. I wonder if you can give us the level-headed— for both outcomes, what are the economic consequences to the rest of the global economy on either result of this referendum?

Ben Hunt: Minimal. Minimal. So, so, and here's, here's why I say that. There are, in my thinking, I think I think there are 2 what I'll call Humpty Dumpty moments, right? Meaning that events that are so damaging to the status quo of monetary policy and this edifice that, you know, the central banks and the status quo politicians have built up over the years.

There are 2 of those Humpty Dumpty moments that I can identify. One is what we just talked about. If China floats their currency and it devalues, If the euro devalues by 20%, which I think it would, that's an atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, and Asian and European banks are in an unbelievable world of hurt if that happens. We can talk about that.

The other Humpty Dumpty moment is something that strikes at the heart of the euro.

You'll notice both of these Humpty Dumpty moments have to do with currencies. And that is the world we're in. And that's why I think you smartly started off our discussion talking about the dollar. It really is currencies today through which all of these political and monetary forces present themselves.

So the thing, though, that would break up the euro, it's not Brexit, right? So obviously, you know, the U.K. is not part of the euro system, so their exit doesn't threaten the euro system.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: And that's why I say it's not an issue that really is that big of an impact fundamentally on markets, because it doesn't impact the euro system. It impacts the E.U., the European Union, but it doesn't impact the euro system. What would impact the euro system?

A President Le Pen, right?

Erik Townsend: Right.

Ben Hunt: An election in Germany in 2017 Where, you know, a Le Pen equivalent, right, comes to the fore in German politics. That is what strikes at the heart of the euro system. And those are the Humpty Dumpty moments that I think you have to look at for Europe. So, look, is Brexit important? Of course Brexit is important. It's particularly important for the U.K. I'd vote to leave in a heartbeat if I were over there and I were voting.

You know, that's just me. I think that the politics of identity and sovereignty are clearly making a resurgence in the world. I think this is a— the Brexit vote is a symptom of that. And if I were a betting man, I'd say that they leave. But I don't think that it has that great of an economic impact. I think, you know, Look, I think you can have a risk-off moment in markets if they vote to leave, because the dollar will go up when they leave.

The pound will go down when they leave. That's a risk-off scenario. But for me, that's a moment to jump in and buy, as opposed to those other Humpty Dumpty moments I spoke of, you know, a Chinese devaluation, a French election, of the National Front candidate. Those are events where I want to sell on the risk-off and then keep selling.

Inverted price signal: equities as monetary-policy proxy

Erik Townsend: Let's come back to the United States. Equities, as we're speaking on Wednesday morning, are flirting with all-time highs. And of course, it appears that the catalyst for that is bad news, that we had this dreadful payrolls report. So I particularly have been looking forward to asking you this question because you view economics through the lens of game theory. And what I see here is just nobody's talking about the fact that we've completely inverted the price signal. You know, the S&P 500 used to be a leading— or still is a leading economic indicator. But what we see now is bad is the new good.

You know, it seems to me if the sun were to rise in the west tomorrow, that would be big news. That would make the news, right?

Ben Hunt: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: But we've completely inverted the price signal and nobody's talking about What does this mean and what are the knock-on effects of it?

Ben Hunt: Well, the knock-on effects is that we continue to gravitate higher. Look, you're right that the S&P used to be a leading indicator of what was going on in the actual economy. Why? Because stocks were in fact fractional ownership shares of real companies where the earnings, GAAP or otherwise, the The cash flows, that was all then reflected in stock prices. But, you know, as you're alluding to, and again, as you started off the start of this conversation, you know, that hasn't been the case for— well, it's remarkable how the correlation, how now the S&P is actually a following indicator, again, of monetary policy as reflected in the dollar.

That's been the case really for the past 30 years. Well, 5 years. I mean, obviously, these events started in March of '09 with the first imposition of QE by the Fed. And as you know, I've got some charts on this that I like to show in some of my blog posts and the like.

But if you look at the 9 years before March of '09, so from 2000 to March of '09, what we would call a quality factor, and you can, you know, Deutsche Bank and some other guys do indices of these different factors, right? And the quality factor, which is exactly what you would think it means, right? These are companies, these are large-cap companies that have a high return on equity, high return on invested capital, have positive accruals from accounting perspective.

If you had just invested in those companies and you insured And shorted the companies that, that had the worst on this score, i.e., you're market neutral, right? So you're, you're purely market neutral. You just want to be long quality and short crap, right? That index for the 9 years, March of 2000 to March of 2009, was up 70-something percent. What was S&P? It was down 50%. Since March of '09, So the S&P 500 has tripled.

That quality index, flat. It's up about 9% over the intervening, you know, 7 years now.

That's what happens when the banks, the central banks, insert themselves into markets. And today it's, you know, every, every month, every year I wake up and say, well, we can't possibly become more correlated more linked to, more driven by monetary policy. And every month and every year, yes, we are. So you're exactly right that, that in a sense, the sun is now rising in the west and setting in the east. And in the sense that you were correct in is that the stocks, equity prices are no longer a leading indicator of what's happening in the real economy. They're no longer a reflection of what happens in the real economy at all.

They are purely a lagging indicator, a reflection of monetary policy. And that's the prison we're in right now.

Fed policy, negative rates and the war on cash

Erik Townsend: And with respect to monetary policy, I mean, this is just one payroll report, and obviously the implication is that we're not going to get a rate hike in June. But, you know, supposedly Janet Yellen's story is that we're still in a rate normalization process, even if the hike doesn't happen this month, maybe it'll happen next month. But the time between hikes has already exceeded any past precedent in terms of how long they wait between hikes when there is a true rate hiking cycle in play. So do you see this as we're on the verge of a policy U-turn that's headed back towards negative rates and more QE, or is this just a brief pause as Janet says it is?

Ben Hunt: So, look, this gets back to that first question you were asking about how do you predict the dollar, where the dollar's going to go up or down. And I wish we were back in those happy days when I could look at U.S. industrial production, I could look at U.S. jobs, I could look at U.S.-only indicators and tell you which way is the dollar going, because I could then do the same thing about interest rates as well. And that's how we all grew up. We all grew up in markets that, okay, if you just focus on the U.S., you can figure out what U.S. policy's gonna be.

But that's not the world we're in anymore, whether you're talking about the dollar, which is, again, that reflection of monetary policy, or you're talking about monetary policy itself.

So, in that March speech that Janet Yellen gave, where she essentially turned the barge entirely around and said, oh, you know, we were talking in December about 4 rate hikes, And Stanley Fischer was talking about doing 4 rate hikes. And maybe we won't hike at all here in 2016. That was the big dovish moment, right, in March.

In that speech, she mentioned China and the dollar more frequently than she had mentioned China and the dollar in every other speech she's given put together. And that's what's changed. I think that the Fed The Fed has slowly, belatedly come to realize that it's not just what's happening in the U.S.

I'm sorry, but— and look, I wish it were. I wish it were just what was happening in the U.S., but it's not. It is that strategic interaction between the U.S. and particularly China, also Europe, also Japan. So, when you look at the rest of the world and you see how just— it's just obliteration out there. There in terms of inflation, in terms of growth.

I mean, for God's sake, the German 10-year Bund is, what, at 2 basis points today? I mean, it's— we are truly in a world where, even though I think the Fed really does want to normalize, they want to— look, they're just people, right? And they're like people like you and me. I would love to go back to normal times where fundamentals mattered and where the Fed could just stay the heck out of the way.

But we're not.

And so long as the rest of the world is in negative rates and getting more negative, so long as the rest of the world is declining from an economic growth perspective, so long as inflation expectations are declining, so long as— and this is the most important thing to me— global trade is shrinking, there's no way the Fed can raise rates.

Or if they do, it'll be like December and you have major freakout moments and they have to reverse themselves. That is unfortunately the world we're in today.

Erik Townsend: And whether or not we actually get to negative rates in the United States, as you said, we've already got them around the world. I just saw this week Toyota issued a corporate bond at 1/10 of 1 basis point.

Ben Hunt: Hey, let's— let me be clear. Negative rates are here in the U.S. And here's what I mean by that. In money market funds, money market funds, and this is driven both by global rates, but also by new regulations that have been passed here in the United States governing money market funds. So, I'm aware of 2 large money market fund complexes that As of April 2017, will be no longer offering positive rate of interest on their money market funds.

The fact is, is that for money market funds, because there's a cost of maintaining these funds, they've been giving essentially refunds, a rebate, on their safest money market funds. Market accounts, which are the ones that are only in short-term government paper. You can get a few more basis points if you're prepared to go into munis, if you're prepared to go into commercial paper, like the Toyota— the short-term paper, not the long-term bond that you're referring to.

But because of these regulations, most money market complexes are going to be Eliminating those funds that can actually pay, you know, 20, 30 basis points in favor of only offering the most conservative, you know, US government, other sovereign government short-term paper. That is obviously at zero or close to zero, and they are no longer going to be offering the rebate.

So, starting Starting in April of 2017, you've got a money market fund, you're going to open up that statement, and there's a big— let me assure you, there's a big difference between zero or a few basis points of positive interest and seeing that you are now paying for the privilege of keeping your money in a money market fund.

So, that's coming soon to a money market fund in the U.S.

Erik Townsend: I'd like to look at this a little deeper in terms of game theory, because what astonishes me is nobody is talking about the risk of a run on the bank coming from, you know, as soon as we get substantially negative returns, there's an incentive to just hoard cash, put it in a safe deposit box.

Ben Hunt: For sure.

Erik Townsend: And the whole fractional reserve banking system can't tolerate a massive run on the bank and everybody hoarding cash. So, short of outright banning cash, how can this

Ben Hunt: Well, you say banning cash. I mean, that's not— that is how it works. So, let me be clear what I mean. So, an acquaintance of mine, he's for one of the big Swiss banks, he runs their retail branches. You know, the bank starts with— the name of it, you know, starts with a U and ends with an S.

And he was talking about the branches and the vaults and the safe deposit boxes. Well, they've totally run out of safe deposit box space in Switzerland, because, obviously, people are using their safe deposit boxes to take money at Swiss francs and just put them in the safe deposit box.

They have a special holder for the notes. They're out, of course, of those holders, but the real problem is That the holder, the currency holder, doesn't really fit. You know, in Europe, many European countries, the size of the— the greater the denomination, the larger physically the note is. So the largest denomination Swiss franc note does not fit well inside the currency holder they have for the safe deposit boxes. So what they're doing now is they roll them up, roll the highest denomination bills up, put a rubber band around it, and he said, you know, it's like, We're drug dealers, right? I mean, this is how we're storing our money now, exactly to your point.

So, so, so what, what's the reaction to this? Well, I mean, it'll come soon, I'm sure, in Switzerland, but, but in, in the EU, which of course is the, you know, much larger issue here around negative rates, yeah, they're going to get rid of the, of the €500 note.

They're going to get rid of it. Uh, I would, I would be I'm not surprised in the least if the US gets rid of the $100 bill. And the rationale for this is going to be, well, well, these are the notes that are used for money laundering. You don't want to be supporting terrorists, do you? Because, you know, if you've got $100 bills, you're clearly, you know, you're with the bad guys here. You're supporting terrorism. That's why we need to get rid of these notes.

And it's just, you know, it's just a crock, right? They want to get rid of the higher denomination notes because it makes it that much more difficult to take cash out and to store the cash. And it forces you to keep your money in the system, forcing you to accept the negative interest rates. And listen, that's, like I say, it's already here in the rest of the world, and it's coming soon to a money market fund near you.

Erik Townsend: Just the notion. The notion that central banks need to eliminate high-denomination banknotes in order to make sure that a lot of money doesn't fit into the available vaults is really—

Ben Hunt: Crazy, right?

Gold as insurance against central bank error

Erik Townsend: An amazing thing. That obviously leads us to the topic of precious metals, because if you start to lose faith in the system, that's usually the most obvious place to go. Gold has— was really— the gold chart was looking awful until we got this news. It bounced immediately to the 50-day moving average and is now today as we're talking broken well above that. Do you think that the, the bottom is in now for gold and it's all higher from here, or do you think as we get back to at least a narrative about rate normalization that we're still going to see some weakness in the yellow metal?

Ben Hunt: Look, I, I think that what gold is is an insurance policy. It's an insurance policy against central bank error. And my view is that particularly when interest rates are zero or negative, particularly when the price of gold is where it is today, it's a— and what it could be with a significant central bank error.

I think it's a phenomenally cheap insurance policy. But it's like any other insurance policy, right? It's, it's even if you're not paying for it, right, there's an opportunity cost. You're, you, you are buying gold as a As opposed to putting your capital somewhere else, somewhere that might have actual cash flow dynamics and actual production. So, you know, when I think of how to protect myself, you know, and I think about my investments, what I'm looking for is something close to me, something that's out of the casino of public markets that— because nothing is going to be perfectly insulated. Isolated from the monetary policy casino that we have going on.

But you can get more— as much distance as you can put between you and that, the better.

And typically, that means private activities, private businesses. And it means insurance policies like gold. So, look, again, I think it's a phenomenally inexpensive insurance policy, but that's the way to think of it. It's not, it's not a currency. It's not a store of value. It's an insurance policy. And, and I think it's a cheap one at that.

Commodities, the dollar and Chinese devaluation risk

Erik Townsend: Moving on to the rest of the commodity complex, we're getting some mixed signals. A lot of people have been saying, okay, look at how impressively oil is bouncing. So clearly the commodity bear market is over. Well, if the commodity bear market is over, Dr. Copper didn't get the memo, at least not in the last few days. Where do you see commodities in general going from here?

Ben Hunt: Well, so, so look, so, so the firm I work for, Salient, we're, you know, got a big Houston base. We've got a— sure, we've got $5 billion in, you know, MLP investments. So this is something we spend a lot of time thinking about.

And I will tell you that, again, it gets back to that very first question you asked. You tell me where the dollars go And I'll tell you what the commodities are doing. Oil is a little bit different, but only a little bit different than, as you said, copper, because oil has this other narrative, the narrative of supply and demand, that also impacts its price action.

You know, as the dollar appreciates, through February of this year, copper, industrial metals went down. With the weakening of the dollar from, call it, mid-February, February 22nd, I think it was, to that jobs report, or, you know, actually the dollar started to strengthen again a little bit more When, you know, we got that renewed thinking that, oh, well, maybe they'll hike rates in June.

You know, you got the dollar then strengthening again, and so most commodities went down again. Oil's been flattish, right? Maybe nominally higher, because again, that supply and demand narrative has switched around 180 degrees.

But as far as what happens with commodities going forward, look, if we're able to preserve this status quo environment where Yellen and the Fed jawbone about wanting to raise rates, but really don't, where we're able to keep the political genie in the bottle, bad genie in the bottle, by not having a trade war sparked from the US, not having A euro-destroying election in France or Germany in 2017.

Yeah, the dollar gets— maybe gets a little weaker because U.S. data is getting a little weaker. The dollar gets weaker, that is all good. It's all good for risk assets. It's all good for commodities. It's all good for China. The dollar gets weaker, even if it's because we've got some weaker U.S. data, that's good for risk assets.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Ben Hunt: My concern is actually that the U.S. data gets better. My concern is that actually, from a political perspective, the Fed does hike. My concern is that as the dollar goes up, commodities go down, and China is forced to devalue. And that, my friend, like I say, that's the atom bomb of deflation. That's a Humpty Dumpty moment, not just for commodities but all risk assets.

Erik Townsend: And that's self-reinforcing for the dollar because of And of course, if China devalues, the dollar goes right on up.

Ben Hunt: That's exactly right. It's a— it is a non-equilibrium situation, as we'd say in economics.

Japan, Kyle Bass and the China banking thesis

Erik Townsend: And we covered China already. What do you make of this whole Japan situation? Of course, Kyle Bass has been very outspoken in saying he thinks it's all about to come crashing down. How do you see the BOJ?

Ben Hunt: Yeah, I know Kyle, and, you know, you know, talked to him I'm thinking about his China thesis now as well. By the way, I disagree with Kyle on his China thesis. I think that China domestically is likely to come out of this just fine. You know, you end up in China with zombie banks with a devaluation, but very similar to the Japanese banks of the 1990s, and that's not good, but China has the ability, much more than Japan did then or does today to grow their way out of that zombiness in their banking system.

So, on Japan specifically, look, I agree with everyone who points to this demographic time bomb in Japan, but the thing about demographic time bombs is that the timeframe you're talking about is decades. And there's, there's, there's not really, I think, an investable catalyst around, uh, around demographics. That, that's always been my issue with investment themes or an investment thesis based on demographics. You know, what's the catalyst, right? What's the event that says, aha, this is an untenable situation or something has to be done or et cetera, et cetera.

You don't get it in markets around demographics. And also, you rarely get it in politics. You rarely get that kind of political catalyst around a purely demographic issue, like a change in the composition of the electorate or the change in the aging of the population or the like.

So I understand the arguments that about the death of Japan, literally the death of Japan. Sorry, I shouldn't laugh, but that it is a literal statement when people are making this argument. I just don't know how to invest on that, right? Because the, like I say, these demographic arguments, it's just very hard to find a catalyst.

US election and shrinking global trade

Erik Townsend: Speaking of politics, the front-running presidential candidates have very different views. Mr. Trump seems to want to start a cultural war with Mexico. Mrs. Clinton has some, I think, fairly aggressive ideas that maybe lead to more American hegemony. The markets tend to hate uncertainty, and we really have no idea where we're headed. How do you see the economic consequences of the potential different presidential election outcomes?

Ben Hunt: Well, look, the— for me, the most important consequences of this election, and this gets back to the What I was describing as the observation about the world that I find most troubling is that global trade, that global trade pie is now shrinking. That hasn't happened in a long time. And what I mean is that since Q3 of 2014, not coincidentally, when you started to get competition in monetary policies, when Europe, Draghi, Went to double down on QE in June of 2014, and Janet Yellen, that was her moment of saying, we're now on a tightening course.

It's not an accident that that's when the dollar started to go straight up. It's not an accident that that's when global trade started to shrink. And my big concern is that no matter who's elected here in the U.S. in November, that tightening, that shrinking, is going to accelerate. I think it accelerates more with a Trump in office, right? I mean, as he says, who's afraid of a little trade war? Well, I am.

I am. You know, it's— the unfortunate thing is that it's such a powerful electoral issue when a majority of voters in the United States States think that free trade is a bad thing, right?

I don't know what you do with that, except if you're on either party's standard bearer, you run with it, and you campaign on that basis, and then you actually do something about it. And that, to me, is— that is a catalyst, because when you have a declining trade pie, what happens is that the financial institutions that are levered to global trade— and that's mostly Asian banks, and that's certainly mostly European banks— they, they are revealed as being as insolvent as they actually are. And that's a bad thing.

Epsilon Theory and why game theory plus history

Erik Townsend: Finally, about 3 years ago now, you wrote a piece called The Epsilon Theory Manifesto, which—

Ben Hunt: Oh yeah, my start. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Got a lot of attention, and it's actually morphed now into the Epsilon Theory blog at the Salient Partners website. Tell us about it. What's it about? What information is available there? We're going to send a link to that to our registered users through our Research Roundup email.

Ben Hunt: Oh, well, thanks very much for that. Look, I was a hedge fund manager here in Connecticut for a lot of years, and We did well, and I was just looking at that like, I want to go back to my roots, which are really more writing and being an academic, but I wanted to stay in the business.

Salient is an asset manager, I'd say, based in Houston, San Francisco. They'd been investors in my hedge fund. I joined them 2 years ago as their Chief Risk Officer, and it gave me that perch, that ability to continue to write about risk and reward in markets today. So as you say, I'd started about really 3 years ago, almost to the day.

And it was really just writing to myself and, you know, a few colleagues and clients, about 200. And I tell you, it's just, it's just trying to speak honestly, to call things by their proper names, from

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Ben Hunt: Someone who's actually managed money and is in the business of this, but not to present it with the pablum that you get from the sell side and the, you know, people trying to pitch their own fund. I'm not pitching a fund.

It really is my observations about this golden age, now silver age, of the central banker and, you know, how dangerous And how difficult it is to be an investment survivor in it. So we've got about, oh, about 100,000 email subscribers now. So it's been very gratifying that it does seem to have struck a chord.

So absolutely, if anybody's interested in looking at it, there are a lot of pieces. It's all free, of course, on the website. You can find it at Salient Partners or at Epsilon Theory.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Ben Hunt: And, you know, it really is trying to look at the world through those lenses of game theory and history, because I think that's the necessary lens to see the world today, because we haven't been in this sort of policy-driven market since the 1930s. So our traditional measuring sticks and mileposts, they just don't— I just don't think they work as well.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I certainly think that of the free content that's available on the internet, Epsilon Theory definitely has a reputation for being some of the highest quality content that is out there. So, Ben, I cannot thank you—

Ben Hunt: Thank you a lot. You're very welcome, and the compliment is well deserved.

Erik Townsend: I can't thank you enough for joining us on the program. Thanks so much. Nathan Egger and Aaron Chan will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Nathan Egger back with you. Normally, as co-host, I get to listen to our feature interview before we tape the final segment of the show so that I can ask Erik questions about what was discussed with our featured guest. But due to my tight travel schedule this week, I was unable to do so.

Thankfully, however, as we announced last week, Aaron Chan has joined forces with us as captain of the MacroVoices research team. So now I get to delegate. Aaron, what did you think of Erik's interview with Dr. Hunt? And what questions did it bring to mind? The floor is all yours.

Postgame: what game theory is and why investors care

Aaron Chan: Well, Nathan, thanks. You missed a good one, but I'm happy to take the steering wheel for a little bit. So, Erik, I thought that was a fascinating interview, and you guys really stamped your passports in terms of geographic coverage. So right off the bat, and this may be for our listeners who may not be as familiar with Dr. Hunt's work, what is game theory, and why are game theoretical concepts something investors need to think about when considering the macro environment?

Erik Townsend: Well, people may remember the movie A Beautiful Mind, which was actually about the guy who did

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And he did a lot of pioneering work on game theory. But essentially, if you look at how competing parties that are trying to outsmart each other, whether it's in a poker game, or in markets, or what have you, what are the ways that they do that? A lot of the concepts around that are very vague, or tend to be very vague in the way that they were thought of before the development of game theory, which is basically applying mathematical discipline to building mathematical models to describe how different actors that are expected to act on their own behalf may try to manipulate situations and events in order to have the outcome that they want.

So it is the mathematical study of these interactions, and what Dr. Hunt does is apply that mathematical study to analyzing markets and trying to figure out how different players are going to affect each other and what the reflexive relationships are between them. between the actions of different entities.

End of the central-banker golden age and inflation as trigger

Aaron Chan: That makes sense. Now, near the end of the interview, Dr. Hunt noted that his writing represents observations about the gold or silver age of the central banker. Now, in a recent interview, and along a similar vein to the market-neutral strategy he described where you are long quality and short garbage, he spoke about a surprisingly effective Fed-based strategy. And so the strategy It involved buying an MLP, which is a master limited partnership index, on Fed days versus buying on any other day. And the Fed strategy actually outperformed the other strategy by nearly 70%.

So with Draghi recently coming out insinuating that QE might not be working, and Japan's continued lack of success with negative interest rates, might we be transitioning to a bronze or even a stone age of central bankers?

Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think that we are yet. Yet, my expectation, you know, what people do when they're desperate, let's take the example of young adults that get themselves overextended on credit cards, and they know that the situation is not going to resolve itself. They're going to eventually end up in bankruptcy. Human nature is people tend to just keep reaching, trying to hope and pray and somehow cross their fingers and hope somehow if they can just get one more credit card and take cash advances on it in order to pay the minimum payments on the other credit cards, they won't get foreclosed on or something.

And it never works out. But people tend to not give up until something comes crashing down in the night. So I do think that we are headed towards a major transformation where the whole world wakes up and says, this whole business of central bankers trying to control the economy by essentially price-fixing the cost of money was a really dumb idea and it didn't work. But I don't think we get to that point until Until the house of cards that they've built on printed money comes crashing down. When does it come crashing down? When they can't do it anymore. And I think inflation is likely to be the trigger for that.

So when inflation hits the stage, according to Julian Brigden, could happen this year. I think that's probably— I would have guessed it would take longer than that, but we'll see. That's the point where I think you see the transformation to a realization of, oh, all that we did with all of this central banks trying to centrally plan the economy was to make the next crash dramatically Worse than the last crash. It doesn't come until their hand is forced, though. I think what you're describing is maybe somebody would wake up and recognize that what they're doing is stupid. I don't see them doing that. I think it's not until their hand is forced. Hmm.

1930s parallels, the gold standard and Weimar

Aaron Chan: Well, Dr. Hunt also made numerous references to the Depressionary 1930s and drew interesting parallels to our present-day scenario. For me, the Great Boom and Panic of the 1930s wasn't taught in any of my business or finance classes in undergrad. So I was curious, when Dr. Hunt talks about the world swimming in debt and draws similarities between early 20th century Germany and present-day China, what other similarities do you see, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm going to focus actually on the dissimilarity, which is, I think, the most important one. There are huge similarities between the 1930s Great Depression era and what we've had since 2008. The difference is that on a gold standard, you didn't have the ability for the Fed to just print money. So we don't now have the discipline of a gold standard. If you look at what's happened since 2008, it really is the same thing as the '30s. And what the proponents of money printing, quantitative easing, and central bank management of the economy would say is, look how beautifully it's working. We have not had the repeat of the Great Depression, and that's because we got off of the gold standard, which was a bad idea according to them, not to me.

And that means that now central banks have the tools that they need to be able to print money in order to deal with these problems, and everything is just hunky-dory.

So far, those people are being proven right in the short term. My contention is, in the long term, there's no free lunch. This house of cards that's been built on printed money is going to come crashing down, and when it comes crashing down, it's going to be considerably worse than 2008.

But the thing is, that doesn't have to happen until inflation hits the stage. Until then, the Fed can get away with papering over our problems, and not just the Fed, but other central bankers can get away with papering over all of our problems and mistakes with freshly printed money.

They're getting away with that because of the deflationary backdrop. If you look at your history, go back to the Weimar hyperinflation. It started with a deflationary backdrop, allowing Rudi von Havenstein to do what he did. Right. To print way too much money. He got carried away, he got complacent, and eventually you had the Weimar hyperinflation. I don't think we'd have a US dollar hyperinflation, but we could see easily sustained periods of 20% inflation per year for 10 years or something in order to inflate away the mess that's been made, and we could have an inflationary depression. None of that has to start until inflation hits the stage, and until then, I think we'll have the continuing false perception that all of this is working. And it's not until inflation hits the stage that it starts to fall apart.

Deutsche Bank, Creditanstalt and private debt

Aaron Chan: So let's stay with the 1930s for a second. Separately, I've heard Dr. Hunt talk about the parallels between Deutsche Bank and Creditanstalt, which was a German bank that went bankrupt in 1931 due to an overexposure to merchant loans and plummeting global trade, which Dr. Hunt brought up in the So interestingly, Deutsche Bank is actually an heir to Creditanstalt. And given that Deutsche Bank's CDS spreads are now well above 500 basis points, should investors be paying attention to Deutsche Bank, or maybe some second-order entities that may spread contagion into an already precarious situation in the European Union?

Erik Townsend: Well, I definitely think that investors should be watching. You know, the problem that we have here, as Steve Keen said so eloquently when we interviewed David Hume, is too much private debt. We have too much debt on every level, public and private. What we need to all be watching for is when does that actually start to cause a problem? When does it start to fall apart? Widening credit default swap spreads on Deutsche Bank are a perfect early sign. It's certainly not the only one.

Now, as far as the analog to the 1930s, again, the difference is because we're not on a gold standard and central banks can do things, like print money out of thin air in order to buy toxic debt from financial institutions at artificially high prices in order to bail those institutions out for the sake of protecting the overall system. Those tools were not available under the discipline of a gold standard. A lot of people would say that was a good thing. The current thinking in central banking is that it was a bad thing and it's good that they have these tools available. The question is, will people like me be proven right eventually that these tools were just exacerbating the problem and making the next crash worse than the last one? Or will they be proven right that, yeah, you really can have something for nothing, print money out of thin air and have no adverse long-term consequence?

You know which way I'm thinking, but obviously that is a question that is yet to be resolved.

Negative money market yields and reach for yield

Aaron Chan: Yeah. And it could be, as Dr. Hunt said, with demographics in Japan, it could be a long time and the timeframe just doesn't make sense for investors. So, Erik, last question. Dr. Hunt talked about money market funds no longer offering positive interest rates, and that really sounds pretty concerning.

We all know investors are clawing for yield, and we also know this low-yield environment has resulted in certain municipal credits like Puerto Rico raising more funds than is warranted. So taking into account the pension crises in New Jersey and Illinois, which Andrew Levine, a fellow listener, wrote about a couple weeks ago, do you think money market funds going negative Do you think the negative will push investors to ignore the putrid fundamentals and to bid up bad muni credit?

Erik Townsend: Oh, absolutely. And I think that what we'll continue to see is this reach for yield, both on a retail and an institutional level, where people, you know, people used to be satisfied with a so-called 5% risk-free yield. When there was no more risk-free yield at 5%, they had to meet their 5%.

So they took whatever they could get in order to get the 5%. Now it's very hard even in junk bonds, which a lot of institutions are not able to hold in order to get those yields. And yes, the reach for yield will continue and eventually it will exacerbate the magnitude of the crash.

Research Roundup

Nathan Egger: And Aaron, you also just took over curating our free Research Roundup email, which has already been sent to registered users at MacroVoices.com. Would you please mind giving us a quick rundown of what's in this week's roundup before we close?

Aaron Chan: For sure. We've got a 7-course meal lined up for our registered users. And frankly, there's a lot of solid content, but we don't have the time to cover it all. But this week we're bringing you a 106-page macro deck from David Rosenberg, which offers sweeping coverage of the monetary mess we're in. We've also got a great video interview between Dr. Benn Steil, the Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Keith McCullough of Hedgeye, where they discuss internal Fed politics. Finally, Danielle DiMartino Booth's article on Venezuela's socialist tire provided some much-needed historical context to what's happening there.

Again, I look forward to your feedback and want to remind our subscribers that they can submit their own content for inclusion in the Research Roundup newsletter by emailing us at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter.

Sign-off and next week's guest

Nathan Egger: Thanks again for all your help, Aaron. You've made my life a heck of a lot easier this week while I'm traveling. We'd like to thank all you listeners again for tuning in, and we encourage you to subscribe to MacroVoices While you're there, rating and reviewing us helps us expand our audience in a massive way. If you have colleagues, friends, or families who find value in the work that we do at MacroVoices, please let them know about us. We're on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Erik has a personal handle @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. You can also find Aaron on Twitter That's @_Aaroanchan_.

Erik Townsend: @Aaroanchan_.

Nathan Egger: If you don't do Twitter, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums. We'll be back with you again next week when economist John Llewellyn of Llewellyn Consulting will be joining us to discuss in greater depth the upcoming Brexit referendum. For Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. See you next time.

Announcer: That concludes This edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Art Berman — Petroleum geologist (as introduced on the show)

Show open and preview of the Art Berman interview

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business. MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 17 was recorded on June 2nd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Petroleum geologist Art Berman will be joining us as today's special guest. Art and I will review the analysis of oil market fundamentals that we presented back in MacroVoices Episode 3 back in February, as well as the predictions we made about supply, demand, demand, inventory stocks, and price. We'll compare the picture as it stood then to how it looks today and get Art's take on where the story is headed from here. We also have a special second guest to introduce you to at the end of the program.

Market wrap: equities, Fed hike odds and the dollar

Nathan Egger: And I am Nathan Egger. Erik, we saw the S&P break through 2,100 again this week, and we closed this Thursday that we are recording at 2,105. Is everything as completely awesome as it seems here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think it's as awesome as it seems. I definitely still think the smartest guys in the room are George George Soros and Carl Icahn and Stan Druckenmiller, and really the small chorus of voices that have been saying this market is just way overdone and the Fed is taking the punch bowl away, albeit slowly.

This week, Andy Xie joined the chorus. Andy was for many years Morgan Stanley's chief economist in Asia. If there is a really smart guy who understands the feedback loops and unintended consequences of a strengthening U.S. dollar in Emerging markets. Andy is the guy, and he has joined in this week in saying the global economy is not looking good and does not justify current asset prices. So what gives? How come we're seeing all this strength? I think it's probably 2 things: collapsing rate hike expectations. It seems like nobody thinks the Fed is going to hike rates at next week's FOMC meeting. I'm not really sure why they think that. I think that there is room for that. One analysis that I saw this week actually said That Fed fund futures are implying as low as a 4% possibility of a rate hike. I think the number is higher than 4%, folks. I don't know that it's 50%, but I would have guessed 30%.

The other one probably is the resumption of the U.S. dollar rally. Just on a technical basis, the dollar chart looks pretty strong. It seems like maybe the bottom is in. And as more international investors are looking at that, and as we continue to see difficulty in Europe, I think we're seeing a lot of capital flows into the dollar and into the U.S. stock market. That's boosting asset prices. So, for longs, I would say, in my opinion, now is not a bad time to be taking profits and reducing equity exposure, but it's hard to justify going short here when I can't reconcile the tape action. It doesn't really make sense to me. If we have no hike next week, as everybody's expecting, is it already cooked in and we just see the market, you know, buy the rumor, sell the news event, or is that going to spark another rally to all-time highs? I don't know. The market is not making sense to me, and as the old saying goes, the market can stay irrational longer than I can stay solvent.

And so I'm just on the sidelines right now.

Market wrap: OPEC no-freeze, EIA data and Nigeria

Nathan Egger: We're going to save the bulk of the crude oil conversation this week for our feature interview with petroleum geologist Art Berman. But our listeners should know that this interview was recorded on Wednesday to accommodate Mr. Berman's travel schedule. So Erik and Art didn't have the benefit of knowing the outcome of either the EIA inventory report, which was delayed until Thursday this week due to a holiday, or the results of the OPEC meeting, which was also on Thursday. So, Erik, what do our listeners need to know in terms of the news that came out after the interview that was recorded with Art Berman on Wednesday?

Erik Townsend: Well, I think the Niger Delta Avengers striking again in Nigeria and vowing to crush Nigerian production to zero, which is a threat they made again on Thursday. It's probably the biggest news to come out today. As far as the OPEC meeting, surprise, surprise, no production freeze. Oh boy. Why do people think this is news? I don't know, but it was a dollar down spike. On the non-news that there's no production freeze, which I think was made very clear by several ministers before the meeting. And it's something I just don't understand why the market doesn't see as clearly as I think it is. What's going on here is Saudi Arabia has no intention of agreeing to a production freeze, but they see that they can make their archrival Iran look bad by saying, oh look, we were willing to freeze, but oh, Iran doesn't want to play ball. And obviously Iran's not going to agree to a freeze when they're just ramping up to get to their former production now that sanctions have been lifted.

So I think this is all political theater. I don't know why anybody takes it seriously. That was a dollar down spike. Then when the EIA came out, delayed until 11 o'clock today— it's usually 10:30 on Wednesdays, it was 11 o'clock on Thursday today— a 1.4 million barrel national drawdown was smaller than analyst expectations. The consensus was about a 2.5 million barrel draw, although the Cushing, Oklahoma drawdown of 700,000 barrels was a little bit bigger than expected.

Doesn't really surprise me. Remember that the Canadian wildfires are most directly affecting that Cushing number because that's where the Alberta oil goes is into Cushing, Oklahoma. These are very small drawdowns for this time of year, and I know that seems at odds with what we were saying a month ago when we were talking about how any build on inventory was a big deal. Now we're seeing drawdowns. Well, it just comes with the season. How do you interpret this information when it is so seasonal? The answer is something. called a comparative inventory chart. If you've never seen one of those, we sent you one in your email if you are a registered user here at MacroVoices.com. And Art Berman will be going into all kinds of detail to explain what comparative inventory is and how it works when we get into today's feature interview.

Market wrap: gold tests $1,200; dollar uptrend

Nathan Egger: And we know, and those listeners who have been paying attention will know, that you're long-term bullish on precious metals, but you've also been cautioning for weeks that the party could be over in the short term for gold as the US dollar rally appears to be For now, back on track again. And when we recorded last week's show, we were looking at gold prices around $1,220. So, what's happened since then?

Erik Townsend: Well, we went and tested all the way down to $1,200, hit some round number support there at $1,200, bounced back up as high again, almost to $1,220. As we're speaking now, just after the close on Thursday, we're looking at $1,212. So, the question is, we're headed down from here. Down how far? Is $1,200 going to hold? There's a round number support level there. I don't think it will. The next logical target to look for after that would be the 200-day moving average, which on the futures chart is about 1168 right now. So I think that we're probably going to head down, and the Fed meeting next week will probably be where we find our direction. If there is a rate hike, I think it would be a sudden and immediate downhill move for gold. If there is no rate hike, that might mark the bottom, and we might see a. reversal here. Are we at the end of a cycle where we really have begun a bull cycle and maybe this is the dip that you should be buying?

Maybe. I'd like to see what happens at the FOMC meeting before I make any final decision on that.

Nathan Egger: And anything new to say about the dollar this week, Erik?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, just that the tape action continues to be reasonably strong. We did get a little bit of a pullback this week, but still well within, you know, an ongoing uptrend. The uptrend isn't quite as vigorous as it was a couple of weeks ago, but to me, the The chart still looks strong, and I think we are moving towards a higher dollar. All right.

Feature teaser and registering for the chart deck

Nathan Egger: Well, thanks for bringing us up to speed on the market. This week's featured guest is petroleum geologist Art Berman, who was also our featured guest way back in MacroVoices episode 3, which we aired in February. Erik and Art will review the predictions they made back in February and assess the crude oil fundamentals landscape as it exists today.

Erik Townsend: And again, folks, we taped this interview on Wednesday. So Art sent us some fantastic relative inventory charts. that have already been emailed to registered users at MacroVoices.com.

Nathan Egger: And we're still receiving emails from people asking us to register them, and I can't emphasize enough how much I can't do this for you, as much as I'd love to. If you haven't registered yourself yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button on the top right side of the homepage, then click the Register for Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page that you will see.

Again, it's always free, and we promise never to spam you or sell your email address to anyone. Once you're registered and logged in, you can click the Research Library function on the menu bar, then choose Documents, then choose Guest Publications. From there, you can download a PDF file containing Mr. Berman's charts.

So we're going to get to Erik's interview with Art Berman. That's coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

February predictions revisited and Saudi strategy

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me now on the program is petroleum geologist Art Berman. Art, thanks so much for coming back and joining us on the program.

Art Berman: Oh, it's a pleasure to be here again, Erik.

Erik Townsend: When we recorded episode 3 of MacroVoices back in February, we made a number of predictions that led me to a very bearish outlook on Crude oil. At that time, prices were around $30, and we both thought that they were headed lower. So I definitely want to start by acknowledging I was dead wrong on the price call and definitely lost money as a result. And in this business, you can't get away with saying, I got the analysis right, but I lost money anyway. When you lose money, you were wrong, bottom line. But holy cow, Art, I went back and listened very carefully to episode 3, and as much as the price has done the exact opposite of what we expected it to do, almost all of the predictions that we made about supply and demand and inventory and so forth were actually spot on. So, what I'd like to do in this interview is review what we said in episode 3 and compare what the situation looked like then to how it looks now.

So, we both agreed at that time in February that Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait were working together in this market share strategy. And we thought that their goals were probably to sabotage the source of U.S. shale oil funding. In other words, damage the junk bond market's ability to fund another shale revolution, and also to coerce at least Russia and possibly others into joining them in joint production cuts. We thought that their strategy was essentially to keep on producing as much as possible, force the price down until other countries had no choice but to join in with the OPEC countries in price cuts. But a whole lot has changed since then.

Saudi Arabia allowed the price to rise dramatically in advance of that Doha production freeze meeting. Saudi Arabia fired the former oil minister, Mr. Al-Naimi, who was presumably the architect of that market share strategy. At the time that that happened, a lot of analysts thought that was bearish, that Mohammed bin Salman, the prince who fired Al-Naimi, probably was about to turn up the dial on production in order to force prices lower, as if the reason for firing him perhaps was that the prices had risen too much. But there hasn't really been any follow-through on those threats. And now this week, the United Arab Emirates is starting to talk up $60 oil. So that's not at all consistent with them still having the goals that we presumed at the time. So what does all this mean? Did Saudi Arabia change its strategy, or what's going on here?

Why Saudi strategy worked and why oil rallied

Art Berman: That's a great question, and those are fantastic observations. Thanks, Erik. And the simple answer is I don't know, and I don't think we ever really know. Trying to figure out the inscrutable minds behind whatever Saudi Arabia is doing, I think, is— oh, it's a fun game to play, but it's probably not one that we can win, certainly not that I can win.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: I think at this point is that I really didn't see that the firing of al-Naimi represented a change in strategy. And, of course, that did come after our February discussion. Why did they decide to unceremoniously get rid of him? Beats me. But at the time, I really didn't think it meant a big change in their strategy, except insofar as that one meeting in Doha.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: The meeting where they were supposed to agree on a production freeze that never really made much sense to anybody, but apparently Al-Naimi had put a lot of his own personal capital into that agreement, and Mohammed bin Salman just didn't want to do it. And at the time, prices were in the low $40s, going towards $45.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: And why do anything if prices are in the direction that you want them to go in?

I mean, that's the way I read it. So, I can't tell you why they fired al-Naimi, but I think the truth and the reality is, is that Saudi Arabia is hurting financially, and they're not hurting as much as some people would like to think they are. They're not desperate, but they can use the revenue from higher prices. And I don't think there's any way to, you know, to dispute that. At the same time, I would say that their strategy, if we're correct in greatly restricting the flow of capital to the U.S. unconventional producers, I think that's working.

The way I read the U.S. situation, and I base this on people in the field who pretty much live in the field in places like South Texas, West Texas— I've been in both places in the last few weeks— they tell me, and I believe them, that there's no way that we're going to get back to drilling in the U.S. anytime soon.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: I don't think oil is going to come back anytime soon in a big way. There seems to be a lot of analysts who, I might add, have absolutely no experience working in the oil and gas business, that talk about, oh, well, once prices get above $50, we're going to go right back to drilling again.

I don't think that's a likely scenario. I think that the oilfield service companies have gotten rid of so many people, have stacked so many rigs. Rigs and other equipment, cannibalized existing rigs and equipment. I think it's going to be a long time, regardless of demand, before they're back on their feet again, ready to, ready to party on. Plus, I think that the, the clear evidence is, yes, there's still capital available and apparently flowing to the U.S. E&Ps, but it's not being used for drilling.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: It's being used to repair balance sheets. It's being used to, you know, to pay salaries and overhead costs. So I think the damage is done, and surely Saudi Arabia and everyone else who takes the time to notice understands that. So the question now is, well, what's next?

You know, having perhaps accomplished some of those goals, where do we go from here? The, you know, the price rise, as you said, Erik, from a fundamental standpoint, we got it, we nailed it. And as always, fundamentals, eventually the markets come into harmony with fundamentals, but they can take an awful lot of strange pathways to get there and even some excursions.

And my read on what's happened is that Fatih Birol, the chief economist at the International Energy Agency, showed up here in Houston during CERAWeek in late February and gave a very chilling talk about future supply with all the lack of investment that's gone on.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: In the last 2 years.

The workers' strike followed almost immediately after that, or a few weeks after that, kind of bringing everybody back to the reality of a world with no spare capacity, the result of OPEC producing like crazy for the last couple of years, among other things. And then a series of other events followed Including the wildfires in Canada, outages in Nigeria, concerns about Venezuela, none of which, by the way, affected supply.

But, you know, we're coming out of the stupor of the mindset that, oh my God, we're drowning in oil. And we're starting to think, well, we may have an oversupply, but— We're not going to run out. But it's precarious. And the other thing that's important to understand is there just hasn't been any real global economic bad news.

A lot of what was pushing prices down below $30 was all this terrible depression about what's happening in China and their currency devaluation and their inability to control their stock market.

Erik Townsend: China Yeah.

Art Berman: The Fed has retrenched. They've gone back to controlling their currency, and we haven't heard any bad news. And even this latest round of potential Greek problems that brought the market down last summer, in part, they fixed that real quickly. So, you know, there just seems to be, you know, a harmony of lack of bad economic news, more attention to outages, even though we've, we've kind of had them before, and just this overwhelming wish that we, you know, we're just really sick of low oil prices. The market wants to find every reason it can to push them higher. And you put all those together, plus interest rates— let's not forget interest rates— interest rates have pretty much been going down ever since prices started going up, and now And that's, that's another consistent relationship. And you mix it all up and you got the price rally that we're looking at now.

US production and EIA revisions

Erik Townsend: And of course, the US dollar rally pausing certainly did not help with respect to a bearish outlook on oil prices. But one thing we were very clear about is we both thought our bearish view on oil prices back in February was short-term. And we both agreed that in the second half of 2016, the market would rebalance itself. So the question becomes how How close are we to that happening? Because even though I think we did get a lot of those fundamental factors spot on, the fact is, it's not February anymore. It's June. And the second half starts next month. So, we were both extremely skeptical back in February of the 2.24 million barrel oversupply estimate that IEA had just released when we did that interview. We both thought it was going to be really lower than that. And of course, it was subsequently revised way lower.

But we also agreed that U.S. production needed to decline much more dramatically than it had at the time before the market would balance. So what's the update, Art, on U.S. production? Where is it now and where is it headed?

Art Berman: U.S. production declined 100,000 barrels a day roughly in, in April compared to March. Now, the EIA, the U.S. Department of Energy, they went back and completely revised all of, all of their numbers going back as far as, as, as a year, and essentially increased consumption, which is what they use as a proxy for demand.

And the result of that was

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: And the other thing is, is that kind of as we, as we suspected, that those near months in the early part of 2016, the oversupply, at least from EIA's perspective, was significantly less than they had previously said. So I think in a way we were spot on in those observations as well. You know, how much stock do you want to put in these kind of revisions? I don't know.

I think it's normal to be skeptical about them. At the same time, where else are you going to go for data? I mean, you've got EIA and you've got IEA. IEA comes out with quarterly data, and so when we have the full picture for the second quarter, great, but, you know, we don't, and so EIA is what we have.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: Have to work with. So I think, I think the story is that the, the oversupply was to some extent— I won't say it was exaggerated, it was just overestimated a little bit. And, and we had so much momentum on the downside coming into the new year that, that, that kind of colored the sorts of wording that were used in IEA, EIA, reports and certainly the, the, you know, the, the press coverage of it. And now the mood has shifted. It's again mostly momentum, which is a nice way of saying sentiment.

But there are some, there are some, there are some reasons behind it. And, you know, I've stated a few of those, uh, which have to do mostly with world events. But, um, you know, let's talk about inventories, because that, that really is, is the story that I think is ultimately what is going to tell the, you know, where we go with price. And so—

Cushing inventories, contango and price cycles

Erik Townsend: Well, and that, that just blows my mind, Art, that inventories— when we spoke before, inventory was at 85%, and you were very emphatic in saying history teaches us when Cushing, Oklahoma inventory goes over 80%, prices get crushed. And there's a lot of data to back that assertion up. That was 85%.

We went all the way to 96.42% 2 weeks ago, and prices rose 90% at the same time. I mean, how how could that be possible? Number one, and number two, I think an even stronger indication besides outright price is the contango—the difference between the first and second month—and at that time, because everybody was worried about storage, we were seeing contracts closing at as much as a $2 spread, $2 discount. in the expiring contract to the next contract. But now that we're above 95% of operating capacity at Cushing, that first to second month spread is only 39 cents, which just doesn't make any sense to me.

Can you make any sense of this?

Art Berman: Well, no, I really can't, because you're 100% right that, that— all right, comparative inventory, that's what I look at. And in some way, I think that a lot of professional traders look at some version of that, comparing at least current inventory with a year ago. And there's no doubt that the— you can look at just the absolute inventories, that the spread between earlier in the year or the end of last year and And today, that, that, that, you know, that difference is narrowing. And when I say comparative inventories, I'm comparing this year, the current storage, with a moving average of the last 5 years. And so it is, it is declining, and, and that's, that's a positive thing.

And so going back to history, when we look again at the, you know, the price rally and April, May, June of 2015, there, you know, we had grotesque overhang of storage, but prices did go up to $60, and there was a very nice and pronounced fall in comparative inventory. Now, it didn't last, partly because people went back to drilling, but partly because I think the reality of how much we have in storage came home to, you know, to kind of haunt people. And they said, oh my God, what are we getting so excited about?

And I suspect that something similar to that is where we're heading today, that, you know, the market wants to push the price up. We are seeing comparative inventories falling, both U.S. and Gulf Gulf Coast. Gulf Coast is by far the largest single storage area. The problem is, is that Cushing was falling for a while and it's been rising for the last several weeks. So there's some mixed signals there. But the bottom line, just to cut through it, is all right, comparative inventory is falling. That's a good thing.

We usually see a price response to that, and we do. But will we wake up as we did in July of 2015 and say, well, that is a great thing, but we still got so much, so much storage, we're at such a high percentage of capacity, how's that going to work? And prices, prices slid.

I don't anticipate that we're gonna, you know, that we're gonna go back down that much. But people who think

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Art Berman: And those who think that prices just move in one direction really need a lesson in history, because they never do. As I've written, and I'll say it again, I think that we are— we're going to see a series of price cycles.

We're in one now. These cycles, for the last couple of years, have lasted, on average, about 150 days, which means that, you know, We're on the outside of this cycle, and I suspect that something is going to bring it back down. We haven't been able to, you know, we've seen resistance at $50. That seems to be kind of a, you know, kind of a top for this one, and I suspect it's going to go down. It's not going to go down as low as it had before, probably, barring some kind of, you know, terrible economic Economic world news or something like that, but it's going to go down before it goes back up again.

And then this storage thing, there's no way, in my way of looking at the world, that we're going to— that people that talk about getting to $70 or $80, not until we work off 100, 150 million barrels of U.S. storage.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: And we're not going to do that in anything less than something like a year. It's just not going to happen, short of, you know, if Venezuela shuts down all of its production, okay, you know, that'll be a different story. But in a relatively normal functioning world, which means you have periodic outages and all of that and periodic conflicts, it's going to take a It's gonna take a long time. It's gonna take 9, 12, I don't know, 16 months to work through it, assuming everything keeps moving in one direction.

What comparative inventory is

Erik Townsend: Now, before we move away from comparative inventory, I just want to point out you sent us a PDF file which we've already emailed to all of our registered users at MacroVoices.com. Any listeners who are not registered can go and register and then find that PDF in our research library download area.

You did include a comparative inventory chart, actually a couple of them, in that handout. Could you just define comparative inventory? Comparison of what to what? And then what exactly is the chart telling us?

Art Berman: Okay, so, so the way this works is I take this week's storage number, whatever it is, and I compare it Compare it to a 4-week moving average of last year, 2015, and the 4 previous years. So you get a number that averages the 4 weeks prior to today in all of those past 5 years.

And what that does and why it's so powerful is because it normalizes out the kind of seasonal issues of more use, less use, refinery maintenance, you know, all kinds of things like that. Because all— everything I'm comparing it to is happening at the exact same time of the year when those seasonal or maintenance kinds of events ordinarily happen. So, so it is truly a relative thing. It's happening right now. So, so if comparative inventory are falling, that means that's irrespective of weather and irrespective of maintenance and other kinds of issues. So it's saying that we are seeing a real drop. It's not a, you know, it's not just an absolute number, it's compared to normal usage.

And why that's important, obviously it's an important benchmark, but What I didn't include in the package, because it's a little bit confusing to look at, is when you plot that comparative inventory versus price, and it's hard to look at because there's no time scale on it, that gives you a yield curve.

And that yield curve is absolutely the best predictor of price trends that I know of. And— When we see that yield curve turn around and start paralleling or following a trajectory that we know from the past, then we can tell where the mid-cycle price is. And the mid-cycle price is the price that the market, whatever the market is, thinks is necessary to maintain supply. That doesn't mean it's going to be tomorrow's price, but that's the direction that we're going. So, that's what comparative analysis is. Inventory is about. It's not something that I expect everybody to immediately latch on to and say, oh yeah, I get it, you know, I'm gonna start doing that, because it's, it's a little bit abstract. But it is by far the most— if you had to choose one thing, it is the most significant, meaningful, and insightful way to look at where prices are going and And even, even getting a little bit specific about where they're headed.

So that's, that's why I think it's very, very important.

$50 oil, rig counts and shale breakevens

Erik Townsend: Now, you mentioned that $50 magic number that seems to be a psychological barrier. We have traded— and you mentioned actually in the February interview that $50 to $55 was, even for the very best operators, the people that had the very best plays, the best land leases, $50 to $55 was their breakeven. They're not even making any money at that. We've traded above $50 for all of about 20 minutes, quite frankly, so far.

You know, a couple of little spikes to just above $50. They didn't last long. We're just right around $49 as we're speaking on this Wednesday that we're recording this interview. So, how is it possible that I'm already seeing articles in the paper about how U.S. drillers are gearing up for more drilling because they've got $50 oil prices. Is this rhetoric that they're spewing trying to get the sources of funding to believe that they could be profitable, or is it true that they could actually be profitable? I mean, should we expect the rig count to, to tick up from here as we hit $50 and the shale drillers go back to work?

Art Berman: Well, those are, those are critical questions. That's a great question, Erik. And, again, the answer is, I don't know, but I don't think so.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Art Berman: The rig count over the last couple of weeks has, you know, effectively— it's flattened out. I mean, you know, we're losing a couple of rigs a week as opposed to 20 or 15 or 25 rigs a week not very long ago.

Well, there's a reason for that. I mean, it's a diminishing returns thing. You reach a point where, you know, you just can't, you don't have any more rigs to get rid of. I mean, we're down to, you know, to just sort of basic maintenance at this point. So, and as far as, you know, the breakeven price, I'm sure that all the listeners, you know, are just completely bewildered by the You know, the range of breakeven prices that they read about and they hear. And, I mean, there was a Bloomberg report, and they put it on television at one point about, you know, all the counties in Texas that can actually make money below $40 oil. And there's even a few, they said, that, you know, can make money in the $20s. And that's just pure crap. I mean, that is just— It's just so fundamentally distorted and untrue that it's painful to me, because, I mean, this is the business I'm in, and I've got a pretty good sense of what the floor is. And I promise you, nobody's making money or breaking even at the prices that that Bloomberg report was talking about.

And so the question is, well, how did they get there? And they get there in a real Well, they do it in a very simple way.

They exclude costs. You know, they exclude taxes and royalties and overhead and interest expense. You exclude everything except for drilling and completion. And, well, yeah, okay, you know, that will get you down to a pretty low number, but that's, you know, that's not real. I mean, that's like me telling my bank that, You know, my only monthly cost is my mortgage.

Well, you know, they're not going to believe that. They're going to say, yeah, what about loans? And what about, you know, do you eat? You know, do you drive a car? I mean, those are, you know, without those, I don't live. And it's the same for these companies. They, you know, to just to use some number and to not even discount it. I mean, that's another thing.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: So, there's a million things. I could talk for an hour or two just about the flaws in the way that many analysts evaluate the profitability of these companies. Why do they do it? Well, they're selling stuff, aren't they? I mean, there's nothing wrong with that. That's the business they're in.

They're pushing stock. They're pushing investment banking transactions, and they need to talk it up.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: And that's what they do, but it's wrong. It's just not even close to true. And I'm not the only one that thinks that. And this is the business I'm in. I mean, I'm not an analyst. I drill wells. I make maps. You know, I explain dry holes. I look at deals. That's the world I live in. And I promise you that there are no companies, little bitty companies, companies like the one I'm sitting in right now that has very little overhead and no debt.

You know, we can't make money at the prices that some of those analysts say others are. So, you know, $50 is an absolute floor for companies that just happen to be in the very sweetest parts of the very best plays. And like you said, Erik, they're not They're not making money. That's breakeven. Okay? And they're not investing. They're not, you know, they're not growing at those prices. So, go back to drilling at $50? I don't think so.

OPEC cut prerequisites and US production outlook

Erik Townsend: I'd love to spend that hour and a half talking this up in more detail, but we need to move on. So, I want to go to the really big thing that we both predicted. I think, actually, we both predicted it would happen someday. I think you even said you thought it was likely to happen in 2016. We predicted in 2016, which is that Saudi Arabia and OPEC would eventually cut production in order to support higher prices. And we predicted that several things had to happen before that. One, we thought that capital providers needed to pull back meaningfully so that shale didn't have the source of funding it had. You said already that the signs that you're seeing is that that has happened. We also said that U.S. production had to drop significantly, and the number that you cited was At the time, we were seeing maybe drops of 50,000 barrels per day in a given month from the previous month.

You thought that number needed to go to 150,000. It's gone to about 100,000. So maybe we're halfway there. I had suggested that I didn't think that OPEC would cut until Russia joined the party and agreed to cut with them. Just this week, Russia pulled away from their previous willingness to agree to a freeze, never mind cuts, just a freeze. They're no longer willing to do that. So we're not there yet on that one.

What's your take now? Do you still see these things as prerequisites to OPEC cutting, and do you still think an OPEC cut is likely, which would imply that those things would get resolved over the course of 2016?

Art Berman: Well, let's just back up a second and talk about U.S. production, because you did ask me that, and I, I did say that, you know, it had fallen 100,000 barrels in the last month. And the EIA forecast on that, I think, is worth looking at. And I don't believe anybody's forecasts out, you know, more than 6 or 12 months, but I think that the EIA is probably pretty close to right on that. And they're saying that by the end of the summer, by September, U.S. production will have fallen We're going to be down 1.5 million barrels per day, roughly, since the peak in April 2015. So we'll be down close to 8 million barrels a day from a high of about 9.7 million barrels a day.

At the same time, it's worth looking at what EIA thinks West Texas Intermediate prices are going to be, and they're already wrong, but Interestingly, by December 7th, 2017, the end of their forecast, they see WTI at $59. Again, I don't— wouldn't take that to the bank or anything, but I do have a certain amount of respect for the sophistication of the modeling and the work that goes on there, just as a rough kind of a benchmark number.

EIA is not— they're not seeing prices going back to, you know, to $70 or $80. Is it enough? The answer to that is it depends. It depends on what's happening in the rest of the world. And, and the, the mood and the sense right now is that the rest of the world is precarious.

And I think it's relevant— we were talking about the damage done to US producers and, and the financial providers and enablers. Well, I think a lot of, a lot of the rest of what's going on in the world— the outages in Nigeria, the outages in Venezuela— these are directly related to the governments of those countries having no money from lack of oil revenue. And so we reach a point where the pain gets, gets so bad that we actually have countries on the verge of failure.

And, and that's where we are. And, and so the time for, you know, for some relief from price before the world order implodes on itself, I, I think is at hand. And, and is there, you know, are there some silent hands Working behind the scenes to, you know, to try to restore, you know, some semblance of future order. I don't know. I don't subscribe to those kinds of theories, but we are in that kind of scenario right now, and it's dire. I mean, we really need to take this seriously. There's not a thing we can do about it, but the specter— I mean, Venezuela produces more than 2 million million barrels a day, and that country is on the verge of collapse.

And, you know, you take 2 million barrels of oil off the world market, and I promise you that prices are going to go up a lot. So, are we there based on U.S. production? No. We're sure heading in the right direction. And is 1.5 million barrels a day by the end of the summer enough? It's probably Probably enough, given everything else that's going on in the world. And that's changed a lot too, Erik, since we talked a couple of months ago.

Venezuela, Nigeria, Canada, Iran, Iraq and Libya

Erik Townsend: Yeah, one of the things that I think— a prediction you made in February that was very prescient. You said everybody's talking about Iran, but the true wild card, was your word, is Libya, not Iran. Now, at the time, nobody was talking about Libya, and we were discussing it in the context of, you know, you said if Libya were somehow able to solve their unrest problems, they could increase their production, and that would be very bearish for prices. Of course, the opposite has happened. It's gone the other way, and their unrest has gotten much worse, which I think you had actually said in that interview. You didn't think it was likely they could solve their unrest problems.

Meanwhile, we've got the situation you described in Venezuela, literally on the verge of societal collapse. And for our listeners who may not be aware, what's going on there Venezuela's most important thing it has to do is keep producing and selling oil. But they have mismanaged their country so badly that the foreign contractors that are essential to producing oil were not getting paid and basically gave up and went home. And they're not able to produce as much oil because the whole country is falling into disarray. Nigerian militants attacking pipelines, creating major shortages. And of course, the Canadian wildfires.

The estimates I've seen from analysts are as high as 3.75 million barrels taken offline as a result of these various geopolitical developments. And of course, we were only talking about a 1 to 1.5 million barrel oversupply. If you subtract 3.75 from 1.5, you get a negative number. And so it looks like, you know, the surplus, the oversupply, is now a deficit. So I think the key thing is Are these things temporary or are they going to last?

And particularly, can these geopolitical events last long enough to get us to that point later in 2016 when you thought that the market was going to rebalance itself anyway because of U.S. production declines? So, what do you— what's your take on these things, particularly Canada, because that's the one that most directly affects Cushing inventory, which we both agree is very critical?

Art Berman: Well, as I understand it, despite all the, you know, the fanfare— and it was a gripping thing to watch those fires— that Canadian supply to the U.S. did not change. And I mean, you know, you may have more information on that than I do, but that there was enough oil in storage available that, you know, that was a temporary thing.

Erik Townsend: Right. Mm-hmm.

Art Berman: Albeit a dramatic one. So, I've seen the same reports that talk about 3+ million barrels a day offline, and frankly, I just don't believe it. I think that's, you know, what could potentially happen, or what, you know, may have, you know, could have potentially happened, but I just don't see numbers like that. You know, you want to add 2.3 million a day from Venezuela into that, Or half of that, yeah, sure, you can get there. But that hasn't happened yet. And I think we have to keep that in mind, that, you know, the sky is falling, you know, people get hysterical about things like that. And let's talk about, you know, what has happened versus what may happen.

So, you know, back to February, you know, Iran, yep, they're, you know, they're going to increase production, and we've seen it. And it's steady, and it's within predicted ranges. And for Iran to be at 500,000 or even 600,000 or 700,000 barrels a day above December sometime in 2016, I think, is probably realistic.

Iraq. Iraq was the big sleeper that nobody was paying attention to. The country second only to the United States that had increased its production the most since early 2014. It seems like Iraq's economic and political problems have probably reached a point where that production is, is, is not going to grow anymore, and, and it may actually fall. Libya, if I had to say, I mean, Libya I think Libya is probably incrementally closer to a solution than they were when we talked in February. At least they have a unity government. It's not functioning very well, but there is a government, and that's a step in the right direction. So I don't want to get anybody's hopes up about Libya, but let's not forget, Libya solves its civil problems and there's 1 million barrels a day that is right back online.

So, I still see there's plenty of sources of oversupply remaining in the world. And let's not forget, either, that even these very desperate countries and companies, they still have to produce for cash flow, and they're going to take advantage of higher prices. You know, these higher prices of nearly $50

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: From $30, $20 a barrel. I mean, that is a huge increase. Not, you know, it doesn't bring them back to profitability.

And I guess the other thing that's important to bear in mind, and I didn't send the chart, but it's on my website, I've got a chart that compares, you know, OPEC fiscal breakeven numbers from the IEA. IMF with the oil sands plays in Canada and the key U.S. shale plays.

And the truth about that situation is that for as expensive as unconventional oil, deepwater, oil sands, tight oil is, that so is everybody else's oil, including OPEC. And this idea that OPEC has been And Saudi particularly has been promoting, you know, that we're the low-cost producers and you guys are the high-cost producers. Well, not when you consider overhead.

Companies have overheads and countries have overheads. And you look at those numbers and everybody, I mean everybody, has to have at least $50 oil to break even, including OPEC. And that's a— That's the world we live in. And, you know, that's something that nobody— most people don't want to pay attention to. The age of cheap oil is over. That's momentum moving us in the other direction, unfortunately.

Mohammed bin Salman and Vision 2030

Erik Townsend: Speaking of OPEC, I'd like to go back to Saudi Arabia, and particularly something that the firing of Mr. Al-Naimi really spoke to me is the ascendance to power of Prince Mohammed bin Salman, the 30-year-old prince. Who apparently is kind of the head honcho in charge now in Saudi Arabia. So I immediately wanted to learn more about this guy and find out what his vision of the future was. And very conveniently, he had just published a document called Vision 2030, which I expected to articulate Saudi Arabia's energy future strategy.

This guy is talking about getting Saudi Arabia out of the oil business and into the tourism business. I just don't know what to— I was speechless to read that. Is this guy lost in space? Is this intentional misinformation? Is he serious about what he's saying, that Saudi Arabia should move away from dependency on oil exports, which really is the key natural resource that the country has?

Art Berman: Well, you're not alone in that reaction, Erik. There are an awful lot of Saudi Arabia watchers who know a lot more than I will ever know about the royal family and the internal workings of that country, who think that his Vision 2030 is reckless, is irrational, that it's meant to produce an effect which is, by gosh, we're going to change in a big way. And that's something That is needed for internal consumption in Saudi Arabia, apparently. But let's talk about reality. So Saudi Arabia, I don't think it's going to be a big tourist— I mean, it's not on my list of places to visit with my family. The Saudi munitions piece, I guess, is perhaps the most doable part.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: But, you know, on a more philosophical level, it seems to me that, you know, what I was just talking about, that, oh my gosh, if everybody in the world's breakeven price is $70 or $80 on average, you know, is there an end to the age of petroleum just because the world can't afford it coming in the near future?

And put in a, you know, put in the, the kind of price spikes that are inevitable as a result now of 2-plus years of underinvestment. And, uh, you know, that perhaps Mohammed bin Salman is, is thinking along those lines. I, I honestly can't, can't decode the message there, uh, for myself, much less for other people, but he is, uh, You know, he— let's, let's give him credit. He's probably a very smart guy, but let's also remember that a lot of this is, is, is for internal consumption and dramatic effect.

The chart deck and Labyrinth Consulting

Erik Townsend: I have several more questions on my outline here, Art, but unfortunately we're starting to run out of time. I do want to just quickly go over the charts that you sent us. Give our listeners a quick sense of what's in that PDF so that they know what they're looking at when they open it

Art Berman: Well, there's there's three charts that that show comparative inventory versus price along a timeline, and and they're gonna they're gonna see that there are there there's Cushing, which I think is is absolutely central to understanding pricing. And and and what's interesting about Cushing is that Comparative inventory fell through mid-April and then started rising again. So that's a countercurrent kind of movement.

The total U.S.— that's commercial crude oil— I show the same kind of data there. And what we see there is that beginning in mid-March, those comparative inventory inventories started falling, which is consistent with the price rise.

And then I think the final chart that I had there was a combined Cushing plus Gulf Coast, and that accounts for something like 70% of U.S. storage. And there I'm showing that the comparative inventories are generally falling. But I'm also showing a front-to-back futures spread. So, you know, that's typically going to be like a June-December futures contract spread, and it rolls a little bit forward in the last month or so of that chart.

But that gives, you know, some idea of the incentive for, you know, for lower price or higher price. And so typically the higher spread

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: Higher spreads reflect lower prices and vice versa. So, those are the charts.

And then, of course, the other one that's always— people always forget to think about, or some people do, is going to be the strength of the dollar versus the futures price. And that's the NYMEX WTI, and I use the Wall Street Journal Dollar Index, but you can use a lot of them.

People scramble for explanations for why oil prices are falling and rising, and they're all valid, but I always remind myself to look at this because when the strength of the dollar is high, prices tend to go down and vice versa. That's a whole other discussion as to why that happens, but empirically, that's generally the way it works.

Erik Townsend: So, Erik?

Art Berman: Those are the charts.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. As we close, I think our listeners already know your blog at artberman.com is free and one of my favorite resources on the internet. Your for-profit business is Labyrinth Consulting. Tell us a little bit about what you do and what services you offer.

Art Berman: Labyrinth is basically me and a couple of engineering colleagues. We, we advise We advise investment companies, hedge funds, money managers on their portfolios. We do reserve forecasts, we do economics, and we also do basic geology. So that's what we do. We have a very interesting and diverse clientele.

Erik Townsend: Well, Art, thanks so much for joining us on the program today. Nathan Egger and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Postgame: Erik's conclusions on the Saudi agenda and crude

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Nathan Egger: Every time I hear Art speak, Erik, I enjoy it. There is no unnecessary emotion, no BS, not even a lot of opinion unless you're begging him for it. It's just insightful analysis. But I'm curious, after this update from Art, what are your conclusions about where we are in this whole crude oil story?

Erik Townsend: Well, the biggest thing that I see is really this question of what is Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Kuwait's agenda really, and has it changed? I was absolutely convinced that there was no way that Saudi Arabia went on this market share strategy on an indefinite basis, just thinking it was a smart idea to do for the long term. Obviously, they're going to suffer lower total revenue from their oil sales as a result of allowing the price to drop. So, I've made the assumption that they were intentionally allowing the price to drop in order to do damage to their competitors. And I believed to coerce Russia and others into playing ball with them. I think perhaps what's happened is Russia did capitulate. They were talking about a freeze, but probably could have been led down a negotiation path towards a joint cut.

And I think that Saudi Arabia is not willing to talk about a freeze or a cut or anything when Iran is growing production. The idea politically in Saudi Arabia of The Saudis reducing production in order to allow Iran to increase it is just on every level, socially, culturally, religiously, it is anathema to everything that they stand for. And I cannot figure out this Mohammed bin Salman guy who is preaching about how Saudi Arabia should get out of the oil business and into the tourist business. That just doesn't make any sense. So I really think the key is in understanding what their intentions are and at what At what point are they going to be willing to consider some kind of joint cut?

That's not happening yet, and I do think that we are at the top of a cycle. Technicians I'm reading are saying $51.90 is a major retracement level that might mark a top in this cycle. I'd consider shorting it from there. In the meantime, I'm just in the crude oil term structure steepener trade that we've talked about in previous episodes and waiting to see what happens.

Announcing Aaron Chan and the research team

Nathan Egger: Well, as the MacroVoices project gains momentum, we're excited to be growing our team here. It's been necessary, but we've come across some great people to help us out with the content of this program. So we're pleased to announce that Aaron Chan is joining our production team, and we're going to spend the last few minutes of today's show introducing Aaron to our audience. So, Erik, give us the backstory on how Aaron will fit into the team before we bring him in to introduce himself.

Erik Townsend: Well, as I've described in prior episodes, the whole vision for the MacroVoices project is to create a global community of sophisticated private investors, family offices, and other smart people, and to encourage them to collaborate and share investing ideas online. We've actually had several people reach out to us and expressed interest in helping the cause, but Aaron Chan has probably been our most vocal proponent. Ever since episode 1, Aaron has been talking us up on Twitter sending us interesting articles for our Research Roundup, and so forth.

And believe me, folks, we need the help. This project has turned out to be way more work than Nathan and I first imagined. Registered users probably noticed that this week's Research Roundup email was kind of light on content, and that's just because we're swamped and we don't have time to do as good of a job as we had first envisioned with the Research Roundup.

So Aaron has agreed to join our team as the captain of what we're calling the MacroVoices Research Team. The first responsibility of the research team under Aaron's leadership will be to curate and expand our Research Roundup emails, which have been extremely well received so far. Over time, we envision the research team also helping us to identify and recruit future interview guests for the program and to help us refine the format in order to promote the development of that global community of sophisticated investors that I described a moment ago.

Aaron Chan introduces himself and the #MVRR hashtag

Nathan Egger: So we're going to go ahead and introduce Aaron to our listeners Aaron, welcome aboard Please tell our listeners a little bit about yourself, your personal and professional background, and how you discovered MacroVoices.

Aaron Chan: Thanks for having me. I'm really excited to join the team. Well, I'm originally from Toronto, and I'm currently based in New York. Academically, I studied finance on a Division I tennis scholarship at Fairfield University and then received my master's in sustainability management with an emphasis on energy markets. From Columbia University.

In terms of my professional experience, I was a fixed income derivatives summer analyst at Morgan Stanley, and then afterwards, an energy investment banking analyst at JP Morgan. Following my time in investment banking, I decided to level up my data analysis skills and recently graduated from a full-time data science program at Galvanize in San Francisco.

Although not finance related, this program culminated with a capstone project I worked on where I designed a system that scraped data from over 100,000 Kickstarter crowdfunding campaigns and applied a random forest classification algorithm to predict fundraising success with around 80% accuracy. With all that being said, I'm now looking to apply my finance and data science skills towards asset management and macro research.

As for how I discovered MacroVoices, I would say that there are really 2 main drivers. Back in January and February, when I was interviewing with tech companies, as you know, markets were tanking and China was seemingly falling off the precipice. So I found myself reading voraciously about what was happening while repositioning my own portfolio, as in getting off of the QE escalator.

I was reading and listening to all the mainstream financial outlets, but was really left desperately wanting for more nuanced and sophisticated analysis.

So secondly, I love the podcast medium. I even started my own project, the Laissez-Faire Podcast, with one of my best friends from college, Ricardo Espaillat, where we talk about politics, economics, and finance from the perspectives of free markets and individual liberty. So in the process of working on my own project, I stumbled upon MacroVoices and I was basically hooked from day one because it introduced me to content that I hadn't seen or heard anywhere else. And it also introduced me to a community of like-minded, inquisitive people.

Erik Townsend: Well, Aaron, thank you so much for volunteering to help us with this project. We are excited to have you aboard. Why don't we start by telling our listeners, first of all, where they can find your podcast in case they're interested in that, but also what is #MacroVoices? MVRR all about, and how can our listeners use it?

Aaron Chan: Yeah, for sure. You can find my podcast on iTunes. It's the Laissez-Faire Podcast, and we're also on SoundCloud. As far as the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, Erik, as you had mentioned earlier, our vision is to create a global community of sophisticated investors to collaborate and share investing ideas online.

As such, the weekly Research Roundup newsletter is really one of the main vectors through which we can build and share interesting research with our community. So to that end, we are introducing the #MVRR hashtag as a way for our Twitter-savvy listeners to tag interesting research or articles for inclusion in the next Research Roundup. Of course, our non-Twitter listeners also have the option of submitting content to our researchroundup@macrovoices.com email as well.

Erik Townsend: So basically, any listener who's got something that they think is worthy of our other listeners' attention that should go into our Research Roundup email, the 2 options are to email us at researchroundup@macrovoices.com at MacroVoices.com, or if you're on Twitter, just retweet with the #MVRR hashtag, and that will get Aaron's attention and he'll be able to evaluate whether it fits into the next Research Roundup email.

Aaron Chan: That's right.

Erik Townsend: So again, Aaron, I cannot thank you enough for helping us out in this capacity. I hope to find ways to make this experience as rewarding for you as I'm sure your contribution will be for our listeners. But we are putting you basically in charge as the captain of a ship that doesn't yet have a crew. So please tell us what kind of help you're looking for as you build the MacroVoices research team.

Aaron Chan: Yeah, for sure. So initially, for the purposes of sourcing and curating content for the Research Roundup, we're looking for a team of volunteers who have experience reading financial literature, be it out of personal interest or for their own investing. The process itself is still being developed, but I envision one that is collaborative. And I know we have listeners from all around the world, so all time zones are welcome.

I'd also encourage our Twitter-savvy listeners to volunteer. Our goal is to build out the community, and Twitter is one of the venues where we can really do that while engaging in the marketplace of ideas.

And lastly, generally speaking, we want volunteers who are eager to learn and want to be part of building something that, for me, and I'm sure for tons of our listeners, contributes greatly to our financial education. Again, this is not an exhaustive list, and nor should it be construed as a set of job requirements. Participation is purely on a volunteering basis. And as this project continues to grow, there may be opportunities for greater involvement, be it in guest recruiting or content development. In that vein, we also encourage listeners who have skills outside of finance and social media.

But Erik, more than anything, I'm most looking forward to getting to know and learning from other engaged listeners.

Nathan Egger: And if our listeners want to volunteer some of their own time to help the cause, how can they contact you, Aaron?

Aaron Chan: Yeah, listeners can email me directly at aaron@macrovoices.com and on Twitter @AaronChan_.

Closing and next week's guest, Ben Hunt

Nathan Egger: So that's aaron@macrovoices.com. Besides outright volunteering to help us here at MacroVoices, the best way you can support MacroVoices is by subscribing, rating, and reviewing us on iTunes. This helps us move up in the rankings and gain more visibility. What we're essentially trying to do is get the word out. So telling your friends, family, coworkers, sharing on social media, this really helps us grow. Speaking of social media, you can follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and Erik has a personal handle, which is @ErikSTownsend. That's E-R-I-K S-Townsend. And remember folks, #MVRR is how you get our attention on Twitter for research that you would like to see included in our Research Roundup. Aside from Twitter, you can continue the discussion of topics covered on the show by joining us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.

We really hope you'll be back again next week as Dr. Ben Hunt will be joining us. He is the Chief Risk Officer at Salient Partners and the author of the popular newsletter, Epsilon Theory. For Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend.

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Nathan. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week, free of charge.

Disclaimer

Announcer: MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only.

The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts. Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Julian Brigden — Julian Brigden, Macro Intelligence 2 Partners (introduced as 'Macro Intelligence 2 founder' by Erik at w85 and 'Macro Intelligence co-founder' by Nathan at w2008) (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the premier financial podcast featuring weekly interviews with the most brilliant minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics. MacroVoices is always free of charge, and unlike the mainstream financial press, we are not a platform for market cheerleading. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the business MacroVoices is telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 16 was recorded on May 26th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Macro Intelligence 2 founder Julian Brigden will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts to support this interview, and we'll be talking about the US dollar cycle, what it means to both developed and emerging markets, inflation, precious metals, and much more.

Equities: S&P rebound and the June Fed meeting

Nathan Egger: And I'm Nathan Egger. Let's get started with equities, Erik. 2 weeks ago, you said you were watching the S&P and waiting for a daily close below the 50-day moving average before you'd consider putting on a short trade. And we got that close on Friday, 2 weeks ago. But then last week, you were a little hesitant, saying that you didn't like the tape action. And you said you were going to wait and see what happened with the head and shoulders pattern that has been developing. which was actually trading below the neckline intraday when we were recording last week's show. Did you end up going short?

Erik Townsend: No, and I'm glad I didn't. Obviously, this week's upside tape action has just blown my mind. When we did not see an acceleration of downside momentum on that intraday break below the neckline and eventually closed above it, I knew we were set up for at least some kind of a bounce. I wasn't expecting quite this much. And frankly, what really kind of blows my mind is that The expectations, market expectations of a Fed rate hike at the June meeting have collapsed. Now, in the past, what we've seen is coming into these meetings where there was a threat of a hike, the market would throw a little tantrum. It would be down 100 S&P points effectively to scare the Fed out of hiking. The market's not trying to scare the Fed. I think that it's— it is a live meeting. As Mr. Dudley said last week, it's entirely possible that they could hike rates at the June meeting. It seems like the market has decided that's not a risk.

And I'm looking at 2,000 We're trading at 2,090 right now, which has been a technical level that's been thrown around by some technicians as maybe where we're going to find resistance. I don't know what to make of this, though. Clearly, the head and shoulders pattern has been invalidated now as we've moved well above what would have been the right shoulder. So, we're in uncharted territory. And I think that the Fed meeting in 2 and a half weeks' time is going to be very telling. Until then, I don't know what to make of the equity market.

Crude oil near $50, Cushing inventories and spreads

Nathan Egger: And of course, the crude oil market comes next, Erik. The financial press finally got their $50 crude headlines. Where do you see us going from here?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I was actually surprised. As bearish as I've been, I thought we were going to see a breakout above $50 with a lot of irrational exuberance and marching band music and retail investors piling in saying, okay, it's over. And I thought we might get to $51 or $52. And then I thought probably that would be the cycle high.

I did expect that we would break above $50. I thought it would last for more than half an hour, which is about what it's been so far. And then we saw a very aggressive sell-off. We closed on Thursday below the $49.50 level, which a lot of technicians have said is where that long-term channel resistance line is. So we're still, you know, in that trading range.

It's not an upside breakout. I would still expect probably a little bit more action above $50. If that was it, just the half an hour that we spent above $50 this morning, then I think that's a very bearish sign. Next week's inventory, of course, will be very important. And it's hard to tell. You know, the oil that comes from Canada in the pipeline, it takes it a month to get from Canada to the United States where it eventually hits those tanks. So with the disruptions and all of the up and down, first the Canada wildfire situation was critical, then it was resolved supposedly, then it turned out not to be resolved and there was another evacuation. It's been a lot of up and down. So what is that going to mean to Cushing inventory numbers next week remains to be seen. The 4.2 million barrel drawdown that was kind of the catalyst for the move higher this week. Was, I don't think, any real big deal.

It should be expected given seasonality. First of all, it's time of year that we should be having drawdowns on national inventory. Canada fires, Venezuela, and so forth. The fact that we only saw a 650,000-barrel drawdown in Cushing inventory in the face of the Canadian fires is really amazing to me. And to put it in context, you know, we were at 96.42%, I think, of operating capacity. We're all the way down to 95.51%. of operating capacity at Cushing, Oklahoma, as of this week's report. The thing that people didn't seem to really focus on in this report is there was a 2 million barrel gasoline build.

So, they're producing gasoline for summer driving season, which is upon us. The demand hasn't quite been there. And that is, to me, a bearish signal that the market didn't really discount as much as it should have. If the Canada situation gets resolved and normal flows into Cushing continue, we could still be setting up for that storage crisis. I don't think it would happen now, but, you know, We should be seeing big drawdowns in inventory this time of year. We won't get through fall maintenance season if we start at these inventory levels. So we've got to see drawdowns in inventory between now and the fall. Well, it's summer driving season and that should solve everything, right? Because we'll be consuming more oil. Look at this unexpected build in gasoline inventories. It seems like the demand is not coming as much as people thought. So I do think that the market rebalance should take care of itself in the second half.

But boy, we need to see Cushing Cushing in particular. And it's interesting to me, at 96% of operating capacity, the opportunity to pipeline some of that oil out of Cushing down to Houston, you'd think that would be happening. But what the traders tell me is the price levels just aren't there in order to arbitrage that trade. By the time you pay for the oil in Cushing and then pay for the delivery expense of sending it through the pipeline, nobody in Houston is willing to pay extra for it. So, You know, we still got this situation in Cushing, and I think we could see that in the expiration of this July contract, which would be in the middle of June. Right now, the difference between the first and second month is only about 39 cents as we're speaking. It was about 75 cents in the first to second spread a month ago. So, what happens when we get toward the expiry of this contract?

All the people that are piling in, the speculative longs that are saying, okay, you know, this is it.

Nathan Egger: That's it.

Erik Townsend: We're headed higher from here. Those people are buying front-month contracts, and as that contract expires, they have to sell them. They can't sell them to other speculators. Normally, who you sell them to is the guy with the storage tank who makes a little bit of money storing it for a month. If those storage tanks are full, I think you could see a dramatic widening of that spread as we approach the expiration of the July contract. In general, though, this cycle, I think it's getting tired, but it may not be over yet.

I think probably $51, $52 are some irrational exuberance before maybe next week's inventory could be the catalyst to begin a move to the downside. There are continuing signs of hedging going on in the oil market, as evidenced in those time spreads compressing. What that says to me is the front month is strong as it is pushing the curve up. The back months are being sold by producers hedging their forward production.

Gold: 50-day break, 200-day target

Nathan Egger: And you said last week that while you're long-term bullish precious metals, you feared that the party might be over for gold At least in the short term. And this week we saw gold lose $25 in a single day. That was on Tuesday. And as we're taping on Thursday, it looks like the selling is continuing. What do you see next?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, $1,219 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon before the futures close. And in general, something I've noticed about the gold market is the 50-day moving average tends to be more important in gold than it is in some other markets. It was the close below the 50-day moving average that we had earlier this week that really accelerated the downside selling. The next logical target to look at would be the 200-day moving average, which right now is right around $1,168 or so, at least on the futures chart. And I would say, if I had to, you know, what I like to do is kind of project just what the trajectory is. How long is it gonna be before we would get there? Looks to me like the test of the 200-day would come right around the time of the FOMC meeting on the 15th of June. So, I'm guessing that we're gonna see continued weakness in gold.

Nathan Egger: Okay.

Erik Townsend: If there is a rate hike, I think that would be the catalyst to send gold below the 200-day moving average.

If there's no rate hike at that meeting, I think that's where you might see the upside reversal, and that might be a buying point.

US dollar index after the Fed minutes

Nathan Egger: We've also been keeping a close eye on the dollar index here at MacroVoices for the last couple of weeks. And I'm sure our featured guest today, Julian Brigden, is going to have a lot to say about it. But is there anything that you would like to add, Erik, from your perspective?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, you know, what has surprised me, what I said last week is, boy, we've seen really good tape action. The case for the dollar index really looks bullish. But boy, you know, a lot of that was this Fed minutes thing. And I thought we would see a pullback and we didn't really see the pullback. We have in the last couple of days seen a little bit of weakness, but, you know, nothing that's big enough to worry about. Where I thought we would see a pullback and a retracement of some of that strength that happened in response to the FOMC minutes. We're still holding right about at the same level as, as after that big move up. So, I think that it's— the tape is saying to me that this dollar rally is pretty strong. We do have a little bit of a pullback here.

I think that no hike at the Fed meeting might be a catalyst for a little bit of a move lower. But I think the lows are probably in. And if we did see a Fed rate hike, I think we're headed higher from here.

Guest preview, chart PDF and registration

Nathan Egger: Thank you, as always, for the market update, Erik. This week's featured guest, as I mentioned, is Macro Intelligence co-founder Julian Brigden. Brigden. This guy is brilliant. I think you guys are really going to enjoy this one.

Erik Townsend: You know, Julian sent us a fantastic book of charts that he's going to be referring to in the interview. So, for those of you who are not listening at the gym or someplace where you can't look at a PDF file, I recommend that you pause now and open Julian's PDF file full of charts. He'll be referring to them in the interview. Registered users at MacroVoices.com should have already received this presentation via our Research Roundup email, which was sent to you when the podcast was published.

Nathan Egger: We've had a problem actually over the last couple of weeks where people are emailing me asking me to register them. Look, folks, this is a part-time job for me. And as much as I'd like to help you out, I can't do your registration for you. This is something you're going to have to do on your own. So, if you haven't registered yourself yet, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button on the top right side of the homepage, then click the Register Your Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page that you will see. It's always free. And we promise We promise never to spam you, and we're not going to sell your email address to anyone else.

Erik Townsend: We did discover a flaw in the registration process, which we fixed, and the problem was people were going ahead and registering at MacroVoices.com, as Nathan just described. That automatically signs you up to receive the next Research Roundup email, but what a lot of people wanted was the current Research Roundup email so that they could look at this week's content, which had already been sent out.

To solve this problem, we've added a new Research Library tab to the MacroVoices.com homepage. This new area of the site is eventually going to allow registered and logged-in users to go back and peruse all of the past content that we've ever distributed through our Research Roundup, including the latest content that supports this week's podcast.

So, if you were not already registered and you want Julian Brigden's presentation, here's what you need to do. First of all, go to MacroVoices.com, register a free account, per the instructions Nathan just gave you. Once you've done that and you're logged in, on the black menu bar at the top of the page, choose the Research Library function from the title bar, then choose the Documents dropdown. From there, click on Guest Publications, and then look for the Macro Intelligence 2 Partners presentation, which is about halfway down in that list of documents. We just set this up over the last couple of weeks, and frankly, the navigation could be better. We don't have pictures of the guests and that stuff yet.

Nathan Egger: Right.

Erik Townsend: We'll get to that at some point, but for now, we do have a solution. So, that's how to get Julian's presentation right now if you're not registered yet.

Nathan Egger: Thank you for the clarification, Erik. And thanks for your patience, folks, for those of you who are already registered. But explaining this in detail on the show is going to save me from answering dozens of emails from listeners asking me to register for them. Erik's interview with Julian Brigden coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Broad trade-weighted dollar versus the DXY

Erik Townsend: Joining me next from Macro Intelligence 2 Partners is Julian Brigden, one of my favorite Real Vision appearances. I really love the graphs and charts that you have produced, Julian, and thank you so much for sending them to our audience ahead of time. Before we get into your first chart, though, about the US dollar, something I've noticed— I interview almost everyone in this program about the US dollar rally. And most people on Wall Street, when they talk about the US dollar, are talking about the DXY, the dollar index. But I noticed that most of the smartest guys in the room, yourself included, all prefer the broad real trade-weighted dollar index instead of the DXY. So, let's start with what's wrong with the DXY and why do you prefer the trade-weighted dollar index?

Julian Brigden: I don't think there's anything wrong per se with the DXY. It just has a, you know, a huge euro component to it, which makes, to be honest, from a trading perspective, it's sort of a waste of time. You might as well trade the euro.

But really, from an analysis perspective, I think we have to move beyond that. When we're looking at trying to look at macro effects of the dollar, you have to think well beyond the DXY, because the DXY is essentially the developed markets. So, it's got euro, sterling, CAD, Aussie, etc., etc. When we're trying to see the macro impact of dollar moves, I much prefer to look at the broad dollar, because it contains a huge element of EM in that. And that's important because these are the guys in the EM space are the guys who generally tend to fund themselves in dollars. You don't find many European or UK companies funding themselves in dollars, because they have large domestic deep capital markets. So when you want to look at the impact of the dollar, we prefer to— from a macro perspective, I said, we prefer to use that that broad dollar.

Three dollar cycles: the pause is not the top

Erik Townsend: And as I look at the chart that you've provided, you've got— looks like about a 40-year history of the Trade-Weighted Dollar Index showing the massive buildup in the '80s before the Plaza Accord, and then again another peak around 2002 or so. And that cycle bottomed in the last couple of years, and it looks like we're headed higher. And of course, the question on everybody's mind is, is this rally in the dollar That has clearly paused. Is it over or is it just pausing? And is the pause over? Are we headed higher? What's the direction from here? And what does this history tell you about what we can expect next?

Julian Brigden: So I find, you know, if you've got the chart in front of you, you can see this broad swing in the dollar. But if you don't, essentially what you're looking at is 3 cycles for the dollar. And you have these extended multi-year declines in the dollar. During those periods, whether it was— and it's hidden slightly by the gold standard, you know, we had all the Bretton Woods game. But essentially, the dollar was falling in value hard even before this chart began in '72. And that was because we were essentially devaluing the dollar or debasing the dollar by printing money to pay for the Vietnam War.

But as the dollar falls in value, you tend to build up bubbles in things that are very dollar sensitive. So emerging markets, commodities, that type of thing. And then as the dollar rallies, what you find, and you can see it on the chart, is roughly at around 21-plus percent, between 21 and sort of 24, 25, you tend to get a problem. And it's simply because the reserve currency has moved so far that you start to undermine the excesses created in the falling dollar periods. As I said, those typically tend to be in EM or in the commodity space.

So the first one that we saw was in the early '80s where we get the Latin American debt crisis. We'd built up massive bubbles in the Latin American commodity space fed by petrodollars out of the Middle East as their oil prices had boomed post the end of controlled commodity and oil prices in the '70s.

And as the dollar rises, Led by Volcker's extremely tight monetary policy, basically 21% change off the lows in the dollar. We get Latin American debt crisis, and that has consequences for the United States. We saw you know big losses in U.S. banks, people like Chemical Bank and Citibank, who were very present down in Latin America. They take hits, and the Fed steps off the gas, and we get this corrective pause.

The same happened in the late '90s. So this time we're coming off the highs of the dollar in the Plaza Accord. In 1985, the dollar falls steadily, steadily, steadily. The first thing that we do as the dollar is falling, we're building excesses actually in Japan because the yen's rising every single day as the dollar is falling. The money floods in naturally into Japan seeking to double dip both in terms of the currency appreciation and the equity market appreciation that's going on there. And then we get the Nikkei bubble burst eventually. The money comes flooding out of that and it goes into the next hot topic, which is Asia. And so we build excesses there. And then We put a low in the dollar when Sakakibara comes in in 1995 and says, look, yen strength is just too excessive. The dollar starts to rally 24% and change off the lows. We get the beginning of the Asian crisis.

It actually kicks in around 21%. It's the first time we get problems with Thailand in early 1987— 1997, sorry. And the US pauses. The Fed pauses because you've got problems. And the dollar dips.

But here's the point. In both of those cycles, it was a corrective pause. It was not a top. And when we look at the current scenario, we've been using this chart. And you can see here— or you can't see here— but basically, we're 25% off the lows of 2011 now. So, all of last year, we were saying we're going to get an emerging market crisis, and we were playing for an emerging market crisis.

And we did very well out of that. And now essentially we're in that pause phase.

But here's the point. History dictates that this is not the top. And I think there's some other things that we can talk about, gents, in terms of what's driven this structural move in the dollar, which do make it somewhat different and much more difficult to prevent that continued dollar strength. So this is a pause. We've been playing for the pause. We tend to think the pause is probably over in terms of the move down. We're down to the lows on the dollar.

We may not be ready quite yet to break out to the highs. That's going to take Fed rate hikes. But we think that's coming in the second half of the year. And we can explain that as you would like.

Dollar, oil and the second-half inflation upturn

Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, this entire move in the dollar, if you expect the dollar to be headed higher after this pause, most people would say, okay, that is inherently a deflationary event. If the dollar is stronger, then things that are priced in dollars would go down in price. And so, this is inherently deflationary. But I think you have a different view.

Julian Brigden: Yeah. So one of the things that we've been intrigued about is the way that central banks have— well, firstly, you know, you'll see in the chart pack if you've got it, you'll see that a dollar pause is itself truly reflationary. I mean, basically, if you look at— we've got a chart in here of G7 inflation against the dollar.

And you can see that the highs of the dollar are the lows of G7 inflation and the lows in the dollars are the highs of G7 inflation. It literally, within a sort of broadly structural disinflationary world that we live in. I don't like to use the word deflationary because deflation implies falling aggregate demand and falling inflation. So in this sort of disinflationary environment, the cycle is set by the dollar.

So what I find quite intriguing is that we've seen this hugely disinflationary pulse by a rapid rise in the dollar since, particularly since the summer of 2014, which has crushed oil prices. But the key thing for us is that, you know, back in the spring, in February, we started to suggest to clients that they actually start to buy oil.

And when you look at inflation, the issue is obviously we've had this massive disinflationary pulse. We've seen a bunch of central banks across the world, not so much the Fed, but certainly they've delayed hiking because of the disinflationary pulse. But certainly in the ECB, we've seen a bunch of central banks ease into this disinflationary pulse.

You know, that policy is now passed. We're already starting to see the base effects drop out from the oil price. And if you look at one of the final charts we put in there, we look at CPI in the United States. And you can see that essentially the big key components of CPI— owners' equivalent rent, services, and medical costs— are all sitting well comfortably above 3%.

What we've had is this huge drop in energy prices, which from a CPI perspective at the lows when the dollar peaked basically in January, February, were running at around 20% negative year over year in energy costs. So, that pushed down overall CPI.

But the point is that this is a one-off deflationary shock or disinflationary shock. Oil prices are by their very nature transitory. So, and we've seen this in the past, you've seen scenarios where particularly in the mid-'80s, '80s, where you saw huge drops in oil prices, similar sort of magnitude that we saw now, big drops in interest rates as central banks moved to ease into that thing. But a year later, those base effects drop out. I mean, literally, you go back to where you were with your underlying inflation, which in the US is above 3%.

And then unfortunately, you have to build into, to take into effect what happens then to the oil price. And we've actually You essentially doubled the oil price now, and so we have to then add in that inflationary pulse. So, as we move into the second half of the year, we truly believe that you get this cyclical upturn in inflation within a structurally disinflationary world, but a cyclical upturn in inflation, which causes huge problems for the central banks and potentially the bond markets because central banks have distorted bond markets and rates to such a large extent.

So, in the second half of of the year, what we expect to happen is the Fed to be forced to hike rates potentially significantly more than certainly the market's pricing, not necessarily the Fed is pricing, but the market is certainly pricing. And that we believe will reignite the next leg of the dollar up move that will be destructive again. So this is a cycle. This is a sequence of events and it's a sequencing game, but it will be, we truly toxic for emerging markets and I think do some significant damage.

So it's this misjudgment by central banks that we think is the big problem, that they've misjudged oil as a disinflationary event or as a deflationary event when it really is a transitory disinflationary event. And even in the US, where we have a huge shale industry, which has been responsible for a lot of the growth outperformance we've seen over the last few years, even in the US is ultimately stimulative lower oil prices.

Asia and China: money supply and the EM crisis risk

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to go back to your comment about emerging markets and what could happen there, because a lot of people have expressed great, dire concern about the risk that exists of another Asian financial crisis, as we had in the late '90s, if the dollar were to continue to appreciate. I think you have a slightly different view than the mainstream on that. So, could you elaborate on what you see happening there? Where are the risks, and how do reserves play into that?

Julian Brigden: So, if you look at if you look at Asia, one of the things that you can see is certainly from a currency perspective, one of the few regions that's seen little to no adjustment or the least adjustment, should we put it that way, in this dollar move has been Asia. You know, part of that is because you know as the savings pool is built up in Asia, the money has sort of stayed at home. It's been they've been very stable, safe places for domestic investors to keep their money. I mean, far better than you. Yes, in nominal terms, we've seen, you know, huge increase in US equity markets. We've seen big increases in European equity markets as these central banks have QE'd.

But because the currencies in Asia have stayed strong, there's been less incentive for this money to leave. The problem is, is, is that since last year, we have been building this disinflationary cycle in Asia because they have had— they've kept these very strong currencies. And we obviously have borrowing exposure. In US dollars, either directly or indirectly.

So, for example, if you look at somewhere like Singapore, if you track money supply growth in Singapore year over year, it is an utter mirror image of the fluctuations of the dollar because they run a true peg. And as they run a true peg, what happens when, you know, in 2006, when the dollar— '07, when the dollar was on the low, Singapore money supply growth was running at 25% almost year over year, which is why she has one of the most overvalued property markets. And overvalued asset markets in the world. And as the dollar started to appreciate, that money supply growth slipped dramatically.

And in the autumn of 2014, it was approaching zero, which is why she had to allow her currency to take some of the strain.

The same metrics essentially apply in China. So much more closed capital account, obviously. But essentially, while the dollar is stable or falling in value, which we saw into 2011, China, outside the absurdities of the GFC, and you can see this in the slide, basically control money supply growth somewhere between sort of 15 to 20% per annum. All is well.

The dollar starts to appreciate in 2011. Money supply growth slips a little bit. She manages to rejig it. But then in 2014, when the dollar really takes off, China is forced to intervene. Reserves fall. Remember, she takes dollars, they come straight through the front door, they get converted into renminbi, and her money supply growth slips towards 10%, which is when you started to get problems in the housing market, problems in the real economy, and problems in the equity market. Simply isn't enough cash to keep all those balls in the air.

So she had to let the currency go. And the point is, I think, is that we're in this, the eye of the storm at the moment, for better, for want of a better term.

And while the dollar is pausing, it is a pause to use a sort of trite phrase, a pause that refreshes because the fact that the dollar isn't appreciating takes the pressure off places like Singapore, Korea, Taiwan, and most importantly, China. It allows them to not have to continue to intervene to maintain currency values and not draw down their own domestic money supply growth. But if we're right, and as this inflation story picks up in the second half of the year, and the Fed is then forced to hike rates and the dollar reaccelerates, and you can see Towards the end of the chart pack, we show the dollar how the typical correction in the dollar, if you look at that '81-'82 phase or that '97-'98 phase, is sort of 4% versus EM on a TWI basis and about 8% to 9% versus DM on a TWI basis. And we've essentially seen those moves.

So you'll also see at the end of the thing at the pack, the last slide that I put in there is the rate of change of this real broad trade-weighted dollar index. And you can see that Once we get over 12% to 13%, the wheels fall off the world. And that's that green line we put up there. You get an emerging market crisis. But the point is, is there's only 2 occasions where the dollar has lost all forward momentum and gone negative year over year. And that is Plaza, which was central bank intervention, and we're not about to see that. And that was post the GFC, where the Fed came in with QE1. And absent QE4, which we all know is still a long, long way away, That isn't going to happen either. And in every other occasion, we see a dip, a bleed-off of momentum, and then a secondary reacceleration.

So I think in that secondary reacceleration, which, as I said, I think we've possibly seen the lows on the dollar yet now already. We may not be ready to break out to new highs until the Fed is forced to acknowledge the rising inflation story. But once that happens and the dollar reaccelerates, we go very, very, very quickly. Back to the chaotic crisis we saw in EM, and particularly focused around Asia that we saw before. And I think the Chinese will have to let the renminbi at that point continue to gradually depreciate. I'm not so much in the sort of huge one-off 20% type thing, but I do believe they will let this renminbi march steadily, dollar-renminbi march steadily higher.

Chinese capital flight and property abroad

Erik Townsend: There has been an extraordinary appreciation in property values, particularly high-end luxury real estate in Hong Kong, Vancouver, San Francisco, and several other cities, which most people have attributed to money leaking out of China, essentially saying that it has entirely to do with the wealthiest Chinese wanting to get their money out of the country. How would this whole picture that you're painting reflect on And what property owners might expect in those markets?

Julian Brigden: Interesting tangential question. Look, I mean, I think that's entirely true. I mean, we have seen, you know, huge outflows. And I think we continue to see sort of steady outflows. They're trying to clamp down on this. They have to clamp down on this. But I think— and as I said, we're in this sort of eye in the storm where we've seen— I mean, if you actually started to see Chinese reserve growth actually improve a wee bit, and we've got some charts that sort of show that literally, you know, is part of this pause that refreshes in terms of the dollar pausing. That's literally what happens. But as soon as the dollar starts to reaccelerate again, I think you will see that pressure to the extent that it can from those Asians to continue to file out, fly out.

And I think it's not only going to see it just from the Chinese.

I think you're going to see it from numerous wealthy Asians who, as I said, have been Essentially, up until the latter half of last year, were cocooned by their strong domestic currencies. And certainly, I know by talking to Asian clients of mine, you know, starting last year was the first year in five or six that they'd actually started to allocate cash to overseas investments. So I think, you know, we will definitely see renewed interest by by Asian investors to the extent that they can. Can, to the extent the Chinese can, I think this is a trend that's not going away. Does it mean that Vancouver real estate isn't a bubble?

No, it doesn't. Because I think you can see it everywhere that there's huge excesses in the system. But I think there's always going to be a solid bid there. And you're going to have to see something, I think, really quite dramatic to call these markets to collapse. Cool off, cool down a wee bit, because just domestics can't buy this stuff. I mean, look at London. You know, look at the center of London. It isn't domestics who are buying this stuff. They're selling and moving out to the suburbs because the price arb is so huge. But there's still a constant bid underneath the market.

Silver and precious metals in a strong dollar

Erik Townsend: Now, you've articulated a bullish story for the US dollar, which most people would initially think of as bearish for precious metals. But you've also described an inflation case, which most people would think of as bullish for precious metals. I know you've got a slide here which makes a bull argument for silver. So, explain first why you see the current environment in the face of— you're expecting stronger, you know, strength in the dollar, but also strength in precious metals, and why silver over gold?

Julian Brigden: So, one of the trades that we recommended at the end of last year in December was to buy silver. It was purely a sort of chart-based call. So, you can see here, we've, we've got a Quite heavily scripted sort of silver chart, and there's a reason for that. First off, these the key thing to note is these are essentially anti-dollar trades because you can see here we've marked 2002 dollar high, 2011 dollar low. Those were literally the lows and highs of the silver price. So don't ever con yourself that these are any more. Than anti-dollar trades.

The reason why we scripted this silver chart so heavily, it is because we follow this pattern in charts which we use for all sorts of things. You know, for example, Triple D, the 3D printing people, or Apple stock at the moment, or whatever. And this is what we call a classic bubble. And we did a ton of work over the last few years looking and trying to identify a classic bubble. And essentially, it has nothing to do with valuation. It is all about greed and fear.

And it breaks down into sort of 4 parts: stealth, discovery, mania, bust. And it has some key components. You have to get a bear trap, you have to get a parabolic move, you have to get a bull trap, a failed neckline.

And silver fit all of those metrics. And believe it or not, we wrote a piece back in 2011 when silver was breaking through sort of $36, $37. And we said, our target on this is $13.50, this very long-term trend line that comes off the lows of the early 2000s. And so we got down to sort of $13.50, $13.75 at the end of last year. We recommended buying it because we were expecting this dollar pause because we'd done simply so much damage to the underlying global economy that the Fed would have to back off.

So as things stand at the moment, we've been long some silver. We took a little bit of profit recently or recommended taking a little bit of profit recently as the dollar started to show signs of basing. We're hoping we can get up to sort of $18.50, $18.60, $18.80, where there's a trend line. And I do think in an extreme scenario, we could possibly move up to $20.00. But I will stress this, that we like precious metals. But let's say we get that inflation dollar strength story in the second half of the year.

I'm really not expecting precious metals to massively outperform. I think they are going to be what they say on the can, and that is a store of value. So in an environment where my big fear is as the dollar rises, we get what I call a risk-off dollar rally. So you're getting the dollar rising as global equities are under pressure from this rising inflation and potentially bonds are under pressure too.

I think it's possible that precious metals hold their own. I'm not sure if I can really believe that we get a massive rally. I just do not believe we're getting back to much above even in the best-case scenario 25 on something like silver. So, we like it. We like it. We've liked it off these very tempting lows. We're getting closer to some resistance.

But, you know, I do like it as a potential store of value.

Emerging market equities and bonds: MSCI EM target

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to emerging market equities. Obviously, the weak dollar and rising commodity prices has been good news for emerging market stocks. One of the biggest trades of the last few years has been short emerging market equities, whether it be through the EEM or the MSCI Emerging Markets Index or whatever. A lot of people have said, though, that that trade is over. Certainly if you draw a trend line through the 2002 low and the— I guess it's the 2008 or '09 low, you know, from the financial crisis, we already hit that trend line. A lot of people say the bottom is in and it's uphill from here for emerging market stocks. I think you have a different view. Why is that?

Julian Brigden: Yeah, I mean, you know, for those of you who've got the slides in front of you, you will see that we've got a chart of the MSCI Emerging Markets Index here. And as with silver, I mean, this is a classic bubble. It is actually a classic bubble that should have burst in 2011, 2010, and should have collapsed. But QE came along and supplied the world with sufficient dollars to keep the game going via outflows from the US current account— sorry, capital account.

And when we look at precious metals, as I said, sorry, when we look at EM and emerging market equities, we cover most of our position back in January as we hit this trend line, and we've seen a countertrend rally.

But I can't be a bull on emerging market equities if I suspect that we have a secondary reaccelerative move coming in the dollar. And if I don't believe a top is coming in the dollar, and I think the only way that you can be a bull, and I think a lot of people are bulls, is this assumption that the highs are in on the dollar.

But I fundamentally don't believe the highs are in on the dollar for numerous reasons. I mean, we haven't even seen a single— well, we've seen one rate hike. So this has not been a dollar rally that's been driven by interest rate differentials. This is driven by much more structural underlying problems, which we can discuss in a second.

But when those interest rate differentials start to rise, as you know, as the inflation picture starts to accelerate, I think the dollar reaccelerates. And at that point, I'm— when we break that trend line in in the MSCI Emerging Markets Index, which, as you correctly point out, comes off those sort of 2001, 2002 lows, then I think we are going to see a major liquidation.

And the other sector that I'm watching very, very closely, which I think held up remarkably well in the second half of the year in the face of that weakness in emerging market equities, has been emerging market bonds. But if I'm right that we've got inflation and dollar strength coming through, It's in— it's— that's where I think we are going to start to see some real wealth destruction, destruction potentially, is not so much in the equity space, but in the bond space. And when that happens, I think, and you start to see outflows out of things like EMB, then you're going to see major pressure on those equities again. And our ultimate target for the MSCI Emerging Markets Index is about 400, which would in EM terms is about 15%.

Plaza Accord redux?

Erik Townsend: Now, one of the common narratives that you'll hear is that for exactly the reason that you just described, having to do with emerging market debt as opposed to emerging market equities, that the central bankers of the world cannot allow the dollar to appreciate as natural forces might want it to. And some kind of intervention along the lines of a Plaza Accord would be necessary because they're smart enough to know that if they let the dollar appreciate, it's going to cause an emerging market debt crisis.

Julian Brigden: Right.

Erik Townsend: What do you think about that? Is that realistic thinking?

Julian Brigden: I mean, look, here's the thing. I mean, there was obviously a lot of talk at the beginning of the year about some sort of pact. And I worked for policy consultancy policy groups for a number of years in my career, Medley Advisors being sort of one of them. And I'm always suspicious about this sort of coordinated intervention stuff, because when you actually chat to these guys on a one-on-one basis, the level of sort of international cooperation is not as great as you imagine.

And don't get me wrong, I think there was a sort of handshake that we got at the beginning of the year, which was facilitated by conditions. So, you know, given that we were starting to see equity weakness in the US as a consequence of the sort of deterioration we were seeing elsewhere in the world, given that we were starting to see pressure from the Chinese on the currency, I think everyone was in a position to stand back and allow the dollar to pause and allow the renminbi's depreciation to stabilize.

But that's where this inflation story comes through, because there comes a— you know, and we've just seen it from the G7. There just isn't that degree of cooperation. I mean, they can't even agree between the Japanese and the Germans and the US to allow the Japanese to try and push dollar-yen off the lows. I mean, they've done a decent job chatting it off the lows. But, you know, there's no way heading into a US election that the US can condone this, particularly since they know that they'd be handing a battering ram to Donald Trump. The Germans just aren't in favor of it, period, end of story, because they don't want to see the euro strengthen. So, I think that the practicalities of actually something much more concrete than a handshake, which in itself is, I said, afforded by this dollar pause, is it can only come about from something that I think is much, much more destructive.

So, in other words, I think I'm not I'm not putting the concept of some sort of Plaza Accord completely off the table, but I think you have to see a hell of a lot of pain to create that. It doesn't just happen now. And as I said, if domestic conditions in the United States start to materially change as the inflation picture, as the disinflation from the oil shock drops out, and then we have to factor in the 100% increase in oil prices that we've seen since January, I don't know.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Julian Brigden: I don't think the Fed can just stand back and just let, you know, and ignore it, because otherwise they're going to lose control of the bond market. And I think that's a far greater fear.

The central bank put: bonds versus equities

Erik Townsend: Now, I want to, I want to come back to that bond market point, but maybe in the context of another narrative that you hear a lot, even from some Fed governors recently, which is that there's just way too much complacency in developed equity markets, because people believe in what used to be called the Greenspan put or the Bernanke put, or I suppose now it's the Yellen put.

And what people have said is, look, at some point, the ability of central banks to bail out the stock market, even if they wanted to, breaks down. How does it break down? I would think what you were alluding to with the bond market is probably the answer. What does that look like? And what does it mean in terms of— I think there is tremendous complacency that, you know, nothing can really go wrong. 20% down, we know we're going to get more QE and a bailout. It's all going to be fine.

Where does that breakdown?

Julian Brigden: So as I said, I mean, if when I look at bonds and equities, there are some indicators which I sort of look at which just show just this extreme. And essentially, in the sort of halcyon world of academia that now passes itself off for central banking, it may be justifiable to have risk assets nailed to the ceiling.

And risk-free bond yields nailed to the floor. But as an investor, and clearly not of the same intellectual weight as these central bankers that we have now, I look at that and I just go, hmm, one of these things is wrong, and arguably possibly even both. Either we do have a recovery and reflation, in which case we've got the equity markets right, bond market is wrong, And we get a scenario like we got last spring starting in Europe. And particularly, I think the sensitivities in Europe, as I said, given how much they've overreacted to the fall in oil prices, and we get a massive correction in the European bond markets because, you know, if the DAX sitting at 12,000, I don't want to own Bobl 5-year Bobls at minus 37 basis points. It's just simple. We get this huge correction that in itself, as we saw last spring, will tend to undermine the equity market.

The other alternative is that the bond market is right. My natural inclination as a sort of bond-biased individual is to always believe the bond market's right. And there is no recovery. There is really no sustainable reflation. And in which case, the equity market's just a Ponzi scheme. Now, in that situation, in that latter situation, I think you can get a correction in the equity market, but absent inflation, You will, I think correctly to what most people's assumptions, get a central bank put at some point.

Now, does it work? We'll see. I mean, I'm very worried by the apparent lack of effectiveness of ECB and BOJ QE. And I do believe that the efficacy of QE depends very heavily on us believing it works. Right? Rather than it actually working, we have to believe it's working. We have to take money out of the bond market and put it into the risk asset market. And if you like Japan, and this is a problem in Japan, the Japanese have never believed it's worked. They've never taken money out of their own bond market. So, in that latter scenario, let's say the bond market's right, there is no reflation, then yes, I think the central bank put can come in. Where does it come in? We can all argue the toss. Is it, you know, 1,600? Is it 1,800? Is it 1,900? 1,900? Sorry, 1,600 or whatever on the S&P doesn't really matter.

But in the first scenario, where the equity market is actually right that we have growth, that we have reflation, and in the second half of the year we get that inflationary pickup, which all our models are starting to show in Europe, in the U.S. in particular, then I. I think the ability of central banks to act is actually really restrained. And I actually think that's the worst and the most dangerous outcome. So, we get this cyclical burst of inflation created by swings in the oil prices, which is what it generally does.

And a major disconnect between bond and equity prices created by this overreaction, this panicked reaction of central bankers. And in that case, as the bond market is under pressure, and the equity market starts to strain, the ability of those central bankers to come out and act will be heavily, heavily tied.

And in that environment, I think you're looking at a much, much, much more toxic, dangerous environment, you know, an environment eventually that leads to, you know, a major equity correction. Pushes us right back into deflation again, but with central banks' ability highly questioned, and the efficacy of QE even potentially questioned, which I think would be tragic.

Fed or the bond market: three trenches and the ECB

Erik Townsend: Now, one of the slides that you have in your chartbook just says very simply, either the Fed hikes in the second half of this year, or the bond market does it for them. I assume by does it for them, you mean the reemergence of inflation expectations is going to force

Julian Brigden: Correct. So, you know, as I said, they can, they can, you know, they'll try as much as they can to be behind the curve. And its logic dictates this is the right thing. I mean, there is an asymmetry to the risks here. But we've already started to see a pretty solid pickup in some of the breakeven indicators.

And if you look at the bond market, we kind of like to think of it as a sort of, you know, sort of First World War analogy, 3 sets of trenches.

So, your first trench with the onslaught of inflation is breakevens. Breakevens should naturally take the strain as the inflation wave starts to hit. And we've seen, as I said, solid pickup in US breakevens. We think that's got a lot, lot further to go. Then depending on how the central bank reacts, we come to the second trench. And the second trench is essentially the shape of the curve. So if the Fed is ahead of the game, game and hiking aggressively into that inflation pickup, then it's very possible that we get a flattening curve.

If they hang behind, which I think is their natural inclination, I think it's entirely possible if they prevaricate, you know, we don't get a hike in June, they maybe don't go in July, then we get into the, oh God, can they go in front of the election as that inflation pick accelerates, I think you see the curve potentially steepen.

And then the third and final line of defense will be those ED strips, you know, sort of Z 2016s against Z 2017, that kind of thing. So I think, you know, so far we're only in the embryonic stage. The only pressure that we're really seeing in, in the bond market is really in the breakevens. The curves have really done very little, certainly not protesting anything. But I think I think the Fed, they've picked up in the US, but I'm actually expecting in the next couple of months to see a marked acceleration of European inflation as those base effects that we've seen in the US already start to drop out.

We think that inflation picks up markedly in Europe into the second half of the year. With the ECB still pumping like crazy, I think we could start to see some pressure in that bond market. And let's be honest, I mean, ECB's reaction function to oil prices has been deplorable.

You've only got to go back to the summer of 2008, where we had, you know, Trichet saying— I have a slide which I show my clients— you know, he had a quote where he said, if we do not act decisively, inflation may explode. I think at the time oil prices were like $142. So, we were literally, you know, within a few bucks of the absolute high of oil prices. And of course, Of course, by treating it as a purely inflationary-deflationary event rather than a demand stimulative or demand destructive event, they overreacted. They hiked rates. And in January of this year, we had the mirror image of that where Draghi says, we will not surrender to low inflation. Well, they won't have to.

They will not have to. Inflation is going to rise markedly in Europe. Inflation, consumer inflation expectations are already rising. Raising and tend to lead the turn in the actual inflation. Wage growth is really robust in Europe. In fact, if you look at that versus CPI, we're at 2.8% now year over year compensation growth in Europe.

This is the sort of level where back in 2011, the ECB actually hiked. Now, we've changed colors totally in the ECB from sort of too So, from sort of Nordic toughies to sort of southern Mediterranean wussies when it comes to the inflation story. But the reality is that this situation, I think, emerges hard in the second half of the year, ties these guys' hands down markedly.

Erik Townsend: Now, correct me if I'm wrong, but from everything you're saying, I hear what sounds almost like a perfect storm analogy that you see inflation expectations rising that will force central banks to allow the dollar to appreciate, allowing the dollar to appreciate. At a time when inflation expectations are rising potentially takes away the ability of central banks to provide that Bernanke put or Greenspan put capability. And that potentially ignites a major risk-off situation. Am I, am I putting the lining the dominoes up correctly here?

Julian Brigden: Yeah. I mean, here's, here's the thing. I think I keep saying, you know, people say to me, you know, oh, but this is what central banks want. Right. And I keep saying, well, they've got to be careful what they wish for, because in a normal world, this wouldn't be a problem, right?

In a normal world where we hadn't distorted bond markets, this wouldn't be a problem. But the problem occurs because we have distorted bond markets and because we have created historical-wide divergences between bond markets and risk assets. So, yes, this may be what they want. But my concern is, as I said, is in the reset process where we push bond yields markedly higher, how much damage does that potentially do to these, to these, to these risk assets? And I think, you know, it may not be catastrophic, you know, because ultimately we do want reflation. It may not be catastrophic, but I fear That, you know, it may make last spring's bond meltdown and ensuing equity correction look like a walk in the park.

Macro Intelligence 2 Partners and Real Vision

Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, we have not gotten to all of the excellent slides in your chartbook that you provided our listeners, but we are running out of time. I want to stress for our listeners, many of our listeners are also Real Vision television subscribers. I know you are one of the most prolific and popular personalities on Real Vision, so there's quite a bit more of your research available on Real Vision for people who are subscribers. Before we close, what can you tell us about Macro Intelligence 2 Partners, or MI2? I'm pretty sure that's the British Secret Service agency that James Bond worked for.

Julian Brigden: But I think— It's funny you pick up on that, actually. It was— he's actually MI6. But there was actually an MI2, and it is sort of a play on words. We set the company up 5 years ago this summer at the behest of a couple of hedge funds. Clients of mine who were reading my sort of my muses, musings that I was sort of making on from from my prior employer. And so we were looking around for a sort of name. And you know, look, as I said, I'm a Brit, and you know, I do love everything James Bond.

So I sort of came up with a logo that looks frighteningly similar to the sort of Universal Exports logo. And MI2 was just a play because there was actually a there were two of us who starting it off, and there was an MI2. And an MI3 and an MI4 and an MI5 and MI6. But MI2 was in charge of geographical intelligence up until just after the First World War. So, that's kind of— that was the play.

We've now grown the company over the last 5 years to sort of 8 individuals, 4 professionals. And we've got guys in London, we've got guys in New York, and I'm lucky enough to live out here in the mountains in Colorado. But essentially, we produce— the underlying aim of the business is not to pontificate about economics. I really— I'm not an economist.

And our role is to try and help clients make money. So, we develop these structural themes, some of the stuff that you're seeing today, where we talk about the bigger picture themes to help get people's heads around the issues that they should be watching. Those are a key part of the product. Then we have this piece that we called MI2 Trader, which is produced by one of my colleagues who's got 25 years as a hedge fund PM.

And essentially, his role is to look at the instruments we can express these views in, and more importantly, to say now, this is breaking now.

So, for example, last spring, we'd been bearish on US fixed income. We expected a slowdown in the US at the start of the year. We weren't looking at it from a weather perspective. We were looking at it from the shale perspective. We'd ridden the rise in the US bond market, and we were waiting for that turn where the market went, okay, this is over, and then the bond market started to sell off. But Erik, who's the trader, said— called me up one day and said, look, mate, I'm afraid it's not the Treasury market that goes. It's the Bund market, and it's going now. So, that's where we put the piece out, managed to catch the Bund sell-off.

And then finally, we have a Japan product, which is just produced by another colleague. It's fantastic. People love it. It's a very different product from the main product. It's basically a summary of the news with some commentary and analysis by a guy who's traded Japanese markets for 35 years and is beyond a fluent Japanese speaker. He frequently ends up putting out pieces where he's correcting some misinterpretation by Bloomberg and Reuters.

But yeah, that's, that's kind of what We are an institutional client base, ranging from family offices through to big money managers.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so your primary products are all institutional, which is a large part of our listener base. We also have a retail component. Is Real Vision the best place for them to follow you? Because for the folks that can't afford institutionally priced research, you do some fantastic stuff. Where can they find it?

Julian Brigden: Yeah, I think Real Vision— Raoul and I have— we've known each other since I used to cover him when he was at GLG. The hedge fund, and I was at Medley. And so, yeah, that's probably the best place to do it, because I certainly will be a relative— at least sort of 3 to 4 times a year, I'll be on Real Vision.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. And of course, for our institutional listeners, MI2Partners.com is your website. Julian, thanks so much for joining us today. Nathan Egger will be joining me again as MacroVoices continues right here at Macro

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger.

Postgame: Real Vision offer and format feedback

Nathan Egger: Erik, we mentioned Julian Brigden's excellent Excellent work on Real Vision Television a couple of times today. And I just want to remind our audience that they can receive a free 1-week trial of Real Vision Television by visiting realvisiontv.com/discount/macrovoices. There's absolutely no financial incentive for us in promoting Real Vision, but we really do believe in their work. And we like to get you guys discounts wherever and whenever we can.

Erik Townsend: Yeah, and you know, I want to mention something else, Nathan, which is a question in my mind. We, we really love the Real Vision guys. They are doing a video format, and one of the things that differentiates us, aside from being free, is you can take us to the gym and listen to us on the treadmill because we're audio. So, I don't really know the best way to handle an interview like this. Julian had such fantastic charts, I just wanted to talk to them and talk about the detail of the chart. We welcome your feedback. Should we be doing that, or should we be trying to keep it focused on talk so you don't need to look at anything, giving you more flexibility to listen from wherever you are. We tried to kind of balance it today, but we would welcome your feedback on that point.

Postgame: inflation and the Fed

Nathan Egger: So, Erik, what did you think of Mr. Brigden's view that inflation is returning and that it might handcuff the Fed in terms of their options going forward?

Erik Townsend: It's absolutely fascinating to me that he brought that up. This is something I've been talking about literally for 5 years, and I don't have a prediction for when inflation comes back. But the point that I've been making is that you know a lot of people say, "Boy, quantitative easing, just printing money, trying to paper over all of our problems. This has to end badly someday."

And usually they don't fill in the blank and say, "Well, how would that happen? How would it end badly?" My answer to that is the Fed can get away with this money printing in order to paper over our problems until inflation rears its ugly head.

Once we have inflation, the Fed is forced to tighten policy in order to arrest inflation. And that means they can't bail out the stock market. So, I don't think that we really get to the endgame where we find out what the unintended adverse consequences of all of this money printing is until inflation starts to rear its ugly head. What Mr. Brigden is saying is that's coming by the end of this year. And if that's true, I don't really have an opinion on the timing of it. When and if it happens, Houston, we have a problem. Okay.

Postgame: dollar versus Saudi policy in oil

Nathan Egger: And do you tend to agree with his view that it was, in fact, the US dollar rally that caused the oil price collapse?

Erik Townsend: Well, it's a, it's a very interesting one, because I'm sure that the US dollar rally has had a lot to do with exacerbating the downside. I personally am very strongly of the conviction that the oil situation was a man-made event caused by Saudi Arabia intentionally. They could have supported prices by cutting production, as everyone expected them to do. Going into that Thanksgiving of 2014 OPEC meeting. They did the opposite. I am convinced that that was the catalyst that caused the massive downside move in oil prices.

Now, would it really have gone all the way to $26, or would it only have gone down to $50 if not for the US dollar rally? I think it definitely was an exacerbating factor, but I really think the catalyst that brought it on was Saudi Arabian policy. And the catalyst that has not happened What hasn't happened yet that will really bring on a strong recovery in oil prices is a reversal of that Saudi policy. I think eventually Saudi Arabia intends to coerce Russia and other producing nations to join forces with them in a cartel. When that happens and they cut production, everything changes overnight.

Oil outlook, next week's guest and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: Until then, I think right now we're in an overbought condition, and I would expect a move back at least into the high 30s before this thing

Nathan Egger: Listeners should know that in addition to all the excellent feedback that we've asked you for and you've been providing, the very best way that you can support MacroVoices is by subscribing, rating, and reviewing us on iTunes. You can also follow us on Twitter @MacroVoices, and you can get regular market updates from Erik throughout the week by following his personal handle @ErikSTownsend, E-R-I-K-S Townsend. If you're not already subscribed, If you're not a Twitter person, but you'd like to continue the discussion of topics covered on the show, please join us in our forums at MacroVoices.com/forums.

Next week, we'll be back with fan favorite Art Berman. He's going to be bringing us up to speed on the oil market fundamentals just as we're reaching this key $50 level. For Erik Townsend, this is Nathan Egger wishing you all a great weekend. We'll see you next time.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week free of charge. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Nathan Egger, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions. based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

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MACRO VOICES is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented in MACRO VOICES should NOT be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making important investment decisions. The opinions expressed on MACRO VOICES are those of the participants. MACRO VOICES, its producers, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall NOT be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MACRO VOICES.

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