David Hay — Evergreen Gavekal (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend. Hello, everyone.

Erik Townsend: Happy New Year, everybody. MacroVoices episode 44 was recorded on January 5th, 2017. I'm Erik Townsend. David Hay from Evergreen Gavekal will be joining me as this week's featured interview guest. Dave and I will discuss the equity market outlook under President Donald Trump, interest rates backing up the US dollar rally, Energy Master Limited Partnerships, and much more.

Year-ahead format; stocks, the Trump rally and central banks

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Erik, since this is our first show of the new year, I'd like to take a different approach this week. Normally, our market wrap focuses on what happened in the last week and what you see ahead in the next few weeks for stocks, crude oil, bond yields, precious metals, dollar index. But since it's been a few weeks since our last regular format show, and we're starting a new year, let's zoom out to a longer time horizon and talk about what happened in markets last year and what you see on the horizon for this year. Why don't we start with stocks?

Erik Townsend: Okay, sure. Let's go all the way back to a very long time horizon. The view that I've had for many, many years now is that overly accommodative monetary policy from central banks only sets us up for the next successive crisis to be bigger than the last one. So my view has been that easy money policy in the '90s led to the late '90s boom period and then the dot-com bust. It was the overly accommodative monetary policy in reaction to the dot-com bust that set the stage, again, with easy money policy that led us into the housing crisis. And now, of course, with quantitative easing, we've had just huge accommodation since, and my prediction is that eventually sets us up for a worse outcome. And I think that you have to, at this point, kind of acknowledge, you know, hey, that's an interesting view, but it's been like 8 years now. And if you go all the way back to when the 2008 event, as it's called, really started, it was the second quarter of 2007.

2007. So, we're back, you know, 10 years ago to when the last crisis happened. If I'm saying there's going to be another one, you know, maybe I'm wrong and it's time to give up. Hugh Hendry certainly is the guest that we've had on the program who's taken that view, that, you know, he thought the same thing, but, you know, the big bad event never happened.

I would say my view is that, you know, it's definitely gone on longer than I thought possible. But the thing is that I don't think that the endgame really starts until you get an inflation problem, because in a deflationary backdrop, central banks can keep on printing money and propping up asset markets and doing, you know, whatever they want. They can get away with it. It's when you have inflation to contend with, which we haven't seen yet, although it seems like now it's starting, that's when we start to be in trouble.

So when I listen to some of the views that have come out since we did our last regular show in the last few weeks, Ray Dalio coming out, you know, one of the most famous investors of our time, really, the most successful hedge fund manager in the history of the world, saying that he thinks that we are headed into a new period of economic prosperity to be led by Donald Trump. You know, just super bullish message. Stan Druckenmiller turning very bullish. Carl Icahn, of course, being very outspoken, although he may have a little bit of conflict of interest in his relationship with Mr. Trump, but saying that he thinks that the Trump presidency is super bullish. So, I listened to all of these incredibly famous people with these very bullish views. And it's kind of awe-inspiring to me because I just can't believe it. You know, I think if you go back to Raoul Pal's argument that the business cycle is incredibly long in the tooth here, we're overdue for a recession.

If you look at the presidential election cycle, after a change of party, a new 8-year cycle, it's almost 100% within the first year you get a big A lot of people are saying that Trump is the new Ronald Reagan and that that's super bullish. Well, hey, wait a minute. The first 2 years of Ronald Reagan's presidency was defined by a massive recession. So, I don't see this really, really bullish view. I think, if anything, this Trump rally is probably overdone, and I'm not at all inclined to take a long view here. I'm on the sidelines still because I don't see this bull case, but at the same time, I don't really want to be short on the other side of the trade from guys like Ray Dalio and Stan Druckenmiller. Those are some pretty serious names.

So, I'm waiting to see what happens, but I'm still very skeptical about the stock market. Yes, Donald Trump, if he's able to do all of the things that he wants to do, that should be bullish for stocks, no doubt about it. But the things that he wants to do are going to require fighting an incredible headwind of political opposition. You know, half the country hates this guy and is trying to do everything they can possibly think of to prevent him from achieving the things that he wants to do. And it remains to be seen whether or not even the Republican Party is going to give him the support that he needs.

So, the big test, I think, is what's going to happen when the government needs to print money to deal with its debt problem. Because, you know, where's the real risk here? The risk is not in the stock market. The risk is in the bond market. We have so much debt that has accumulated. since 2009 that we can't go back to historically normal yields because if we did, the government would be unable to pay its bills, to service its debt. So they've got to keep interest rates low. Well, how do you keep interest rates low? Quantitative easing has been the technique for that. What happens when you try to use quantitative easing to hold interest rates artificially low when you have an inflationary backdrop rather than a deflationary backdrop?

My contention is that's when things really blow up. Now, we don't have right runaway inflation yet. We don't have anything close to it. But I think that may be what we're headed towards. The only way that my long-term view, though, will be proven right, if it's going to be proven right, is if we get to that situation where we just can't service the debt and you start to get a runaway inflation problem. And I think we could be headed for several years of massively high inflation, not hyperinflation, but very high inflation. There's a significant difference definitionally there.

Stop and think about this, Aaron Can you really just conjure money out of thin air and use it to prop up asset markets with no adverse consequences? Well, for crying out loud, if that's actually true, we should abolish taxes and print enough money for everybody in the country to get a new Mercedes. Well, nobody's proposing that. So, apparently, there are adverse consequences. Everybody agrees, but they think they can get away with the amount of debt that's already been created and the amount of money that's already been printed and not suffer any adverse consequences and not have to pay the piper. I I still don't see it, but it's not until we get to an inflation problem that we're going to find out.

So, as far as I'm concerned, I think we've seen this big reflation. I think that the Donald Trump is good for the market is probably already priced in, and I don't have a very bullish view, but I don't dare to be short because I don't want to, you know, be on the other side of the trade from Ray Dalio and Stan Druckenmiller.

Crude oil outlook and spread trade

Aaron Chan: Okay, let's cover crude oil next. What are your reflections on 2016, and what do you see coming in 2017?

Erik Townsend: Well, 2016 almost certainly marked the low, the bottom, after the great Saudi-induced sell-off that started Thanksgiving of 2014. If I look now at the supply and demand fundamentals, I think that this rally is overdone. OPEC is thought by many people to not even want prices to go higher than $60 because they're afraid that higher than $60 is where the Bakken shale boom, you know, takes off again. They don't want to enable the full resumption of the shale boom in the United States. So, we're already pretty close to what a lot of people think OPEC's real target number is.

And the shale revolution has really already started to resume, at least in the Permian Basin. It hasn't in the Bakken yet. But, you know, the shale drillers, the rig count's going through the roof. They are going to be making a lot more oil in the United States. The OPEC/non-OPEC deal, the compliance is already being questioned. I have predicted, as you know, they're probably not going to comply with this, that this was mostly hype. So I think that the big rally we've seen in oil prices has been driven by propaganda and sentiment. And I think if you look just at supply and demand factors as they exist now in the market, I think they all point to lower prices coming in the next several months. So does that mean I'm short? No, I'm not. And the reason is I do see a scenario that could cause prices to spike much higher in the next few months. And the scenario that I'm talking about is my prediction is that very shortly after taking office, Donald Trump is going to somehow get tough with ISIS.

I think it very much satisfies his political objectives to take a tough stance with ISIS. So, how does he do that? How does it play out? Well, of course, you can't read Donald Trump's mind. I don't think anybody can do that. So, who knows what form it will take, but I think it's quite possible that he could lay out some kind of ultimatum, basically saying, okay, ISIS, cut it out. No more terrorism, because if Any kind of aggression towards the United States continues, you know, it's, it's, you better cut it out or else. If he leaves some kind of open-ended ultimatum like that, I predict that the half of the country that's all freaked out and doesn't like Donald Trump is going to go into utter hysterics. They're going to start thinking, okay, Trump is about to launch nuclear weapons on Syria and the world's coming to an end and we're all about to, you know, die in World War III. I think that if that were to happen, it would be hysteria. And hype.

I don't think that Donald Trump is really going to do anything that starts World War III. I think he's smarter than that. But I do think that there's a lot of people who are very, very, very paranoid about Donald Trump and military action. So if there's any kind of threat about anything, which I think is very likely, I could easily see a geopolitical risk perception, not reality, but a perception that's just through the roof. And that could cause oil prices to spike markedly higher on fears that there's Yeah. What I'm worried about is that there's about to be some massive war in the Middle East started by Donald Trump. I don't think it'll really happen, but I do think that it could spike oil prices in the first or second quarter substantially higher. That would be the shorting opportunity if that happened. Right now, I'm not taking any directional trades. What I am looking at is the shape of the term structure.

We're seeing backwardation starting to develop as close as June, July, August of 2017. The storage tanks are all going to be emptying in the first half of the year. In the second half of the year, we won't have a storage problem, and there will be no premium for storage of oil. I don't think that's going to happen. So, I think the opportunity in the oil market right now is a spread trade on the term structure, basically expecting that backwardation to come back out of the market. And, you know, there's been some great opportunities. I already bought a bunch of spreads from shorting the June contract and long the December contract at minus $20. Minus 10 cents. So, you know, a backwardation of 10 cents across those months. I predict by the time June gets here, we'll be back to contango, at least in the front end of the curve. So I think that that's probably where I see the trading opportunity.

As far as a directional call, I don't dare make one at this point because of what could happen, as I said, with the geopolitical risk perception created if Trump threatens ISIS. Okay.

Aaron Chan: All right.

Bonds, global debt and inflation

Aaron Chan: And you said earlier that the big systemic risk is in the bond market and not the stock market. So, can you elaborate on that? And where are bond yields headed in 2017?

Erik Townsend: Well, global debt levels are utterly unprecedented now. I just saw a report from the Institute of International Finance that we're now at $217 trillion in total debt worldwide. That's 325% of global GDP. Of course, people familiar with Reinhart And if you've read Ken Rogoff's research, know that at least when you talk about sovereign debt, more than 100% of GDP is where you start getting into a really serious problem where it always ends badly. Now, we're talking about total debt, not just sovereign debt, but still, 325% is too much. And you've got a huge amount of negative yielding debt all around the world. And it creates a very, very serious trap because we're basically stuck with super low interest rates right now. If interest rates If interest rates were to go back to anything close to historical norms, it would bankrupt Western governments almost instantly because the average maturity of Treasury debt is much shorter than the good old days. It's only a few years and it has to be rolled over.

So, if you start seeing rates backing up, all of a sudden, the government cannot service its debt. Well, if they can't service its debt and they have to keep rates down, what do they do? Well, quantitative easing is the obvious answer. That's worked before. And I predict that because it's worked before, They've used it before. They'll use it again. The thing is, quantitative easing worked when we had a deflationary backdrop. I contend that it cannot work in an inflationary backdrop, which is what we appear to now be moving into. So, if there's no choice but to either tolerate very high inflation for many years, what are we gonna do? I don't think we're gonna have a choice. Now, I'm not talking about hyperinflation. Hyperinflation is a complete collapse of a currency system. It's not the same thing as high inflation, which is That's what I'm predicting. But I think we're gonna get to the point where there's no choice but to inflate away the real value of this debt.

And the way that that's going to happen is that we're not going to be able to raise interest rates as much as would be necessary to combat inflation. And we're gonna get a period of several years of very high inflation. That does not necessarily mean that we're going to have a stock market crash, because at least in the first several years of inflation, it's generally good for the stock market. The place The place where you're going to have trouble is in the bond market.

And the other thing to consider is that we are seeing more and more nations looking to diversify. They're not abandoning the US dollar, but they're starting to look at SDRs and other currencies. If we see more selling pressure, if China has to dump Treasuries in order to deal with its problems, and other countries start moving away from Treasuries, that means that there's even more pressure on rates and more— Risk. impetus for the US government to have to do something. And it might be forced to monetize deficit spending or monetize bond purchases or do something. If that starts to happen, precious metals will be the big benefactors. That's the reason that I have a very bullish long-term view on precious metals, although in the short term, I don't think that that's going to be the case.

Gold and Plaza Accord 2.0

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, all the way back in October, you predicted that the Fed would hike interest rates in December, which they did, and that the rate hike might mark a bottom for gold prices. So, so far, it looks like you were spot on with that prediction. Gold bottomed at $1,124 just a day or so after the rate hike announcement, and it's already back above $1,180 today as we're speaking. So congratulations on that call. Now, are you still of the opinion that was the bottom and it's all uphill from here for the yellow metal?

Erik Townsend: No, I'm not. It does appear that that call is working out. I think I got lucky as opposed to right on that one. And the reason I say that is with the expectation of more rate hikes coming in 2017 and so forth, I think that there's still a potential for more downside in gold. Now, yes, in the last couple of days particularly, gold's been very strong, but that's because the dollar rally is stumbling here in reaction to unprecedented action by China to intervene in its currency markets in the last couple of days. I think that's going to blow over. I think that the US dollar rally is going to resume in earnest, and when it does, that could result in further downside pressure for gold.

So, I'm not convinced that the bottom is in yet. So, where does the bottom come for gold? I think the bottom comes for gold when the market figures out that Plaza Accord version 2.0 is inevitable. In other words, at some point, central bankers are going to see that the dollar rally is causing too many problems around the world. Particularly, there's so much dollar-denominated debt that emerging markets owe that you're going to get to a lot of default risk growing and so forth, and central bankers will do something to To arrest— there's so many bullish factors for the dollar. At some point, they're going to have to cap it. When that starts to come into view, when the dollar rally is causing serious problems around the world, and the market starts to anticipate that there will be some policy action to prevent the dollar rally from continuing, that's where gold bottoms, I think. And that's where I would get very bullish from there.

Because once the dollar rally is arrested, which I think it will have to be at some point, you know, again, I think we're headed someday for massive inflation.

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And that will be very, very bullish for precious metals. I just don't know how far off that is, and it could still be years away.

Dollar index and China intervention

Aaron Chan: Well, since we're on the topic, the US Dollar Index broke out to a new cycle high earlier this week, trading intraday as high as 103.81. But today, we're back to a 101 handle. So, what happened there, and what's next for the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, what happened there is China, and it was a result— basically, I think China is trying to squeeze the shorts out of the short short yuan trade, and they have intervened in the last couple of days. And of course, if they're doing that, it has an effect on the dollar index. So the reason that the dollar has stumbled here, 101.46 as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon, is because of this China intervention. I think that's probably a one-time thing, and I don't know exactly what's going to happen, but I think this is a buying opportunity. I'm probably going to look at buying, adding to my long position on the dollar index, and I wouldn't be surprised if In the next couple of weeks, we've moved considerably higher.

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for the market update, Erik. David Hay is Chief Investment Officer for Evergreen Gavekal. Erik's interview with Mr. Hay is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Interview: Trumponomics and the Reagan analogy (David Hay)

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Evergreen Gavekal's David Hay. David is, of course, the Chief Investment Officer for Evergreen. And also writes Evergreen's newsletter called the Evergreen Virtual Advisor, which, by the way, is probably one of the best free newsletters out there on the internet. Thanks so much for joining me, David.

David Hay: Privilege.

Erik Townsend: It's great to have you here. You're the first guest of the new year.

David Hay: Oh, a double privilege.

Erik Townsend: I want to start with something that's just blown my mind. The number of people over the holidays, just before Christmas, I think Ray Dalio came out saying we're headed for a new era of economic prosperity under President Trump, and Trump is going to lead everything. Stan Druckenmiller turning super bullish.

David Hay: Druckenmiller. Yeah.

Erik Townsend: And, you know, I love the message, but I just don't see it. Trump has a few good ideas, but he's got like half the country that hates his guts and wants to get rid of him. And there's all kinds of Democrats that are pledging to do everything possible to block anything that he tries to do. And even before you consider his ability to be successful, I mean, we're way overdue. Raoul Pal has made some excellent arguments about the business cycle being very long in the tooth. The presidential election cycle If you just look historically, you know, it seems like we're way overdue for a recession. And I'm hearing a lot of people invoking analogies to Ronald Reagan, saying Trump is the next Reagan. I'm thinking, okay, well, you're entitled to that opinion, but, but hang on, the first 2 years of Reagan's presidency were a massive recession.

So if that's the analogy, you know, why are you bullish right now? So what do you think about all of this bullishness?

David Hay: You did anticipate one of the things I was going to say, which is if you really did kind of a best-case analysis of Trumponomics, it's Reaganomics 2.0. I mean, I really think that's the best case. And I don't think it is, but let's just assume that. And as you already pointed out, you beat me to the punch on this, this one, which people forget, is that in the first 2 years of Reagan's term, he had a very severe recession, a deep bear market, And he got shot, and you know that's that's a pretty rough first couple of years in office.

And I actually think that you could see a similar scenario with Mr. Trump, hopefully not getting shot. Though, as you point out, there's an awful lot of people that dislike him intensely. So I am hoping he's got great security.

And I also want to point out that there's a number of his policies that we agree with that we've been actually writing about for years in our newsletter. You know, particularly the tax reform. And then the regulatory rollback, those have been 2 of the things that we have been screaming about for a long time, and even infrastructure, which back in 2010, 2011, we thought a domestic Marshall Plan type of thing was really appropriate. You know, you had a legion of unemployed construction workers. Very different story today, and that's a whole other topic as far as perhaps the overhyped infrastructure, you know, because it just takes forever to get these deals done, and, you know, they really happen at the local level.

Erik Townsend: Right.

David Hay: And there's only so much Trump can do. And I do think there was a pretty good little story about Truman, when Harry Truman was passing the baton to Ike, Dwight Eisenhower, who of course had been, you know, Supreme Commander of the Allied Forces in World War II. And there were high hopes that Eisenhower was going to be able to work miracles. And as Truman pointed out, you know, I feel sorry for Ike because he's going to get in the office in the White House, the Oval Office, and say, do this, do that, and nothing's going to happen. Right. And I think that, you know, certainly happened to Eisenhower, though he did do a pretty good job with the interstate freeway system. So that was one of the best infrastructure programs of all time. But, of course, the era today, you know, the NIMBY thing is so much different, not in my backyard.

I think that there's going to be disappointment there. I think your key point that you were making, that expectations have raced way ahead of reality, are very true. And you hate to argue with people like Ray Dalio, or Stan Druckenmiller, as you point out. You know, Icahn maybe is a little conflicted given the way he's in the administration, sort of. But I just think in general, you know, part of what— you got to give them credit. They said this stuff early on and they were right. I mean, they called it pretty, pretty well for the last couple of months. The question is going forward. And when we look at the way investors are positioned right now, particularly speculative investors, those that tend to have the worst track record, record. They are very bullish the US dollar. They're very bullish small-cap stocks, for example.

They're very bearish bonds. They're very bearish gold. So, at this point, we're more intrigued looking the other way, so looking at those asset classes that are extremely out of favor.

Contrarian trades: long Treasuries and solar yieldcos

Erik Townsend: Well, let's talk about who wins and who loses under the Trump presidency and then put that in perspective of, you know, how far has the market gone, maybe too far, and, you know, is there a contrarian trade there?

David Hay: What actually looks appealing to you as a result Well, I think as a trade, and I'm not sure it's the, you know, something you're gonna fall in love with long-term, it may be more of one to rent rather than own, but let's talk about bonds, and particularly long Treasuries, which have been nuked since the election. And we're seeing almost record-breaking negative sentiment on those in the various measures that we look at, including from our friends at Ned Davis. Right. And I think that's a trade that's worth taking.

So I do think there is a trade there. Now, you could be right that we— or I think you were quoting Ray Dalio saying that the— no, it was Jeff Gundlach that you were mentioning saying that the long-term bull market is over. And he could be right, but he's also kind of hedging himself a bit, and he's actually made some semi-bullish noises lately.

So even, you know, whenever you have a major turn in a trend, you still have countertrend moves, and I wouldn't be surprised to see this to be a fairly significant countertrend move. Perhaps a move from 2.60 on the 10-year back closer to 2, which would be a pretty nice total return.

We did just see in Ned Davis that whenever bond sentiment is as negative as it is right now on the long-term Treasury, you get a 19% annualized return. So it is possible to generate double-digit returns even with a 3% long Treasury. So that would be one area. But also, of course, when Treasuries catch a cold, a lot of the rest of the income market gets pneumonia. Right. So we have been buying some of the equity income names that were really hit hard after the election, and particularly in the solar yieldco area, which are like solar MLPs.

They're bouncing a bit now right after the first of the year, but they're still down pretty substantially with yields in the 5.5 to 8% range and very stable cash flows from long-term contracts. That's one of— it's really the only way we've been able to figure out how to play the solar theme, because frankly, almost everything else in that area area has been an unmitigated disaster.

Repatriation, interest deductibility and buybacks

Erik Townsend: One of the things that seems very clear is that Donald Trump is serious about this business of pressuring companies to bring their business back to the United States. And I think that is both bringing jobs back to the United States, but also maybe reversing some of these inversions that relocated companies' headquarters offshore.

There's been a lot of speculation about the repatriation trade. You know, it could be strong for the US dollar. What are the other effects of this? And particularly, I I think corporate buybacks probably also get affected by some of the tax implications. So give us the picture on what this aspect of Trump policy is going to mean in terms of markets.

David Hay: Well, certainly the interpretation at this point, it's very bullish for equities. And where that could be misplaced has to do with kind of the granularity of the proposal. The market tends to look at things pretty simplistically at times. So it sees repatriation coming. And we do think it will. It looks like there's bipartisan support for repatriation.

But part of what I think the market is missing is that it's also part of this overall solution, or tax reform would be a better way to say it, just a sweeping tax reform that would potentially, and it looks likely to, disallow the interest deduction on corporate debt. Now, there is— it's unclear whether it would be for both existing or just new debt, but either way, I think the implications are significant, and particularly for buybacks. So let's assume repatriation happens, so this money starts to come back to the United States.

I think you're right; it probably pushes the dollar up even further. But then what do they do with that money? And particularly if that money, if they're looking at a situation where debt is no longer tax deductible, I think at that point, and especially if you look at corporate leverage, which as you're probably aware was in pretty good shape back four or five years ago, but these companies have leveraged up grotesquely, frankly. I mean, we are basically back to where we were pre-crisis in terms of debt. Levels. The debt service is fine because interest rates are so low, although rising as we've talked about.

So we think that given— in fact, even rating company pressure now starting to build on some of these as they get close to their, you know, their debt covenant limits in terms of cash flow relative to debt service.

So what you could see is a debt paydown with, you know, maybe a nominal amount of share buybacks. But share buybacks have been running at $500 to $600 billion a year for years. Years, really a fever pitch. And, you know, the trouble is these guys are buying their own shares back at, you know, higher and higher prices, which is more, ever more dilutive to core earnings. You know, people say, well, it's good for earnings per share, but realistically what it does is it actually lowers earnings, especially if you're borrowing money to buy back your own debt, which they clearly have been doing.

So I think it's more of a mixed bag as far as this, you know, repatriation theme? It's getting probably like so many things overplayed.

Erik Townsend: Well, I've seen a lot of analysis by some very, very smart people saying that really the equity rally of the last few years, corporate buybacks has been at the core of it. And it's all about super low interest rates and, you know, the ability to borrow a lot of cheap money and use it to buy your shares back. If what you're saying is right, I mean, it sounds like the market's got the direction wrong on this. Because if they lose that deductibility of interest, and suddenly these buybacks are not attractive anymore, that could be a major secular shift in direction for equity markets to the downside.

Am I overstating that? Am I misunderstanding this? Because it sounds like from what you're saying, this could be pretty big.

David Hay: It could be pretty big. We just don't know, of course, what the actual tax code is going to look like. It's just that right now, I think the market's looking at it as only the positives. They're only looking at lower tax rates. They're not looking at the potential lack of or loss of interest deductibility.

So I think it's a little bit of, you know, looking at the glass as only half And so, yes, I think that that's where—

Valuations, the Fed and Plaza Accord 2.0

David Hay: I just think in many ways, as you've already alluded to, there's just been an overextrapolation of the benefits of Trumponomics. And, you know, again, if you go back to the Reagan era— and I think a key point to make about Reagan is when he came in there, first of all, he came in, you know, after a very rough economic period under Jimmy Carter. And it got rougher, as you pointed out, because Volcker was given the green light to raise interest rates dramatically.

And then at that point, you had a very nice economic recovery that started fairly early in Reagan's term. Well, Trump is coming in at a very late stage of the economic cycle, and he's also got a market that instead of trading at a single-digit PE, it's trading at one of its most expensive valuations ever.

In fact, one thing that, you know, you get into the— I'm sure you've had the debate with various people about what is really the PE of the market, and it tends to be a debate of almost religious intensity. You know, whether you use the trailing PE, the current PE, the forward PE, the Shiller PE, it's, you know, it gets pretty confusing when you start to go through those different scenarios. We like to keep it simple and look at price-to-sales, and because sales, as you know, are much harder to manipulate, they're not as distorted by just the economic cycle.

But right now, particularly the median price-to-sales is outrageously high. In fact, it's higher, substantially higher than it was in 1990. Which really speaks to how overvalued mid and small-cap companies are versus back in the late '90s during the tech bubble when they were actually very inexpensive. So you have unquestionably in our minds, and I think anybody that looks at the, the various metrics that have worked over time, you can also look at market cap to GDP, which has been Warren Buffett's favorite. You can look at total household exposure to equities right now, which is also very high, not quite as high as it was in And there's a very tight correlation between when households are heavily exposed to equities and future returns. And as you would imagine, when that's the case, future returns tend to be very low.

So all these things say the same thing. It's just that I think the most— the cleanest is looking at it on a price-to-sales basis.

So hugely different part of consideration when you look at the market that Trump is inheriting versus what Ronald Reagan Reagan got. So it's not just the economy. And as you pointed out earlier, and Raoul has eloquently expressed in the past, this is a very, very mature economy. So we are due for a recession. And I think one of the things that could be a trigger is the Fed.

You know, this has been a very timid Fed. But now they've got kind of a green light to raise rates. And I think the market is saying there's no way they're going to raise rates 3 times this year, which is really what the dot plot is saying. But I think they could. I think they could even raise more More than that.

Because Janet Yellen views it, you know, she's now a lame duck Fed chairman. And she, you know, I think she could basically point the finger at Trump and say, hey, this is your deal. And you wanted interest rates to be higher. You've said all along they're too low. We're gonna, we're gonna give you exactly what you want.

And I do think that if that's the case, you are going to get some kind of a Plaza Accord 2.0, because as those rates go up, it's just going to push the dollar through the roof. So you could be right in being that it's perhaps a little premature to be too bullish on gold, because if the dollar does go further until that Plaza Accord 2.0 happens, then it's probable that gold will go even somewhat lower.

But I don't think you get a lot of downside. Just the sentiment is so negative right now, you probably don't have a lot of exposure downward.

Erik Townsend: Well, and that was actually going to be my next question, so you're reading my mind, is this US dollar rally. You know, there are just so many bullish factors, and I agree with all those bullish arguments, but how much farther do you think that this dollar rally can go? How high can the dollar index get before the damage it causes in emerging markets causes central bankers to take action? And, you know, as you said, Plaza Accord 2.0, some kind of coordinated action to arrest the dollar rally. It seems to me that that's inevitable. I just can't decide when that would occur or what the threshold would be. Any thoughts?

David Hay: Well, I agree with you, it's inevitable, but I also agree with you, it's almost unknowable. I'd say you probably have to see a lot more market stress than you're seeing right Right now, I mean, it's— yeah, there's been a bit of a sell-off in emerging markets in both equity and debt, but it's been pretty orderly so far. So far, you're definitely not seeing the kind of extreme angst that was happening a year ago and into mid-February of last year, when you supposedly did have kind of an unofficial Plaza Accord, the so-called Shanghai deal, which is still not really known whether that happened or not.

But, of course, that did coincide with the market bottoming and credit spreads starting to come down dramatically. And, by the way, credit spreads, which are a huge influence on financial markets. They're very calm right now. If anything, they continue to ease. So there just isn't— I don't think there's the pieces in place yet to create that kind of an agreement. I think it's going to have to take a higher dollar and probably more Fed increases and more market turmoil.

But at some point this year, I think those things will all happen.

Bond yields, late-cycle signs and the global debt trap

Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and move on to bond yields. You know, Jeff Gundlach has suggested that the 35-year bull market in bonds is over. And, you know, potentially it's time to be strategically It sounds like you described a tactical view earlier, which is that you see a long trade, at least for now, because it's overplayed. And I think, as you say, even Jeff Gundlach himself has said that. Do you think he's got the call right, though, that in general, the big picture, once a correction happens, is that, you know, this has played out? Or do you think that maybe the Raoul Pal view, which is we could still be headed, if we get that recession, recession towards sub-1% yields is still on the table. I've been having a hard time deciding this one myself.

David Hay: Well, I think you hit the nail on the head. If we have a recession, rates are going lower, particularly in the United States. The ability for them to go a lot lower overseas is fairly limited. But certainly, in the United States, this huge yield gap, which is another supporting factor for the U.S. bond market— I mean, money is fungible across borders. And if you're a European investor and you're looking at where Treasury yields are and you're thinking, geez, and they've got a strengthening currency, and why not move money over to the US?

So I do think that puts a bit of a lid on where our rates are. But if we, you know, recession is, as we've already mentioned, extremely overdue. You're seeing a number of late-cycle indicators. And one of those I would actually point out is one that most I hear brought out kind of bullishly lately, which is how optimistic consumers are in the wake of the election. So consumer confidence has done kind of a moonshot. Shot. But if you look historically, that also is a late-cycle indicator, and it also tends to coincide with tops in the stock market.

But beyond that, if you look at auto sales, auto sales are strong, but they're strong with almost unprecedented incentives being given to move the metal. You're seeing dramatic rises in subprime auto loans and subprime auto loan defaults. defaults. And you probably have seen how these guys have stretched out to 84 months or whatever on the auto loans.

And they're doing rollovers into new vehicles with negative equity. So there's— it's almost kind of like shades of what happened with housing back 10 years ago, now playing out in the auto area. And of course, autos are interest rate sensitive. Interest rates are moving up. The housing market's interest rate sensitive. Mortgage rates are up substantially. Mortgage affordability wasn't that great before the big up move.

You're starting to see rents fall in a number of cities, including amazingly even Seattle, with this tremendously strong economy we have here.

So again, you look at it, the art bubble, for example, has already popped. The collector car bubble, that's popped. Penny stock bubble popped a while ago, biotech bubble. So we've had— it is interesting that we've had a number of kind of these serial bubbles, and then— or mini bubbles, and then they burst. And maybe that's what's allowed this thing to keep going longer, because that's kind of created this cleansing process on a sector-by-sector, asset class-by-asset class basis, and you haven't had everything going down at once like we did back in '08.

But still, that doesn't change the fact that, you know, we're how many years now, 8 years roughly into a recovery expansion, and that's a very, very long expansion. And so, as I say, you don't have to look very far to see evidence that this Yeah. And that one is getting a lot of gray hairs on it. But that is the key. I think you're right. If the next recession, rates are going to go lower, and I wouldn't be surprised to see us take out the low of around 1.3, 1.35 on the 10-year Treasury in that kind of an event.

But could they go higher in the meantime? Sure. I do think what you're going to see is— because some folks have said, well, if you believe the Fed's going to be raising rates, you know, at least 3 times this year, won't that mean that Treasury yields go up? And not necessarily, because what you're likely to have happen, particularly as they raise more frequently and get deeper into that cycle, is more of a yield curve flattening and eventually an inversion.

And of course, that will be the classic ringing the bell of a recession impending.

Erik Townsend: Well, and I think we're very much in agreement on that. But let's move out to the longer term, because clearly at some point someday, we've got to get, you know, through this bond market bubble, if you want to call it that. And someday we're going to get higher yields. And what I just can't figure What we have to figure out is how do we ever get out of the debt trap that has been created by all of the credit expansion that's occurred since 2009? Because we can't go back to historically normal interest rates without bankrupting governments around the world, because they can't afford to service their debt. So, if the government has to keep interest rates low in order to be able to service their debt, but they also need to be able to raise rates to combat inflation someday, but they can't, you know, what does that lead us to? Do we eventually get to inflating away all of the success Massive debt.

How do you see this thing playing out in terms of all the debt that's been created? I just read a report, and now we're at 325% of global GDP in, uh, in total debt around the world. Holy cow, how do we get out of this?

David Hay: Well, you're right, and I think that's an update of the McKinsey report, which had previously said there had been a $57 trillion increase in global debt since the financial crisis. And I think this latest one you're referring to, they said it's up another $11 trillion. So, it's just, it's a staggering amount of global debt that we have got out there, and that is one of the reasons we believe that interest rates are not going to go up as much as a lot of the bears are postulating right now.

So, we totally agree with that. We're more in the Lacy Hunt camp, and I don't know how much you know about Lacy, but he's had a tremendous track record both in terms of economic forecasting and actually running bond portfolios with Van Hoisington. Yeah. And their view is that you're precisely right, that if you look historically, when debt levels get as high as they are right now, you tend to be in a chronically slow growth period of very low inflation, even at times deflation.

And I still think that paradigm is probably dominant despite the Trumponomics aspect. So that's really, I think, going to be the multi-trillion-dollar question as this year unfolds, is the battle between kind of the renewed animal spirits of Trumponomics versus the hard, cold reality of this massive debt load.

And I would also throw in, you've also got demographics. I mean, Donald Trump is not going to be able to create a population boom. In fact, if anything, he's kind of working against that with anti-immigration, because that really has been the saving grace for the US relative to the rest of the world for as far as— because, as you know, GDP is a function of labor force growth and productivity.

So if your labor force growth is very low because of aging demographics, which it is, then you limit immigration, that makes it even worse. So the hope has to be productivity. And productivity, as I'm sure you're also aware, has been in a long bear market. Now, maybe that's going to change. I mean, I think that's where you hope that Trumponomics is, and things like the regulatory rollback start to help productivity. And I think that's in the best interest of all of us. But I think we've got to be realistic that it's not likely to go up dramatically.

Hopefully, we can stop the downtrend and increase it a bit, but you've got you know some real factors weighing on that, including the fact that there's about 95 million adult Americans who are now out of the labor force and probably not likely to come back in anytime soon. So that's a major drag on productivity.

So, but I think beyond that, the just really the number one reality is this massive debt load, and I think you're correct that it puts the governments in kind of an odd position. They really don't want to see fast growth that would lead to higher interest rates because that would be devastating to their budgets.

So then you get into the situation where it's kind of the Japanization, if you will, of the developed world, where we kind of follow the Japanese toward lower and lower interest rates on these higher and higher debt levels, and it almost creates a situation where stagnation is almost what the governments are after. They might not admit it. Admit that. But you're right, it's just if you were to normalize rates, that's why we think in this Fed tightening cycle, yeah, they're going to try to push them up as much as they can until something breaks, because then that's going to give them the ability to cut during the next crisis.

But we think that, you know, if you got to 2% on the Fed funds rate, that's probably going to create some serious pain. So it's— we're just not going to see— we don't see any time in the near future a return to what we would consider to be quote-unquote normal interest rates, kind of in the 4% to 5% range on the Fed funds and the Treasury.

Precious metals outlook

Erik Townsend: Let's touch on precious metals next. Obviously, we've seen some weakness since the election. You know, at one point I was thinking that maybe the hike in December would mark a low point, and so far that's playing out. But I'm starting to think, with all these bullish factors for the dollar, maybe gold has lower to go, and it's maybe not until we get that Plaza Accord 2.0 on the horizon that gold bottoms. What do you think? Is the bottom in yet? Do we have lower to go? What's your view on precious metals?

David Hay: Well, it's bullish long-term, but I would agree with you. I don't know if we've hit the bottom. I think there is a tradable rally there right now because of the extreme negative sentiment. To the extent that that works off and gold rallies a bit, then, you know, we'd probably take a more guarded view.

So I'd say, you know, to give you our best guess right now, that we'd be short-term bullish, maybe medium-term cautious, long-term bullish.

China: currency, debt and Treasury selling

Erik Townsend: Okay. And let's move on to China. Obviously, we just had a major intervention in the last 24 We saw that in the last 24 hours where there looks like they're trying to squeeze the yuan shorts out of the market. Where do you see the China situation going? And how big of a risk do you think it is in terms of contagion to other global markets?

David Hay: Great question. You know, it's funny that back in 2015, whenever the renminbi was weak, the markets were, you know, they were terrified. And the renminbi has actually gone down a lot versus the dollar over the last several months, but there's been very little spillover to the financial markets. And it's probably because it's everything going down versus the dollar. So if you look at the renminbi versus the basket of other currencies, it's been, you know, quite stable. So that's probably why we're seeing less anxiety.

I just think the problems in China are more than the currency. I think that it's like we're discussing for the planet overall. They have a ton They have a ton of debt, and the debt increase has been just— it's unprecedented for any country in such a short period of time. And to also give another factoid that might surprise people that think that infrastructure is going to be the panacea for the U.S., in the last year, China spent $500 billion on new infrastructure, and yet their growth rate has continued to decelerate.

So, it's— I mean, what they've tried to do, you know, they've tried to wean their economy from one that's heavily driven by borrowing money for big capital projects, building steel plants or building new airports, and get to more of a service-based economy. And I think they're making progress there, and I think over time they'll be able to do it. But it's been a pretty rocky road. I mean, they have used things like an equity market bubble to try to keep the economy going. They've used another housing bubble here recently to try to keep the economy going. And I don't think it's healthy. I don't care who you are, what country You are.

And China's obviously got enormous currency reserves, which are dwindling a bit, and huge savings. And that's probably the number one advantage they have is their tremendous domestic savings. So they don't owe any debt really outside the country of any consequence. I'm sure their, you know, their assets are far, far above their liabilities, though I can't quote you that number off the top of my head.

So they do have a better ability than a lot of countries to delay the pain. But there's already, you know, we've seen some pretty disastrous stuff happen out of China in the last couple of years. And I wouldn't be surprised to see another major shakeout, shakeout, probably more in the real estate market there.

And with some of these sovereign wealth— excuse me, not sovereign wealth products, but these wealth management trusts that they use, that the banks issue that are, you know, they're like subordinated bank debt that pay higher rates. And those look to be quite Risky. So I think that is certainly, if you were to identify one of the big macro risks out there, would be some kind of a blowup in China. Our partners at Gavekal know much more about China than we do, and I'd say they have a fairly neutral view. They're not worried about an Armageddon kind of situation, but they do acknowledge that there are some pretty extreme excesses going on in the real estate market right now.

Erik Townsend: I doubt China is going to be the thing that blows this bull market out of the water, but it's I know one of the things that people have started to speculate on is that China may be forced to dump a lot of its US Treasury holdings in order to deal with their own situation, in order to deal with the yuan devaluation.

Do you agree with that view, and do you think it's big enough to pose a serious threat to the US Treasury market, or do you think we can absorb potentially China having to dump a lot of its holdings?

David Hay: I think so. I mean, they've been in kind of a gradual liquidation mode for a while, and without any real— I don't think that's been the driver of the Treasury market sell-off. I think it was much more a function of the election. And as I said, you've got, you know, that's not just European investors, but also Japanese investors that look at this tremendous yield spread that Treasuries offer over their own domestic securities. So I think that provides a counterbalance for Chinese selling. So I suspect that they will continue to sell, but I don't think they're going to do I don't think they're going to do anything really drastic unless Trump decides he's going to slap a bunch of tariffs on it and really trigger a trade war with China. Then they may retaliate by dumping their Treasury portfolio at a much faster rate.

Europe: euro, Italy, Le Pen and Fillon

Erik Townsend: Speaking of European investors, let's talk about the Europe situation. We've heard a lot of different views on this program from different guests, some saying, you know, Brexit marked the beginning of the end. It's all over for the European Union. That's it. To others just saying Brexit was a flash in the pan. Don't worry about it. It's going to be fine.

What's your view on the evolving situation in Europe? I know, I think Marine Le Pen just made some comments in the last couple days about maybe taking France off of the euro. Where do you see all of this playing out?

David Hay: Well, our view on Europe for years has been that the euro was going to fall to around parity. And this is when it was 1.40, 1.50, 1.60, when Tom Brady's wife wanted to only be paid in euros, and I forget which rapper it was wanted to only be paid in euros. And, you know, we thought that was kind of classic top of the cycle for the euro.

But now we're getting close to parity. And so the euro is pretty undervalued, incredibly undervalued for Germany, you know, much less so for Italy. So it's actually helping the European economy right now. The European economy is definitely perking up. And I think people tend to vote their pocketbooks. So that's probably taking a little bit— And it's actually similar. Marine Le Pen's comments lately have been not as anti-euro as I thought they would be.

And it is interesting, if you look, as you probably have, at some of these country surveys, most of these countries, actually, they don't like a lot of things, you know, Brussels and the, you know, kind of the micromanaging that comes from all the bureaucrats there, but they like the euro. It's just always amazing to me that even in Greece, during the worst of that crisis, they did polls of the Greek citizens, do you want to stay on the euro? And they were overwhelmingly in favor of staying with the euro.

So, it may be a little tougher to break up than I thought at one time, but I do think it's still a pretty unsustainable situation. For example, you look at Italy and the debt level, they have 130% government debt to GDP, which makes us look good, not easy to do, and an economy that's been in and out of recession multiple times over the last 15 years or so since the introduction of the euro, and I don't see that changing. I think Italy is just headed on a downward spiral, and that's such an important country. And then you've got France, which seems to be doing a little better, and I think that is one of the positives, is that it looks like probably Fillon is going to be the next president of France, unlikely to be Marine Le Pen. And I think he's got— he could revive confidence in France in a similar way to what's happened with Trump here, maybe with the even more sustainability.

So, I don't think this is going to be the year of a European meltdown.

Master limited partnerships recovery

Erik Townsend: Dave, I know that you guys are very involved at Evergreen in a different side of the oil market than I focus on. I trade oil futures, but you guys, I know, are very expert at MLPs, which, of course, are the master limited partnerships that own a lot of oil infrastructure. Can you tell us a bit more about that market? And particularly, you know, is the bottom in? Is it time to be buying MLPs? Obviously, We saw a big sell-off in energy. How do you see this situation moving forward?

David Hay: Well, we still like it, but we've got to be realistic. It is an area that has had a monster move, and kind of against all odds. So, if we were to roll back the clock to about a year ago, the negative sentiment towards MLPs was just staggering. In fact, it was worse than negative sentiment. It was actually forced liquidation along the lines of 2008. So really what you had is that during the boom period from kind of 2011 to 2014, mid-2014, you had a number of new funds that were set up, closed-end funds that owned MLPs on leverage. And even in Japan, supposedly Japan had over $50 billion of MLP funds set up. And when they started falling out of bed in late 2014, and that accelerated into 2015, a number of these leveraged investors like the closed-end funds funds that were 30% roughly leveraged started getting margin calls.

So you literally had 3 different episodes of forced liquidation, margin-driven selling in MLPs during especially the summer of 2015, and then it kind of hit the crescendo early in 2016. And those forced liquidation periods always create enormous opportunities if you're not leveraged and you have cash, which we did.

And I wish we— I said we waited until the very final flushout before we started buying, but you never know that. You never know if there's only going to be one round or 2 rounds, but you just got to go in and buy systematically, which is what we did. So when it seemed like everybody in the world was selling MLPs in January, February of last year, we were on the buy side. And since then, there has been an enormous rally, particularly some of the ones that were most beaten down, where in many cases they've had a Triple off the bottom, and even the more stable names are up 40-50% or more.

So it's you were not at the bottom by any means, but it's kind of like if you'd bought financial stocks in 2008 after they had been annihilated. Once they had their initial move, they kind of consolidated. We saw that with MLPs in the last few months of last year where they backed off and kind of went sideways a bit, and then another upleg. So we think there's another upleg coming. It's actually been kind of playing out here over the last few. So, I think you have to be realistic about how much they can go, but you're still able to get— I mean, for example, the premier MLP out there right now has still got a yield of about 5.5%, and it grew its distribution at a 5% rate through the worst of the energy meltdown. And as you pointed out, these guys own the energy infrastructure assets.

So, they're really— I mean, to use a simplistic term, the toll collectors in the energy world.

Erik Townsend: Right.

David Hay: And if you look at MLPs in aggregate during that horrible, horrible year of 2015, a true industry depression in energy, they actually on aggregate raised their distributions through that. So we think that they do have further upside, but it's just going to be a lot more modest than what we've seen over the last year.

Evergreen Virtual Advisor and the Gavekal relationship

Erik Townsend: Now, Dave, I really enjoy reading your Evergreen Virtual Advisor, which, by the way, for our listeners, it's one of It's one of the very few free newsletters that actually has substantive content on it. It's not just advertising. It's good stuff in there. We're going to have a couple of sample issues of EVA in the Research Roundup newsletter that we send to all of our registered users at MacroVoices.com. So, for registered users, you can find a copy of it. I definitely recommend it. It's a free subscription, and it's good stuff there. So, you know, don't miss out on that.

David Hay: Thank you.

Erik Townsend: Good stuff when it's free. But I'm curious about your relationship with Gavekal, because of course Gavekal is an institutional advisor. What's the connection? What does Evergreen do with Gavekal?

David Hay: So we are partially owned by the Gave family. So that's really our number one connection. But also, Louis Gave is one of my very closest friends. So that's— those are two of the reasons why. And I think it's— there's a bit of a symbiotic relationship in the fact that We are their main foothold in the North American market for private wealth management. They also have a money management firm based in Denver, but that's more institutional and not really a retail-facing type of operation.

So I think we fit a niche for them, and the benefit for our clients and for the EVA readers is that, in fact, once a month, we actually run a handpicked, what we think is one of the most interesting of the Gavekal pieces. That's actually what we're running tomorrow.

So it's, you know, I think definitely benefits our readers. It certainly helps us in terms of having access to their very bright minds, not only Louis, but his father Charles, who's pretty legendary in our business, and Anatole Kaletsky, who's one of the more influential financial strategist commentators in Europe, and a number of other very bright analysts that they have on their team.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

David Hay: So you're right, you know, institutionally they have a great reputation. They're not as well known retail, but we're trying to change that.

Erik Townsend: Well, fantastic. I definitely recommend that our readers check out the newsletter that we— again, we sent you a link to that. And I really want to thank you for an excellent interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: financial deregulation

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that was a great interview, and I really enjoyed the early discussion about Trumponomics and repatriation. Another potential policy avenue is financial deregulation. And I guess if you don't think that can happen, just take a look at Trump's administration picks. I mean, a lot of Wall Street connections there. So if you just look at the bank stocks so far, you could say that a good chunk of the rally probably centers on steepening of the yield curve. But Erik, do you think the market is pricing in deregulation? And if so, what might that look like and what would the effects be?

Erik Townsend: It's going to be very interesting. You know, Trump's rhetoric about draining the swamp and getting the corruption out and so forth, it's going to be very difficult for him to let all of his Wall Street boys just take care of their own, so to speak, in his administration. But then again, they are all his Wall Street boys.

As you say, look at the picks that he's got. So, I don't know how this is going to work out. I think you're right that the market is definitely already discounted that That there's likely to be a lot of accommodation and deregulation and friendly-to-Wall-Street kind of regulatory policymaking. But boy, how hard is that going to be opposed by the Democrats? And how much say do the Democrats really have? You know, both houses of Congress are going to be Republican-controlled, but how, you know, how in sync with the Trump administration are even the moderate Republicans? So, So, I don't think that anybody knows yet, and I think it really remains to be seen, but I think that you're definitely on the right track that the people that he's chosen are going to likely have a very accommodative attitude towards Wall Street.

Postgame: high inflation versus hyperinflation

Aaron Chan: Right. And before we move on to the next question I had, I actually want to move back and get you to clarify something. Erik, can you explain the difference for our listeners who just joined us? I know you've explained this maybe a couple months back, but can you explain for our listeners, what is the difference between high inflation and hyperinflation? Where is that line?

Erik Townsend: Well, hyperinflation, using the term correctly, some people use them interchangeably. You know, you'll hear people talk about, oh, we're gonna have hyperinflation like we had in the 1970s. We didn't have anything remotely close to hyperinflation in the 1970s. It was feared that we could get there, but we never got anywhere close to it. Hyperinflation is not a matter of prices going up because there's more money competing for goods and services. It's about prices going astronomically through the roof because the value of the currency is collapsing. And this is what's happened in places like Zimbabwe when they've printed too much money, is essentially the currency becomes practically worthless and there's a perception of prices going up. In reality, the price is not going up. The value of the currency is going down. It's falling apart.

High inflation, as I described earlier in the program before the interview with David Hay, has to do with too much money chasing goods and services and pushing prices up. And that too much money comes from if you're printing money, conjuring it out of thin air in order to buy bonds, in order to support the asset market or keep interest rates low or whatever you're doing, that money has to go somewhere and it ends up being inflationary. That kind of inflation could easily produce, I think, certainly double-digit, maybe as high as 20% annualized rates of inflation for several years. That's the That's the only way I could see an eventual resolution to this massive debt bubble that we're in. Will that actually happen? I don't know, but that's kind of where I think the future lies potentially. That's not hyperinflation though. Hyperinflation, one textbook definition— there are several different definitions, but one of the most popular ones is hyperinflation is when there is more than a 50, 5-0, percent rate of inflation.

Aaron Chan: Wow.

Erik Townsend: rate of inflation per month. Prices are going up 50% per month. That annualizes to something north of 1,000% per year. So, by that definition, even the Argentine inflation of the early 2000s didn't technically qualify as a hyperinflation. It was just extremely high inflation. So, you know, we're, we're really talking about 2 different animals here. The scenario that I do predict for the United States is eventually There's got to be several years of very high sustained inflation. Let's say between 10% and 20% per year of price inflation. That's not the same thing as hyperinflation, which would be a collapse of the currency. And I don't really think that that's possible for the US dollar unless there was a radical, radical change of power and somehow the United States was no longer the, you know, the military superpower that it is today.

Postgame: euro parity and trading the euro

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for clarifying that. Thank you for clarifying that, Erik. And the last topic that I want to touch on, I actually want to revisit what you said about Marine Le Pen, one of the candidates in France, about taking France out of the European Currency Union. Well, from my own reading and research, there are commentators and analysts predicting euro-dollar parity in 2017. So, Erik, I want to ask you, how would you trade this in 2017? What's your view on this? And what is your view past 2017? Yeah.

Erik Townsend: You know, I am generally of the view that the European Union has always been doomed. The euro currency, you know, it's the argument that was made before it was introduced, which is you're trying to introduce a monetary union without a fiscal union, and that's just a bad way to design things. So, and I think the Eurocrats were hoping that they would eventually get their fiscal union and solve the problem by bringing everybody under a United States of Europe. Europe kind of, you know, new tighter political alliance. Instead, I think it's likely to fall apart. But boy, the timing on this, you know, I think that already there's been so much short euro speculation. Yeah, the euro should continue to depreciate. The dollar should continue to appreciate. Am I trading it? You know, am I short the euro? No, I'm already long the dollar index. And of course, a very large component of the dollar index is the euro currency pair, euro-dollar pair. So you're already short the euro if you're long the dollar index, and that exposure is enough for me.

I don't want to have a separate position to be short the euro explicitly. I think that the overall capital flow into US dollars— I see that as more of a global phenomenon. A lot of that will come from Europe, and I'll get my exposure to euro weakness through my long position in the dollar

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks for that, Erik.

Sign-off and Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Anything else you'd like to add before we close?

Erik Townsend: You know, as I always say, we really need your help, folks, promoting the show. So please retweet us when we announce the show on Twitter. And most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. It only takes a few minutes. The benefit to you is you get our Research Roundup email, which includes a compendium of links to all the best research. Be sure to check out this week. I know we've got David Hay's newsletter, which is a free subscription. I recommend I recommend that one. And there's a lot of other good content in there. So what else is in there this week, Aaron?

Aaron Chan: Well, this week we were lucky to have our listeners supply nearly all of the articles for Research Roundup. So a big thanks of appreciation to those of you who contributed. There are a bunch of great reads in there, and it's on a broad range of topics. So really be sure to catch up on those. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program

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Julian Brigden — MI2 (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Episode setup: Brigden chartbook and Raoul Pal cameo

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 43 was recorded on December 15th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Julian Brigden of MI2 gave us one of our most popular interviews ever back in May, and he's back with us again as today's featured interview guest. We'll discuss all things macro, from inflation to Treasury yields to the US dollar and much more. The full-color book of graphs and charts that Julian prepared for his interview in May was our most popular download ever, and he's done it again with another book of graphs and charts. I strongly encourage you to take a minute to download the chartbook before the interview begins, as we'll be referring to it throughout our discussion. Registered users at MacroVoices.com already received the download link in your Research Roundup email. For those of you who have yet to register, Aaron will tell you how to get the download before the interview begins. But wait, there's more.

As regular listeners know, I've really been looking forward to getting an update from Real Vision founder Raoul Pal on his views on Treasury yields and the duration risk trade that we discussed at length And we talked about this at great length in his feature interview several weeks ago. So Aaron has arranged for Raoul to make a cameo appearance in today's show after the feature interview with Julian Brigden.

Fed hike and the dot plot

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Before we get to equities, let's start with the Fed's decision to hike policy interest rates by 25 basis points on Wednesday. Now, markets responded with a spike in the dollar index to cycle highs and sharp sell-offs in everything from stocks to crude oil. But what doesn't seem to add up here is that this rate hike should have already been priced in, quote unquote, considering that almost Every single prominent analyst was predicting it. So, Erik, what's going on here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I don't think it's the rate hike. As you say, the rate hike was priced in. Everybody knew it was coming. What very, very few people saw coming was the update to the dot plot, which now says that the Fed is forecasting 3 rate hikes in 2017 instead of 2 previously. So the sentiment that this would be the last hike and that the rate normalization cycle was a fantasy that was not really going to continue, that seems to be fading In favor of the view that, hey, you know, Trump policies are changing the landscape, inflation is coming back, therefore the Fed is going to have to continue the rate normalization process.

And of course, that affects everything. Now, of course, everybody is conveniently forgetting the fact that it is still impossible to truly normalize rates, you know, all the way back to a 6% Treasury yield. It would be categorically impossible for the government to continue operating because it couldn't possibly afford its debt service if we truly normalized rates. But at At least moving back in the right direction is something that the mainstream has begun to catch hold of. I would caution, though, you know, let's remember, one year ago today, the Fed was predicting 4 rate hikes in 2016. We only got a grand total of 1, and that came in mid-December. So how important is it that they're forecasting 3 in 2017? Probably not very, but it's definitely impacting the way people are viewing the market.

Electoral College outlier risk

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, you asked me to put the presidential election back on the agenda. Dude, haven't you heard? It's over. Donald Trump won. So, why do you want to bring it up again? What's on your mind?

Erik Townsend: Well, remember my tweet from Election Day morning when I said this thing ain't over until it's over? And folks, it ain't over yet. The way this works is these people called electors take the popular vote, or rather the Electoral College system vote, and cast the electoral votes on December 19th. That's this coming Monday. We have all sorts of things going on. Hollywood celebrities have produced a video encouraging the electors to defect and not vote for Donald Trump because they just think that it's an unthinkable world under Donald Trump. Meanwhile, you've got Larry Lessig, a Harvard University professor, offering free legal advice, telling the electors that in many states it is legal for them to ignore the will of the people and vote differently than what they're supposed to vote based on how the election went. And And meanwhile, ZeroHedge reported this morning that the electors are actually receiving death threats if they vote for Donald Trump. So, my point is, this is not a prediction, this is definitely an outlier, but if ever there was a presidential election where absolutely anything could happen, this is it.

And the propaganda that's being slung is this evidence-free report from the CIA, supposedly saying that evil Russians hacked the election, and therefore the electors should ignore the popular vote, which may not have been Privy to the latest intelligence, and perhaps they should declare this to be a situation where Donald Trump is unfit because he's actually a secret Russian spy. And the electors do have the ability to essentially throw the election to the House of Representatives if the vote does not happen in favor of Donald Trump as everyone expected. They can overturn it and basically allow the House of Representatives to choose the next president. That would be quite a an unprecedented thing. And again, it's not my prediction. I'm just saying this thing. It ain't over till it's over. All it takes is 37 of these 500 or so electors to defect and not vote for Donald Trump like they're supposed to, and the election goes to the House of Representatives.

Equities on the sidelines; long the US Dollar Index

Aaron Chan: The stock market broke out to a new all-time high of 2,273 on E-mini S&P futures earlier this week, but it's been selling off in the wake of the Fed's rate hike and the forecast of 3 more hikes coming in 2017. Erik, what's your take on equities here?

Erik Townsend: I still don't have any strong view on the fundamentals here. I'm on the sidelines because I think there have been good arguments made on both sides. And I don't think that the real, what does the Trump presidency mean, you know, narrative has really been formed yet. So, I'm waiting to see. If you want to know what the catalyst is that would bring about an outright crash, that situation— and again, it is an outlier, it's not a prediction— but if the election were thrown back to the House of Representatives and nobody knows who's going to be the next president, that That would definitely cause market havoc. Again, not a prediction, just an outlier.

Aaron Chan: The US Dollar Index broke out to a new cycle high above 103 in reaction to the FOMC announcement. So, what's next for the dollar?

Erik Townsend: Well, I sure wish that I had bought more. I am long Dollar Index futures ever since 97.70 or so, after— just after it broke out above 97.50. And I wish that I had bought more. I was waiting for a dip, and then, of course, the unexpected dot plot update is— it's not the rate hike that has caused this big spike up in the dollar index. It's the dot plot. So, so far, Thursday's high print was 103.53. We're looking at 103.14. I wish that I had bought more on a 100 handle yesterday when I had the chance, but I didn't. The position that I do have on is, of course, performing very well.

And I think that we're headed much higher from here. Again, if there were an upset and this Electoral College thing on Monday were to see a wrinkle, and especially if they threw the election back to the House of Representatives, that could cause a huge downside risk for the dollar index due to uncertainty. But short of that, I think we're headed much higher. I would say, though, that, you know, it's kind of overdone here. We're seeing a big knee-jerk reaction to the FOMC. And probably, you know, if history is any indicator, we'll give back about half of that before the rally resumes again in earnest. So I wouldn't be rushing to add more to the position here. I'll be looking for a pullback. If we get back down to 101 or so, I'll I'll definitely be looking to add to my long position.

Crude oil: production-cut skepticism, curve trade and inventory puzzle

Aaron Chan: Well, speaking of knee-jerk reactions, crude oil has been on a roller coaster ride this week. So what's going on with the oil market?

Erik Townsend: Well, there was a combination of the non-OPEC countries meeting over the weekend and agreeing to go ahead and do what everybody thought they were going to do, which is to supposedly curtail their production. Now, this is a small enough cut that there's room for everybody to cheat. There's a lot of speculation as to whether anybody is going to do it. As far as I'm concerned, it's for public consumption. It's in name only. Whether or not anybody actually cuts production remains to be seen. So that was one half of it.

Probably the other big half was the unexpected statement from Saudi Arabia over the weekend that they might— I emphasize might— cut production even more than agreed. They didn't say how much more than agreed. And that— were these things significant? Of course they were significant. Did they justify the gap-up open by more than a dollar on Sunday evening's open? In my opinion, no. Did they justify another dollar to the upside in the first minute of trading after Sunday evening's open into thin liquidity? In my opinion, no, but it happened anyway. Did it justify still another dollar on top of that, all the way to more than $3 of upside in the next hour? So the first hour of trading on Sunday, we're $3 up against Friday's close. No, it was ridiculous. And it's no surprise at all that that resulted in a blow-off hysteria top. $54.51 was the high That was within the first hour of trading on Sunday's thin liquidity session.

And of course, I knew it was not going to last.

I used that opportunity because backwardation became very apparent in the belly of the curve. And I used that opportunity to put on another curve steepener trade, basically betting that the backwardation that existed in the second half of 2017 is going to go away before those contracts expire. Of course, just as I expected, it mean reverted. I'm already up very nicely on the curve steepener. In her trade. So, you know, I love it when this kind of thing happens, but it didn't make any sense.

Inventory, very confusing again this week. 2.5 million barrel drawdown on nationwide inventories, and that's in the wake of API, which is the private American Petroleum Institute, predicting a 5 million barrel build in inventory. Now everybody's ridiculing API. Those stupid dumb idiots don't get it. Their prediction was all wrong. Remember, API is not a predictor prediction of what EIA is going to do. API is its own independently sourced data, and it's true that it is voluntarily submitted, whereas EIA is based on compulsory reporting. That's the reason a lot of people put more credence in the EIA numbers. But I question who's actually getting it right, because the EIA numbers don't make sense lately. We talked about this last week. Cushing, Oklahoma, 1.2 million barrel build in the EIA data. So why is How is it that if Cushing is building both this week and last week, that nationwide numbers are drawing down both this week and last week? Most of it, if you look at the breakdown, appears to be on the West Coast, because it's not PADD 3 it's not the Gulf Coast where these drawdowns are happening.

Why would the West Coast suddenly be drawing down in inventory? I can't come up with a reason for that. Finished products were kind of a mixed bag. 497,000-barrel build on gasoline inventories against a 262,000-barrel drawdown in distillate inventories. So that's, you know, almost balancing each other out. The thing I keep seeing is what is going on that API's numbers and what you would expect from the Cushing numbers is that we'd be seeing builds in nationwide inventory. But the last 2 weeks in a row, EIA has reported drawdowns.

So I thought Art Berman knows everything. I'll email Art and ask him what's going on. Before I got a chance to do so, I got an email from Art saying, Erik, what the hell is going on here? It seems like API's numbers don't jibe with EIA, and the national numbers don't jibe with Cushing. It doesn't make sense. What do you make of this? So neither Art or I can figure out what's going on, but I would say the EIA numbers are not really consistent. They don't make sense to me, and I'm inclined to put more credence in the API number, which was a 5 million barrel build on inventory last week.

So nobody seems to be noticing amid all of this, you know, as we look at this big spike up in prices, it all happened as a result of this production cut talk. This is all promises about what people are supposed to be doing in the future. What's happening in the present? Well, Saudi Arabia just announced all-time record high production. Iraq's loading schedule— that's the schedule of when they're going to load ships with exported oil that's going to be shipped out in January— that shows a 7% increase in exports in January when they're supposedly going to be cutting because of this agreement. So what they're saying and what they're doing don't match, but the market is paying attention to the rhetoric that coming out of the oil ministers. You know, I listen to this stuff and I think the only people dumb enough to believe this would be, uh, yeah, the whole oil market, because they do believe it.

And I, I just can't believe it.

Gold after the rate hike and 10-year Treasury yields

Aaron Chan: So, Erik, you've been predicting that the widely anticipated Fed rate hike would hammer gold prices lower. And well, that's exactly what happened, with gold trading as low as $1,124 late this morning and closing around $1,130. But you've also suggested that this rate hike-induced weakness in gold could mark a cycle low and thus a great buying opportunity. So did you buy the dip in gold?

Erik Townsend: No, I didn't buy the dip. And of course, what we saw is exactly what's happened. The thing is, I don't know if it's over yet. And the reason I say that is the dot plot update. If people are expecting the rate normalization process to continue, for Treasury yields to continue to move higher over the next year— and again, the fact that I'm skeptical that they're going to do that and actually follow through on it doesn't matter. It's what the market expects to happen, not what's really going to happen, that's going to drive prices.

And that's bearish for gold. You know, gold competes with Treasuries. Most people think that they are equally safe, even though I don't personally agree. A lot of investors see Treasuries as a risk-free asset, just like gold. And as Treasuries continue to produce higher and higher yields, that's bad news for the gold market.

So, I'm not sure this is over yet. I'm going to definitely be asking Julian Brigden this question in today's feature interview. I want to get his take, because he was recommending gold when we interviewed him last time. But as far as I'm concerned, I'm still on the sidelines. I'm wait-and-see mode.

Aaron Chan: And lastly, 10-year Treasury yields are breaking out big time, trading above 2.60% earlier today and closing at 2.60% as of Thursday's close. So what's going on with bond yields here?

Erik Townsend: Well, definitely the extra strength in bond yields is a reaction to the FOMC. It's because of the dot plot and the expectation of more rate hikes occurring in 2017. Of course, you know, the 10-year is going to react to short-term rates as there's an expectation that more and more People are seeing the Jeff Gundlach view that the 35-year bull market in bonds may be over and that we're headed towards higher interest rates. That's all fueling this. The question is, how much farther does it have to go? I'm going to save the meat of this for Julian Brigden because he's the guy who predicted all of this 6 months ago. He told us that we'd be back to inflation and he told us that we'd be looking at higher bond yields. And that's exactly what's happened. I tend to put credence in the guy who got it right before it happened.

Chartbook download instructions and feature lead-in

Aaron Chan: So I want to find out what Julian has to say about Well, on that note, let's move on to today's feature interview with MI2 founder Julian Brigden. As Erik mentioned earlier, you're definitely going to want the chartbook for this interview. Registered users will find the download link in their Research Roundup email. If you're not registered yet, it's free and only takes a minute. Just go to www.MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button at the top right side of the page, then click the Register Your Free MacroVoices Account button near the bottom of the next page. Once you're registered and logged in, click the Research Library button on the black menu bar, then click Guest Publications. That will take you to a page where you can download today's chartbook, as well as other presentations from all our past MacroVoices guests, including Julian Brigden's first chartbook from back in May.

Erik Townsend: Folks, anybody can sound good on a podcast show. All you have to do is confidently pontificate about what's driving the market and use the right terminology to express your views, regardless of whether they turn out to be right or wrong. But if you want to know who the one guy is on this program who really nailed it and whose predictions on this show came true in spades in the months that followed his interview here, it's Julian Brigden. So, for those of you guys who are really serious about this stuff, I encourage you to go back and listen to Julian's first interview from May 27th and review his first chartbook.

You can still find that on our homepage at MacroVoices.com, and Aaron just told you how to get the chartbook.

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: Look at what Julian predicted back then and remember how he was practically laughed out of the room by most of his peers for predicting a trend change from disinflation to inflation. And then check out how all of his other predictions have worked out. Bottom line, when Julian Brigden talks, I pay close attention, and I encourage you to as well.

Aaron Chan: Okay, and without further ado, let's get to the interview, which is coming up next, right here at MacroVoices.com.

Julian Brigden: dollar cycles, the oil collapse and central-bank overreaction

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Macro Intelligence 2 Partners founder Julian Brigden. And Julian, I want to start by congratulating you. I think of all of the interviews that we've done, your predictions from the interview we did back on May 27th have probably come true more than almost any other guest that we've spoken to. So congratulations on that and thanks for coming

Julian Brigden: Well, thank you, Erik. I mean, better, as I always like to say, better to be lucky than smart. But I do find it quite interesting that we've managed to get it wrong, and yet these central banks just seem to have been floundering and looking in the other direction. So, yeah, I mean, it's— back when we chatted to you guys in May, we just sort of presented this view where we said, you have, in our view, and I've started off the slide presentation with the dollar. chart, because I just think this, to me, is the crux of what dictates basically the cycle in financial markets.

So it's the waxing and waning of that dollar, which causes commodity prices and a lot of other prices to move. So when the dollar is falling, it's broadly inflationary. So if you look at that first cycle, you can't see it was falling very, very high levels because it was masked by Bretton Woods, the fixed exchange rate mechanism in the late '60s into the '70s. But Essentially, we were— the dollar was falling in value as we were printing money for Vietnam. We were pumping up commodity prices in Latin America in particular. The dollar hits the low. Paul Volcker comes in where you need this policy response off that low level.

And amazingly, that line on the bottom, even though, Erik, this is an inflation-adjusted trade-weighted index, so it's untradeable, that's actually a dead straight line. It's just uncanny. And then the dollar rallies again. And around sort of 21%, we break the bubble in Latin America. And dollar goes up. You hit Plaza But you can see that we have this very sequenced cycle, and it's similar sort of amplitudes in terms of percentage changes.

And so when we spoke to you guys back in May, we said, look, we've just seen another big rise in the dollar from 2011, but particularly often in an accelerated manner from the middle of 2014. And we've broken the world again. The Fed has stepped back. But that's never to us the dollar high, because Because in that process of stepping back, and you can see it, we've done it now 3 times, you get this 21% odd rally, 25% or change or so, and then we pause.

And it's because we have caused an emerging market crisis. And we certainly had one in 2015. It was not quite the same nature as the Latin American or Asian crises of the past, because we didn't have pegged exchange rates, but they were ugly crises. This was an ugly crisis.

So the dollar pauses. It naturally creates this reflationary cycle in emerging markets and commodities again. But because it is reflationary, eventually, the Fed has to tighten again. And so, you know, this time, they'd obviously, I think, massively overreacted to that dollar rally.

It was a dollar rally that caused oil to fall again. And they said, oh, you know, oh my God, this is deflation. Well, falling oil prices, even in the US with a massive shale industry, isn't deflation. It is transitory disinflation because we measure pricing over a year-on-year basis, and it's ultimately stimulative. So we got ECB NIRP and BOJ NIRP, just massive, massive, massive overreaction to this transitory disinflationary and stimulative event. And so we had sort of— we're coming into the summer, and we said, oh, they've overcooked this. They've really really, really overstimulated.

And there was lots of concern about the equity market. Could the equity market take the strain? But our focus was on the bond market. That's where we thought the biggest mispricing had been created. And our thought was that as these— as the reflation started to move through into the real economy.

So, you know, we saw the dollar pause in January. As soon as the dollar started to pause, oil prices, commodity prices, EM all ripped again. But it takes some time for that effect to feed through into the real economy. But our thought was that as it fed through into the real economy, you would get this cyclical rebound in growth and inflation.

And that's what we were playing back in the summer. And the growth comes through because if you look at the chart that I've shown you here—

Erik Townsend: And I just want to insert for the benefit of our listeners who might have skipped ahead, Aaron did tell you where to get the chartbook. We're talking now about the chart on page 2 of the chartbook and the instructions for the download. were presented before the interview began. For those of you who fast-forwarded and skipped the instructions, go back now and that's where you'll find it. I'm sorry. Please continue.

Julian Brigden: No, no, no problem. So if you look here, we've got a chart showing wholesale sales. And you can see that obviously we had in the US, we had built up this big shale industry. And you could argue in many respects that it was somewhat responsible for the outperformance of the US economy versus the European economy for much of the recovery we've seen since the GFC was this big burst of domestic investment related to shale. But you can see as soon as it started, the dollar started to rally. We've highlighted that in red. You burst that bubble and all the data deteriorated in industries that were related to that, obviously petroleum, metals, and some of the other industries which we haven't highlighted here.

But you can see how it just whacks out. But the trouble is, is we measure— when we look at data, we typically look at the speed of data. We don't look at the level. So we don't talk about the level of GDP. We talk about the rate of change. We talk about quarter over quarter, year over year. And even something like ISM is ultimately a level, a measurement of speed and not level. Hence, in 2009, at the depths of the GFC, you could get ISM manufacturing moving from sort of 33, I think was the low, up to almost 60. There was nothing really much better going on in the world. What had just happened is very simply, there was a base effect going on. The massive drawdown that we'd seen in ISM in '09— sorry, in '08, Dropped out in '09, and the data reverted.

And so essentially, that's what we were playing for. And you can see it not only in the US, but if you look at the next slide here, you'll see global trade. And you can see once again, dollar rallies, global trade gets crushed because it's very heavily emerging market and commodity related. And all of those are exceedingly dollar sensitive. The minute the dollar stops rallying in 2006, Your global trade picks up, and we think that this global trade is coming through and will continue to push through into sometime in Q1, beginning of Q2.

And so our basic case was: Look, central banks overreacted to this collapse in oil prices led by a higher dollar. Those they pause the dollar as as the Fed backs away from further rate hikes. You get this reflationary cycle. You get this pickup in global trade, and essentially the sell-off in fixed income.

Growth and inflation pressures in the US, Europe and China

Julian Brigden: Was got nothing to do really with Donald Trump per se. I think he acted as a clear accelerant, but it was already baked in the cake. And so now we're having to deal with better data, and we can see it now with everything from Chinese export data to some of the PMI data we're seeing here in the US. I mean, you only got to look at today's data. It was incredibly robust prints, a lot higher than people expected.

And now in addition to that, we have to deal with inflation, because once again, if you look here, we've got a chart of US CPI. And you can see really a lot of the key components of inflation, the ones that we have to deal with on a daily basis— owner equivalent rent, service costs, medical— actually have hardly budged. In fact, very slightly increasing and steadily. What happened to headline inflation? It was dragged down by a massive fall in that energy component, once again caused by that massive rally in the dollar, which we've highlighted where the dollar peaked. And as soon as the dollar peaks, energy CPI comes back, and it's dragging up headline CPI. So once again, going into the spring, we are still dealing with not only stronger growth, but higher inflation pressures. And we think they're going to print— some of these headline numbers are going to print some materially higher numbers.

And it's not only headline inflation. So if you look at the next chart here, you'll see a wage cost model we've got. Now, Atlanta Fed is already printing close to 4%, and it's probably got a little bit more further to go. But average hourly earnings has not. It's still got a long way to go. We think this could be pushing up towards 3.5%.

And given that the Fed, you know, has only given us sort of 50 basis points of rate hikes, that suggests to us that they are woefully, woefully behind the curve. And this becomes, I think, a significant problem.

And what I think is actually even more interesting, even than the US story, because we know that the US has had a stronger economy, is that you're actually starting to see inflationary pressures in areas of the world which are meant to be mired in deflation. So we've quoted here the comments from one of the Eurozone PMI numbers that came— surveys that just came out. And they are talking— if you look at the last sentence, they say manufacturing output price inflation is currently running at the highest level for 5 years, which is inevitably translating into higher consumer prices, which will inevitably translate into higher consumer prices in coming months. It's just not what the ECB is even contemplating. And I have nothing but scathing comments to say to talk about the ECB when it comes to timing of rate policy responses. I think this is possibly one of the worst central banks out there. I mean, these are the guys who hiked in 2008, going into the worst downturn ever because oil prices were heading up to $150.

And Trichet said, if we are not decisive, inflation may explode. He got it just 180 degrees wrong because it actually imploded as the real economy imploded under the pressure of $150. And then Draghi, beginning of this year, he said, we will not surrender to low inflation, was the exact quote. He is not going to have to. So if you look And the next slide, you'll see our model for headline CPI in Europe. And we think this is going to push materially, materially higher. And we've yet to see that full effect come through.

And even in another part of the world where we're supposed to— where this is supposed to be a disinflationary force in the world, China, you can see here, we're now starting to see a material acceleration inflation in PPI. In fact, it was a big shock when PPI jumped up towards 1.2% last month. But we think this thing has got a lot further to go. So we continue to think that this pushes forward. And once again, you'll see a quote coming from one of the PMIs, this side saying this is the Caixin manufacturing PMI. And they said that the index tracking input and output prices rose at the fastest level in 5 years. Once again, this 5-year thing pointing to further intensification of inflation. Pressures.

So we just see, Erik, this world where we've overcooked it. We pushed bond markets thanks to these asinine policies of the ECB and the BOJ, NIRP, pushed bonds to absurd levels, distorting long-term valuations by quite considerable amounts. And now we have to deal with this base effect of rising inflation, And rising yields and rising— sorry, and rising growth. And to us, this is going to have a very material impact.

Peak central-bank omnipotence and the path to 3% yields

Julian Brigden: And we're still working through that in terms of the bond market. So we started to see this correction in the bond market. But you can see here from this chart that when we look at Treasuries, it still looks like we've got further to go. And I think we're starting to see that move in today's price action, certainly after Yellen's message yesterday in In that as well. And you're getting the next level of the sell-off, which we think can take 10-year Treasury yields up to just slightly above 3%.

But that's even— and this is the point— that's even before we've even spent a red cent of Trump's fiscal spending package. This is just purely based on the existing economic dynamics, let alone some accelerative package.

Erik Townsend: Before we move on to the dollar, Julian, I'd like to ask you a few questions because my mind is just going a million miles a minute. First of all, it seems like you're really, you know, this rise of populism with Donald Trump and Brexit and everything else. Some people are saying that central banks are losing power. Is this the moment where, you know, they kind of lose control of the curve and even if they want to hold rates down, they can't anymore? Or are you saying they're going to change their mind and not want to hold them down anymore?

Julian Brigden: You know, it's funny you mentioned that, this sort of losing of power. We wrote this piece to clients that are heading into the Jackson Hole meeting at the end of the summer. And we called it Jackson Hole: From Heroes to Zeros. And essentially, we said that we thought that we'd hit this sort of cycle high in terms of the power of central bankers, not only because they've really failed to deliver benefits to the real broad economy, but also because they were just massively extensively misreading the financial economy. And they were creating this bubble. And they were just delving further and further into the absurdities of deep academic thought, that they were becoming more and more divorced from the reality of the real world.

So, going into Jackson Hole, we had the ECB going full-blown QE, along with the BOJ and NIRP. And we'd written extensively about how those policies in combination with each other were utterly ridiculous. One is truly reflationary QE, and the other one sends an utterly deflationary signal, NIRP. And yet, here you had a bunch of people who believe viscerally in the power of forward guidance, the Captain Picard, make it so type moment. And yet, they were sending this conflicting signal. So, yes, I think we do believe that the peak has been achieved. Achieved in terms of central bank omnipotence.

Erik Townsend: So, so that begs my next question, which is, if I look at your chart here on slide 13, you're expecting just current fundamentals before we consider Donald Trump to get us above 3% Treasury yields. Jeff Gundlach has said longer term, maybe as high as 6%. And I can't help but just say, wait a minute, governments cannot operate, literally would go bankrupt at historically normal Treasury yields because of this massive debt burden that they've undertaken since the GFC. So what happens? Does that mean that we can't get to those yields or we do get to those yields and there's a big collapse of the government? I mean, how does this play out?

Julian Brigden: No, I think, look, I think, you know, there are times when you can go back and look at history. In fact, I was doing it sort of yesterday. We were, you know, you can take CPI charts back on, you know, if you've got access to things like Bloomberg, but you can, you can look on the Fed websites and the government websites and get these and you can look at these periods where for much of the '60s, we had very, very low inflation, very, very low, very stable, very similar to now, actually. And yet, amazingly, there was no panic about, oh my God, the sky's falling, we've got deflation.

And then all of a sudden, we entered 1965. We're starting to spend money in Vietnam. And lo and behold, big fiscal spending outruns this inflation cycle.

But it is a process, if you look at it, Erik, of 2 steps forward, 1 step back. And actually, in fact, we were doing some work internally with one of my quants who's a mining specialist. He worked on— it's very cool. He was an explosives expert. But his mathematics is very good, because I guess you have to be pretty precise in that space. And we were looking at these cycles of inflation and how you almost have this sort of natural amplitude, and it continues to sort of build. And it actually can be replicated by a lot of sort of fluid dynamic cycles. But the point is, is you see this initial pickup. There is a response. It pushes things down, but you never quite go to the low. And so to To this sort of 6% argument, I would say, is it possible? Yeah, maybe over time.

But I do think that the run-up to 3%, because essentially what I've been talking about is a cyclical story, all right, in many respects based upon base effects of the negative draw, you know, drop of oil feeding into the shale industry, feeding into global trade. As that just drops out, we see the pickup, but it is just a base effect cyclical story. And that will mostly peak, as I said, sometime in Q1.

At that point, if we hit 3% in 10-year Treasury yields, we will also have to deal with the reality of a pretty significant tightening in financial conditions, fixed income being one element, the dollar, which we'll talk about in a second, being another one. And so I do expect then to see some sort of pause before we get the sugar high of the Donald Trump spending, which realistically won't kick in until End of Q3, beginning of Q4. And now at that point, maybe we see that next leg up.

But I do— I don't think— I would agree with you. I don't think we can go back straight to 6%. I think if you go anywhere close to that, the world will just implode. But it doesn't mean— I think all we're doing at this point is just normalizing where we should be. So yeah, 3%, then back off a bit, let the dust settle, and let's see what comes through from Donald Trump.

Gold, silver and oil in a rising-dollar world

Erik Townsend: Trump's money. And with the inflation talk that you're predicting, of course you were predicting inflation back when we spoke in May. Everyone else seems to have caught up with you since then, and it's very popular now to predict inflation. But, you know, the gold bugs would tell you that inflation is supposed to be super bullish for gold, and boy, that's not happening. So what's going on with gold? And also, I guess, you know, there's kind of a— there's a strong dollar argument should be negative for oil, but at the same time, inflation should be positive for oil. So gold and oil, what do you see happening as this forecast plays out?

Julian Brigden: Yeah, I mean, it's— look, I think at the end of the day, you're dealing with commodities and commodities can have— they're very, very, very heavily correlated to what the dollar does. And but within that sphere, there are lots of different commodities. You've got the softs, you've got, you know, raw materials and you've got precious metals. And precious metals to me are And I think I said this back in May, simply an anti-dollar trade. I think I showed you at the time a chart for silver. It's what we call a classic bubble. It had its blow-off highs in 2011. And if you look at that chart, take a long, long-term chart of silver, and you chart it against the dollar, it is essentially 100% inverse. It is just a high-beta dollar trade. Unfortunately, people people get viscerally attached to precious metals. I don't know whether it's that shiny element, which just causes people to just get irrational about it in many respects, but I think they're great trading vehicles.

And I think I expressed at the time that we'd advocated buying it back at the beginning of January, silver, but it was a trade. And the problem is, is as the dollar starts to rise, particularly driven by higher yields, then something like precious metals does very badly. And I know I'm going to upset some of your listeners when I say I think that, we are probably heading back down under $1,000, potentially on a nasty flush out quite badly under $1,000 in gold, and silver will be pushing the mid to low $14s. So that's the precious metal story. Oil, on the other hand, is a— it's not necessarily just an anti-dollar trade. I mean, there is a demand-supply cycle to this. There's an investment cycle that takes digging it out of the ground. So it is possible to have periods of strong oil in a rising dollar environment. So I think one has to take a step back and look at it.

It's not— look, don't get me wrong, I'm not wildly bullish for oil. We were bullish back in March. We suggested buying it on a break of $30 with a sort of target of $45 to $50. And I think, you know, if I want to be a cynic, I'd look at what the Saudis have done and say, you know, this is basically allowing them to tee up for the sale of Saudi Aramco, which Which, if you want to be altruistic and say, oh, this is about trying to relaunch the Saudi economy and invest, take that money and invest it in alternative forms of growth in Saudi. If you want to be a cynic like me, you'll say this is basically to allow the royal family to pad their wallets so that when the inevitable, let's not name it, hits the fan, they've got plenty of cash sitting in Geneva so they can take— excuse me— so they can take the money out.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Julian Brigden: But I think that there is a clear plan here from the Saudis to keep the oil price elevated into that Saudi Aramco sale next year. But the point is, for your clients, is you have to differentiate in commodities. There are different types of commodities. Precious metals to me, though, are 110% just an anti-dollar trade. And especially when rates are rising, don't want to own any of them.

Equity tipping point via economic strength

Erik Townsend: One more inflation question before we move on to your dollar slides. You know, I have felt since the great financial crisis that basically what's propping up asset markets, particularly equities, is central bankers printing money in order to prop up asset markets. And I've thought to myself, what brings that to an end someday? And my contention is they don't stop until something forces their hand. So my question is, is the degree of inflation that you're predicting enough to force their hand to, to basically create a threat where they can't print more money because it would exacerbate or run away inflation? Or do you not think we're looking at that much inflation? at this point?

Julian Brigden: Well, I think it's all relative. By that, I mean, it's the relative pricing of inflation and rates relative to other asset prices. If you live in a world where your inflation's 10%, your rates are 12%, then your other assets are priced accordingly. We're living in a world where equity discount factors have just been amazing, because Because rates have been so incredibly low.

So it's not like we need to see inflation go back to 10%. Rampant inflation would be 3.5%, given where asset prices are.

So I think one of the things that Raoul and I have ended up— who writes the Real Vision stuff and GMI— have ended up talking about at times is his longer-term view, which is much more bearish, and my short-term views. And it's not Not that I necessarily radically disagree with Raoul, I don't. I think it's always been to me a question of how do we get to that potential tipping point? And I think you raise a very good point.

Lots of people have been saying, look, we get to a point where the central banks just are increasingly ineffective and equity markets roll over. And my point was, yeah, but how do we get there? Do we get there because we have economic weakness? And to me, that was just not going to be the case, because if you've got economic weakness, they just keep giving you more and more crack cocaine in the form of QE. QE or whatever latest iteration or buying stocks if they had to.

The problem, fundamentally, the structurally dangerous point actually arrives where I think we could be sometime next year. And that is that you actually have strength coming through and you do have that inflation story coming through. And let's say that we get to a point where this backup and tightening of financial conditions causes the equity market to tip over, because I think there are many similarities to the cycle of falling oil prices, falling headline inflation, wobbly growth, and then a sort of basing of oil prices and a move higher that we saw in 1985 into 1987 crash, and from 1996 into the 2000 crash.

So let's imagine that we're at that point sometime next year, that we've seen growth rebound, the bond market and inflation— the bond market's wobbled badly, yields have backed up, but initially, Initially, the equity market takes it as a positive because it's backed up by this cyclical rebound in growth, which is what you saw in 1987 and what you saw from basically sort of 1998 into 2000.

And we're seeing now in this speed of data improvement. But then you get to a point where having taken money out of the bond market and allocated into equities, which is exactly what's going on and keeps that equity market growing, there's suddenly that cyclical data actually starts to falter at exactly the point that you have much tighter financial conditions.

Now, you could say, oh, well, the Fed will just ease, but might not be so easy for them to do that or the ECB, because then maybe we're actually starting to see secondary inflationary pressures. And I just showed you it's happening in wages, seems to be happening in some of the PMI data, according to at least some of the market surveys.

So imagine a situation where the equity market actually starts to falter, but you have this backdrop of strong inflation that I actually think is by far the most dangerous scenario that we've faced since the GFC. So it's not that I would say I'm a rampant bull. I think it's just a question of how you can potentially get to that tipping point. It's— for me, it's not via weakness.

That tipping point potentially comes via strength.

Erik Townsend: So economic strength is actually the risk factor that could start off what essentially becomes a self-reinforcing process in the equity market to unwind what has happened?

Julian Brigden: I think so, Erik, and very simply because I think, you know, and this is odd, you know, I've had conversations with clients and they said, but Julian, you know, this is what we want. We want growth and inflation, don't we? And I said, of course we do. But unfortunately, thanks to these asinine policies of these academics, we've pushed— we've created market extremes within the adjustment process. You know, we push Bond yields to the floor.

We nailed equity prices to the ceiling. In that adjustment process, you create so much friction that you just tip them over. And that's, that's my, my fear. That is my fear.

US dollar outlook and corporate repatriation

Erik Townsend: Okay, I think we left off around page 14 or 15 of your slide deck where you started to get into the US dollar. What can What can you tell us there?

Julian Brigden: So, you know, I think there's a lot of— you know, we've been bullish on the dollar for the last sort of 2 to 3 months. And we said, you know, essentially, as I said, if you go back and look at that very first slide that you get, you get this big run-up in the dollar, 20, 25%.

You get this emerging market crisis. You see, then see this pause in the dollar and the dip. But because you, you kick off this reflationary cycle, at some point the Fed is forced to hike again. And as they hike, the dollar starts to break out. And the very fact of the matter is, Erik, this is perfectly normal. So that— so our point has been that this movement in the dollar, this rise in the dollar, yes, it's been accelerated by the Trump story, but is a perfectly normal cyclical story, 100% supported by the fundamentals.

And if you look at the slide here, we've got, say, the euro. And we've put in the interest rate differential between 10-year Treasuries and 10-year Bunds, and we've just inverted it. And you can see there's no major divergence here. You know, FX is trading fully in line with the interest rate differential. This is quite normal. This is just a cyclical move. There's nothing abnormal at this point.

Where things start to get interesting, I think, and could truly get disruptive is when we contemplate the prospects of this corporate repatriation package, which is certainly on Donald Trump's agenda. And one of the things that we've discussed with clients is what happens not only in terms of the price of the dollar, but actually in terms of dollar funding. So if you look at the price, I think a decent indication of what could happen is what happened in the past when we did a repatriation deal. The last one we did was enacted at the end of 2004 and ran into 2005, and it was called the Homeland Investment Act.

And the vast majority of the money, I think it was about $360 billion in total that was repatriated, $300 billion of that happened in 2005.

And if you look at the price action of the dollar, if you pull up the chart from the beginning of January of 2005, you'll see virtually the first trading day of the year, this thing goes straight up. And remember, this was happening in a period where essentially from 2002, all the way into the GFC in 2008, the dollar was just inexorably declining. So the one positive year we get is when we get this Homeland Investment Act.

And so I think we're looking at that sort of prospect when this thing is enacted. Now, it's— we're talking end of 2017 when the legislation probably gets passed in sort of September, October for 2018. But I think this is a big risk because we've already got a strong dollar. But the biggest risk actually is to me is not the price of the dollar, and that is it's the supply of dollars.

Reserve-provider dilemma and dollar funding squeeze

Julian Brigden: And we've shown you this chart before, but let me run through this because just like the first chart that we showed, this to me is a fundamentally important thesis that your your clients need to understand. Now, just take a step. Back, what is the role of the reserve provider in a reserve currency system? Well, he gets lots of benefits. He gets seigniorage, he gets cheap funding, but he really has only one single objective. And that is basically to supply sufficient reserves to the rest of the world to enable them to grow. So if you are India growing at 5% per annum, you need 5% more dollars to buy 5% more oil, 5% more copper to fuel that growth. Where do you get them? You get them sustainably from the current account deficit of the reserve provider.

And that is actually typically why reserve systems end up collapsing, because it's quite encouraging as the reserve provider where you've got very low rates subsidized by the rest of the world to actually become overly profligate, to run excessively large fiscal deficits, to run excessively large current account deficits. And the whole system typically collapses when your creditors turn around and go, oh, yeah, you're not going to be able to pay us back, are you?

And this classic example being France during the Bretton Woods system, which actually led to the collapse of Bretton Woods system. So as we discussed, Vietnam War, we're pumping out money. And the French go, yeah, give us our gold back out of Fort Knox. And the system collapses.

And that point is actually called— there's an economic term for it called Triffin's dilemma. And Triffin's dilemma is essentially a point where the policies you're running domestically are incompatible with the policies you should be running as the reserve provider. And what's interesting is that, as I say, that's typically because you're overprofligate. Now, there are examples where you actually have Triffin's dilemma, but it's the other way around. You're not providing the world with enough reserves.

So if you look at this chart here, you'll see I've highlighted 2 previous occasions. So when Volcker came in, he came in, we've got high inflation, he comes in and he puts the screws to the US economy. The US current account deficit shrinks as a result, and it drops woefully below the level necessary to support global GDP growth.

What happens is the dollar explodes higher and we burst the Latin American debt bubble and commodity bubble, and we get a big EM crisis. The same thing happened at the end of the '80s where the Fed overtightened inadvertently, crashing the housing market. The first thing that bursts is the Nikkei bubble. The second thing that bursts is the Asian bubble. But the point to note here, Erik, is that the Fed really hasn't done much tightening.

And yet we have this significant shortfall of the current account deficit. And the reason for that is simply because of oil substitution. We are now no longer importing anywhere close to as much energy as we were. And that is our biggest single element of, of the current account deficit. So we think that deficit is running at about $400 billion a year.

The difference is made up by outflows from the capital account, which we've used the Fed's balance sheet as a proxy. But we all know that that's incredibly fickle. We've all seen how last year, suddenly American investors go, ah, let me bring my money home. We all saw in January how when the dollar relaxed, $60 billion floats out of the US, pumps up emerging markets, and then Trump gets elected, and the money comes back again.

And the reason why we can go from feast to famine in emerging markets in a nanosecond, and within that as well, the commodity space, is because we have this fundamental structural shortfall caused by the collapse of the current account deficit.

And I'm very much afraid that because we've seen some quite significant changes to the plumbing of the process by which dollars in the United States get rehypothecated, or should we say, flow back out to overseas, because we've seen significant changes, most notably in money market regulations, and because of Basel III, that if you take that money that is sitting on corporate bank accounts in, say, Geneva, even if it's in dollars, and you bring it back to New York, once again, in dollars, just the changes to the plumbing mean that those dollars will not be able to fund overseas dollar liabilities. And with this structural backdrop problem that we have because of this current account shortfall, we will just get this explosive dollar rally, and we will get a massive dollar funding problem, the like of which we probably didn't see in EM since '98.

Reserve currency status and risks to Treasuries

Erik Townsend: Now, one of Triffin's predictions— I'm a huge fan of Robert Triffin— was that eventually, long term, the US would lose its reserve currency issuance status because of all of the overspending and things that it was able to do as a result of having that status. And some people thought in the '70s that that was happening, and of course it didn't. A lot of people think the petrodollar system is what saved it. Well, now, of course, the petrodollar system is under question because, as you say, we're not importing as much oil. So do you think that Triffin's ultimate prediction of the dollar losing reserve currency status is getting closer? Is that on the horizon or is that still distant future?

Julian Brigden: I think we could get quite— if I'm right, sometime in sort of 2018, 2019, I think that debate— because remember, the repatriation probably kicks off really heavily in 2018— I think that is going to be a question that is on everyone's lips. Ironically, not because we're being overprofligate and supplying the world with too many reserves, but because we're not supplying the world with enough.

And I think that third-time major, fourth-time possibly at that point, major emerging market crisis, people may well turn around and say, whoa, whoa, whoa, we have to actually come up with an alternative. And I think it'll be at a time when you're moving to greater to sort of insularism in what I would call economic nationalism, which I think is the main cause of what you see behind Brexit and what you see behind President Trump's election. I think those factors come into play, because at that point, the US should step up and say, okay, fine, we can come up with some massive amorphous pool of dollars that we can lend to everyone. But I'm just not sure I'm not sure that an increasingly insular Trump administration is going to want to do that. So I think that's when you could see some sort of alternative. Now, what does it get based around? Probably has to be some sort of synthetic currency like an SDR, because the Chinese— to be a reserve provider, you have to run a deficit.

And I'm just not sure who's going to be running that deficit.

Erik Townsend: Well, if that were to occur, if the world started looking for an alternative to dollars as reserve assets for the reason As you described, that the U.S. is not able to provide enough to meet demand. Does that result in kind of a blow-off top in the dollar at some point where suddenly, as a viable alternative emerges, maybe it's some combination of an SDR or China? You know, there's been talk supposedly about China and Russia asserting a new gold-backed currency. I think that's a lot more hype than reality. But if something like this were to occur, does it eventually lead to a crash in the U.S. Treasury bond market? Because Everybody says, hey, these guys can't repay this, this money. These yields are ridiculously low and we've got an alternative suddenly. Does that result in a major sell-off or do you think the demand for dollars continues because it stays a desirable reserve asset, even if not the only one?

Julian Brigden: Right. I mean, I would— you know, you're talking a long way out here and a lot of things could be happening. I think it does create risks to Treasuries. I mean, I think we're seeing that potential risk now. I mean, I think if you become— if we become more interested in when you stop running a large current account deficit, then essentially, and you're causing through that dollar strength to cause a lot of your reserve holders to already draw down on their reserves and sell dollar assets. So you're already putting a lot more emphasis on US domestics funding their own deficits. And I mean, if you ask domestics just to fund the government deficit, what would be Treasury yields? And I'm going to say, that's where you get your Gundlach 6%.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Julian Brigden: That's how you do it. I do think, though, the reality of the situation is, is when you, when you reach that crunch point, if the US doesn't step up to the plate, the US would play very hard to ensure that whatever new system we got, some sort of basket currency, that the US dollar played a very dominant part, perhaps not— and almost certainly the dominant part. But there's a lot of moving parts when you get out to that point, Erik.

But I think the fundamental point that your clients need to understand is that as things stand at the moment, given this structural hole caused by the relative collapse of the US current account deficit, which isn't going to close anytime soon— close slowly, but it won't close anytime soon, particularly with Trump's policies— that we have this structural instability at the heart of the reserve system. And it means that you do anything to start playing with those capital flows, for example, this corporate tax repatriation deal, or even just making rates in the US just go up, you know, relative to the rest of the world, then you create massive instant instability.

MI2 products, Real Vision and retail plans

Erik Townsend: Julian, I would love to continue this for another hour, but unfortunately we are up against our time limit. So I'm going to have to shift gears here and ask you first, for our institutional listeners who are able to consider your institutional advisory product, what do you do over at MI2?

Julian Brigden: So MI2 has been going just over 5 years now. We were launched by some of our clients who became clients who'd— I was sitting on a bank trading desk, and they asked me to start to go independent. And we've continued to grow organically since then. We basically provide the stuff that you've got here in front of you. That's the stuff that I primarily have focused on, this structural bigger picture theme stories to help Key up major changes in the markets, bond market move being probably the most recent example, or the dollar move that we're in the process of seeing. And then we have, in addition to that, we have this adjunct product, which we call MI2 Trader. And that is very much designed, Erik, to sort of say, right, we've been talking about bond yields rising.

Here's the level that you've got to watch on, say, 30-year Treasuries, and it's now that you pull the trigger. And then we also have a slightly different product called the Japan Update, which is just basically written by one of our colleagues who's got 35 years trading Japanese equities, is a beyond fluent speaker of Japanese. And that's also— clients love that because we launched that in 2012, where there was really no Japanese research around. So we've kind of got these sort of 3 core elements of the institutional product. And that's what we do at the moment.

Erik Townsend: And those are all institutionally priced products that are probably out of reach to our retail audience component. For the retail audience, you have been very prolific on Real Vision Television. I know that you were featured in their Donald Trump special, and you have some great content there, which I think that's actually, even if you're not a Real Vision subscriber, they've got that one up for free at RealVisionTV.com.

TV.com. But I've also heard a rumor, Julian, that you may have something in the works that may make some of your services more available to the retail component of the audience. Can you tell us anything about what might be coming?

Julian Brigden: Try me. Erik, your antenna are good. Yeah, there's— we're working on something. We're working on something. Early next year, we hope to have something which is more orientated to what I would call the active retail client base. But yeah, we're definitely working on something. Wow. Quite impressed with that intelligence.

Erik Townsend: I have sources in the industry. That gives me an excuse to get you back on the program sooner rather than later. So thank you again so much for a fantastic interview. We are running a little bit overtime, actually, so I'm going to have to end it there. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: Raoul Pal on Treasury yields after the election

Aaron Chan: Wow. Julian Brigden is awesome, and I always come away learning something new from his interview appearances. So on last week's show, Erik, you also asked me to reach out to Raoul Pal for an update on his view on Treasury yields. Well, Raoul joins us now from Real Vision headquarters in the Cayman Islands. Off to you, Erik.

Erik Townsend: Raoul Pal, thank you so much for coming back on the program. I have been dying for an update. Last time that we interviewed you at full length on the program. You had brilliantly closed out your long positions on bonds back, I think, in June or so because you saw this backup in rates coming. But when we spoke, and of course that was before the presidential election victory of Donald Trump, your view was that this was going to create a buying opportunity as we got between 2.25% and 2.5%, I think was what you predicted. Sure enough, we're there. You said it was going to be time to buy because sub-1% rates were still coming in a recession scenario. Now we've got, of course, a totally different backdrop and landscape. Does it change your view or do you still think that we're headed for lower yields?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, nice question. That's not an easy one to answer because the problem is, is we're dealing with things that we don't know. So the market's extrapolating a future growth path out of the Trump presidency. Now, we have no idea what policies he's going to managed to implement, the success of those policies, whether they end up like Abe policies that didn't really do anything. You know, we don't really know what's coming, so it's difficult to really make an assessment about the future. You know, as I've noted in the past, if we look at every 2-term presidential election after a 2-term incumbent has changed, there has been a recession every single time going back to 1910.

So the probabilities of a slowdown caused by the changes in the presidential cycle are meaningful. And as I've spoken about in the past, you know, the economy was slowing down. We got to a point last year where— well, this year where growth got down to zero again, but we don't get that recession. We saw recessions in almost all indicators. Nothing really happened.

So the question is, is what's going to happen in 2017? The markets are now extrapolating something wildly different, but it makes it very difficult for the bond market call. You know, we're at the level we start— should be starting to assess. We note that kind of the bond yields have never— let's say 10-year bond yields have never backed up beyond the previous backup, if that makes any sense. So the previous backups occurred when it went to 3% yield. I think that was the taper tantrum.

And so therefore, unless the bond market goes beyond 3%, we can't say anything's changed. If it did, it'll be the first time it's done that pretty much in the entire history of the bond bull market, in which case maybe something has dramatically changed. The market narrative is that everything has changed, but I'm not sure that's the case knowing the demographic backdrop, the slow inflation, the impossibility of generating inflation. I'm just not sure it's there. Also, we've got to note the dollar is screaming higher, something that I've been talking about for, for a few years now.

That's wildly deflationary. So I'm not sure the market's not going to be wrong-footed in this, which is why I'm still interested in the idea of buying bonds. But I'm looking for that right entry, looking for the bond market to do something that is not expected now. Also looking for the economy to start showing signs that things are not as people perceive it to be.

So it's really about that. Now, the kind of reflexivity story would be equities and everything else are creating now a more positive economic backdrop, maybe something does change. Maybe I'm wrong. Maybe this is the outlier where suddenly we don't get a recession in the first term or the first year of a new president.

We don't know. We just have to wait and see. So I wish I could be more specific on it. But there's times when you have to just sit and assess. And I'm still in the assessing point.

Erik Townsend: You said that you were looking for an opportunity to buy bonds. Is there a particular signal that would cause you to take that action?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, I think firstly I want to see how they trade as they get towards 3%. So at 2.6% today in the 10-year bond, let's see what happens with stronger data. Let's see what happens once equities start correcting. They will at some point. You can't just keep going up in a straight line.

Let's see what the dollar does in terms of translation effects, in terms of inflation. Let's see if it affects the oil markets at some point. So there's a whole number of things we need to look at. And we can't just isolate the bond market itself. We need to look at the overall picture. But I'm really looking to see the bond market starting to run out of steam at some point and where they've priced in so much economic growth that things have changed.

Basically, for the bond market to be right now, you're starting to see a longer-term pickup in nominal GDP. Now, is that possible? Yes. Is it probable? I don't really know yet. So Yeah, again, I wish I could be clearer, but sometimes, you know, you can't just bet your life on it and say, yeah, it's going to do this. We have to wait and see. But I think I'm looking for that yield to top out. If it breaks 3%, then my mind changes and I think something has changed overall.

Real Vision Publications launch and pricing

Erik Townsend: I want to go back to our last interview again because I tried to set you up at the end to talk about a new business venture that you guys are doing. And I love the disruptive approach that you take to finance. You wouldn't talk at the time. So are we ready to go public with Real Vision Publications now?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, we are, Erik. I mean, thanks very much for giving me the opportunity to talk about this because we're doing something which is really, again, breaking the mold. We're getting rid of the bad parts of the financial media and showing the way forward, how things should really be done. And the newsletter industry and the research industry has got 2 main problems. One is on the research side, the more in-depth research side, the kind of stuff that I do, it's not available to the average guy.

It's very expensive. The people who write that research aren't well known to the general public. They're well known within the industry, but people don't get the chance to that. We firmly believe at Real Vision in the democratization of financial information. It's really important that the average guy gets high-quality research.

And that leads me on to the second point, the newsletters. Most of the average investors, they get newsletters from kind of well-known names. Most of these names have never managed money before. They're not really well respected in the professional arena, but they are in the newsletter arena. Now, the problem is, is the quality of the research is generally pretty low.

And the marketing is so aggressive. It's spam. It's sensationalism. It's the world's going to end. Buy gold. Buy this newsletter. And I just think people deserve more, much like we did with financial television. Where we saw the incumbents in the financial television industry basically treating finance as entertainment. This is people's life savings. It really matters.

And you can't treat it so flippantly. You can't just have 3-minute soundbites. And it's the same in the research world. So we built something called Real Vision Publications that takes that all on. What you're going to get is you're going to get 30 of the world's greatest research writers, be they newsletter writers or high-end writers such as Julian Brigden.

Nowhere in the world do you get that spread of things together, of writers together, and you get a much broader base of information than you ordinarily would out of a standard newsletter writer writing generally about the end of the world and buy gold. So, you know, we are doing something really important. I think it'll set the entire benchmark for the industry. We've developed a stunning platform, much like we did with Real Vision television We've built the world's most beautiful research publications platform as well. So we're super excited about it.

Erik Townsend: It sounds fantastic. I have to tell you, I have one point of skepticism, which is I've seen the list and you are not aiming for the bottom. You are definitely looking at some top people in the industry. But you take a Julian Brigden, who we just interviewed on today's show, his institutional advisory service, I think it's about $30,000 Stephanie Pomboy, who's also on your list, is in the same approximate price range, as is your Global Macro Investor. I think you've got Jonathan Tepper on your list. I believe he's a $50,000 subscription. So, I'm sitting down, Raoul. I'm assuming this thing costs a lot more than Real Vision Television at $365 a year.

How much is it? Because you're tapping into some very expensive people. of services here.

Raoul Pal: Yeah, you know, we are, you know, this is going to be the crème de la crème of services. And for that, you're going to pay a massive $200 a year. Well, that's the introductory rate anyway.

Erik Townsend: $200. And that's how— I don't get it. How do you get access to people who sell their services for $30,000, $40,000, $50,000 a year at that price?

Raoul Pal: Well, you know, the people like with Real Vision Television, they believe in our message. Now, it's good for them because we're not giving all of their research away. So you're not getting 30 research writers every single piece. You're getting examples of, but it's timely examples. You get over 104, I think, pieces of research a year. So that's 2 a week of all of these incredible list of writers.

And basically they believe in what we're doing. They believe in the democratization of financial information. And so they've come with us on this journey and we hope a lot of— a group of people come with us on this journey too, in terms of, you know, consuming this research, because we really think we're setting the benchmark.

Erik Townsend: And we've got a link in our Research Roundup email that we've sent our subscribed users to a video that you and your partner Grant Williams produced describing in more detail what Real Vision Publications is all about, what you get, and so forth.

Pal's next venture and a January interview

Erik Townsend: But I want to move on because I know you've got yet another disruptive business plan that you're planning to launch next month. Tell us about that one.

Raoul Pal: No, no, I'm going to give you the scoop. You're going to get the scoop. I promise you the scoop. But right now I can't reveal it. But it's another really exciting thing where we've got huge ambitions and we just want to change again the benchmark of which everything is judged. So you'll hear about it as soon as it comes. You'll be the first guy to know, I promise you.

Erik Townsend: Well, I'll tell you what, if you, if you're not going to give it to us this time and we have to wait till next I want another full-length interview out of it before we're going to get you back on with another promotional opportunity. So let's, let's get you booked for a full-length interview. When's good for you? Sometime in January?

Raoul Pal: Yeah, I think later in January will be perfect. Also, hopefully by then I've got some stronger views because I'm— I don't have that many strong views right now because of the problem of the narrative versus the reality. So I'd like to come back and add some value when I do.

Erik Townsend: I want to go through everything we talked about in your last interview. From precious metals to bond yields to equities, because I think that it is all changing dramatically. And like you, I haven't quite figured out yet precisely how it's changing. So, let's revisit that towards the second half of January. And thanks very much for joining us. We really appreciate it.

Raoul Pal: Thanks so much, Erik. And have a great, great holiday.

Erik Townsend: I sure will. You too.

Holiday programming schedule and registration plea

Aaron Chan: Thanks, guys. Well, unfortunately, we're out of time. But, Erik, anything else you'd like to add?

Erik Townsend: This will be our last regular format episode for 2016. So I'd like to thank all of you listeners for listening, and we sure would appreciate your help in spreading the word about the show. But it's not over yet.

Over the holidays, we have a whole bunch of exciting content planned for you. It is all prerecorded, so it will not include up-to-the-minute market information. But December 22nd, next Thursday, we're going to air part 3 of my Accredited Investor Academy series. That's all about alternative investments, which is venture capital and hedge funds and private equity and so forth. We're gonna talk about their fee structures, their legal structure, the basis in the Investment Act of 1940 for how they get around the rules and regulations that apply to regular investment funds. That's coming up next Thursday. Next Friday, December 23rd, we're gonna air part 3A of the Accredited Investor Academy. That's actually essentially a rerun of my interview with David Rose back several months ago.

Then on the 24th, we're going to have again a Real Vision special rebroadcast. They're promoting their new Real Vision Publications business that Raoul told us about. So I think they're probably going to send us some pretty good content. So you're not going to want to miss that on Christmas Eve. Then the following Thursday, December 29th, we're going to bring you part 4, the final chapter of my Accredited Investor Academy, and then yet another special rebroadcast. And then we'll have a special And then we'll have another Real Vision rebroadcast on the 30th. So you've got a whole bunch of content coming up over the holiday weekends.

And of course, as I've said many times before, we really need your help promoting the show, folks. If you would retweet us when you see us announce the program, and most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com, especially you accredited investors, because the statistic of how many users we have registered, and particularly how many accredited investors we have registered. That's what Aaron uses in order to persuade the most interesting and desirable guests that it's worth their time to come on this program and give us a full-length feature interview, as we got from Julian Brigden this week.

The benefit to you is that you'll automatically receive our Research Roundup email, which gives you links to things like the download for Julian's presentation so you don't have to go digging for it, as well as all of the very best content that Aaron could find around the internet every single week. Aaron, what have we got in this week's Research Roundup?

Research Roundup contents and sign-off

Aaron Chan: Well, this week we got the latest slide deck from Jeff Gundlach's monthly webcast. This presentation is entitled Drain the Swamp and is a must-read every month it comes out. Next, there's Hugh Hendry's latest investment letter and market commentary. And finally, for those of you who are not yet Real Vision subscribers, there's a link to clips of the top interviews of 2016 that you should definitely check out. You'll find Find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.

So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @MacroDidact.

For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Happy holidays and have a happy new year.

Announcer closing, mailbag notice and disclaimer

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Steve Keen — Professor Steve Keen, head of the economics department at Kingston University in London (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone. MacroVoices episode 42 was recorded on December 8th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Professor Steve Keen has been one of our all-time most popular guests on the program, and he's back this week as our featured interview guest. We'll discuss his outlook for markets in the wake of Donald Trump's victory, Treasury yields, inflation, debt monetization, and a whole lot more.

Equities: is the Trump rally a blow-off top?

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan The stock market has been on fire this past week, trading briefly above the psychologically important 2,250 level on the S&P 500. But more and more pundits are coming out calling foul on this rally, suggesting the Trump rally has run out of steam and is set to reverse. So, Erik, what's your take on equities here?

Erik Townsend: Well, finally, I'm hearing coherent, original views in the financial media. For a few weeks there after the election, I think whoever the first guy was to say inflationary aspect of trade policy must be the explanation. Everybody just started parroting that same message because they didn't know what else to say. Now we're hearing a lot of different views, and I think there are very coherent and logical views on both sides of this. The people that are saying, hey, what happened here is this was basically a changing of the guard.

The people that, you know, most people thought that Trump was unlikely to win. The people that thought Trump was going to be good for the economy and good for markets, they all piled in when he did win, and that propelled the rally as there was a changing of the guard. From, you know, a new set of bulls, people with a different ideological viewpoint. But it's done. It's over. It's played out. And indeed, as you said, we hit what looks like it could be a blow-off top, 2,251.50 on the S&P futures earlier in Thursday's session, back down to 2,244 or so as we're taping this interview at about 3 p.m. New York time.

On the other hand, if you look at Trump's policies, whether it be trade policy, infrastructure spending, what have you, those make a bullish argument. I can't decide. I kind of look at it as we need to wait and let the market tell us. I think the people that are saying this could be a blow-off and that it could reverse to the downside make a very persuasive argument, but I'm not ready to go short here because I don't know how much further it has to go, and I think the bulls make a good argument. So I'm on the sidelines. I think in terms of interesting views, though, Pippa Malmgren has an interesting view, which is that she thinks that everybody is assuming that Trump means huge fiscal spend in the sense of deficit She thinks what he's gearing up to do is first threaten China with trade tariffs and then basically sit down and say, look, you guys want to make a deal?

Let's make a deal. It's all about foreign direct investment. I want China to pay for building new infrastructure in the United States and get foreign direct investment. Definitely in terms of variant perception, I think she's the only one I've heard with that viewpoint. And definitely a lot of people are assuming that the Trump victory means a lot of deficit spending. Again, I'm not sure. I'm on the sidelines. I don't know where this equity market is headed. I'm waiting to see what the market tells us.

US dollar index: secular rally back on

Aaron Chan: When we taped last week's show, the dollar index was flirting with 102. Since then, it's traded as low as 99.49, but as we're recording this just after 3:00 PM on Thursday, it was back up at 101.09.

Erik Townsend: Well, I sure wish that I had bought more at 99.49. I do think that the secular move upward is on. Raoul Pal had some interesting views on Real Vision Television about this. They put together kind of a special on the Trump presidency and what it will mean. He made some excellent arguments. I tend to agree with that view. So I think the secular dollar rally is back on. I had been waiting for a pullback, and I missed that move down to the mid-99s. As you say, we're looking at 101.10 around 3 PM on Thursday afternoon. If we get back down in the 99s, I'll probably buy some more. But I do think that the trend to the upside is back in play.

Crude oil: OPEC cut, Cushing build and $60 skepticism

Aaron Chan: Well, we've seen a bit of volatility in crude oil this week, with WTI trading as high as $52.42 and as low as $49.61 since last week's show. What's the story on crude this week?

Erik Townsend: The first thing that's going on this week is I think the market is trying to digest the OPEC production cut. And frankly, as far as I'm concerned, it's noise because the numbers on this cut are such that everybody can get away with just cheating and producing as much oil as they possibly can. And I think that's what they're probably going to do. And, you know, this, this This thing is in name only. It's for public consumption. But it definitely has an impact on markets and investor psychology. As far as inventory this week, real big dichotomy here. 2.4 million barrel drawdown. Of course, a drawdown would normally be bullish for prices in crude oil inventory. But wait a minute, that's national inventory. Cushing, Oklahoma, which is that critical choke point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, not only a build on inventory, but the biggest one-week build in inventory since 2009. 3.8 million barrels in a single week, and that's on the back of 2.4 million barrels last week.

Now, okay, that's a dichotomy. How come we got a big build in Cushing and a draw nationwide? I don't know, but if we're looking for confirmation, look at finished products. Gasoline, 3.4 million barrel build. Distillates, 2.5 million barrel build. Really huge builds this week on top of really big builds last week. So we're seeing builds in inventory almost across the board except for the national crude oil inventory. inventory number is actually a 2.4 million barrel drawdown. That number's a little bit suspect in my mind considering nothing else seems to corroborate it. OPEC and non-OPEC are still bickering about whether or not the non-OPEC countries and who's going to participate and so on and so forth. Again, I think it's all noise. A lot of people are saying $60 oil by Christmas. Personally, I'm not buying it. I think at about $52 here, we're kind of played out.

We've seen a lot of resistance there. Looks like we're seeing strength this afternoon on Thursday, $50.84 as we're speaking just after 3 PM.

Aaron Chan: Okay.

Erik Townsend: Thursday afternoon. Wouldn't be surprised if we get back up to 52 or so, 52.50, I don't know. But I don't see the move to 60 happening unless there's some new piece of news in order to justify it.

What I am watching with much greater interest, though, is that we're starting to see just a hint of backwardation developing in the belly of the term structure. So in other words, at the front of the term structure, the first few delivery months, the price goes up every month. But then after you get about 6 months in, the prices start actually going down month over month as the market is forecasting that there will be a peak in prices and then it heads back down. So I'm watching very carefully to see what happens with the developing term structure of the crude oil futures market. But for now, I'm not buying this $60 by December story. I think that's a lot of wishful thinking on the part of the bulls.

Gold, the FOMC hike and the dollar hedge

Aaron Chan: Gold traded as low as $1,158 this past week and was trading around $1,172 at 3 PM Thursday. Any change to your outlook?

Erik Townsend: Regular listeners will recall that my thesis that we've discussed for the last several weeks is I think that a rate hike out of next week's FOMC meeting is almost a certainty. That would normally be bearish for gold, but I think it could mark maybe a low point and potentially a buying opportunity. I'm not real certain of that view though, because the really important indicator for where gold prices are headed is real interest rate expectations. And of course, real interest rates means nominal interest rates minus Well, in order to have an expectation about real interest rates, you've got to filter out the noise and the hype from 2 separate variables. That's inflation expectations and nominal rate expectations. And there's plenty of noise and hype in both of those numbers these days.

So, my point is simply, it's kind of a moving target that's tough to call here. I don't know where it's going. I'm going to be careful. But one thing I can tell you is that if I do buy gold, and I have been looking for signs of a bottoming pattern in the charts, I'll definitely be hedging.

Aaron Chan: Okay.

Erik Townsend: hedging that position by adding to my dollar index long position. And that, of course, is the pairs trade that Raoul Pal and I discussed when he was interviewed on the program several weeks ago. So that's the way that I would approach it. And, you know, how much farther it has to go to the downside from here, I really don't know. I'm watching the chart.

10-year Treasury yields: Gundlach and the end of the bond bull market

Aaron Chan: And finally, 10-year Treasury yields are still quite elevated, 2.40% as of mid-session Thursday. So, Erik, any change in your outlook here?

Erik Townsend: You know, I'm really coming around rapidly to the view that Jeff Gundlach has been extremely right on. If he, if he got it right, he called it not just to the day, but I mean, to the hour. That guy nailed the trade. And what he said is basically the 35-year secular bull market in bonds ended this past summer. It's over. And that's due to Trump trade policy, Trump infrastructure spend policy, Trump hates Janet Yellen policy.

You know, you name it, there's a bunch of catalysts here that are, I think, I think driving a change. Even Jeff Gundlach himself, though, has said this move that we've seen all the way above 2.40% on the 10-year yield is overdone. He thinks it's going to pull back a little bit before it continues. I'd love to get Raoul Pal's view on this. We've, of course, heard from him in a full-length interview before the election. I'd love to know Raoul's view post-election. But the guy I really want to talk to about this one is Julian Brigden, because it occurred to me this week when we interviewed Julian I don't know, it must have been 6 months ago. He called the change from disinflation to inflation before anybody else was even thinking about it. We had people thinking he was nuts when he made that call, and that seems to be playing out. So my rule is whoever got it right before it happened is the guy I want to talk to about what's going to happen next.

So hopefully we can get in touch with those 2 guys.

Aaron Chan: All right, I'll see what I can do. Professor Steve Keen heads up the economics department at Kingston University in London and has been one of our most popular feature interview guests. Quite a lot has changed since our last interview with Professor Keen, so we're excited to have him back as this week's feature interview guest. Erik's interview with Professor Keen is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Steve Keen: Trump's fiscal stimulus and the Reagan analogy

Erik Townsend: Joining me next as our featured interview guest is Professor Steve Keen, economics professor at Kingston University in London. Steve, so good to get you back. It's great to have you back on the program. I really enjoyed seeing you on the other side of the table as the interviewer on Real Vision Television, interviewing Michael Hudson recently. And I definitely recommend that interview to our listeners who are Real Vision subscribers. But where I want to start today is, you know, it's fascinating to me that every single mainstream media pundit and commentator were all saying the same thing. If Donald Trump gets elected, equity markets are going to crash. Nobody said anything about the bond market. And of course, what's happened is equity markets went the opposite Bond markets are crashing. And the same exact people that got it completely wrong are now confidently saying, well, this is entirely about inflation expectations that have to do with Trump's trade policy.

And I just sort of think these, these guys have no clue what's going on. I don't put any credence in that just because they're saying it. I'm still trying to figure out what's going on. So what do you make of both the bond and stock market reactions to the Trump election? And what do you think of this mainstream narrative? Is it anywhere close?

Steve Keen: No. Well, the mainstream narrative, as always, is off with the fairies because they leave out the major causal factor in capitalism and then try to analyze it. So I don't take their, their, uh, prostrations about the trade impact, uh, at all seriously. What, uh, what I see happening is that people know Trump is going to be a big spending and tax-cutting president. The last person who was like that was Reagan, uh, and that Reagan used to be called the, the best Keynesian economist, that pro-Keynesian president that America ever had. And Trump's possibly going to put him in the shade. We know he's going to slash the top tax rates and to some extent down the bottom as well.

So there goes a large source of government revenue. We know he's going to spend up big as well on infrastructural projects.

And I think he'll actually succeed in doing that because he literally owes nobody anything, which is for Donald Trump maybe an unusual position. The Republican Party completely abandoned him. The Democrats tried to cut him off at the knees, or maybe even higher up. He confounded expectations and won against everybody. So he doesn't owe anybody any favors with the fact that he's now president. And he can ram through— I think we know that's going to be his style— the spending he wants, because he wants his name, as we know, plastered everywhere, including now. Rather than Trump airplanes and Trump airlines, it'll be Trump airports.

So we're going to see a huge fiscal stimulus to the economy. And I think that's what Wall Street was actually reacting to. What's going to happen if Trump gets the leadership? Lots of investment projects, lots of construction, lots of government contracts. And so bang up goes the stock market.

And on the other side, if you expect that level of spending, there is inflationary expectations built in there because if you have that gigantic increase in government spending, that's going to hopefully generate more employment. And there's plenty of unemployed people to be absorbed despite these fictional low unemployment data we're seeing right now. So with that base, There's a good reason to expect some inflation and increase in interest rates and therefore a fall in bond rates. I don't think the latter is going to last, by the way, but I can understand what happened in the immediate aftermath of the election.

Erik Townsend: Well, if we're going to draw that analogy or parallel to the Reagan election, it seems to me that Reagan, of course, did reduce taxes and spend like crazy, and that had the effects you described, but not until we got through the '81-'82 recession, which really began his presidency. And a lot of people would say that we're overdue for recession right now. So, do you think there's an argument that maybe before Trump has that heyday of spending and economic boosting, that maybe we're in for a cyclical downturn here?

Steve Keen: No, I don't, because of the fact that the Reagan administration was also the one that hit Bush number 1, and that was that there was a burst in the rate of growth of the credit bubble that's been driving the American economy since 1945. There was a slowdown in the rate of growth of private debt after a bit of a bubble before Reagan came into power. That's what caused the slump then.

We've already been through that back in 2008 and 2009, and credit in America is still growing. It won't grow anywhere near as substantially as it did in the past because with the level of private debt they've got accumulated in the subprime bubble hitting 1.7 times GDP, that's never been That's the highest it's ever reached. We're back down to about 1.5 and it's growing from that level. It won't grow particularly high, but it's currently— debt's expanding at about 7% of GDP per annum right now.

There was a bit of a— it looked like it was actually starting to slow down and go negative again. I think with Trump coming in, it's actually going to go up again. So I think there's going to be a positive boost to the economy from credit. Plus, Trump's spending programs at the same time.

I've been disappointing quite a few of my democratically aligned friends in New York on this recent trip by saying I think Trump is going to, by his policies, cause an enormous boom and get reelected in a landslide in the second term, unless something totally mad happens with the other parts of his administration.

End of the bond bull market? Private debt caps yields

Erik Townsend: Let's talk about this secular 35-year rally in bonds. And of course, before the election, Jeff Gundlach was very outspoken in saying, okay, it's over, the bottom is in in yields. I thought he was wrong. I thought we were still headed for some sub-1% yields. But boy, post-Trump election, it seems like maybe the reversal is on in force. What do you think? Is this it for the 35-year-old bond bull market, or would a recession take us to even lower yields?

Steve Keen: Oh, it's going to go. I don't think there's any chance for bond prices to keep on falling and yields rising because, again, of that level of gearing we've got. Again, I don't know that Trump takes this seriously. I certainly know the economics profession doesn't even look at it.

But with the private debt level as high as we've got, you simply can't have high interest rates. What's been driving the rates down is the rising level of private debt and the inability for this economy to carry rates anything like what was happening back in the '50s and '60s.

And even in the '80s and '90s. So the low yields are here to stay while private debt's still that high. Now, if you have sustained increase in rates— like, now let's imagine we got back to the 4% rate that I know is the fantasy level that the Federal Reserve would like to be operating at.

That would— 4% plus the margin you put on for commercial rates hitting about, say, about 6%, you're talking about close to 9% of America's GDP being necessary simply to service bank debt. Now, that's just unsustainable in the current circumstances.

So if it happened for a while, that would eliminate credit growth once more. You'd go from credit being at the moment 7% of GDP back to negative again, and you'd be in a recession. So I think we're going to bounce between the two over time. This is a short-term rally in bonds. I think it'll turn around. But it can be kept alive for a while on the sheer volume of government spending, and that compensates for the impact of, uh, of, you know, the extra burden of interest rate payments on private debt. So, um, I think we're going to see a bit of a rise, but it's certainly— we're never going to— we're not going to see a return to rates of anything like 4 to 6%. That's just not on.

What happens then?

Private debt, Trump and the people's QE debt jubilee

Erik Townsend: Well, I, I've asked that question myself, is, is how— what could possibly happen if we Even at historically normal interest rates, it seems to me like it's just impossible to service the debt burden at that point. And I would assume that that collapses the economy and that we end up with, again, lower yields as a result of that. I want to stay on this topic of private debt, though, because you've been very outspoken in your past interviews on this program that's saying basically private debt is the whole problem. We've got to do something to get it down. Now, Mr. Trump is not exactly the kind of guy who doesn't believe in debt. So how do you see the Trump presidency, which it sounds sounds like you think is very bullish in terms of growth and in other respects. What do you see happening with this private debt problem that you've spoken and written so much about in the past?

Steve Keen: Uh, well, that's one thing I find fascinating about Trump, because he's— one thing he's had in his personal history is enormous numbers of debt resets and debt write-offs and so on. So his attitude towards, uh, towards debt is very different to the Republican Party sort of sackcloth and ashes attitude. One must repay one's debts. So if he actually gets to realize that private debt's the problem in the economy as a whole, and that he's got the capability to reverse that by getting the Federal Reserve to do people's quantitative easing and make it into a modern debt jubilee, as I've been arguing for, for a decade, he might well do it. This is, this is something which I find quite intriguing, because if he did that, the impact of using the government's money creation capabilities to cancel private debt, as chaotic as the transition would be, would set off a boom potentially equivalent to the 1950s.

Now, if he wakes up to that, he's willing to do it, then he could do the debt jubilee that I've been arguing for, for a decade and not getting through the brains of neoliberally addled brains of Democrats for the last 2 terms. So, It's an intriguing thought that he could actually do that.

I don't know. I mean, I really— I'm going to hold my breath and see whether I get a phone call about, okay, how would we do this? Because if anybody can understand what's involved in doing it, it's somebody who's used accounting to his advantage for his entire business career. So yeah, it's one of those weird things that people— the last person you could expect to do it might actually be the very first person to do it, given his very elastic relationship with private debt himself in his own business career.

Erik Townsend: You know, it's something— as a person who doesn't particularly believe philosophically in debt jubilees, I think your model is by far the most responsible and moral that I've heard yet. Could you state it again just for our listeners who may not have heard it in your previous interviews here?

Steve Keen: Yeah, sure. Well, the bottom line is that we think about debt at a personal level. It's if you lend me your watch and I don't return it, therefore I've ripped you off for a watch which you had to save money to buy in the first place. That's the mental approach most people have to thinking about debt. In fact, debt is just simply created by banks writing an asset on one side and giving you a deposit on the other side of the ledger, which is a liability of theirs. They create it out of thin air. The whole idea that they're constrained in doing it or that it's something like lending gold is just the wrong way of thinking about it. Once you've got that straight, it simply says banks can create too much debt, and that can cause a financial crisis if you try to repay it when you've got more debt than you can actually handle.

That's the background. So what I've argued for is we simply have to get the debt down to enable the economy to grow as it used to in the '50s and '60s with both the turnover of existing money, which would rise if you reduce the debt burden, and with credit growth as well if we got back to a level of debt where people weren't worried about extending their leverage.

But if you do that just by writing off the debt, then you advantage people who speculated, you penalize people who tried to save their way through their own personal circumstances during the dot-com bubble and the subprime. So what I recommend is to use the government's money creation capacity so that rather than quantitative easing as is currently being done, meaning the government buys the bonds and debts of the private financial sector, It injects money directly into people's personal bank accounts, but requires anybody who's got debt to pay that debt down, whereas people who don't have debt get a cash injection they can spend. And that way you don't benefit debtors over savers, and you actually give a stimulus to the economy rather than crippling it, as what tends to happen when debt is reduced without any other compensating mechanism.

So a modern debt jubilee would use the state's capacity to create money, which they're currently using for QE, make it the people's QE, but the money would go to debtors and savers equally and reduce the debt burden on the economy.

Erik Townsend: You know, Steve, the thing that I really like about this approach that you've proposed is that if you're going to conjure money out of thin air using the government's ability to print it, you give it equally to everyone, and the people that are in debt are forced to use it to pay down the debt, but the other people get to keep the money, and it just sounds so much more fair and equitable. But hang on a second. The US dollar is really the currency of the world, and I presume that what you're proposing is the US government would give all citizens equal amounts of money. So what about the non-citizens? What about the people that have dollar-denominated debt around the world? How would they be affected by what you're proposing?

Steve Keen: Well, this would only be something which you could do through American bank accounts, so it would only benefit people in America. I think it's nothing more to call it one Donald Trump. And of course, if you had a— if you did it on a substantial scale, you wouldn't have to do it on a scale at the level that's actually needed to reduce private debt, which is where the level I see is where it should be, which is about 1/3 of what it is right now. But you could do it in small doses. But nonetheless, if you did, of course, that's going to give people extra money to buy imports with. So you would have potentially an increase in the trade deficit, and he's trying to rule that out.

So there's an argument in favor of using the government's capacity to control tariff levels to balance it. So you keep most of the stimulus domestically rather than letting it leak out internationally. So if he did this, he could also stick with his fairly nationalistic attitudes on trade as well and say, look, we're doing this. Unless you do the same as us elsewhere, we're going to restrict the benefit for America by by putting up tariffs so that the stimulus we give to— by creating the money stays in the American economy rather than leaking across to you lot who aren't pulling your weight. That sounds pretty much like a Donald Trump-style statement to me.

US dollar outlook

Erik Townsend: It sure does. If the Trump staff are listening to MacroVoices, who knows, maybe they'll pick up the idea. Let's move on to the US dollar. We, of course, recently saw the breakout above 97.50 on the dollar index and well above 100 now. Looks like the secular bull market in the US dollar is maybe back on. A couple of people have said they think it might be over, that it's associated with the Trump rally that they thought would fizzle out. What's your view on the US dollar? Do you think it's headed to 110, as some people have said, or is it already overextended here?

Steve Keen: I think it's likely to keep on going because, again, if Trump gets his stimulus program through, the American economy is going to boom compared to the rest of the world, particularly compared to Europe, of course, which is still locked in the straitjacket of the euro. So on that basis, with With an expanding economy, the usual story, people want to put their money where the assets are rising, and you'd get a revaluation of the American dollar continuing. So my expectation is the American dollar is going to continue rising, and that's before we see any probable breakup of the euro on the other side, which again, you take that currency out of circulation, the American dollar has to rise even further.

Inflation and the missing workers in the unemployment data

Erik Townsend: And the related subject obviously is inflation. A lot of people have said, okay, the Trump presidency really means that this is it, this is the moment where we shift from a deflationary trend or disinflationary trend into an inflationary trend on a secular level. Would you agree with that view? And where do you see it headed?

Steve Keen: I see it certainly regenerating some inflation. And of course, remember, central banks are trying to cause that right now rather than trying to prevent it, which is what's built into their DNA. But that inflation to me can only go— it can't go the full hog of setting up an inflationary spiral in the economy because we've still got that huge debt burden. We actually need to reduce the debt burden. Inflation is one of the ways to go about it. So I can see some sustained inflation coming out of it because people are wondering why we haven't got inflation right now and unemployment is, inverted commas, so low.

You don't need to go to the Breitbart News to find alternative data to that. You go to exactly the same data source you can find the unemployment data at. Louis— Federal Reserve's FRED database, Federal Reserve Economic Data. Don't look at the— check the unemployment data. That's called the U3 series. Plot that on one side of your axis. Muck around for a while and include another little series, which is put together both by the OECD and by the Bureau of Economic Analysis and Bureau of Labor Statistics. It's called the employment-to-population ratio. Graph the employment-to-population ratio for 25- to 54-year-olds.

And you'll see rather than an obvious recovery, which is what you see when you look at the unemployment data, you see that about 2% or more of that cohort is without a job compared to the number that had a job back in 2007. So there's a substantial slack in the American working-age population. It's equivalent to roughly 2 million workers when you account for demographic change over the last decade. There are about 2 million people who were working of that age cohort, 25 to 54, when they they won't be at university. They haven't yet retired. They're not looking to retire. Two million people in that cohort don't have a job right now, compared to those who had a job in 2007. And it's even worse when you look back to 2000 because that was actually the peak level of employment. The population ratio—you take that into account—there's about four million. People who would like to have a job who've fallen off the— in the— what the heck do they call it in the unemployment data, that little fix in the participation rate?

Not in the workforce. So the reason that you're getting such a fantastic-looking figure for the unemployment rate is 4 million people have been statistically moved into not in the workforce when they still damn well want a job. And they're the ones who voted Trump.

So I think you've got a fairly strong chance you can absorb absorb a pretty substantial increase in the working population of the country without triggering the huge increase in wages that are necessary to give you inflation. So I see it's going to— it'll be, it'll be a takeoff inflation to some extent, but it won't be a sustained and rapid boost because the economy is not in a boom right now.

The unemployment figures are a lie, and unfortunately the people probably promulgating that data, the Democrats, uh, in, in the Clintons And they're— and even the Krugmans of the world, they don't realize they're lying because they're relying on unreliable data.

Can central banks keep printing? QE and asset-market risk

Erik Townsend: Now, there's a theory that I've had for several years. So, Professor, maybe you can grade me on my term paper here, so to speak. I've always thought, as we were in a very deflationary backdrop, I've always predicted that, you know, what ends this game? What could happen that would tie central bankers' hands to the point where they couldn't continue to prop up asset markets in the economy by conjuring money out of thin air? And I always thought the answer was someday we get runaway inflation. And when that happens, It ties their hands because they can't just print money because that would exacerbate the inflation problem. First of all, do I have the theory right? And second of all, it sounds like you think, at least at this stage, we really might have inflation coming, but not the kind of runaway inflation that would be required to trigger the scenario that I described.

Am I on the right track?

Steve Keen: Well, the central banks can keep on printing money for the asset markets indefinitely. This is one of the dangers. There's no physical barrier to the capacity for the central bank to create money. That's twofold. One, because banks create money out of thin air and they're just another bank in one sense. The second part, however, is that a normal bank, like a private bank, has to have a positive equity. If you subtract its liabilities from its assets, you've got to get a positive sum or you are bankrupt. You get shut down. That's why Lehman collapsed so quickly. And that's why financial crises are such a rapid, rapid event. You can go from positive equity to negative Negative equity.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Steve Keen: in the blink of an eye with an asset revaluation and you're out of business. That never happens to a central bank.

They can actually operate notionally with negative equity because effectively their equity is the entire country. So there's— they can keep on doing it forever. Now, the reason QE hasn't given us inflation is because the circuitous path which they're trying to make it work is just total nonsense. First of all, they believe that by pumping up reserves, that'll give the private banks more to lend.

When they cannot lend from reserves. It is impossible, using the rules of accounting, for them to lend their reserves out. It just doesn't work. It's a stupid textbook model that it's about time they grew up and threw out.

The second side that can work is because they're buying bonds and shares and assets in general off the pension funds and so on. When they buy off the pension funds, they create money in the accounts of pension funds and And the like that are then stored with private banks themselves. But those pension funds are mainly required to buy assets with it. So they use that money to buy assets which drive up asset prices. The money leaks into the real world because, of course, they've got to employ people in those organizations, our delightful bond traders, the wolves on Wall Street. And when the wolves go shopping, then some of the money they get paid as fees ends up as income in the real economy. And that's where we're getting a small amount of the boost that QE actually generates.

Erik Townsend: Okay.

Steve Keen: But it's absolutely trivial compared to the amount of money they're creating there. So we're not going to get inflation in that route.

And the central bank's hands won't be tied by— they won't so much be tied by this ceasing to happen. If inflation actually takes off in the real world because of what Trump does, it won't tie their hands with asset markets, but it'll mean they stop doing it. Now, what that means What that means is potentially a crash in the asset markets because they've pumped up asset markets so much by QE that if they suddenly disappear, that can take away a lot of the buy pressure that's driven up share prices in the first instance. So we could have a bit of a paradox here. We could have an economic boom and a stock market slump.

Europe: Italy, France, Le Pen and the end of the euro

Erik Townsend: Steve, I want to move around the globe to Europe because post-Brexit, you know, a lot of people are talking about European exit contagion. Italian referendum, of course, is the most target on the horizon. Austria also. Tell us what's going on there and how do you see it, and what do you think this means for Europe? I'm really getting concerned about the future of the European Union.

Steve Keen: Well, I think it's got to— it's got to fold. The European Union was a great idea executed badly, and you just really can't sustain indefinitely a badly executed good idea. So, you know, a good idea being preventing The French and Germans from blowing each other up. The execution of that meant that France would like to sever its ties with Germany, and most of the rest of Europe would like to blow Germany up, and Germany would like to blow up the rest of Europe, all over the imposition of impossible rules for the euro that have caused a Great Depression in the Southern European countries and a boom in Germany because they've got a captive market that can't devalue.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Steve Keen: Against them. So it's a horrendous situation overall. And what we're seeing in Italy is Italy suffered all the way through with the change to the euro. It really hasn't grown for going on 2 decades now. And yet industrially, nobody's going to claim that Italians can't, for example, make really good cars.

The thing is they're losing out to Germans on selling good cars to their own customers because the lower rate of inflation in Germany has

Erik Townsend: That's right.

Steve Keen: And that's meant that prices, German prices versus Italian, even though the difference in inflation has been quite small, of the order of maybe 1% to 2% per year, you compound that for 15 years and you get a 40% or 50% cost advantage for German exporters selling to Italian customers. So the Italians have got every right to go— have got sick of the euro and want to break away from it. And that's a large part of what the no vote for this referendum implies.

Austria, similar sort of thing, plus all the racial overtones of too much of the migration impact.

The free movement of people, which is part of the euro, was something that was based on the idea of people having episodic reasons to move one country to another. You get a better pay rate, or you tend to prefer the weather in London to the weather in, say, Madrid.

But what was actually happening is systemic. You're migrating to get away from a failed state, which is what's happening to the southern European countries that are in the euro. Euro, and you go to somewhere which is unfailable, which is either Germany or Austria within the European Eurozone, or you go to England. So Brexit's first of all taken that exit route out. If Austrians also object, they're going to move out of the Eurozone for the reason just of getting away from free migration.

And with Italy, there's a strong sentiment to bring back the lira.

Now, of course, on the top of that, you've also got what's happening in France. So with Fillon becoming the center-right candidate and the Socialists having shot themselves in the foot by swallowing the neoliberal blue pill and imposing austerity on France and believing that would cause an economic recovery, you're going to see a battle between Le Pen and Fillon in the second round. And normally, you'd expect the left to come along and try to back Le Pen by voting for the center-right candidate, but the center-right candidate is just as right-wing on migration, on identity politics and stuff like that as Le Pen is, and promising IMF policies rather than anti-IMF. So France itself could go, and if she goes to— France goes to Le Pen, then I think the euro's days are over as of next year.

Erik Townsend: And if that were to occur, do you see this playing out as sort of a gradual decay where the European Union reverses its trend of growth into a decay period that lasts a couple decades, or is it something where you get to a point where a couple of key countries are gone and everybody just says, okay, that's it, and everything crashes at that point?

Steve Keen: Oh, it'll be catastrophic in the transition. It wouldn't be— it wasn't going to be smooth at all. If Italy pulls out, probably that's the end of the euro. If France pulls out, definitely that's the end of the euro. You're going to have a scramble as countries try to reintroduce introduce national currencies.

Some of those countries hopefully will sensibly say we're not going to pay our overseas debts. That's going to totally compromise the French and German banks. They're going to be in desperate need of a rescue. It'll be absolutely hell. It'll be— it'll mean— it'll make the Lehman Brothers crash look like a picnic. So I expect real chaos in the transition. But of course, if in the process those countries write off their overseas— their, their debts by just refusing to pay them and also devalue their currencies against the, the German mark, which is what the euro really is, then there could be a serious recovery in those economies as well. But the financial transition is going to be absolute chaos.

Erik Townsend: As this all happens, the Eurocrats would like us to believe that, you know, we cannot let the euro fall because peace in Europe, you know, the fact that we don't have wars in Europe as much as we used to, is all because of their precious I don't know if that's really true or if that's just the propaganda system for the euro. What do you think the knock-on effects are? Let's say that you're right and that the euro fails. The currency is gone. Europe goes back to national currencies, maybe eliminates the Schengen system, and we're back to borderless— Europe has gone away, separate countries. Does that mean that we've got increased geopolitical risk? What are the knock-on effects of that?

Steve Keen: this? I think geopolitical— I think the geopolitical risk comes out of staying in the euro rather than leaving it, because all you're doing is enhancing the rise of fascist attitudes towards non-nationals. Of course, we've got very first public fascists in Europe were Greek, not the usual shade of fascist in that front.

So it's just this anti-foreigner sentiment can arise anywhere. Anywhere if you give economic privation, which can be blamed on the foreigner coming in rather than what you're doing domestically. So to me, it's just the maintenance of the euro and the maintenance of the European Union as it currently stands is, is the recipe that's going to lead to this sort of social discord. That's why I was in favor of Brexit. The sooner we get out of the damn thing, the better. But of course, getting out of it is going to be catastrophic, and you would have things like, you know, the Schengen agreement might free movement might come to an end.

It'd be brutal, but it might make people wake up and say, boy, we did that badly. Let's go back and try to do something more sustainable, which respects national boundaries more than we ended up doing in the euro itself. The trouble is, of what I know of the euro bureaucrats, they still think they can move towards the idea of a European treasury where you tax differentially and have fiscal transfers to fix the whole thing. Thing up. I just think that's ludicrously optimistic given they're sort of the situation where Germans don't want to pay for Italians and vice versa. When of course, if you go back to the formation of the European Union, at that stage the basket case economy which other economies were helping out voluntarily was Germany.

So we've destroyed all the goodwill that came out of the end of the Second World War and the desire not to repeat these problems So it's, it's just, you know, you're looking at a classic bureaucratic mess. And these things which, if you start something poorly, it'll end badly.

UK university rankings and Keen's position at Kingston

Erik Townsend: Speaking of classic bureaucratic messes, I'd like to shift gears and kind of move to a personal question, if you don't mind. Something that I heard about recently is apparently there's a move on to categorize or define all of the education over there in terms of sort of a bronze, silver, gold system.

system. And it sounds like the funding for universities is gonna be dependent on how some bureaucrats someplace categorize them. I wonder what that means for you, 'cause you obviously are an economist of great international fame, so to speak. You went to Kingston University to take over the department there, and I know that that's a great place to be, but boy, I can't imagine Kingston University is on the gold end of this new spectrum. So what does this mean for you, and how do you feel about what's going on with this socialist classification of education over there?

Steve Keen: Oh, it's insane. I mean, the whole idea that you can classify an entire university as gold, silver, or bronze as an educational center on what they call the Teaching Evaluation Framework is just brain-dead stupid. You have brilliant people working in some institutions and useless ones. You have some people who are brilliant academics and lousy teachers, but everybody's going to get a gold standard level at Cambridge, and everybody's going to get a bronze at Kingston courtesy of this classification system. What that means in economics is that people will believe that— that amplifies the belief that you get the best education and everything if you go to one of the prestige universities. Now, all the non-orthodox thought, the sort of stuff that I've developed and that the non-mainstream people from Austrians to post-Keynesians have been developing, only gets done at the lower-ranked universities because inside economics. The mainstream just drives non-mainstream thought out.

So you get Oxford and Cambridge and Harvard and co. are just mouthpieces for the mainstream, whereas the divergent voices that have got some originality are in the minor locations. This is going to make it even harder for us to get students than it currently is with that status attitude that students currently have to choosing which university they go to, because all high school students know is high-prestige universities are better than low-prestige. They don't know that low-prestige universities are where innovative thought occurs in economics. So it's another damn handicap. And my response to it is to think I've got to find some other way of reaching the public and reaching students than going through the university sector. This, in some ways, is the final gasp of neoliberal thought being applied to universities, where they believe they can turn it into a marketplace and have no idea idea of what a market really is. Markets require repeat buying for people to be intelligent about what they're consuming.

Otherwise, markets don't work at all well. They're imposing an education where they simply failed in the first place. And that paradoxically is making it harder for us to escape from neoliberalism. So it's just the final straw for me to some extent. I think universities have been destroyed by this market-driven ideology. that these bureaucrats learned when they did a couple of years of university economics. And I'm trying to bring in sense, and what's bringing me undone? University economics yet again.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Keen's Patreon project and how to follow him

Erik Townsend: Well, I know you've got a new book coming out soon. Are you going to do anything else to try to spread your message other than through the university system?

Steve Keen: Yeah, I'm going to see if the public can help out here. You need a university structure to get education out at the moment. But that's because you can't get funding unless you're in a university. So I'm going to use the new Patreon site. If you've seen that, patreon.com, which enables people to be patrons of the artists they like, well, I'm going to have a crack at being an economics artist there and see if I can get enough support from the public to establish a clean online economics resource. I can't call it a university. That would trigger all the copyright rules, but an online resource where we we teach people a non-orthodox approach to economics and we develop it further with the assistance of the public and get away from the fact that universities are no longer a place where you can do paradigm-shifting work. You're only allowed to do stuff which conforms to whatever paradigms might dominate.

And that's the exact opposite of my whole approach to economics. So hopefully Patreon will help me spread the word more broadly than the university sector lets me do these days.

Erik Townsend: Well, I certainly applaud any effort to teach people how the economy really works, because clearly they don't teach it in universities. So is that something that's set up now, or do you have a timeframe? When should people be looking for that? Where can they follow you to find out about it? Was Twitter the best place to follow you to know when that's happening?

Steve Keen: Yeah, Twitter's the best place to follow us. Pretty— when it launches, it'll be patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen. That'll be where the page goes. And I hope I hope to be launching it between February and April. It's in the lead-up to the launch of the next book, which is April, May.

Next book: private-debt crises in China, Canada and Australia

Erik Townsend: Okay. And just refresh us, the next book, of course, is Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? Give our listeners a quick refresher on what that's about.

Steve Keen: Yeah. Well, it's basically saying once you understand money, credit plays an essential role in a capitalist economy. Credit causes rising debt. You get too much debt, credit no longer can grow, and you end up being stagnated in stagnation because of excessive private debt. That's what caused the financial crisis back in 2008. A number of countries evaded the problem by continuing to borrow— countries like China, Canada, Australia, Norway, Belgium, and a few others. And I now expect a financial crisis to occur in them over the next 2 to 3 years as they run out of spending power by getting too much private debt. So we expect to— expect the financial crisis in the peripheral countries, of course, including China. And that, when that finally rolls its way through, we're all going to be turned into the, what I call, the Walking Dead of debt. And that situation, the only way out is a debt jubilee.

I still, I'm not going to hold my breath on it happening, but I suppose in some ways, back to where we started, Donald Trump being in power means it might happen in the most unlikely of places with the most unlikely of leaders doing it.

Erik Townsend: Okay, so the book is, of course, Can We Avoid Another Financial Crisis? By Professor Steve Keen. That's expected out in April. The Twitter handle is @ProfSteveKeen, and the new coming website to actually teach what they don't teach in university is patreon.com/ProfSteveKeen. Steve, thanks so much for joining us for a fantastic interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer break

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now back to your host. Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: Michael Hudson interview and the bank-stock rally

Aaron Chan: Great interview, Erik. I wanted to start the postgame by talking about Professor Michael Hudson's interview with Professor Steve Keen on Real Vision. It was published just a couple of weeks ago, and I highly recommend it for our listeners who haven't seen it yet. Now, if you're not subscribed to Real Vision, well, then you should, but fret not. You can get a free 7-day trial. And if you use the partner code MacroVoices, that gets you a 10% discount on a full-year subscription.

Our listeners are obviously very familiar with Professor Keen, but are perhaps not as familiar with Professor Hudson, who is research professor of economics at University of Missouri-Kansas City and a research associate at the Levy Economics Institute of Bard College. He is a former Wall Street analyst and consultant, as well as president of the Institute for the Study of Long-Term Economic Trends.

All right. So, Erik, I love how they open up the interview with Professor Hudson explaining the crux of his book, Killing the Host, which is that the financial sector is very much like a parasite that has successfully convinced the host that it is an integral part of the host body. Now, you talked about the crazy equity rally we've seen since the election. If you look at the Dow, a substantial portion of those gains are driven by banks. Just look at Goldman, it's up 30%, JP Morgan up 20%.

Are the parasites trying to convince us that they're good for the economy? Or, I mean, what do you think is behind this rip higher in banks?

Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, I am a huge fan of Michael Hudson. I can't wait to read the book, and I love the title and the kind of play on words that he's using there. I think it's an excellent analogy. We ought to get him on our wish list to get on the program because I've always been a fan of his. As far as what's driving the bank stocks, probably it looks— I think a lot of people are persuaded that we're looking at a secular change in the direction of yields here, and of course higher yields give banks more room You know, to make more money. So I think that that's probably the explanation of the bank stocks. As far as the rest of equity markets, you know, again, as we discussed earlier in the program, I really could see this going either way. I think that the 2 schools of thought here that are forming is one just says, look, this is a changing of the guard rally where a bunch of new longs came in because they like Trump.

That's been played out. Equity valuations are just way overextended here. The other side of the argument is Trump is going to spend, spend, spend on infrastructure and the trade policies could be inflationary. Some people actually think that higher interest rates are inflationary because they increase the cost of money. I'm not sure if I completely buy that argument, but it's an interesting one. So there's a couple of schools of thought, and I'm on the sidelines waiting to see what plays out. I definitely think that equity valuations are very stretched here, but hey, I've been saying that for 2 years, so I'm happy to get out of the way of this. I certainly don't want to be short, and I'm waiting to see what happens.

Postgame: banking fragility and Townsend's changed view on central banks

Aaron Chan: All right. I want to stay on this topic of the banking system because you and I both know that the problems stemming from 2008, 2009 have only been papered over, and Monte dei Paschi of Italy is just the latest episode, now stalling to get a bailout after failing to execute on a private recapitalization.

Sure, central banks around the world can keep suppressing volatility with their asset purchase And by selling VIX futures. But the unresolved issues are starting to rear their ugly heads, but this time it's being met with rising populism around the world. So does this mean bankers will go to greater lengths to keep the game going with draconian financial repression, or are they starting to lose control here?

Erik Townsend: I think it's totally uncharted territory, and a place where my view has changed, and you heard it in this interview with Steve Keen, is I used to say, look, okay, we're coming up to an endgame, folks. What's going to happen here is central bankers are going to lose control control of the curve. And as soon as interest rates start to back up, what happens is the government cannot afford to pay its bills.

It's— the cost of debt service is too expensive. The government cannot continue to operate. And as there's a loss of faith in the government's ability to pay its bills and operate, that causes a loss of faith in Treasuries as being a safe haven asset. People fall out of Treasuries, and it's a self-reinforcing Professor Keen has a view that even in an inflationary environment, they still have plenty of room to keep on printing money. This has never happened before in modern financial history. We don't know what happens when all the central banks around the world are printing money like crazy. So far, all of the people, myself included, that said eventually they lose control of the curve and we get a massive recession, massive spike in yields that cripples the government and a Treasury market crash. That's still entirely possible, plausible. But I've definitely come around to appreciate the other view, which is they can arrest this pretty easily with more money printing.

So I don't know what's going to happen here. Certainly, we're seeing the beginning of a secular move in bond yields. I'm also watching what some of the spreads are doing in terms of junk versus Treasuries. And I, I don't really have a clear picture.

Julian Brigden is the guy that I would really love to talk to about this subject, because if anybody— if I think through all of our MacroVoices interviews over the last year, you know, who's the guy that really called what's happening here with a reversal in bond yields and a reversal potentially appears to be upon us from a deflationary or disinflationary trend towards an inflationary trend? Brigden is the guy who called it before anybody else.

Erik Townsend: So I would really love to talk to him about

Aaron Chan: All right, lastly, why don't you provide our listeners with an update on where we stand in terms of hiring a new producer and co-host for MacroVoices?

Erik Townsend: Well, I heard from quite a few people. I am, as soon as we get this show produced today, I've got to reply to everybody. I apologize, I was traveling. Couple things I want to set straight. This can be done from anywhere. I had several people say, you probably wouldn't consider me because I'm not in New York City.

Don't need to be in New York City, doesn't really matter where you are. And I am most interested really in trying I'm trying to figure out how to either find a sponsor or otherwise cut some production costs so I don't have to keep paying for this thing out of pocket. I've got a couple of companies that might be tasteful sponsors for the program, and I've got several people that have written me about the producer/co-host role. So I'm going to try to get back to them. I welcome more inquiries. Right now, we're still looking. If anybody doesn't know what we're talking about. Aaron is leaving the program because of a fantastic career opportunity that he's come into. And in last week's show, after the feature interview with Art Berman, we went into much more detail about exactly what Aaron's job entails and why we're looking for someone to replace him.

So please refer back to that if you're just coming up to speed on this for the first time.

Outro, Research Roundup and disclaimer

Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for that update, Erik. Anything else to add before we finish?

Erik Townsend: You know the story, folks. We really need your help promoting the show. We're getting some fantastic guests on the program. If you reach Tweet us every time you see that announcement on Twitter of the show coming out. Tell your friends, forward your Research Roundups, and most importantly, register your free account at MacroVoices.com, especially you accredited investors, because that's the statistic— how many registered users we have and how many of them are accredited investors. That's what we use to sell the really high-profile guests, the hedge fund managers, the people we really want to get on the program, on why this is worth their So register your free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you get the free Research Roundup email, which is a compendium of links to all of the coolest research that Aaron could find on the internet this week. So what do we got for them this week?

Aaron Chan: We've got an excellent lineup for you this week, starting with the latest investment outlook from Bill Gross and an excellent market update from Alex Gurevich. You'll also want to check out Raoul Pal's post on the horrid year it's been for fake news organizations. Organizations, and makes the case that nonconformist views need to be considered even more seriously than ever before. Finally, Jayant Bhandari has written an excellent 5-part series on the sudden demonetization of 500 and 1,000 rupee notes in India. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.

So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. Better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.

If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @MacroVoices. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

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Art Berman — petroleum geologist (as introduced on the show)

Opening announcement

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Erik's teaser: OPEC cut and Art Berman

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 41 was recorded a day early this week on Wednesday, November 30th, 2016, so that we could bring you timely reporting on the OPEC production cut announcement. I'm Erik Townsend. Today's OPEC meeting in Vienna has been the focus of much anticipation as traders have been speculating for weeks on whether or not a production cut deal would really happen. So it's no surprise that oil prices spiked by more than 8% to the upside overnight as OPEC announced a 1.2 million barrel per day production cut. But hold on, that's a cut back down to levels that were actually all-time highs just a few months ago. So how significant is this market-shaking news from OPEC that came out this morning? Fortunately, Aaron saw this coming and predicted that oil would be the hot topic this week. So he booked our favorite crude oil expert, petroleum geologist Art Berman. as this week's featured interview guest. Art and I will discuss the OPEC production cut and much more.

Art put together a fantastic slide deck in support of this interview just for MacroVoices listeners. Registered users can find the download link in your Research Roundup email that you already received. If you're not registered yet, Aaron will tell you how to get the download before the interview starts. We'll also have an important announcement about the future of the MacroVoices podcast after the new year. So please be sure to stay tuned for that right after today's feature interview.

Wrap: equities at new highs; Erik on the sidelines

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. We recorded the show early this week, and our market wrap was taped at about noon Eastern time on Wednesday. So please keep in mind that our commentary won't consider Wednesday afternoon and Thursday's tape action. But as of mid-session Wednesday, S&P futures were trading at 2,205 and have obviously broken out of new all-time highs since our last show before the Thanksgiving holiday. S&P futures hit 2,211 just after Thanksgiving. then broke out to another all-time high just this morning.

The high print so far has been 2,213 at about 9:00 AM Eastern time Wednesday. Erik, what's up with equities?

Erik Townsend: You know, if there's one way I can distinguish myself from other commentators, it's that when I don't know what's going on, I'll admit that rather than making shit up that sounds good. And frankly, I think there's a lot of that going on. So look, the same people who thought that equities would crash on a Trump victory and the same people who never saw the bond market reaction coming, Never predicted that. Now they're all confidently saying the same thing, which is that this is entirely about inflation expectations and trade policy around the Trump election. In other words, they're making shit up and repeating what other people say because they don't know.

So, you know, I was definitely one of the people that got this wrong. I thought equities were gonna move the other way on a Trump election.

And what I said was that because Trump was so critical of Janet Yellen's artificially low interest rates, that if he was elected, that was gonna put a lot of pressure on the Fed's to prop up equity markets with low rates. Now, what seems to be happening here is the market is interpreting part of that, which is the Trump win means no more artificially low interest rates, and that's leading to a sharp bond sell-off, or at least I think that that is the reason for this to be happening. For sure, inflation expectations are spiking, but, you know, I think that's a herd mentality thing, and I think that time will tell whether or not that trend continues or not. We don't know if the Trump election is bullish for stocks, Meme that we've seen since the election is gonna last or not.

If anything, I would say timing's about right. We know we're coming up on, you know, almost a month since the election. If this was a false move and it's gonna actually reverse to the downside, as some people have suggested, we should be watching for that to maybe begin. But, you know, as far as I'm concerned, I got the call wrong on what equities were gonna do. I can't explain this. I'm not gonna jump on board with this same story everybody else is telling about how it's entirely about trade policy.

Aaron Chan: Hmm.

Erik Townsend: driving inflation expectations. I don't think anybody really knows for sure exactly what is driving this market. So I'm on the sidelines. I think that the recession scenario, we're definitely overdue for that. I think the equity correction is overdue and coming before 2017 is out. But, you know, does it start before 2016 is out? I don't know. I'm just sitting on the sidelines waiting to see what happens next.

Wrap: US Dollar Index outlook

Aaron Chan: All right, we'll wait and see. Before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index, which traded as high as 102.12 just before the Thanksgiving holiday, a new 13-year high. So far, Erik, your dollar bullish scenario is definitely still playing out. Any updates on your dollar index outlook?

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I think it is still on. If anything, I wish that I had been a little more aggressive. I am long US Dollar Index futures. I've been looking for a pullback as an opportunity to add to that position, probably saw that Yeah. Yesterday when we saw a pullback down to 101, or actually below 101 to a 100 handle, and I thought maybe it had lower to go, and I was waiting for a sign of a bottom there, and I probably missed it because we're back to 101.56, and I wouldn't be surprised if we're back above 102 in the next few days here.

Of course, there are things on the horizon like the Italian referendum that are definitely going to affect the trade, but my general feeling is that the secular upward move in the dollar The dollar index is back on, and I think 103 is probably going to be a resistance level. And then once we break through that, 110 comes into view. So I think it's up and away from here on the dollar index.

Wrap: EIA crude inventory report

Aaron Chan: This is where we normally cover crude oil, but obviously our whole show this week is going to be dedicated to that subject. So, Erik, is there anything you want to cover now on crude oil before we move on to gold?

Erik Townsend: Yeah, when I taped the interview with Art, the crude oil inventory numbers had not come out yet. Wednesday morning's 10:30 inventory release wasn't there, so we were not able to include That. I want to cover that now, but I'm going to leave the rest of the subject of oil for the feature interview with Art. So after that interview was taped, we did get our inventory numbers. 884,000 barrel drawdown on national crude oil inventories, a little bit bigger of a drawdown than expected, but totally offset by across-the-board builds on everything else. Cushing, Oklahoma, 2.4 million barrel build on inventory, way above expectations. Gasoline, 2.1 1 million barrel build on inventory. Distillates, huge, just enormous, 5 million barrel build on distillate inventories in one week.

Now, normally all of these very large builds on inventory would be bearish for oil prices. But of course, it's all about OPEC this week. As we're recording here mid-session on Wednesday, $49.37 was the high. We're back up to $49.25 as I'm speaking right now. I wouldn't be surprised if we see 50 in the next day or so, because there's all of this enthusiasm. I think some of that enthusiasm is misplaced. I think Art agrees with me, but let's save that part for the feature interview coming up with Art Berman.

Aaron Chan: Great.

Wrap: gold, real rates and the December hike

Aaron Chan: Well, gold broke below the psychologically important $1,200 level since our last show. What's going on with the yellow metal?

Erik Townsend: Well, recall my thesis from the last show, which is I think a December rate hike is almost a certainty. And I think that that could potentially be a low point for gold. Maybe, maybe not. Some people think that gold has much lower to go here, so I'm watching it closely. $1,180 was— has been a key level in the last cycle, so it's kind of important to see whether $1,180 holds or not. Looks like maybe it's not going to. We've seen a couple of prints well below that on an intraday basis.

$1,170.30 looks like it was the low print so far. That was several days ago. This morning we saw $1,170 1171.30. We're back up to 1176 as we're recording just after noon in New York on Wednesday afternoon. So, are we going to see a close below 1180 and will it hold below 1180? That's going to be significant.

What's driving all this? You've said, you know, hey, if inflation expectations are spiking, shouldn't that be good for gold? The answer is a lot of people will think that Treasury yields are headed much higher and therefore bond prices much lower. Remember that Treasuries are effectively gold's competitor. So if the yield on Treasuries is expected to increase, that makes Treasuries a more attractive alternative relative to gold. And that kind of explains the conundrum with how could it be that even in the face of rising inflation expectations, there is still downside pressure on gold. The answer is if you expect much higher Treasury yields, then gold has competition In terms of another safe haven asset, at least in the eyes of most people, they consider Treasuries to be just as safe as gold, although I would personally disagree with that. That's kind of the consensus view.

And so how do you reconcile this? Well, the real answer is it's not about Treasury yields. It's about real interest rates, which means take the Treasury yield and subtract inflation from it. And that really is the number that gold has to compete with because gold can't deliver any yield. So, but it does keep up with

Aaron Chan: Right.

Erik Townsend: With inflation. So, in order to have an outlook for what real interest rates are gonna be, you've gotta have an outlook for inflation expectations. And I really think that that outlook is blurred by crowd psychology. Definitely, the expectation right now is that there is a massive, massive spike in inflation expectations. It's because all of the commentators on the cable networks are saying that that's true. And, you know, the herd is running in that direction right now. Whether or not Donald Trump's trade policy is really going to lead to a secular increase in inflation and therefore inflation expectations. As far as I'm concerned, the jury's still out.

Looks like that's the direction right now, but it remains to be seen.

So what happens for gold from here, I think, will have a lot to do with real interest rate expectations, and I think it's a moving target.

Wrap: 10-year Treasury yields

Aaron Chan: And finally, 10-year Treasury yields are still quite elevated, 2.38% as of mid-session Wednesday. So what's going on with fixed income?

Erik Townsend: This is definitely a result that is in reaction to the election of Donald Trump, but whether you say that's spiking inflation expectations or the other description that I gave a minute ago, which is just that this is about Trump being so critical of the Fed that they're not going to be able to get away with artificially suppressing interest rates, and it's, it's about Fed policy as opposed to inflation expectations, those are 2 different explanations for the Which one is right? I don't know. I don't think anybody knows. But my point is simply that this mainstream media, you know, everybody's so confidently telling the same story now. They're making shit up because it sounds good, and they're copying what other people are saying because they don't know. And I don't think anybody really knows. We need to watch the market and let the market tell us what this means.

Technicians are saying the next target is around 2.5%. A note out from Goldman this week says that 10-year yields above 2.75% or so is where they would start to really present a serious headwind that might get in the way of this equity rally.

So Goldman thinks the equity rally can continue until we get above 2.75% on the 10-year yield. As you said, we're still at actually 2.39% as we're speaking, just after noon on Wednesday afternoon.

I'd really like to get Raoul Pal's take on this because he's been a very outspoken person to say that we still are going to see sub-1% 10-year yields before this thing is over. Raoul said that before the election, though. I'd love to get an update. So if you can book him for a short interview in the next couple of weeks, that would be awesome.

Aaron Chan: All right, Erik.

How to download Berman's slide deck

Aaron Chan: I'll see what I can do. Thanks for the market update. Petroleum geologist Art Berman has been one of our most popular guests. So we brought him back to cover today's OPEC production cut announcement and for a general update on energy markets. Mr. Berman prepared a slide deck just for this interview, and we strongly encourage you to download it as Erik and Art will be discussing it in the interview. Registered users already received the download link in our Research Roundup email. If you're not yet registered, just go to MacroVoices.com, click the red Subscribe for Free button at the top right corner of the page, then click Register Your Free MacroVoices Account near the bottom of the page. Registration is free and only takes a couple of minutes. Once you're registered and logged in, click the Research Library function on the black menu bar, then click Guest Publications. You'll see the download link for Art Berman's slide deck at the top of the list.

Erik's interview with Mr. Berman is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Berman's first take on the OPEC cut

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is petroleum geologist Art Berman, one of our most popular guests ever. Art has prepared a slide deck for this discussion. For any of you who fast-forwarded to this point and skipped where Aaron told you how to get the download, don't send me an email angrily saying that there was no instructions. Go back and listen. We told you before the interview started where to get the download.

So, with that covered, out of the way, before we can even get to the slide deck, Art, the story and the world has changed since it was prepared last night, because of course this morning OPEC finally agreed to cut production by 1.2 million barrels per day, and that sent oil futures up more than 8% overnight from last close on Tuesday afternoon. But I want to make sure we put this in context. That's a 1.2 million barrel cut all the way down to 32.5 million barrels per day, which was an all-time record high level just a few months ago. So this production cut is really just going back to where we were as a new all-time high, you know, less than a year ago. So what's your take before we get into the slide deck, Art, on the news out of OPEC this morning?

Art Berman: Right, Erik. Well, it's— of course, it's anyone's guess, but my take is that They had to deliver something at this meeting, because if they didn't, the bottom was gonna drop out of oil prices. I mean, they've been doing this dance now for, what, since February, mid-February of this year? And there's really no— there's no material reason for oil prices to be in the mid-$40s, although it's a perfectly fine price as far as yield curves and inventories and all that go. But realistically, There's no reason why it should be 45 as opposed to 40 as opposed to 35, since it's been in that territory for some time.

So my sense is that this agreement was more about a floor than a ceiling, that the internal negotiations and discussions were something like, you know, if we don't deliver something, the bottom's going to drop out of this market, and then we're really going to be hurtin'. So we got to give them something. We can worry about the details. And of course, with OPEC, the talk is great, but, but, you know, let's actually see how, how the execution works. Let's see the action. And of course, none of that's happened.

So what do we know? We know what people have murmured, that, you know, something like half the cut, half a million barrels, is going to come from Saudi Arabia, supposedly. Somebody said that almost the rest of it is going to come from Russia, 400,000 barrels a day. Russia said, we think that's excessive. So, in other words, we don't know anything. We don't know anything more than we knew last night. And if you— if we would have had this interview last night, I would have told you, I guarantee they're going to come up with something. They're going to cut something because they have to. So in a way, what's occurred is not— it's not really news for me.

It's obviously news for the world, and that's great, and prices have responded. But in a way, maybe not even so much. I mean, they've gone up a couple of bucks, but to that extent, I mean, an awful lot of this cut has been priced into the market for how long. And like you say, the level that they're cutting to is not exactly something that's gonna restructure the oil market. So that's, that's my early take. And of course, I don't think anybody knows anything more than I just told you right now. And if you do, tell me, because I'd love to know about it.

Why OPEC cannot fix low prices: Berman's six points

Erik Townsend: Well, I should point out for our listeners too that we're speaking before the inventory numbers even came out on Wednesday morning at 10:30. By the end of this interview, those numbers will have come out and we'll have a chance to discuss them. But as we're speaking right now, I'm looking at $49.26. That's about 8.5% up from yesterday's close. So it's a significant move, but, you know, it's back up to where it was a few weeks ago. It's, it's still well below the— was it $52.22 was the high on this cycle from, I guess it was about 6, 8 weeks ago.

So with that, let's move on, I think, to the first point in your slide deck, page 2, which that you say OPEC really can't fix the problem of low oil prices anyway. I think you've alluded to some of that, but why don't you go ahead and start to walk us through what you've got in this presentation for us?

Art Berman: Sure. The premise that I come from— and don't get me wrong, I'm not at all opposed to higher oil prices. In fact, they would work very well for me personally. My business is drilling wells, producing oil. So, you know, I— it would be great if we had higher oil prices, but I am skeptical because my foundation is always in fundamentals, and we know that fundamentals don't always rule the market. But in this particular case, I mean, sentiment has really ruled the market more than anything else for most of— gosh, most of the time since oil prices collapsed, you know, 2+ years ago. But so the premise is that, okay, OPEC's gonna cut supposedly 1.2 million barrels. That's great, but what's that going to accomplish?

And the key points I want to cover are, first of all, Well, cutting production, the idea is to bring the market into balance. We've heard how many times that there's this horrible glut, this unbelievable oversupply of oil. Well, not really. I mean, if you look at the data, we're something like 250,000 barrels a day above market balance, just taking production minus consumption, and it's been that way for 6 months now. The market doesn't get any closer to balance than that. The notion of an equilibrium oil market is, well, it exists only in the minds of men. As long as you've got storage, it is a disequilibrium system.

And in previous posts I've done, I looked at when the market has been within 250,000 barrels plus or minus, and what are the prices that you get. And You get any— just any price you want. I mean, there's nothing magic about market balance. But the fact is, we're effectively in market balance. So what's the cut going to accomplish? I mean, that would be the main purpose of the cut.

The second point, and it's related to the first, is we've got way too much oil in storage. And people somehow think about market balance as production minus consumption. But But, but storage is a big part of both supply and demand because it is a disequilibrium system that, that you almost never have available everything you need, which is why every week we look at the inventory numbers to see how much was added to storage or how much came out of storage. And that's why it affects the price as much as it does.

Third point is supply is what everyone's focused on, and that's great. But what about demand? And the truth is, is that demand growth is very weak. Now, that doesn't mean we don't have demand. It's demand growth, the rate at which demand increases. And we're way below the average for the last 4 years or 6 years or 8 years. And so, so that's a, you know, that's a problem going forward. That why is demand growth as weak as it is? And we'll talk about that.

The fourth point is U.S. production started increasing again before any of this happened. Last couple of months, we've we've had it sputtering around, going up a little bit, going down a little bit. But the the decline in U.S. production is is is over, and and EIA has been forecasting this for a while. The rig counts are way up from where they were in in mid-year. And gosh, you know, you drill more wells, you produce more oil. And the U.S. is the prime offender when it comes to the imbalance in the market. We want to blame OPEC, but as we'll see when we get into the deck, it's the U.S. that's the biggest part of the problem. And there are some OPEC members that are problematic, like Iraq mainly, and Iran more recently.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Art Berman: The second-to-last point is that the press wants to tell us that OPEC is desperate for higher prices. Well, what's the basis of that? And don't get me wrong, just like me, they would love to have higher prices. There's no doubt about it. But how do we define desperate? How do we measure desperate? And if we look at at the foreign exchange reserve account. The reality is, is that the principal members of OPEC that control so much of the production, I don't see a case for the fact that they're desperate, and certainly not Saudi Arabia. Saudi Arabia is way down on their cash reserves, but they're way above any year previous to 2010. So comparatively speaking, they They're fine.

And then finally, it's the economy, stupid. The answer to all of these questions, all of the 5 previous points, is that we've got a super weak, fragile global economy. And a price, you know, production cut is nice, but it's not going to fix the weakness in the global economy. We've got an economy That's burdened by debt, and low oil prices are really a response to that fundamental underlying weakness.

So that's where I came from last night before the cut was announced, and sitting here this morning after the cut was announced. First of all, let's wait and see what action is in fact taken beyond words. And second, you know, back to the points that I made, it's hard for me to see that this is going to fix low oil prices beyond the initial buzz that we're seeing right now.

Market balance and what ended the oversupply

Erik Townsend: So, going back then to your first point— that was an excellent summary, by the way— so, we'll drill down now on each one of those points. Your first point was the market is already in balance. And we should point out for any listeners who don't follow this closely that, for sure, the market was dramatically Dramatically oversupplied with too much oil to the tune of at least 2 million barrels a day. But as your graph on slide 3 here shows, that's history now. That's something that happened, you know, a year and a half ago, and it hasn't been true, as you say, for 6 months. What else can you tell us on this next slide here?

Art Berman: Well, as I said in my introduction, market balance is a human construct. It's an That you know that balance particularly accomplishes anything, and and the notion of equilibrium in a commodity market for me is is just bizarre. That that exists only in economic theory, and so the the the important point and the important issue is if we're if you accept what I'm saying that twenty five you know point two five million barrels a day is about as close to balance as you ever get.

Then why haven't prices responded more than they have? And I would argue, and if you look at graph 2, you can see that prices have moved up somewhat from low 40s to mid-40s, as we know. And, and if you didn't know anything else, you could say, oh well, that's, that's in response to approaching market balance. And I'd say, well, maybe, or at least approaching market balance isn't a negative, but I think most of that has to do with a couple of things. First, everybody's desperately waiting for an OPEC production cut. That's— so it's sentiment, it's market sentiment that's, that's been buoying up the price of oil.

And importantly, we've had some very anomalous withdrawals, or reported withdrawals, from US storage since the beginning of September that, you know, we can, we can talk about You know, are they even real? But whatever, you know, we've seen some some very peculiar behavior in U.S. inventories, which the market has responded to generally more positively than negatively. So that's that you know that that's the problem. The problem is is that you would expect prices to be higher or at least more stable than than they have. than if in fact market balance oversupply is the issue.

And I think you nailed it, Erik, and that is that this thing all started back in— well, it really started in January of 2014 when we started to see this imbalance. But the initial symptom, the superficial reason, was way too much oil being produced relative to demand or consumption. That largely got fixed. 2015 was a pretty bad year for oversupply, but Towards the end of 2015, prices got low enough, they got below $30.

And, you know, strange as it sounds, market discipline de facto has gone into effect. People are drilling better wells or better locations. They've cut a lot of staff, they've cut a lot of costs, they've hammered the service industry prices way down. So So it's, you know, there's an efficiency that has come into the market. So that's really the issue.

Erik Townsend: Hang on just a second, Art. I want to go back to this issue about oversupply because the level that OPEC just announced that they would cut down to, that's 32.5 million barrels per day. They had never ever in history produced that much oil Back when the market was oversupplied dramatically. So clearly, you know, OPEC has just been increasing production.

It's not like OPEC has solved the problem by anything they've done. So is it all coming out of US production? Has that been the reason that we have gotten away from this 2 million barrel a day oversupply, or is it something else? What has solved the problem?

Art Berman: Tough question. US production has fallen by a million barrels a day. So US production is certainly a big component of it. The other piece is that in 2015, demand went way up. I mean, we had demand growth at 2.5 million barrels a day in response to lower prices. So it always works on both sides of the disequilibrium.

Lower production and higher demand in response to lower prices. So, you know, it's difficult in any given month to account for all the pluses and minuses in the equation. So, but, but I think that, you know, the, the big components are, are those principally. US, Canada to a lesser extent. Canada's production is kind of more inelastic, if you will, because the oil sands are the major component. And once you start getting those online, you don't turn them off the way you can with shale wells in the US.

Storage, Cushing and heavy-oil imports

Erik Townsend: And going back to your next point, which is too much oil in storage, you know, for you and I, we're both concerned that we might be getting to the point where Cushing, Oklahoma could run out of space. And it seems like that problem is pretty much abated now. What, what else can you tell us about what's going on with the storage picture?

Art Berman: Well, I think the, the storage picture is, is fluid. It's very dynamic. And obviously, the Cushing story is that, is that there's been a considerable amount of takeaway capacity that's been added through mainly pipeline reversals. So Cushing a year ago or so seemed to be the key to everything for me, understanding, you know, price response, and it's become less so.

Now overall inventories and comparative inventories absolutely rule, but it's become more of a shell game to understand You know, is it is it Cushing? Is it Cushing plus Gulf Coast, or is it or is it total U.S. stocks? And more recently, it's it's become more of an issue of of total U.S. stocks. I think there's there's some misperceptions about what exactly is our our crude oil capacity, and and you know we tend to think of that as you know that we've been teetering on the edge of of maxing out.

And the reality is that there's more, that if you actually dissect the EIA numbers, you find that they're, you know, that it's not quite as critical as we thought. But mainly, the, you know, the issue for storage, for me, has become much more of an issue of imports than it has US production. That that as I look at fluctuating storage volumes on a weekly basis, it's it's almost always.

I mean, production is kind of has been sort of slowly declining, but it doesn't have that much that much variability on a weekly basis.

It's imports, and so why why are we importing so much oil? And I think the answer is very straightforward, and that is that. We we've got to import the heavier oil to blend with our ultralight that's come to dominate U.S. production. We simply can't refine the the amount of oil that we're producing, even at a lower level. And so the only way to deal with it is to bring in heavier oil to mix with it. And that's a a side of the story that I don't think has really surfaced very strongly.

Except a year or so ago when there was a lot of movement to repeal the crude oil export ban, which was done. And incidentally, it didn't accomplish hardly anything in terms of increasing U.S. exports, and it hasn't solved the problem of too much ultralight oil. So that's, you know, that's a, that's a quick summary of a sort of complicated story.

Weak demand growth and debt

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to your next point, which was demand growth is What's the story, and what can you tell us about the graph on page 5 of your slide deck here?

Art Berman: Well, you know, again, it's all got to do with, with affordability, Erik. I mean, I think that's, that, that's the big issue that's, that's emerging here for me. And, and, and that is that our demand, our willingness to spend money on energy in general is extremely price sensitive since the— well, certainly since the financial collapse back in 2008, but I think you can, you can trace it back even farther.

So it's a little bit like the, the ads you see on television for, you know, it's Ford Truck Month. You don't think you can afford a new truck, but let's, let's show you how that's, that's not really true, that That, you know, you don't make any payments for 5 years, and you don't have any interest for 7 years, and we write you a loan for 8 or 9 years. So, you know, rest assured, you can afford it. So it's all about debt. And so we've pushed so much of our economy into the, into the realm of debt. Let's, let's, let's, let's pay for what we need or what we want today, and we'll worry about how we pay it off later. And I think what, what 2008 showed was you can't push it any farther, that, that the economy, the world economy, is, is maxed out on debt. And, and that has had a pronounced effect on people's willingness to spend money.

You remember George W. Bush right after the financial collapse, you know, trying to cajole people into going out and shopping Spend some money, guys. And of course, the central banks' efforts, not only in the U.S. but, you know, elsewhere, certainly in the developed countries, has been to try to get people to spend money, try to increase the so-called velocity of money. And it hasn't been very effective, no matter what we've done.

So demand for everything is weak because people are maxed out on their ability to meet debt service. You give them a little extra money, Cash for Clunkers, or whatever. And what do they do? They, they pay down debt or they, they save money. And they don't go out and buy the Ford trucks. They don't go out and refinance their homes. They don't go out and, you know, buy new furniture the way that we used to because we can't. So this is a, you know, a huge problem that is certainly not exclusive to crude oil.

US production rebound and the Permian rush

Erik Townsend: Next topic, of course, is that US production has started increasing. And I'd really like, because you're in this business, Art, to get your perspective not only on what's happened, but what you're hearing and what the sentiment is in terms of your customers. Is everybody gung-ho and saying, okay, look, this thing's over, it's time to ramp up and drill as many oil wells as we can? Or is it a wait-and-see thing? Or is it about hedging? Or, you know, what's going on?

Art Berman: That's a really good question, Erik. It's a race to the bottom is what it is what's happened is that the investors, the capital providers, and have concluded with all of the problems in the US oil industry, the bankruptcies, etc., that, that they've got to be more selective. And the Permian Basin in West Texas and southeastern New Mexico has emerged as the preferred group of survivor companies and oil supply for the United States. And so the Bakken and the Eagle Ford, which were, you know, all the rage a year or 2 or 3 ago, those are less favored basins these days, plays, if you will.

Not to say that they've been abandoned, but those are, you know, as far as the capital providers, the investors, they're saying, you know, we need to greatly reduce the number of companies and plays that we're going to put our money in.

It doesn't mean there's any less money going. Eagle Ford is basically— I won't say it's dead, but it's lost huge momentum. It's way out of favor. Bakken, and not so, you know, it's kind of lukewarm. The Permian is the great hope. This is, you know, I've written a post called Saudi Permian. And of course, just, just a week ago, we had this crazy news barrage about how there's some new US Geological Survey study says that the Permian Basin's got 20 billion barrels of of resources, and all of a sudden, you know, we're— people are beating their chests about how we don't need Saudi Arabia anymore, we're, you know, we're on our way to energy independence. We see this kind of nonsense, you know, it emerges from time to time. So, so the story is that the Permian Basin has— it now accounts for 65% of the US Total rig count. Total rig count. It's crazy.

And people are spending upwards of $60,000 an acre for leases for land in the Permian Basin. I've never seen anything that even remotely parallels this in my almost 40 years in the oil and gas business. A couple of years ago, when shale gas was going berserk, we saw $30,000 dollars an acre in the Haynesville Shale. And we're talking double that right now.

So this, this is a rush. This is an absolute oil rush, gold rush kind of phenomenon. So it's all focused in one place. And, and the thinking is, oh well, these plays are actually commercial at current prices, which is only true if you exclude a whole lot of costs and play around with the numbers. But So, so that's, that, that's the deal. But the Permian, you know, let's not sell it short. There's something like, you know, 2 million barrels a day of production that increased just in the last— since 2010. Probably 60 or 70% of that is from 3 plays that all have to do with horizontal drilling and hydraulic fracturing. They're not shales, for the most part, but, you know, we're not going to split hairs.

And this is a basin that, you know, gosh, it's been producing oil for over 100 years. I mean, it's, it's got a great petroleum system, a lot of relatively little wells, but you put them all together and it does produce a fair amount.

So that's where things are going. Happy days are not here again, but if you're in the Permian Basin, it's boom times and things are going berserk out there. If you're in the Bakken, it's okay. If you're in the Eagle Ford, not so Not so good.

Venezuela, Nigeria, Libya and Iran supply risks

Erik Townsend: Your next point is OPEC is not as desperate as many people believe for higher prices. I'd like you to comment on that, but specifically on the difference between different countries, because one thing I've read a lot about recently is just Venezuela is really in trouble. And that situation may have its roots in other things besides oil prices. But it sounds like without a significant recovery in oil prices, that country could fall apart. And I tend to think in terms of, okay, what does that mean in terms of reflexivity? You know, when that happens, if Venezuela is going to fall apart, if there's not a significant increase in oil prices, which neither you or I see coming, well, that means a bunch of supply is likely to come offline at some point if somebody doesn't bail them out. And so, how does that play into the whole picture?

So, could you just comment in general, but particularly on that point?

Art Berman: Yeah, Venezuela is a mess. I mean, there's just no doubt about it. And Venezuela has has been a mess for the better part of this century. High oil prices for certainly from— well, with the exception of the financial crisis, from about 2005 through mid-2014 bailed them out of a lot of hurtful situations. But they had a populist ruler, this Chavez guy, who basically took a lot of that oil money and just gave it to the people to buy their votes.

He was selling oil to Cuba until very recently for almost as low a price as he was subsidizing it for his own people. And so Venezuela, under Chavez, And he basically destroyed their national oil company, PDVSA. He, you know, he fired most of their competent technical people. Production was faltering, even at high oil prices, just based on mismanagement and incompetence. So the seeds of what we're seeing in Venezuela were sown a long time ago.

And of course, the United States and Venezuela have been at each other's throats politically and economically for way back into into the Bush administration, certainly. So Venezuela has, I think, you know, high potential for becoming a failed state. And and what are the implications of that? Venezuela has huge reserves. Most of those reserves are heavy oil, oil sands, if you will, and and that's not. So the reserves and their production, there's a big gap between them. But yeah, I mean, the United States imports a, you know, a reasonable amount of oil from Venezuela. And if they were to go offline entirely, that would be a big problem for the world. Now, what you, what you can see in, in the chart, the right-hand chart in slide 7, is that this is happening in sort of a, you know, a gradual way, that Venezuela's production has been tapering.

And my guess is that we probably won't see a catastrophic ending of production because the government there will— that's going to be the, you know, the resource of last recourse. That's their only real source of revenue. So they're going to find ways, I think, to, you know, to keep production from absolutely cratering. But, but I expect it's going to continue to, to, to decline. So I don't see that as necessarily, you know, being a cause for more concern than, than, than we've seen for the last certainly 6 months or 18 months. But it could develop. I mean, popular unrest, if they actually you know, end up losing control of the state, then that's going to have an effect on oil production. So Venezuela is a special case.

Nigeria, you know, their production's way down, mainly because the government stopped paying off the rebels who are bombing pipelines and causing a lot of disruption in the Niger Delta. I don't quite know why they haven't just decided to resume payments to those guys, and I expect that that will happen at some time fairly soon.

But Nigeria has certainly has the potential to increase its production by half a million barrels a day very quickly if they just, you know, if they just do what they need to do in the Niger Delta region.

And then Libya is the other country that has upwards to a million barrels of capacity that has been effectively on-off to varying degrees since they ran into civil unrest there back, you know, back in 2010, 2011. So what I'm saying, Erik, is that I'm very concerned about Venezuela, as you are. Don't get me wrong. I don't in any way mean to diminish the potential for for disruption of the oil market in Venezuela. But I also see that certainly Nigeria, Libya have good potential, and there's reason to expect that we're going to see some of that made up.

And of course, then there's Iran that's come on very strong with 800,000-plus barrels of oil production that wasn't there last November. You know, with OPEC, with these funny countries, you know, that are so dependent on oil, there— it's always, you know, there's always offs and ons compensating production. And that's what we've always seen. And Venezuela, like I say, is extreme.

But there is some— there are these these compensating aspects.

Is OPEC desperate? Saudi reserves, Aramco IPO, $70 oil

Erik Townsend: Going back to Saudi Arabia and the other countries that have more pull in terms of OPEC's decisions, you know, I hear a lot of people, a lot of traders saying, okay, look, we've got the first production cut, probably more production cuts are coming because obviously this was just a token production cut, cutting down to a level that was an all-time record high just a few months ago.

As far as Substantive cuts that would actually cause some of these predictions of $75, $85, $95 oil prices. I'm having a hard time putting that one together, Art, because from what you're saying, it sounds like the OPEC needs to continue having token cuts if that's what it takes to keep prices around $50 a barrel.

But the argument for why they would have to make a substantial cut that would actually push prices back up, you know, would draw down from all this oil in storage and push prices back above $80 a barrel. I'm not really seeing the logic for why they would do that. Do you see it differently?

Art Berman: No, I see it the same, Erik. And I think it's— so on the one hand, I'm saying that, that let's just talk Saudi Arabia for a moment and look at the graph on the left of slide 7. I mean, You know, that's basically their cash reserve. And sure, it's, it's way down. I mean, they've burned through almost $220 billion since this oil price collapse began. And, and you can make much of that if you like, but relative to, to previous levels of cash reserves, they're, they're still above every year before 2010. They got a lot of money in reserve.

They're not running out of cash. They've got twice as much as the United States does in cash reserves. Not that that should be particularly comforting, but that's the reality of the situation.

My sense is that, look, this debt thing and these budgetary issues affect everyone. They affect companies and they affect countries. And whether you're Saudi Arabia, who is in relatively better shape than, than much of the rest of OPEC, or, you know, or if you're Venezuela, I mean, you got to have cash flow. And, and, and countries and companies, whether they're shale companies in the US or, you know, whoever, you know, they're, they're gonna produce oil at a loss to generate cash flow to keep the lights on, to maintain their debt service, and etc. And that's just, you know, that's the reality. So how much, you know, I want— I say on the one hand that OPEC's not desperate, but the fact that it's taken them so long to put this cut together, and the fact that they couldn't deliver on a freeze, to me speaks volumes about how important cash flow is to the, just the maintenance of some kind of equilibrium in terms of fiscal budgeting.

So I don't see a lot of appetite for, you know, for successive cuts, especially when you look at the other side of the equation, which is going to be increased US production. Let's not forget that But it was mostly US overproduction that at least precipitated this oil price collapse back in 2014. And there, I think it's, it's more than fair to say that if there was in fact a Saudi strategy to try to stem the flow of capital to the unconventional oil sector, not just US But, you know, oil sands in Canada, deepwater, etc.

It has not been very effective. In fact, it hasn't been effective at all on US unconventional production. Been more, more effective on the oil sands, more effective on the deepwater, but the appetite for investors, capital providers, to keep funneling money into the shale plays, it just hasn't happened.

They haven't stopped, and and so you know at some point again you know assuming that was their strategy and we don't know that's failed.

So the other thing you have to look at is Saudis in the middle of of a huge shift in in their in their culture and their their economic focus. They've got a young prince who's sort of running the show over there. This You know, Mohammed bin Salman, and, and the ideas to try to diversify their economy. They— we keep hearing about an IPO for Saudi Aramco, which I think is very real. And, and so the controversy in the debate is how to value Saudi Aramco.

And, and if oil prices are not at some respectable level, whatever that is, then those reserves, their value drops, and they can't, they can't raise money. So I'm, I'm saying, you know, for Saudi, their focus is perhaps a year in the future to when this IPO for Saudi Aramco occurs. And, and so I think that, like, they're going back to my initial comments, this agreement, this production cut, I think was about a floor and not a ceiling. The, you know, whether or not they're there, they can move towards a higher price. I mean, $70 oil, I just don't— I don't see any technical way to get to $70 oil until, you know, going back to, you know, to slide 4. I mean, we've got to— we've got to go through at least 350 million barrels of OECD advanced nation liquids storage before we could— we have any possibility of getting there.

And as I say in that slide, you know, that, that's the equivalent of almost 1.5 million barrels a day for a year just that's coming out of storage. So it's just very, very difficult for me to see what has to happen to get to $70 or $80.

That's— I I just, I'm not saying it's possible, it's impossible, but the only way I see it is, is, is by major outages. And of course Venezuela is one that we can talk about. And but, you know, we're talking about, about civil unrest, wars, that kind of thing that could cause a, you know, a production deficit, an outage sufficient to actually cause supplies to become tight.

Energy, debt and the economy

Erik Townsend: But we still got to work through that storage, and that's going to take a long Unfortunately, we've only got a few minutes left, so let's touch briefly on your final point, the economy, stupid.

Art Berman: Yeah, we just, we just don't want to look at what's happened to our economy. And I, of course, see it very much related to the cost of energy. And so we had these huge dislocations huge increases in the price of oil back in the mid-'70s through the mid-'80s. And, and that just resulted in a fundamental restructuring of the global economy because the economy runs on energy.

We've talked about this before. I can't say it enough times: energy is the economy. Money is, is a call on energy. And, and, and what we've done, what we certainly in the US— who, you know, it's not all about the US, but it's a lot about the US as the leader of the world economy— the way that Ronald Reagan and some of his successors, all of his successors, the way they dealt with the impact of those elevated energy costs was through debt.

Okay, and so we look fondly back on the Ronald Reagan days and Make America Great.

Well, what Ronald Reagan did, among other things, was he got us really on the debt wagon. And, and so now we've gotten to a point where, where our debt, it exceeded GDP, gross domestic product, right after that, that period of oil shocks. And it hadn't gotten any better, it's gotten worse. GDP growth has been declining since, since just after that initial oil shock. And then we got, we got another big one that, you know, that just, just burst here a couple of years ago. So, so we've got a situation where we, you know, we have economists and politicians scratching their heads and trying to say, why can't we recover the economy? What's happened to growth? And the answer is the cost of doing business has increased tremendously. And that's the cost of energy, which for the most part is the cost of oil.

And, and even at today's depressed oil prices, we are still 40% higher constant-dollar 2016 oil prices than we had from 1986 to 2003.

And I just don't know of any business that I've ever been in or been associated with that can stand a 40% increase in their underlying cost of doing business business and still grow. I think, you know, maybe organized crime, I don't know. But that's the problem, that, that we, we've just gotten ourselves into a US and a global situation of debt dependency that has now come due. And the financial crisis should have been a wake-up call. We solved that problem of too much debt with more debt. So to me, the, you know, the, the energy debt Debt, global economy, oil price situation that we're talking about there, they're all a common topic, really.

Are EIA inventory numbers reliable?

Erik Townsend: Art, I had hoped that we would be able to not only get into your conclusions slide, which I think is pretty self-explanatory here, but also really talk in detail about inventory. Inventory numbers have come out while we've been talking. Unfortunately, we're really up against our time limit. What I do want to One thing I want to mention is you've got a really interesting theory that a lot of these inventory numbers that the government's reporting may actually be wrong because of some accounting funkiness that's going on there. You've got an excellent blog post that goes into that in detail. We're going to have a link to that blog post in this week's Research Roundup that our registered users will be able to find.

Give us just the 1 to 2 minute, very quick summary of what they can find there before we close?

Art Berman: Sure, Erik. It's pretty straightforward. I mean, there are some inputs and outputs. Production net imports are the inputs and refinery runs are the outputs. And the EIA provides all that data on a weekly or monthly basis. And if you add all those, you know, the pluses and the minuses, you ought to get inventory change. And what we found is that you don't And that the government, the EIA, has these— they've got these fudge factors that they introduce to try to make everything work out on the assumption that inventory is correct. Our conclusion is that there's something like a 350-400 million barrel discrepancy between reported stocks since about 2002. And what you get for, you know, what they ought to be based on the same inputs that EIA provides. So we could, we could have a whole lot less oil in storage than, than I think, if all that's, that's true.

Point being that, that there's, there's huge uncertainty. And, and, and so the, the assumption is, is that we know how much oil is in storage. And the, and the truth is that that it's based on a sampling algorithm, and nobody ever goes out there, at least the EIA doesn't, and measure what's in the tanks and the underground storage. So I'm not saying, you know, I'm not ringing an alarm bell here. I'm just saying there's huge uncertainty. And I've been in discussions with the deputy administrator, the second in charge of the EIA, who, you know, who basically thinks that I'm out to lunch on this, but I continue to talk about it because the numbers just don't add up.

Erik Townsend: Okay. Unfortunately, we do have to leave it there. We've actually run a bit overtime, although it was worth it to get your perspective. I know you've always been one of our favorite guests on the program. So thank you so much for a great interview. For anyone who's not familiar with Art's work, the blog is artberman.com. Art also Writes for Forbes, has a blog there.

Subscribing to ArtBerman.com, I think, is just a no-brainer. It's fantastic content. We do have links to that in your Research Roundup. And we're going to have to leave it there, folks. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Mailbag announcement

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Aaron Chan's new job and departure

Erik Townsend: Thank you, Bill.

Aaron Chan: Congratulations on another great interview, Erik. I always enjoy listening to Art Berman.

Erik Townsend: Well, congratulations are definitely in order, but for you, not for me, because you have accepted a full-time job in finance. So congratulations. And I, for one, am proud to say that your excellent work here on the MacroVoices podcast probably helped open the door for you to really launch your career with what sounds to me like an absolutely outstanding opportunity.

Aaron Chan: Well, thanks a lot, Erik. I'm really excited about the new job, but unfortunately, I'm going to have to stay mum on the subject for now. But suffice it to say that it's a strategic career shift for me, and I couldn't be more excited about it. But what I can say though is that MacroVoices was an instrumental part of my securing this new role, and I wanted to personally thank you for the opportunity to co-host alongside you, Erik. It's been a lot of fun, but it's also bittersweet now that I'm forced to leave MacroVoices in order to fill that focus role.

Erik Townsend: Well, I'm glad you enjoyed it.

Aaron Chan: on my new role.

Erik Townsend: Fortunately for both of us, I know the guy that you're going to work for personally, and he's one of the few true gentlemen in this business. He knew that hiring you would put me in a bind, so he very graciously went well beyond the call of duty and agreed to allow you to continue hosting the show while I recruit a new producer and co-host. So if you are listening, sir, I thank you from the bottom of my heart for your gesture of courtesy. But that said, you're right, Aaron, I'm about to lose you. So I need to start looking for your replacement. But before we get into the details of that, I want to first publicly thank you for all of your excellent work to date. This show would never have been possible without all the hard work that Nathan Egger put into helping me design the format and serving as my first producer and co-host.

Likewise, we never could have achieved the growth that we've seen since then without all of your hard work. So I hope our listeners will join me in thanking both Nathan and Aaron for their amazing contributions.

The producer and co-host role; recruiting

Erik Townsend: I could never have done this without you guys. So thanks so much.

But now, as you say, it is time to let our listeners know that I'm interested in hearing from anyone who might enjoy being our 3rd producer and co-host. But you can't know whether or not you might be interested in that until you know actually what it entails. So Aaron is far better qualified than I am to describe what his own job is. So Aaron, please tell our listeners exactly what it is that you do for MacroVoices.

Aaron Chan: Well, I'll try and keep this as brief as possible. The co-host role is probably how our audience perceives role, but that's actually a very small piece of it. The show is typically just over an hour in length, so recording it takes just over an hour a week.

Once we finish recording, our partner over at Fractal Recording takes a few hours to edit the audio, mix the music, and get the show ready for release. Then I proof listen to make sure there are no glaring editing mistakes and release the show. Releasing the show consists of a few steps to post a description on the MacroVoices website, which I usually do while Fractal Recording is editing the audio. Then I release the show to our iTunes feed and send out a tweet announcing that the show is up and ready. Finally, I create a topic in our listener discussion forum to provide listeners with a place to discuss what they've heard.

But the real work of the producer job is in recruiting the feature interview guests. Now, we strive for high-demand guests who aren't the easiest to get a hold of. Most of them have assistants screening our calls and emails, emails. And so getting their attention is more of an art than a science. Some of our best guest interviews have been people we had to invite several times before they even responded or noticed our invitations. It definitely requires patience and persistence. I also curate the Research Roundup emails.

Virtually 100% of the articles come from my perusing the internet. So this job definitely fits with someone who eats and sleeps markets and reads voraciously like All in all, I'd estimate I typically spend around 15 to 20 hours a week on MacroVoices, including all the production-related tasks, guest recruiting, schedule coordination with Erik via email, and so forth.

Erik Townsend: Listeners, I'm looking for someone, preferably a longtime regular listener to the show, who's interested in taking over Aaron's responsibilities. If you're interested, please email me at info@macrovoices.com and let me know a little bit about yourself. Explain yourself why this interests you and what you would expect to get out of it.

Aaron Chan: Again, that email address is info@macrovoices.com. Based on my own experience, I learned a tremendous amount, both personally and professionally, from producing and co-hosting MacroVoices. I hope the next guy or gal has the same great experience I've had.

Production costs and the sponsor pitch

Aaron Chan: But Erik, you also told me off the air that you're considering the future direction of the show for other reasons. So let's also bring our listeners up to speed on that. What's on your mind here?

Erik Townsend: Well, I've really enjoyed producing this show for most of a year now. For some reason I can't describe really, I just find financial journalism is fascinating and personally rewarding to me. And to be sure, as a fund manager, I do have an ulterior motive here. I get to pick the brains of the smartest people on earth every week, and I learn something from every interview that helps to shape my market

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: So, I really do enjoy doing this, but frankly, it costs a lot more than I expected it was going to when we launched this thing. And to produce the show like this is expensive. So, admittedly, I could do it on a smaller budget if I compromise quality. Chris Curran at Fractal Recording is the best of the best in the podcast production business. But frankly, he knows he's the best of the best, and he's not shy about expecting to be compensated at a premium rate.

Great for his premium talent. Chris edits out all of our mistakes, mixes the music, and turns the whole thing around in a few hours' time every single week so that we can air the show literally just 3 or 4 hours after we tape our market wrap.

That's what it takes to deliver a show of this production quality on a timely schedule. And it doesn't come cheap. So let me just cut right to the chase. The bottom line here is that while I don't want or need to make a profit from this, I I can't justify continuing to reach into my own pocket and spending thousands of dollars a month just for the privilege of being able to work hard to produce this show every week and then give it away for free as a hobby. Now, as I admitted a minute ago, there's definitely a benefit to me as a money manager to be able to pick the brains of the smartest people in finance every single week. But I just can't justify the out-of-pocket expense to continue indefinitely on the path that we've been on.

So what I really need to do is recruit a sponsor, someone who's willing to cover the production costs in exchange for promotional consideration. But I really want to avoid disrupting the flow of the show with commercials or anything like that. So here's my sales pitch to prospective sponsors. Wall Street Week with Louis Rukeyser was made possible by a grant from MFS, providing services to mutual funds and other institutional investors.

Aaron Chan: Wow.

Erik Townsend: Listen, folks, that quote was from memory, and it was from 35 freaking years ago when I used to watch Wall Street Week as a teenager. So that classy, understated style of marketing really is effective. And I'm pretty sure, by the way, that that quote is accurate word for word, and that's from memory 35 years later. So my ideal solution would be to find a sponsor who will foot the bill for production costs in exchange for bookending the show. With a tasteful promotional announcement along the lines of what Wall Street Week used to do. But I really don't want to disrupt the format with commercials during the show or having to endorse some sponsor's product personally. I use it myself, you should too. You know, let's try to keep it away from anything cheesy, please.

Bottom line, my request to our listeners, please think about who you know in your professional network that might be in a position to sponsor Macro MacroVoices and let them know about the opportunity. I really need to do something so that I don't have to continue to reach into my own pocket in order to produce this show every week.

Aaron Chan: OK. To sum that up, production costs are more than you can justify paying to continue producing the show out of the goodness of your heart without any revenue. And the ideal solution is a sponsor who is willing to keep us afloat in exchange for promotional exposure, so long as it's done in a tasteful manner without screaming sales pitches for their product disrupting the show. Now, I'm confident you'll find that sponsor, Erik, and I've gotten some solid feedback from some of our guests about the promotional benefit they've derived from appearing on MacroVoices, and our listener download counts are growing in leaps and bounds. But if the ideal sponsor doesn't step up to the plate, what other options are you considering?

Options without a sponsor; breakeven forum thread

Erik Townsend: Well, I really want to avoid going to a paid subscription model if at all possible. I want MacroVoices to stay free of charge to listeners. So, I suppose the obvious alternative would be to compromise the quality in favor of lower production costs. You know, we could just totally skip the market wrap and all the other commentary and just do the guest interview alone every week with me and the guest and no co-host. That would reduce the audio production costs significantly. But frankly, it wouldn't be the same show if we did it that way. And so, I'd like to avoid that if I possibly can. In fact, what I'd really like to do is go

Aaron Chan: Yeah.

Erik Townsend: The opposite direction and make some upgrades that I have in mind to the show format that would bring more voices to the show each week. But those changes would actually increase production costs, not decrease them. So, that's, you know, completely out of the question without some kind of sponsorship.

The other obvious path would be to add, you know, advertising or some other monetization tactic, you know, to sell the show or something like that. I'd really prefer to avoid that if I possibly can. But frankly, beyond that, I'm fresh out of

Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, our audience includes a lot of incredibly smart people. So how about this? Why don't we start a thread in our listener discussion forum at www.MacroVoices.com/forums and brainstorm the issue with our listeners?

Erik Townsend: Now that's a fantastic idea. So why don't we do this? I will post a thread. I'll title it Making MacroVoices Breakeven in the listener discussion forum as soon as this episode airs. lay out the problem and some of the other solutions that I've considered, and I'll try to go into a little bit more detail than we had time to discuss on the air here.

Aaron Chan: All right. Well, sounds good. Erik, we're out of time. Anything else you want to add before we close?

Erik Townsend: Our regular listeners have heard it before. We so much need your help. If you want to continue to hear some of the fantastic guests that we've had lately on the program and people of that caliber, we need your help promoting the show. So please retweet us when we announce the show on Twitter. Twitter. Forward your MacroVoices Research Roundup emails to your friends and colleagues to help spread the word. And most importantly, please register your free account at MacroVoices.com. The number of registered users we have is the statistic that's most effective in recruiting these high-profile guests and getting them on the program. And of course, the benefit of registration is you get our free Research Roundup email every week, which is a compendium

This week's Research Roundup

Erik Townsend: of the very best content that that Aaron could find on the internet every single week. What do we got for them this week, Aaron?

Aaron Chan: Well, this week's Research Roundup includes the latest speeches from Mervyn King at the American Museum of Finance and Kenneth Rogoff at the Royal Society. Now, these videos are interesting not necessarily because you agree or disagree with them, but because they are thinkers who have outsized influence over existing and future monetary and economic policies. Next, we've got a bubblicious slide deck from Astalon Capital Partners latest market update. You'll definitely want to sit down and spend some time with this chartbook. And finally, the Wall Street Journal published an interesting article that relates the macro to the micro and tells the story of a German nun turned trader who, upon figuring out what swaps were, moved quickly to sell her Deutsche Bank shares. You also get some insights into Sister Lioba's thinking on the negative interest rate environment, risk management, and position sizing. You'll find all this and much more in This week's Research Roundup.

So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.

If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik at ErikSTownsend and myself at MacroDidact. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan Chat with you next week.

Disclaimer

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing. You'll also gain access to our free listener discussion forums and research library.

And the more registered users we have, the more we're able to recruit high-profile feature interview guests for future programs. So please register your free account today at MacroVoices.com if you haven't already. You can also subscribe to MacroVoices on iTunes to have MacroVoices automatically delivered to your mobile device each week. Free of charge. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer your questions on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional. Before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan, shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices. MacroVoices is made possible by funding from Fourth Turning Capital Management LLC. For more information, visit MacroVoices.com.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Paul Krake — author of Hong Kong-based View from the Peak newsletter (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.

Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone.

Episode preview and early-recording note

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 40 was recorded on November 17th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Paul Krake, well-known author of Hong Kong-based View from the Peak newsletter and market advisory service, will be joining me as this week's special interview guest. We'll be discussing the global bond market sell-off in detail, along with Chinese debt dynamics, inflation expectations, the commodity supercycle, Japan, and a whole lot more.

Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Let's start by letting our listeners know that we recorded this week's show early Thursday morning before markets opened, as opposed to our usual taping time at Thursday's close. So, please keep in mind that our commentary won't take Thursday's market action into account. S&P futures rallied after Donald Trump's election initially, but appear to be leveling off in the 2170s on the S&P.

Equities after the Trump win

Aaron Chan: So, what's next for stocks?

Erik Townsend: You know, I don't think that anybody really knows. And one of the rules that I like to use is when you have a bunch of people all very confidently saying, oh, well, the explanation for this is such and such and so forth. And they're the same people that failed to predict what's happening right now.

I kind of question the narrative of what they think is now happening. And if you look at the history here, I don't remember anybody saying, if Donald Trump wins, we're going to see a massive spike in inflation expectations and a huge global bond market sell-off.

Everybody was worried about an equity sell-off. So it seems to me that there are almost no pundits that managed to correctly predict what would happen in the event of a Trump victory. And so now they're all saying, oh, well, it's trade policy that is causing inflation expectations to spike. And I think whoever said that first was the first person to come up with a credible explanation of anything, and everybody's latching onto it. And frankly, you know, it might be right, but I'm not sure it really explains everything in terms of what we're seeing in markets.

So I don't really know where this thing is headed. I continue to I feel like equity valuations in general are very extended and highly valued here. Interestingly, Carl Icahn turned around today. He had gone long on election night, and I don't remember whether he said he actually closed that position, but he's starting from his comments today to turn— and I say today, I mean Wednesday just passed because we are recording early this week— He's changed his view a little bit and no longer sounds like he's quite as bullish as he was. So I don't know where we're, where we're headed here.

US Dollar Index at 13-year high

Aaron Chan: Before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index, which traded as high as 100.60 this week, a 13-year high. So far, your dollar bullish scenario is playing out, Erik. So any updates on the dollar outlook?

Erik Townsend: I think that the dollar rally has resumed in earnest, and I think that we're headed much higher from here. But just to be fair, you know, this, this so-called breakout to a new cycle high was only 9 small handles. The previous number was 100.51. Now it's Right. Right now it's 100.60, so 9 small handles higher. That's not really a decisive breakout, and it's retracing a little bit. So I'd like to see it get above 100.60 and stay there for a few days to really persuade me that we're breaking out above the previous cycle high, but it looks to me like that's what's coming.

In general, this is all about the world digesting the Trump win, and I think everybody thinks that it's going to be dollar bullish. The big question is a lot of people in Europe are freaking out over the Trump victory. If Trump's victory leads to further European exit contagion, that could very easily accelerate the U.S. dollar rally. So, you know, I think that there's a lot of dynamics here. There's a lot of moving parts. We don't really know for sure exactly what's going to happen, but I think the trend is definitely going to be higher for the dollar.

Crude oil: inventory build and OPEC rhetoric

Aaron Chan: Erik, you've said that crude oil should test $42.50, if not lower, but you were cautious to call the direction from there. Now, we saw WTI trade as low as $42.20 since last week's show. So congratulations on that call. But it's back to a $46 handle on Thursday morning. So what's next for crude here?

Erik Townsend: Well, inventory this week was a massive build, 5.3 million barrels of national crude oil inventory increase. 691,000 barrels of that was in Cushing, Oklahoma. So not a super huge build in Cushing, but big builds across the board. Gasoline and distillates also big builds—750,000 barrels of gasoline, another 310,000 barrels of distillates.

So everything is building across the board. So wait a minute—we were at 42.20. Why the heck are we so much higher now? Seems to be entirely about this same old game that we've seen before, where we get some bearish inventory numbers and OPEC. And then the oil ministers respond by putting out some kind of rhetoric or press release. And there was a headline that supposedly OPEC is about to come to yet another, you know, deal that's not really going to happen. And there are people walking away from this meeting. There are, I think, now 3 countries that have said they're not even going to bother to attend. But they're still spinning the rhetoric, and it is working in terms of hypnotizing markets. I think you said 46 handle. It's almost 47 as we're speaking, 46.96. So, we're getting close and probably moving higher.

Gold sell-off and the hedged gold/dollar trade

Aaron Chan: So, pivoting to the yellow metal, gold has collapsed to the low 1,200s with 1,211 the low print so far. But this is all happening when inflation expectations are spiking. So, Erik, help me with the logic here. I would think spiking inflation expectations would actually be bullish for gold.

Erik Townsend: You know, I'm going to ask Paul Krake this same question for sure, but what Stan Druckenmiller said It kind of makes sense to me. And you're right that normally you'd think is, you know, spiking inflation expectations. A lot of people see gold as an inflation hedge, and gold ought to do well if inflation expectations are spiking.

What Druckenmiller said about gold is that the Trump victory is causing a lot of people to reallocate capital out of safe haven assets, out of Treasuries, into equities, and into US dollars. And so his view is that And the Trump victory is going to be extremely bullish for the U.S. Dollar and therefore bearish for gold, at least in the short term. Now, when I say at least in the short term, those are my words. Druckenmiller didn't say that.

I think that the other thing to consider is the rate hike expectations for the end of the year, for a December rate hike, are way above 90% now. The market thinks that we're going to get a rate hike. I think that's probably right, and I wouldn't be surprised if the low in gold coincides with that rate hike happening or imminently about to happen or just happened, you know, within a few days on either side of the rate hike, assuming we get one in December. I would predict that that's a good possibility as to when we might see a low in gold. So, I think that this gold sell-off is not structural. I think that if we are going to have Spiking inflation expectations, or I shouldn't say spiking, but rising inflation expectations on a consistent basis, that will eventually be bullish for gold.

But right now the focus is on the dollar bullish story. And of course, this is very much the reason that we've talked so much about that hedged trade, long gold and long the dollar index at the same time, because although you're kind of getting clobbered here if you're long gold, You're making a killing on the dollar index, which has been performing extremely well.

Global bond sell-off and 10-year yields

Aaron Chan: Speaking of Treasuries, the 10-year yield is going through the roof as bond markets around the world sell off. So what's going on with fixed income here?

Erik Townsend: Well, Aaron, I'll make a profound declaration. This is a big deal. Okay. What does it mean? Frankly, I don't know. And I don't think anybody else does. We're either seeing the beginning of maybe a secular change. Maybe it really is true that Jeff Gundlach got it exactly right and the bond bull market of 35-plus years is over and reversing rather abruptly now, or it could be that people are just sort of thinking that's what this Trump victory means, and because everybody else is doing it, they're doing it too, and it's all going to retrace before we know it.

I think it's too early to say yet, but boy, 50 basis points in a week, and I say 50 basis points in a week, it's back down to less than that now, but we were above 2.25% on the 10-year. Technicians I'm reading are saying the next target is around 2.5%. It'll probably get there. Looking to me more and more like the view that Raoul Pal and I have talked about, that we'd eventually get to sub-1% 10-year Treasury yields, might be wrong after all, because right now those yields sure are moving rapidly to the upside.

Aaron Chan: Thanks for the market update, Erik. Paul Krake is the founder of View from the Peak, a popular Hong Kong-based market letter and advisory firm. Erik's interview with Mr. Krake is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.

Interview: why bonds sold off - fiscal spending and the Republican sweep

Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Paul Krake, very well-known author of View from the Peak in Hong Kong. And Paul, I think that it's so It's so timely that we get to talk to you this week because the rest of the world, I think, is being driven very much by the result of the U.S. election. We did have Pippa and Harald Malmgren on last week immediately after. But boy, did anybody anywhere predict that not the stock market, but the bond market would sell off dramatically, 50 basis points in a week on the 10-year yield? So holy cow, is this entirely about the election? Is it surprise factor? Is it inflation expectations? What's happening here?

Paul Krake: Erik, thanks very much for having me on. I think, look, I think that the bond market move was, was bound to happen regardless of who won the— of who won the election. Now, the speed of that move, I think, has been exacerbated by the Republican— by the Republican sweep. But at the end of the day, there was a narrative that was getting developed through the course of the last 3 months or so that whoever came to office, that a priority was going to be an increase in fiscal spending, predominantly on the infrastructure side of things.

So if you actually look at it, the bond market was actually starting to move well before the extraordinary victory by Mr. Trump. You know, we bottomed in US 10s in the summer at what I think about 1.38, I think we were. And we've been moving steadily higher since then because we had a campaign that was littered with promises of fiscal spending.

So what we've seen now and why the pace of this has accelerated is because that what We have a Republican sweep that means that anything that the Republicans want to be done can be done legislatively. And the debate really is not Democrat versus Republican. It's small government Republicans versus the populist movement of Trump. And that's where the true battles are going to lie.

We did a call today with a guy called Jim Capretta, who was a former very senior Bush administration budget guy. And we outlined this in— he outlined this in a lot of detail that there is a real ideological battle going on within the Republican Party on how this stimulus should look and how much should actually occur. I mean, if you take Trump at his word, and that has to be the base case for everything from fiscal spending to trade, the US budget deficit is about to balloon Big time. I mean, we could, we could be heading from the current 2.5% of GDP to well north of 5%.

And the Paul Ryans of the world and the Mitch McConnells of the world are not going to take that lying down. You know, if you read the Paul Ryan manifesto, A Better Way, it is a classic small government, balanced budget agenda. And that is the polar opposite of what we're seeing out of Mr. Trump.

Ripping up the investment playbook

Erik Townsend: Now, let's stay on the significance of this. Obviously, we're used to looking at elections in terms of Republican or Democrat. Democrat outcome. But it seems to me this election is more about the anti-establishment, throw the bums out, change everything. And I certainly understand why a lot of people resonate with that, but I'm not sure how much Donald Trump can really do to be effective at prosecuting an agenda that delivers on his campaign promises. So how significant is this election outcome, which is basically down with the establishment? It seems like everything is changing very dramatically.

Paul Krake: So, Erik, let's break that up into a couple of sections, right? So if we talk about ripping up the investment playbook, that's certainly what we've done since Tuesday night of last week. Because for the previous— really since the end of the financial crisis, we've lived in a world where the overriding investment thesis revolved around structurally low interest rates around the globe.

And that went from all the QE programs right through to the era of negative interest rates where we are today. And suddenly, what the Trump administration or the rise of the Trump administration has done has effectively ended the negative interest rate era or the negative bond yield era, I should say. So everything we thought we knew about our investment process several years forward, i.e., structurally low interest rates has gone out the window. Now, what we're seeing now is a violent rotation out of these long bond proxies, long carry, which is effectively a short volatility world, into a potentially higher growth, higher rates, potential stagflation, lower regulation, greater forward growth world. And the reality is that the investments that we own don't represent that.

So what you're seeing is a violent rotation into banks, into cyclicals, out of EM, out of bond proxies and the like. And the reality, the reality is that we're about to see just balance sheet and pension destruction because we're transitioning from one form, you know, one investment thesis to another. And the world's currently not positioned for that.

Now, if I was to put my— Erik, my fancy hat on and talk about the whole concept of risk parity and how risk parity is going to get hurt. Well, all risk parity is, is your retirement fund and mine, right? It's because you're long bonds and long stocks and that gets hurt in an environment where rates— where rates are going up. And the issue I have with all of this is because you are going to see personal balance sheet destruction, portfolio portfolio valuation destruction is that you can see this thing really spiral out of control. And that's the potential for VaR-related selling in the near term. But the losses on portfolios around the globe are going to be absolutely, absolutely enormous. There's implications on the deficit.

You know, we, as we talked about at the start, I mean, you know, there is an ideological conflict in the Republican Party between the Reagan, basically the the Reaganites and the populists that is going to dominate thinking in Washington for the next 4 years. And this is putting all the social policies to one side, which, again, we'll leave those musings to Facebook. But when you've got a guy like Steve Bannon, who— I spent an hour on Breitbart News on the weekend, And what's on there is terrifying if you're a normal person.

It's scary stuff.

So everything we look at, not only about the budget, but about trade, about the implicit global security guarantee that the US has— which is basically the US has had in place since 1945, which has effectively kept the developed economies around the globe out of, you know, out of conflict, with a few exceptions, that goes away. It changes the environment for Asia. It changes the environment for Europe.

You know, this is— to say the election of Mr. Trump was a historic moment is to, is to understate the significance of what happened.

Inflation expectations, stimulus lag and 2017 stagflation risk

Erik Townsend: Inflation expectations have obviously spiked dramatically, and a lot of commentators have sort of simplified this to say, oh, well, Trump's trade policies are going to involve tariffs and that increases prices and that's inflationary. It feels to me like there's more than just that going on. How do you see the spike in inflation expectations? Is it just about Trump's trade policy or is there more to it?

Paul Krake: Well, no. So going back to why bond yields went up and bond yields have been rising now for several months now, you know, so have inflationary expectations because there is a a very valid notion that we're going to get some base effect inflation in the first half of the year, the first half of 2017, just on the back of high commodity prices. And that's purely mathematical, but that is coming. Now, when you throw in a, you know, a $7 to $8 trillion tax cut over, you know, over, over a 10-year period, when you have situations such as, you know, Another, say, $1 trillion of fiscal spending. You have the tax amnesty on offshore earnings, which will allow US corporates to bring back maybe as much as $2.5 trillion from overseas at, say, a 10% tax rate. There's a lot of fuel being thrown on the fire.

Now, I am very skeptical about this. And I see a lot of market turmoil and actually a bear market in equity and credit in 2017. Because any stimulus that occurs in the first quarter or second quarter of next year is not going to have an impact on growth for at least 12 months.

We found that through when the US did its stimulus post the financial crisis, that you really didn't have a sustainable pickup in growth until well into 2010. There is a lag. Look, the only people who get rich in the early days of a fiscal stimulus are architects as things get as things get planned.

So what you could easily see in 2017 is classic stagflation, where you actually have slow growth because there's no impact of the stimulus. I'll make an argument because of the poor social policies that potentially could get implemented that there's a hit to consumer confidence in the US. So I could easily see a scenario where the US in the first half of next year is growing at 1%. And we have, you know, inflation that is through the top end of the Fed's, Fed's 2% target. But with interest rates heading towards cycle highs, that's a disastrous outcome for equity and credit markets globally.

Dollar strength and emerging-market fallout

Erik Townsend: But another big aspect of this story, of course, is the US dollar. The strength in the US dollar has continued. We're now trading above a 100 handle on the US Dollar Index. So how much farther do you think the US dollar has to go to the upside? I assume that your view is dollar bullish.

How much farther can it go before it has adverse consequences on emerging markets?

Paul Krake: Well, we're seeing that now. Now we see it's having adverse consequences. But you've got to throw it all in that— in the sort of the— into a bucket, sort of, because there are a lot of crosscurrents here. Trade policy, protectionist trade policy, the ripping up of NAFTA, the death of TPP. You know, these things that are anti-trade are actually— you know, it's bad for emerging markets and good for the dollar. And again, we have to take President Trump's, President-elect Trump's policy prescriptions at his word. There's a lot of people who are trying to apologize, and who are apologists, I should say, for the Trump campaign, saying, well, it's not gonna be as bad as what he said. Our base case has to be what he said, right? And what he said is very anti-trade, which is a terrible environment for Asia. Look, the dollar's going up for a myriad of reasons.

Most importantly, rates are going higher.

The Fed is not going to be on the same trajectory that it has been through the course of 2016, i.e., they're going to hike on multiple occasions next year. Do they hike on 4 occasions, 3 or 4 occasions? Certainly, that's conceivable in my thinking. And the dollar is going to be a high-yielding currency versus versus other majors. So the scary thing for markets as a whole is, again, going back to, do you have the situation that interest rates rise in a disorderly fashion?

If that's the case, then in concert with that, the dollar is going to rise in a disorderly fashion as well.

Now, just on the emerging markets side of things, You know, there's little doubt that the vast majority of emerging market economies, probably with the exception of somewhere like Turkey, have dramatically improved their external sovereign and corporate debt positions than they were at any— in the prelude to any other crisis in the last 30 years.

Indonesia is in much better shape on the external side of things. If you look at any ratio you want, but things like short-term debt to FX reserves across an array of emerging markets, they're just in better shape. Right. You know, the economic stewards in the emerging— in emerging market economies have just got better at running their economies in general. But it's not going to stop outflows of sovereign— in sovereign bond markets, in emerging market corporate credit. There is going to be a significant mark-to-market hit. Does it create an emerging market crisis? Probably not. But is this going to be worse than the taper tantrum that we saw in May and June of 2013? Absolutely it is.

Erik Townsend: We've obviously seen emerging markets sovereign debt already starting to sell off. Is that about the dollar? Is that about Trump trade policy? Is there more to the picture? And how much farther do you think it has to go?

Paul Krake: Yeah, look, it's all, it's all of the above. You know, and again, this, this stuff was starting to weaken a little bit, you know, as I said, over the last couple of months because the process started, started a little earlier. You know, it still, it still has further to go despite the fact, though, One advantage to emerging markets is that, you know, as we've known for the last 5 years, investors have been structurally underweight EM. And it was really only in February of this year with the impeachment of Mrs. Rousseff in Brazil that you saw a bottom in EM and flows start— and the underweight stance that global allocators had, they started taking that back in, taking that back in February. But look, you are going to see money leave EM.

You know, there are markets that are crowded and Brazil's an obvious one where people were piling into, into the short end of the Brazilian yield curve. And you saw Brazilian 2-year notes go from 16, 16-odd percent in, in February to a low. I think they traded as low as 11. And obviously yields are backing up now because, you know, that was a very crowded trade. And, you know, as you know, in the early stages of any form of adjustment, the crowded trades get hit, get hit first.

And that's why Brazil's had such a torrid time over the last week. And to be honest, that's only going to keep going because Brazilian equities are, you know, Brazilian equities are expensive and the like. So there's going to be aggressive selling there. I think India is another place that potentially could see further selling just purely on a valuation basis.

Look, EM's got further to go and EM's about to get very cheap in a world where the dollar gets very strong.

Gold: Krake's skeptical view

Erik Townsend: I actually read a headline this week that said gold is selling off because of inflation expectations. increasing. That's a little backwards from the normal interpretation. What's going on with gold?

Paul Krake: What's going on with gold? Erik, I did promise you I wouldn't rant on about gold, so I won't. But I— can you just answer a question for me? Is gold an inflation hedge or a deflation hedge? Because gold bugs will tell you it's both. And again, I, I think that gold in the last few years has lost all its predictive ability. Yes, it is a store of value in the case of severe crisis. But look, at the end of the day, tell me how many middle-class Indian weddings are going to happen in the next 12 months, and I'll tell you where the price of gold goes.

Because at the end of the day, gold is— gold is for practical— primarily for practical purposes these days. It's, it's, you know, Indian jewelry demand is one of the key drivers. You know, if you look at, you know, sort of ETF flows into gold, etc., they've come down a long, long way over the course of the last Last few years. I'm probably the wrong guy to ask about gold because I think, you know, mocking gold bugs is sport to me.

But, you know, on the whole, I, I don't think that gold is, is, is anywhere near as relevant as, as it once was.

China: debt dynamics, the yuan and Kyle Bass

Erik Townsend: Let's move on then to a topic that I know you've done a lot of work on, which is the dynamics of this Chinese debt situation. The credit expansion in China since 2008 has been monumental, and I'd like to look at this both in terms of the big picture But also vis-à-vis the recent election event in the United States.

Why don't we start? Because I don't think it's possible to understand the Chinese debt situation without understanding the cultural issues in China that drive the government's behavior. So give us the big picture here.

Paul Krake: Big picture. Start and end every conversation about China with this: number one goal of the Communist Party is preservation of the Communist Party. Only thing that matters, right? So within within that, prevention of social unrest is the number one priority of the party, and the and you've seen that in the form of you know the anti-corruption campaign as part of this. You know the way that they have handled you know the property market over the years, the bursting of the equity market bubble and the like. It's all it's all predicated on trying to increase the the wealth of the middle class. And if Xi Jinping has one power base within China, it it is the middle class. And, you know, they handle— they have many, many policy missteps along the way. And as I said, the way they handled the bursting of the equity bubble last year is a classic example of this. But look, what do we know about Chinese debt dynamics?

Look, the trajectory is certainly heading in a very dangerous, dangerous direction. That said, the only reason a debt problem becomes a credit crisis is if you have forced selling of assets.

One of my concerns about Xi Jinping is that the perception of him being a market reformer, I think, is very, very flawed. I think that he is far from that. As such, he will not allow the market mechanism to play a predominant role, particularly where it comes to the banking sector. Now, what I'm saying in a very, very roundabout way is that you're not going to see sharp increases in defaults in China because the government's not going to allow them to allow that to happen.

Because the Chinese cannot risk en masse unemployment because the last thing the last thing China needs is a million unemployed steelworkers with access to the internet, right? So what what you will see over time is a very organic approach to working out the debt problem. They legitimately believe that they can grow they. They grow their way out of it, and if they, for example, achieve their goal by 2020 of doubling GDP in the preceding decade, which they should do if growth can average 6.5%, then they go a long way to alleviating the debt problem. Now, recent you know what we see with the economy is they go in fits and starts in terms of credit. And if you actually look at the economy in the last four years, what they've done is. He's done a fiscal stimulus just after Chinese New Year, around January and February in Q1.

You've had strong growth basically Q2, Q3. Growth starts to slow at the end of Q3, slow in Q4, slow in Q1, another fiscal stimulus. Now, this is all very credit-driven every time they do that. Look, what you have is you have an economy that is on a glide path lower. It is transitioning towards a more self-sustaining, service-oriented economy, but it does go in these little mini cycles that tend to get fueled by credit. What eventually happens for me is that the return on investment, so the ROI on the economy is continuing to go down and down and down, and that is because of the debt dynamics.

Now, eventually, I don't think China has a debt problem. I think it ends up with a growth problem. But as we stand today, I think China has the means, it has the savings, it has effectively an undergeared federal balance sheet that can plug the holes where needed. So let's say the federal balance sheet is— they have federal debt to GDP of around 20%. So they have about $2 trillion of federal debt. Let's say that the banking, the bad debt problem is $3 trillion.

China, over the course of a several-year period, could issue $3 trillion worth of bonds. They'd be eagerly sought after internationally if they were to open up the capital account further. Then what you've done is put $3 trillion into the banking system, recapitalized all the banks, and federal debt to GDP has gone from 20% to 50%.

So I actually don't think that the aggregate debt levels in China are that bad. I think they're very much related to property, which has to do with a rapid expansion in property, with property rights and housing ownership in the last 20 years. I'm not as bearish on China as many are, but I am concerned that the rates of return are going to continue to fall if they continue to use credit as a vehicle of stimulus.

Erik Townsend: Kyle Bass has been very outspoken in suggesting that to achieve what you just said of not allowing a massive wave of defaults, that China would probably have to recap its banking system and in so doing would be forced to dramatically devalue the yuan. What's your reaction to that view?

Paul Krake: Don't agree. I don't agree. I mean, the bears on China— and the irony is that the further you get away from China, the more bearish people get. And a lot of the most bearish people on China have actually never been there. So I do find that— I think that's a very interesting take on the psychology of how people look at China. Look, I mean, people have been calling for the demise of China from a debt standpoint for 10 years, and it hasn't happened.

Now, the Chinese in August of last year go to a more flexible pricing methodology for the currency, which was purely done to get into the SDR, for the IMF to put China into the Special Drawing Rights basket. And that was a great symbol of economic power according to the Chinese. But the Chinese then started to let their currency slide.

Now, if you had told me at the start, at this time last year, that by Q4 of 2016, that the dollar-RMB would have been at 6.84, and the trade-weighted basket would be down some, what, 12% on the year, I would have told you that Malaysia would have been at the IMF and dollar-Brazil would have been at 4.5.

But the Chinese achieved the impossible. They've orchestrated a very slow, steady depreciation of their currency. that didn't have a dramatic impact on the rest of the emerging world or commodity producers as a whole. It's extraordinary that they've done this.

And what they've proven, effectively, if you point enough guns at enough heads, you can stop capital flight. So if you actually look at all the money that's left the country, it's effectively equal to all the corporate outflows in regards to M&A, et cetera, that's gone on over the course of the last year. So they've shut down underground banks. They've basically stopped the leakages out of the economy. And they've done a masterful job at weakening the currency in a very orderly fashion. No emerging market economy on earth has ever been able to do this.

And to be honest, the only reason they can do this is because it's, at the end of the day, it's still a totalitarian regime that can change the rules whenever they want and change those rules by force. But what they've done, I think, is just extraordinary.

And to be honest, I don't see the need for a dramatic depreciation of the currency. Look, the only way that a debt explosion becomes an issue is if you have domestic inflation. And the overcapacity issues in China basically ensure that you don't have domestic inflation. Right, and that's look, and that's not just a China problem; it's a global problem. I mean, you know, we QE was QE globally was meant to create en masse inflation, but it never it never happened, and it never happened because you know governments and central banks regulated their banking systems out of the business of expanding their balance sheets. So you could never really have a an inflationary a credit fueled inflationary bubble like you would have had in previous cycles. And what's happened in China is that a lot of the Liquidity has ended up in, in forming mini asset bubbles around the country.

Property, and property is the latest little— I'll call it a mini bubble that's, that's occurring across the country. And that's all due to a function of excess liquidity.

Trump, Asian security and de-dollarization

Erik Townsend: Obviously, Donald Trump's campaign rhetoric was very aggressive towards China. So how does the election of Donald Trump change or shape your views about China's future?

Paul Krake: It doesn't change my views about China's future per se. Look, I think that— look, Donald Trump has done already irreparable damage to the relationship that the United States has with Asia by basically telling the Japanese and the Koreans that they should go and get nuclear weapons and look after themselves. You effectively pulled the rug out of the implicit security guarantee that, as I said before, that's been in place since 1945. And what you're seeing now, and be it the Malaysians, be it more profoundly by Mr. Duterte in the Philippines, there is a movement away from a reliance on the US and a move towards— back towards China.

China's policies in the region are clear. There is territorial expansion. They are looking with One Belt, One Road to expand economic dominance. And all that the US has done, particularly by scuttling TPP, is pushing the region towards China.

The Japanese and Koreans are very concerned about this. The Chinese position in the region has improved dramatically. And this is not a good thing. This is not a good thing for our allies in the region. You're going to see massive increases in defense spending in Australia, in Korea, in Japan. And it's all on the back of the fact that the US is losing its influence in the region. And there's a policy the State Department has under the Obama administration. There was a, there was a policy called the pivot, which was pivoting away from effectively conflicts in the Middle East and, and involvement in Europe and focusing more on, on Asia, which was where the US saw its the need, the greatest need for its military influence, but to temper a rapidly expanding China. That pivot now is well and truly under threat, and US influence in the region is also under severe threat.

Erik Townsend: You described that reference, the Asian region. A lot of people have suggested that US economic hegemony really globally is on the decline. And of course, Russia has intentionally tried to encourage the rest of the emerging world to drop the US dollar as a reserve currency. Do you think that that trend has got further to go? And or is it just in Asia that you see this phenomenon?

Paul Krake: No, it's, it's, it's global. I give you a couple examples on this, Erik. I think that the, the US in the last few years has really overplayed its hand legally in some issues. And I'll give you the best example, which was the— I think it was 3 years ago now, maybe 4, which was where BNP was fined $8 billion by the Department of Justice for breaching sanctions with the South Sudanese.

Now, Europe doesn't have— didn't have Sudan under sanctions. But because they did an oil trade and settled that trade in dollars, a New York federal court judge turned around and said, if it's US dollars, it's our jurisdiction. You're in breach of our sanctions. Pay us $8 billion. And it was around that time where everyone, be it the— be it sort of more shady characters like the Saudis, the Chinese, the Venezuelans, the Russians, et cetera, et cetera, Hang on a second. If I settle an oil trade that doesn't involve the US in US dollars, suddenly my banks can get shut down in the US, or my accounts could be frozen.

No way I want to do that.

And that was the beginning of Russia developing its own— trying to develop its own SWIFT system. This is the Chinese looking to try to settle stuff in renminbi. It sort of was part of the beginning of the hastening of the internationalization of the renminbi. And all of this revolves around basically a legal grab by the US, which scared a lot of people. So I think that not only the internationalization of the renminbi, but the settlement of commodities that have historically been settled in dollars, settling them into other currencies, Be them oil exchanges, oil exchanges in China or whatever, that is going to grow and grow and grow.

But the problem with that is that we still live in a world that is laden with US dollar debt. And if you start settling transactions in currencies apart from dollars, suddenly you have economies that have debt in dollars but reserves in other currencies. And last time I looked, you can't settle a US dollar bond with renminbi.

So what's the result? Well, that leads to, over time, a structural appreciation of the dollar, because to pay back debt, you've got to sell your renminbi to buy dollars, or sell your rubles to buy dollars. So again, the move towards the dollar as the global— away from the dollar as the global trade currency is actually a severe dollar strengthener over time.

The commodity supercycle is over; energy goes free

Erik Townsend: Speaking of commodities, aside from settlement prices, let's talk about the commodity supercycle. I know you've done quite a bit of work there. There?

Paul Krake: Well, it's over. It's well and truly over. And it's— look, it's over for— it's over for a variety of reasons. It's over because, you know, China is transitioning away from fixed asset investment to more focusing on, on a service-driven economy. It's over because of massive supply expansion that you saw at precisely the wrong time of the cycle for everything from iron ore to coal to to copper. Everything, everything was part of that.

But look, I think there's some real, some real, you know, technology, technological issues as well.

And I think that if I was to say what is the, what is the biggest theme for the global economy over the course of the next 50 years, I would say that the inputs of doing business, i.e., energy, is going to effectively be free going forward. Right. And that changes, that changes so many— that just changes the way we do business, the cost of how the cost of doing business. It's incredibly deflationary if everything— if energy is effectively free because it comes from the wind and the sun. And I think that the way that we drive, i.e., electric cars, the way that we build our homes with solar panels as the staple going forward, it changes so, so many things. But it also means that we're going to use less of certain, certain things.

We're going to use less oil. We're going to use less coal. You know, the demand for copper is going to change because, you know, solar panels don't use as much copper as traditional sources of electricity generation. We are transitioning the things that we use. And just as, you know, commodities such as lead don't get used anywhere near as much as they did in the past, you're going to find other commodities that will become obsolete because of just extraordinary technological changes.

Japan: bullish turn, yen, Nikkei and the constitution

Erik Townsend: I know that although you're probably a little bit more bullish on China than some people, you're probably more bearish than others on Japan. What's your view there?

Paul Krake: Well, again, I was really bearish on Japan until last week. Look, again, I've never been a debt blowup guy in Japan. I think that, you know, the domestic savings pools cover enough. I'm a— look, I'm a big believer that just because a central bank owns a lot of JGBs, it's still Japan Inc. that owns those JGBs. And if the government wants to turn around and say to the Bank of Japan to turn them into perpetual bonds or to just write the debt off, these sort of things can all be done.

So I don't believe in the Japanese blowup. I mean, I am a big believer that the Japanese economy ceases to be relevant because of demographics and a shrinking population, all due to demographics. But this time, put it this way, this time 2 weeks ago, I was advocating policy mistakes in Japan. I was advocating that they were running out of policy options, that the whole yield curve targeting thing was completely flawed, and that they would never be able to— and all they were doing by targeting the yield curve was destroying bank profitability. And crushing their insurance industry and the like.

But Donald Trump steepened the yield curve globally. And dollar-yen— sorry, and dollar-yen's gone sharply higher because the dollar's gone up around the world because of the potential for Trump policies to become legislation.

So from a financial asset standpoint, Japan's incredibly attractive now because it has a bunch, a bunch of, a bunch of tailwinds that have nothing to do with domestic Japanese policy. But it will be enough to drive Nikkei dramatically higher in the next 12 months, to drive the yen significantly weaker over that time and steepen the Japanese yield curve, which helps the banking system, banking system and the like.

Look, the structural problems in terms of demographics aren't going away. You know, what Japan needs is immigration. And unfortunately, that's not going to happen. One thing I think that has changed in the last week is the outlook for the rewriting of the Japanese constitution. Abe, Prime Minister Abe, at the end of the day, is a foreign policy guy first. He's a markets/financial guy second. He wants his legacy to be that he's protected Japanese grandchildren from the rise of China militarily. Now, with the removal of the implicit security guarantee, suddenly the backstop of Japan, i.e., that the US would be there in case they ever got into military strife, suddenly they can't rely on that anymore.

Whilst the pacifist constitution is incredibly popular in Japan, or should I say, the prospect of rewriting it is very unpopular, That was always the case with the implicit guarantee that the US would always be there to back them up. If they're not, then suddenly Mr. Abe can seriously make the argument that says, we are on our own. We can see what the Japanese are doing in the Senkaku Islands and the like. They are expanding.

They are a legitimate threat. North Korea is a legitimate threat. We need to be able to be preemptive and have an offensive military military force. And I think you could see this— again, Japanese politics works in a very glacial way, but over the next couple of years, you could easily see a real movement towards reforming the pacifist constitution.

Practical macro and near-term positioning

Erik Townsend: Finally, I'd like to touch on something that I really appreciated from your recent Real Vision interview with Raoul Pal, which is your firm's focus on the concept of practical macro, that it's so easy in the world of macro to talk about, you know, these things that are intellectually fascinating, but not Actionable. So I want to turn this around and say, what questions have I forgotten to ask you? Or what, for the part of our audience who runs money for a living, what are the practical things that you're seeing in the market that actually lead to trading ideas?

Paul Krake: Well, let me put it this way, Erik. I mean, my partner often tells me, we run a product called the Expert Series where we get guys from the American Enterprise Institute or the Peterson Institute or the Brookings Institution to come in and talk about a topic of their choice. So we had a call on the fiscal situation today. We've had calls on the Saudi Aramco IPO. We've done stuff on productivity.

And my partner always says to me, Paul, we cannot be a high-priced version of The Economist. We don't want to be this coffee table magazine that people really enjoy reading, but can't make any money out of. And last time I looked, we were in the business— that's why we do this. We do this because we want to invest.

And the whole concept of Practical Macro is basically taking thematic work and at the end of it saying, OK, here's this thesis we've just outlined. By the way, you can make money by buying this equity, buying this credit, looking at these options. Here are the ways you implement the idea. And look, when I started the firm 5 years ago, that was the whole premise. There's a lot of great economic research out there. There's some wonderful thematic work. But a lot of it's— again, it's not practical. You've got to be able to put an idea on at the end of the day. Now, obviously, you need to develop a framework, an intellectual framework to before you develop these ideas. But a report without a trade idea at the end of it is, as I said, nothing more than a high-priced version of The Economist.

So what we really try to do is to find things that we can implement. One of the things that we're very focused on is actually asking the question, what is your timeframe? Because again, my view on on dollar-yen on a 1-week, 1-month, 1-year view, they may all be very, very different, and all for very valid reasons. So when we talk about the practical side of things, we have to ask the question first, what's your timeframe? So if I look at between, say, now and the end of the year, there's very little on the horizon that I can see that stops this violent rotation out of fixed income, out of bond proxies, into banks, into banks and cyclicals. Look, I mean, I think cyclical stocks globally are very, very expensive, but it doesn't mean they're not going to continue to go up. You know, we are seeing a fairly violent rotation out of large-cap tech. I mean, Google, Amazon, Facebook, etc., you know, they're companies that change the world every day.

And if you want a simple investment thesis, buy stocks that change the world every day. But these things are going to go down for the next 6 or 8 weeks. Because everybody owns them. And this is, you know, again, the practical side of things is not just about positioning, but it's certainly from a structural positioning standpoint, it becomes very, very relevant.

And in the near term, the practical stuff revolves around, you know, things like, you know, despite the fact that these companies are wonderful companies, they are over-owned and people are rotating into something different. So again, it's just all about the practical side of things is all about It's about having a well-thought-out thesis, but being able to implement something to make money out of it.

What View from the Peak offers

Erik Townsend: For our listeners who would like to follow your work, before we close, let's tell them about View from the Peak and what your firm offers.

Paul Krake: View from the Peak is, as I said, a practical macro or practical thematic research firm. We publish most days now, actually. I publish my flagship report, which is my weekly thought That comes out once a week. We publish with— so with the flagship report, what we have is a bunch of model portfolios, which is effectively an amalgamation of all our ideas. So we run a macro portfolio, which is all our ideas, asset class agnostic, currency agnostic.

We run 2 equity portfolios, which is an Asia long-short equity and an Asia 20, what we call 20 for 20, those 20 stocks that you need to own for the next 20 years around the region.

So we publish portfolio updates on that. We publish a Sunday night blotter, which is basically my thoughts for the upcoming week. And then we publish the transcripts of our expert series, which are cool video conferences that we hold once or twice a week on, as I said, on a myriad of topics.

So we're a subscription-based service. As I like to think, that— like to think that the true value in the services, you know, being able to talk to myself or Cindy and other members of the team, that's what we— that's what we do well. The written— the written word is, you know, probably, you know, probably 25% of what we're thinking, and the rest of it comes out through, you know, having a discussion just like this.

Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Well, I can't thank you enough for an excellent interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as Macro MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.

Now, back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.

Postgame: Treasury sell-off, narratives and US stability

Aaron Chan: Great interview, Erik. You know, one of the big stories since the election, which you and Paul discussed thoroughly in the interview, was the bond market and Treasury sell-off that ensued. I think we've been sold this narrative that Trump, plus a Republican sweep of Congress, is inherently inflationary. But with the Chinese and Saudis clearly selling Treasuries, presumably for the purposes of addressing dollar shortages and FX interventions. I mean, what part of this reflects the retreat of US hegemony in general?

Erik Townsend: I think that's an excellent question, Aaron First of all, I agree with you when you say that we've been sold this narrative. I think that the first person to come up with a credible narrative, it caught on. And it's— everybody's sort of into this. It's all about Trump policy is going to be inflationary. I'm not persuaded that that narrative is correct. I think that time will tell. But you bring up an excellent point, which is I think that Americans tend to miss half of the story here just because of their orientation.

What you see a lot of awareness of right now among Americans is, boy, the divisiveness in the United States. There's a bunch of people that are just all excited because their boy Donald Trump won. And there's a bunch of other people that are literally throwing Molotov cocktails in the streets and trying to organize efforts to overturn the election results because they're so upset about it, because they feel that Donald Trump is the wrong person. So this divisiveness, I think everybody in the United States gets that. There's another category of divisiveness that I think is just as big of a story, if not bigger, which is that the way the rest of the world is looking at this is, holy cow, the United States, as much as they were offended that Putin was the one to say it, really is starting to look like a banana republic. Neither one of these candidates were fit for office.

And, you know, Americans are having riots in the streets if their candidate didn't win. It's causing the rest of the world to get really nervous about the stability of the United States.

And we're seeing this rush away from U.S. Treasuries as a safe haven asset. I don't think that's entirely about a loss of U.S. hegemony, but I think that that is a contributing factor to it. And we're we're seeing a lot of loss of faith and a lot of discussion around the world about some countries abandoning the U.S. dollar as a trade settlement currency. Other countries are Are abandoning their military and political alliances with the United States. There is a divisiveness that is about whether or not the U.S. is still the top dog on the street. And I don't think Americans are really perceiving it because they're so caught up in the internals of Trump versus Clinton. I think the rest of the world is looking at it in terms of what the heck happened to the USA in terms of the leadership and stability that it used to portray to the rest of the world.

Aaron Chan: Right.

Postgame: Asia trade deals and trading protection for influence

Aaron Chan: Erik, speaking of the disequilibrium that this US election has created, I read an article in the Financial Times about how Australia might be snubbing the United States and TPP in favor of an Asia-Pacific free trade deal, which China hopes to advance at this week's trade summit in Peru. Now, China's territorial aims in the South China Sea are well known, but it appears they're also highly interested in making trade deals. So, do you see the same remilitarization thesis in the region as Paul

Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I would spin it a slightly different way. I think our views are very compatible. The way I would describe this is historically the United States has been in the business of exchanging or trading military protection for political influence. Basically, the deal is we're going to provide you with military protection because your country needs it and you can't afford to provide it for yourself.

And that's going to allow us to tell you what to do. And we expect you to play ball with us, or we're going to take away the protection that you desperately need.

What Donald Trump is saying is, look, these countries are getting a free ride. If they want military protection to be provided by the United States, they ought to pay for it. And frankly, I think what Mr. Trump is missing is the United States got a lot of political influence in terms of how it could control the actions of other countries by trading that so-called free military protection for political influence. If you put a price tag on that military protection, you lose the political influence and you lose the control that the United States has enjoyed. So I think that this international game of political influence and vying for power is a little bit more complicated than Donald Trump understands. And I think that his view about, you know, sending people a bill for their military protection is maybe a little bit misinformed.

Closing thoughts and Research Roundup

Aaron Chan: Thanks for that, Erik. That's all the time we have for this week. Erik, any closing thoughts?

Erik Townsend: Well, first of all, I want to let our listeners know that there will be a show next week. Of course, next Thursday is Thanksgiving Day, but we're going to air a prerecorded show, which will be episode 2 of my Accredited Investor Academy. That will appeal particularly to high-net-worth individual investors, but may interest the rest of the audience as well. And then we'll be back on December 1st with a regular format show and another feature interview guest.

And beyond that, as always, we need your help, folks, promoting the show and getting the word out.

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What's in this week's Research Roundup, Aaron?

Aaron Chan: We've got a great lineup this week, including some reactions to Trump's victory from Ray Dalio, Howard Marks, Bill Gross, and Jeff Gundlach. In particular, we've got the 60-page slide deck from Jeff Gundlach's latest investor webinar. So, be sure to check that out. Finally, you may have heard about the recent demonetization fiasco in India, where the government botched an attempt to ban the circulation of 500 and 1,000 rupee notes from circulation, ultimately creating more confusion and chaos for Indian citizens. To get an on-the-ground perspective on what was happening, be sure to read the latest article from The Indian Express. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.

So, that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @macrovoices for the latest updates. updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik at Erik S. Townsend and myself at _AaronChan_.

For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.

Announcer: That concludes this edition of MacroVoices. Be sure to tune in each week to hear feature interviews with the brightest minds in finance and macroeconomics. Please register your free account at www.macrovoices.com. Www.macrovoices.com. Once registered, you'll receive our free weekly research roundup email containing links to supporting documents from our featured guests and the very best free financial content our volunteer research team could find on the internet each week, which never includes advertising or marketing.

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MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

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MACRO VOICES is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented in MACRO VOICES should NOT be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making important investment decisions. The opinions expressed on MACRO VOICES are those of the participants. MACRO VOICES, its producers, and hosts Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna shall NOT be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MACRO VOICES.

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