Harald Malmgren — advisor to 4 US presidents (as introduced on the show)
Pippa Malmgren — Dr. Harald Malmgren ('advisor to 4 US presidents', starting with Kennedy) and his daughter Dr. Pippa Malmgren (advisor to Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush; the President's working committee/group on financial markets, 'Plunge Protection Team'). (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone.
Announcer: With Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 39 was recorded on November 10th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. We have a special post-election program for you today as investors' eyes have all turned to what a Trump presidency will mean for financial markets. We set out to find the very best expert on both politics and financial markets, and we ended up finding 2 such experts. Dr. Harald Malmgren served in the official capacity of advisor to 4 US presidents and unofficially to a couple of others, starting with the Kennedy administration. His daughter, Dr. Pippa Malmgren, followed in his footsteps as advisor to Presidents Reagan and George W. Bush, and also served on the President's Working Committee on Financial Markets, much more infamously known to many as the Plunge Protection Team.
This interview ran considerably over our usual time budget, but the content was just too interesting to cut it off early. So we're going to keep our market wrap a little bit tighter this week and try to tighten up the show in order to keep the overall length under control.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Erik, on Election Day at 8:44 AM exactly, you tweeted, Brexit déjà vu. Markets acting like Clinton win is a done deal. Not smart. This thing ain't over till it's over. Well, needless to say, that tweet was spot on.
Erik Townsend: Well, thank you. I appreciate that. But frankly, I feel like I really blew the call because I was convinced that if we saw this outcome of an upset victory by Donald Trump, which I explained last week, I thought was actually a lot more likely than other people thought, I thought for sure that the Hillary campaign would challenge the results, blame it on Russian hackers or whatever. And I have to say, as much as I'm personally not that big of a fan of Secretary Clinton, she was very professional in conceding defeat in what I thought was a very mature and eloquent way. So, I've got to give her credit for that one. And it also did not surprise me that equities retraced. You know, there was a panic just like Brexit. Oh my God, the world is ending. It's not what we thought, because markets hate when there is uncertainty.
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: But, you know, this prediction that a Donald Trump presidency is going to lead to an 80% market crash in the first 2 days turned out to be nonsense.
We've retraced to the point where we're trading well above those prices. And I think that that's mostly a reaction to spiking inflation expectations as people think that Trump's policies pertaining to trade tariffs and so forth will be inflationary.
Aaron Chan: Indeed, equity markets not only didn't crash like so many people predicted they would, on a Trump win, but we're actually trading higher now than before the election, with E-mini S&P futures trading as high as 2,180 in the overnight futures session and closing Thursday afternoon around 2,163. So what's next for stocks?
Erik Townsend: Well, the next big test would be a close above 2,191, which was the previous high, and I think we'll probably get that. Whether they're right or not, it seems like the initial market reaction is Trump presidency, very inflationary, and that is basically resulting resulting in people abandoning Treasury bonds and moving more aggressively into equities. And I think, you know, even Carl Icahn, who's been extremely bearish and concerned about the market, said that he went— he left Donald Trump's victory party early so he could go buy $1 billion in net notional exposure to equities in the overnight futures market. So this has so far been taken as a pretty bullish thing. And definitely it seems that the Sentiment about, well, if Trump wins, that means we're going to have a market crash. Seems like everybody conveniently forgot that.
Aaron Chan: Well, before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index. We traded on a 99 handle earlier today, and we're looking at a 98.87 around 4 PM on Thursday. Is the rally back on here?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I definitely think that it is back on. And, you know, all— as I said last week, I don't think that it ever made sense to think that a Trump presidency was negative for the dollar. The possibility of a contested The election result, I think, was the main reason that we saw so much weakness in the dollar in the run-up. And now that it's a done deal and nobody's contesting the election, I think the rally is very much back on in earnest. We had an opportunity on election night to buy the dollar index on a 95 handle. I think 95.90 was the low print there, and we're already back up to almost 99. I think that the next big test will be 103 with the previous high, and then 110 comes into view after that. So I think it's It's up and away from, from here for the U.S.
dollar.
Aaron Chan: Well, crude oil looks to be treading water this week, still trading on a $44 handle, hardly changed from last week. So what's new in the oil patch this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, inventory-wise, we did see a 2.4 million barrel build on inventory. So the oil is piling up on a national basis. But Cushing, Oklahoma, which is the critical choke point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, only saw a 28,000 barrel build, basically de minimis. Meanwhile, Those builds, a national inventory of 2.4 million sounds like a pretty big number to the upside in terms of inventory, but gasoline and distillates both drew down dramatically. Gasoline, 2.8 million barrel drawdown; distillates, 1.9 million barrel drawdown. Collectively, the size of the drawdown in finished products is considerably bigger than the total size of the build. Notably, though, production was up again this week as the rig count continues to rise. I still think that lower prices are coming. Certainly, a test of 42. $1,250, if not lower. As far as whether it gets much lower, the inventory numbers are going to tell us. I do note this week that the time spreads are widening considerably, which means that people are expecting the possibility of lower prices.
And a lot of traders will tell you that widening contango, widening time spreads, is oftentimes a predictor of lower prices still to come.
Aaron Chan: Well, gold traded as high as $1,338 on election night, but surprised a lot of us by reversing pretty dramatically after the election results were in, with a low print so far of $1,251 earlier on Thursday and closing around $1,256 as we're taping the show.
Erik Townsend: Well, Stan Druckenmiller really surprised me, and I think got a lot of people's attention, when he told CNBC that he sold all of his gold on election night. And he's been an outspoken gold bull and obviously a very, very shrewd investor, famously astute investor. And he says that he really thinks that in the wake of this Trump presidency, What that's going to mean is inflation expectations picking up and that causing massive flows out of safe haven assets like Treasuries and gold into US dollars. So, he is again confirming the bullish view on the US dollar, and he thinks that that will be negative for gold. The tape action is very much confirming that so far, seeing a lot of weakness in gold. So, I think long-term, I don't know that I'm completely sold that the argument that we've had for gold has been very strong.
I do continue to look at any weakness in the gold market as buying opportunities, but maybe it's time here to wait this out and see if those buying opportunities get dramatically better from here.
Aaron Chan: So 10-year Treasury yields exploded this week, trading at around 2.10% on Thursday afternoon. What's the story here?
Erik Townsend: I think it's entirely about spiking inflation expectations in reaction to the election. Both Pippa and Harald Malmgren in our feature interview are gonna have more to say about that, so I don't wanna I don't want to steal their thunder, but I think that maybe the market is getting a little bit ahead of itself. It really begs a question then, is this that buy-the-dip moment that Raoul Pal alluded to where we get north of 2% yields? Maybe it's time to buy Treasuries expecting those sub-1% yields that Raoul thinks are still coming, or is it time to say, wait a minute, spiking inflation expectations, that changes the game. Maybe Jeff Gundlach is really right and the bottom is in for yields and it's all uphill from here? That's the question to ask for sure. I don't know what the answer is. I'm still on the sidelines.
Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Drs. Harald and Pippa Malmgren hardly need any introduction, both having served as economic advisors to multiple U.S. presidents. Erik's interview with the Malmgrens is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Throughout history, there have There have been father-daughter teams for just about everything, whether it's running a restaurant or another family business. But if we talk about advising multiple United States presidents, as well as prime ministers and senior officials from around the world, Drs. Harald and Pippa Malmgren are, for sure, the world's only father-daughter team that both have experience advising multiple presidents. Normally, we don't get into a lot of introduction time on this program, but since both of you have a political background that some of our financial audience may not be familiar Could I ask both of you, starting with Harald, to give just a brief introduction to your background?
Harald Malmgren: Well, I— yes, I was an academic when I was asked to come to Washington with Jack Kennedy. And at that time, the first thing I did was work in the Pentagon. And then I would— then I was kept by Lyndon Johnson and given a lot of responsibility. Then I left, and then Nixon brought me back saying he had a lot of trouble with the Senate. Because I'd been advisor to the Senate Finance Committee in the interim.
And I was popular in the Senate. And then, Jerry Ford asked me to stick around. So, since then, I was asked by 2 other presidents, one Republican, one Democrat, to come back into the cabinet. But in the later years, I declined because I was busy working with leaders in a number of other countries. And I was having fun being on my own without having to worry about The political consequences. But I spent a lot of time also on advising sovereign wealth funds and some of the bigger ones around the world, and quite a few banks and several corporations on how the world was changing and affecting where they locate and how they manage their finances.
So it's a kind of very broad background. But with an eye always to the politics, not only in the US, but elsewhere.
Erik Townsend: And Dr. Pippa?
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, well, I had my dad to begin with, which was a huge advantage in the start of my career, because he taught me that economics was such a fun, interesting subject. And it got me interested in getting into politics. So, I had my first job was working for Ronald Reagan during the time that they were doing the Plaza Agreement with the dollar. Doing the beginning of the Uruguay Round. So, I was just a kid and a White House intern, but that's where I started. And then I worked in financial markets, but I became the person that explained the markets to the policymakers and the policymakers to the markets, because the 2 sides don't understand each other very well. So, I ended up being the Chief Currency Strategist for a couple of the big banks. And from that, I was invited to be the President's advisor in the White House on all financial market issues under George W. Bush.
I was on the National Economic Council, the President's Working Group on Financial Markets, famously known as the Plunge Protection Team for all the conspiracy theorists out there. And then I worked on all the big issues like Enron and 7 of the 9 largest bankruptcies in American history. And I worked on terrorism risk to the economy after 9/11. And then since, I advise mainly big institutional investors, but I also advise governments about what's happening on the landscape that's going to move prices. And particularly, my focus is on the risks you can't quantify. So politics, policy, and geopolitics, and how they're going to move markets.
Erik Townsend: Fantastic. Obviously, the topic of discussion for today is going to be what the Trump presidency will mean to investors in financial markets. But before we dive into the financial implications of this, I want to start with just the bigger picture of the Trump presidency. Obviously, President-elect Trump had a very strong message in his campaign. That strong message was essentially that all of the people that he now has to work with are corrupt and shouldn't be trusted. So he didn't make a whole lot of friends along the way on the campaign trail. How effective can he be? We do have now a White House and a Congress that are both controlled by the same party, which would normally be, you know, very good for collaboration and cooperation. Do you think President Trump will be able to pull it off, or do you think there's going to be a lot of divisiveness in the party because of how contentious this campaign has been?
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, I think on that, the The Republicans are now going to savor the fact that they've got now control of the agenda. So there's one rump group in the lower house, our House of Representatives, named the House Freedom Caucus. There are about 40 members. And in the last year or 2 or 3, they've been obstructive about everything.
But I think now that they see that they're going to be in the middle of a dominant political agenda, they'll probably cooperate, at least for a while. The enemies, well, he's made enemies with a lot of people, but none of those enemies are going to be in the new administration. What he's basically done is cleared the decks in order to bring in an entirely new establishment.
You can say this is risky, but you can also say it's a chance to reset He'll flip the entire apparatus of government in the United States with fresh people and no past agenda. So, all of those conspiracies like the neocons will be swept aside. We won't see any of those people in this new system. So, I see it as a chance for a reset and an opportunity, but it depends on who he chooses.
Erik Townsend: And Pippa, anything to add?
Pippa Malmgren: I have to agree. But one of the interesting things is people hated the language that he used, but they liked the principles that he represents, which is mainly, I'm going to attack the entire establishment, left, right, the media, the politics, the money, and he's going to use that language on all those people. So, he's going to be at war. He basically is like a guy with a bulldozer, and he goes into the system and he just razes everything. And this is what people want because they realize that the government is broke. It's got its finances in a terrible mess. It's never going to be able to look after you. So, if you want to look after yourself, then you want a world that has smaller government, lower taxes, less red tape. And in order to get there, he has to be outrageous in his attack on the system. But actually, so far, he's done it.
So, I'll give you just one example, which is the money side. I mean, they say now the average cost, the average price of his voters, what it cost him to win a single vote was $5. He basically only spent money on those red hats. He didn't spend any money on the ground game. He didn't spend any money on the team and the campaign. He spent nothing on pollsters, which was incredibly wise in retrospect, given how lousy their predictions were. But what that proves is you do not have to sell your soul anymore as an American politician in order to win the presidency. You can get there with no money whatsoever. And I think every lobbyist, every lawyer, every fundraiser in Washington is having a heart attack attack right now because they are out of business. And so, first task already accomplished. And I think that is the world we're looking at.
It's going to be a rough ride, but kind of somebody had to do it.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, we've had, obviously, just in the first 24 hours after the election result, which surprised a lot of people, we've seen riots, we've seen 5 people shot in Seattle, we've seen death threats against President-elect Is this a flash in the pan? Do you think that we're seeing the beginning of an escalation in divisiveness that's going to continue? You know, will it subside or will it escalate from here in terms of the reaction that we're seeing that's so angry by so many people?
Harald?
Harald Malmgren: It's been escalating now for, for a couple of years, so it's— this is not new. It's been getting rougher and rougher. Police being shot directly has happened more frequently in the last several months. And President Obama, although he probably didn't intend to do it, he increased the divisiveness by trying to tell the nation that it's not surprising that the Black community is upset. There's a long history.
And so in a sense, he gave a blessing to a certain amount of public dissent and disorder. That will— that's not going to stop. That will be wound down slowly. Absolutely. But it was already in place. Now, for the time being, you've got people who are Trumpers and people who are Hillary people, and they'll be happy. But I've never seen Hillary people actually out doing things with guns and riots, although they are pretty active in social movements.
The Trumpers, you know, they're satisfied now. I mean, they'll quiet down and basically get behind the president for a while.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Harald Malmgren: And one thing that's really noticeable is the margin in the Electoral College was much stronger for Trump than it was for George W. Bush.
Erik Townsend: And Pippa, anything to add?
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah. So, I agree with my dad that this trend towards more violence has been in place for a while. My personal view is that the real driver behind it is, first of all, a rise in the cost of living. Now, that's super controversial to say because the Fed says there's absolutely no increase in inflation. But even if you look at the official numbers, we've gone from practically no inflation to hitting the central bank's target, which is 2%.
And Janet Yellen's already said, well, then let's raise the target. Let's make it higher. So, I think inflation is in play. And if you're poor, you feel that when your rent goes up, when your cost of groceries go up, when protein prices go up. And so, I think people were already angry and feeling pain from that pressure. Trump has said, I want the Fed to print money. And while he can't throw Janet Yellen out, she's protected technically, the guy's a landlord, right? He knows how to make a tenant uncomfortable and push them out of the building.
So, I suspect that that's what's going to happen. And we're going to end up with a Federal Reserve leadership that says, yeah, let's hit the printing pedal. And in that environment, we can expect more inflation. And that will again hurt the poor, So, we really need to think about the social consequences of any decision to inflate more. So, I think that's a critical issue. The other thing is just the divide between those with assets and those without, the split between the rich and the poor. It's so wide. And the avenues for the poor to improve their situation are so limited that it has to express itself one way or another.
Anger, pain, protest. So, hopefully, what Trump can do is deliver the hope, the possibility that the avenue for a regular person who has no money, no connections, just talent or hard work and pure grit has a chance to make it, which has traditionally been the American story. So, he's just about— if he can return us to that past environment, where you could get ahead on your own hard work, I think it'll diminish the need for people to protest their way out of it.
Harald Malmgren: But there's one thing that, that, that, uh, it's politically incorrect to say, but, um, the Federal Reserve policies basically increased the wealth of those people who had large holdings of assets, you know, property and stocks and commodities. But when you tell the story of the US economy, there are really 2 stories. There's the Fed story and the president's story, which is the economy's been growing since the great financial crisis.
It's better now than it was. It's safer than it was. But then if you step— say, well, wait a minute, if we set aside the top 5%, including the wealthiest plus doctors, lawyers, scientists, and supervisors and just take the 95% of the people in the streets, what is the situation? Well, when you break out the 95%, the median income has been going down since the president started.
And when you go through it, you get 2 groups. One group is no better off, and then a large, large group which is much worse off. Now, what happened? There was a new thing that happened that I've been predicting for months, and that was that healthcare insurance costs would go up dramatically just about election time. And in fact, the insurers throughout the country sent out letters which arrived on people's doorstep 4 or 5 days before the election, saying, by the way, beginning November 1st, your premiums are going to be increased by 30%, 40%, 50%.
Aaron Chan: Oh, yes.
Harald Malmgren: And oh, yes, by the way, what you're going to have to spend out of pocket in order to qualify for relief is going to be tripled or quadrupled. So there was— that was one big thing, because incomes for most people have not been rising. So if you say to somebody, by the way, we're going to take a bigger bite for healthcare, that was a heavy hit. And second, all the young people are moving towards renting rather than buying homes, and the rent costs are going up dramatically. So, when you start looking at the 95%, basically, you can say they're worse off now than they were.
And the older people cannot say that their children are going to have a better life than they had. They're now thinking they're going to have a worse life, and even worse, they're going to be home in the house because they can't afford to live outside. That's been building up for some time.
Erik Townsend: As we turn to financial markets, I want to go back to this theme of inflation, because certainly as we look at the charts, there have been a massive spike in inflation expectations since the election result. And I think it's pretty clear that people think that President-elect Trump's policy statements around imposing tariffs and so forth— people see those as inflationary.
And of course, bonds are already dumping on this. And I can't help but wonder, boy, you know, I personally have held the view for a long time that we're kind of in a bond market bubble that needs a catalyst to pop it at some point. And I've always wondered what that catalyst would be. I wonder if this sudden spike in inflation expectations is the beginning of something much bigger, and if it could potentially lead to, you know, a dramatic sell-off in the bond So, I guess starting with bonds, but also looking at stocks and other financial assets, precious metals and so forth, I'd love to get both of your views on what presidency of Donald Trump is going to mean for financial markets. Harald, do you want to start?
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, I think everybody in the market in the last, what, 3 days is jumping to the conclusion that everything Trump will do will be inflationary. And that may be true, but I think everybody's jumping the gun. First of all, it takes a long time to set up a new administration.
And second, he hasn't really said explicitly what he's going to do about anything. He's been broad brushed. He's raised issues that everybody's excited about and concerned with, but how he would proceed is a whole other question. And then then there's the issue of what. What is— what power does he have? He cannot raise— he cannot change taxes without the Congress passing tax legislation.
And that takes a process of consultation with not only all the businesses, but the Catholic Church and the charities, the Boy Scouts. Everybody in America gets involved with tax reform. And it takes— it normally takes 9 months to 18 months to write tax law. And then can he raise duty? Can he put obstacles up for trade with China? He doesn't have power. The Constitution, strangely enough, says that only the Congress has authority over trade.
And so he has zero power. He can ask the Congress to do something, but the Congress will then divide between the people who want to hammer China and the people who sell to China. I mean, the companies that's selling a lot of stuff in China, like General Motors will be lobbying hard to do nothing.
So probably there'll be an impasse for a while because the president himself doesn't have the power to do anything in trade.
Then we start looking at what else can he do? Well, he can change healthcare, but again, he has to bring about a very detailed change in the law. And we're talking 1,000 or 2,000 pages of law. Right. That's not going to happen overnight. So everybody's jumping the gun as to what how this all plays out. Also, he'll bring in a new Treasury Secretary, and he will be working. Well, he is working already on on whether the Fed should be restructured, have a different role, what the influence of the banks over the Fed should be.
The idea is already, let's say, under discussion whether you should move all the bank supervision away from the Fed completely. So that the banks don't have a grip around policy, because right now the banks own the Fed. So all of that is in play.
I think it's way early to— that the market is overreacting, because give me— I'll give you one example. If the European banking situation goes into a mess this winter, which is, I think, highly likely, Uh, a lot of money is going to flow to the US, and I think the dollar is going to get stronger.
And during that time, there will be crises also as the dollar gets stronger in the emerging markets, in China, because there are so many of these countries have been borrowing in dollars in the last 3 years. So you've got about $10 trillion of foreign borrowing in, uh, in dollars.
Aaron Chan: Uh-huh.
Harald Malmgren: And now, what you're seeing, it's not so visible yet, is dollar shortage all over the world. And so, black markets are beginning to appear in a number of countries. So, all of that's going to play out too. So, I think, yes, inflation is coming eventually, but is it now or is it 3, 4 years from now? I think that's a really uncertain question to answer.
Erik Townsend: And Pippa, your view?
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, I'm also not as worried about this issue of a bond market sell-off. Because, well, so many different reasons. One is if the yield goes up on U.S. bonds, frankly, the rest of the world would love to buy that. People just don't like to buy a falling knife. But if they think that the yields are going to have an adjustment and then settle down, that's viable.
Second, like I said, people are really interested in investing in the United States. They see the U.S. as the fastest growing industrialized economy in the world. Probably the most dynamic location on the planet is the Mexico-Texas-Midwest corridor today. And they are definitely putting capital to work there. And if Trump opens up infrastructure to foreign investment, which I think he will, and get foreigners to finance our new airports, our new physical infrastructure, then actually, you won't be blowing out the budget And therefore, the pressure on the bond market is not so great.
Also, he said he wants to cut expenditure on lots of things, like you know the famous line that he wants to kill the Environmental Protection Agency. Well, probably isn't going to be able to completely shut it down. I mean, we need rules of some kind, but he could really radically change the budget and and reduce it, and in a way that would leave money for other things. So we don't know yet.
But we do know that actually, the global appetite for more fiscal policy is a lot higher today than it has been in the past. So, I'm not sure you're going to get that bond market vigilante response. Because frankly, people have forgotten about inflation. They're like, we should be so lucky as to get some. They have just no memory of what it's like when you can't control it. So, probably inflation would have to go substantially higher before you get back to a world where bond market vigilantes have any role to play.
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, I agree with that. I think we may see the yields on the longer maturity Treasuries go back down some distance, because I think the demand for dollars is going to be so strong. There are a lot of people now pointing out that the Chinese are selling off Treasuries.
Well, That's sort of half true because Chinese are also big buyers each time there's a Treasury auction. Why the Chinese are selling off is they're running out of dollars, and a lot of the state enterprises and businesses have been borrowing in dollars the last three years, and now they got to find a way to pay off those dollars. They they don't have enough dollar cash, so there are temporary factors in play that everybody's overlooking.
So I, you know, I think we're going to see terrible problems in other countries. We're going to see currencies fall in many places. Dollar will get stronger. And if you're a hedge fund in Europe, you're going to position yourself in dollars and get out of euros and out of a lot of other currencies because you're going to make money just from the capital gain. And so if you buy Treasuries with a reasonably decent yield, Way higher than Europe, and you also got a rising currency. It's a no-brainer to— so dollars are going to become— Treasuries are going to become more attractive once trouble hits everywhere else.
Pippa Malmgren: Totally agree.
Erik Townsend: So it sounds like both of you think that the market is jumping prematurely to conclusions about inflation. With respect to the bigger picture, though, of just your outlook for for various financial markets. Do you have one yet, or do you think that we have to wait and see in terms of how this presidency goes before you can form a meaningful opinion on where markets might be headed as a result of this?
Pippa Malmgren: I don't know. I think it's pretty clear that equity markets are gonna go up on this overall story of smaller government, lower taxes, less red tape, more accommodating environment. I agree with my dad. I think Europe is coming into a period of some turbulence. I've just spent 3 days in Italy. I met with the recent former head of the Italian Constitutional Court. I think the Italians are going to say no to this next referendum on December 4th. The whole world is going to go, oh my God, they're not going to pursue reform. There's no solution. The markets will attack the Italian banking system again. Some of those institutions like the famous Banco Monte dei Paschi have already lost like 98% of their share value. And there's no way to do a bailout. And I think they can lose 98% percent more of their share value. We're going to have a series of crises around financial institutions.
We've already seen 2 of the biggest German banks are in the headlines all the time on this same question of what's the condition of their finances.
In that world, people are looking to the US as a safe haven. I also think there are developments in other parts of the world like China that we've maybe missed because we're so focused on the Trump stuff. Like last week, the Politburo in China announced that Xi Jinping has been elevated to what they call core status.
Only 2 other people in modern history have been given this: Mao and Deng Xiaoping. And what it basically means is it's one guy in charge now. He won't be challenged ever again. He's permanently there until the end of his life. And personally, I have questions about can China innovate in that more one-man rule environment?
Is there enough creativity and oxygen for that in that situation? Maybe not. And if that's the case, again, they're going to look to other places.
Personally, I think Mexico is the new China. Its wages are 20% cheaper than China. It's deeply integrated to the US. And again, to your point, the markets are selling off China way— I mean, sorry, Mexico way prematurely on the assumption that somehow Trump is going to shut down economic activity across the border. I think this is absolutely a misreading of what he has said. And actually, American companies are moving south as quick as they can because high productivity, incredibly high quality control, better than China. And if there's more process around immigrants coming into America, but they aren't excluded from coming in, they just are pushed into legal channels, which he has already said he's going to make shorter and faster.
Frankly, Mexico is going to be a buy story very shortly, and the US generally as well. So, I'm a bit optimistic on that one.
Erik Townsend: Harald, anything you want to add?
Harald Malmgren: I agree with all of that. And I would add that, you know, to the extent that he wants to halt immigration for a while from Mexico, a lot of companies will say, fine, we'll just move the plants down there. I mean, there, it's going to be counterproductive because the US needs that, that labor.
And so if we can't bring it in, the production will simply go to where
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to some more foreign policy subjects. Certainly, Vladimir Putin was very quick to congratulate Trump and has made it clear that he would welcome the opportunity to work with Trump to repair the condition of Russia's relationship with the United States. That sounds like a fantastic idea to me, but I wonder how effectively President Trump could do that, because there's been so much rhetoric in the United States that Putin's a bad guy, and, you know, if Trump is seen to be friendly with Putin, I think it probably damages him. How do you see this playing out? Can Trump save the day somehow and correct the relationship with Russia before it falls apart?
Harald Malmgren: This is a really complicated subject because what Putin would like to do is get the U.S. to recognize that the area that was the old Soviet Union, much of Eastern Europe really is historically part of the realm of Russian influence, and so they they would like the U.S. to say okay, we're not going to expand eastward anymore. This our military interest through NATO, and we're going to not be so let's say attentive to to Eastern Europe, and that of course frightens Poland and the the Baltic states and some of the countries to the south.
That would be his objective. It depends on how the president would negotiate because President Trump has said what he wants to do is lean on present NATO membership to either pay up some more for the protection of the West or otherwise, there's no reason for the US to keep putting money into protecting people who are getting a free ride, particularly about Germany.
So how that's going to play out is— we'll see. I don't think it's something that happens overnight. I think it's something that will be slowly negotiated, discussed over 3 or 4 years. It's something that may change over the duration of his first term as president. But not something that's going to change tomorrow morning.
Too many different pieces of the puzzle are in play, both relations with the US with Europe and the US with Russia.
Erik Townsend: Pippa, anything to add on Russia?
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, definitely. You know, I worked for President George W. Bush, and we all remember when he said, I've met Putin and looked him in the eyes, and this is a guy I can do business with. And then it turned out not so much. It was not such an easy thing to do business with him.
Well, I suspect we may have the same thing with Trump, that he thinks, oh, I can negotiate with this guy. We see eye to eye. But in reality, Putin is pursuing what is in the national interest of Russia. And so, for example, when Trump has said Ukraine and Crimea, hey, look, we don't want it. You guys have it if you want it. We certainly don't want it.
Well, this may be true. It may be true that it's in the American national interest to step away from that issue. There are a lot of people who would say, my gosh, we fought hard for that in the Cold War. And so, there's going to be a big debate about that. But I do think if I were Putin, and they handed something valuable to me like that, if they said, oh, Syria, we don't really want that. If you want that, go for it, I would say, oh, this is great. I can pursue my national interests more aggressively. So, I can't say we should be surprised If we see the Russians behaving a much more aggressive way and expanding their reach at a time when they detect the Americans are not interested in creating a bit of a vacuum, as a small example, it looks like you know North Africa is becoming destabilized very quickly. The Saudis have just cut off the money for Egypt because they're running out of cash themselves.
Libya is obviously held together by two threads. And there's worry about Algeria. Well, guess what we saw last week? The Russians held the first military exercises, I think ever, in North Africa near El Alamein. What are they doing in North Africa? Answer: Well, it's a vacuum, so they step in.
So, I think that this issue is going to come back. The other one is the issue with the Chinese and the arguing about the South China Sea and who's legitimately allowed to be there. And I suspect I suspect that Trump is also going to face tricky issues in managing because the Chinese are going to say, listen, we got to feed our people and 10% of the world's fish supply is right there in the South China Sea, not to mention all the access for the shipping lanes that are so critical for a nation that can't feed itself and depends on bringing food back home and other raw materials as well. So, I suspect foreign policy is going to get a little noisy.
And everybody knows that Trump has said, I'm not interested in this issue and I don't want to deal with it. So that's an invitation for trouble a little bit.
Erik Townsend: Now, in addition to everything you just mentioned, of course, there's the oil and gas rights under the South China Sea, and that just adds to this. But a lot of Trump's critics have said, you know, this guy is going to start a trade war with China that's just not in our best interest. Do you think that's a legitimate criticism? Do you think that Trump starting a trade war over tariffs and import duties and so forth could potentially be the catalyst that causes an escalation of those other issues that you described with China?
Harald Malmgren: Well, let's, let's stop for a minute. Something I said to you earlier in passing, the Constitution, for whatever curious reasons of how it was drafted, says explicitly the Congress shall regulate foreign commerce. In other words, the president can do what he wants with diplomacy, but he has no power power to alter trade policy.
The House and the Senate have jealously guarded their authority, and this is why we're getting these battles from time to time about delegation of authority to the president to negotiate. So what Trump can do is he can stop things like— he can stop the famous Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement if he wants to, because that's not law. Yet, but he can't just impose new restrictions on China. He can, if he wants, play the game of unfair trade and increase antidumping duties and countervailing duty duties, but he can't impose new restrictions on his own.
Now, if it goes to the Congress, there are going to be 2 interest groups. One is, time to kick the Chinese in the butt. And then there is the other group that sells to China a lot of stuff, and where we have many companies in China that would be, let's say, put in jeopardy if we have a trade war. And we're not talking about minor companies, we're talking about GM and Google and a lot of other of the big, big parts of our economy. So, there would be a debate.
And he's a pragmatist. I think Trump would simply listen to all these different sides and say, ah, this is more complicated than I thought. So I don't think it's easy for him to start a trade war with China, but he's, he's scaring the Chinese. That's clear. So we'll see how that plays out. But I think that's a long game. He can't do it. He has no power to do it by himself. It's going to be publicly debated, and the lobbyists for the big companies are not going to
Erik Townsend: Pippa, anything to add on China?
Pippa Malmgren: Totally. I totally agree. There's a phrase that gets used. There are China sluggers and China huggers, or panda huggers and panda sluggers. This is the fight that's going to play out, as you say, Dad, between the folks who want things to go well with China and the people who want to be more confrontational. I think there's the same fight with regard to Russia, that there are people who say we got to be accommodating and that'll calm things down and the people who say the only thing that works is a hard line. But one thing I'd point out is my dad went to Russia, to Moscow, back in the early 1970s with Henry Kissinger. They were sent by President Nixon to have a dialogue with the Russians at the height of mutual assured destruction, when nuclear weapons were all pointing at each other, and we were pretty close to the brink at various times. Today, I think there is almost no dialogue between the United States and Certainly, in official circles, it's unbelievably limited.
And I think that we're more likely to have problems if we're not talking. I don't know, Dad, what do you think based on your experience?
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, I think exactly right, because I did have experience with, with the Russians. And indeed, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, I actually sat next to Putin when he was a deputy mayor of St. Petersburg. I sat next to him at quite a few dinners, so I actually know him. Now, when I say I know him, I mean, I know him well enough to know that I would not want to be in a dark alley alone with him without somebody protecting me.
But there is no dialogue now. That's correct.
At the time, even in the worst of the Cold War, there was always a dialogue. And nobody pays attention to all of that. We had an— the Russians had an ambassador in Washington named Dobrynin. Right. Dobrynin, who was there throughout most of the Cold War. And I had many conversations with Dobrynin. Dobrynin also was always talking to Kissinger, but Dobrynin was in Moscow a member of the Central Committee. So he was the unusual ambassador here but had voice there.
And, and there was always a dialogue, and, and we avoided lots of accidents. Accidents. And we even managed to have arms control agreements from time to time, even though there was a lot of growling. Right now, there's absolutely nothing going on. And it's an atmosphere in which the two— the militaries can easily have accidents between each other.
There's no hotline, by the way, now. There's no— for whatever reasons, our present president didn't want to continue with it. So we have— the military's there, and the military's in the United States want to have more dialogue just to avoid accidents that hurt some of their people unnecessarily. But once you start talking, the issues tend to calm down and get more focused and more defined. And once— it's the way of international negotiations. If you can narrow things down to one step at a time and one issue at a time, it becomes manageable.
Erik Townsend: Before we move on from foreign policy, let's touch Mexico briefly. Obviously, President Trump's promises during his campaign were very bold. You know, build a wall, make Mexico pay for it, deport every single illegal immigrant and send them back. Do you think that those are just campaign rhetoric that's going to be forgotten, or do you think that he's going to follow through? And what will the knock-on effects and economic consequences be if he
Harald Malmgren: Well, Pippa probably has thoughts, but as I said before, if you, if you stop the flow, I mean, then Ford, GM, and Chrysler will simply build more cars south of the border. I mean, that's not— it's not going to happen. And if the flow is stopped, the labor costs inside the southern U.S. will be jumping through the roof. Yeah. Popping up in California, Texas, and other places.
But I don't think it'll happen quite that way. I mean, I think there'll be a dialogue. There's a lot to do between the 2 countries. And the president also can't change immigration laws so easily. I mean, the Congress has been involved with immigration quotas since the 1920s, when in those days there was so much allotted for Ireland and so much for Italy, and it was negotiated all the time according to which companies needed which kind of workers.
The laws are so deep, it's just that Obama was ignoring the laws. So I think when he sits down with people who are expert in this, they'll find many ways of handling what he wants to do. And the idea of a wall is going to be well down the list of priorities. But I'll give you an example of one thing that can be— that is already under discussion, and that is the Coast Guard. The Coast Guard has been crippled Crippled and treated as a forlorn orphan that nobody cares about. And yet, probably most of the problems, including drug movements, are the realm of the Coast Guard. So there is a— some of the Trump people are already talking about, well, what can we do about bringing the Coast Guard back into relevance? Because the water is probably the biggest problem.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Harald Malmgren: Problem. So that's, that's already underway. I, I'm not so gloomy about the thinking that's going on. I think it's going to be how the president delegates this, and then probably where he has to begin is a major revamp of Homeland Security, which is full of deadweight created by the last administration to fail They were open borders, and the morale got really low, and anybody who really cared basically retired or just took longer days— shorter days and played more golf.
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, I also have an interesting different view on Mexico. I did the live coverage of the debates with one of the big international television channels here out of London, where I'm based, Sky News. And it was so interesting. Trump was very careful when he said that the wall goes up, but I want to create a situation where people with talent and skills and experience can come into the US to deploy it, and that people who don't have that can actually get through the legal hurdles more quickly with greater certainty.
And I think that this message is very, very powerful, and it was undernoticed by the markets. And like I said, Mexico, bottom line is that it is a very dynamic economy. The Chinese are investing a ton of money in Mexican infrastructure, from physical railways all the way to building new refineries. I mean, the word is that they're going to build 5 new oil refineries about literally 2.5 inches off the US border.
And why? Because the Environmental Protection Agency didn't permit the building of a new refinery for the last, I think it's 32 years last time I looked. So, the Mexicans have said, fine, we'll build them. 34 years ago. It's 34, thank you. So, the Mexicans have said, okay, we'll build them. The Chinese said, we'd be delighted to fund that because what we want to do is take all that crude out of the Gulf of Mexico and bring it back to China. China. And technology permits this now. What used to be really messy and difficult to deal with, now technology makes it easy to pull that stuff out of the Gulf of Mexico. All that is a by story.
I agree as well, by the way, the legalization of marijuana in the United States, which is gaining momentum like crazy, it's super popular with everyone for obvious reasons, some not so obvious, mainly governments are doing it at the state level because they're broke. And if you make it legal, you can tax it. It's a revenue-generating measure. It's not like their morals all changed. It's that their pocketbook needs the cash. And as those states start to do that, it'll make the whole relationship between Mexico and the US over the drug trafficking issue potentially easier to manage. Everybody will have to spend less on enforcement. They'll have more capital to spend on other things. And so, it's up to you to decide, do you think if you legalize marijuana, you open the door to much harder drugs that are even more difficult to police? Or do you think once you legalize marijuana, it diminishes the use of drugs generally, including the hard stuff?
It's an open question. But I think that overall, it looks like the drug trafficking issue gets diminished if both sides start to say it's legal. And the Mexicans have said, as soon as California says it's legal, we're going with that.
Erik Townsend: Let's take a step back now from these specific issues around the Trump presidency and focus on what I think may be even a more interesting story, which is the bigger picture of the rise of populism. You know, first it was Brexit that everybody thought was impossible, but the people didn't do what the elites wanted them to do. They did what they wanted. Next, President Trump, you know, totally unexpected by most. All the pollsters got it wrong.
The Italian referendum could be next. So what is driving this big rise in populism around the globe, and where is it likely headed from here? Harald?
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, well, we could both talk about this because regarding Italy, for example, Pippa was just there and deeply involved with the discussion about that referendum. But this populism, it can be found in many countries. I mean, there are some that's not— Japan is still sort of semi-establishment sleep about this type of issue, but it's a growing issue throughout Europe.
It has similar dimensions to the US, but worse. Europe is aging, and it has a huge social support system it can't really support as the population ages because the labor base is shrinking relatively to the amount of number of people that have to be paid for. But the policies of European governments have been so harsh on ordinary people, and like the US, favoring the banks and the wealthy, that the population is basically confronting the same widening wealth gap and they're rebelling.
We're going to see not only the UK talking exit, but the pressures for— the 2 things that are going to happen in Europe. One is pressures for exit in other countries, Greece maybe again. Netherlands is seriously considering a shift in that direction. France depends on the dynamics of the coming election in this next year, but they're going to be more, let's say, less euro-friendly and more in favor of greater nationalism.
Then you've got Donald Tusk, who is president of what's called the European Council, which is the leadership of all the countries, and who's saying basically, when you count in all of Eastern Europe and the smaller countries, what we want is less making of laws by bureaucrats in Brussels and more democratic processes with greater delegation back to the national governments. Governments of regulation of many things that Brussels had taken over it. That's going to be a growing issue throughout 2017.
It will affect also, for example, in Spain, Catalonia wants to break loose and get free of everything to do with Brussels, because that's where all the money and business is. They want freedom from— get out from under all that regulation. So it's, it's, it's a similar process, widening income gap, everybody's stuck, no progress. And then of course, on top of all of this, very slow world growth.
And the one thing which I spent decades on in government was trade.
And I've been saying now for several years, since the great financial crisis, world trade has been slowing down. Now this year basically showing signs of contraction, even in volume, not just value. Now, what this means is that a heck of a lot of countries around the world managed to find ways to grow, even though they have weak domestic consumption, by, by selling stuff to other countries. They use external demand to drive. Now, how many countries are we talking about? More than 100.
And of these, Germany, for Germany, for example, is the most export-dependent country in the world. Hardly anybody pays attention to that. I think Germany is— Germany's economy is set to start shrinking because there is no growth in world trade now. And without growth in world trade, there's no driver for growth in Germany. And then they've got the old-age population. So all of these things are at work.
So this rising populism is unhappiness. That average people are not better off, they're worse off. And it looks like they're going to be even worse off. And this is before we even talk about inflation in the next few years. So it's a growing global problem. It has a lot to do with slowdown in global growth, collapse of world trade.
It's a kind of a— we're going to see a period of deglobalization, not because people choose to do it, but because it's happening. And there'll be more regional arrangements like US-Mexico. But it's a kind of— we're going to go through a couple of decades anyway of recalibration of societies. And in the meantime, unhappy publics that want change, and they want change which It means greater autonomy at the local level.
And I think we're going to see it in the US too, by the way. I think we're going to see more and more pressure to delegate back to the states and back to local communities a lot of things, because we're just getting overregulated at the national level.
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, I have to agree with you on most of that. I'd take it even further though, and say, you know, what's at the heart of the whole populist uprising is number one, everybody is discontented. It's not just that a few people or one part of society, even the people who are really, really well off are feeling nervous that all the wealth has ended up in such a small number of hands and that somehow this is rendering our societies less stable.
I wrote a book this last year called Signals. And one of the core ideas in it was that there's always a social contract between governments and their citizens. It's always a deal. And you agree to pay your taxes and abide by the law. And in exchange, you expect government to deliver certain things like roads without potholes, education to a certain level, a justice system that you can trust. There are lots of things, a fire department that arrives when you call the number.
And what's happening today is the debt burden is so huge that it's causing governments to be unable to deliver on their promises. They promised you could retire at, I don't know, 65. Now, they come back and say, well, maybe like 93, given the state of our finances. And people are mad about government defaulting on those promises and the inability to follow through. So, you're getting a populist uprising. Let's also keep in mind that actually, the public has been incredibly patient, because the financial crisis was in 2008.
And they were told if they just tighten the belt and just gave it a little time, government policy would fix all this stuff. Well, here we are years later, and they tighten the belt and they waited, and things are not materially better. I mean, you can hardly call the growth we have in the United States today a home run.
It's better than it was, but it's certainly pretty paltry compared to what you'd hope for, especially given the resources that have been thrown into this. Thing. And so, now people are saying, enough, enough of all that. I want to rejig this whole thing. And they're basically asking 2 questions.
One is, why is the wealth in my society being distributed to some other guy and not to me? Why am I not a beneficiary of all this? And number 2, how come you people are in charge? I would like my own people in charge. And that explains Brexit. It explains Trump. It explains the protests that we're seeing in Europe and the rise of the further exit movements there, which all their own names.
In Sweden, they call it Swexit. In Denmark, they call it Dexit. In Italy, they even have the name. It's so funny. They can call it Itexit, which is deeply ironic since that's their problem. But at any rate, everywhere people are saying enough.
And I think this is the essence of the populist movement. The good news about the populism is it doesn't seem to be saying It has a particular outcome that it wants in respect to being on the left or on the right. People are basically saying, I want a version of capitalism that works for me.
And that's what needs to be delivered. Now, whether that comes as a socialist answer in some parts of the world, or a capitalist answer in other parts of the world, that's a local issue. But overall, people just want to come up with a system that works. So, yeah, populism is a tough subject markets are having to adjust to. But I think in the end, what we're not going to end up with is a French Revolution.
The system will be able to adapt. The ballot box will do the job it's supposed to do and take the pain. And if Trump doesn't work, they'll do it again. And after all, they voted Obama in on a change mandate. He didn't work, they chucked him out. Now they've thrown Trump in. If he doesn't work, they'll chuck him out and start again. So, I'm optimistic about the flexibility of our political system to adapt to the populist forces.
Harald Malmgren: I would add to that, just a quick comment, because I agree with that. There's been a collapse of confidence in societies, not only in how the governments function and the way in which nothing's been improving lately. But now, you know, it's really dramatized by this election, where all the pollsters got everything wrong and the media, mainstream media had everything played one way and it came out differently.
I think there's also a collapse of confidence in the fourth estate. There's a collapse of confidence in basically every— all the news, and slowly, slowly increasing attention to alternative media. I think we're going to find that new forms of news management are going to gradually develop where you get more objectivity and less news that's harnessed to particular interest groups.
And another aspect of this is we've You have, in every country, a policy community that is known as the elites. They're the people who have experience. They've been around a long time. These are the people who really know. But the reality is they have gone off on the wrong track.
A lot of what the Fed has been doing is liked by other people who have been at the Fed or wish to be at the Fed, but the reality is Fed policy has gone way off track and has been in the last 10 years a failed experiment. So we're going to see somehow some efforts to rebuild confidence, but it takes time. So right now there's growing disbelief. Whatever I hear, I don't believe it anyway.
And people don't believe in the government figures. They don't believe in how decisions are made. Everybody thinks there must be some conspiracy. There's no way to explain a mess unless somebody's behind it. But the reality is it is a mess. So the transition won't happen fast. It's going to take a decade or two.
But the existing institutions are simply not trusted any longer. And we're going to see a lot of fresh thinking that does get publicity.
Erik Townsend: We've only got a couple of minutes left, but I just want to push back quickly, Pippa, on your comments about this breakdown of the social contract, because I just can't help but I would observe, if you think it's bad now, just wait for what's coming, because holy cow, we have a Social Security system and an entitlement system in the United States which is just unfunded.
It is mathematically impossible to keep this Ponzi scheme going indefinitely. If you look at the social welfare system in Europe, it's largely been financed by deficit spending, more and more growing of this mountain of government debt. And if you're right and inflation is about to rear its ugly head again, that means that the cost of all this government borrowing is going to go up dramatically. So, there's going to be, I would think, a dramatic increase in the rate at which governments fail to deliver on the social contract. Does that mean that we're headed towards a huge amount of unrest, or do you think that this is somehow Or do you think that I've got the economics wrong?
Pippa Malmgren: No, no, I think you got the economics right. And I think if the public understood that their pension isn't really there, if they knew how underfunded Social Security was, if they understood how underfunded their pension was, they would be outraged. And yes, it's a fundamental rupture of the social contract. But the question is, what will people do about it?
It. And I think there are 2 choices. One is, yeah, you can protest. You can go to the streets, you can burn buildings down, but you know what? It won't cause your pension fund to be funded. It won't give you more money in Social Security. And people are intelligent, and they will go, you know what? There's only one other option. And that is to innovate. That is to build. That is to work longer. Already, we see that folks over the age of 50 are not only working longer, but folks over 50 are reentering the workforce at an incredibly rapid rate. And interestingly, they're not entering into the workforce in full-time positions with traditional corporations, because those jobs aren't there for them. What they are doing is engaging in what we call the gig economy, where you work part of your time for a friend who's running an entrepreneurial venture, and you spend part of your time advising the company that you spent many years working for, and you spend a little bit of your time doing other things that generate some revenue.
And people are building portfolios of activities. And I think they're doing it across a wide array of income levels.
I was in the US recently, and I had a wonderful Black female taxi driver. She was an entrepreneur. And we started chatting, and she started talking. She's got a couple of kids. She's working for Uber, but she's trying to create a catering business. And she's practically explaining more to me about how the tax code messes her up than I think half the people at the IRS could do in explaining the US tax code. And her determination is massive because her feeling is there is no other choice. Nobody else is going to look after me here.
I have great confidence that the people that we assume might go to the streets and burn things down. Among them, there will be some that do this, but actually, most people will want to find a way to grow and build our way out of this. And I see lots of indications that this is exactly what's happening.
Technology is empowering this. If you look at a place like Detroit, which everybody completely wrote off as a disaster, Actually, since they did the write-off of the debt, Detroit is on fire. Investments coming in, businesses are succeeding again. It's an energy hotspot where people are going because of all the activity. So, I mean, you can have a very negative view. I just don't. I have a deep belief that Americans in particular are so hopeful that they will figure out how to innovate their way out of this. I mean, we may have our bumpy moments, but over Overall, this is not a country that goes up in flames. I wish I could say the same about continental Europe. I'm not as optimistic there.
Erik Townsend: Unfortunately, on that point, we are not only out of time, but considerably over time. Before we close, I'd— just for our listeners who would like to follow more of your work, Harald, I know you write for a defense-oriented website. You also have a new book coming out this year that you're still writing. Tell us a little bit about how we can follow your work, as well as what's the new book about?
Harald Malmgren: Well, I write for Second Line of Defense, a website that is read by the military and the defense community throughout the world, the defense industry. And it's a small group of us who do it, but it includes some of the world's leading experts on what the defense industry is and how it functions and how it interrelates with governments. And it's pretty much the frontier of what's going on in what I believe to be a world arms race. It's probably one of the real growth engines of the global economy, for good or bad.
And I write sometimes for other places. For example, this last week, Business Insider picked up an explanation I gave on how long it takes to set up a new administration, what are the mechanics of doing it, how does the Congress work, how does the president function, in which I said that it takes about a year to put an administration in place, no matter what your intentions are. There's no 100 days.
So, the book I'm writing is about the last 50 years. How did we get from where we were after the end of the Cold War to the mess we are in now? And it's— I've been involved in almost all, all of the phases, not only in the US but with a number of other countries. So I think that might be interesting, but that is a process in work.
Erik Townsend: Thank you so much. And Pippa, you have a new book called Signals, which is all about this breakdown of the social contract. Tell us a little bit more about that, and also where else can our listeners follow your work?
Pippa Malmgren: Yeah, absolutely. Well, I constantly put stuff up on Twitter and Facebook under the handle @DrPippaMalmgren. M, because nobody could spell Malmgren. And I give examples of signals that I see all the time that tell me about what's going on in the world. It was one of the ways that I called the Trump landslide just before the actual vote. I saw all the people showing up at the rallies, and the polls had to be off. It just didn't make sense. So, that's one place. I have a book out. It's called Signals: How Everyday Signs Can Help Us Navigate the World's Turbulent Economy. And interestingly, Unfortunately, the publishers in the US said your book is too international for an American audience. So, in fact, you cannot get it on Amazon. What you can get is the Audible version that I personally recorded because I felt so passionately about the subject. And I also have another book called Geopolitics for Investors.
It's a bit more technical about the geopolitics in the world economy, but these are the 3 ways that you can follow my work.
Harald Malmgren: I should have mentioned that I also am on Twitter. Actually, I'm active on Twitter. The interaction is now becoming blossoming because I'm the only person on Twitter who's saying the politically incorrect things, that is explaining why the Fed is completely wrong. And I'm finding a surprising response, so many people saying, thank you for finally saying what I've been thinking. So I'm pretty productive or prolific, let's say, on Twitter if anybody's interested in that.
Erik Townsend: And your Twitter handle?
Harald Malmgren: Yeah, my Twitter handle is called Hal's Rethink because my nickname over the years was Hal. But it's just, you know, rethinking what you see is— may not, may not be what's going on. Look a little deeper and what you'll find is there's usually less there than meets the eye, and occasionally, sometimes there'll be more there than meets the eye.
Erik Townsend: And on that note, we've got to end it there. Thank you so much for a fantastic interview, Aaron Chan. Shan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues in overtime right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Wow, amazing interview from the Malmgrens. You know, I've been looking forward to this interview for quite some time, and I'm so glad we were finally able to bring them together for our listeners. You know, it was such a great interview that we just had to let them run with it, and unfortunately we won't be doing our usual postgame segment. So, Erik, anything else to add before we close?
Erik Townsend: I'm glad that we let it run too, because I thought it was great content. And so in the interest of time, let's just get right to the point. We really need your help, folks. As you've noticed, we're getting some better and better interview guests as we had today. Aaron's got some fantastic people lined up for you for the rest of the fall lineup. So I think you're really going to enjoy the show in the next, you know, through the end of the year. But in order to keep doing this, we really need your help. So please retweet us when we announce the show, tell your friends about it, forward your Research Roundup email to your friends and colleagues, and most importantly, register at MacroVoices.com for your free account. Doesn't cost anything, only takes a few minutes to sign up, and the benefit is you will receive our free Research Roundup email, which every week contains links to all of the coolest free stuff that Aaron could find on the internet.
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Aaron Chan: Well, since we're already way over our time budget for this week's show, You know, let me just throw some names at you. Kyle Bass, Howard Marks, Stan Druckenmiller, Carl Icahn, Sam Zell, Bill Gross, James Grant, and much more. Be sure to track down this week's Research Roundup for their latest reactions to the outcome of the presidential election and general market commentary. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend or myself @_AaronChan_.
For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
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Willem Middelkoop — manages the Commodity Discovery Hedge Fund (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Hello, everyone.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 38 was recorded on November 3rd, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. This week's featured interview guest is Willem Middelkoop, who manages the Commodity Discovery Hedge Fund, which Bloomberg recently featured as a top performer, up an astonishing 114% year to date. Willem and I will discuss his recent book, The Big Reset, in which he posits that the international monetary system needs to be reset so as to replace the US dollar as the global reserve currency, and his thesis for how the Chinese yuan will slowly gain favor as a central bank reserve asset, first through its inclusion in the SDR, and then eventually on its own. We'll also discuss why Willem thinks that we're at the beginning of a secular reflation in commodities, why precious metals have performed so well this year, and a host of other topics.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Before we even get to markets, I'd like to start with the election, since I guess so much has happened in the last week. And I know your views, Erik, on equities, gold, and the dollar will be strongly influenced by your views on the election situation.
So, why don't we get to that first? What's the update as we move into the final days of this circus of an election cycle?
Erik Townsend: Well, my first prediction is that this circus of an election cycle, it's not the final few days because I think it's going to run into overtime. And I'll make a bold prediction. At this point, I think a clean, uncontested election, in other words, an election in which we wake up next Wednesday morning and it is clear beyond any doubt who the next president of the United States will be. I actually think that is now the outlier case that is extremely unlikely. My base case, which I think is almost certain, is somebody wins in the election and that is then very hotly contested by the other side with myriad legal challenges.
And the reason that I'm so convinced of that is if you look at what's happened in the last week, both sides of this have really good reason to object to either potential outcome. If you're a Hillary supporter, obviously, this business about the FBI suddenly reopening this thing at the last minute, questions about whether or not the Hatch Act was violated by FBI Director Comey, who was acting in direct disobedience of managerial direction from the Department of Justice not to do this. Clearly, if you're on the Clinton side of this, you've got reason to say, That, you know, Donald Trump was not going to win this thing until the FBI went and reopened this thing at the 11th hour, which is completely unprecedented. On the other hand, if you're on the Trump side of this and Hillary wins, you've got perfectly legitimate reason to say, hey, look, sure, the Project Veritas guy obviously has his own agenda. Maybe that video was edited or whatever other objection you want to make.
But at the end of the day, there is overwhelmingly clear and compelling evidence that election manipulation, voter fraud, There's dead people voting. There is very clearly efforts that were put forth on behalf of the Hillary campaign, regardless of whether she was personally aware of it, that were intended to influence the election in illegal ways.
So, both sides of this have legitimate reason to be very upset. And I think where we are right now is a calm before the storm, because people on either side of this are kind of crossing their fingers, hoping that their candidate wins.
What I think happens Wednesday morning, inevitably, is tens of millions of people are seriously pissed off because their outcome didn't happen. And there are legitimate reasons on both sides of this to say, hey, this is just not supposed to happen this way. It's already been reported that both campaigns are already amassing teams of lawyers in all of the key swing states to contest the output. The press made a big deal about how bad it was for Trump to not be willing to say he would accept any outcome of the election. I actually think that Hillary's side is more likely to make a big stink out of this, blaming Russian hackers and so forth. So the base case, I think, is a hotly contested legal debate similar to the 2000 election, where we don't really know what the final outcome is immediately.
There are then extreme outliers, and they are outliers, but you could have crazy things happen here. Hillary could win by a landslide, but then be indicted on federal obstruction of justice charges, as the FBI has begun to intimate that they have evidence to support. On the other hand, And if you want to look at this from the other direction, the polls could reverse by Monday afternoon to show that Trump is the shoo-in likely to win, and President Obama might actually invoke emergency executive powers that he doesn't actually have under the Constitution, but that's never stopped him before, and postpone the election until the Russian subversion claims can be investigated.
Now, Trump could win in the other direction again. Trump could win in a landslide, and then Comey could be indicted for violating the Hatch Act, and then Clinton could successfully demand a new vote. I'm not predicting any of these crazy scenarios. I'm not saying they're going to happen. What I'm saying is the fact that any of these crazy things are remotely plausible is terrifying. And all of these things are plausible, Aaron This is an absolutely screwed up situation. Vladimir Putin offended a lot of people last week by saying, what is the U.S., a banana republic now? Look, forget that it was Putin. Forget that it came from him. Not living in the United States myself, I can tell you the days where everybody else in the world felt resentment toward the United States that was all about envy and jealousy are gone.
It's not about envy and jealousy anymore. I think that faith in the United States is being lost. Hillary made a big deal about, you know, a guy like Donald Trump with his personality should not have the nuclear launch codes. She then went to reveal state secrets that it takes 4 minutes for the president to give those codes and actually have the missiles be launched.
Aaron Chan: Oopsie.
Erik Townsend: Oopsie. So, the question that the rest of the world is asking is, wait a minute, neither one of these people ought to be in charge of this incredibly powerful nation whose nuclear arsenal is, is, you know, unmatchable. So, I think that we really are on the edge of a dramatic upheaval in either direction, regardless of who wins.
I think the other side is going to be very upset. I saw an article on ZeroHedge that there are actually armed militias forming, practicing their combat skills to get ready for the post-Hillary win upheaval. You know, people are going crazy, and I think anything is possible next week. So, if anything, I think that this situation is worse than most people think.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, it's a hairy, spicy meatball for sure. Okay, so how does all this transfer for equity markets? I mean, in the last week, the S&P traded as high as 2,130 and also as low as 2,079 and closed Thursday session at 2,083. So, Erik, what's going on here? What's the outlook?
Erik Townsend: I think equity markets are still underpricing outlier risk. And obviously, some of the things I said a minute ago are admittedly crazy, but you know what? They're not completely implausible. We could easily see all kinds of things happen.
If you want to know what's the catalyst that could bring about a 1987-sized crash, the answer is a major upset after the election. You know, it's either Hillary Clinton wins, President-elect Hillary Clinton is indicted on federal obstruction of justice charges, and you get into a whole question of, you know, is it possible to impeach a president before they're even inaugurated? Or it could go in the other direction, where Trump wins in a landslide, and then the Clinton side successfully pushes the Hatch Act argument and Comey is indicted and Hillary's side gets some kind of decision for a rematch or a new vote. If we had a loss of faith where nobody knows who the next president of the United States is, anything could happen. And I don't think even the weakness that we've seen in the last few days in equities begins to do justice to that.
So these are, again, outliers. I'm not predicting that they're going to happen, but the very fact that they're plausible is scary. When I saw on Tuesday morning that decisive breakdown below the February 11th trend line, the trend line that began on February 11th. So that was a move below about 2120. And particularly when we took out the FBI announcement lows, which was about 2114 or 2113, I ended up getting filled at 2111 on a short position on the S&P.
And, you know, I could get stopped out of that. It could reverse very easily.
But I think volatility is going to be the story Moving forward. I am absolutely upset with myself. As soon as the FBI news came out on Friday, the first thought to hit my head was calls on VIX futures, and they had already spiked, and I didn't pull the trigger. And I'm so wanting to shoot myself because that was exactly the right trade. And I think probably the, the move is already in, but we could see VIX go to the moon from here. So anything's possible, and I expect heightened volatility into the election. And after the election in probably several waves. You know, first it seems like there's a clear winner on Tuesday night, and then it's contested. And then whether or not the argument that it's being contested under is going to hold water or not gets answered by somebody. And then it comes back into question again. And then new evidence comes out. And then the FBI makes their next move.
There could just be chapter after chapter of volatility as a result of this highly uncertain situation.
Aaron Chan: Absolutely. So let's move on to the US Dollar Index. One of the biggest stories we've been following for the last few weeks now has been the DXY's upside breakout above key resistance at 97.50, where it stayed for quite a while actually, but suddenly we're trading below that key level. So what happened there?
Erik Townsend: Well, yeah, we were up to a 99 handle briefly, and for sure the proximal trigger that caused the Dollar Index to fall off a cliff was definitely the FBI announcement last Friday. If you look at the tape action, it's just very Very clear that that's what started the move. I was stopped out of my long position when we moved below 97.50, which is, you know, we've talked about as a critical level. So far, the low print has been 97.07 earlier on Thursday. As we're speaking, around Thursday's close, looking at 97.16.
I think we're still headed lower from here. So the question is, why lower? Why is the dollar taking such a hit? I don't think it's because the market thinks a Trump win would be dollar bearish. I think it's because the uncertainty Or the chance, rather, of an uncertain outcome where we don't know who the next president's going to be. That would be definitely dollar bearish, as there's a loss of confidence around the world in the U.S. political and financial system. So, I think the dollar weakness is about the uncertainty risk, and I think that could get worse. So, you know, it's a question. I'm going to wait, and hopefully— I think that the base case for why We've had a bullish view on the dollar, is still there, but this could potentially be a retest all the way down to those cycle lows before it's over.
It's a question of how long this uncertainty plays out. And as I said earlier, I think we're seeing just the beginning of the uncertainty in terms of what could happen in this election. So I'm out of the long dollar trade for now, and I'll be looking to reenter it, but probably at a much lower entry point.
Aaron Chan: All right.
Aaron Chan: Well, on to crude oil. WTI reached new cycle highs 2 weeks ago. Trading above $52 for the first time this year. I mean, you said you thought the rally was overdone and likely to reverse. And now on Thursday afternoon, as we're recording, we're trading on a $44 handle. So good call there, Erik. What's going on with crude and what comes next?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, $44.37 was the intraday low so far. We're looking at $44.61 around the close. Well, what's happening? First of all, OPEC did not reach any decisive agreement at their informal meeting last weekend. Well, holy obvious outcome, Batman. Who could have seen that coming? Coming. MacroVoices listeners know. And, you know, of course, it's November 30th is the big meeting, but it's looking more and more like people are waking up to the fact that this agreement is not as certain as they thought.
Nobody seems to be waking up to the fact that it was irrelevant to start with, because now we're seeing downside action that started before inventory came out just on OPEC uncertainty. But holy cow, when inventory came out, every expectation of every analyst was utterly crushed by an all-time series record of 14.4 million barrels added to national inventory.
Those are mostly from imports. And so, you know, as much as it might be tempting to declare victory and say, okay, the view that Art Berman and I had back on Labor Day, it's finally being proven out. It's tempting to say that. But look, folks, I don't think that's what it is. I think that we had a whole bunch of tankers that were en route to the United States Hurricane Matthew probably had a lot to do with why they didn't get here when they were supposed to. They all hit port at once, and now there's a whole bunch of inventory being dropped on, for the most part, PADD 3 the Gulf Coast. As tempting as it might be to say, okay, that reignites the whole argument for a storage crisis, look at Cushing, Oklahoma, the delivery point for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract. A build of only 89,000 barrels compared to 14.4 million nationwide.
So this is all about inventory. I think it's delayed ships coming into port, and it is offset. We saw a drawdown in gasoline inventories of 2.2 million barrels, a distillate drawdown of 1.8 million barrels. So, you know, it definitely is helping prices move to the downside. I think they're headed into the low 40s, probably. But the idea that, that we're going to get back to a new low below 26, as Art and I thought might be possible back on Labor Day, I don't see that at this point.
Okay. That uptrend, however, that started with the $26 low back in February, and if you draw from that low through its— I guess it's the 2nd or so of August is the next low, and then there's another low on the 19th of September. That trend line was very clearly and decisively broken to the downside. So we do have a new trend in play. How far does it go? The obvious support levels: $42.50, 40 or so would be the next obvious support level, then 39 after that, and then probably no real obvious support level below 39 until you get all the way down to about 35.45, 35.50. So, you know, those are the potential levels. As far as what happens, I think whether or not we see a continuing trend towards inventory builds is going to be the real determinant of that. And I don't think, as huge as this was, that it's necessarily the beginning of a trend.
Erik Townsend: I think it's more of an anomalous
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, all the while, gold has gained momentum to the upside, trading above $1,300 this week. How are you feeling on gold here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think that the dollar weakness and election uncertainty is definitely what's driving this sudden strength. I'm definitely regretting missing my chance. I almost bought $1,250, and I thought, nah, I'm gonna wait for $1,225. I think we've still got lower to go, just because that breakdown from the descending triangle pattern looked so strong to me.
It looks like I missed the bottom. So I did end up buying, starting to scale into a long position on gold. I got in at $1,296 on Wednesday morning. And, you know, so far my trade is in the green here as we're looking at $1,304 as of the close as we're speaking on Thursday.
But, you know, I think this is likely to continue as long as that uncertainty that we talked about around the election continues. Once that's all resolved, it'll be interesting to see whether or not gold can hang on to its gains. So I'll be looking for any more weakness to scale in, though. And we can talk later on about the long gold, long dollar index trade. I definitely want to get into that position as the opportunities present themselves.
Aaron Chan: All right. And finally, 10-year Treasury yields are holding up in the mid-180s this week. Anything new for this outlook?
Erik Townsend: Actually, back down to 181 as we're speaking now. And yeah, you know, we're seeing that Strength in yields. More and more analysts are starting to predict that we've got inflation coming into the system, and that could mean a secular trend reversal, which would tend to confirm Jeff Gundlach's view on this. I'm on the sidelines. I haven't seen enough to really tell me decisively which way I want to be in this. I want to be short Treasuries in the long haul when we get a return of inflation and a secular reversal in yields. I'm not convinced for sure that that's upon us yet, but it looks like it might be, so I'm waiting it out.
Aaron Chan: Okay. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Willem Middelkoop manages the top-performing Commodity Discovery hedge fund, which has received a lot of attention this year for its outstanding performance. Erik's interview with Mr. Middelkoop is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Willem Middelkoop. And Willem, I usually start these macro interviews talking about the US dollar. But in your case, I think your view on the US dollar is very tightly connected with a broader thesis which you described in your latest book, The Big Reset. So why don't we start by just laying out for our listeners what reset are we talking about, what needs to be reset, why is there going to be a reset, what's the big picture, and from there we can move into the US dollar.
Willem Middelkoop: Yeah, great. Well, we have 2 major problems within our international monetary system. As you know, the current monetary system was set up in 1944 during the Bretton Woods Conference after the end of the Second World War. And in the Bretton Woods Conference, the US proposed to start a new phase in the international monetary system in which the dollar would be the anchor for all international trade and would be the anchor for the international monetary system. They also proposed to set up the IMF And the World Bank. So it really was the start of the financial system like we all know it.
In the last few years, especially since the start of the credit crisis, more and more people have pointed to the fact that the dollar as an anchor for the international monetary system is, well, it's starting to get shaky. And especially the Chinese and the Russians have been very vocal about the need to find a new anchor. Right. To bring the international monetary system towards a new phase. So that's what I call a monetary reset. It doesn't mean that the banks will close down and we will see riots in the street. But we can change the monetary system, and it needs to change.
And there's a second problem. We have too much debt into the system. So we need debt restructurings within the— especially the developed countries in the West, but also in Japan, And I think also within China. So debt restructurings are needed worldwide, and we need to find a new anchor for the international monetary system.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Now, that's a view that I've certainly thought quite a lot about, and it just begs a really important question, which is, as much as you make very persuasive arguments, the fact remains that so far right now today in 2016, we don't really have a viable alternative to the US dollar as a world reserve currency because there's no bond market deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows other than the US Treasury market. So how do you see us getting from where we are today to where I agree with you we have to get to someday, which is a viable alternative to the US dollar?
Willem Middelkoop: Yeah, these changes don't happen in a few quarters or a few years. Changes within the international monetary system always take years and years and even decades. The US was the largest economy already in 1870. It took 70 years before the US dollar became the most important currency. So it can take a while.
The Chinese have been quite clear that the SDR, the special drawing rights of the IMF, the currency basket of the IMF, should be used as a new world reserve currency. And it's quite clear that the IMF, the Chinese, together with the US, are working to upgrade the SDR so it can be used in the future when deep enough liquid bond markets and other parts of the system have been developed so it can take over some of the roles of the US dollar in the future. And I expect this to happen within the next decade, that serious changes will be made within the next decade. And by adding the renminbi into the currency basket of the IMF, into the SDR basket, October 1st this year, it's— well, actually, it's proof that— for me, it's proof that the IMF is serious in upgrading the SDR.
Erik Townsend: Okay, now as far as what this will mean to the US dollar, the view that I used to have about this is, hey, with the ridiculous amount of debt and unfunded entitlements and everything else that the United States has done to weaken its financial position from being the biggest creditor nation in the world to the biggest debtor nation in the history of the world, I used to have a very bearish view on the US dollar. But in the last year or two, I've come around to the view that probably, you know, there's so much trouble in Japan, and Europe and China, that probably the US dollar benefits and eventually gets to some kind of blow-off top that we haven't gotten to yet before eventually that bearish view takes over. Would you agree with that view, or do you think the top is in and that it's downhill from here for the US dollar?
Willem Middelkoop: No, I don't have a very bearish view on the value of the dollar because, like you explained, the dollar is needed. And as long as the dollar is still the main currency within this system. I don't expect a dollar collapse to happen anytime near.
But we do have this huge debt overhang. And we all know that US debts are growing towards $20 trillion. And I think that's also a reason why the US needs the IMF and needs the SDR. To get rid of part of this debt.
And during my research, I just published a new chapter for my book, The Big Reset, a few months ago. It's open. You can find it on the internet. I can send you a link. And in this new chapter, I published some reports about the idea to use a substitution fund within the IMF.
So countries like China can substitute their dollar holdings into SDR holdings. And by using this substitution fund, we can get rid of excess dollar debt without causing a crash of the US dollar. So I think that's the road we want to follow. And a substitution fund for US dollars. is already— has already been proposed in the early 1970s by the US. So it's an idea which has been on the table before.
Erik Townsend: Can you elaborate a little bit more on the inclusion of the Chinese yuan in the SDR? Obviously, part of this is kind of ceremonial. It's, uh, okay, China's part of the club now. Is that it, or is there a structural change with the yuan and the SDR that is going to affect markets? that results in a tradable strategy?
Willem Middelkoop: I think there are 2 important points to understand. The Chinese are very aware of the fact that the Chinese renminbi is not ready yet to be the world reserve currency. Chinese are very long-term thinkers, and I've been traveling to China quite a bit in the last few years, and I learned there that China China wants to be the leading power in the world, let's say, at 2040, 2045. At that time, it's 100 years ago that the Chinese Revolution started. So the Chinese want to be in control, not in 2020, not in 2025, but But much, much, much later on. So the Chinese are trying to make the renminbi a full international reserve currency. And they know and they understand they need time to do that.
And so they can use the SDR by being included into the SDR currency basket of the IMF. And now the renminbi is added as a 5th currency after the dollar, the pound, the euro, and the yen. It's quite clear that the renminbi is now coming to the center stage of the international reserve currencies. But they need much more time to develop their own financial markets, to open up their markets, to make the renminbi fully convertible.
This phase should be seen as one of the steps which have to be taken before the Chinese can really upgrade their renminbi into a full world reserve currency.
Erik Townsend: So it sounds like your view is that China's strategy to eventually make the yuan itself a viable reserve currency is to first diversify the world's reserve currency from dollars to SDRs, which is a basket that includes both dollars and yuan. And basically, if they're both in the same basket, the more that the yuan starts to look like a stronger credit over a period of decades as opposed to the dollar, the more that people will, will prefer it, and eventually they take over effectively. Is that what you see on the horizon?
Willem Middelkoop: Yeah, and by doing this, the central banks can gradually increase their position in renminbi as being part of their financial reserves. And this solution by using the SDR, it's a great solution because the US stays in the driver's seat because the main component of the SDR is still the US dollar. So by using the SDR as as a world reserve currency, and maybe we can even start trading oil in SDR, we still have a situation in which the dollar, in which the US is in control.
So this is a great opportunity for both China and even Russia and the US to find a common solution to the current problems within the international monetary system.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so it sounds like this is a long-term strategy, and I definitely agree with you that China is very good at crafting long-term, multi-decade strategies. And what you say makes a lot of sense. I want to shift gears now.
Willem Middelkoop: I just want to— let me add one point because I think that's important to understand. The Chinese are totally different from the, from the Russians. The Russians are on a track of confrontation, and the Chinese are on a track of cooperation. The Chinese don't want any confrontation, but they've made it very clear to the US they can't accept the current dollar system for much longer. So adjustments have to be made, and these adjustments we've seen in the last few months being made within the IMF.
Erik Townsend: Okay. I'd like to shift gears now because commodities in general have been just hammered for the last several years by deflation. But we're starting to see a reflationary trend in 2016. And I know you've been in the news yourself recently because Bloomberg recently published a performance table where the Commodity Discovery Fund, the fund that you manage yourself, was actually the top performer year to date through September, up 114%.
So, congratulations on that outstanding performance.
Willem Middelkoop: Thank you.
Erik Townsend: But you've talked about a global parabolic demand for commodities and looming supply shortages. That's obviously at odds with the trend of the last few years. So what happened? What changed? Why is the tide turning for commodities, and where do you see it going from here?
Willem Middelkoop: Well, we, we've had this large correction in commodity markets since 2011. Of course, the supercycle for commodities started around 2000, 2001. We've seen commodity prices increase quite a bit in this period. And this was linked by China being added into the World Trade Organization and the rise of China and the rise of Asia.
Well, markets don't go up in straight lines. So sometimes you have corrections. This was a very deep correction. It coincided with the cooling off of the economy in China. But everybody was afraid for a hard landing. Landing in China, but so far, we haven't seen any hard landings.
And when you look at the trade in commodities, and especially to the Chinese imports of commodities, copper imports have seen records. We've seen records of copper imports into China every year— 2013, 2014, 2015. So now, investors are waking up and realizing that the cooling off of the Chinese economy is giving a slowing in the growth of demand for commodities.
The growth in demand for commodities in the last decade was 10%, 11% in China, and now the demand growth for commodities is half, so that's 4% or 5%, but it's still extra demand yearly of 4% or 5%. The commodity prices have declined. Declined quite a bit in the last few years. And we also came to the point in time— I've been warning about this for a number of years— that the first shortages and deficits would occur within commodity markets.
And if you look at the current supply and demand figures, you can clearly see that we have production deficits not only in gold and silver, but also in platinum, in palladium, We have production deficits in zinc because quite a bit of zinc mines are closing down, and this well this is sending prices of zinc to multi-year highs. And we've seen increasing prices in the precious metals complex, and it is our understanding based on our studies that within the next few years more and more commodities will be. arriving at a point that production deficits will send the price much higher, and that's why we invest in those companies who are adding to their reserves at a very low valuation.
Erik Townsend: Let's stay on precious metals for a minute. If we go back to your Real Vision television interview from January of this year, I think anyone who followed your advice on precious metals and mining shares is probably pretty happy right now. Because the performance has been really outstanding. So, congratulations on that call. But almost a year has gone by, so let's get an update. You know, we, we had a correction, a breakdown that looked to me like maybe we were headed towards the low 1,200s, but we only got to 1,243 was the low print. And as we're speaking on Wednesday morning, we're back up to 1,305 now. So, nice move above 1,300 just this morning. Is the correction over? Is it all uphill from here? What do you see on the horizon for precious metals?
Willem Middelkoop: Just before this interview, just before this call, we have been adding quite a bit to our precious metal positions just today, because I think now is a wonderful time to increase your positions. We were fully positioned at the first part of this year, up until August.
In August, we realized that markets were getting a little bit ahead of itself. Valuations were getting a bit stretched. So we loaded off quite a bit. And we have seen precious metal stocks giving back 50% of their gains year to date since the start of August. And our fund is down only 15% since the high in early August. So we have waited to see if this correction would be nearing its last phase. And I think the price actions we've seen since last Friday convinces me that we're very close to a real breakout in this short-term correction, which started in August.
The index for unhedged gold mines, the HUI Index, has broken out yesterday on Monday. Today, we're on the verge of a breakout in silver stocks. So I think this correction is almost over. And then we had a wonderful technical correction, which brings us to a point that the strongest rally within this recovery of commodity stocks, and especially precious metal stocks, It can and will start probably in Q4 this year. So we're on the verge of the start of the next leg up. That's our understanding. And this next leg up can take us until the middle of next year and really send up especially precious metal stocks up another 100%, maybe, and even
Erik Townsend: Well, great minds think alike. Literally minutes before we started taping this interview, I bought gold futures myself. So, I guess we're both on the same page with that. Something that caught me by surprise putting that trade on, though— I see this as a long-term trade. I didn't want to buy the Z6 contract, the December of 2016 contract. I decided to push out to next year's December expiry, just because I expect to hold that position for a while.
Willem Middelkoop: Okay.
Erik Townsend: And boy, we're looking at almost a $20 contango over the course of a year, which is almost double what historically, at least to my recollection, we saw there. Why is the forward strip so steep in gold right now?
Willem Middelkoop: I think many people are aware of the strange situation in gold and silver markets. Of course, the takedown in the last few months was exaggerated because of the selling of a lot of paper gold. Many futures in gold were sold.
I think many people are aware that given the current uncertainty, especially about the US elections, is bringing many investors to the precious metals markets. For the first time in decades, we've seen insiders like Bill Gross, CEOs and other institutional investors being very open and advising people to, well, to add gold to their portfolio.
Ken Rogoff, the former Chief Economist of the IMF, wrote a column in which he advised developing countries to to add gold to their financial reserves. So I think we're entering a whole new ballgame in which even institutional investors who haven't been active into precious metals for a very long time are starting to move institutional money to these gold and silver markets. And these are very small markets. And we also have learned that the central banks of Switzerland and Norway, they both have a portfolio of gold and silver stocks of over $1 billion now. So central banks who can create as much money out of thin air as they like are using this money now to buy gold and silver stocks. So what more proof do you want where you have to hide? Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Let's go back to your Real Vision television interview from January for a second. Something you said in that interview, I think, caught a few listeners and viewers by surprise, which is you said democracy is not the only form of government. And what's happening now is indicative of the failure of the West. Can you clarify what you meant by that and where you see it going from here?
Willem Middelkoop: Well, because I travel quite a bit to the Far East and to China, and I'm a student of history and a student of monetary history, And, you know, I think you live in the US, and your history is 300, 400 years. And the Chinese history is 300, 400, 5,000 years. And in China, they never had democracy.
And the Chinese, they— is one of the only cultures which has survived over 5,000 years. So when the Chinese make remarks about our democracy, I tend to take it serious.
And the Chinese always say, well, your leaders say that they do what you want and what you like. But we do what the people want and what the people like. We do what the people need. And of course, China is not perfect. And in China, if you're a critic of the regime, you'll be punished very severely.
But the personal freedom in China is wonderful. The Chinese government allows their citizens to do almost anything as long as they don't have any criticism on their leadership. And I always have liked the Eastern and the Asian mentality, which is so different from Western mentality, also when it comes to food and medicine.
And this has led me to start thinking and doubting about our Western democracy.
And the current fight in the US over the leadership of the most powerful country is such a great example of the failure of democracy. And we have been given an insight by reading all those mails which were released by WikiLeaks. Leaks coming from the elite in the US, and we're being fooled, and we're being lied to. And more and more people are realizing that the current structure and the current democracy is failing not only them, but the country as a whole.
And I think that's what I mentioned during the interview in January. We're reaching a point that the Western and the American empire and US hegemony is reaching a point that, like all large empires in the past, the empire is on the verge of breaking up. And this is a scary development. And we see revolutionary powers.
And the success and the large support for Donald Trump and the large support for the Brexit vote are clearly examples of people being fed up with the current Well, I think we're probably in agreement.
Erik Townsend: I remain the biggest fan there is of a true democracy, but unfortunately, I don't think we've had one in the United States for a long time. And I think we have essentially fascism masquerading as democracy, where the government's policy is for sale to the highest bidder. And it's, it's a very sad story that it's happening. But let's go ahead and move on and talk about central bank policy, because that affects markets so directly.
Willem Middelkoop: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: A question that I've posed to quite a few guests is, you know, if you look at the situation of the last several years, whether you agree with it or not, central bankers have been able to prop asset markets up by essentially conjuring money out of thin air with quantitative easing. And my contention is they will continue to do that for as long as they can get away with it. And so the question that I think is so important is, okay, what is the event that will eventually tie their hands and prevent them from being able to continue propping up markets with freshly printed money?
And the only thing I can come up with is eventually we'll get to runaway inflation. And when we get a runaway inflation situation, now suddenly they can't be so accommodative because that would exacerbate the inflation. Would you agree with that view? And what else can you think of that might tie their hands and bring an end to this regime of central bankers supporting asset markets through excessively accommodative monetary policy?
Willem Middelkoop: Well, I'm always surprised that these developments always take much longer and can go on much longer than you could envision, especially given the current monetary madness like we've seen in the last few years. You would think that this soon would be over. Don't forget, worldwide, we all use the same policies now. Central bankers from Japan, even China, Switzerland, Europe, the US, UK, we all use the same QE system in which money is being created out of thin air. And a whole new generation of especially younger people is growing up with the idea that this is normal.
And look, we don't have inflation, so what's wrong by just adding a little bit more oil on the fire? Because crisis also to be expected every once in a decade, you can expect that in the next crisis even more money will be created out of thin air. And only a few risk The biggest risk is that the general public will lose confidence in fiat money.
I don't see any signs of it. It's only a small, small part of investors and insiders who are starting to move from paper assets to real assets. And central bankers can always bring gold back back to this system to bring back trust into the monetary system. You can make the SDR gold-backed by using all the gold reserves of the US, the EU, and China to combine these gold reserves and use them to build a golden foundation under the SDR, and then trust will come back.
Another risk for the system is, as you say, that inflation will come back. And I think we're on the verge of a new period in which inflation will start to increase. But like I said, central bankers can use some more tools in their unorthodox toolbox to stay in control a little longer. And the fact that worldwide, The policies are so similar.
All these countries will will stay together, will join forces within the IMF to continue this game as long as possible. But there's always a risk of a large crash like we've seen in late 2008 after the fall of Lehman. But I think central bankers are very well aware of. these possibilities. And when you can create unlimited amounts of fiat money, you can solve almost any crisis which can occur. So I'm not that pessimistic on the short term.
Erik Townsend: It sounds like we agree that in the short term, you know, who knows how long they can keep this going on. They've been successful printing money out of thin air and using it to prop up the economy supposedly, and asset markets assuredly. And who knows how long that could continue. But you've also spoken about the dynamics of history, demographics, and even revolution. And I guess the question on my mind is, if you look at whether it's all of the debt that has been created since 2008, China's credit expansion has been just massive. We've had, you know, people talk about the deleveraging in the United States, but in reality At least in nominal terms, the, you know, the amount of debt has dramatically increased. Central bank balance sheets have increased. Government debt, $20 trillion in the United States now.
We've had numerous guests on the program who have said, you know, it's not right away, it's not next week or even next year. But if you look at history, war is usually the inevitable outcome of insurmountable government So, do you think that that view is correct? Do you think that this eventually all leads to an impossible financial situation for the Western governments that brings about, you know, a major war? Or how would you see this eventually being resolved?
Willem Middelkoop: Well, I'm not a big fan of Donald Trump, but I sincerely hope that Hillary is not— will not win the US elections. Because Hillary and her neocon friends can bring the US into a position that a military conflict with Russia is unavoidable. And I see this as one of the largest risks in the next few years.
And we as investors are getting more and more defensive because we see I see this risk as being one of the larger problems which could occur in the next few years.
I always have my hopes on China, because in China, we have very sensible leadership, which is very stable at this moment. And the Chinese, they just want to trade with everybody else. They just want to see cooperation, no confrontation. Then we see America also bringing tension to Southeast Asia. And the situation regarding the South China Sea could even bring more tension between China and the US.
So yeah, a large conflict, a larger war. War is certainly one of the major risks, but I think we can get rid of debts by using organized debt restructurings. I think within the next 5 to 10 years, the IMF might take the initiative for a wave of debt restructuring. So, debts are not that scary for me as most people see them, because debts can You can get rid of the debt from balance sheets by using a few financial engineering tricks.
Erik Townsend: And finally, I'd like to go back to the Clinton versus Trump presidential race. We ask all of our guests not to endorse, you know, their personal views because our listeners didn't come here for that. But just to comment objectively, in the case of either outcome, Clinton or Trump winning the presidency, what would you see the intermediate, you know, short to intermediate-term impacts on financial markets. And this week I'm going to expand the question because I think the game has changed here, which is not only what is the impact on markets if we have a Clinton or a Trump presidency, but I think there is a very plausible risk now that we have a contested election and potentially a period of several weeks where we don't know who won. Or, you know, it's also possible that Hillary could win and then be indicted by the FBI.
So what do you think these 3 scenarios of either Clinton, Trump, or we're not sure would mean for markets?
Willem Middelkoop: I think the most important part for me, and that's what we also play with in our fund— early this week we started to play volatility. So we expect volatility to increase quite a bit. It also started last night, when Trump will win the election, you could see huge volatility, even leading to a crash.
And I think most investors are too complacent and are not fully prepared for the risks when election results will be seen as negative. Well, when Hillary will be chosen as next president, not too much will happen. I think gold will rise because gold has been held in check near $1,300 just in the weeks leading up to the elections.
So gold wants to move higher. I think the commodity complex wants to move higher. There's a real risk of much higher volatility when Trump will be elected. And then you really have to start to position yourself in a real defensive way in the next few days, because things can get rough on financial markets.
Erik Townsend: And what do you think the impact and result would be if we had an inconclusive election Where the election results are contested or there's something else that results in the outcome being unclear for a period of weeks?
Willem Middelkoop: I don't expect this to happen because this has happened in 2000. It would be very strange to have this happening again in 16 years. But I think when Hillary will win, and maybe Hillary— a lot can happen in the next few days. But when Hillary would win the election, I think a lot of uncertainty will stay because the FBI will keep investigating the Clinton Foundation and Hillary Clinton and everything which has been going on about the missing emails. So you could end up into a situation where Hillary Clinton could become in a position where she gets really big troubles in her first year of presidency. So when we have a situation like this, we also have, I think, much more volatility and much more concerns in the market. And if you add to this picture the deteriorating situation in the American and world economy, I think investors are in for a few, few, few unpleasant surprises.
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, thank you, Willem, for a fantastic interview. For our accredited investors in the audience who are able to invest in hedge funds, I'm sure that they can contact you to learn more about your Commodity Discovery Fund. For the rest of the audience, the name of the book, of course, is The Big Reset. Is that available on Amazon, and where can people contact
Willem Middelkoop: It's still available on Amazon. People have to be aware that there's a revised edition. It has a little red note on top, the top right-hand of the cover So be aware you buy the revised edition. And I'm glad to send you the link with a free updated chapter about the latest developments.
Erik Townsend: Okay, we'll get that link in our Research Roundup email that will go out to our registered users at MacroVoices.com. Thanks so much for a fantastic interview, Willem. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program.
Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, that was an excellent interview, and I immediately want to jump to answering a question We're going to get to Davy Nelson's multi-part question about the popular long dollar, long gold trade that you and others have spoken about on the program. Now, you've explained the thesis numerous times, but Davy wants to know some of the finer details surrounding this trade, such as in what currency denomination would you be going long gold? Also, do you view gold as a commodity play without the drawback of contango and storage costs of, say, something like copper?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, so Davy Nelson's question is a great question. Okay, well, let's start with the basic thesis for the trade. Why would you want to be long gold in the first place? And the reason is that governments around the world are all working to debase their currencies. It's a race to the bottom, as some people have called it, competitive devaluation. You can use whatever phrase you want, but governments around the world and fiat currency in general is weakening. The problem is is when you buy gold futures, or if you are at least a US person who, who has your assets denominated in US dollars, when you buy gold in US dollars, you have the problem that US dollars themselves are likely to be the beneficiary of that same phenomenon, which is other currencies around the world weakening relative to gold for sure, but also relative to the US dollar.
And because gold is priced in US dollars. You know, when the US dollar is strong, it may not be weak for gold in terms of how gold performs against other currencies, but if the US dollar is strong, which a lot of us expect it to be for a number of fundamental reasons that we've talked on previous episodes about, that means that gold is not going to fare too well when priced in dollars.
So, the combination of a long position in gold futures, or if you prefer, a long position in a gold ETF like GLD, GLD, as well as a long position in the US dollar, which would be in the futures market in the DX futures contract, or if you wanted to do it in an ETF, you'd use something like UUP, which is the ETF that's long US dollars. By being in both US dollar long and a gold long at the same time, you're effectively hedging out the fact that gold is priced in US dollars. So, if those same things that we're expecting to make gold do well end up making the US dollar do well, and that would sort of undermine or take away the benefit in terms of price appreciation of gold in US dollars, even though it's appreciating against other currencies, having that long position against the dollar index hedges out that risk so that you can kind of win either And the scenario that we've talked about, Raoul Pal and I discussed at some length, is you can certainly paint a case for why gold could go down here as priced in US dollars.
You can paint a case, as we're experiencing right now, why the dollar index could be weak. But the idea that they both trend lower at the same time, it's hard for me to think of any justification or explanation for why that would occur. Right. So being long both of these assets that historically are inversely correlated actually makes sense here. They're serving as a hedge for each other, but we believe that there is an argument for both to move higher as both the U.S. dollar and gold move dramatically higher against other currencies in a flight to safety trade.
Erik Townsend: So that's the rationale for why to do it. As far as the contango argument, I wouldn't say so much that it's a commodity. Commodity play, it is essentially a currency play that's not trying to trade one currency against other fiat currencies, but it's trading currencies in general, all currencies against something which is actually limited in its supply and has intrinsic value because of its scarcity.
And finally, to address the contango aspect of the question, and let's just refresh our listeners who may not be familiar with that: contango is the. Difference between the near-dated futures price and the longer-dated futures price. The reason you heard me ask Willem Middelkoop that question is I wanted to get his take on this, but I found it very interesting that the contango in gold futures in particular has steepened dramatically. In other words, the difference between the price for December of '16 futures and December of '17 futures, that 1-year contango Contango, historically, at least, you know, off the top of my head, I think the average number is probably about $10. It's more like $20 right now. So why is it that there is a discount in the near term? Normally, that discount would have to do with storage costs. In this case, what you heard Willem Middelkoop describe is he thinks the reason is because people think the price is discounted right now and have an anticipation that the price is headed higher.
Okay. Higher, he believes that's the reason. And there's a lot of argument in the futures business about whether or not there really is a discounting function about future expectations or if it's just interest rates and storage costs. But in this case, interest rates and storage costs don't explain a $20 contango over the course of one year. So I think Willem sees that as a bullish indication. I would tend to agree with him. And it means that markets probably are expecting higher gold prices in the future. Does that really mean if this is an alternative to a trade in corn or something? No, I think that the, the trade in soft commodities, as Raoul Pal and I talked about recently, is a pretty good opportunity. And I think a long position in wheat, corn, and soybeans might be a good idea here. It might be turning into a good idea in the next few months.
But I don't think that this really is— this trade is a replacement
Aaron Chan: All right.
Aaron Chan: So, Erik, thanks for answering that question. Now, I want to pivot over to something that's more pertinent to the politics. Now, from a geopolitical perspective, numerous scenarios that you described at the beginning of the show involve some greater sociopolitical instability in the United States, as we've seen with the Philippines pivoting towards China and Malaysia opting to purchase military naval vessels from China. I mean, do you see the 2040 timeline for China's ascendance as the world's monetary superpower, as Willem described it?
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Aaron Chan: Or do you think the sociopolitical instability in the United States will accelerate that timeline?
Erik Townsend: That's a fascinating question. I think we're kind of talking about 2 separate issues here. What Willem was talking about is China would love to have the yuan become a strategic global reserve currency, and there ain't no way that's going to happen now, and everybody knows it, because there, there simply is no yuan-denominated dominated bond market that could even begin to absorb central bank-sized capital flows. So, they've got to crawl, walk, run in order to get there. And when he talked about a 2040 timeline, I think he's talking about a 2040 timeline for the gradual replacement through growing the yuan's presence in the SDR, eventually increasing the size of the bond market, you know, what it would take to get to the point where the yuan, independent of other geopolitical events could, from a monetary standpoint, ascend to be a contender for a global reserve currency.
I think it's a separate question, though, which is, if things are falling apart in US politics, and, you know, does that potentially increase the pace at which we get to a change of hegemonic power from the United States to other countries? You know, I think that that is entirely possible, but it's really coming from a different perspective, which Which is that whether Hillary Clinton is elected president and potentially picks a fight with Russia, and that potentially escalates to a major conflict— a scary statistic, something like 48% of Russian citizens believe there is serious risk of nuclear war breaking out as a result of a Hillary Clinton escalation with Russia. They're scared about this. And I frankly think we should be too. Meanwhile, if you go the other way, Donald Trump is elected, he's going to pick a trade war. It won't be a shooting war at first, but he's ready to pick a trade war with China, which I think is a huge mistake.
And I think that could escalate and eventually become a shooting war. So I think that we do have a lot of rising geopolitical risk, but I really think the topic that Willem Middelkoop was talking about in this interview was a little bit different from that.
Aaron Chan: All right.
Aaron Chan: Well, that's all the time we've got for this week. Erik, anything you'd like to add before
Erik Townsend: Just the usual, that we really appreciate your help, folks. ZeroHedge I want to thank them again for picking up last week's interview with Hugh Hendry. That helped our download counts and listener counts. The most important thing, though, is that you register at MacroVoices.com for your free account. Doesn't cost you anything, gets you the free benefit of our Research Roundup email, which is a compendium of links to all the best free research and content on the internet. content that we could find on the internet each week. And again, when you register, that increases our number of registered users, particularly if you register as an accredited investor. That's the statistic that Aaron uses to entice all of these high-profile guests to agree to come be on the program as featured interview guests. So we really appreciate you taking just a couple of minutes to register. Aaron, let's tell them what we're going to get in this week's Research Roundup.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, also special thanks to ValueWalk for the So for this week, we've got the latest video from the recent Vanity Fair and New Establishment Summit, where Jim Chanos and Kyle Bass shared a stage to discuss their views on China and taking contrarian views. It's a great interplay between the micro and macro, and I think it's a must-watch interview for the listeners. Then we have Raoul Pal of Real Vision TV, who shared an interesting infographic detailing the risks that hyperconnectivity posed to global stability. And this was inspired by Dee Smith's recent interview on Real Vision, and I highly recommend subscribers check it out.
Finally, we're sharing a 2-part series on the geopolitics of a reserve currency by Bill O'Grady at Confluence Management. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make the program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com.
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.
Aaron Chan: Send us your questions to roundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution. If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @_AaronChan_. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
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Hugh Hendry — Legendary fund manager (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 37 was recorded on October 27th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Legendary fund manager Hugh Hendry has been one of our most requested guests. Hugh will be joining me as this week's featured interview guest. We'll discuss the US dollar rally, Hugh's views on post-Brexit Europe, why he's more benign than some of his peers relative to Japan, His outlook for equity markets, Treasury yields, and much, much more.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. S&P 500 touched 2,150 briefly this week and closed Thursday session at 2,127. Erik, any changes to your equity outlook?
Erik Townsend: Not a whole lot of change, although I do want to correct something I said last week. I commented that that trend line we've been in all year, the uptrend that starts on February 11th of this year and then goes through that Brexit low on the 24th of June, that we were trading below that. And actually, I, I made the mistake of going by somebody else's chart when I looked at that. Some people draw a trend line from the intraday low, which was $18.02 back on the 11th of February. But, you know, most technical analysis books would tell you you really should work from the closing print, not the intraday low. And if you draw that line from the closing print on those 2 days, we're still just barely above the line, but right on the hairy edge of it. So depending on which one Which way you draw that line, are we below that critical support level or are we right on it?
I think I could make the argument either way. As you said, though, we're trading— you know, a lot of technicians have said that the previous highs that we had back, you know, going to almost a year ago can't be violated to the downside unless— or if they do, that that's going to be a very bearish signal. 21.25, some technicians have said. I've seen others saying 21.20 is the magic number. If we close below that figure, that means that it portends a much more bearish outlook. Well, we're right on the hairy edge of that. It was 2,124.5 just about 15 minutes before the close here on Thursday.
S&P futures have recovered all the way to 2,126, you know, a point above that critical level. What's going to happen in the next few days should be very telling for the equity market.
Aaron Chan: Right. And before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index. The DXY made an important upside breakout 2 weeks ago with a daily close above 97.50. Now, last week you observed that the breakout was holding, but not really accelerating to the upside. How's it looking this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, right after that interview last Thursday, Friday we saw a big move higher. We have a couple of times now traded on a 99 handle. We're at 98.87 as we're speaking around the close on Thursday. So, you know, we're very close to 99. It looks like we are seeing a slow and steady move higher. Keep in mind, of course, that the true breakout, the really important breakout, That would be above the previous cycle high, which was around $104. We've still got a ways to go in that. But as far as the consolidation range that's been in play since February, you know, we're holding more than 2 weeks now above that $97.50 level, just teetering on the edge of a $99 handle as we're speaking Thursday. So we're getting real close to it. There was a pullback earlier this week all the way down to $98.31, and we've recovered nicely from that, back up almost to $99 at the end of the day Thursday.
So it looks to me like the move to the upside is continuing, but it's kind of a slow-as-she-goes move as opposed to a really exacerbated breakout with a lot of exuberance behind it.
Aaron Chan: Right. We'll be watching that closely. All right. Well, drilling forward to crude oil, WTI reached new cycle highs last week, trading above $52 for the first time this year. But now we're back below $50. So, Erik, what's going on with crude here?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's been a heck of a week. You know, we saw oil selling off early this week as more and more people were figuring out that an OPEC production cut was not really all that likely to come together. Iraq has been saying that they don't like the numbers that OPEC was using to represent their production. For a while, there was a huge move up Thursday morning after a headline said that there was some discussion about a 5% production cut from the all-time high.
They conveniently left out the fact that Russia very promptly said, no way, we're not going to play on that game. So, you know, it's— it was selling off. Inventory has been a roller coaster ride this week. There were expectations of a 2 million barrel build on inventories. Of course, we're right in the smack dab in the middle of what seasonally should be a restocking period for crude oil inventories. That 2 million build expectation was doubled when the American Petroleum Institute, which does the private survey, predicted on Tuesday afternoon that we would see a 5 million barrel build on inventory. That caused the market sell-off to accelerate to the downside. But then on Wednesday morning, when the EIA report came out, 553,000 barrel drawdown, other direction, opposite of what was expected. The price of WTI crude oil futures rocketed up more than a dollar within seconds on that news. And it was also a very large drawdown of 1.3 million barrels in Cushing, Oklahoma.
Hmm. 2 million barrel drawdown on gasoline, 3.4 million barrel drawdown on distillates. This is all, you know, in theory, these drawdowns are very bullish for crude oil. So we did see that very rapid move up, but there was strong resistance around the $50 level. And once the headlines wore off, the sell-off continued and we retraced fully all the way back down to, you know, low $49s.
And we've seen now we're $49.62, around the close on Thursday. There's been a little bit more strength here on Thursday, but in general, the big inventory pop didn't make that much of a difference. And what's fascinating to me is all the headlines that I'm reading have returned to the rhetoric about how concerns are returning about a supply glut. Look, those of us who were not distracted by all of this OPEC rhetoric over the last few weeks have been concerned about this supply glut, and frankly, the inventory numbers have been proving us wrong. We're right in the middle of when we should be seeing big builds in crude oil inventory, and we're seeing drawdowns. So that story about the supply glut—we need to see a whole bunch of big inventory builds in a hurry here if that theory is going to continue to hold any water. Seems like it is getting more and more attention now. But seven of the last eight weeks have been bullish inventory drawdowns.
Production did increase this week, reflecting the shale drillers going back to work. That probably had a lot to do with. why once the headlines had faded, we saw that retrace back to the downside in crude oil prices. But I'm waiting to see what happens with the inventory numbers. I'm ready to change my view and turn bullish. I'm not quite there yet, but I'm on the edge of it.
Aaron Chan: Right. And moving on to gold, it's gained a little ground since we spoke last week, but only a little, trading at around $1,270 on Thursday afternoon. What's the update on the yellow metal?
Erik Townsend: Well, you know, I'm going to actually disagree with you a little bit. It's true that in nominal terms, we've only gained a few dollars since last week. But the fact that gold is going up at all in the face of this very strong U.S. dollar strength, really, you know, that is a testament to the strength of the gold market. One would expect with all this dollar strength that gold would be taking a nosedive.
So, the fact that we're still $1,269 as we're speaking Thursday afternoon, that we're, you know, basically $1,270, Even after the dollar has very decisively broken out to a new cycle high here, that gives me more and more faith that, you know, maybe I was thinking we were headed to the low 1,200s after I saw the breakdown from that descending triangle pattern. I'm starting to wonder now if, if maybe we missed the bottom. Maybe that 1,243 print from 2 or 3 weeks ago was the low and we're just headed uphill from here. So I'm watching it carefully. I want to see what happens with the dollar, if the dollar continues to be strong, whether not gold can continue to hold its own. But to me, the chart looks very strong here.
Aaron Chan: Yeah, I agree with you, Erik, and that's a great observation. It looks like it's basing out here. All right. Lastly, 10-year Treasury yields are up about 10 bps this week, trading at around 1.85% on Thursday afternoon. Erik, any change on your outlook here?
Erik Townsend: No, no change really. You know, I'm definitely going to ask Hugh Hendry his view on this. We've heard from Jeff Gundlach and from Raoul Pal, you know, kind of opposing views, which Raoul has described as really being about different time horizons. I'm on the sidelines I think most likely that Raoul's view will play out in the sense that we probably will see this bounce continue, maybe up to 2% or so before eventually we get into recession territory and much lower 10-year yields. But, you know, if I look at how much confidence I have in that 1% 10-year target versus how much confidence I have in something like gold moving higher over the next few years, I feel much more confident that there's better places to put this trade on. The thing I will watch for, though, is when When we get to sub-1% yields, I'm going to be looking for the long-term strategic short play on Treasuries. But, you know, if you take the Raoul Pal view that we're coming into a buying opportunity for a tactical long, he's probably right.
It's a little bit too aggressive for me. I'm going to wait for the short play, which is maybe a year out.
Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update. Hugh Hendry of Eclectica Asset Management in London is perhaps one of the most iconic and well-known hedge fund managers of our time. His macro views are extremely well respected in the industry, and his interviews on Real Vision Television have drawn record numbers of viewers. Erik's interview with Mr. Hendry is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is one of our most requested guests ever, Eclectica Asset Management's own Hugh Hendry. Hugh, thanks so much for joining us. Thanks for joining us and taking time out of your busy day. I want to dive right into the US dollar. We are seeing what most people would consider to be a breakout back to a 99 handle on the dollar index. A lot of our guests have said that they think this dollar rally is set to resume in earnest as a lot of capital from the rest of the world flows into US dollars. What's your outlook for the US dollar? How do you see this playing out?
Hugh Hendry: Okay, so I, I believe like Almost everyone in my community are long dollars. I feel that it's somewhat premature to say it is a breakout, but it is— the conjecture of the breakout is very, very appealing because it would be a breakout on the basis of 30 or 40 years, which would suggest it could be a very, very powerful breakout. But it's not quite there, and indeed, the principal factor I think dominating markets right now is this kind of binary situation that we keep finding ourselves in, which is I believe that the US economy has now successfully, if you will, re-engineered itself to deal with the fact that the dollar rose roughly 20% against the rest of the world after the Jackson Hole meeting of August 2014. If you remember, we went from 80 on the dollar index to about 104.
That acted as a tremendous brake on the US economy, and we've had subpar growth. I think that's been recycled, and I think all of the evidence now indicates that the US economy can operate robustly with where the dollar trades presently. And with the backup in nominal yields that we're seeing, with yield curves steepening, One has to believe that we are live. We are going for a rate increase by the Fed in December. The question is what comes next? Because so the fork in the road really is, does the Fed do one, but kind of signal that it's one quarter point each year, and therefore it's going to be— it wants to engineer a function of being behind the curve that actually wants to see inflation, that it wants to permit inflation running higher? In order to offset the deficit and the undershooting, if you will, over the last few years?
In which case, then, already we're seeing signs where the US inflation-protected securities are beginning to trend— it's tentative, but they're beginning to trend positively against the nominal equivalent. And that would be an environment, again, which would be helpful for gold. Or is this the case where the Fed feels emboldened to again, to use these binary terms, but rather than being dovish, to be hawkish.
If so, and the Fed indicates that this is now— it feels it can raise rates again and again, then I think your supposition of a dollar rally is very valid. I think we'd move quickly into 104 to 105 to 110 range. But beyond that, it's very hard, because I do believe that that, again, would act as a brake on the US economy. So we're all watching. I'm afraid it's very unsatisfactory, but we're all watching.
But currencies, I think you have to— the Fed gets a very hard time for having not raised rates more over the last 2 years. But people forget that the currency did the policy tightening. And so we have to watch.
Erik Townsend: You said recently that the Brexit vote helped to reassign the probabilities of questioning the euro, and you gave an analogy. You used the analogy of the U.K. leaving the gold standard in '31, when at the time there were 45 members, and a couple years later, there were only 12 members. Do you think that we're on the precipice of European exit contagion becoming a major macro issue, or is Brexit going to blow over?
Hugh Hendry: Well, let's talk about it in terms of, I think, what are the probabilities that the market is assigning to these big questions? The market reveals its thinking when we look at the yield spread between the 10-year Italian BTP bond future and the German Bund for 10 years. And presently, that spread is 130 basis points.
Now, before the advent of the great financial crisis in 2008, that spread was 30 basis points, which is to say Europe had converged There was no sovereign risk that BTPs were the equivalent of German bond yields. And therefore, there was zero probability, if you will, of disintegration of the system.
And we can contrast that with the other extreme, which was at the height of the drama surrounding Greece back in the summer of between 2011 and 2012, and that spread between Between the core, if you will, the core engine of Europe, Germany and Italy, it blew out to 600 basis points.
And so my take on that is every 100 basis points of movement in that spread between those 2 sovereign bond markets of Italy and Germany seems to suggest a 10% probability of system or regime change. Right. So as I said, in 2007, zero probability. In 2012, a greater than 50% probability that someone would exit.
Today, it trades at 130. And so the market is saying it's kind of like a 10% probability that the system breaks. And that's what I would challenge. I think with the advent of Brexit, and I think with the failure to resolve the problem with the banking system, which is just profoundly greater in terms of its size and its importance in the credit mechanism within Europe vis-à-vis the US. I think that probability is too low.
And I think it's going to creep higher, especially because we have a very busy timetable for European political elections. Not only do we have this referendum in Italy, which is not going well, And we'll find out in the first week in December. But you have the French going into their national elections next April. You have the Germans having an election. You have the Dutch having an election. And I think all of the fears and the angst which were captured with Brexit, I think they're going to feature again clearly in these European elections. And I think most notably in France, where it would seem that the right-wing candidate of Le Pen seems like an odds-on certainty to go into the runoff in terms of determining who will lead the country.
And what I'm thinking is I think it's more likely to be a stable, strong European nation that rejects the status quo, as opposed to where we were back in 2011, where it was whether the weak economies could bear the pain of remaining. I think it's turned around now, where the rich, strong economies are saying there's just less and less political wherewithal, that the upside, the rewards from the system now just don't seem apparent. So that's why I'm curious about that trade. I think a 10% probability is just too low.
Erik Townsend: And what would be the next domino to fall? Is it France, then, if something starts to come apart?
Hugh Hendry: Well, the most immediate one is the Italian referendum. And it's the story written large of Europe. The referendum was a good idea. The policy that they're trying to enact seems sensible, so they're trying to challenge the fact that nothing really ever gets done in Italy, that they always suspend the hard decisions almost forever.
By trying to give more power to the party that wins and give them a mandate to pursue those policies for 5 years uninterrupted, if you will, that sounds like a good thing. However, with the foolishness of the political scene It has been transformed into a referendum on the popularity of the Prime Minister, and of course the present Prime Minister Renzi is struggling from the malaise, which is that Europe isn't working. So that's the first, that's the first clear and present danger, and from then on we just get more and more events.
An ally to that is. That Brexit itself is becoming the dominant policy, is consuming the policymakers. Europe worked, the promise of the European integration was one of rewarding that they were better together. Whereas it is, I was going to say subtly, but there's no subtlety, you have the French Prime Minister and others warning that Brexit is a hard negotiation, that the UK has to be punished for the decision. And so I fear politically, when you move from a rewards-based system to a system which can only survive with punishment, that is a system whose days are numbered.
Erik Townsend: Is there a trade opportunity out of all this now yet, or is it hurry up and wait and see what happens?
Hugh Hendry: Well, my team and I had something of a eureka moment going back about 4 or 5 weeks ago. So we had been trading— and again, I would say a lot of our peer group had been trading— the spread, the yield spread between those Italian and German government bond yields.
That spread, as I said to you, was 130. And what we know is that since March 2014, that spread has failed to trade below 100 basis points. Below 100 basis points, that would be people being willing to pay more and more for the Italian bonds. And it's remarkable if you think for over 2 years, 2 and a half years, when you think that the ECB finally submitted itself to quantitative easing, it got the Bundesbank onside.
And so lots of, if you will, positive monetary developments have occurred over that time frame. But investors, in their wisdom, have decided that at 100 basis points, Italy feels very rich versus the German bonds. And so people are unwilling. So it would seem the only way you can break that 100 basis points would be for the Bundesbank to give its permission for the ECB when it's doing this quantitative easing and buying the sovereign bonds in Europe.
If it were permitted to buy more, a disproportionate amount of the peripheral bonds, then that would challenge my trade. But in this environment, I cannot see, with the number of monetary hawks who reside in the corridors of the ECB, I can't see how they would permit that. So for me, it has the notion of being asymmetric. We are 30 basis points below a line which has held. It's held for 2.5 years. If it breaks, I would challenge whether I should hold that position. I'd be looking to close that position. However, if the odds begin to favor another country seeking to terminate its relationship with the present regime, then you could see that trade trading 300, 400, 500 basis points higher. So it has the whiff of Asymmetry, asymmetry, I have to say to you, is one of the most overused words in the macro community. Everyone delivers, everyone promises it, but fails to deliver it.
This would seem to be an area where it's on the cards, but it's a negative carry trade. The eureka moment was that my team and I were able to determine that we could actually co-join that trade with other European-related trades, and we could eliminate the negative carry so we could have a positive carry trade. So I don't care when it happens. I just have a misgiving that we could get a fatal policy mistake. And from the modeling that we have, we believe we could make a lot of money. So on the other side, I don't like discussing the other side because it's a new trade. But it plays to the heart of the problem.
The problem with quantitative easing is clearly it undermines the profitability of the banking sector. And I think if you go back to one of the Bundesbank's reservations, they believe that economic recovery is a function of strong risk-seeking banks. And you don't get that with quantitative easing. So we've seen in the last 2 months that the European bank stocks have rallied. I mean, global banks have rallied. By the order of about 30%. It's been a tremendous and sharp price movement on the expectation of yield curves being steeper, on the expectation of higher interest rates.
Now, that just shows you the inconsistency of the world we live in, because Europe today, if anything, needs easier policy. And the banks, of course, need higher rates. They don't work. The system doesn't work. And therefore, Something has to give. I think that's my fear, that when it gives, when it breaks, it's going to be unpleasant.
Erik Townsend: Well, it's certainly hard to argue with a positive carry and a big asymmetric return opportunity. Let's move around the world to Japan. You also said not too long ago that you were a lot more benign toward Japan than some of your peers in the industry. I think that was before the BOJ really came full on and said yield control, or yield Yield curve control is us, and really took on greater ownership of the Nikkei. Does that change your views in terms of being benign towards Japan?
Hugh Hendry: I think it reinforces the view. The only complaint with it is that it doesn't offer an immediate catalyst for moving asset prices. I think what, again, what the Bank of Japan— it was a very dovish action by the Bank of Japan, and they're saying that actually they would like to see inflation overshooting its target on the upside.
Now, of course, they can only dream of that scenario because for the last 20 years, it's been the opposite. But they were saying that it's a bit like John Lennon, give peace a chance. The Bank of Japan was saying, give inflation a chance. OK? What the Bank of Japan are laying out is that they do not want any incipient inflationary pressures to be eliminated. By the private sector, if you will, hiking interest rates immediately on any first sign of incipient inflationary pressures.
So it's a very bold, a very strong message. But it's a message for the future, if you will.
And the other complaint is that does that mean— let's say we had, again, a policy error out of Europe. And of course, the expectation is that when bad things happen, you get the repatriation of capital back to Japan, and so the yen appreciates. Is it the case that they would prevent 10-year bond yields?
My understanding is that it's set at zero. And if the private sector wants to push yields below zero, I think the Bank of Japan would allow that. Others disagree and believe that the Bank of Japan, at negative rates, the Bank of Japan would be selling their JGBs. Which would perhaps confound or compound the problems at that point. We'll see. I think it's experimental, and they have to suck it and see somewhat. But what it does require, regardless, what it does require, they've given an open pass, an open invitation to the Japanese government to spend more money.
Now, the Japanese government certainly has not been shy in spending money. I think the criticism is the projects that they've chosen to spend money don't seem to have done much to address the fortunes of Japan.
If I was to have a wish list, Japan, and indeed the UK, I believe, could do this. But they should be willing to run bigger fiscal deficits and cut corporate tax rates. Corporation tax rates in Japan are very high. Japan has struggled for 25 years. I don't see why Japan could not, say, abolish corporate tax rates and say, we are this island of enterprise and we welcome others. And my goodness, I think that would get things moving quickly.
And lastly, on the benign or benevolent view on Japan, I just think at the cultural and political level, it feels more homogeneous than, say, Europe. Europe is trying to force many, many countries and many, many different regimes of past experiences with inflation and deflation, et cetera, into one one-size-fits-all, whereas with Japan, it's just one entity. They don't have these competing different sovereignties, if you will, having to be submerged into one national policy.
I think if any country were to get the political mandate it really to let rip at the fiscal level, then I think there are fewer obstacles in Japan than we find in the rest of the world.
Erik Townsend: The next question is one I've really been looking forward to asking you, Hugh, which is about the evolution of your views on developed market equities. Obviously, 5+ years ago, you were famously, famously bearish. And when you first turned bullish, the way I remember, or the way I perceived what you were saying at the time, was essentially, okay, this quantitative easing propping up asset markets. It's crazy, it's wrong, it's immoral. But hey, who knows how long they can keep this charade going? In some of your more recent interviews, it sounds like you don't think it's a charade anymore. You actually think that we're in a sustainable secular recovery. Is that right?
And, you know, help me understand how your views have evolved and what your current outlook is for US equities and other developed markets.
Hugh Hendry: Well, managing money is a lonely and a complex activity. And in some respects, it's an impossible task. We are trying to determine events which have yet to happen. So we are soothsayers trying to predict the future. We should really be in a circus. Instead, we're housed in skyscrapers in New York and London, et cetera. And we have this pretense of knowledge, which really doesn't exist. There is no knowledge of the future. And therefore, when I do have set out a view, a belief system, then I believe that belief system has to be subject to a time stop loss. And I gave myself no more than 2 years to be able to capitalize upon that view, which allows me to build the portfolio. So first and foremost, we had stopped ourselves out of that view of the world. That view of the world wasn't working. And it was particularly painful in 2013, because we missed— all global stock markets rose 30% in dollar terms.
So that was a Thirdly, I took exception to, if you will, the morality that I was choosing to pursue in the judgment of central banks, and I felt that that wasn't my role. That is the role for people when for citizens when they are electing leaders to run their countries. It's not the role of a hedge fund manager.
And then fourthly, I looked at what the the policy had achieved. And the policy, I think we all have to be very thankful because we did not get a depression. Back in the early months of 2009, you could not rule out that we could have taken the path which we saw with devastating implications for regular house, regular people pursuing their regular lives.
Would have been damaged immensely. So as we sit here today, the US economy is on the verge of one of its longest economic expansions in the last 50 or 60 years. Now, immediately the criticism is, yes, but the magnitude of the expansion has been modest, which I accept. However, when we're looking at the pace of the expansion in GDP, We have to remember that this has been the first economic expansion in living memory which has occurred without the private household sector taking on more debt.
Again, I think in terms of quality, the quality of this economic expansion is good, and it's long. If you'd given me that, if you said, here's the outcome if we pursue this policy, back in March 2009, I'd have bitten your hand off. Yeah, I mean, that's a great outcome.
And again, contrast that— the European nations, again, lacking the homogeneity of cause and with different factions fighting, it was disastrous. They raised interest rates, if you remember, back in 2011, and it wasn't until until the end of 2015 that they finally committed to having a looser policy. And I fear that, again, ordinary households have suffered owing to that policy. I think the ECB has been too hawkish, that monetary policy has been too tight. And therefore, Europe has wasted and has lost the opportunity that has been afforded to America.
For all of those reasons, I had to say, you know, swallow my pride and say I was wrong. And that, you know, people like— and again, when I go to say this, but Bernanke was right. I think he was courageous, and he engineered a sustainable US recovery.
The final point, which is very technical, but if you think of the world or our economy, It is split between—you can generalize and say we have two parties: we have debtors and we have creditors. Households and companies are the debtors. We have these great ideas. We wake up every morning with wonderful ideas how we're going to change the world. But of course, changing the world requires money, and we never have enough money.
And so thankfully, we have another class, which are the creditors. And these guys—they always have money. But they never have any ideas about what to do with the money. And the genius of the market-based economy is that it brings the two groups together, and the system works because the people with ideas get financing, and those ideas go on to change the world in a better way.
Now, when you look at the last thirty years, what I fear happened was. That companies and households were being asked to pay too much, that if you will, the creditors— and let's call them the bankers— not through any bad intentions, if you will, but they were being overrewarded to lend us money. So we were paying too much money. And I think that's why you saw 2 very bad developments. You saw debt continue to rise as a percentage of GDP. Which makes the economy vulnerable to shocks. And of course, you saw this grotesque disparity in incomes that creditors tend to be rich. And if you overreward rich people, then they get richer versus everyone else. So the rich got richer.
And it was all a function of this transfer mechanism called the interest rate effectively being too high. And what I believe the kind of unheralded And the purported genius of quantitative easing was that it sought to change that. It sought to eliminate this transfer levy to the rich people, to the rest of us. And it succeeded, because what it's done is it has brought interest rates down, not only overnight rates, but of course, right out to 10 years, rates are by and large flat.
They're flattened in real terms. And so— And so today, the private sector, if you can get credit, if your bank is willing to lend you money, it is lending you money at a fantastically attractive level, which can only be good for enterprise.
And my conjecture there is that— and indeed, the thought bubble which led me to that reasoning was, if interest rates are too high, if we're overrewarding credit This explains why stock markets, the S&P has lost 80%, 8-0% of its value versus a vol-adjusted holding of 10-year Treasuries. And over the last 40 years, when you think 40 years, we had Microsoft, we had Apple, we had Google, we had Facebook. You think of all the remarkable positive things that happened in America. At the entrepreneurial level, where we created businesses that went from zero to global leaders. And at the same time, we had immense economic growth from the rise of China, which itself was remarkable. And yet, on a vol-adjusted basis, stocks massively underperformed bonds. That tells me that there was a rent transfer to the creditors. The bond market represents the creditors.
So as I look forward, what I can see is that since the advent of quantitative easing, American stocks have stopped underperforming government bonds on that risk-adjusted basis, because now you're not overpaying for credit. And that has to be a good thing. So I think there's some cause to look at the world more positively, but My fear just now is that Europe and the quagmire of the policies of Europe, if we could resolve that, then I think life would look better.
Erik Townsend: Okay, but the consequence of all this is we now have more than $10 trillion of negative-yielding sovereign debt around the world. And there are obviously significant consequences to that. Perhaps the biggest is that there's so much of it now, and there's been So much credit expansion, I don't think most governments could go back to historically normal interest rates because they couldn't possibly service their debt if that happened. So it feels like the mother of all liquidity traps that we're sort of stuck in this negative yielding. And you've got very well-respected people like Ken Rogoff at Harvard saying we need to go deeper into negative yielding, ban cash, all this kind of stuff. How do we ever get out of this? What would the unforeseen consequences be? And I guess also what trading opportunities are created by this situation that we find the world in now?
Hugh Hendry: Well, so the negative— as you say, $10 trillion of negative rates. And I suspect over the last few months, they've become less negative, because clearly nominal bond yields have risen sharply in the last 6 weeks. But the true irony is that the central banks have succeeded making credit very cheap. But the irony is that governments, as representatives of households, are not using that present.
The central banks have delivered— we talked about Japan. The central banks have delivered this incredible opportunity to borrow money and be paid to borrow money by the capital markets. And you go to Germany. Germany, and they're running a balanced budget. They don't want to spend money. You go to the UK, you go to the US, that actually having a fiscal expansion is politically— it's the last thing any politician wants.
And so you see, this is the problem, because some of your listeners heard my last comments, and I'm saying, hey, if you can borrow from the bank, this is the best opportunity you've had in 40 years. And they'll be saying, yeah, it's all right for you to say, but when I go to the bank, the bank says, No.
Well, the government can borrow the money for you. The government can borrow and be paid to borrow and provide better services. The list is long in terms of what you could do in terms of infrastructure in the US and elsewhere. But there is just no political will to go there yet.
So I find that odd.
I find that the biggest Second, I think you're very right, because clearly, we have bond vigilantes. We have people who constantly fear inflation. When the Fed announced quantitative easing in March 2009, people said— we had the metaphor of Zimbabwean hyperinflation. And it was profoundly wrong. And what we're we're discovering is that in a mature political economy, it is very hard for policymakers to create inflation. Now, why is it hard? It's hard because the sovereign bond markets are gigantic. And those prices clearly is an interaction— in the modern markets, an interaction between central banks and the private sector, but the private sector is large of, whereby, as we've seen in the last, what, 4 to 6 weeks, US 10-year Treasury bond yields have gone from 1— well, if we take it from June, July of the summer, US 10-year bond yields have gone from 1.36 to what? Where are we today? 1.86 or so. So the private sector has tightened rates by 50 basis points at that 10-year level.
When you look back at the episodes of hyperinflation, in Germany and elsewhere, you find you just didn't have this private sector policeman, if you will. The size of the sovereign bond markets were minuscule versus their size today. And therefore, their ability to actually set interest rates was less, and policymakers were unconstrained. So I would say to you, even with these negative rates— and I think you touched upon If there are policymakers and they want to generate inflation, good luck to them, because it's hard. That's why, again, that takes us why the Bank of Japan had to come in and say, we give you absolute promise that 10-year bond yields will not go above zero. That's the first radical step of this proposition that central banks banks, unless they promise such dramatic measures, then the private sector will tighten policy.
And we won't see in the next 2, 3, 4 years, we won't see the Fed make such a promise. And therefore, if the economy in the US picks up steam, if the dollar rises, then you'll find that the private sector will be tightening policy, not the Fed. Fed, but the private sector will be tightening policy, and the economy will— I would expect the economy would slow down, and you won't get the inflation. So it's clearly, these are complicated, convoluted matters.
But that's how I react to the description you gave me.
Erik Townsend: So where would that leave you in terms of your outlook for US Treasury yields? We've got Jeff Gundlach saying, okay, guys, the 35-year bull market in bonds is over. The bottom is in for yields. Raoul, on the other hand, is saying buy the dip. We're headed for sub-1% on the US 10-year before this is over.
Who's right?
Hugh Hendry: Well, I would preface that Jeff is saying he's not arguing that bond yields are going to go shooting up. He's just saying he thinks the low is in, sort of thing. But my interpretation of what he's saying is those 10-year Treasury yields could just remain in this range, like 1.30% to 2% for the next X number of years.
Raoul, of course, is saying that they could go lower. I agree more with Jeff for one reason. And I think this has not been disseminated and picked up by the popular media. In the summer following Brexit, actually, I think what we saw was the convergence of US 10-year rates with the rest of the world. So what do I mean? So you're sitting there saying, what am I talking about? Because Japanese And 10-year German Bunds are yielding zero, whereas in the summer, US 10-year got to about 1.35%, 1.36%. But at those levels, foreign buyers of Treasuries got no yield uplift.
We live in a world where big financial institutions don't want to take any risk. So if you've got a very large pension or insurance endowment or one of these sovereign wealth and they are, say, based in Europe or in Japan, and they're buying US Treasuries, they will swap the dollars. They don't want to take the risk of movements in the euro-dollar or dollar-yen. And when they take out the financial— sorry, the foreign exchange risk, they have to make a payment to eliminate that risk. And that payment is captured by the OIS spread, the US LIBOR LIBOR. And as you know, that has shot up.
And so when you factor in how much you pay to hedge your foreign exchange, in the summer of this year, I would say to you that US Treasuries converged their yields on a, if you will, foreign exchange parity basis converged that they were all priced at the same level.
And I always thought that the US Treasury bull market would come to an end when US rates converge with the lower rates in the rest of the world. So I think that's happened. But I suspect that they're going to remain around these levels.
And to answer your point of where is redemption, how does the world survive with this gargantuan quantity of outstanding debt, the answer is that real rates Real 10-year US rates today are zero, and they're likely to remain at zero. And I suspect they may go negative. In the summer of 2012, we saw real negative rates of about -0.6% for US Treasuries. And so if you can run with negative real yields for 20 or 30 years, years, you will see an unwinding of debt, because economic growth will unwind it as a percent. So debt to GDP will come down.
I think that's really the— I think that is the policy which is being pursued, that the system needs to keep rates priced at these levels.
I think the system can prevail. I think it can prevail because if we look back in history, we don't have— if you look back in US history, we We had the infrastructure boom of canals, of railroads. We had the huge productivity revolution in the 1930s, but we had the buildup of chemical plants, of telecommunications. In the 1950s, we had the movement of people living outside cities. And so we needed a huge infrastructure boost to join suburbs to the cities. Today, it's not obvious that we have something. something for governments really to get behind and to spend a lot of money.
And therefore, I think you're going to see— and I think the best-case scenario is a very slow deleveraging by the world operating with negative real Treasury yields or rates.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to the Chinese yuan. And I've been very curious to watch your views and contrast them with those of Kyle Bass on this subject. As you know, Kyle has obviously been extremely strongly of the opinion that China is going to be forced to devalue dramatically. And when Raoul Pal put that question to you in a Real Vision interview, you said, no, no, look, the consequences of that would be so great, there's no way they're going to let that happen. And I don't know if you caught it, but in the next interview, Grant Williams put your comment back to Kyle Bass, and Kyle said, no, no, no, Hugh doesn't understand my view. I agree with him. They would never let that happen, but they're not going to have a choice. They're going to be put in a situation where they're forced to recap their banks as this mountain of credit expansion comes falling down. And against their strongest objections, they're going to be forced to allow the yuan to devalue dramatically.
How would you respond to that view that Kyle expressed?
Hugh Hendry: Yeah, I did see that interview and I was frustrated because I felt Grant and Raoul were not really passing on the substance of my argument. So first of all, yes, I was saying that an overnight devaluation would be dramatic. And I think I was offering to jump out the hotel window if we woke up tomorrow and that was the case. And there, I was suggesting that really, it's unnecessary.
It's unnecessary, and it would provoke such an obvious reprimand from the rest of the world, that it's not obvious that it would be a remedy.
So you know that for the last 10, if not 15 years, I think the US Treasury has had to report to Congress a report on China's FX regime, and pretty much has concluded that China has been a manipulator, that they've been prepared to put up with it, but by and large, China China has organized itself whereby its currency has been lower, or cheaper, if you will, and it's gained a competitive advantage.
So against that backdrop, the notion that the US would sit idly by and allow China to unilaterally come through with a 20% overnight devaluation, I find hard to take. I think what you would see immediately is that there would be immense tit-for-tat, that the US would impose sanctions.
Be import restrictions from China. I think that would be followed by the satellite nations of Japan and Korea. I think even the Europeans would object. Large tracts of industrial activity in Europe would be wiped out by such an FX regime. I think then the Chinese would, of course, react, and they would make it impossible for Western companies to invest more in China, and they would make it tougher on them.
You would get to a situation where the whole WTO system of the world It would unravel very quickly, and my point is: Would it be necessary?
Again, we are talking about the world's largest creditor nation that runs a huge trade surplus that is not obviously suffering from the level of its currency. And secondly, there are so many powers available that don't require such a contentious policy decision. So they can tighten up the capital controls, which is by and large what they did over the last year. They tightened up; they made it harder to take money out of the system. So they have that fiat ability to make it harder.
And then, with regard to the underlying problems of the domestic Chinese economy, they see they would seem to be overplayed. Is there a problem with bad debts in the banking system? Yes. Was there a problem with the Japanese banking system with bad debts if we go back 20, 25 years ago? Yes.
But those problems in the banking system were pretty much socialized. The government pretty much took on those debts. And Japanese debt-to-GDP levels— government debt-to-GDP levels went higher. So for my mind, the Chinese government could easily easily, by allowing us a 10% per annum expansion in debt to GDP, could resolve the bad debts residing in the banking system.
And then finally, the big issue and the big fear, if we go back 18 months ago, was clearly overinvestment. And it was especially the overinvestment in the tier 3 cities in China. And it was so immense that it probably represented almost 20% of economic activity. And we were left with, I think, what, 40 weeks of oversupply of property.
And again, what they've done, they've loosened the internal passport, hukou system, whatever it's called. And so they've made it easier for people to move into those areas. They've removed the one-child policy, which, of course, is abhorrent as it is. Various policy maneuvers, if you will. And what we see is that the worst fears, which were postulated 18 months ago, have not been fulfilled, that those property prices are rising, that the amount of surplus property in those tier 3 has dropped precipitously. I think it's about 18— it's either weeks or months down from 40.
So my point was that China was actually a grown-up nation. In terms of— I've always made the distinction between sovereigns, that you have a tier 1 and a tier 2.
And I felt that some of the bearish dispositions to China were looking upon it as we looked at Thailand and some of the Asian countries, the Asian Tigers in the 1990s, that had these huge problems. Now, they had huge problems because because they were subject— they were borrowing money from overseas. And when that money got yanked, then the system fell apart. China's problems are internal.
China is of such a size that it has to be compared with the US and with Europe. And these countries, given the scale of the internal market, they have more autonomy in terms of what they can do with their money. Monetary and fiscal policy without fearing a collapse in the currency. So they've exercised that autonomy.
Their steps seem to have provided a remedy. The economy has not gone into freefall. It's stabilized around about 6%. And finally, of course, they have favored the household sector.
I think they did get a fright after the financial crisis of 2008, where they saw that they had a susceptibility to overseas demand. Demand in terms of exports. And when that fell sharply, they did have some industrial tensions with workers being laid off. And so they looked at it and said, perhaps our model relies too much on selling to the rest of the world.
And we should pivot and make our growth more centered upon domestic or autonomous growth that we can control. And to do that, they've allowed wages to rise. So Chinese citizens have captured more of their productivity gains over the last few years. Chinese citizens get more positive real rates than they got previously.
And Chinese citizens, if you look, the renminbi versus the euro has appreciated. So you're seeing swathes of Chinese people around the world because they're feeling wealthier. So Chinese households— the Chinese household sector had been squashed, if you will, to favor the large enterprises and to favor the exporting of China Inc. And going back 5 or 6 years ago, I think the Chinese pivoted to say, hey, listen, I think we squashed the household sector too much. And now it's time to reward them.
And if we do so, then we will get this autonomous growth, which will probably put a floor on our GDP, round about somewhere between 4% and 6%.
You have to remember that consumption as a share of GDP was only 34% in China. And we've never— that's— I can't— people throw figures around, but that is a remarkable figure. It's 50% in the Philippines. We've never seen a major economy have such a low share of GDP accounted for by consumption. And so the opportunity And the opportunity to promote economic growth in China was to pursue domestic policies which encouraged more household wealth, and therefore more spending, and therefore more Chinese economic growth. And I think they've pretty much delivered that.
So I still find myself at odds with that thesis. And again, for me, when I listen to the complaints about China, my The second point is that the clock is running. If you can't capture your thesis within 2 years, you're probably wrong. If people were wise to that discipline, we would have less widowmakers, if you will, from the JGB trade of the last 25 years. You have to be able, as a macro manager, capture your contentious thesis within a— let's be generous— within a 2- to 3-year time period. Beyond that, I think you've got to kind of— you've got to pack up and find a new trade.
Erik Townsend: For my final question, I'd like to shift gears onto a much more personal note, and that is about the personal experience that you, Hugh Hendry, have had over the last few years. Because you basically built a brand around being the most outspoken bear in the industry, famously advising people to panic and schooling Nobel laureates on how things work in the real world. And people were cheering you on at the You then got to a point where you recognized, as you just said, after a couple of years, your view wasn't working, and you changed your view. You must have known that by turning bullish, that would actually cost you redemptions and a reduction in assets under management, even if you were right. And you were proven right. You did the honorable thing. You did the noble and ethical thing, which is to change your positions to reflect where you thought the market was headed, and you were absolutely right about that, but it still cost you in terms of fees and assets under management, and to some extent notoriety in the industry because you had such a brand built.
What has this experience been like for you to have done the right thing, to have done the ethical thing, and to effectively have been punished for it, I would guess, in terms of the income that you produce because you're no longer that outspoken Scot
Hugh Hendry: Yeah. As you say, I recall sitting in front of my computer where you have to press that send button on the email and thinking, ooh, this is going to be painful. I think there was a German philosopher— I can never pronounce the German— Vonnegut. And he said, if you're going to pretend to be someone, make sure you're comfortable being that person you're pretending to be.
Erik Townsend: Be.
Hugh Hendry: And I've always been true to that. So I'd say beyond that, there was the way— my view of hedge funds was that they were a band of outsiders. They were the pirates. They were watching things, and they were willing to have a go when they saw opportunities. And then the world kind of— more money came into the system, and it became more a function of your back office service ability and how many analysts and support staff you had. And i.e., you had to look more like the Royal Navy than being a pirate. And there was a time where I felt that I started pretending to be the Royal Navy.
And that's where my— if I have regrets, it was the period where I was pretending to be someone that I was deeply uncomfortable being. So that, that shifted when, when I, when I pressed the send button. I said, it's gonna cost me, but I've got to do what feels right for me. And that's, you know, my fund— the rewards to managing other people's money can be high, but it can be capricious, and it can be a very short-lived experience.
We have managed money for now 14 years. And so we've stood somewhat the test of time. And it comes from the willingness to make those hard decisions. But for me, I need to spend a lot of time on my own, my thought processes. It's impossible to put me in an office surrounded by other people. I make too much noise.
I like to be play music and walk around. And I'm very distracting to the other deep thinkers within my organization. So I have to be penned off, if you will. And there are times where I just seek that solitude just for the deep thinking which is necessary in the endeavor. So I have that. But I can't let your question pass without, of course, reflecting on the fact that my business business did get smaller.
And so the biggest regret is that you have to lose staff. And that's a grotesque and horrible experience. But I would say that my business was too large in terms of the people we had. And I think I've now found a level where I'm happy spiritually. I'm happy intellectually. I'm happy.
And we've just sent this letter, of course, with our European European blowup trade. And so now we have the ability to— should unforeseen and unfortunate events strike, especially in Europe, or external factors come through and risk becomes very elevated, volatility goes shooting up, I now have a profile which I can make money in very bearish outcomes.
And what I'm finding is my phone— since I sent another letter saying, oh, I'm back, I'm bearish Again, I'd be welcome back, if you will. So perhaps the lesson is listen to the clients. There is a profound amount of bearishness on the part of macro— people who wish to invest in macro portfolios today.
And what I've learned is that it doesn't matter if you're right. People will not invest in a macro fund with a large equity weighting in this environment. I think they are looking upon macro just now as offering a degree of portfolio insurance against the elevated prices of risk within client portfolios. And so you have to offer a portfolio whereby if bad things happen, you are almost guaranteed to make a lot of money. So I've pivoted once more, and we certainly have trades in our book which gave us the profile that we had going into the storm of 2008.
I'm back into that strange world where storms would create big returns for my portfolio. We'll see.
Erik Townsend: Well, Hugh, I cannot thank you enough for a fantastic interview. I'd love to go into more detail on that recent note you had about the post-Brexit trade. We'll get a link to that article into our Research Roundup email that goes to our registered users. Sadly, we are out of time and can't go any further. For our accredited and institutional investor audience, of course, Eclectica-AM.com is the website for Hugh's hedge fund business. And for the rest of us, just thank you so much for a fantastic interview, Hugh. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Wow. What an awesome interview, Erik. You guys were really on such a roll, and unfortunately, we don't have a lot of time for postgame today. As an aside, apologies to our listener, Davy Nelson, who actually asked a great question about the long dollar, long gold trade, and we'll try and address this question in a future episode. But Erik, we've got time for one question, and I wanted to get your take on what Hugh said about QE being unheralded success.
Because it is the mechanism that transferred wealth from creditors, i.e., those with money, to debtors. Now, I'd argue that the exact opposite has happened, especially when you think about the asset inflation we've seen with QE, and just thinking about who owns financial assets in the first place. I mean, it appears to me that QE has made matters worse, not better, and is part of the reason governments around the world are actually immobilized by populist uprisings. So what are your thoughts here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I am definitely humbled by, you know, I have so much respect for Hugh Hendry. brilliant minds of our time. But I too was shocked by that comment that he now believes QE is an unheralded success. I was frankly very inspired by his previous sets of views about QE as being immoral. So, you know, I definitely want to pay homage to my great respect for Hugh. Maybe I'm just slow to come around to his new views. view, but I don't see it that way. And a question I had wanted to ask him, and unfortunately we didn't have time for today— he's made a comment in the past about how he eventually, when he turned bullish, decided he needed to turn down the volume, was the expression he used, on voices like Dr. Marc Faber or James Grant, who have expressed a very bearish view about how this all ends very, very badly.
And what I wanted to ask him is, You know, I too have come to the opinion that you've got to turn the volume down on those voices, because a mistake that I used to make and no longer make was because I was persuaded that those guys had it right in the long run, I assumed that that meant it was somehow imminent that things would fall apart. And that's just not true. These things take a lot longer to play out than you think they would.
I'm still persuaded that Dr. Faber and Mr. Grant have it exactly right as far as this will end very, very badly because governments have just created so much debt and conjured so much money out of thin air, and they've gotten themselves into what I think is the ultimate liquidity trap where there's literally too much sovereign debt that it would be unserviceable if we ever went back to anything close to historically normal interest rates. And you can't possibly have all the pensioners of the world ever get their pensions if we don't someday get back to normal interest rates. So I see this as all ending very, very badly in the long run. The view that I have come around to is my feeling of 5 or 6 years ago that it was imminent, that everything was about to come falling apart.
No, clearly quantitative easing has succeeded at— what's the word I want to use— at staving off this process. problem and buying us time. Now, I think it just makes the eventual resolution worse in the end. But boy, I am humbled to hear a man as brilliant as Hugh Hendry taking an opposing view, because I have so much respect for him.
In fact, a lot of my negative views are informed by what Hugh thought 5 years ago. So, if the pattern is he's 5 years ahead of me, maybe I really need to listen to this interview a few more times. times and see if I can come around to his viewpoint. But so far, no, I think that the endgame is eventually very, very bad. I think what may be true is that Ben Bernanke bought us much more time than I had previously appreciated was possible.
Aaron Chan: Well, I agree with you, Erik. And I think one of what it really speaks to as well is sort of his intellectual malleability and agility. And that's definitely something that all our listeners can take away. Well, that's all the time we've got, unfortunately. Anything you'd like to add?
Erik Townsend: Well, I just want to point out the reason that we're able to bring you a really big name like Hugh Hendry is because some of you guys are cooperating with us and helping us out by retweeting us and particularly by registering at MacroVoices.com. When Aaron reaches out to Hugh Hendry and Eclectica Asset Management in the future, as we continue to reach out to more of these big names that you want to hear, like Kyle Bass. The more registered users we have, and particularly the more accredited investors that we have registered in our database, that's the statistic that Aaron uses to sell these guys on why it's worth their time. So please help us out. Sign up for your free account. You get as a benefit of that the free Research Roundup email each week. Aaron, let's tell them what they can expect this week.
Aaron Chan: Great. You know, the mix of video and textual content has been very well received, and we continue this week with Ray Dalio's latest speech at the Council on Foreign Relations CEO Speaker Series, wherein he runs the macro gauntlet and offers his latest views on a wide range of macro topics. Next up, we have Thomas Schumann Capital's presentation on water as an asset class, where they make the case that water is the next big environmental investment opportunity. Now, those of you who've seen The Big Short and are fans of Michael Burry, Currie will find this presentation to be particularly intriguing. Finally, we've got Felix Zulauf's latest thoughts on markets and commentary from David Hay, who makes the important observation and sounds the alarm that markets are underpricing an increasingly hostile U.S. Congress. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
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Erik Townsend: Thanks, Patrick.
Aaron Chan: @ErikTownsend and myself @AaronChan_. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
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Robin Griffiths — Robin Griffiths, Head of Multi-Asset Research and Advisory at the ECU Group; formerly HSBC Investment Bank, Rathbones, Cazenove Capital Management (transcribed 'Casanova'), W.I. Carr (transcribed 'WICAR'), Grieveson Grant (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 36 was recorded October 20th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Robin Griffiths will be joining me as this week's featured interview guest. Robin and I will discuss his work with cycles, ranging from short-term seasonality cycles all the way up to the 39-year generational cycle. We'll then examine today's macro issues, ranging from the dollar to equities to Treasury yields and gold, using Robin's work with cycles as a framework for our discussion. I think the key thing to understand is that
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan
Aaron Chan: The S&P 500 has recovered slightly from last week's lows, but only slightly. E-mini S&P futures traded as high as 2,144 this week and closed Thursday's session at 2,135. So, Erik, any change for your equity outlook?
Erik Townsend: Not a whole lot of change. I think for the most part, the market is waiting for the election to be over. I wouldn't be surprised if we saw a rally just because the uncertainty is eliminated after the election. And I wouldn't be surprised if that kind of made a final high and it was downhill from there, because I do think that we're headed towards recession territory. If you look at the market from a technical standpoint, the trend line that has been in play all the way since the 11th of February was one of the lows. The next low is the 24th of June. You draw the line between those 2 points, and you'll see that we've now actually begun to trade not so much below the line, but to the right side of the line. And that means that Technically, that uptrend line has been violated, but it hasn't been violated with a massive move to the downside.
It's just a horizontal consolidation pattern for now. Most of the technicians that I'm reading have been saying that a close below 2125 would be extremely bearish because that would suggest that a downward move is in play next.
So far, we haven't seen that. We've seen a horizontal consolidation. This morning, Thursday morning, we got within about a point of that just as I was recording the interview with Robin Griffiths. But as you said, by the close, we're looking at 2137, back up safely above the line. Watch for that move below 2125, and I wouldn't be surprised if we actually see a move higher after the election and then eventually move much lower. But again, it remains to be seen. So far, we could still be in buy-the-dip territory.
Aaron Chan: Okay, now before we move on to crude oil, let's start with the US Dollar Index. The DXY made an important upside breakout last week with a daily close above 97.50. Now, you said last week it needed to stay above 97.50 for at least a few days for confirmation, and lo and behold, it has. So, Erik, is it time to declare that the dollar rally has resumed in earnest?
Erik Townsend: Well, resumed, yes. Earnest, I'm not so sure about. Let's talk about the anatomy of an upside breakout. What happens is a market moves above some technical resistance level that previously acted as key resistance. In the case of the dollar index, that would be 97.50. Hasn't moved above that number since February. Sure enough, it did last week, and very much consistent with what tends to happen. You'll get an initial breakout, then everybody looks at it and says, oh boy, is this real or is it a false breakout? And the market drifts back down to retest that same key resistance level, but now the question is, has it become a support level? Sure enough, that's what happened last week. We went back down and just kissed 97.50, started moving up. Now, from there it looked pretty good, but what would you expect in a true upside breakout is at that point people see confirmation and it's everybody's piling Piling in at once.
They can't get in fast enough because the previous resistance level has turned into a support level, it's held, and everybody is just diving into the trade.
We're really not seeing that here. What we're seeing is that, yeah, it just barely stayed above 97.50, kind of struggled its way along to stay above 97.50 for most of the last week, and then just after this morning's ECB meeting with Mario Draghi, we saw a bump all the way up to 98.40, then a retrace back down to 98.15, back up to 98.30 as we're recording on Thursday afternoon. So yeah, it's looking good, but it's not looking to me like a massive, huge move to the upside is upon us. We're just drifting higher, but we are now more than a week above that previous resistance level. So the next test is going to be the prior high, which I think on this cycle was more than a year ago now, a year and a half ago. I think it was either 102 or 103. So the next test will be, can we get above that level? And do we eventually see some momentum building?
Right now it's been a little bit sluggish.
Aaron Chan: All right. Well, moving on to crude oil. WTI reached new cycle highs this week, trading above $52 for the first time this year. So what's going on here, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, not only this year, I think that $52.22, which is the high print so far, that's the highest since July 2015. That's 15 months. So definitely very significant price level. What's going on? Huge inventory drawdown, 5.2 million barrel crude oil inventory draw this week against expectations of about build in inventory because we're in seasonally speaking what should be a restocking period. Cushing, Oklahoma, 1.6 million barrel drawdown. Gasoline, 2.5 million barrel build on inventory, but distillates, 1.2 million barrel drawdown. So for the most part, drawdowns across the board. You talk about the world's biggest head fake. You know what really confused Art Berman and I when we did the Labor Day weekend oil special is when we would normally not expect to see seasonal inventory builds across
Aaron Chan: Right.
Erik Townsend: They don't start occurring until late September into October, and we were seeing them in August, and it seemed like it was starting early. So when we saw those, we thought, boy, it was starting early.
Just wait and see what September and October bring.
And we've gone in totally the opposite direction. So when we should have been in the middle of summer driving season in a drawdown period, we were building inventories. When we should be in a building period now, we're drawing down. So everything's working backwards. At the end of the day, though, this has gone on too long to write it off to some anomaly. 6 of the last 7 weeks have been drawdowns on inventory. Cumulatively, that's 26 million barrels over the last 7 weeks that have been drawn down from national crude oil inventories. You know, it's time to say, hey, those of us who thought there was going to be a storage crisis just plain got it wrong. And sure, you could start seeing, you know, maybe there's some anomaly has to do with Hurricane Matthew delaying the arrival of some imports. Maybe they're going to come. But at this point, we've already drawn down enough inventory and we're far enough into the season, we're not going to have a storage crisis.
So as I was saying last week, it felt like maybe these price levels, $51, $52, is kind of a high in terms of how far the market can go based on the fact that if it goes much higher, we're just going to see a lot more shale drillers starting to add rigs. And of course, we did see an increase in production this week, which is a reflection of the increasing rig count. The thing is, to say it can't go much higher than here, can't go much higher than here if we're still working off this huge supply glut. If we're going to continue to see 5 million barrels a week of drawdowns, the price is going to eventually go much higher. So I've been thinking that we weren't there yet to the point where the market had rebalanced. Certainly a lot of other people— Goldman Sachs analysis has said that the market is still oversupplied. But boy, the inventory numbers sure don't reflect that.
So if this continues, prices could move substantially higher from here. I'm waiting to see what happens.
Aaron Chan: Gold has gained a little ground since we spoke last week, trading at about $1,266 on Thursday afternoon. So thankfully, Erik, I'm out of that broken record, but what's the update for the yellow metal?
Erik Townsend: Well, it actually got to $1,275, almost $1,276 earlier today. Post-Mario Draghi, it kind of took a nosedive back down to $1,266. But as you say, you know, a couple weeks ago we were looking at a low print of $1,243. Is it over? Did we miss the bottom? I haven't bought any gold yet. I've been waiting for lower prices. I still think that I think that we're probably going to see a test of the low $1,200s, somewhere between $1,200 and $1,250. Maybe I'm wrong and we've missed it. I don't know. At this point, I have gone ahead and bought the Dollar Index, and I'm kind of waiting for gold to show a little bit more weakness before legging into the other side of that long gold, long dollar trade that Raoul Pal and I have discussed on the program a couple weeks ago.
Aaron Chan: Got it. And finally, 10-year Treasury yields have been trading in the high 170s this week and closed Thursday afternoon around 175. So what's next from here?
Erik Townsend: You know, I really don't know. I think Raoul's got the right picture that we're in a bounce here in yields, probably will eventually move lower in yields, but not until there's confirmation that a recession really is on the horizon, as I believe one is. You know, it's tempting to look for a bounce above 180 in yields and go long Treasury futures at that point. I'm not going to do it just because I think there's better trades. I'm much more optimistic about the gold trade playing out in the long run. I want to look for the right opportunity to get into a long position on gold. As far as this tactical long on Treasuries to maybe ride the yield down to 1% before reversing to a short, I'd rather wait it out.
Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Robin Griffiths is Head of Multi-Asset Research and Advisory at the ECU Group. He was previously Chief Technical Strategist at HSBC Investment Bank for 20 years before Before becoming Head of Global Asset Allocation at Rathbones, and then a Director and Technical Strategist for Cazenove Capital Management. Robin was a partner of W.I. Carr and Head of Technical Analysis at Grieveson Grant. Robin is a committee member and former Chairman of the International Federation of Technical Analysts and former Chairman, now Fellow, of the British Society of Technical Analysts. Robin has been a member of ECU's Global Macro team for over 20 years. Erik's interview with Mr. Griffiths is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me next on the program is Robin Griffiths. And Robin, I normally start these macro interviews with the US dollar, but I'd like to take a different approach with this one because I know that your approach to markets is very much based on cycles. So please explain your approach. Tell us about cycles and how you use
Robin Griffiths: Well, I got into stockbroking 50 years ago, uh, coming to it with a degree in economics. And, uh, in the economics, one of the more interesting bits was Joseph Schumpeter's work. He was Austrian, but he ended up as an American professor of economics. And he wrote a lot, uh, very erudite books. Um, and the bottom line is he didn't invent any single cycle. He simply said, these other people seem to have discovered different cycles in economic activity, people with names like Kondratiev, etc., Clements, and there are other names. And if they're right, the different cycles will interact with each other in a complicated way, and I'll show you how that happens.
And what I did ever since I've been in the market is say, and if that is right,
Erik Townsend: Right.
Robin Griffiths: It will lead to a certain development in the stock market, and I'll draw you a map of what that looks like, where we've come from and where we're going in the future.
And the cycles basically in Schumpeter's model is a very long-term cycle, which I simply call secular trends. But he called it the Kondratiev Wave. Poor old Mr. Kondratiev got sent to Siberia in Kula where he died because the regime didn't like him telling them that they hadn't done anything clever, they were just riding an up cycle, and in due course it will turn down, which of course it did.
And then the next cycle is a 10-year cycle, which is sort of like a long business cycle, and within it is a shorter-term business cycle, which these days of course we call the presidential election cycle because ever since the US became the biggest economy, that your cycle is mandated to be 4 years. Whereas in the earlier period when Great Britain was the dominant superpower, the cycle actually varied. It could have been as short as 3.5 years or even as long as 5. It simply had an average near to 4 years.
And then there's an even shorter cycle, which is annual seasonality. Believe it or not, almost all financial markets markets have an annual seasonal deviation, and it's a Northern Hemisphere deviation because our northern economies dominate the rest of the planet. And of course, you don't have to go back very far in time before agriculture was the most important thing, and of course, naturally, it has an annual seasonal cycle.
So I simply put these things together, and then more recently people have discovered other types of cycle.
There's one called a geopolitical risk cycle. There's also a commodity market cycle, and, um, etc. A demographic cycle. Ever since we've heard about the baby boomers in America and the aging, shrinking population in Japan, people have realized that demographics is jolly important, and the waves of population do tend to go in cycles. Of Of course, none of these cycles are a sine wave. In Schumpeter's model, he drew them out as a diagram as though the cycles were equal, nice neat sine waves and show how they would interact with each other. But in reality, it's much noisier and more varied than that. But nonetheless, these up and down movements in the cyclical fashion do appear very regularly. And once you're in the up or the down part, you're in a very dominant trend.
So having identified that trend, you can indeed back it. And some of these cyclical movements move for incredibly long periods of time. So, um, for example, in the Western world, we've actually been in a secular downtrend since the year 2000. And the fact that the S&P and the Dow are higher now than they were then Doesn't override that fact. The secular trend in the Western world has been negative for 16 years. And the bad news is that isn't long enough to end the secular trend. It's going to carry on for quite a lot more years yet before the next secular uptrend kicks in.
Erik Townsend: Robin, I know that there is excellent basis in history for the work that you do with cycles that proves out their predictive value. But if I can play devil's advocate for a minute, I think a skeptic might say, hey, wait a minute, central bank intervention over the last 8 years has changed the game. And that means that really, you know, you could argue that whatever value cycles may have had in the past, the name of the game now is central bank intervention and monetary policy affecting markets. Does that throw these cycles off balance? Do they stop working, or am I missing something?
Robin Griffiths: No, no, you're absolutely correct. In what Bill Gross has called the new normal— bank intervention, quantitative easing, zero interest rates, all of that, or negative interest rates is completely unprecedented. And I go a long way along with you to suggest that the— what we used to call the capital asset pricing model, or capitalism, has been smashed to pieces as a matter of deliberate policy. Of course, they think, most of these governments, that they're following Lord Keynes's ideas faithfully. But Japan's been doing that longer than the rest of us, and it absolutely doesn't work. Yeah. But what they've definitely done— the whole thing about capitalism is prices should be decided by the interaction of willing buyer and willing seller. And if some businesses or product is meant to go down in price and go bust, you have to let it go bust. Otherwise, capitalism doesn't work.
And what you've got at the moment is central banks delighted that things go up in price, but as soon as they look like they might want to come back down again, again, they step in and, and try to stop it.
And of course, they've been successful up to a point. Um, what we think is happening is central banks are collectively running out of bullets. Uh, they— it is what the effect of each intervention— the intervention has to be bigger and bigger for less and less effect. It's rather like injecting a drug addict. He needs a bigger hit to get the same response. And it absolutely cannot go on much longer. So at some point, we're going to return to what Bill Gross would have called the old normal.
And in the old normal, interest rates would normally be something like whatever rate the economy grew at, plus a bit for inflation. So if the economy is growing at, say, 2.5%, and you get about that much inflation, interest rates shouldn't be a long way different than 5%.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Robin Griffiths: But if you try and go to 5% from where we are now, you would cause such a massive destruction of wealth in the bond market globally. You bring on something worse than the Great Depression of the 1930s, which is clearly not in anybody's interest.
So what typically happens is when there are factors intervening in the cycle. It's much easier to override the shorter-term cycles than the very long-term ones. So, for example, the annual seasonality—you can easily stop that from happening. And even the shorter, the shorter-term four-year cycle can be has been overridden to some extent.
But what you can't do, no government's ever done, is to stop the demographic cycles and these longer-term ones. So. When you've got a generation as big as America's post-World War II baby boom generation, as they grew up, they drove the entire economy before them. But no force on earth can stop them now being in their retirement part of their life cycle.
And it doesn't matter when they die. They could all live to be 120. What matters from the economy point of view is the expenditure. In their life cycle, and that tends to peak out round about the age of 50 to 53, that sort of thing, when they've got their biggest house, the kids living at home, they're paying the school fees and all that sort of thing.
Now that all the baby boomers are clearly older than that, the kids have left and gone off on their own, and they're scaling down, they're looking for 2 things: a pension plan. Well, normally your pension plan would be quite a lot invested in the government bond market as a risk-free asset.
Well, the intervention has meant there is not enough yield on that to fund the pension. So that's bad news, number one. And the second thing these older people look for is their health. And Mr. Obama and the Congress have gone and kind of made a mess of the health service such that it's now largely unaffordable for the vast majority of the population. So the idea that these The idea that these people are suddenly going to drive a consumption boom, which drives the economy, is just absurd and ridiculous, and it can't and won't happen.
So no amount of government intervention can override that one. And the intervention that has happened has made this problem worse rather than better.
There is some good news, of course, in that the millennial generation is a monster. But these guys are on average too young to drive the economy, and we've got to wait until somewhere between 2020 and 2023 before the millennial generation will do all the right positive things to drive the economy. And we've got to get to there from where we are now, and that's when this, uh, these artificial interventions are going to have to be unwound. But you're absolutely right that in the short The— and it's not just America doing it. I mean, Europe's doing it, Japan's doing it. Many other central bankers are doing this same policy. They've been a failure. They aren't working, and they're causing massive mispricing of asset classes all around the world. And that's where my gloom and bearishness comes from.
Erik Townsend: So to summarize, it sounds like the message is to be informed by the So, we want to focus on the long-period cycles, and for now, in this current central bank intervention environment that we live in, maybe de-emphasize the shorter-term cycles that are more easily interfered with. If we take those sort of rules and start to apply this to markets, let's move on now to the US dollar, because that's something that a lot of guests that we've had on the program, and my own view, has been that perhaps the US dollar is getting ready to break out to the upside. And I think you have an opposite view. So, please explain your views on the dollar. What informs them and what do you see coming?
Robin Griffiths: Well, against something like sterling, the dollar has broken out to the upside. But what's really happening is it's the pound that's going down. On the chart, the DXY, or the dollar trade weighted, which is probably more important to follow than any individual cross rate, it's been in a sideways trading range of roughly 92 to 100 for 2 years. Now. And in the early part, I mean, 2 years ago until about 1 year ago, most of the fluctuations within that range took place above the various moving averages which technical analysis use.
In the more recently, the fluctuations have taken place below the moving averages that technicians use. Well, now that's not good.
If this was something other than the dollar trade weighted, you'd imply being below the moving averages as a negative signal. However, there is no breakdown unless the DXY goes under 92. And rather perversely, I think because we're in the new normal now— in the old normal, if the currency goes down, that makes US exports much more competitive, would be good for the earnings per share of those companies. So it would be a bullish thing, just as we proved recently since Brexit the pound has fallen. So our biggest companies— Shell, BP, Glaxo, with HSBC with loads of overseas earnings— have gone up in price.
But what's happened in this new normal is the world has been herded into the dollar as the so-called safe haven currency. And if you now then turn it to trash in their hands, You cause panic, not competitiveness. So you're absolutely right. If we were on an upward breakout and it went to, let's say, 103 or 104 or more, then that would be people going into the dollar.
There would be trade-offs, of course. The reverse of what I've said is US exports would be less competitive, but people that had panicked into the dollar would be very pleased with what they've done. But rerun that— is people panicking out of everything else to drive the dollar up like that?
Well, all of our work suggests that because of those demographic reasons, there is no scope for the US economy to suddenly go into some great boom ahead. That can't happen until the millennial generation are quite a bit older.
So the reason why the dollar would break up is to hedge the fact that everything else in the world economy would be breaking down, and that would be the overriding thing. It would actually be bad news if the dollar went rocketing up. In fact, you could argue that any form of destability— the dollar going strongly above 100 or strongly below 92— either one would be bearish because they would enter yet more uncertainty into the world than we've currently got, and we have got plenty of uncertainty right now.
Erik Townsend: Okay, let's move on to the equity market. You know, there are so many famous people, very, very successful people, whether it be Carl Icahn or George Soros or Stan Druckenmiller, Ray Dalio recently saying the credit cycle was over. And I know from a technician's standpoint, if we look at the trend line that started February 11th, I think it was, And then the June 27th, something like that. We're starting to see a breakdown below that uptrend. A lot of technicians that I've heard have said we've got to stay above 2125 or else it's a very bearish signal. As I'm speaking to you on Thursday morning, we're looking at about 2127, so we're right on the hairy edge of that. Are we close to what could be considered a technical breakdown and a sell signal in equity markets here?
Robin Griffiths: Almost all markets in the world are already in a bear market and have been for over a year. The fact that the S&P is where it is is due partly to the interventions we've been discussing and also due to 5 to 8 stocks in the index with names like Alphabet, Apple, Amazon, Facebook. These are giant market cap stocks which didn't exist in the old And they typically are on incredibly high earnings multiples. I think Amazon's at about 350 times earnings now, but they've definitely been holding the index up. If you say, well, let's take them out and look at the ones that have always been the backbone of America, we're talking Walmart, General Electric, IBM.
It's quite obvious we're in a bear market, and what we've had is a bear market rally. And typically that bear market rally is over, is as near over as makes no difference right now. And another thing that follows from this, if Fed intervention and central bank intervention doesn't allow us to have a nice steady bear market to reset prices to fair value from being expensive, then what you've actually done is increase the chances of that coming A flash crash.
We've had a flash crash over here in sterling. It fell 8% in about 1 minute flat a week ago. And sterling isn't the only thing capable of flash crashing. I remember very well 1987. Back then, world markets were actually in a bull market, and yet for what seemed at the time like no apparent reason, you came in one day and found that I seem to have lost 20%. How did that happen?
Happen. And of course, it was all over fairly quickly. 3 months later, it was quite hard to remember what had actually happened. But nonetheless, it was as scary as hell at the time, and a lot of money got lost.
I think we are very vulnerable for those stocks and markets which are expensive to come down to something like fair value. Taking the CAPE ratio on the US market, that would involve a fall of 50%. For it to be cheap by its own historic yardsticks, the fall would be 75%.
Well, that would— you— that would go straight into the history books and indeed the annals of legend along with 1929, wouldn't it? Those are those— for the market to fall that amount. Nobody's saying anything's going to go wrong with the business of Google Facebook. But if the P/E ratio comes down to what by U.S. standards has been deemed fair value, a 50% decline is the absolute minimum needed to do that.
Erik Townsend: And what would you be watching as far as signals to tell you that that move is beginning? Is there a particular price level or other signal in the market that you can watch for that would tell you that that big move is on?
Robin Griffiths: The other thing— well, if you go below the 200-day moving average, I think most algorithms will start shorting like crazy. Plenty of individual hedge fund managers have put shorts on individually selected stocks that look a bit ridiculous to them.
But psychologically, what's happening is the public aren't really buying the market and haven't been for ages. The baby boomers tend to be taking money out of their mutual fund and other savings plans because they need the money an hour to live on, and as they're trying to scale down their living expenses and cope with existing in this new normal. And the very fact that the 2 candidates for the presidential election are who they are— and over here we've had some pretty weird voting things, quite unprecedented— these are the sort of social
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Robin Griffiths: There are all kinds of subtle signs that the public in the Arab countries are not happy with what they've been getting, and they want something different. And for 95% of all Americans, they're not the ones who are all well off. It's the top 1% to 2% who've been doing terribly well with the stock market. The average guy has absolutely not been doing that well, and he's become aware of that. Else seems to be screwing me, if I can put it like that, and they're not happy with it. And they're— you're getting social unrest.
And, um, when you compare the social unrest we're getting in lots of places now to previous periods in history, it's always at that time been followed by a recession, occasionally by a depression, and on rare occasions by And of course, the war won't be in the U.K. or in the USA, but we're very close to war elsewhere in the world. And that's deeply unsettling, making us negative.
Erik Townsend: Let's move on to Treasury yields. You know, we've heard so many different views on this. Since 2000, Treasuries have outperformed equity markets dramatically in terms of capital appreciation if you're buying duration risk. You know, we've heard my friend Raoul Pal at Real Vision says, if anything, this backup in rates is a buying opportunity. We're headed to sub-1% yields on the 10-year. Jeff Gundlach, on the other side, very famous bond manager, has used almost the same argument but come to the opposite conclusion, saying, hey guys, it's a 35-year bull market in bonds. It's coming to an end. You know, it's time to start betting in the other direction.
Where do you see this resolving?
Robin Griffiths: Well, you're absolutely right. If you simply plot the yield on the 10-year Treasury, you're going to see the Kondratiev wave mapped out before you, basically. Ever since 1946, end of the war, over here, gilts in England and Treasury bonds in America, in real purchasing power, went down and down and down. And something called the cult of the equity is what went up and up and up.
And then about 30 years ago, it flipped over the other way. We've been coming down the other side of that Kondratiev wave. And you're right, when you get to be zero, you can't go an awful lot lower than that.
And in real terms, of course, we're at zero now. We're actually negative right now. I do believe that the Bank of England and the US Fed do not want to actually have a nominal rate that is negative in their countries. But plenty of other countries—I mean, a third of government bonds around the rest of the world—are already negative.
I mean, in Switzerland, they've issued a 50-year bond where you're going to get slightly thrashed every year, and people are queuing up for that.
Now, when I asked why would people do that? Are they all sadomasochists? And the answer is the guarantee that you'll get quite a lot of your money back. Sounds quite good if you were worried you might get none of it back because you speculated in the wrong asset class. So, but it's not sustainable. And many people, including Bill Gross, have tried to call the end of the great bond bull market before. I myself stuck my neck out in 2003 thinking this is it.
And for about 4 years, we looked as though we'd nailed it, but we were, we Too early. It was just a plateau and we've come lower again. So, um, I think we will get it so that in real terms we will be well into negative territory, even if in nominal terms we only go close to zero.
And on my work, on my cycle work, the turning point, it looks like being roughly this time next year. So late 2017. Always looked like it might be the lowest low in the cycle, and then it will be back into real assets and you'll be buying cheap equities then.
But from 27 times earnings on a CAPE, that's not US equities. They're not the cheap ones. They need to come down between then and now to be cheap and get bought. The cheap equities are in Asia, basically. They're in places like India with great demographics cheap markets. And even though India is expensive by its own historic yardsticks, it's half the price of American equities.
So, and it's got everything going for it. So I mean, this is— you're going to— well, I know from talking to U.S. equity fund managers, they're looking to this sort of part of Asia to make money and taking it away from good companies which are highly rated in their own home market.
Erik Townsend: So to summarize, it sounds like you think about 1 year from now is where this 35-plus-year bull market in bonds eventually tops out and we see the low in yields, high in price, and the big secular trend is still about a year away from turning according to the cycle work that you're doing.
Robin Griffiths: The low in the commodity market should be at about that stage as Well, my work is quite clear that the final low for commodities is not yet in place. Of course, uh, the fact that oil has come up from $26 to $52, suddenly you hear a whole lot of people telling you it's going to $80, whereas my work was absolutely adamant, no, it's not going to $80, it's coming back down again and will keep falling until to make that final low in about a year's time.
Erik Townsend: So you don't think that $26 was the final low for for oil? You think there's still a lower low coming?
Robin Griffiths: I think you're going to at least have a very close retest of that low. I mean, $30 would be fine for me as a sort of ballpark. But the notion that it's about to go to $80 and all those frackers will suddenly get rich again, I don't buy that one little bit.
And even when the various Arab states agree with each other, let's try and get a sort of monopoly going here again. Russia's on our side. That's not going to work either. Historically, these guys cheat on each other like crazy, and besides which, they need the money. They're going to keep pumping. Only if Saudi agrees totally to be the swing producer and take the hit all by itself will you get the price steadying up. I think you'll find it fluctuates and goes down, and only if there were to be a war flare-up, a real war in the Middle East, well, that could suddenly mean we can't get any gasoline or whatever. And then I could be wrong, but we wouldn't like the world we were in if we were wrong for that reason.
Erik Townsend: Okay. So tying all of this together in terms of the developed market secular outlook, you said our last major secular trend change was in 2000, and you feel that what we've been through is a bear market rally, basically. So I assume then that your expectation is markets roll back over However, the secular bear market has not played out yet. How long do you think we've got before we get to— is it that same late 2017, or is the equity low at a different time than the commodity low?
Robin Griffiths: I think what we're basically— after the great fall, you're going to have a base-building period. Now, if I'm right that we get down there with something approaching a flash crash, then it may well be that the low made in October 2017 is actually the lowest low. But then the market doesn't go straight bouncing up like a rubber ball into a new bull market. It spends a long time going sideways in a rather narrow and rather boring trading range, making a base for a later roaring bull market.
But the roaring bull market doesn't look as though it's really going to get going until after 2020. So there'll be a sort of flat period down there. The type of equities that I think would be picking up would be those related to the commodity cycle, which of course are already pretty beaten up, and they'll be even a bit more beaten up by the time. And so they would count as real assets, and the currencies that go with that, like the Canadian dollar or the Aussie dollar, I would expect them to play into that cycle as well. So they may be the first places, first type of equities to really look like they're in a bull market. But the more industrial sector would take that long time to make a base before they get going again.
Erik Townsend: Now, if we're talking about a very pronounced down move in developed markets, as you're describing, I note what seems to me like kind of a conundrum. On one hand, you've already described a very bullish argument for China and India having completely different fundamentals. But I would also think that A lot of money in China and India is Western money. And if there is a huge equity sell-off in the West, people are going to be selling everything, including China and India. So I would think there would be downward pressure there. What do you see happening for emerging markets as this developed market story plays out?
Robin Griffiths: Yeah, no, you're absolutely right that when you suddenly find you need money, you sell whatever you can sell. And that's frequently the things that you actually like most. And want to hold on to. And that certainly, I think, would bring China up again.
China also has a monstrous debt bubble. The fact that its economy seems to be growing at 6.7% at the moment, which is a jolly good number, is done because of enormous sums of credit which are being pumped out. And that's got to be deflated. Obviously, to the extent that foreigners are in the Indian market as well, uh, they would probably take a bit out and the index would come off. But, um, the, the good thing about India is it doesn't import or export very much of anything to anybody.
It needs to buy some oil, so the low price of oil is a bonus for it. But it can grow itself from a $2 trillion economy to a $5 or $6 trillion economy without importing or exporting much. It's all about putting in very basic infrastructure— water pipes and drainage pipes into the villages where most Indians actually live. And then between them, building more roads, extending the already enormous railway system and making it more efficient. But we're not talking anything like bullet trains as in China. We're talking about old-fashioned trains but run more efficiently. And then finally, the electrical generation system, which is, you know, straight out of a Dickensian Victorian novel, that needs to be modernized.
But none of this is rocket science. It's all basic common sense infrastructure development. Nothing new needs to be invented. And yet you can double or treble the size of this economy. So to me, if there was a serious wobble, like, say, a 20% setback in the Indian market, I think you'd find a lot of people saying, I'm willing to look ahead and buy the hell out of this one. It's one of the few places politically stable relative to many of its neighbors.
They speak English. I understand where they're coming from. And the Modi regime is absolutely what this country needed. And he's arrived at the right time to drive it forward. So the biggest risk would be Modi must stay alive. As long as he stays alive, I think you can— I could see a secular uptrend in India running at least a decade from now, and with the economy compounding at 10% per annum or even a little more.
Erik Townsend: Okay, and let's move on to gold, because, you know, I could make either argument for gold. On one hand, if everything else is going down, it's a flight to safety. On the other hand, sometimes we see, as we did in 2008, that gold sells off with everything else. So, as you see this big equity sell-off in developed markets, what happens to gold?
Robin Griffiths: Yeah, well, in most currencies other than the U.S. dollar, it's been in a roaring bull market for a long time now. And even in the dollar terms, it's actually in a pretty good bull market at the moment as well. But there was a time when it fell back from the old all-time high of 1960. To roughly 1,100. Obviously, in dollar terms, for 3 to 4 years, it wasn't a great investment. And of course, the mining companies in this sector were being thrashed completely— I mean, absolutely thrown away and trashed— and it was hardly worth operating the mines.
Now, even in dollar terms, it's in a bull market, but its first leg up was from roughly 1,100 to 1,380, and the chart I said between 1,380 and 1,400, there was very substantial overhead resistance. And it was— you're going to see some profit-taking and a consolidation. And my prediction was it would come back to between 1,200 and 1,250. Well, we've recently been about 1,250. We're tiny. We may yet get into that range. But once it resumes the uptrend, which I'm pretty sure it will do, even in dollar terms, it will—
Erik Townsend: Right.
Robin Griffiths: Not only go through $1,400, and then there's nothing much to stop it going back towards the old all-time high of $1,950.
Only if it goes through $1,950 will all of those predictions with a couple more zeros added on the end come right.
I'm not a gold bug as such, but I'm certainly long of it myself at the moment and expect it to to go certainly within the next year to be above 1,400 on its way to 1,900. Um, of course, if it were to go past the all-time high, you wouldn't want to be in US dollars there. I think what would have happened is we would have had some event, possibly economic, possibly warlike, which has scared everybody witless, and they didn't even want to hold the US dollar.
And they would be stuffing things into their mattress, and gold coins would be high on that list.
Longer term and more rationally, we are moving from an era. I mean, if you think about history, England used to dominate. Then we've had a long period of America dominating, which it still does. But we're quite obviously moving into a future where first China and then later India, mainly with Asia anyway, are going to be. The largest economies with the most people on it, and we better get used to this. And in their culture, both of those 2 cultures, gold is not a commodity. Gold is money. It's real money. And paper money, they don't trust an inch, basically.
China is already the largest single miner of gold on the planet, bigger than South Africa. It's building up its reserves, and it's quite good at only buying when price suits them rather than just continuously all the time. And the Indians, as they become wealthier, will continue to buy gold not just for the festival of Diwali or for weddings, but, but in big size, because it's deep in their, in their genes. They, they regard this as proper money.
If it were just a commodity or a pet rock, it's about 40% too high right now. It's managed to detach itself from the CRB and the other commodity indices. It's not behaving like a commodity at the moment. It's behaving like money, and money that the Asian part of the world loves better than it loves any fiat currency.
So going with that, I would— I'm long. I think we're going to make a profit on it, not necessarily a super duper duper profit. Because, as you mentioned earlier, when people are really worried, they may— they'll need to raise liquidity from whatever they can raise it on. And there may later come a day in a bear market for other assets, actually, it's only the gold that they can turn into liquidity again.
Erik Townsend: Now, the whole story that you've told us based on your cycles work is looking kind of grim for developed markets, at least for the next little while. You said it really doesn't get better until the millennials get older, driving a generation So if we can find some good news in this story before we wrap up this interview, when does this eventually change? When does the, the next boom kick in, and what drives it?
Robin Griffiths: Yeah, well, you're absolutely right. We shouldn't be too gloomy. The first thing is none of my economic indicators at the moment are saying the world is going into a Great Depression. When we talk about what we do need to do is to get interest rates back up to a sustainable old normal whereby, as I said before, they're the rate of inflation plus however fast the economy is growing.
And what we're actually— I think we're going to get is the economy slowing down to a low positive rate of growth, but we call it a subpar rate of growth.
The second thing is, and this goes back to Schumpeter, he invented an expression he called creative destruction. Russia, that new industries come along and without exception they always kill old industries. So the motor car killed the horse-drawn carriage, the cell phone killed the wired-up television, um, telephones. And luckily for us, modern technology is queuing in the wings now. There are a lot of technologies, each one of which will I think it will produce new industries.
We've got plenty of them in things like Facebook and Google. These are new industries, but they don't employ millions of people.
But I think we are on the cusp of the robotics age coming along. I mean, I can easily— not too far down the road, we'll talk to R2-D2 or C-3PO and, you know, we'll all have staff. But then they'll be little tin men. They won't be humans. We'll having the driverless electric car. There's all of these new industries coming along, and when that kicks in with the millennial generation being really, really old enough to drive the economy, I think you'll have an unstoppable great boom ahead. And because so many of these inventions are Western world ideas, we may make them somewhere else, but we invent them here. We're definitely going to. Have our share of the action here. And you can already see some of these coming. There'll be others, I think, new sources of power. It's not just lithium batteries replacing old batteries.
Solar panels are much, much more efficient now and cost-effective than they ever used to be. So whole new industries are coming along which will need to be built.
And when you look at the demographics, The millennials will probably start driving the economy from 2020 when the eldest of them, you know, get their proper job and maybe get married and start buying starter homes. However, unlike earlier generations of students, the millennials typically graduate with $80,000 to $90,000 of student loan debt.
Debt. And if they buy a car on top of that, they're over $100 grand in debt. So it'll take their liftoff a little while to get some real momentum, but from 2023 onwards, it'll be unstoppable. I just think it'll go boom.
And many of the industries that will be driving that, we, we haven't even anticipated them yet. They'll just— like, you think how fast the cell phone went from being a little toy made by a called Nokia. All of a sudden it isn't made by them, it's made by a whole bunch of other people and everyone on the planet's got one. It'll happen really, really fast and be very powerful and very positive and the standard of living across the world will go up a long way. But we've got to get to that starting point. But we can see the seeds of its creation already there. They're in the ground and they're being watered to some extent.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so given all of these views, where does that leave you in terms of asset allocation? It sounds like you like treasuries and precious metals. Do you have any equity exposure here? Do you keep it in emerging markets, or how do you build a portfolio with these views informed by your cycles work?
Robin Griffiths: Yeah, what we—you've got to TINA, as they say. You've got there is no alternative. You do have to own something. You can't, however much you'd like. Just say, okay, liquidate the portfolio. Although some of the very famous people you've mentioned have got up to a third of their assets in cash.
For the coming 12 months, we need to— I think we want to take as little risk as possible. And this leads to what we call a barbell strategy. In the middle of the bar, where all the other assets are, we just don't want to own them. And to some extent, that will include property as well. If you don't have to own half a dozen houses, don't. Just own the one you actually live in and get rid of the spare ones. This is global. It's not just a U.S. or European thing. It would apply globally. But you you do need to own because you want some sort of security.
Highest quality government bonds, which is U.K. gilts and U.S. treasuries, because there, for all the minimal yield. Yields, you are actually guaranteed, as far as a guarantee can be given, to get most of your money back in a year's time or whenever you want it.
And then at the other end, although we're very far— hard to make forecasts, there are certain business franchises which firstly are bigger than most of the countries on the planet, and they're pretty secure and they're paying dividends. And even if they cut the dividend a bit, the dividend stream that they're going to convert into a present value looks as though it's better than a Treasury or a gilt.
In fact, in the old normal, for decades at a time, no more than 5% of stocks ever yielded more than a long-dated government bond. As of now, in the new normal, 60% of stocks yield more than a government bond. This is pretty ridiculous, of course, because equities aren't as good as government bonds. They're inherently riskier. But on the finest quality businesses, when you simply can't live without the good or service that the business provides, if they look like paying a decent sustainable dividend, owning some of them for an income is the way to go.
And then for the coming year, you do want a cushion of liquidity. Some of it might be in gold, but some of it in just in liquid assets. And the US dollar is fine by me, so that you'll be able to buy some bargains when this reset has taken place, which I'm pretty sure is going to come. And then you'll be able to pick up some good stocks. Of course, if you were If you're a super sophisticated risk-taking investor, you'd actually go short of some things in the meanwhile rather than— but that's pretty dangerous for the public to do. And as that excellent book and film did make clear when it came out, The Big Short, even if you were correct to be a bear and put your short on, you have to be a bit early and you die 1,000 deaths and nearly go bust before you get the payout, even if you were a successful bear. So, but the average person don't do the shorting, but I'm sure some of the big hedge funds will do shorting of lots of things which they can see just going down.
And from 27 times earnings, the index can fall quite a long way before those very same stocks just appear to be fair value or cheap.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Finally, we ask all of our guests not to describe their own personal views, but just to comment objectively. Hillary Clinton Clinton or Donald Trump as president, either of those outcomes, what do you think the immediate impacts on markets would be?
Robin Griffiths: I think whoever wins is going to preside over a cooling economy, if not a recession, with a high probability that it will turn into at least a minor recession. And they will not enjoy their first 2 years in office, whoever it is. And we The voting, however extraordinary it seems, voting around the world, the public of the planet seem to be voting against elite politicians screwing things up yet telling you what you've got to do.
So against all the logical odds, that actually puts the Donald in quite a good position, although I have no personal thing against Hillary, who. He must, on paper at least, be the most highly qualified person ever stood to be president.
Erik Townsend: Well, unfortunately, Robin, we're going to have to leave it there. We are out of time, but I'm sure that a number of our listeners would like to follow your work. You did an excellent interview on Real Vision Television recently, which I would highly encourage for our Real Vision subscribers. For people who are not on Real Vision, where can they follow your work?
Robin Griffiths: At the Global Investment Roadmap, www.globalinvestmentroadmap.com.
Erik Townsend: www.globalinvestmentroadmap.com. www.globalinvestmentroadmap.com. Thanks so much. It's been a fantastic interview, Robin. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Wow, Erik, great interview. And, you know, the first question I had is about Robin's views on how millennials and technology will save developed markets from secular decline. Now, maybe just to play devil's advocate, but personally, I know tons of people in my generation who are saddled with student debt. And when I think about the automation risks posed by robotics and the utter non-alignment between education and the skills required, I mean, I'd like to believe that our generation will ride in on our robotic horses to drive the Western economies forward. But honestly, with the insurmountable government debt and Western politicians seemingly hurtling us towards armed conflict, I mean, it appears to me that our generation has a Herculean effort effort or task ahead, and I'm not convinced we'll overcome. What do you think?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm glad that you're accepting responsibility that it's all your generation's fault. But kidding aside, I think that the way I look at this is the millennial generation, I think, has yet to find its contribution to society. And to be sure, millennials have contributed a lot of really cool We've got social networking, Facebook. This was all invented by millennials. It's very much the millennial generation that has made it successful. But you know, as cool as that stuff is, and I think it's really cool, I love Twitter, it's not really helping the country be more competitive.
Whereas if you look at previous generations, you know, the IT revolution, computerization of business made those businesses more profitable and more competitive. It made the country more productive. I think that Millennial contribution to technology so far has made Millennials more connected to each other by social networking, which is really cool. But as far as what's the advancement that's going to economically advance society other than just, you know, Facebook stock going to the roof, I'm not sure that it's been there yet. And I don't think that means that, you know, Millennials are slackers that aren't going to do anything. I think the millennial generation hasn't found what needs to be engineered or what needs to be created in order to make that next advance.
So, when Robin says that after 2023 or so, the timing is about right for the millennial-driven boom to happen, well, most booms happen when a new generation invents something the old guys didn't understand. And maybe that's about to happen. Yeah, something makes me think that Facebook 2.0 just isn't going to cut it.
Aaron Chan: Well, I want to move on to the US dollar and Robin's point about how in this new normal where investors have piled into the US dollar safe haven, you know, a decided breakdown out of this 20-month trading range could trigger a panic sell-off in dollar-denominated assets. Now, Erik, is this finally the demise of the world's reserve currency, or will the panic reflexively lead people back into US dollars? I mean, if we get the equity sell-off or flash crash, that Robin described. I mean, the default reaction is to pile into Treasuries and US dollars. So in the end, what breaks this reaction function?
Erik Townsend: I think that it's very much a reaction function back into US dollar-denominated assets, particularly US Treasuries. I think that will continue to be the safety trade. And the reason is simply there is no alternative, even though Russia and China would love to change the game and say that the US dollar is not gonna be the world's reserve currency. You gotta remember that trade settlement and central bank reserve assets are 2 very different things. You may see some success of China and Russia changing the way that the US dollar is used for trade settlement, and that will change things because it will mean that there'll be less demand internationally for dollars, and it will change the dynamics slightly. But at the end of the day, what are central banks going to denominate their reserve assets in the savings account or the piggy bank for a country, so to speak, are the central bank reserve assets. Those are gonna be in US Treasuries because there is no bond market in the world that is deep and liquid enough to absorb central bank-sized capital flows other than the US Treasury market.
Now, I do think that someday there will be, because there's a lot of people in the world that are increasingly ticked off with the US dollar's hegemony over the global financial system. But so far, they haven't created a viable alternative. And until they do, that safety trade, the panic trade, is going to be back into US Treasuries.
Aaron Chan: Well, Erik, speaking of being ticked off with US hegemony, and before we run out of time, I wanted to get your take on something that was mentioned quite a bit in the last presidential debate, and that's war. My word counter broke after the nth mention of Putin, Mosul, Iran, and Syria, but it appears to me that we're inching ever closer to a global conflict. So, I mean, following the same rules we've had with our guests of leaving out their personal opinions, I want to get your take on what either candidate would mean for world peace or war, which seems more likely now.
Erik Townsend: I'm very concerned about it. You know, people accuse me of being a conspiracy theorist or something. I really think if you look at history and what some of our most informed guests have said, whether it was Jim Rogers on our very first show, you know, I said, don't you think that there's a possibility that these circumstances lead to war? I said, no, it's not a possibility. Every single time in recorded history that we've had the kind of financial circumstances that we have now, it's always led to war, 100% of the time. The question is how long it takes and where it happens.
I think that it is a very different scenario of where the risks are. Hillary Clinton clearly wants to pick a fight with Russia, and I'm scared to death if Hillary is elected. I think that's very well documented that we will see an escalation of tension between the U.S. and Russia. It will start with the proxy war stuff, but eventually, even though it's happening in some third-party country like Syria, once U.S. forces kill Russian soldiers or Russian forces kill U.S. soldiers directly, everything escalates dramatically, and it could get really, really ugly really quickly. And I think that we are at as high of a risk now as any time during the Cold
Now, it might sound like I'm about to turn, you know, big super Trump fan, and I'm not. I think Trump is a loose cannon. He's more likely to first cause trouble with Mexico and then potentially, I think, get into initially a trade war that could escalate to a shooting war with China. So, I think that it's a different mechanism of which countries Hillary or Donald would pick a fight with. with, but they both seem to me to be anything but pacifists. And I'm very concerned about the future of the world under either outcome.
Aaron Chan: So it's either the dragon or the bear. Sounds like good options. Well, Erik, that's all the time we've got. Anything you'd like to add?
Erik Townsend: Our regular listeners know the drill. It is so helpful to us if folks tell everybody you can about MacroVoices, forward your Research Roundup emails to your colleagues and friends. The more people that know about the show, and particularly the more registered users we That's the number of registered users we have at MacroVoices.com. That statistic of how many registered users and how many accredited investor registered users we have is what Aaron uses to recruit the very best guests. And we've got a fantastic one coming up for next week. I'll leave that as a surprise for now. But the more that you help us, the more that we can help you by bringing you better guests. Go to MacroVoices.com, register your free account. That gets you the benefit of a Research Roundup.
Aaron Chan: That's right.
Erik Townsend: Roundup email subscription every single week. And Aaron, why don't we tell them what's in this week's Research Roundup?
Aaron Chan: Right, Erik. We've got the latest from Kyle Bass, who spoke at the Vanity Fair New Establishment Summit in San Francisco, wherein he argues that the Chinese will need to perform a mammoth banking recap for the recklessly built financial system in the not-too-distant future. Next, you'll definitely want to check out the latest piece from Ambrose Evans-Pritchard over at The Telegraph, where he writes about Otmar Issing's recent statement to the journal Central Banking. About how the euro is a house of cards waiting to collapse under its own weight of political incompetence and moral hazard. Oh, and just in case you didn't know, Professor Issing was the ECB's first Chief Economist and the founder of the monetary union for which he is predicting ruin. So hat tip to Grant Williams for sharing that article.
Finally, we've got the latest Quarterly Market Commentary from Jeffrey Gundlach's DoubleLine Capital. One interesting fact from the report was that, quote, in 19 out of the past 22 elections, and every election since 1984, The incumbent party has retained the White House if the S&P 500 index had appreciated over the prior 3 months. Now, for us, that magic number is 2,181. So it'll be interesting to see if that's correct this time around. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-finance community, community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
If you haven't already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for the latest updates and interview releases. You can also follow Erik @ErikSTownsend and myself @_AaronChan_. For Erik Townsend, I'm Aaron Chan. Chat with you next week.
Erik Townsend: Thanks, Aaron.
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Mark Yusko — Morgan Creek Capital founder (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik. This is Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices Episode 35 was recorded on October 13th, 2016. I'm Erik Townsend. Morgan Creek Capital founder Mark Yusko will be joining me as today's feature interview guest. Mark and I will be discussing this week's upside breakout in the US Dollar Index above recent cycle highs, the European banking system and Deutsche Bank in particular, the Chinese online retail market, the oil and gas industry outlook, and much more.
I think you're really going to enjoy Mark's views, as many of them sharply contrast those expressed by other guests that we've had on the program in recent weeks.
Aaron Chan: And I'm Aaron Chan. Before we even move on to equity markets, I'd like to start with your comments on a bizarre event last Friday. Now, just hours after we taped last week's show, the British pound sterling crashed by 6% against the US dollar in less than 2 minutes. Now, this occurred in the Asian trading session early Friday morning. Erik, what is the significance of this event?
Erik Townsend: I think it has huge significance, and I'm disappointed. You know, we've gotten to the point of complacency where you can have $10 trillion of negative-yielding sovereign debt around the world that makes zero sense, and everybody thinks it's normal now. You have financial markets that go up in reaction to bad economic news because they assume that that means more accommodation is coming. So, we've turned the price signal upside down. And now we've gotten to the point where there's a major flash crash. Everybody's like, oh, Flash crashes, everybody's used to those by now. We've been having them for years.
Aaron Chan: No big deal.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, no big deal. And, you know, the reality of the situation is that high-frequency trading has driven the human liquidity providers out of the system. And as a result, regulators are basically ill-equipped. It's impossible for regulators. They don't have the tools to analyze what high-frequency trading algorithms are doing in, you know, nanosecond time intervals.
What happens though is because the human liquidity providers are no longer there, when the high-frequency trading algorithms panic and think something is wrong, they pull all their bids and suddenly the liquidity evaporates from the market. And that's what happened here. Now we're not talking about Thai baht priced in, I don't know, Swiss francs.
Dollar pound is probably the Second or third most liquid market on Earth. And currencies in general are famously very liquid. They're one of the few things— the reason they're preferred by the really big macro hedge funds is that they can absorb billions of dollars of capital in a single trade without moving the needle too much.
This was a case— it did admittedly happen during thinly traded Asian trading hours, but, you know, maybe it started with a fat finger, who knows? But 6% in 2 minutes, that's not supposed to be possible. Right. And you know, it got lots of attention for like a day or so, and it seems to have been forgotten. And it just blows my mind. We've gotten to a point where markets are just not sound anymore. And at some point, I think this whole high-frequency trading thing, you know, all the machines are going to shut off one day. There's going to be no liquidity, and we're going to have a major systemic event result from it. And it's not like we haven't seen plenty of evidence of the problem. And you know, I don't think it's so much that regulators are failing to respond. They don't have the ability and expertise to respond.
They don't know what to do. So I think it's a big deal.
Aaron Chan: The S&P 500 has shown some weakness in the wake of the presidential debate, and a key technical support level was violated this morning, albeit only briefly and on an intraday basis, when S&P futures plunged briefly to 2,107 before rebounding. Now, E-mini S&P futures closed on Thursday at 2,126. So, Erik, what's your outlook for the stock market here?
Erik Townsend: Well, as far as violating that key technical level, it happened on an On an intraday basis, we did close, as you said, at 2126. So I don't think we've seen it yet. I wouldn't be surprised if it's coming, though. What really shocked me, though, is how little volatility we had during and since the presidential debate. The first debate, we had a huge amount of volatility. Futures markets were trading. E-mini S&P futures were up and down almost every time somebody seemed to score a point in the debate. And we only saw 2 or 3 points of up and down during the whole debate, which really caught me by surprise. The other thing that's, I think, very interesting Interesting thing is there was, as far as I'm concerned, a very clear correlation pattern where if Hillary was starting to win or score a point in some way, markets were up. If Donald was winning points, markets were down. That correlation seems to have gone.
I think just about everybody would agree, even Donald's most staunch supporters would have to agree that Hillary has certainly won the rhetoric contest for the last few days with this tape coming out about Donald from 11 years ago on Friday. You would think maybe there would be some upside as a result of that. The opposite has been true. And we've also seen quite a bit, just from the transaction volume on S&P puts, that it looks like the smart money, the institutional money, is buying a lot of hedging downside risk. So despite Hillary doing better, it seems the Hillary is a shoo-in equals market races higher, that's been forgotten. So I think that's very interesting. It's really a question, though, of what happens from here. Mark Yusko is going to have some very interesting views about where this equity market is headed, so let's just save it for his interview coming up in just a few minutes.
Aaron Chan: Let's stay on the election for a minute. We announced last week that our policy will be to ask our guests and ourselves to refrain from espousing our personal political views, but to instead comment objectively on what various political outcomes could mean for markets. So, Erik, any update to your view since last week?
Erik Townsend: Well, certainly, as I said, the Hillary win equals big upside for markets. It seems like that's That sentiment has faded. I feel that there's kind of a Brexit déjà vu here, and what I mean by that is, although the polls very clearly show in the last few days that Hillary has shot ahead, Trump is not looking good at all as a result of last Friday's sexual comments and so forth that he made in a recording from 11 years ago, everybody seems to be saying, okay, you know, it's next to impossible for Trump to win yet. I think it's very foolish to assume that. Look at how much has changed A lot can change in a week. We have a few weeks to go. We don't know how much more WikiLeaks has in terms of dirt on Hillary that they're going to release.
We don't know how this could be turned around. And I'll give you a hypothetical example. And again, I stress it's hypothetical. It's not a prediction. But there have been rumors circulating for the last couple of days that it may have actually been Ryan's staff who leaked this tape about Donald Trump for the purpose of sabotaging his campaign. Now, if that were proven true, and I don't believe that it has been proven true yet, But if that were proven true, and Trump came back swinging and said to his supporters, look, look at what's going on. They made a spectacle in the beginning of the primary debates. They had everybody raise their hand except for me saying, I swear I will support the Republican nominee. They all raised their hand. Now they're turning against me because the establishment is so wrong. It's about us, the American people, fighting the establishment. And then reaching out to Bernie supporters and saying, Look at how Bernie got screwed.
Hillary stole the nomination in the primary from Bernie. We've got to do something. And, you know, he pulls off a landslide. I'm certainly not predicting that. I think it's very unlikely at this stage. But my point is simply, this game ain't over until it's over. Anything is still possible.
What I do see, if you want to know the real outlier— again, not a prediction. I think it's unlikely to happen. But the outlier that would be the catalyst that could set global financial markets into utter chaos would be if we go into election night just as we did for Brexit, where the polls are pretty darn clear within the margin of error that's been calculated. It's just pretty much a shoo-in that Hillary is gonna win, and then Donald manages to pull off some kind of unexpected landslide victory because a whole bunch of swing voters changed their mind or were affected by the last weekend's rhetoric from Donald or whatever.
If there were an unexpected Donald upset, I think it's almost a certainty that there would be calls from Hillary's side of this to declare the election, blaming the Russians as being fixed in Donald's favor. There was Russian hackers. Clearly, the polls showed that this wasn't supposed to happen. We have to declare the election results invalid, and President Obama has to stay in office until a new election can be organized. Even if If they only stay stuck for— remember how crazy things got in the 2000 election when it wasn't really clear between Gore and Bush with the vote count in Florida and so forth. If there's even a week worth of President Obama saying, we're going to not necessarily accept these election results until we do some more investigation as to whether Russian hackers were behind it, I think you could have a massive eruption of political unrest, violence, and utter chaos. in markets.
Again, that is absolutely not a prediction, folks. Don't put those words in my mouth. What I'm saying is we have ingredients where anything is possible. It ain't over until it's over, and I think it would be foolish just because Trump looks awful right now in the wake of this latest sex scandal. It doesn't mean Hillary's not going to look just as awful in the next Hillary scandal. This stuff has been changing every week. Who knows what next week is going to bring?
Aaron Chan: Yeah, Erik, I completely agree with you. And that last scenario you described is definitely, at least what I've been saying, is a non-zero probability. So definitely interesting to keep watching.
Aaron Chan: Now, before we move on to crude oil, I'd actually like to change our usual sequence of topics this week. Now, you're always saying that the US Dollar Index is so important because commodities like oil and gold are priced in dollars. So this week's upside breakout on the DXY, I guess it begs some discussion before we move on to oil and gold. So, Erik, is this the Is this the big movement or moment that you've been looking for? You and Raoul Pal and so many of our guests have predicted where the U.S. Dollar resumes its 2-plus-year rally in earnest.
Erik Townsend: Well, the short answer is it's too early to tell yet. The previous cycle high was around 97.50. I think the actual number was 97.48 or 97.49. We had a daily close above that yesterday, and then overnight we traded all the way up to 98.12. What that says to me is, okay, we've had the breakout above the previous cycle high. It has It hasn't really stayed above that level for long enough to constitute a confirmation. A very common pattern in technical analysis is you'll have a breakout and then it'll sort of fall back over and go back down to that key level.
The test is now, did what was previously a resistance level turn into a support level? And we have seen this afternoon the trade back down to 97.51, just 1/100th of a point away from where that technical level was, and it's starting to rebound off of that. Can it hold it? If we go back up above 98.12 and stay there for a few days, I would say, okay, that's when you declare the breakout has happened and the bull case for the dollar is on. We haven't seen enough yet. This could be a false breakout, and certainly a daily close below 97.50 would be cause for concern that that may have been what happened here. It does look like the beginning of it, and I would add that because Gold has also been weak. It tends to confirm the idea that we may be on the cusp of this dollar index rally taking off from here, as so many people have predicted.
Fortunately, we've got a fantastic guest coming up. Mark Yusko is going to have an opposing view, so stay tuned for that.
Aaron Chan: Okay, finally, on to crude oil. Rumors about an OPEC production freeze deal seem to come and go every day. So, what's the outlook for crude oil here?
Erik Townsend: Well, as I've said before, I think the OPEC deal remains irrelevant from a real-world supply-demand standpoint, but a lot of people are buying it anyway. And hey, this spring we saw $10 of upside as a result of the Doha freeze talk, even though it really didn't mean anything as far as I was concerned. So anything's possible here.
Let's go back to the hard numbers though. Inventory, 4.9 million barrel crude oil build this week. Finally, a build. So it's tempting for me to declare victory or save face, as the case may be, and say, okay, finally the big string of inventory builds that Art Berman and I predicted is coming true or starting to come true.
Honestly, folks, we have to throw the view that Art Berman and I discussed on the Labor Day weekend show out the window at this point. Even if this is the beginning of a series of really big inventory builds, it's going to be too little, too late. The thesis One of the risks that we discussed then is if you had a series of builds through September and October, then by the time you got to fall refinery maintenance season, when the refineries are unable to process as much crude oil, that could have led to a storage crisis and a real big price drop. That ain't gonna happen, folks, because if— even if we had 5 weeks in a row of, you know, 5 million barrel weekly builds like we had this week, that would just offset the huge draws that we had for the last 5 weeks. We'd be back to where we started. So, we're not gonna have that. That storage crisis.
What remains to be seen is do we see more builds on inventory? This one, a 5 million barrel build in a single week, seems like a big deal.
But when you look at the rest of the numbers, Cushing, 1.3 million barrel drawdown. Cushing is most important for the price of West Texas Intermediate crude oil. It's going in the other direction. Gasoline, 2 million barrel drawdown. Distillates, 3.7 million barrel drawdown. Now, without a doubt, I'm sure that hurricane influences had to do with those big draws on finished products. But at the end of the day, you've got 5.6 million barrels of finished products drawn down, 5 million barrels or 4.9 million barrels of crude oil built. You know, it's almost a wash in terms of total inventory effect or net inventory effect. So I don't think that there was really huge news. And certainly the market action, you know, on that 4.9 million barrel headline, the market just fell off a cliff, down a dollar in the first few minutes. But then it retraced fully, actually more than fully within the next hour. And we're trading now higher than when that data came out.
Check it out. Art Berman has a new report out speculating that stocks have actually been overstated due to some fuzzy accounting practices at the EIA. There is a link in your Research Roundup email for registered users at MacroVoices.com where you can find that article. And, you know, it was— it occurs to me, during that period where we had all of those unexpected builds in inventory, everybody was ridiculing API, the American Petroleum Institute, which reports its data a day before the government report because it seems like API was getting it all wrong. Well, if Art was right and they've been overstating the government data, it's interesting that during those same weeks API was actually expecting drawdowns and then we got builds in the government data. Maybe even though everyone ridiculed API for being wrong, maybe they had it right all along.
I did speak to Art. He says that he thinks that the recent series of drawdowns may just be adjustments and it may not reflect a real change in actual inventories. So it's definitely a moving target in terms of inventory numbers. Bottom line on this, I think, as far as where we are, probably I think we're pretty much out of room here. We're back up to that high level we saw in June. If there is more talk, and particularly if OPEC and Russia talk about cutting, not just freezing, but cutting production, which is not what's on the table right now, that could certainly propel prices much higher. But I don't see a big move up from here unless we get that kind of consideration out of Russia and OPEC.
Aaron Chan: Got it. Gold has been treading water since we spoke last week, trading at about $1,259 on Thursday afternoon. So what's the update on the yellow metal, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's, as you say, treading water. And the way I'm looking at this is we're seeing what may be the beginnings of a significant upside breakout in the dollar index. We don't know that yet. So I think it's a hurry-up-and-wait moment here. If the If that dollar index rally continues, and especially if we were to see a closing print above 98.12, which is the intraday high so far, that would say to me the dollar-up story is on, and I would expect further weakness in gold as a result.
I think also that there's a pretty good argument to be made that the Fed needs to get one more rate hike in before the end of the calendar year, not because it makes economic sense to do so, because it is a credibility and face-saving They've signaled so many times that there would be at least one more rate hike this year. So, I think a token rate hike before Christmas is a distinct possibility, and I think that would result in a down spike in the price of gold, and that would probably be an excellent buying opportunity. So, I don't want to line up too many dominoes here. We have to wait and see what happens with the dollar index breakout, or perhaps false breakout. If it turns out to be a false breakout and the dollar index rolls over, maybe it's time to buy gold while you've still got the chance before the price goes back up above $1,300.
But if we see the dollar index rally continue, I think there's going to be more weakness in gold and the buying opportunity will probably come at the end of the year, especially if we see that rate hike.
Aaron Chan: Got it. Now, for the last few weeks, we've been reflecting on your decision not to buy the dip as you'd originally planned by buying 10-year Treasury futures when the yield briefly topped 1.70% about a month Well, guess what? Last week you had a second chance at 1.70% again, but you were quick to pass, and you sure got that one right with 10-year prices dipping this week to the point that the yield topped 1.82% earlier this week. So you and Raoul definitely got the call right. 1.70% was not the top in yields as many people expected. So what's next from here?
Erik Townsend: You know, I don't know, and I don't think anybody does. We did see at least 1.82%. I saw that number go across my screen. Probably there was higher than that on an intraday basis, and I didn't even see it. We're back down to 1.74% right now. So, was the 1.82% the top, or is it still going to go to 2%?
I don't know. But in general, while Raoul's scenario of a move up to 2% and then back down below 1%, it seems entirely realistic, but it depends on a recession in order to make sense. And I don't know for sure that we're going to see that recession, although I certainly think that there's a strong likelihood that we're headed into a recession in the next 6 months. I haven't seen it yet. So, I also think that Jeff Gundlach's argument is very good.
If we get to sub-1% yields on the 10-year, which is Raoul's scenario, that's where I think the real opportunity lies. It's time to go short there because, yeah, it can go from 1% to 50 basis points. But, you know, how much farther does it go and how long are you going to make money on the other side of this when the trend eventually does top out and reverse and being short Treasuries is the place to be? So I don't think I'm going to try to chase the long side of this trade, but I also do not think it's time to go short here. I think it's time to see if that recession plays out and we do get sub-1% 10-year yields to look for the strategic entry opportunity for a long-term strategic short position. Right now, I'm just sitting on the sidelines.
Aaron Chan: Great. Thanks for the market update, Erik. Mark Yusko ran the Notre Dame and then University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill's endowment funds before going on to found Morgan Creek Erik's interview with Mr. Yusko is coming up as MacroVoices continues, right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me as today's featured guest is Mark Yusko from Morgan Creek Capital. And Mark, I've really been looking forward to this interview because frankly, as you know, the worst thing that can happen is to sit around with people who agree with you completely and I think it's important to have a lot of guests on the program recently that have agreed with a lot of my views, and I much prefer someone with some contrasting views.
So along those lines, let's start with the U.S. dollar. So many of our guests have taken the view I've had that the U.S. dollar rally is probably set to resume. And of course, this week it looks like we may be seeing the beginning of that with a breakout above 97.50 on a closing basis, trading as high as 98.12 briefly in the overnight session. I think you have a different view. I have a different view on the dollar. So I'm actually buying dollar futures this week. I'm guessing you would tell me I should be selling them. How do you see this US dollar situation?
Mark Yusko: No, I would indeed. And, you know, one of the things I like to live by is that if 2 people always have the same opinion, one is unnecessary. So my big thing is to always try to be necessary. But I actually do have a very differentiated view on the dollar. You know, we think the dollar has peaked. We think the dollar peaked for this cycle. We think historically the dollar peaks when the Fed raises rates. The Fed raised last December, so we think the dollar peaked right around the November-December time period last year. It's actually been dead money here really for 18 months.
If you're a technician, it's created a gigantic bear flag and looks like it's getting ready to break down pretty hard. But my, my view is, is really more of a fundamental view. I think I think that the dollar is due for a long, slow deterioration away from its dominant position as the only world reserve currency.
And I think that really came to light here with the ascendancy of the renminbi into the SDR, which is now a reserve currency.
The dollar is still the world reserve currency, but the renminbi has the long-term plan, and I think it's got its sights set on— China. The dollar long term as well. So, longer, longer discussion. But I think, you know, there's a lot of also, I think, misplaced belief that the Fed's going to raise and maybe even raise dramatically, which is going to be good for the dollar.
I think nothing could be further from the truth. I think the Fed won't raise this year or even next year. I think they are going to be faced with a recession in the US. And pretty tough to raise interest rates into that recession. So, and then on top of that, my biggest reason for, for a lower dollar is just the decline of petrodollars.
More and more transactions are occurring not in dollars. Chinese and the Russians are now doing oil and gas trades directly in renminbi. There's other countries around the world that are skipping the translation into dollars. And that hegemony that, that was the dollar being the only trade currency for oil and gas, I think, is gone.
And then you can throw on top of it just the fact that global trade is declining. We've got this rise of populism and isolationism and protectionism all the way back to Smoot-Hawley, 1930s. So I think there's a lot— there's gonna be a lot of pressure, and a lot of global trade is denominated in dollars, and there's gonna be less demand.
Erik Townsend: And I think that plays very nicely into our next topic, which is the equity market. And you wrote a piece, I think it was earlier this spring, called 2000 all over again. And it definitely resonates for me. But the problem I have with, with this market is so many smart people, whether it's George Soros or Stan Druckenmiller, or recently we had Ray Dalio out saying the credit cycle is over. So many people are saying really bad things could be coming for this equity market. But I've felt like it was overpriced for a few years now, and I kept being proven wrong.
Mark Yusko: Yep.
Erik Townsend: So what do you think it is about right now that maybe is the turning point where finally these crazy equity valuations come back down to earth?
Mark Yusko: Well, I don't think you're wrong at all. I mean, we have been overvalued for a number of years, right? That's fact. Now, we haven't had the correction that people have been predicting. And, and, you know, I've probably been in that camp. I was probably a year early. I thought last year we would see a recession. And then about mid-year last year, I kind of bumped it out a year and said, okay, the Fed really is committed to— well, not just the Fed, all central banks really are committed to this liquidity parade, so pushed it out here to 2016, '17, which actually lines up better. And, you know, I tweet a lot at @MarkYusko, and my thing is #2000.2.0.
And the reason I think it's going to play out very similar to 2000, 2001, 2002 is 2000, we had the highest equity valuations in history. Today, we're at the second highest in history.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Mark Yusko: Actually, if you break out the median PE, it actually is even higher than 2000. In 2000, we had a very narrow part of the market in technology and TMT that was really, really crazy, and everything else wasn't bad. In fact, there were places that were downright cheap. Small-cap stocks were cheap, REITs were cheap. Today, there's nothing cheap. I mean, we call this the everything bubble. Bonds are expensive, stocks are expensive, stocks across all industries are expensive. I mean, there are some stupid stocks. Yeah. Stuff like consumer discretionary and the low volatility names. I love to pick on ExxonMobil. You know, for 40 years, ExxonMobil's PE has been 12. And because of these crazy low vol ETFs that just buy without thinking— I love the fact they call them smart beta, which is a total oxymoron.
I mean, it's like jumbo shrimp. Beta can't be smart. It's rule-based. It's dumb by definition. So they've bid up ExxonMobil to 35 times PE. So you're absolutely correct. There's no question that that is overvalued. You know, there's no way they can grow into that valuation.
And so it's got to correct. The question is when. And so every smart person I know that manages their own money, whether it's George Soros or Julian Robertson or Jeremy Grantham, who I had coffee with yesterday in Boston, every single Every single one of them is flushed with cash. Seth Klarman, I just wrote a long letter called The Value of Value about Seth Klarman, and he's up over 50%. Warren Buffett's up over in the mid-50% in cash. Everybody has a lot of cash that really cares about their capital.
And the only people I hear talking about stock market going to new highs are people who are managing other people's money. And it just doesn't make any sense to me. In fact, a year ago, July I put out a thought experiment out on Twitter, and I said, if you went to cash today, and you avoided— you're going to miss the last 10% of the bubble top, and then you're going to avoid the down 38% to 40% normal correction, because that's a normal correction.
How would you— why would you be less off? You'd have $1 instead of $0.68. And everybody blistered me saying, oh my gosh, the market's going to go up so much from Well, it peaked at up 6% from last July. Now it's back to only up 2%, and after today, it might be back to flat.
So, I just don't think there's a lot of downside in holding a lot of cash here. And very similar to 2000, 2001, 2002— 2000, the market was only down 9%. 2001, the recession started, down another 12%. It was 2002 where the big downdraft happened, down 22%. And I think the same thing will play out here. The recession next year in '17.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Mark Yusko: You know, double-digit down year, but the real down year is when after all the debt blowups occur in the energy space from that massive debt bubble that was created a couple years ago.
Erik Townsend: I think that's an excellent prediction and an excellent thesis, but let me just play devil's advocate here. Let's suppose what you describe starts, and I think that your logic is extremely well-placed, and things start to look like 2000 all over again. What it seems to me is different now is central banks have not the slightest bit of hesitation about just throwing everything, including the kitchen sink, at propping up asset markets. So the question I ask myself is, what's to stop them from conjuring a few more trillion out of thin air and using it to prop up asset markets? And, you know, the one thing that occurs to me, at some point we're going to hit runaway inflation, and that shuts the game down. But until we get to that point, what stops the central banks from just printing a few trillion more and solving the problem?
Mark Yusko: Well, you know, it's such a great question and really important. And I think what's interesting about it is we have to look at what's actually happening versus what these central bankers say. They are really, really good at jawboning. You know, Mario Draghi, you know, whatever it takes, except he hardly ever does anything. In fact, you know, the problem that he faces Is he's now out of bonds to buy, and he can't do anything else. He can't buy equities. He can't buy ETFs like Japan. Same thing with the US. The US hasn't expanded their balance sheet for 18 months. Surprise, surprise, the stock market's flat for 18 months. Hmm, there must be a correlation there. Well, the reason that the ECB and the Fed are on the sidelines is they literally just ran out of stuff to buy.
And by law, they are not allowed to buy ETFs and REITs like they are in Japan. So the Bank of Japan has been trying to keep the party going. But let's look at the facts. Bank of Japan has been expanding their— they're not expanding their bond buying. Again, they ran out of bonds to buy because they're up to like 38% of all the JGBs. But they did run out— they didn't run out of ETFs to buy. They're up to 50% of the ETF market. And they said, oh, take it up to $2,000 But what's happened in the Japanese stock market in the last year? Down 20%.
What happened to the European stock market since the ECB started buying corporate bonds? It's down 20%.
So I think the faith in central banks' ability to conjure value is dissipating. And I think, you know, for the first time I think ever, someone said this morning, the Fed used the word credibility in the minutes, and they used it 4 times.
Erik Townsend: Wow.
Mark Yusko: And you can't lose credibility if you never had credibility. So, I think we are at that bang point that people have talked about for many years, where central bank is out of tricks, and now gravity is going to come back and take over, and people are going to have to— I grew up in the time of the Road Runner cartoon, and Wile E. Coyote ran off the edge of the cliff. And he stood there suspended in midair until he looked down, and then he fell. So I think, I think the markets are about to look down and see there's a lot of air underneath them.
Erik Townsend: Okay, well, it certainly could be a crazy ride. Let's move over to the European banking system. Our mutual friend Raoul Pal and I talked about this, and Raoul has been, as you know, very outspoken in saying that Deutsche Bank has been a canary in a coal mine for a long time, and he stopped short of saying that this is the Lehman moment for Europe, but he said it could be. And I think you have a very different view that perhaps Deutsche Bank is actually a value play as a buy here. So tell us why you see it so differently.
Mark Yusko: Well, Raoul's a good friend, and again, we are— we have some very spirited debates, and we agree on most everything. But on occasion, you know, whether it's on the dollar or whether it's on Deutsche Deutsche. And actually, I'm not sure that we disagree that much on Deutsche. I think, you know, he, he has a couple other banks that he thinks really are in bad shape and probably go away over in Europe. The problem for Deutsche is it is Germany, right? There's— comparing it to Lehman, I think, is so comical.
I can't stand it. I mean, Lehman was an also-ran investment bank in the United States, did not matter to anybody except Dick Fuld And maybe some shareholders that got taken out, but it was not systematic or central to the US economy, and it wasn't worthy of being saved.
Deutsche Bank, on the other hand, there's no question it is too big to fail. There's no question that it will be supported, but even more importantly, and I've been talking about this for a while, and it appears that maybe I have That, you know, the little birdie that talked to me about it was, was right in that it wasn't even going to have to be the German government that stepped up because Deutsche is an incredibly valuable asset.
When people compare the leverage ratios of Lehman and Bear to Deutsche, it just means they don't understand bank accounting and they don't understand the difference between European banks that keep all the housing lending on their balance sheet as opposed to pawning it off to phony and fraudy Fannie and Freddie like they do in the US. So you can't compare leverage ratios in Europe to leverage ratios in the US, because they don't have the GS— the GSEs. So, you know, the thing about Deutsche is it's such a valuable franchise and such a valuable asset that you just saw, you know, the Qatari royal family saying, you know, they'll think about increasing their, their amount.
My conspiracy theory on this was actually that, that the Chinese were artificially pushing down the price of Deutsche, kind of spreading the rumors so they could come in and buy the whole thing really cheap and, and really just own the European banking market. But it looks like there's gonna be a battle between the Middle East wealth and the Chinese wealth, and we'll see who wins. But I think that's why Merkel was able to back away and say, we're not gonna bail them out, and appease the voters, because she's on the edge with her constituency, and they don't want to hear about bailing out the rich banks.
But I think it's going to be not a government bailout, but a, you know, real money coming in and liquefying the assets, kind of the same way the Japanese did with the US banks like Morgan Stanley and Goldman Sachs.
Erik Townsend: That's still kind of a grim picture for Germans, though. I mean, if you think about rephrasing what you just said, don't worry, we, the German government, don't have to bail out Deutsche Bank because our entire banking system is about to be acquired by either Saudis or Chinese. We're just not sure which one.
If I was a German citizen, I might be uncomfortable with the idea that my country's banking system was being bought out by foreigners. Do you think that this creates—
Mark Yusko: Well, absolutely.
Erik Townsend: I mean, does that create another risk in terms of Europe and Merkel's reelectability and so forth?
Mark Yusko: You know, look, I think it would be hard, although not impossible, because it seems to me voting constituents are possible and capable of anything these days. But it seems pretty tough to make the leap that Ms. Merkel is responsible for the bad banking system in the EU, and particularly Deutsche Bank, since she's not a board member and doesn't run the bank.
But clearly, everyone wants to blame the president or the chancellor for everything these days. It's really quite astonishing how populism has really grown. I agree with you that you could see that type of backlash, but at the end of the day, economics, I believe, wins. And, you know, when it comes down to, you know, what's in the best interest of the citizenry, is it better to have the bank fail and have them have to have higher taxes to bail it out, or worse, do a bail-in where they actually just start stealing people's deposits? I think given the choices of a foreign-owned owner, or, you know, spending your own money to bail out, you know, the people that made the bad loans?
I think they'll choose the former than the latter, would be my guess.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's keep the trip around the world rolling here over to Asia. You've recently been in the press with— actually, you and Jim Chanos having opposite views on Alibaba. But I'd like to take a step back from that specific discussion before we get into Alibaba in specific. And just help me get my head around this Chinese middle class and online retail in China? Because on the one hand, it seems like obviously China is huge. The size of that country is between 1.3 and 1.6 billion people. They're not sure. So what they call a rounding error is the entire population of the United States. But at the same time, you know, they're not as rich as the United States. They have a much higher percentage of disposable income that just goes to food. So I'm trying to get my head Around what is the scope of the Chinese middle class?
How much of an online retail market is there really?
Mark Yusko: We could talk all day about this. I mean, I think the most exciting opportunities on the planet are in Chinese consumer patterns shifting and becoming a consumer economy. E-commerce and healthcare are the 2 biggest beneficiaries of that. And I said we could, we could talk all day about just myriad examples of tremendous, tremendous opportunities. You know, just little things like JD.com, you know, which is essentially the Amazon of China, you know, is a 66x return for us in one of our private investments with a firm here in New York. I mean, just the scale and scope is just massive.
750 million people in China have bought something in the past year using e-commerce. That's more than the common— that's more than the combined population of the US and Europe. So it is by far the largest consumer market on the planet and will be for the next decade until it's surpassed by India, which will probably surpass it probably 10, 15 years from now. But the Chinese e-commerce market, according to McKinsey, is going to grow 26% per year compounded for the next 10 years. The The global component of e-commerce is going to grow 52%.
So plug in 1.52 to the 10th power into your HP-12C— that's a calculator for all the youngsters that have never seen one— and you get 66, which means the market for e-commerce is going to be 66 times larger 10 years from now than it is today. So it's just an enormous, enormous opportunity.
I hate to think that I am that guy that just disagrees with everybody, but I'm not disagreeing with Jim. Jim believes that there's some shady accounting going on at Alibaba. And given how accounting rules work, I think most accounting is shady, the difference between GAAP and non-GAAP and all the things that go on. And we've heard all kinds of stories in the US over the years, Enron and WorldCom and all kinds of shady accounting. So, is there some shady accounting in China? There probably is.
But one thing I am certain of with Alibaba is that it is the largest e-commerce company. It is dominant in so many markets. Heck, their mobile payments business is worth a huge amount higher than it's currently valued. This thing they've done, Ant Financial, has got huge potential. They started a money market account a couple of years ago, and in 6 months, months raised over $8 billion in a money market account. I mean, it became the 3rd largest money market account in the world in a matter of months. It's just the power and the scale and the scope of the network effect.
And I was kind of disappointed on Monday, Paul Romer didn't win the Nobel Prize, although it was funny, NYU actually accidentally released a test page on their website saying that he did, because they wanted to be ready just in case that he did. And he probably will next year or the year after. But this guy, you know, he has this theory called the theory of increasing returns. And basically what it says is, as the larger— as a network grows larger, it becomes exponentially more valuable, and you actually get higher profits. Most people think when there's more competition, you get less profits, but the actual opposite happens.
And then the last thing that favors China is they don't allow the large US companies to compete in China. They like their national champions. You've got the BAT, Baidu, Alibaba, and Tencent, but now you're starting to see new businesses pop up. We just invested in one that's going to create the largest food distribution company in China, because they're not going to let Sysco, S-Y-S-C-O into China.
I think we'll make probably 10, 15 times our money over the next decade decade by, you know, helping to build this company that delivers food to restaurants? Because I'm not sure of a lot, but I am certain that they're going to eat out more in China over the next decade, 2 decades, 3 decades.
And then the last thing I'll leave you with on this point is, if you look over the last 50 years in the United States, 5 sectors have dominated: consumer retail, consumer staples, technology, healthcare, and alternative energy. Those same 5 sectors are going to dominate China over the next 4 decades. And it's going to be the greatest consumptive boom that the world has ever seen when you combine India and China, or Chindia, as I like to call it. Just the opportunities are so vast and so amazing. I just can't get enough of it.
Erik Townsend: You started to mention India. Let's zoom out even further than that to just look at emerging markets in general. A lot of people who have been bearish emerging markets are bearish because of their strong dollar bullish views. So I would imagine not having that view. Do you have more of a bullish outlook for emerging markets in general across Asia and around the world?
Mark Yusko: Yeah, we've been bullish emerging markets all year and have been overweight, not overweight enough given that it's, you know, those markets are up 16%, 17%, and some of them like Brazil are up close to 70%, 7-0%. Yeah, we missed that one a little bit. We, we did not think that they actually would impeach Dilma, and they did. So good for them, because that was, that was a necessary step. And, and now we think the upside in Brazil probably continues for a while.
But we love the emerging markets story. You know, I'm a big believer in demographics, and demographics is destiny. And I also am a big believer in Willie Sutton syndrome. You know, they asked Willie Sutton years ago, why do you rob banks? And he said, well, it's where they keep the money. So, you know, where's the growth? You invest in equities for growth. Where's the growth? It's in emerging markets.
And, you know, again, demographics is destiny in the sense that over the next 75 years, we know that 1 in 3 people in Europe will disappear. We know that the US will stay flat. We know that Africa will grow by 2 billion people. Nigeria will go from 150 million people to 450 million people. So frontier markets are even more exciting than emerging markets. emerging markets.
But we really like the stories in India and China. We like the story in Brazil and other parts of Latin America. Take a company like MercadoLibre, which is an online company formed in Argentina, just created the first post-Macri billionaire in Argentina. Argentina is a story. In fact, if I were 26 and unmarried, neither of which I am, I might move to BA today. I think Argentina is going to be just an unbelievable story over the next couple decades with great leadership, great assets, and only 13% equitization, meaning equity value to GDP, whereas the U.S. is 126%, way overvalued. Average is about 70% around the world. So, we go down through a list of other countries. We even like Russia because assets are cheap. We think the retail story is quite astonishing there because it's the largest retail market in Europe, and that the retail stocks there have been beat up.
I think the big fear about emerging markets is currency and the dollar. Again, since we don't think the dollar is rising, we think that that's a tailwind for emerging markets, not a headwind. And the other thing that people forget is in anticipation of the dollar rally from '14 continuing, investors around the world crushed EM currencies back in '14, '15. I mean, absolutely crushed them down 30%, 40%, 50%, 60%.
And so now that the dollar has been dead, I mean, the dollar's been flat for 18 months, people are saying, whoa, wait a second, emerging market currencies already went down, maybe they don't need to go down as much. So now they've been rallying, which is part of the reason, you know, that Brazil's up so much is the real has had a huge rally this year. So, you know, are there risks? Sure. You know, if the world goes into a massive currency devaluation war, you know, emerging market currencies will participate too. But I do think that the growth will bail them out.
Whereas I think in the developed world, you have the killer Ds. You have bad demographics, you have too much debt, and you have persistent deflation. In the emerging markets, you have great demographics, you don't have a lot of debt, and you have actually inflation. And it's the good kind of inflation, the low and stable. So, you know, we think it's a great story. We think there's lots of money to be made.
Erik Townsend: Moving on to oil and gas, you were one of the first people to call for $30 oil back when that prediction was considered utterly insane. I think you were laughed out of the room when you first said it way back whenever that was. And of course, you were proven exactly right.
So, you know, it's probably worth touching briefly on the short-term picture. We've got talk about an OPEC freeze supposedly next month. I'm curious about your comments on that. But more importantly, big picture, it sounds like you feel that the bottom is in and it's time to be buying energy. Is that right?
Mark Yusko: Kinda, kinda. I do think the bottom is in. I think $26.21 in February was, was as low as we're going to see for this cycle. But I don't think we need to rush out and get super long because I don't think oil is going back to I know there are a lot of people, you know, this morning, all the chatter about, oh, $60 is the new $50, and it'll be $70 by next year.
And Pierre Andurand, who I have incredible respect for and think he's the axe in oil, I think is maybe even a little bit aggressive. But I hate to disagree with him. And our view is pretty simple in that if you look at what caused the decline it was a supply shock. It was not a demand shock. And, and everyone's been trying to apply these demand shock models from the last 40 years and not recognizing that it was a supply shock like OPEC back in, in the '70s.
And so the difference is that Saudi made a decision, and I think a bad decision, but they made a decision essentially to abdicate their role as swing producer in an attempt to try to kill off American shale.
And what they didn't count on was the technological wizardry, which is really what it is. I mean, we have some private investments, you know, what used to take 2 months to drill a well, they're doing in 11 days. I mean, it's just absolutely extraordinary what's happened, you know, by fracking, by using more sand in your fracks, you're doubling the output without, you know, any additional or with very little additional cost because sand is pretty cheap.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Mark Yusko: So lots of additional supply is going to come on anytime oil gets much above $50. So we think we're going to be stuck in this kind of trading range between $40 and $60 for a while. I think the idea of an OPEC freeze— again, there's another oxymoron. You know, OPEC hasn't been able to agree to not cheat for as long as it's been in existence, for 60 years or something, 50 years. So I don't know how they're going to start In fact, it's so funny. It's like everybody said, no freeze, no freeze, no freeze. Let us get our own production up to as high as we possibly can. So Saudi got theirs up to records, Russia got theirs up to records, and then they said, okay, now we'll do a freeze.
And Iran is basically saying, screw you guys, we're not going to freeze. We finally got the ability to pump again. So I think it's a lot of sound, very little fury. I don't think anybody's really paying much attention to it long-term. I think short-term, you know, traders had a field day with it. We got a little rally last week, but I just don't see it happening. I don't see Saudi even participating. I really don't. I think what Saudi Arabia figured out 2 years ago is their enemy is not the other OPEC members. Their enemy is not shale. Their enemy is solar.
We are only 6 doublings away from having enough solar power to power everything that we need on the planet. What that means is Swanson's Law says the power of solar doubles every 2 years. So we are 6 doublings away from having enough to power everything. We don't need oil. Now, that's probably not going to happen, because there's a lot of entrenched uses for oil. But I do think that Saudi thought they had a 200-year asset. Now they think they have a 20-year asset, and they're trying to figure out ways to diversify their economy.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Mark Yusko: And not be so reliant on oil.
So, I think there's a whole different game that's being played, and oil is just one piece of it. But yeah, I, you know, we, we do like longs in the best basins in the US, you know, the Permian Basin and the SCOOP stack in Oklahoma. We think the companies there are killing it, and they're making lots of money, and they're good things to own. But I wouldn't rush out and buy oil futures. Okay.
Erik Townsend: Okay. I want to ask you a particular question. I couldn't agree possibly more with everything that you said, particularly around OPEC just not being able to agree with itself. But I can't help but think, you know, if OPEC and Russia jointly agreed to just a 5% production cut and actually did it, actually honored their agreement, that would totally stabilize the market. We'd be back to $90 oil, and OPEC and Russia would all have more revenue, not less, as a result of the cut.
What would it take, or is it possible culturally, for them to see that and to take those steps?
Mark Yusko: Well, I think you're, you're 100% right. We'd have $90 oil for, you know, a few months, because it would take a few months for the shale to crank it back up and, you know, put all those DUCs, those drilled but uncompleted wells, back online and, and, you know, drill some more long laterals and increase the production.
So, I do think it would be short-lived, but you're absolutely right. It could definitely happen. I mean, and even— the funny thing is, it's like the Fed. They wouldn't even have to do anything. All they have to do is say they were going to do it.
If they announced a million-barrel-a-day cut, oil prices would spike, and you'd have a short squeeze of epic proportions. So, what would it take? See, here's the funny thing. I have Yet to figure this one out personally, is I understand why Saudi realized that their 200-year asset was not worth as much as they thought. I got that part. To me, what they should have done is they should have announced the million-barrel-a-day cut back in Thanksgiving of 2014, kept oil prices at $100, quickly did an IPO, CEO of Aramco, banked that money and started building solar panels.
Instead, by not cutting, they let oil prices fall to as low as $26. And at $50 here, if you got 3% more market share, but you're selling at half the price, you have less revenue. It makes absolutely no sense to me, because they did have control back in '14. I think now the problem is they've lost that control.
And maybe what they realized is they'd lost the control in '14 too, and that shale was on the verge of this major breakout and was going to produce, you know, 11 or 12 million barrels a day. Maybe that's what they figured out.
Erik Townsend: Speaking of trends that make absolutely no sense whatsoever, you know, back in the day when things were normal, I always learned that you bought equities for capital appreciation and bonds for yield. It seems like somehow the, the new school of thinking has turned that around and people are actually looking at large-cap blue chips as a yield instrument, buying equities for yield, and focusing on bonds for capital appreciation because they think that there's, you know, further to go in lower interest rates. What could go wrong in this scenario?
Mark Yusko: Everything. Everything. It— the 2 things you just described, you know, bonds as equities and equities as bonds, I think have to be, in my lifetime, in my career, have to be the most dangerous things I've ever heard. I mean, other than maybe portfolio insurance was worse back in '87 when I first got in the business.
These are the most dangerous things. And this whole movement toward low volatility, high dividend ETFs, as I said, they've pushed ExxonMobil ExxonMobil to 35 times, absolutely ridiculous. They've pushed Hormel Foods and Campbell Soup to 20 times. These companies have negative unit growth. Their businesses are falling, and yet people are paying 20 times earnings like they're a growth stock because they pay a 3% dividend. It's absolutely insane, and people are going to lose 10 years of yield. Yeah. In a matter of months during the next correction.
Now, whether that correction lasts 3 months, 3 years, or maybe we're in a period where Jeremy Grantham's predicting that the market's— the real return on equities is going to be somewhere around 1% or 2% over the next— I'm sorry, negative 1% or 2% over the next— the real nominal around 0% to 1%.
The not— the real return is gonna be, you know, -2% over the next 7 to 10 years. Well, if that happens over 7 to 10 years, that's kind of the slow water torture. If it happens over 7 to 10 months, like a, you know, 2007, 2008, you know, that's kind of ugly. If it happens like 2000 to 2002 over 3 years, which is what I really think is going to happen, you know, that's ugly too. But you'll end up down 40%.
You lose 10, 12, 14 years of yield, and that's not a bond.
There's the thing that people forget, and I don't know why they forget it, is if you think about the nature of claims, bonds are contractual claims, right? If they don't pay you, you can sue them. Equities are a contingent claim. You only get money if everybody else is paid off.
And in some cases, the only way these companies are paying dividends is by borrowing money to pay out. So they're paying out more than their earnings. That is not sustainable. So I think it's an absolute nightmare waiting to happen.
Erik Townsend: Since you described it as the craziest thing you could think of, let me just try another crazy one by you, which is this trade that Raoul Pal told me about recently, which he says a lot of people have on in size, and they think it's a smart way to reach for yield.
And that is selling VIX in size, VIX futures, just because the contango is so steep that the carry you get from rolling that position supposedly enhances yield. And I said to Raoul, that's not picking up nickels in front of a steamroller. That's reaching under the steamroller to try to get the penny out. I mean, holy cow.
Mark Yusko: It's exactly— no, it's a great description, absolutely perfect description. You know, it's like, oh, I want one of those, you know, squished pennies that you get at the carnival, so I'll use the steamroller here and then I'll, yeah, I'll I'll put my hand right there. Yeah, really, really, really bad idea. But look, investment banks and broker-dealers and firms around the world, they exist to sell products to investors.
And they're gonna sell whatever they can possibly sell to charge a fee. And if people are willing to buy it, they will make more.
It's like the old Doritos commercial, go ahead and eat 'em, we'll make more. So, they don't really take a fiduciary view and say, boy, this is a really bad thing we're going to sell you. They say, hey, buyer beware. If you want to buy it, we'll sell it to you. So, I think that all of these trends tend toward the Minsky moment. I know some people don't like to use that term, but Hyman Minsky was a great economist, and it is true, right?
The absence of something creates its presence. The longer you go without a herd, hurricane, you know, eventually you're gonna have a big hurricane. The longer you go without volatility, you're gonna have big volatility. And we've, we've seen that in spades in the past. And it has in the past 3 years, because of this trend, you've seen this, this more erratic pattern of kind of buy the dips and, and, you know, the, the corrections that we think are here get truncated, and then they turn around fast and we get these rips back up.
But if you look over the last 18 months, those rips back up keep taking us to the same place, and we're making this big rounding top, and people are getting short volatility, and I think it's going to be a nightmare. And when you combine short volatility plus long these low-vol ETFs, when the cliff actually happens, I think it's going to be steeper and more dramatic because everybody's going to be trying to get, you know, the old proverbial camel through the eye of the needle, just fur and hooves.
So pretty— not pretty, not pretty.
Erik Townsend: Well, you were an endowment manager, so you understand the real money side of this. If I heard about that trade that a bunch of speculators were putting on because they thought their hot money hedge fund could, you know, make a better return, I'd say, okay, dumb people are dumb. But this is something that pension funds that manage people's retirement savings are doing.
Mark Yusko: I know.
Erik Townsend: So what it says to me is there must be a tectonic shift going on where there's so much pressure to reach for yield because these guys running pension money know that they're underfunded and they don't know what to do.
Are they panicking? Is that what's happening? I mean, I don't see how it's possible that professional pension fund managers could not understand understand just the outsized risk that they're taking with a trade like that. But it seems like it's becoming the culture.
Mark Yusko: No, no, look, I think you're exactly right. It's kind of strange to think that it is happening at that level. But I think it's the fallacy of the advisor, right? And we saw this back in the '90s around, you know, Orange County, you know, buying these big derivatives, these leveraged, you know, bond contracts You know, from one of the big broker-dealers. And, and I think that the fallacy that if, if a big investment bank or a big broker-dealer is selling you this product, well, they must have had people that did the research on it and must— it must be safe. You know, they wouldn't be selling it to me if it wasn't safe.
Well, no, they're selling it to you because you're willing to pay a price and you're willing to buy it. So that, I think, is, is the problem, is, is you've got people relying on external advisors that are bringing them these products. And I— and, and look, you know, part of the challenge in the pension world— this is not true of all pensions— but part of the problem in the pension world is most of them don't pay commensurately with equivalent jobs in other parts of the market, right?
They think they want to save money on their compensation. And what that means is you end up getting less qualified people, just by its very nature. The market is efficient. And so, I think unfortunately— and again, there are some great pension managers out there, don't get me wrong. I mean, the guy who runs CalSTRS is fantastic, and there are a handful of guys out there I think are great. But I think unfortunately, if you don't pay market You get what you pay for. And I think those people are more prone to rely on external advisors and rely on, you know, these things. And I think unfortunately, we know what— we know how the story ends, and it's usually not very good.
Erik Townsend: Finally, I want to move on to the presidential race. Holy cow, so much has happened in the last week. There's even rumors this week that supposedly maybe it was the Republican Party itself that leaked this tape that's got Donald Trump in some So much trouble. So, as you know, we discussed off the air, we ask our guests not to push their personal opinion, but just in terms of objectively commenting on what potential outcomes we could see on the horizon here and what they would mean to markets. Do you think that there's any chance of Trump being pushed out of the race, as it seems like they're trying to do? And if he was, what would it mean? How do you see the various different outcomes of either a Trump or Clinton presidency in terms of their effect on markets?
Mark Yusko: Yeah, I think if, if a candidate were to drop out of the race, either side, I think that would be perceived pretty negatively by markets. I think you'd have short-term volatility around that event. I just think that would be a bad event. I mean, perhaps maybe you could make an argument that if Trump were to drop, that people would think that was less potentially volatile, so maybe there'd be a positive reaction, but that one's tough to call.
I think what is striking about these types of events is we have actually a decent amount of history.
We have 6 times where we've had 8-year presidents. And, you know, 5 out of those 6 have had fairly negative returns for the full year. So the fact that we're still mildly positive is, is an anomaly. We also know that in most of the cases after that 8-year presidency, the first year of the subsequent presidency has a recession.
So that, that's actually probably pretty likely regardless of which side wins. The other thing that does historically happen is that when the incumbent party stays after an 8-year presidency, that's historically been better for the market. I think people just, you know, are assuming they— there's more certainty, and markets hate uncertainty. So I think if, you know, Trump were to win, history tells us there'd be more volatility, not because it's Trump, but because it's the other party taking over for the incumbent party.
I think half Having it be Trump, where I would say that most candidates change their mind and say whatever it takes to get into power.
It's like Ms. May over in Britain. She was a Remain supporter until she realized that, hmm, I can get elected PM if I say I'm a Leave supporter. So she totally changed her view in running for PM. It was unbelievable.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Mark Yusko: So people will do or say whatever it takes to get in power.
But the speed at which he changes his mind is the thing that's disconcerting to me. I mean, how do you plan as a long-term investor if, let alone you don't know what's going to happen month to month, you don't know what's going to happen within one speech?
And then the last thing I think that's important is for markets is when there's a divided president and Congress, that's usually better for markets. When you have both of one side or the other, that's usually less good because too many of the pet projects get pushed through, and those usually cost money.
So I would be worried about a Republican president, Republican Congress doing some damage to markets. But that's— that has nothing to do with the people that are running this, just It has to do with, I like my checks and balances in politics.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Well, thank you so much, Mark, for a fantastic interview. I am sure a lot of our listeners are going to want to follow more of your work, and I would tell them where to, but there's so many places. You're very prolific on Twitter. I think you also have some other sources. So where can our interested listeners find out more about what you do?
Mark Yusko: Yep. So on a day-to-day basis, people can find me at @MarkNelson. Yusko. We have a website that has some, some resources as well, which is morgancreekcap.com. And then, well, from there you can, you can reach out to any of us here. And, and we have, you know, we do have some white papers and other things we publish from time to time. I also do a quarterly letter that if you, if you actually just Google MCCM quarterly letter, they'll all pop up in PDF You can read those. They're rather long. So, you know, if you have a couple days to put aside, but I like to write about different people. I've written one on George Soros. I've written one on Sir John Templeton, one on Julian Robertson, one on Seth Klarman, and try to incorporate our views of the world into these great investors' disciplines and quotations.
So lots of places to find out about Morgan Creek, but morgancreekcap.com is probably the easiest link to us and what people are looking for.
Erik Townsend: And I want to add my own endorsement on those letters. I just read your piece on Seth Klarman and really enjoyed it. So for people who do have time at the fireplace to take in a good read, although probably a slightly longer one than a lot of the other pieces we see, it's definitely worthwhile.
Mark Yusko: Nope, thanks.
Erik Townsend: So thank you again, Mark. It's been a fantastic interview. Aaron Chan and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
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Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Aaron Chan.
Aaron Chan: Wow, Erik, I don't know about you, but I think that's got to be one of the best interviews we've done. I've been reading and engaging with Mark's tweets for a while now, and it's really cool when a guest is just as engaging, if not more, live as he is on social media. So for you FinTwit people, be sure to follow Mark @MarkYusko on Twitter. And we didn't want to cut Mark's I don't want to cut this interview short, but unfortunately we're out of time and I had a lot of questions. So, Erik, is there anything you want to cover?
Erik Townsend: Well, we're going to have to save it. I think when we have a guest that's this good, I would much rather give the guest the stage and not worry about leaving time for us to talk about it afterwards.
Erik Townsend: So if we have extra time in a future show, we'll maybe pick it up from there. Let's keep it short this week, folks. We need your help promoting the show. Please tell your friends about it. Please retweet us. And of course, the most important thing, register your free account at MacroVoices.com. That gets you our free Research Roundup email. If you don't want it, it's one click to opt out of it with the SafeUnsubscribe link. Assuming that you do want it, you'll get a compendium of links to all the cool stuff we could find on the internet every week. Aaron, let's tell them what they can expect in this week's Research Roundup.
Aaron Chan: Well, I hope you've got some time this weekend because we're about to hit you with a deluge of excellent slide decks, including Lacy Hunt's presentation at James Grant's Fall conference. Lacy's presentation lays bare the economically deleterious effects of overindebtedness and straightforwardly outlines the characteristics of extremely indebted countries. He does mention that fiscal policy options exist, provided that they do not increase aggregate indebtedness. Now, if we ever get the chance to interview Mr. Hunt, it'd be great to get his take on what some of these policy options might be. Now, turning to emerging markets, you'll definitely want to check out the latest webcast slide deck from the fixed income team at DoubleLine Funds.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Aaron Chan: Finally, check out JP Morgan's latest Guide to the Markets slide deck. It's short on commentary, but the value is in looking at the charts and data yourself and coming to your own conclusions anyways and updating your thesis. You'll find all this and much more in this week's Research Roundup.
So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we've gotten and continue to welcome your suggestions on how we can make this program even better. For our listeners who write or blog about global markets and would like to share that content with our pro-financial community, shoot us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
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