Daniel Lacalle — Chief Economist at Tressis and author of the new book Freedom or Equality (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 220 was recorded on May 21st, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers all over the world, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing. Helping investors overcome behavioral biases.
Daniel Lacalle returns as this week's feature interview guest. We'll discuss the secular transition from deflation to inflation, hard assets generally, precious metals, the stock market outlook, and much more. Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment after the feature interview when Patrick and I will take another deep dive into the crude oil market. discussing both the bull and bear cases for crude oil looking forward.
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's jump into that S&P 500. It's just resilient. It's not really ripping higher, but it doesn't want to go lower either. And we're just chopping in here. What's, what's your take on how this all plays out?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I got my 3rd chance to short this market above 2930, the 61.8% Fibonacci retracement of the big move down. And I passed on it for a 3rd time. Probably the main reason is, you know, You know, I look at the market rallying for the silliest of reasons. In this case, what do we have? We had Moderna, a company which, by the way, insiders including the CEO were selling stock hand over fist as it was being bid up during this little event that happened this week. They come out— now they've done a clinical trial. How the heck they got to phase 1 of a clinical trial on humans without having to test animals first is a mystery to me, but they somehow managed to do a phase 1 clinical trial. They've got 45 patients in 3 groups at different dosage levels, and that means there's 15 people in each dosage level group, and they released only the results for 2 people per group.
Well, why not for all 15? Isn't that the slightest bit suspicious? I mean, while at the same time the CEO is selling stock hand over fist. So, you know, this is not like we've got an incredible breakthrough and, oh my gosh, now there's a vaccine that solves everything. This is if you release extremely and suspiciously limited clinical results from a trial in a way that doesn't seem to make sense, it sounds pretty good to those who don't look at it critically. And that caused the market to jump, you know, a great big jump up. Everybody's jumping for joy and the market's trading higher. What happens, Patrick, when we actually get some real good news? I mean, there's gotta be some good news in this story at some point. We're probably gonna make real progress toward a vaccine at some point. So I just have the feeling that this market knows no limits to how much central bank largesse can continue to keep it pumped up.
And I think as soon as we get some real good news, which I don't think the Moderna thing really qualified, we're probably gonna see another move higher. I still think it doesn't make sense. I think that if we had normal economics, we'd be much lower. But, you know, we live in this crazy world of central banks All right, well, let's move on to the dollar index.
Patrick Ceresna: And the dollar had a reversal off the 100 handle, now down at 99, 99.33 at the time when we're recording, largely driven by a big move in the euro. All we're doing is chopping around in this range. Is that all we should expect more of at this stage?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I mean, until we see either a breakdown below 99 or above 101, there's nothing to say other than we're trading sideways in a consolidation range. And even if we did see a close below 99, Yeah. I wouldn't really get concerned until, let's say, a daily close below 94.5. It's interesting to me that the move lower on the dollar, as well as the move lower on gold this week, seemed to be connected to the hopium associated with this vaccine. So it does seem that the dollar is catching a safety bid because of the coronavirus crisis. And if we get a resolution, not, not just a little bit of false hope, which is what I think this news this week was, but if we get some real significant significant news, maybe that's going to be the catalyst for the dollar and gold as safety trade assets to have a more significant correction to the downside. So, the way I looked at the action this week was just to kind of make that mental note.
Hmm, okay, when we get some bona fide good news in the coronavirus crisis, maybe we should look for a bigger downside correction at that point. But I still think the most likely longer-term resolution is going to be to the upside.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, let's move on to crude oil because crude has just been one direction higher off of that low. It seems like it's almost overextended now to the upside. How do you think this all plays out?
Erik Townsend: Well, as we discussed off the air, Patrick, I could go on for longer than you want to listen to me on the market wrap. So let's do the executive summary now, and we'll dedicate most of the postgame segment to going deeper. The big thing that we were watching is the June contract expiry. That basically went off without a hitch, without any downside fireworks. We did not see a repeat of that May event that took us all the way down to negative prices and so forth. In fact, we even got strong backwardation, almost a dollar of backwardation on the last couple of days of trading. Probably that's because people were taking excess precautions to make sure that we didn't have a repeat of last month. And it's kind of like everybody's on the other side of the boat and balances things out. Normally, Normally, you wouldn't expect to see a backwardation occur unless we had a shortage of oil.
I think the reason it happened this month was just because of overcompensation and people wanting to make sure we did not have a repeat of last month. In any event, the market is sending us a very strong message that the storage crisis is over and the price recovery has begun. A lot of sentiment building, a lot of people thinking that it can only be upside from here. I think it's a little bit more nuanced than that. So let's save the rest We'll save the rest of that discussion for the postgame segment.
Inventory crude oil drawing down 5 million barrels nationally, but that is against a build on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve of 1.9 million barrels. So net of the SPR build, it was only a 3.1 million barrel drawdown, but still a drawdown on inventory after weeks and weeks and weeks of massive builds. Cushing, Oklahoma, the ever-important delivery location for the West Texas Intermediate crude oil futures contract, drawing down down a massive 5.6 million barrels, taking Cushing out of that yellow zone where it was really close to filling up. Gasoline building 2.8 million barrels, distillates building 3.8 million barrels. US production ticking down another 100,000 barrels to an EIA-reported figure of 11.5 million barrels per day. I suspect that that number is still high. I think the real number is lower because the, the only way that we got out of this storage crisis was a whole lot of And a whole lot of US production coming offline. So I suspect that this EIA estimate of 11.5 million barrels is artificially high.
We'll save the rest for the postgame segment after the feature interview.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold, because even up till yesterday, it looked like gold was just winding up along the highs for a breakout. And, and today it takes a step back. We're slowly backing up towards $1,700 here, right back into the center of that trade range for the last 2 months. What's your take on what's going on here in the bullion market?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, it seems like the catalyst that started this downside correction was the good news, or the perception of good news, about a vaccine for the virus. So, I think part of what's going on is everybody's preoccupation with the pandemic crisis as a major world-upsetting event that was helping to support precious metals prices. Some of that premium is coming out of the market. But, you know, we're still holding at a level as of today. Yeah, it's back down to what, $1,724 as I look at the tape?
Now, we've still got quite a ways before we get back down to $1,700. We got almost up to a new high a few days ago. So, you know, this tape still looks reasonably strong to me. I am still hoping for a major downside correction. I, I couldn't be more bullish in the long term about gold, and I'd love to see a technical correction and the opportunity to buy some more at a lower price. So far, I've been disappointed. I'll keep my fingers crossed for lower numbers.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, let's touch on the 10-year Treasury yield because on Monday we had a big pop, obviously, when that big news and that drove a surge in the stock markets. But ever since then, the yield's been backing off. We're back under 0.70, and right now we're trading around 0.68 on the yield. And it's— we are still stuck in that range. Everything seems to be range-bound. I mean, uh, is anything changed for you in terms of the 10-year Treasury yield?
Erik Townsend: Well, what this trading action has done is it's just strengthened my conviction about not having any conviction. And what I mean by that is I felt like, look, I don't want to be trading the 10-year Treasury here. I really don't have any strong conviction about which way it's headed. And what the recent news action has shown me is that, you know, little bits of, frankly, what should have been insignificant news are really causing major changes of direction in this market. Same thing as I'm seeing in the stock market. I don't know what the next piece of news is, so I don't want to be trading it. I'm focused much more on the longer-term picture, Patrick, which is, okay, we're below Are we bottoming here because zero really is a boundary, or are we headed toward negative interest rates? And needless to say, I'll be asking Daniel Lacalle that question in today's interview.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week's feature interview guest is Daniel Lacalle. So why did we invite Daniel back on the show this week as a guest?
Erik Townsend: Well, as our regular listeners already know, I'm very much on a kick to get as many of the smart macro thinkers as we can onto the show so I can ask them all the same basic question, which is, okay guys, We've been in a secular deflationary environment for a decade now.
How do we get from here back into a secular inflation or stagflation environment? First of all, is that really what's happening? I think it is, but I want to get our guest's view on that. And if so, okay, what does the transition path look like? How do we get from here to there? And how long is it going to take? So that's really what's been on my mind as the major macro question I want to get to the bottom of. Can't think of a better guy than Daniel Lacalle to bring back on. He's a big picture macro thinker. He sees not just what's happening in the market today or what the trade is next week, but he's the kind of guy who thinks about the big picture and where the market's headed. So, and frankly, it's also a bit overdue. We haven't had him on the show in quite a while. So I'm really looking forward to this one, Patrick.
This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com.
Erik Townsend: In recent weeks, we've been reminded of the fragility of world financial markets and how quickly sentiment can shift from risk-on to risk-off. Once again, the mantra of buy the dip and the determination of central banks will be put to the test. But as Chris Cole recently told us, the best approach to investing in the long run is very different from what's worked best in recent decades.
To help MacroVoices listeners navigate an uncertain future, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen host of the Top Traders Unplugged podcast, has created a guide to the best investment books of all time. You can get a free copy at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide. And be sure to listen to my full-length interview with Niels Kaastrup-Larsen on trend following.
The download link is in your Research Roundup email. Check out toptradersunplugged.com today. You'll be glad you did.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Daniel Lacalle is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Daniel Lacalle. Chief Economist at Tressis and author of the new book Freedom or Equality. Daniel has prepared a chartbook to accompany today's interview. You'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage at MacroVoices.com, look for the red button that says looking for the downloads. Daniel, the question that's on everybody's mind, okay, coronavirus crisis seems like It seems like at least the worst of the first wave is behind us now. So what does that mean for financial markets? Can we expect the V-shaped recovery that a lot of people are hoping for, or is it more likely to be U-shaped or L-shaped, or what do we expect?
Daniel Lacalle: Thank you very much, Erik, and thanks for having me. I think that what we are seeing right now in financial markets is the stage of what I call central bank hope. I think that the idea that we have seen the worst of the coronavirus crisis and that we have embedded in our macro and earnings assumptions lost 2020 is driving markets to think of a bottom and expect that the combination of very aggressive monetary policy plus very strong stimulus packages from governments is going to drive to a very rapid level of growth in 2021.
My concern is that those 2, both the central bank action and government stimuli are likely to generate more stagnation rather than a strong and healthy recovery. Even if we look, for example, at consensus estimates for 2021, we still see that in the Eurozone, in the United States, in most of the developed economies, consensus estimates have gone slightly more bullish about 2021, but very skewed to the latter part of the year. So we're moving, in terms of estimates, we're moving the improvement to the 2nd quarter of 2021 now from the previous idea of growth and rapid recovery in the 3rd and 4th quarter of 2020.
I also think that the idea from governments that shutting down the economy for a couple of months would have no relevant impact long-term on economic growth is out of the picture. Therefore, I believe it is going to be more of a U-shaped recovery— slow, very indebted, with very high levels of unemployment. Still very difficult to recover the level of unemployment when the services sector has been hit so badly, but also very difficult to recover the level of consumption that we had in 2019 when consumers have had such a tremendous shock that even if you have not lost your job and you have not lost your salary, it is very unlikely that you're going to get out of this crisis spending in the same way that we used to do before the crisis. As such, I think that we need to be very prudent because if anything, if we have learned anything from this crisis is that what we have fundamentally been even the ones that have been bearish, is too bullish.
Erik Townsend: Daniel, as you see this recovery that at least until a week or two ago just seemed like we were charging back, we hit what was just about a 61.8% retracement of the big move down. Was that, in your estimation, likely to have been the top of the bear market rally, or could it be that we're going to, you know, go up and test new all-time highs again? before the market realizes that, that, hey, you know, central banks can't solve all problems with printed money?
Daniel Lacalle: In my opinion, that generated a, a top of a bear market rally fundamentally because it was, it was driven by the sectors that are more likely to be incentivized or, or perpetuated by the central bank action, by very low rates and high liquidity. Interestingly enough, this bear market rally has seen the opposite of what we saw in the bull market, which was we saw the growth stocks go higher and value stocks underperform. This has been almost the opposite. It starts to tell me that it's more about investors looking to position themselves in a way in which they can prudently look for some level of hope.
Without being happy about the likelihood of the rapid recovery. So I think that, you know, we could see another leg down once we have discounted the majority of the stimulus, both fiscally and monetary, but also once we start to see things that are still yet to happen, like competitive devaluations, In the case of emerging economies. And another important thing that I think is likely to come out of this crisis, which is an increase in protectionism and probably, I wouldn't say the same as a trade war, but certainly more protectionist measures.
Erik Townsend: I was interested to see that Stan Druckenmiller commented at a presentation, or I guess it was an online webinar, for the New York Economic Club, saying that that this coronavirus crisis just might be the event that finally pops the credit bubble that has been driven by central banks. And I was frustrated that they, they didn't really ask him to elaborate on why he thought that this event might have that outcome. Do you think that that's potentially in play? Are we maybe at the point where central bank largesse has gone as far as it can go and we're going to have a kind of Realization that it can't go on forever?
Daniel Lacalle: I would not agree with that assessment. I think that unfortunately, what we are seeing from the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the Bank of England, is actually that they're exactly following the path of the Bank of Japan. And if that tells us anything, is that it leads to stagnation and very high debt, but certainly it can last for a very long time.
Think about it from a monetary perspective globally. What the Fed in particular, but also the European Central Bank is doing, those currencies that can be deemed at least to a certain extent as world reserve currencies, what they're actually doing is sucking up the savings of the rest of the world.
That can go on for a very, very long time, as long as the weakness of the emerging market currencies remains, and also as long as there is a certain level of— I wouldn't say growth, but at least some level of nominal growth.
So that's why I think that the recovery is likely to be extremely indebted, because central banks can continue to disguise risk the way that they have been doing. They might not be able to keep spreads where they left them in 2019. And I'm thinking particularly about some countries in the Eurozone. It's very difficult for the ECB to continue to leave the spreads between Italy and Germany as tight as they were last year.
But it looks to me like what central banks are doing is to incentivize the Japanese Keynesian solution, which is to zombify the economy, leave things as indebted as possible, and almost bail out the unproductive at any cost.
Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with you that all indications seem to be that central banks will continue to bail out everybody with as much printed money as necessary. And I agree with you that that eventually leads to probably a deep and perhaps even intractable condition of financial stagnation. Does this create the backdrop to get us out of secular deflation and into secular inflation, particularly if we see programs that are more oriented toward delivering money into the real economy, say universal basic income and other kinds of things that give money to mainstream consumers?
Daniel Lacalle: The risk of what central banks are doing, in my opinion, is that it starts with a deflationary spiral. That deflationary spiral comes fundamentally from the fact that the productive capacity has not disappeared. And what the stimulus is incentivizing goes directly to the sectors that already had overcapacity. So, those sectors will try to export their way out of the problem at the beginning of the recovery. That is deflationary. We are seeing it, for example, in China, where industrial production is coming back quickly without really having the customer base open. That obviously will probably generate a deflationary spiral at the very beginning.
Now, what I'm concerned is the point that you were making is that as governments continue to push for inflationary measures, they actually do achieve a level of inflation once the economy starts opening up, because on one side, some supply chains have been permanently— not permanently, but at least long-term damaged. And on the other hand, you have the debasement of the purchasing power of the currency through all those programs that you were mentioning. And the risk of stagflation starts to come up. Up.
That is the real problem to me because central banks and governments to a certain extent have a rulebook of how to address deflation and how to address inflation. But stagflation is very, very challenging for them because on one side they will continue to try to push for incentives to a demand that doesn't come because most of because real salaries are not going up, because the productive capacity remains in excess, overcapacity in some sectors.
All of those factors, plus the fact that a lot of that money creation goes directly to financing current spending, which is also deflationary. So money velocity comes down. And so you have a risk of overshooting on the disinflationary effects in the beginning, that is then reacted with a higher level of stimulus from governments directed particularly to finance the real economy to a certain extent. And then what you create is stagflation.
Erik Townsend: Let's go a little bit deeper on this question of Japanification of, I think, not just the US, but really the entire Western economy. From what you've described, and I very much agree with you, Japan provides the reference case or the roadmap for what we might expect. Now, a lot of people have said Japan is kind of unique in the sense that although they do have an extremely high debt-to-GDP ratio, they also have a much higher percentage of their national debt which is owned domestically by Japanese. And there's also a cultural difference which is, you know, there's just so much of a homogeneous society in Japan. If the government tells the Japanese people it's their patriotic duty to buy Japanese bonds, they're going to do it. Whereas if you look at something like US Treasuries, they're not held mostly by US citizens, and I don't think US citizens would feel the same obligation just because the government said so to favor an asset if it Its creditworthiness started to come under question.
So, how far can we take the Western world's indebtedness, the sovereign indebtedness situation? How much farther can it go before it really starts to blow up?
Daniel Lacalle: Obviously, there are numerous differences with Japan as a culture and as an economy itself. But let's focus on the things that are similar. The first one is that the massive level of indebtedness of Japan is a way of absorbing the also very high level of savings of the Japanese corporates and citizens in foreign currency. If you think about it from the US perspective in particular, it is not dissimilar to what the US does by increasing dramatically its deficit and increasing dramatically its debt, and therefore, that is used as a reserve by the economies that are increasingly dollarized.
No. So how long can it happen? Only until the United States decides to take measures that stop that process, which would be to take measures to stop being the world reserve currency. We don't know when that happens, but we know that there is a point in which And we saw it, for example, in the repo market. There is a point in which something that you consider as a reserve, as a saver, stops being a reserve for you because you hold too much of it.
So that's a very big risk, because the government is going to test the limits this year with a deficit that might balloon to $4 trillion.
Erik Townsend: No.
Daniel Lacalle: And it's very, very important, therefore, the absolutely realistic situation of what is happening right now, which is that there is a huge shortage of dollars globally, doesn't come and bite you in the sense that emerging economies, other developed economies stop seeing the Treasuries as a reserve asset.
It's a very thin line, and it's not something that the government dictates. The risk is important. And it comes back to your point of the cultural differences. It's not the same to say to citizens in— you don't basically say it either. They don't have many other options because the pension funds are controlled by the same corporations that are close to the government. But in the case of Japan, you basically feel some sort of national duty to hold sovereign bonds. That is not necessarily the case in the United States. It's certainly not necessarily have to be the case in, for example, central banks in other countries. And I think that that's why it is so important that the United States takes very, very, very, very aggressive measures as soon as the economy opens up to reconduct the deficit. Because we are approaching levels in which what you said before, which is important, is that how long can central banks maintain yields so low? low, it starts
to be counterproductive. And the diminishing returns of monetary policy accelerate, but on the way on a negative turn.
Erik Townsend: Daniel, let's talk about how a loss of US dollar reserve currency would occur or could occur. I was very interested, if I heard you correctly, you said if the United States government took action, it sounded like you were implying that it would be the desire of the US government to forfeit their reserve currency. Currency status because of problems created by having that status. The other view would be they want to keep that status, but other countries, particularly China and Russia, have expressed frustration with the US having that status and would try to find ways to create alternatives. So how would you see this going down? What are the possibilities for how the global financial system might evolve to a point where the US dollar is no the global reserve currency?
Daniel Lacalle: Right now it is very difficult for a simple reason, is that most fiat currencies globally and their central banks are behaving exactly as recklessly, or even more recklessly in terms of monetary policy, than the Federal Reserve, but without the investor security, the legal security, the institutions, and the respect of private property that the United States has. So in a certain way, there is also a perverse situation by which the US dollar retains its reserve status fundamentally because everybody else is behaving even more insanely.
You see what I mean? But that can change. And we never know, obviously, if we knew how and when, it would be a great trade.
However, what I think is that If some calls that are quite recurrent in the United States about this concept of weaponizing the dollar, of devaluing the dollar for no reason, going aggressively to finance MMT-style direct government spending and entitlements, et cetera. You go very, very quickly, very quickly from a very rich country with huge resources and huge attraction of capital to the opposite.
It's basically you go from Switzerland to Argentina very quickly. And this is the risk that the United States has in front of it, is that you have too many voices in the political world thinking that everything would be great by by baking the cake and eat it, as they say in the UK, which is on one side, we want a weak dollar, and at the same time, we want it to remain the world reserve currency. Well, guess what? You cannot have both.
If you have a strong economy, you will have a strong dollar. If you want the dollar to remain the world reserve currency, you cannot expect to dilute the massive imbalances of the US economy through the debasing of the purchasing power of the currency.
And if I was anybody close at all to any member of parliament or the Senate or the president, I would say the last thing that you would suggest right now would be to destroy the purchasing power of the US dollar relative to the rest of emerging and developed economies, because the alleged benefits that some monetarists tell you that you would achieve I.e., reducing the debt in real terms, i.e., getting all of the benefits of higher inflation that only governments see, would be more than offset, more than offset by the displacement of capital, by the misallocation of that same capital, and by the increase in poverty and loss of attractiveness of the nation. You cannot do that.
Erik Townsend: Daniel, the way a lot of people have been framing this question of reserve currency is they think, okay, you know, before the World Wars, we had the British pound sterling as the world's global reserve currency. Then the US dollar took over, and the question becomes, okay, what would the next thing be to take over and replace the dollar as the global reserve currency? And of course, for the immediate The answer is there is no viable alternative right now. But I wonder, you know, in the days of the pound sterling, we didn't have a globally interconnected financial system where you can do big forex transactions at the click of the mouse in milliseconds.
So I wonder if there's really a need to have a single global reserve currency, or if we might get to a new paradigm.
Daniel Lacalle: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: where central banks simply diversify their reserve holdings. So instead of being primarily dollar-denominated, you know, they've got some dollars, they've got some euros, they've got some gold, they've got some other assets. Is it practical to envision a world where the US dollar never gets replaced, but instead its prominence is simply demoted in the global financial system?
Daniel Lacalle: That is, uh, that is a great question, and I think that the answer is ultimately, what is frustrating for central banks, for governments, and for supranational entities is that they have been trying to do precisely what you have mentioned, and they've not been able to achieve it. And the reason why is because being the world reserve currency is not something that one government, one central bank, or a group of them decide. It's actually precisely because of the reason that you just mentioned, which is that we have a global interconnected connected, extremely complex financial world that decides every day where does capital go and where does it feel safer is that we almost have a democratic process on a daily basis of what we collectively believe is the safest asset out there, even with the intervention of central banks and the intervention of governments.
So, even if tomorrow, imagine for a second that the IMF and the World Bank, all entities, supranational entities get together, even with the adherence of the United States, and they decide to implement a global reserve currency held by the IMF, the harsh reality of it is that it would probably not succeed if We collectively do not accept it.
Why was the euro a relative success? The reason why the euro was a relative success was because of the evident failure of the lira, the peseta, the drachma, etc., etc. You see, the reason why citizens in Spain, in Italy, or in Portugal, and even Greece, with so many challenges, continue to prefer the euro than to any other alternative is because they don't They're not amnesiac, and they're not stupid, is that they know that if they had a local domestic currency managed by the local government and domestic central bank, what they would certainly have was constant debasement of the currency and massive competitive devaluations that would destroy the purchasing power of salaries and savings. The reason why the euro works is only because people collectively have preferred to have a currency that is more akin to the— similar to the Deutsche Mark rather than similar to the peseta or the lira.
That is exactly the same with currencies and reserve assets today. Central banks, I'm sure that the PBOC, the Russian Central Bank, many central banks globally would probably prefer to diversify their asset base and to have a little bit more gold than dollars, for example, that's absolutely fine. The problem is to add, for example, euro, UK, or Brazilian reserves to the asset base. That doesn't work the same way. But it does not work the same way, not because they would not want to, but because of our collective decision every day.
So the interesting factor here is that despite all of the challenges and all of the excesses that we see in the United States and with the Federal Reserve, we collectively see that any other alternative would be worse. In the case of China, the yuan, because it has massive capital controls, huge challenges of of what is the real valuation, et cetera, et cetera, numerous things. In the case of the euro, because it's barely only used among the Eurozone economies, so it's a very localized currency that actually does not work very well as a reserve asset. All those things are things that are not decided by governments, are things that are decided by ourselves every day as savers.
I'm sure that the Brazilian Central Bank today would be extremely happy to tell their citizens that they need to save in Brazilian reals. The Argentine government would be extremely happy to impose their citizens to save in Argentine pesos. The reason why they don't do it is because they know that their currency will be debased by central bank policy. So, monetary policy is a game— is not a game of who wins, it's a game of who loses first.
And as such, the excesses of the Federal Reserve pale in comparison with the excesses of other currencies. So can that change? Yes, it can. It can if the United States starts to go— starts to believe too much on the ability to do whatever it wants with the currency without any risk.
I think that one of the great things, if there's one good thing that I have to say about the Federal Reserve, is that every member that I've met in my life always pays attention to the real demand of dollars that is out there. And they always— and when they talk about unlimited and massive quantitative easing, etc., it is not true. They are talking about increasing the money supply always a little bit less than the real demand that is out there. If you think about other central banks, they completely ignore more real demand of their local currency, which leads to the lack of confidence in that same currency from domestic savers and international investors. And with it, interestingly enough, a higher dependence on the dollar. That's the reason why China, being so strong, needs to have capital controls, because if they had an open market, The flight of capital would be so severe that it would destroy the economy in very little time.
Erik Townsend: Well, Daniel, the theme that you and I agree on, and frankly, that almost all of the other expert guests that I agree on in these interviews, is that monetary debasement, a debasement of fiat currency, dilution by printing more dollars and more euros and so forth order to contend with the world's problems is the theme, and it's going to continue to be the theme going forward for probably several years to come. Now, a lot of people are saying, okay, given these circumstances, for investors it can mean only one thing: you cannot go wrong with gold. But a few voices are saying, wait a minute, it's not quite that simple.
As you said just a minute ago, central banks have been accumulating gold, and they may be forced to start selling gold to raise cash in order to deal with this coronavirus crisis. And this could actually be a setup for a washout in gold, which is going to catch everybody by surprise. Which of those possibilities is more likely, and, and how likely or unlikely are both of them?
Daniel Lacalle: I think that the reason why it is not that likely that we see a massive sell-off of gold from central banks is that unlike in previous crises, particularly not the 2008, but 2001, '93, '92, those crises, central banks are holding on to their reserves as much as they can.
In a normal crisis, the way that we have seen it today, we would be seeing the central banks of Brazil, Mexico, India, you name it, selling dollars like there's no tomorrow in order to support their currency. They're actually not doing that anymore. What most central banks are doing is trying to hold on to their reserves as much as they can, because they know that once you get into a situation in which the domestic investor stops believing that the reserve base is in some form protecting the purchasing power of the currency, then it's Venezuela.
So there is a risk that some countries, as they did, for example, in the crisis previous to 2008, decide to sell their gold reserves. But those countries that do are going to be a few and might, as by the way, as it was in that period, might be actually an opportunity because the level of buying of gold reserves of just China and Russia alone offsets the sell-down of some of those other central banks. And supply-demand actually works. So there could be a blip. Absolutely, there could be. But I don't think that you could see the level of destruction of reserves reserves that central banks committed in the past. If there's anything that central banks have learned from past crises, is that precisely in moments like the ones that we are living, holding onto reserves is a much better policy than trying to defend the currency at any cost.
And in terms of coming back to the point of getting some cash, because it's not even a question of holding on to reserves is that you need the cash in order to pay for liabilities. It is only a question of reopening the economy. One of the crucial points of this crisis that we sometimes tend to forget is that the productive capacity and that the fabric of the economy has not been destroyed. It's just shut down. So, as we are seeing, for example, these days with oil that is coming back up a little bit and things like this, then it's just a question of reopening the economy, that how quickly some of those reserves come back to central banks. So I don't see that— I understand the risk, it is not small, but I don't see it as negative as, for example, in 2000, 2001.
Erik Townsend: Well, if we're going to see all of the central banks around the world not defend their currencies, allow them to be debased. That seems to really make the argument for, you know, you can't go wrong just backing the leverage truck up and buying all the gold you can. Or is there perhaps a hidden reason why you can go wrong? What would you say for people who are tempted to really overweight gold based on the macro events that we're witnessing?
Daniel Lacalle: Well, I think that one thing is to have a certain amount of gold in your portfolio. It's a good decorrelated asset. Central bank buy-in, emerging market demand, all of those things, supply-demand picture, the fundamentals. Makes sense. But just if you want to go aggressively overweight, massively overweight gold, you probably need to start thinking of different scenarios to the ones that we have pictured in the past minutes. You need to really start thinking of a collapse of such a level that even holding gold itself would not help you because what you would be holding is a financial instrument attached to the price of gold.
So, we must remember that many of us, when we're buying gold, we're buying ETFs, or we're buying instruments that are attached to the price of gold. We're not buying bullion. We're not buying gold coins.
So, I think that you would start to think of a different scenario than stagnation, stagflation, crisis followed by weak growth. You would need to think, in my opinion, of a complete collapse of the monetary system. System. And a complete collapse of the full monetary system is very difficult when all of the nations of the world are playing the same game.
You know, it's very difficult to see the end of the football league when everybody is in the football league. You can see it being less attractive, you can see it being less of an entertainment, but it's going to continue. The only way in which you would see the collapse of the monetary system as we're seeing it is if any of the possible contenders of the US dollar and the euro was actually pursuing a sound monetary policy. But they're not. That's the problem. You see what I mean? Is that— that's why I come back to the point of monetary policy is not a game of who wins. It's a game of who loses first.
And of who becomes therefore the world's tallest small person. That is the challenge that I think is that in order to get to the point of being of only having gold in your portfolio, you would start to think you would need to start to think of a of a situation that we're very far away from.
I prefer to see things that are a little bit more tangible. The reason why I like gold now is. is for all those reasons that I mentioned before. But that doesn't make it necessary to make it the only thing that you own in the portfolio.
Erik Townsend: Daniel, I want to clarify what you said because it seems to me, first of all, I agree with you that the only scenario where you'd ever want to consider nothing but gold in your portfolio would be if you truly believed that the entire global financial system was going to collapse and that gold would be the only anything that had any value. But that's not the scenario I'm even thinking about.
I don't— I suppose that's plausible with the recklessness that we see. It could certainly happen, but I don't want to bet on that happening. It seems to me, though, that what is a nearly certain bet is that for several years to come, major governments around the world will continue to debase fiat money, dilute its value, trying to inflation. Someday they'll succeed and they'll get inflation, and I won't be surprised if it quickly turns into runaway inflation.
Given that prognostication, it seems to me like the only, you know, assets that really make sense are either gold, to some extent real estate and other hard assets. And, you know, if you're of that religion, you can go down the cryptocurrency path. I don't personally feel that cryptocurrencies, which are designed to upset and annoy governments, which is the way that the first generation of them works, are really gonna have a long-term future. But, you know, I could be wrong about that. It seems to me though that what you've gotta do is come up with a trade which is the anti-debasement of fiat currency, because that's the one thing that you and I and just about all the other smart people I talk to seem to agree on. If that's not entirely a gold play, what play is it?
Daniel Lacalle: Well, you cannot— well, let me start from what I— the point that I'm trying to make is that you cannot debase all currencies. You can debase the majority of currencies. That's what we're seeing right now. You can debase the dollar a little bit while the rest collapse. Those things can happen. But a complete debasing of all of the currencies being that it is, you know, there's— it's a two-way. So you cannot have two things devaluing at the same time. So when everybody tries to do the same thing, that is the reason why they haven't been able to generate inflation. The reason why they haven't been able to generate not inflation, the level of inflation that they would like to have, is because everybody's doing the same thing.
So ultimately, the only thing that inflates aggressively is financial assets. So in that scenario, you need to have gold, but you need to have the other part of the equities or in bonds that is most benefited from that debasement of the currency.
That is why technology continues to expand in multiples. That is why the cheap sectors become cheaper and the expense allegedly very expensive sectors become more expensive. Because you're creating this huge, huge benefit from monetary policy to the first recipients of money, and that's why I think that it would be impossible to debase all currencies at the same time. You might have imagine a situation in which tomorrow the euro collapses because everybody stops having faith in the euro, and the ECB is printing too much money. Everything becomes a disaster. The euro collapses.
Immediately, the dollar goes through the roof. Even if the dollar, even if the Federal Reserve that moment decides to increase the balance sheet to $20 trillion, doesn't matter. The dollar is going to go through the roof simply because the amount of leverage in the economy that is tied up to the currency system being in place, the moment that you have one major currency. Collapsing, the other major currency is going to rise dramatically.
And I cannot fathom, I mean, even from a perspective of theory, I cannot imagine a situation in which the same day at the same time, even in the same month, you would see all of those currencies, all of those reserve currencies collapsing in value. One would go through the roof. And the contender there, the contender there, no, the logic dictates that that would be the dollar.
So, to me, the trade there remains, you've got to be long some cryptocurrencies. In the case of the denationalization of money in some economies, you've got to be long gold, you've got to be long silver and palladium, in my opinion, but you have to be long equities that are massively benefited from that environment. Which are, in my opinion, the closest to all that has to do with disruptive technologies.
Erik Townsend: There's a part of what you're saying that I guess I don't understand, which is why can't all fiat currencies devalue at the same time simply by virtue of their quantity being increased so that their real purchasing power decreases? So you You could see— it seems to me logical to expect all fiat currencies to devalue relative to hard assets. And of course, they can't all devalue relative to other currencies, but they can devalue, I would think, compared to their purchasing power.
Daniel Lacalle: You're right. They can devalue. They can depreciate relative to other hard assets. I agree with you. Real estate, to a certain extent, gold, silver, palladium, that makes sense. Okay, but ultimately, unless the world collectively—we are very far away from there, from being there—has found a true alternative that is a means, that is a unit of measure, a reserve of value, and a generalized means of payment, what inevitably would happen would be that one of those currencies. would go through the roof.
You see what I mean?
Erik Townsend: Okay. And you think that that would be the US dollar despite its other problems?
Daniel Lacalle: Fundamentally, because what differentiates the US dollar from the euro, from the yuan, from every other— probably except the pound, but the pound is a distant cousin of the US dollar because of the dependence of the financial sector. But But every other currency, every other currency has a huge flaw, which is that you don't have the same level of investor security, legal security, and absolutely unquestioned respect for private property. These things might seem strange when talking about monetary policy, yet they are absolutely critical. And why? Because on top of that, the euro on top has redenomination risk. So, at some point, and we don't know why or how, Germany might decide to leave the euro, or I don't know, or France might decide to leave the euro, and you have all sorts of redenomination risks everywhere. That's one risk. In the case of China, you don't have property rights, you don't have intellectual rights, you don't have legal security and investor security rights.
And on top of that, you have capital controls. Controls. So the money that you have is not even yours. It's not even available for you to do whatever you want with it. Therefore, we need to go quite a few years in front of us to see anyone or any currency out there that is a contender to a country, the United States, in which you know that if you buy a house, that house is yours. And this is not, believe me, that is not so allegedly generalized as you would imagine.
Erik Townsend: Daniel, since we last had you on the program, you have a new book out called Freedom or Equality. Now, we're not used to thinking of those 2 things as mutually exclusive. Tell us a little bit more about the title.
Daniel Lacalle: The reason why I decided to write the book was because there is such a level of focus on the importance of equality at any cost that has become in reality the promotion of egalitarianism that is trying to convince the average citizen that there is a benefit of losing freedom, losing your personal rights and your personal freedom in order to get some form of equality, and that all of the problems that exist in the economy and in the world are inequality problems.
So, the reason why I call it freedom or equality is because equality is a result of prosperity. If we put equality as the main objective, we lose freedom. And that is a very, very dangerous exchange that citizens are being told globally, that in order to get some security and in order to get some level of equality, they have to give up freedom to governments that are not going to be able to give them either security or equality.
As such, the idea of the book is to not only give arguments to the average reader about how to discuss about things like universal basic income, about the ideas of massive new Green Deals, huge government spending plans, massive taxation policies, but also to give credible solutions to improve from where we are.
What we are being told every day is to take for granted all of the things that prosperity and capitalism have brought to the world, take them for granted, think that we cannot get any worse, and give in to socialist policies. And what I try to show in the book is that we can continue to develop capitalism to a more acceptable and available to everyone solution that provides the response to the social challenges, healthcare, education, et cetera, without going into the territory of massive interventionism that is not going to give us either the equality or the freedom that we so deserve.
Erik Townsend: Well, Daniel, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. Please tell our listeners before we let you go how they can follow your work, handles on Twitter and websites and so forth?
Daniel Lacalle: Yes, you can follow me on Twitter. The handle is @DLACALLE_IA. My website, www.dlacalle.com. You also can find me in my YouTube channel and in Instagram or LinkedIn. It's relatively— it's very difficult not to find me if you look for me.
Erik Townsend: So, uh, I'm very happy to continue the Okay, we look forward to having you back on the show in a few months for another update. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was great to have Daniel back on the show. You know, I continue to be baffled by the idea, like the stock market is in this V recovery, right? Like the bottom came in and it's just ripping higher and everyone is associating that that must somehow mean the economy will also V recover. But the economy has a much different path. And Daniel was alluding to that about the idea that it's gonna be a much more long and prolonged process. And it's really gonna be interesting to see how equities, how much this disconnection between equities and the economy, how long it lasts and where it really goes. What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: Well, I agree with that. And I think that there's a really strong case here for what happens is we know this crisis is going to bring a whole lot more money printing from central banks, and that is probably going to support asset markets even if the economy doesn't recover anytime soon. And I think that's really the dynamic that we're with the stock market. But Patrick, what really hit home for me in this discussion was Daniel confirms something that we've heard from all the other smartest voices that we have on MacroVoices, which is this trend toward hard assets over paper assets, that we're moving into an era of central banks just continuing to debase the value of fiat currency to the point where, you know, for now it's propping up those paper asset markets, but someday you wanna have the security of— Hard assets. Of physical assets, whether it be gold, real estate, or other hard physical assets. And I think that's a really important secular trend to, uh, to pay attention to.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, I did a spotlight interview this week with Scott Lynn from Masterworks. Now, this is fascinating to me as we think about this whole trend around hard assets. Scott is a guy who basically figured out, hey, you know, the smartest big boys of finance They're all recognizing that fine art is an important asset class, actually outperforms the S&P 500 in a lot of cases if you can afford to buy it. And so, you know, a lot of the biggest names in finance are buying these very expensive paintings that cost several million dollars and have shown a pattern of appreciating more than stocks in a lot of cases. So Scott recognizes, holy cow, this is a market that is so ripe that so many people want to be part of. Most people can't afford to be, and that also requires a lot of skill because you got to know what you're doing to buy the right kind of art.
So he figures out how to securitize it by essentially offering something similar to a hedge fund structure, but a way that allows any investor to invest on a fractional ownership basis in fine artworks, which are normally, you know, out of the price range of most investors.
And it really got me to think, okay, what else has yet to be securitized? Art was an obvious pick because it requires the skill of somebody who really knows about art to buy the right art. Well, what else is there? You know, wine collections. Somebody on Twitter suggested classic car collections. You know, there's probably a lot of collectibles, a lot of physical things where there's opportunities for people to do what Scott has done and offer securitized investment vehicles.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: to make them available to more people. So it just makes me wonder if we're going to see a major trend of people doing the same thing that Scott did with Masterworks. So it was a fascinating interview. I encourage our listeners to check it out. You'll find the link in the Research Roundup email. And I would encourage our entrepreneurs in the audience to think about, as you listen to, you know, Scott's done a fantastic job with this business. What else besides fine art that requires Where is knowledge and skill to buy it right? Where is there opportunity for other people to securitize other hard asset classes? I think farmland, they've already done that. There's an ETF for buying farmland, which is another big hard asset favorite of some of the biggest investors. What else are the big boys investing in that little boys can't get into, and who's going to be the first to securitize them?
I think it's an interesting trend.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay. Well, let's dive into the crude oil market, starting with the recent events. You told us last week to watch the expiration of the June contract, which happened happened earlier this week for final confirmation that the storage crisis is under control, at least for now. So how did that all go?
Erik Townsend: Well, basically everything went off without a hitch there. You know, there was no negative prices. There was no crashing of the June contract at the last minute. In fact, we even got to almost a full dollar of backwardation, not contango, but backwardation, the opposite of contango, on the June-July contract. at one point. Now, normally that could only happen if the tanks were running dry and people were panicking that we were about to run out of oil in storage. Well, how could that possibly be happening now when we have the opposite fundamental conditions in terms of the amount of oil in storage? I think the answer is, you know, this is a market that's knee-jerking all over the place. So what we had was a panic situation of too much oil and no place to store it. Then we had the May event, the, the May contract expiry that took us to minus $40 prices because people were panicking and there was no place to put the oil.
And there were also, frankly, some traders that made some really dumb mistakes and got squeezed. Well, I think that probably there's some invisible hands at work here, Patrick. If you think about what is really going on, the WTI benchmark, the fact that West Texas Intermediate crude and the CME Group's NYMEX futures contract contract for it, are arguably the most important crude oil benchmark price in the entire industry. They were facing an existential threat if they had another out-of-control blowup like happened last month. I think that it probably would have been the end of WTI as a benchmark index. I think a lot of very powerful people wanted to make sure that that didn't happen no matter what, and I suspect I suspect that they had plenty of people standing by if there was a price rout to buy up a whole bunch of oil, if necessary, to prevent another price crash.
Of course, what that means is, as you go into the expiry, into the last day, those people that were setting storage aside for that reason, even if the price doesn't crash, they're still going to buy some oil in order to fill up the storage that they had set aside for it.
And I think that probably is how we got into backwardation, just because there had been an excessive amount of people making sure that there was no repeat of last month. It's the only way I can possibly explain it.
So what happens is production was forced lower. I think after the debacle with the May contract expiration a month ago, people freaked out, and people who were on the fence about shutting in production on their oil wells went ahead and shut in production. That happened so much that we got to a point where at least At least temporarily, there's no more crunch. In fact, we're seeing drawdowns out of Cushing, Oklahoma, so that there is finally, you know, a little bit more storage capacity available than there was just a few weeks ago. Question is whether that's going to last. Another really big question to understand, and I don't claim to have all of the answers yet— we'll probably need to get Art Berman back on the program at some point soon to talk about this— so, okay, how much of that capacity, how much of those shut-ins that have just happened in the last couple of months of US production are never coming back online.
There are some stripper wells which, from everything I'm reading, they were borderline economic to start with. A lot of them got shut in by filling the well casings with concrete plugs that would have to be drilled through in order to restart them. Those oil wells are never coming back online. It's not going to be economic to put them back online. On the other hand, from what I understand, And some of the latest technology, the most modern technology, shale wells, it's literally a few taps on an iPhone in order to restart some submersible pumps and bring those shut-in wells back online again. So it's, in some cases at least, it's very simple to take that idled capacity and turn it back on. Well, how much of the capacity that got turned off is stuck off?
And how much of it can easily be turned back on? That really is going to play a huge role in deciding what happens to this market from here. I don't know all of those answers, so let's try to see if we can get Art Berman booked to come back and talk to us a little bit about that.
I think that the combination of a short squeeze on time spreads, which was a very overcrowded trade to start with, plus a lot of those tanker deals that were taking a whole bunch of oil out of on-land storage, putting it into floating storage, and of course the shut-ins of production reducing that oversupply. It just all led to a perfect storm of when everybody feared Cushing was going to hit the tank tops, it ended up going the other way, and now there's a big sigh of relief.
The thing is, everybody is breathing this sigh of relief as if it was completely, totally over and there's nothing to worry about now. I'm not completely convinced of There's one article that Bloomberg had saying that they're already restarting shale wells that were taken offline because of the event that happened at the expiry of the May contract. Well, if they're going to turn all this stuff back on again and we get a second wave of the coronavirus crisis, we could go through a whole second round of super contango, whole second round of storage crisis, tanks actually hitting tank tops.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: It could all come back. The really big question is how much of that idled capacity can easily be turned back on and how much of it falls into the category, which seems to be true of the older wells, that once you shut it in, there's a really, really big cost associated with turning it back on again. I think that's going to play a really important role, and I need to do a little more homework in order to understand exactly what the interplay is. there. In any event, Patrick, we need to really understand both the bull and bear arguments so that when we do get more information and we also see how things are going, we know how to read the tea leaves and how to anticipate what's going to happen next.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, let's start with the bullish argument since that's what's on a lot of people's mind right now.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, the real key to understanding this is understanding how much of the supply that's been taken offline can be easily turned back on and how much of it is going to stay offline because it will be uneconomic to turn it back on. Now remember, some of those old stripper wells, they were borderline economic even before this crisis. A lot of those are going to be retired and never brought back online, but frankly, they didn't represent a very large overall amount of production capacity to start As I mentioned earlier, I'm told that the very latest technology makes it possible to just shut in and then restart some of these wells that use submersible pumps, literally by a few taps on an iPhone or an iPad.
I don't know that percentage breakdown. I wish that I did. But the key to understanding the bull case is if we have seen a lot of production come offline that cannot easily come back online, fine, then you don't necessarily need a full economic recovery. You know, you don't have to see a V-shaped economic recovery in order to get a V-shaped oil price recovery. Remember that oil prices are extremely sensitive to supply and demand. It only takes a small imbalance of supply and demand to move oil prices by a lot. So the bull argument is strongest If you think that a major second wave of coronavirus is unlikely— now, that's not my view, but a lot of people think it's very unlikely— even if there was a second wave, you know, we're going to reopen the economy anyway.
So, you know, second wave or no second wave, there's going to be more demand. If that demand is now going to balance not against the old supply numbers but the new supply numbers, if those new supply numbers have been forced much lower because a lot of production will be— was taken offline. Concrete plugs were installed in wells that would have to be drilled through, which is not going to happen. So it's going to stay offline. There's a case there for a very, very rapid V-shaped price recovery, even in the face of a stagnant economic recovery, just because so much oil was taken out of production.
So, that's the really strong bull argument. And, you know, don't underestimate how quickly Cushing and remaining US storage could draw down from near maximum levels to near minimum levels. It doesn't take too big of a supply-demand imbalance to radically change that situation of how storage is in Cushing. So, if you look at this in isolation with all other factors remaining equal. You can easily make the argument that, holy cow, if there's a lot of supply destruction which was permanent and we get even a partial economic recovery, because we are going to restart the economy with or without a second wave, we're still going to be operating the economy, boy, there could be a moonshot to the upside in prices.
There really is a strong argument there. The thing is, all things are not equal. OPEC+ is very cognizant of certain price thresholds at which it does become economic to drill new shale oil wells in the United States and to go ahead and restart even the ones that are expensive to restart. So, you know, at some point before OPEC+ allows us to get to those price levels, they're gonna start increasing their production in order to temper the pace at which oil prices recover. So, you know, we have to be cognizant of that.
The main point that I want to make about the bull case, though, is it's already started. I think it's almost certain that it's going to continue at least a little bit higher. The momentum right now to the upside in oil prices is unquestionable. The question is whether it can really be sustained all the way up to a full price recovery, or if we've got, you know, we had an overshot to the downside clearly at minus $40 prices. Is the pendulum already swinging too far, too quickly in the other direction? And are we going to be subject to a major pullback and a reversal of sentiment if it turns out that a second virus wave kind of puts a damper on the enthusiasm that exists in the market right now?
Patrick Ceresna: Now, I wanted to ask you how to play the bull case in terms of market positioning, but let's first discuss the bear argument a little
Erik Townsend: Well, as I just said, the bull case is already in motion. It's happening. It's already run pretty far. My sense is that the market is pricing in an expectation that there is no second wave and that a V-shaped demand recovery is going to occur. Now, I think those are dangerous assumptions, although they are plausible. I think there's a little bit too much bullish enthusiasm in this market.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Everybody, I think, is getting sucked into this. Well, the prices are so low, you know, they just can't go wrong in the long run. It's got to be all uphill from here. Well, that's in the long run, that will be true, but there's plenty of room for more downside volatility from here before we get to that.
The question is, now that the forcing function, the thing that really pulled us way down to not just zero price but negative price, was there's a forcing function that when you start to run out of storage, there's no place to put the oil, the price just has to keep going lower until it incentivizes the creation of more storage. Seems like, for now at least, that forcing function is no longer in play. What that means is we can have a sentiment-driven rally where all it takes is people getting excited to drive the prices to almost any level. Level. At some point, I think that's going to become overdone, but I have to critique myself because I've said a few times now that I thought it was already overdone, and boy, look, it's, it's continued. So I'm trying to be a little more realistic and say, okay, this probably still could have a lot more room to move to the upside if the sentiment continues to be right where it is, because there's really nothing— if you look at the technical charts, we've broken through some key I don't see anything on the WTI chart until $38 or so at the 100-month moving average, and that's on the continuation chart.
It's $39.79 on the contract chart. So, you know, you're somewhere between $38 and $40 before you get to the next significant technical resistance on the chart. There's lots of room to run to the upside until we get a change in sentiment. And so far, I don't see any sign of that sentiment change. But I think at some point, if we do get a second wave of coronavirus and there's a realization that even if lockdowns are lifted, that still voluntary behavior does not bring back oil demand because people still, if they're allowed to fly on airline flights, don't want to. That's not being priced in right now. If there is a public realization of what seems pretty clear to me, which is there's no good reason to assume that a coronavirus vaccine is a certainty. We certainly have a lot of very smart medical minds working on one. Hopefully we'll get one, but it doesn't mean it's a certainty, and it doesn't mean that it's certain to be completely effective.
I think that once some of that reality hits the tape, there could be another, you know, reversal of sentiment and maybe an overshoot to the downside again.
This is a very, very volatile market. There's a lot of reason to see room for this to go either way. Right now, the trend is up, I would say, with some reckless enthusiasm. Who's to say we're not going to get another down leg with a little bit more reckless enthusiasm in the opposite direction? If we do, though, I think it's time to definitely be buying that next bottom if you didn't already buy the first bottom or adding leverage on the next bottom, because ultimately this is going to resolve to the upside.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, I want to talk about how to trade the long side throughout the recovery in oil prices. And in the past, you've said that ETFs such as the USO were bad choices because they suffer from the huge tracking error as a result of contango losses rolling forward their positions. So how do you as a futures trader approach the long side of this market?
Erik Townsend: Well, hold on, because it's important to understand that USO issue. The problem with USO was, past tense, that they used to be exposed almost entirely to the front-month futures contract and just roll it all at once right before it expired. That meant that they were subject to huge tracking errors when there was super contango in the market, which is what happens when you get into a very strong demand for storage, as we had recently. Now, ironically, that super contango is basically basically gone from the market now. So the way that USO used to work before they changed it would actually perform quite well in the present environment that we have today, because holding the front-month futures contract and rolling it just before it expires is actually what's performing best right now. Because first of all, you don't have that super contango in the market, but also the super contango has just come out of the market, which means if you were exposed that front-month contract. That's where you got the biggest upside as the super contango was coming out of the market.
Now, that's ironic that it used to be that way, but now USO doesn't work that way anymore. So the way USO is positioned, it's suboptimal for a different set of reasons, which is it's exposed to later contracts in order to avoid the super contango, and they're missing out on the big upside. that exists in the front-month contract. Now, that's ironic to be sure, but I don't think it's coincidental. In fact, I think there's a causal relationship there. One of the reasons that we got to such extreme super contango was because the USO ETF represents such a large percentage of the market that was all concentrated as a paper long in the front month that everybody knew was there, that everybody knew had to be rolled every every month, and the market was basically exploiting the retail investor by creating a situation where that large tracking error would occur. The fact that USO completely changed the way that they do things and now that strategy is not working is not a coincidence.
It's because they changed the way that they do things that is part of the reason that the super contango was able to come out of the market, and it's part of the reason that it's not performing now. So these exchange-traded products like USO are really not the optimal way to try to trade the futures market. I don't know why they're so popular. Getting back to how to trade this in the futures market, if you believe that that super contango is
Erik Townsend: gone for good, it's not coming back, we're not going to have any more storage problems, then holding and rolling the front-month futures contract definitely has a lot of merit. One really big caveat, though, Patrick, is the exchange has dramatically increased the margin requirements for the front-month contract specifically. So depending on how much leverage you use and how sensitive you are to margin requirements, there is kind of a case to be made for holding the second month or even the third month instead of the first month because there's a much smaller margin requirement. to be exposed to that contract.
But the question that's more important is, is this super contango experience that we had with storage, is it really behind us? Or is it maybe more the case that what happened is that short squeeze and the restructuring of USO led to the super contango rapidly coming out of the market as something of an overshoot that went too far, and it's now going to retrace in the other direction? and some of that super contango is going to come back into the market. If you think that's what's going to happen, you don't want to be in the front-month contract for all the reasons that you didn't used to want to be in USO back in the day when it was exposed to the front-month contract.
Now, the way professional futures traders overcome super contango, and frankly the way a lot of them do position trading on the long side of the crude market to start with is by using time spreads at the back of the curve. Now, I should explain, it's, it's an expression in the industry. People say the back of the curve, meaning not the front of the curve. We're not really talking about all the way at the back of the curve, like futures that are dated 2027 and 2028. Nobody trades that stuff. When futures traders talk about the back of the curve, they mean 2 or 3 years out as opposed to the front month contract.
Those time spreads on the back of the curve are a proxy for the flat price, but it's often less volatile than the flat price. And the reason is it's mostly professionals that are trading it. So whereas the front-month futures contract gets ripped around by the influence of these exchange-traded products like the, the USO and, and UCO and these various other ETPs, the time spreads tend to be less volatile and And they provide a more stable way of expressing a long view. Now, there's some nuance to that. You have to understand the concepts associated with term structure because there are scenarios depending on what happens with refinery outages and pipelines and so on and so forth, where you could have a disconnect between the front month price and the performance of those back-of-curve time spreads. But in most cases, the back-of-the-curve time spread is an effective proxy for flat price, and it's not subject to the effects of super contango.
So you get kind of a double benefit there. Usually they're traded on the most liquid December contracts only. In other words, if you're trading 2 or 3 years out, there's no liquidity in the April of 2022 contract. It doesn't make sense to trade that. There's plenty of liquidity in the December contract.
So right now, a very popular trade, Patrick, is long the December 2020 contract and short the December '21 contract. That's a popular trade because a lot of people tend to just go to whatever the, the next December is. Right now, this— the nearest December is December of '20. Next one after that is December of '21. Okay, Z1, Z2, or, or dees red dees, is the expression in the industry. For that spread. Here's the reason I think that's a bad idea: December '20 is too close. If we get a return to super contango, that December '20 contract is going to get sucked down in that super contango event because it's too close to the front of the curve. So I don't like that Z0/Z1, or December '20 to December '21 spread, even though it does seem to be pretty popular right I think that long December of '21, short December of '22 is a much smarter time spread to trade as a proxy to express a long-term bullish view on oil prices.
You could split the difference instead by using the June contracts, which are the second most liquid contract after the December contracts, by going long June of '20 and short June of '21.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Now, that's a little bit closer to the ideal in terms of how far out on the curve it is. But the thing is, there's a lot less liquidity in those June contracts. So especially for larger traders, you really need to be in the Decembers.
But there's also a hidden problem, which is, think about the fact that USO, one of the things that they did when they restructured is they moved a lot of their exposure. I guess it's actually only about 10% of their exposure.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: But still, they're a big piece of the market. So there's a great big position that USO holds long the June '21 contract. Well, if you're going to express your spread trade as long June '21 and short June '22, what happens when USO eventually decides to roll out of that June '21? They're probably going to pull that price down so that, you know, you're making a significant risk there of being in a contract where your long position is the same position that USO is in and that you know USO is going to eventually roll out of. Well, the question then becomes, when is USO going to move out of that June '21 position that they have?
I can't find any intelligence on that. The USO seems to be very open about telling people ahead of time what their trading plans As far as this June '21 position that they now have, clearly they're not going to roll it to July '21. That doesn't make any sense. It's not liquid enough. They probably at some point are going to roll that to December of '21. So if you knew that that was their plan and you could front-run it by being long the June '21 to June '22 spread now, and just before USO rolls their position, You roll your position first out of M1, M2 into Z1, Z2, and then after that, USO rolls from M1 to Z1, you're going to get a bump. You're going to benefit from the fact that USO trading a contract that far into the future is probably going to move the needle on price. You'd have to know ahead of time what their intentions are.
If anybody listening knows their intentions or has any insights on that, let us know. Yeah, I don't know. That. I'm very interested because I'm tempted by that, but for now I like the Z1/Z2 spread as my, my favorite trade for expressing a long view. And in the interest of full disclosure, that is my current trade.
I do have exposure to the long time spreads. I've actually been accumulating that through all of this crisis. I've been accumulating the long-dated time spreads on the long side for quite a while. I had a larger short position on the near-dated time spreads, so they were hedging one another. At this point, I've covered all of my short time spreads, so my only exposure is to the long side. That's what I'm playing right now because I think for now the trend is very clearly up. At some point, I won't be surprised if this sentiment reverses. At that point, I'm not going to close my longs. I very much want to keep these long exposures to those long-dated time spreads. But what I will do is I'll go back to adding short time spreads at the front of the curve to hedge that downside risk, because I do think that we're probably going to get another wave down before this is over.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, we got a lot of inquiries from retail investors asking how retail traders should get in on these trades. What do you say to our retail listeners about how to do this?
Erik Townsend: You know, I've given a lot of thought to this, and I certainly don't want to put anybody off. You know, we, we love all of our listeners. Look, MacroVoices is not intended, it's not designed for retail traders. As Andy, our announcer, says at the beginning of every show, MacroVoices is for professional finance, family offices, and very sophisticated private investors. And we, of course, welcome retail traders to listen to the program. It's not designed for that. And frankly, the real reason is I don't know. I'm a futures trader, I would never try to trade commodities through exchange-traded products like USO and these other ETPs. I think that's crazy. They're very flawed products that don't make much sense. It seems logical to me that you do one of two things: either learn all about this, and it is a fairly significant learning curve to learn all about how to trade futures, including understanding the term structure of the futures market, or don't try to trade it.
Now, there are proxies like buying, you know, ETPs like XLE, which is the oil companies trading the stock of the oil companies rather than the commodity itself. Look, I don't have any personal experience with that. I'm not an expert on that. Patrick, you, on the other hand, at Big Picture Trading, I know you do a lot of work with a much larger retail audience to try to translate some of these trades. to how to, you know, do this for retail accounts. So I guess my advice is, you know, sign up for Big Picture Trading. If you don't want to pay for Big Picture Trading, you can watch Cramer on TV. But MacroVoices is not designed to explain how to translate stuff to retail trades because I don't know how to do that.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, I got it. So for the pros, you take the long time spreads at the back of the curve, particularly focusing on that and favoring that spread between December 2021 and '22. But, uh, you hedge that with some of the short front-of-the-curve time spreads if sentiment was to reverse.
And for those of our retail audience, your answer to them is learn to trade futures and, and the intricacies of the term structure, or just stick with retail products and stop trying to trade commodities through these inefficient ETPs and, uh, that suffer all these large, uh, tracking errors, Right. For me, I find that the correlations between many energy companies and that of oil allow a lot of retail investors to just trade it through many of those energy companies. But that's— that we can have as another conversation in one of our future episodes. Was there anything else you wanted to add here?
Erik Townsend: Well, I just want to agree with what you just said, Patrick, which is I think that if you want to take this to looking at trading the oil companies. You know, an ETF like XLE is a very efficient, effective way to trade a basket of oil company stocks. It's, it's well suited to that, whereas these ETPs that try to trade commodities without any comprehension of how the term structure works, they just seem like a dumb idea. So my strong advice to anyone is either stay away from USO and all these other commodity ETPs like DBA that have all these huge tracking errors because they're administered in a way that has no cognizance of the effects of contango and backwardation in the term structure. You know, trade stocks instead, something that makes sense to trade through those exchange-traded funds. Or if you, you know, are not satisfied with that and you really want to trade commodities, learn how to trade commodities.
Erik Townsend: It just seems like a pretty clear choice to me.
In any event, Patrick, we're going to need to leave it there for this week's show. This episode was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at TopTradersUnplugged.com/MacroGuide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit MacroVoices.com/Sponsorship. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as well as, of course, our post-game chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to a chart deck provided by Daniel Lacalle. Also, there's an interesting article from Seth Levine titled Collateral, Leverage, and Volatility. You'll also find the link to Erik's interview with Scott Lynn about securitized fine art investing, and a really interesting blog article from Variant Perception about the upside inflation risks favoring the value investor. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we will include it in our weekly distributions.
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Ben Hunt — Dr. Ben Hunt, founder of Second Foundation Partners and author of the Epsilon Theory newsletter (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 219 was recorded on May 14th, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers all over the world, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing, helping investors overcome behavioral biases.
Epsilon Theory newsletter author Dr. Ben Hunt joins me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll discuss the long-term knock-on effects of the COVID-19 coronavirus crisis and the post-crisis economy recovery outlook. Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment. Patrick has prepared another of his famous postgame chart books, so we'll be taking a close look at the S&P and just how many stocks are actually responsible for that bear market rally that we're seeing. We'll also look at the dollar Dollar Index, various currency pairs, and other major global indices.
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, Erik, let's dive into that S&P 500. It looked like at the start of the week that we were going to make a run for 3,000 and then we've given it all back in the last 3 days, almost breaking to a fresh low for the month of May. But, uh, what's your take here as we go into OPEX?
Erik Townsend: Well, I had my second chance Patrick. Remember, I, I've been saying 2,930 was the level to short. First time we got there, I intentionally passed on it because I just I had too much leverage on in my oil trades. I wanted to stay focused on that. I've taken a lot of that leverage off because, frankly, we'll get to the oil market in a minute. It's not doing what I had originally thought it was going to do. So, I had my chance. I thought long and hard about it as I was staring at that screen at $29.45 or whatever it was trading midday the other day, and I decided to pass on it. Obviously, in hindsight, at least in the short term, that was a mistake. Stan Druckenmiller went uber bearish. Maybe if I had known that, I would have—
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Been more tempted to go ahead and jump in on the trade. And then President Trump apparently got all upset and in an angry tweet storm, he described Stan Druckenmiller as a so-called rich guy.
Mr. President, if you're listening, I can assure you Stan Druckenmiller is a bona fide rich guy and he got to be a bona fide rich guy, so-called or otherwise, by being really, really good at understanding the economy and markets, probably better than you do, sir. So I don't know about the so-called So, on that so-called rich guy thing, I would love to get Stan on the program. He's— Patrick, he's been at the top of our wish list ever since we started doing MacroVoices 4 years ago.
I would absolutely love to get him on the program because my question for him would be, okay, the central banks have been so successful for the last decade at propping up asset markets. And that's the primary reason that I decided to pass on this is I just don't know if central bank intervention is gonna somehow prop the asset markets, including the stock market, up higher once again.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: It was very curious to me, Patrick. Stan Druckenmiller, in his presentation to the New York Economic Club, which was done as a webinar because, of course, they're not meeting live in the coronavirus crisis in New York City, he told the New York Economic Club audience that he thinks this might be the event that finally kind of tips us out of this credit bubble that's been created by central bank largesse. And so, maybe the jig is finally up, so to speak. Right. As far as I know, and I didn't attend that webinar myself, he never really elaborated, and nobody asked him to, on why he thinks the jig might be up now and why central banks wouldn't be able to continue to just prop up asset markets.
If things really did get to what Mr. Druckenmiller seems to be implying, that the jig is up and markets are going to stop assuming that central banks can achieve anything with printed money, that would be really, really big. We could be looking at the beginning of a an outright depression. Listeners, if anyone has Stan Druckenmiller's ear, we would love to get him on the program for a feature interview. He's been top of our list for a long time. He's a very hard guy to get a hold of. If anyone has his ear, please tell him MacroVoices is worth his time and that we would love to have him on to really dive into those views in more detail.
Going back to the S&P, Patrick, we'll get into this more in the postgame segment when we look at some charts, but I still see it As I did before, as bear market rally that appears to have peaked out at the 61.8 retrace. In any normal market, any market other than one which is propped up by central bank largesse, I would be extremely high conviction mega short here because I think we ought to be headed for new lows below 2,000 on the S&P. On the other hand, what we've seen in the last 10 years is the central banks always seem to just come to the rescue and overcome normal economic gravity. So it remains to be seen what comes next.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the US Dollar Index because every dip seems to be bought. The price action looks like it's going higher, but we don't have a breakout. Like, it hasn't really taken off. What's your take? Are we finally going to see a move in the dollar?
Erik Townsend: Well, as I read the chart, we're still consolidating here between 99 and 101. We got to get a break out of that range before we have any signal. And if it is to the upside, as I expect it will be, The next thing to watch is 104.
I did see someone posted a chart on Twitter saying supposedly today was the breakout on the Dollar Index, and they're drawing a symmetrical triangle that goes through that 104 high to an earlier, you know, much earlier, higher high. And supposedly the way that they've drawn the line, that's a symmetrical triangle, and we broke out of it today. I don't see where that line is going or what the previous high is that it's pointing to. So, I'm not really sure about that chart, but at least Somebody on Twitter thinks that we're getting a breakout right now to the upside on the dollar. I'll believe that when I see first a daily close over 101, then a daily close over 104. I still do think that's where we're headed, but we need to see those technical signals in order to really reinforce that fundamental view.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil because it's been slowly crawling higher for the last couple weeks. Like, are we going to have a retest that low? What's your thinking on how this is playing out?
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm going to be the first to admit, Patrick, that I've been utterly baffled by a lot of what's going on here. The market is sending us a very clear signal in the form of prices, primarily not just the flat price of crude oil, but on crude oil time spreads. And that message is, hey baby, the storage crisis is over. Bloomberg even had an article claiming that some of the shutdown oil wells in the Permian Basin are being restarted. Now, I talked to Anas Alhajji. He thinks that the Bloomberg reporter is confused and they're actually— something else is being restarted, not oil wells.
In any case, it is easy to say, okay, maybe the reason that the inventory builds are petering out and we're starting to see drawdowns, as I had originally predicted, that's what would happen when we got to the point where the tanks were all full. The thing is, if If we were at the point where the tanks were completely full and there's no storage available, the time spreads would not be rallying the way that they have been. We've seen an amazing move in the June-July time spread back up to, as we're speaking right now, 36 cents of contango. Minus 36 is the print.
That's a perfectly normal closing print on OPEX day in a normal market when you don't have a coronavirus crisis, when there's modest demand for storage. Definitely, 36 cents of contango means there's some demand for storage. It's not like we're running out of oil and the tanks are going dry. You'd have backwardation in that case. But 36 cents of contango is a normal market kind of condition. It's not what I would have expected at all. It did start to kind of crash this morning, but it fully recovered to a new higher high.
And today was options expiration day. So, you know, what we're getting in terms of price signals is really telling us everything's fine, nothing's wrong.
The whole problem that we had with storage is all behind us. The bottom's in. Get ready for the recovery to begin from here. The thing is, it ain't over until the fat lady sings. And the way that the futures market works after options expiration day into contract expiry, which really it's Monday afternoon at 2:30 and then finally Tuesday, At 2:30, but Monday is probably the point where you know for sure what's gonna happen. If there's gonna be a crash in the June price and a blowout of that June-July spread into massive contango, which would be an indication of an imbalance where you have too many paper longs that are trying to roll forward and the shorts in the market are physical shorts who intend to deliver into that contract, it puts a squeeze on the longs and the price utterly collapses like it did last month.
If that's going to happen, the fact it didn't happen yet isn't really surprising. You'd expect it to happen after options expiration because options expiration is also when position limits go into effect. So the open interest going into tomorrow's trading day will be much, much smaller than it was today. And now's where that imbalance starts to get worked out. The thing is, Patrick, so far all indications have been everything's fine. And these time spreads can be arbitraged. You can get cheap storage in Cushing by shorting the June contract, delivering oil into it, and buying it back 6 months later. And you get 6 months of storage for about $4.50.
It was more than that for 1 month's storage a month ago. How did this get all better? Do we really believe it's all better? If it was just the flat price, I'd say, okay, this is a sentiment-driven rally. A whole bunch of people are putting too much faith in this rhetoric around reopening the economy and everything's going to be better and probably prices are headed back down. The thing is, the time spreads can be arbitraged. That's not just sentiment. It means that that storage is available and that those spreads are not being arbitraged. So it's a real mystery to me. I'm going to be very curious to see how this works out over the next few days. Inventory.
Crude oil drawing down 0.7 million barrels nationally. Now, that's a little bit misleading because there was a build of 1.9 million barrels on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. So net of Of the SPR, it was a 1.2 million barrel build. A drawdown though in Cushing, Oklahoma of 3 million barrels, which is pretty significant. Gasoline drawing down 3.5 million barrels, distillates building 3.5 million barrels. We also saw a low on the year in refinery runs. So refineries are not throttling back up even though it seems like everybody's acting like everything's getting better. Refineries haven't got the memo yet. From the looks of things, US production 11.6 million barrels. That's down 300,000 barrels from last week. Again, these EIA numbers are estimates. I suspect that the real production number is even lower than that, as we're hearing a lot of reports of very aggressive shut-ins. There's a lot of people who are saying, well, but the thing is, you know, you're talking about these time spreads, but there's no sign of these tanker deals slowing down.
We're seeing more and more oil going into floating storage.
I think that's a little bit of an optical illusion, Patrick. And the reason is the deals that were made last month when people were buying the May contract to take delivery and put on a tanker and selling it back into the market a year later or something. They're taking delivery of that oil this month and putting it on the tanker. So, the oil you see going into floating storage, I think, is based on deals that were made last month. The source of funding that pays for and makes those tanker trades economic is the contango in the futures term structure. As that contango has come out of the market, the source of funding has come out of the market. I can't imagine very many new tanker deals that are being signed or put into place now. The oil that's going onto tankers now, I think, is oil that was in deals that were made a month ago.
Tying this all together, it's possible that this is all a great big sentiment-driven rally where everybody is just excited about reopening the economy and the time spreads are up simply because of an epically crowded trade going wrong and a huge short squeeze. That's a plausible explanation. But the fact remains, those spreads can be arbitraged for storage.
Well, okay, how would we know if they are being arbitraged? In other words, people, if they wanted to arbitrage that very small time spread, they could sell the June contract and buy the December contract. And for that difference of about $4.50, they would get storage of oil for that price for 6 months. Well, if people are doing that, it means that they are selling the June contract with the intention of standing for delivery. We won't find that out until sometime between tomorrow and Monday when the market has to resolve The remaining open interest and get down to who's actually physically standing for delivery. So, if people are arbitraging that spread, as would seem to be a ripe opportunity, we'll find out by Monday. If we get through Monday and there hasn't been any crash in the front month price, I think the only plausible conclusion at that point is there really has been just an extraordinary recovery where the price function forced so much shut-in of production.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: That suddenly we don't have a storage crisis anymore. Storage is able to keep up with the amount of production that's flowing into it. So, just very difficult for me to believe that's actually happening, but that's the signal that the market is giving us.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to gold because gold is up about $22 today, edging towards $1,750. I don't know whether it's officially a breakout. We'll talk about that chart in the postgame, but what's your take right now on bullion? Is it going higher?
Erik Townsend: I keep wishing for weakness so I can buy some gold on the cheap, and I keep getting disappointed. You know, the long-term bullish argument couldn't be stronger. The thing to remember is everyone knows that. A lot of people are already all in. There really are all of the ingredients there for a big technical correction. Doesn't change my bullish view, and I'm hoping for a big technical correction because I want to buy more gold. But, you know, I interviewed Brent Johnson, On All-Stars this week, Brent's one of the few people who's been even more adamant than I am in saying, hey folks, even though the fundamentals couldn't be better, you know, everybody's all in, there's room for a technical correction here.
Brent was really outspoken in saying, you know, we're really very likely to get back to a test of $1,350. This was the first time I interviewed Brent, and he's kind of dropped that, and he's saying, you know, I thought that was going to be the way it was going to play out, but it sure doesn't look that way. So, maybe we're just gonna power higher from here. The big test, of course, will be breaking above the previous high. I think it was 1770-something. If we can break to a new cycle high for this year, then that certainly says we're on the way toward the previous all-time high of, I think it was 1922, set back in 2011.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yield, which is trading around spot 62 right now. But it doesn't matter whether we go 2-year, 5-year, 30-year, they're all just crawling lower. They don't seem to have any jump in the yields that seems to stick, and it looks like they want to break lower. Are we, are we still going to get this kind of deflationary impulse that pushes the yields lower from here?
Erik Townsend: I think so. You know, as I surmise all of the feedback that we're getting from all of our feature interview guests, and I think you'll hear some more of this from Dr. Ben Hunt this week, you know, a lot of people think that inflation is on the horizon. But nobody thinks it's now.
We've still got deflation that really calls for still lower bond yields. Probably the final bottom is not in yet. Maybe the final bottom is negative on the 10-year. I don't know. We'll have to see.
I'm gonna continue asking our guests, but the thing I'm really starting to think about is charting the course for an eventual secular change from deflation to either inflation or stagflation. The last time that happened in the markets was in the 1960s. There's nobody left alive who was, you know, professionally working in the industry at that time who hasn't retired or passed on. So, we've got a whole industry that is not ready for this change. I think it's coming in the next 5 years. Now, is it coming in the next 2 years or is it coming in 6 or 7 years? I really don't know. I'm gonna keep asking all the experts.
Patrick Ceresna: This week's feature interview guest is Epsilon Theory newsletter author, Dr. Ben Hunt. Now, why did we ask Dr. Ben Hunt back on the show this week.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, as this coronavirus crisis unfolded, there was a small group of people on financial Twitter who really saw it early and were very outspoken about it. And we've had Jim Bianco on the program before talking about this. He was one of the earliest and most visionary people to really see how this played out. Ben has been the big picture guy who's really thinking not so much about, you know, what's the difference between R-naught and, you know, the various technical details of understanding virology. He's more thinking about the societal impacts and how it's going to affect generational cycles and, you know, big picture kind of stuff. So, I wanted to get an update from Ben now that we're at least past the worst first wave
Erik Townsend: of this crisis and see where he thinks we're headed. So, that was the motivation for getting him back.
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Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Dr. Ben Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Dr. Ben Hunt, founder of Second Foundation Partners, and perhaps most famously, the author of the extremely popular Epsilon Theory newsletter. Ben, it's great to have you back on MacroVoices. It's so good because, you know, we've done a lot of coverage of the COVID-19 crisis with a lot of really smart people. We had Dr. Chris Martenson on, and, you know, we're diving into the nitty-gritty of, okay, what's R-naught and what's the transmissibility gonna tell us about, you know, the virus mutation, and how do we— what's the difference between antibody testing and contact testing? We've covered all that.
Something I've noticed from day one of this crisis is you've always been the guy who's thinking 5 steps ahead, not so much to what's on the table right now in front of us, but what are the long-term implications on society going to be as we go through, as the entire world goes through something that it hasn't gone through in more than 100 years?
I just think of you as the, the big picture guy who's got a better perspective on the coronavirus crisis, what it means economically, but also what it means for society.
Ben, we spoke off the air about 3 narratives that you talk about as they pertain to this crisis. Let's start with those. What's the first narrative?
Ben Hunt: Thanks for having me, Erik. And I also want to thank you for your coverage of this. So, what I thought might be helpful is to describe what I think are the 3 primary politicized narratives that have been built around COVID-19. Each of these narratives at its core is based on a model.
It's based on a top-down application of an abstraction. It starts with a model, and only at the end does it try to make some sort of imperfect fit to what individuals can and should do. And I think it's so important to understand that that's how I think we can all recognize a political narrative, a narrative that's an effort to maintain control or power, a narrative that is there for institutional interest rather than for the interest of you and me and the common good.
So if that sounds right to you, let me start with that, the 3 big political narratives that I think have really taken over. Our public discourse around this virus. And then I think I can suggest some, some alternative ways of thinking about this.
Number one, I call what about the flu, right? So this is, this is a narrative that, that frankly has died down a bit. It's the narrative that dominated the early days of discussion about You know, about coronavirus. I know you're well familiar with this, Erik, because you and I and everyone who was sounding the alarm about this early, we certainly heard this from, from a lot of different sources that it's just like the flu, the flu is worse, you know, what's the big deal?
The political goal of this narrative, and it's absolutely a political narrative, is to minimize the COVID-19 threat. It has at its heart a nugget of truth. The seasonal flu is in fact a nasty and rather mitigatable disease. But the big lie of this narrative is that COVID-19 and the virus that causes it, the biology of the virus, as you and Chris and so many others have done such a good job in describing, the political purpose is to minimize it, to say this isn't a big deal.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Ben Hunt: Certainly, we can see lots of examples of this narrative being promoted from the political right. I mean, we all have seen the clips of Rush Limbaugh saying, oh, it's just the flu. We've all got our pictures of Donald Trump standing up at the podium and saying similar things.
But I think what's very important is to recognize that In the in the early days of a policy response to this, and I can give you lots of examples of this too. You know, you'd go on to CNN and you'd see Dr. Gupta. He'd be talking about well, we need to you know compare this to the flu, that it's not a big deal.
At the time, this was in reaction, and again, this is how these these these narratives become politicized. This was in reaction to. Trump's decision at the end of January to stop flights coming in from China, or to stop some flights. Let's say that, right? And so at the time, when you looked at a lot of the media coverage from let's call it institutions that were politically opposed to the White House, they adopted this narrative that oh, it's just like it's it's no worse than the flu.
Just as much as the political right adopted this narrative in the weeks ahead.
The reason I say that this is a model-driven narrative, and I think there's, there's, you know, this crazy lack of knowledge about this out in the public, is that all these numbers that you hear about how many people every year die from the flu, these are not actual counts. You know, it's not like we are counting the people who die of the flu in hospitals.
These are models. These are these are these are models that the CDC and and others create to again create this picture, this abstraction of how dangerous the seasonal flu is. The only flu deaths we actually count in this country are pediatric influenza deaths. We do actually count when children die of flu, but the the big numbers that you hear talking about oh the flu kills. You know, X tens of thousands of people last year.
These are numbers that are created from a model. They incorporate essentially every pneumonia death, so many respiratory deaths, and they are created, and then they're presented to us with the purpose of encouraging seasonal flu vaccines. Right? And it kind of boggles my mind because so many of the people who make this argument, oh, it's no worse than the flu.
And then they trot out these numbers. These are people who think they are anti-modeling. These are people who think that they are, you know, raising the alarm about how we're taking these anti-COVID-19 policies on the basis of some model, when what they're talking about, the narrative they're presenting to minimize the COVID-19 threat, It's a narrative. It's a model too.
It's based on a model as well. So, you know, that's kind of my first example of these model-driven political narratives used by both the left and the right, depending on what's politically advantageous to them. And it's just, you know, my first example of how this is being politicized and really used against us.
The second example I'll give is this example of the narrative that, oh, herd immunity, right? That the policy we should take on is one in which we just get it over with, basically. That the political goal here is one of preserving the economic status quo. And again, there's a nugget of truth here, just as there was a nugget of truth in the political narrative of, oh, it's just the flu.
The nugget of truth here is that massive unemployment as a policy reaction to this virus, it is devastating. Massive unemployment is absolutely devastating. But the big lie here, the big lie here that I see in the policy narratives that come out of the idea of seeking herd immunity is that That while we are developing herd immunity, that we can protect the olds and the sick, right? That, oh, we'll do fine in protecting the people who have some condition that makes them more susceptible to dying from this virus, whether that preexisting condition is age or that preexisting condition is something like diabetes or respiratory disease or anything like that.
Yeah. That's nonsense, right? And what we see, what we are experiencing, is that that that is the big lie that while we're developing this, we can we can protect these people. The model that this is based on, you know, the model that this this politicized narrative is based on, with a goal again of of preserving the economic status quo, is. You know, in the same way that It's Just the Flu had these laughably inaccurate models of seasonal flu deaths in the United States, so here do we have these laughably inaccurate models of COVID-19 infection spread and severity, you know, totally distanced from the bi— again, the biology of this virus that Chris and others have done such a good job of talking about. Yeah.
It's it's a made-up, top-down model to convince us that it's perfectly fine to just go about your business. Right? That oh yeah, maybe you want to do a little social distancing, but you know it's it's what we really have to do is we have to preserve the the economy and some sacrifice, some some large sacrifice in lives is you know. Perfectly fine to do that.
Again, it's very easy, I think, to find examples of this narrative from the political right. But I think it's important to recognize that the kind of national example of this, Sweden, you know, this argument is coming from the political left. More appropriately, I believe, is that this argument often comes from political incumbents.
Because while that nugget of truth is absolutely right, massive unemployment is devastating to families and individuals. The political truth is that massive unemployment is particularly devastating to political incumbents who have elections coming up. And I think so much of what's driving this narrative of herd immunity, open back up, it's really not so bad, you'll probably be fine. Is being driven by these political necessities and imperatives.
And that's also true for the third narrative, the third politicized narrative that I, that I think is, uh, so prevalent here today, and that's flatten the curve, right? Whereas it's just the flu and herd immunity, I, I think, are— have some sort of goal either of, of COVID-19 threat minimization in the case of, of, uh, it's just the flu, or have as their political goal the maintenance of, of economic status quo. I think the political goal of much of the flatten the curve narrative is that of COVID-19 threat maximization.
And again, there's a nugget of truth here. These lockdowns that come from flatten the curve are absolutely useful in preventing a surge in cases, which can overwhelm the healthcare system.
At the same time, though, there's also a big lie here. And the big lie, I believe, of flatten the curve is that we can get R-naught down to zero, right? That it's somehow taken on a larger purpose, and the somehow is the politicization of this, But rather than simply doing its supposed goal at the outset, which was to flatten the curve, the curve being healthcare utilization, the curve being avoiding an overwhelming of the healthcare system, as you saw in Wuhan in China, as you saw in many cases in Italy, as you certainly saw in New York City, now it's gone beyond that. It's like, well, no, no, no, just hang on.
We can knock out the disease entirely, not just flatten the curve, but try to eliminate the curve. And the political, I think, drive behind that is that when we've got everyone freaked out about staying alive, man, there's no end to the crazy authoritarian stuff we can get away with, right? So, if the policy prescription of herd immunity is, at its core, oh, hey, you'll probably be okay.
I mean, probably. I think the policy prescription of flatten the curve in its politicized form has become, hey, you know what? You'll find these ankle monitors to be surprisingly light and comfortable to wear.
It's just phenomenal to me how far away we've gotten in all 3 of these politicized narratives. But particularly these last two I mentioned, either the open up, we're going to go for herd immunity narrative, or the stay locked down, we've got to flatten the curve narrative. It's phenomenal to me in both of these how far away we've gotten from the original intent and focus, which was one that was focused on the biology of this disease, and instead has become a Again, a politicized narrative to try to achieve, frankly, ends and goals which are not to our advantage as citizens, but are definitely to the advantage of the institutions and the political structures which are now promoting them.
Erik Townsend: Ben, let's talk about what has happened in terms of the monetary and fiscal policy response. Because, you know, as you go through these different narratives, look, I don't claim to be so smart as to know which one of those I don't think that one of those narratives is more prudent than the other ones. There's obviously trade-offs between flattening the curve and is there some benefit from herd immunity and so forth. It's a hard puzzle.
But what I see here is with essentially zero public debate or discourse, we somehow just one day flipped a switch and said, well, because all of this is going on, first of all, if there's anybody that we can identify and it was not their fault that the virus happened, in other words, everybody, right? Because it's not anybody's fault.
You know, if it's not airlines' fault that this happened, well, then we ought to take public money, your money and my money, and give it to airlines to bail them out because, hey, it's not their fault. Cruise ships, well, it's not their fault. The private jet industry, it's not their fault that this happened. Let's give 'em some money.
We basically flipped a switch and went to unlimited monetary policy, you know, central bank balance sheet expansion. That makes QE 1, 2, and 3 look like a backyard weenie roast compared to what we've now got cooking. It's basically providing the central bank-funded source to supply the necessary money to fuel the next step, which is, hey, every week or so, let's just pass a couple trillion with a T dollars of fiscal stimulus that We haven't really even talked about— not only has there been no public discourse, but even the senators that are voting for this stuff aren't even sure what's in the bill because they haven't had time to read it. And we're passing $2 trillion a week for a while there in fiscal stimulus. And, you know, it— I'm very much of the opinion that the United States needs and would benefit from the right, well-thought-out infrastructure program.
But wait a minute, I haven't heard a single bit of discussion about what the trade-offs are and what kind of infrastructure we should be investing in and what the plan is for this infrastructure bill. It's just, hey, a couple trillion for that, let's do it, why not?
And what are we going to do for our next $2 trillion next week? Where does this take us in terms of— I mean, and I'm so tempted to say, well, it has to be inflationary. You know, I've said quite a few times in the last 10 years, Of course, this has to be inflationary, and it didn't quite break us out of deflation.
Is this finally the big thing that brings about a secular shift from deflation to inflation? If so, how long does it take for that to play out? And if not, what else does this mean? Because it seems like we're in completely uncharted territory with just insane amounts of spending and a new attitude, which is, as long as it's not your personal fault that the that the virus happened. Let's give you lots and lots of taxpayer money as long as you're somebody who knows somebody.
Um, where's this all taken us?
Ben Hunt: Well, I'll, I'll end up with the, the inflation versus deflation question, Erik, because I, I think you're right that, that as an investor, the only question you must get roughly right to preserve your wealth, to build your wealth, to protect your family is the inflation question. You don't have to get it exactly right. You don't have to get the timing perfect. But it's the one question that you must get roughly correct in order to build and protect your family's wealth. So I, I am going to end up with that because I think it's the most important question you can ask as an investor.
But to your, your, your main point here, the way you introduced this, look, it's, it's what I like to call the through no fault of their own exclusion to, to capitalism, which I, I, I didn't know existed, but I'm, I'm thrilled to learn, uh, this— that we, that we have this, this, uh, safe harbor now for through no fault of your own, uh, to protect your, your equity interest in, in anything in the, in the world.
This is exactly what I mean, Erik, When I say that these narratives, particularly the herd immunity narrative of of now you know protecting the economic status quo, protecting wealth, and the flatten the curve narrative, you know both of these really do have nuggets of important truth. Both of these have started, I believe, from a good place.
Both of these have now been co-opted, as narratives almost always are, by political institutions. Again, this isn't just something on the left or the right. This is a power thing to use these narratives to try to, well, accomplish, my view, really sad and terrible things. Right, and and and one of those sad and terrible things is exactly what you're describing here: where the lion's share, if not the vast majority, of the fiscal and monetary support is not going to that single mom who's now been out of a job and has got to wrestle with oh my God, do I go back to work and maybe infect my family when I've got No, nothing to support me here. I've got no backdrop here, right? The amount of support that's going to to that American citizen versus the amount of support that's going to not just the one percent, the one tenth of one percent to the corporations and the larger the better, right?
The amount of support that's going to them is just dwarfed, dwarfed the amount of support. To the citizens that are truly bearing the brunt of this virus.
And that comes through in so many different ways, right? It comes through in, you know, we can talk about your infringements on liberty, which are real and which really we have to be aware of. They come in the form of our political leaders like, you know, Chris Christie saying, oh, it's our, it's your responsibility You know, to go back to work and be that, you know, that, that clerk at the counter, right? And, you know, sacrifices have got to be made. It's just like World War II. We got to sacrifice. I mean, it just makes me so angry, Erik. I mean, a guy like Chris Christie, who's frankly— whose idea of sacrifice is a regular order of fries, right? You know, for him to lecture us about national sacrifice.
It just, it really makes me physically ill.
And this is, as you say, this is the bailout nation that we experienced in 2008 and 2009, now on steroids. It's just like you said. And it's profoundly exacerbating the wealth and income inequalities in this country. It is once again revealing these naked sinews of power. It's once again ripping off the pleasant skin that we have in terms of democracy and capitalism to reveal again, not a left versus right thing, but a state and ultra-rich against everyone else.
And I don't know any better way to say it. I don't know anything better to do than to keep calling it out. But I do think that the time is ripe for all of us to call it out, to recognize what's happening, and return to grassroots civic political action, not to join, you know, the left or the right and and march in some constructed fake competition here, but to actually work for our communities from that bottom-up level in a way that recognizes both the biology of this virus, which is incredibly challenging, and recognizes the rights and responsibilities that we have to each other as citizens. I think that's really the way forward.
Erik Townsend: Ben, I want to pick up on that point that you just made, because instead of just talking on podcasts about how all of this spending is immoral and wrong and so forth, you've chosen to actually make a difference by starting an organization, Frontline Heroes, which is actually making a difference in this crisis. I really want to get to that, but I know my listeners will revolt if I don't let you you first answer the question about inflation versus deflation and what it means for their investments. So let's hit that first, and we'll come back to Frontline Heroes.
Ben Hunt: You got it, Erik. And again, I, I think it's such an important question you raise because this again is the one question that all investors have to get roughly right. Are we in an inflationary environment, or are we in a deflationary environment? And let me say, just as clearly as I can. Right now, today, we are in a massive deflationary environment.
There, there are no two ways about it. No two ways about it. What we are experiencing in terms of job losses, in terms of human life losses, in terms of the, the very real restrictions— not just restrictions, but behavioral changes that we have in terms of international trade, in terms of travel, in terms of everything that makes the modern economy go, we are in a profoundly deflationary environment.
So, that's where we are now. And I've, you know, we've written about this a lot. It's like a— what to call her— the, you know, we talk about the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse, right? Well, Well, I think we can talk about the 4 Horsemen of the Investment Apocalypse also. And the first 3 of those horsemen— and here we're actually dealing with a real pestilence, right? A real plague.
The first 3 of these are deflationary.
Erik Townsend: Right.
Ben Hunt: And these are the challenges that we've been dealing with for decades now. These are the challenges that our monetary policy and our fiscal policy were designed to address coming out of the Great Financial Crisis, which was a deflationary crisis. These are the same tools, and they're going to do more of that with this deflationary crisis around COVID-19.
My strong view, though, is that ultimately we get to the 4th horseman. And the 4th horseman of the apocalypse was death. The 4th horseman of the investment apocalypse is inflation. That fourth horseman will ride into town, and it's going to ride into town because as a result of this response to COVID-19, we finally broken down, you know, the last seals here, right?
We have finally gone forward with what is really an effective merger of the Federal Reserve and the U.S. Treasury. We have the Fed and the Treasury acting in tandem today to create truly a Bank of the United States, you know, going back to Hamiltonian days and, and, you know, Jacksonian days. The modern Bank of the United States is one in which the Fed issues the money, prints the money, and buys things, including the securities the debt securities that the US Treasury puts out.
We've crossed the Rubicon here. We've broken the seals.
I'm trying to think of other analogies I can use. But what we have today in many of the— I'll call it that— the alphabet soup of programs that have been launched are systems where the Federal Reserve is buying the assets. The US Treasury is taking the equity tranche, the first loss tranche of many of these assets that the Fed is purchasing.
And in addition, the Treasury is also issuing many of these securities that the Federal Reserve is now purchasing. It's a merger of the 2 institutions that has been at the heart of what proponents of modern monetary theory have called for for years, right? That was always kind of one of the sticking points of modern monetary theory is that they saw the government as this unitary actor, as this bank, right, that would, that would invest in the real, in the real world, that would spend money in the real world. But it, it didn't match the actual institutional setup that we have in this country and most countries, where you have separate institutions that are doing fiscal policy— that's the US Treasury— versus monetary policy, the Federal Reserve.
And the, the big news, what ushers in this 4th horseman of the investment apocalypse, what ushers in inflation, is the merger of monetary and fiscal policy, as we are absolutely seeing with the response to COVID-19.
Now, where I believe the— I'll call the The rubber meets the road here will happen after the November election. And the instrument of this, it's going to be a $2 trillion spending plan where, you know, it'll be called infrastructure bonds or Make America Great bonds. If it's Trump who gets reelected, it'll be called green bonds or— I don't know, no malarkey bonds for all I know if it's Biden who's elected in November. But either way, it's going to be about $2 trillion, and it's going to be at least half monetized, at least half bought directly by the Federal Reserve.
And the reason this is different from the financial asset inflation that we've seen over the last 11 years, the reason why I really believe this leads to inflation in the real economy is that with this marriage of fiscal and monetary policy, where the Fed is directly monetizing spending from the US government, where the Federal Reserve is now taking credit risk, which is crazy, right? So, the Federal Reserve is now—
Erik Townsend: Ben, let me interrupt you for just a second, because I want to ask you to clarify something. When you say the Fed will be directly monetizing half of That $2 trillion. Do you really mean that they will directly monetize, which would require either a change to the Federal Reserve Act or even more liberal attitude toward ignoring what it says?
Or do you mean they'll continue to play this shell game where, in theory, supposedly it's the debt is all sold to the public and, you know, in reality, investment banks are buying it with the intention of turning around and selling it back to the Fed week later. Do you think that shell game continues? Or do you really mean what you said in the literal sense of the rules change and the Fed is directly monetizing that government spending?
Ben Hunt: I think that, that is the latter. I think that this will be the Rubicon to, you know, just do away with the fig leaf and directly purchase it. In the same way that you're seeing the Fed, I'll say, directly now purchasing issuance by states and localities.
Erik Townsend: And do you think that occurs with a rewrite of the Federal Reserve Act, or do you think it occurs just because they get away with breaking their own rules?
Ben Hunt: I think it's the latter. I think you've probably had Jim Bianco on talking about this as well. And there are a number of people who've talked about how there is an exigency clause in the Federal Reserve Act that the Fed has used in so many, again, of these alphabet soups of new programs that they've announced.
That are clearly in violation, right, of the Federal Reserve Act. I think they'll just continue to expand that, that exigency, that use of the exigency clause. And the reason I say that is that who's gonna take 'em to court?
Erik Townsend: Right, right.
Ben Hunt: Yeah, yeah. Who has standing to say, oh no, that's a violation of the Federal Reserve Act? It is a legit question, right? Because I've talked to people, and there are lots of them, who are saying, look, this is nuts.
And it really is these new alphabet soup programs that are breaking down even further the barriers we've had between fiscal policy and monetary policy. So, I think we see more rather than less of this. I think that if by some miracle there's some way that someone has standing to, you know, take this to court, And by again, by another miracle, there's there's some you know court somewhere that says, oh yeah, this is problematic for the Federal Reserve Act. Then I think they amend it, right? But there is no one. This is what I mean: it's not a left versus right thing. There is no political party.
There is no governmental institution that wants to put the brakes on what the Fed is doing. No one, none. So my strong view is if there is no institution with an interest in stopping this process, it ain't going to stop. It ain't going to stop. So, you know, that's, that's what comes out of this. I think it's a, it's a 2021 phenomenon where we have the really the direct monetization of, of federal spending, where we have the direct use of the Treasury to take credit loss positions, first credit loss positions, still leaving the Fed on the hook for credit losses.
That to me is the most incredible thing about these programs for buying corporate debt, right? You, you are explicitly having the, the Fed, the Fed now take on credit risk Where they are acting as a commercial bank, truly the too-big-to-fail commercial bank. It's a watershed event. It's already happened. And, man, it's not going to stop, Erik. It's not going to stop.
Erik Townsend: Ben, at some point in this crisis, I know things kind of— something snapped for you because we got to the point where the government's basically not doing anything terribly productive. I know at one point I was actually following a story where there were paramedics in New York City dumpster diving behind the hospital looking for N95 masks because nobody had their act together. They weren't able to order the right ones. At some point, something snapped for you and you just heard about this stuff and you said, I'm gonna take personal action to get N95 masks into the hands of the people on the frontline who need them.
Ben Hunt: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Tell us, what is Frontline Heroes? But more importantly, how did it come about? And what was your experience? I mean, you're, you're a very comfortable finance guy with a great career, great reputation. I'm sure you never imagined yourself starting a charity before this all happened. Something happened for you. And all of a sudden, everything changed. Tell us what that was like.
Ben Hunt: You know what, what clicked for me, Erik, is that, you know, I've been railing about our trickle-down economy for so long, right? Where the policy, fiscal policy, monetary policy particularly, it's really designed to support what I like to call the naked sinews of power. And it really comes to a head in a crisis where you reveal that this pleasant skin of democracy and capitalism that we all believe in and want so desperately for ourselves and our children, it's just a skin, right? And then underneath it are all these policies which are designed to prop up and bail out and support the status quo wealth and economy of the very wealthy and the very politically connected.
And what really clicked for me in this COVID-19 crisis was it's the same thing with medical supplies.
It's trickle-down. It's trickle-down, Erik, where the very well-connected, the very politically connected, the crony capitalism that we see in, in our economy, it's the same thing in our healthcare. Where, you know, supposedly we have these millions of N95 masks that are stockpiled and available, And yet, like you, there are there are horror stories of doctors and nurses and EMTs and firemen and policemen and first responders who are forced to put not only their own lives, but when you talk to the to these these heroes, right? What they're really concerned about is bringing this risk home to their families, and that's what they are. Forced to do in this trickle-down system we have, not just for wealth, but for medical supplies, for protecting— again, we call them frontline heroes— the, the doctors, the nurses, the EMTs, the firemen who are, who are responding, who are fighting this war for us.
So that, that's what clicked, you know, what snapped in me, Erik, was, was to To find a way not to compete with the federal government and the FEMA and the state management authorities, right? Not to try to buy a million N95 masks and drive up the price and you know do all that, which is a real problem.
But I'll be damned if I was going to wait for FEMA and these states. Emergency authorities to find the time to trickle down masks to the people who need them so desperately. So, that was the, I'll say, the inspiration for our effort.
And I'm gonna plug it right now, right? It's frontlineheroesusa.org, all one word, frontlineheroesusa.org. And the way it came about was, you know, this is the crazy world we live in, right, Erik, where social media is both a horrible thing in so many ways, but it's also wonderful at connecting so many people.
I got a Twitter DM from an Epsilon Theory reader who works for Intel. And he said, you know, look, we've got a ton of employees, Intel does, over in China. And, you know, I reached out to a couple of my friends over there. You know, they can, they can buy these, these N95 equivalent masks. They're, they're, they're pretty, they're plentiful over there in China.
You know, they're not that expensive. And so I've, I've had a couple of buddies to go online, order some N95 masks, ship them over here to me in, you know, a bag, a DHL bag of like 100 masks. And then I'm giving them to a local hospital or clinic that really desperately needs them. He was calling from— he reached out from Portland, Oregon, where, you know, obviously in the early days there was a lot of need for this equipment.
Erik Townsend: Okay, so listeners who want to help get personal protective equipment in the hands of our frontline heroes, by going to frontlineheroesusa.org, they can make a donation online. the website that directly results in effectively— I don't want to say this too bluntly, but I want to anyway— bypassing FEMA and all the bullshit of the federal government and actually getting the stuff to the people who need it right now.
Ben Hunt: That's what we've done, Erik. We've created an end-to-end distribution system where we are not only able to buy and source these masks where they are plentiful and where they are cheap, which is typically over in China. We're getting them in small quantities. We like to call it like an underground railroad of PPE.
We get it over here to the States. We get it tested at a medical center to make sure we're getting quality merchandise. And then we are getting it directly into the hands of the individual doctors and nurses and EMTs who then distribute it to their teams.
We can't get 10,000 or 100,000 masks to a hospital system. That's not what we're about. What we're about is getting 100 masks, 200 masks to a clinic in Indianapolis, to a hospital in New Orleans. All around the country, we've been able to make these direct connections with these frontline heroes who are in actual urgent need of this equipment.
To date, we've raised over $700,000. We have bought and distributed over 60,000 N95-equivalent masks to more than 600 individual clinics, hospitals, EMT departments, you name it, all across the country. And I got to tell you, Erik, we're just getting started.
Erik Townsend: Ben, we've got a lot of entrepreneurs and business people in our audience. I hope that your actions will inspire some of them to think about what kind of charity they could create. What words of either motivation or advice would you have to someone who's considering doing something like this? Maybe they've figured out a different way that they'd like to help our healthcare heroes or someone else through this crisis.
Ben Hunt: Well, the, the first recommendation I have is just do it. Just do it, right? If you're waiting for someone to organize you, if you're waiting for someone to give you permission, you know, that's, that's what we've been so ingrained and accustomed to. That, that's what, that's what government and big corporations, that's what they do to you. They make you think you, you can't act. Unless you are being led or organized by them, and so my the the first thing and the most important thing I'd say is that's a crock. You just get up and you just do it. You just do.
Now, when it comes to actually raising money, right, and it is important, I think, to operate under the the 501 framework, both to to take in donations and and and have it. You know, enjoy that that tax advantage properties of it, which is really important. But even more so, it it really enforces and requires an element of oversight and documentation that that is so important when when when money's involved.
Now, to establish a 501 from scratch is pretty hard. Takes a lot. It's not hard. It takes time. What we were able to do, and I think what many of your listeners will be able to do, to really, I'll say, formalize this and to get it started as a registered 501, is to find an existing 501 charity in your community, your organization, and partner with them to be a program or initiative of that existing 501 charity.
Erik Townsend: Okay. So somebody who's already got the IRS letter designating them as a 501, piggyback on them, partner with them, and use their IRS letter.
Ben Hunt: Correct. That's, that's exactly what we did. And I think it's a way to get these programs up and moving more quickly than the delays and the red tape from, from getting your own 501 designation. I think it's important to have that designation and to have the oversight and controls that that requires. But I also think that you can move more quickly if you find an organization in your community, an existing 501 that you can work with.
Erik Townsend: Ben, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. Before we let you go, your Epsilon Theory newsletter is one of the most popular and one of the most fascinating in the industry. Tell us briefly about that and where's the website and Twitter handle so people can find out more?
Ben Hunt: Sure. Well, it's easy to find. It's epsilontheory.com and on Twitter, it's @EpsilonTheory. You know, it comes from the old investment equation of alpha and beta. There's a 3rd term on there called epsilon. And usually, you know, epsilon is E for error. But honestly, Erik, that's, that's where all of the behavioral economics lives. That's where all of, I think, narrative lives. We call it the error term, but I think there's a lot of information there. So that's epsilontheory.com and @EpsilonTheory on Twitter.
Erik Townsend: I thought you were going to tell me the E is for extraordinary monetary policy and fiscal balance sheet expansion. Fantastic reading though, and great insights. So I highly recommend it to our listeners. We're going to leave it there. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was great to have Ben back on the show. It was great to have him back on the show. So, what did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: Well, I thought the most important thing that he said, which echoes something I've said before, is the one thing that you really almost have to get at least mostly right in investing is you've got to have a view on whether we've got a backdrop which is deflationary or inflationary, or maybe it's in between and you have a moderate view, but you got to have You have to have some kind of view because the investments and the way you structure your portfolio is either gonna work or not gonna work based on that. And I think we're headed for a secular shift that I don't know, Ben doesn't know. None of our guests have been willing to really, you know, put a stake in the ground and lay out, here's what's gonna happen, because I don't think anybody knows what's gonna happen. But all the ingredients are there over the next few years for deflation to eventually end and give way to inflation.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: And I think that the politics are gonna play a big role in this. We're seeing all of the different political parties seeming to favor more what effectively is monetization. And, you know, it's interesting how each of our guests have different views on this. We got a few emails about Dr. Lacy Hunt making such a big deal saying, look, the Fed doesn't have the ability to spend money. All that they can do is to loan money.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: And provide liquidity into the market. And that's all based on this idea, Patrick, that when the government engages in deficit spending, the Fed is not directly buying that debt. Instead, it's being sent, and there's, you know, free market price discovery occurring because a private sector party is buying that debt from the government, and that allows the interest rate to be set.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: at market rates, and the Fed is not allowed to buy that debt directly from the government. Well, if that's the whole intention of the Federal Reserve Act, but in practice the way it works is that debt has to get sold to a private sector banker who is going to turn it around 2 days later and sell it to the Fed at a markup, that's not That's not private sector market price discovery. That's just a sham that allows the primary dealers to mark up what they're buying and sell it back to a guaranteed buyer of the Fed, who's effectively monetizing. I don't really agree with Dr. Hunt and other people who say that the Fed can't spend money. They're indirectly doing so by working around the intention of the Federal Reserve Act. And I think they're already doing that. To a large extent.
Anyway, let's get to the postgame chart book, Patrick. You put together another terrific chart deck. Listeners, you'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. Now, if you don't have a Research Roundup email, that means you haven't yet registered your free account at MacroVoices.com. Shame on you. You can remedy that by just going to MacroVoices.com and looking for the red button on the homepage that says, looking for the download.
Patrick Ceresna: Yes.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, let's go ahead and dive in here on page 2. This looks like a chart of the S&P, but you got a bunch of other secondary studies around the S&P. What's going on here?
Patrick Ceresna: Right, so what we had was the S&P 500. We've been drawing on the analog of what a bear market would look like and going through all sorts of storylines over the last month. But what, uh, what I really wanted to touch on was What's a growing thing in the market is that everyone's focusing on the big behemoth stocks that have been running like Amazon, fresh new highs, and all these other mega-cap stocks that have been running. And it's been driving the NASDAQ. And when you look at the NASDAQ, which is the black line on there, we can see that it, it, we almost approached the pre-bear market high. And really the bigger question to ask is how did the NASDAQ pull this off? And what's really amazing is, is It's just a handful of stocks. So when you look at the 5 mega-cap stocks, the largest market capitalized stocks in the NASDAQ and the S&P 500, they just have a monstrous weighting into the indices.
So in the S&P 500, those 5 stocks make up 20% of the weighting. So that means the other 495 stocks in that index make up the other 80%. And therefore, as go those stocks, goes the whole market. And what's interesting is that when you look at the indices that don't have the market cap weighting of those 5 stocks, it paints a much different picture. So what I have here is the Dow Jones, which is price weighted. Then you have the London FTSE in yellow. You have the emerging markets. You have the Euro Stoxx 50, as well as the Russell, which is the small cap index. And what you can identify here. Is that once you take out those 5 mega-cap stocks, the indices look incredibly weak everywhere in the world. And this is what I continue to believe is giving us the evidence that this is still truly a bear market and a bear market rally.
Just because you have enough market participants willing to crowd into a few of these mega stocks and drive their prices higher is not really reflective of the underpinning conditions from a breadth perspective that of a very deteriorated equity market. equity market once you leave those 5 stocks. And so to me, it's still a bear market rally and it's still rolling over. We'll see certainly next week once we get past the option expiration gamma pins, whether or not another round of selling may be coming into June.
Erik Townsend: Moving on to page 3, Patrick, looking at the euro versus the dollar. Boy, this chart's looking a little bearish. I guess you could call this either a descending triangle or a wedge depending on how you draw around That late March bottom there. What do you make of this?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, really, you turn this chart upside down and you got the dollar index, right? And what's amazing is the dollar index still has such a huge weighting into the euro, a 57% weighting. And so really, as goes the euro, goes the dollar index. And so what we can continuously see here over the last month and a half, every attempt the euro has had to rally and make it stick, it's lasted no more than a week. And almost immediately the selling comes back down and brings it right to the bottom of the range. And it's just such weak price action that all you need is, it's like the euro's at the edge of a cliff and all it needs is someone to give it a push. And if it loses its footing here, we could be seeing a euro move down to 105 or 103, which would certainly be the underpinning catalyst that will drive the DXY up towards that 104 target that you've often referenced.
And so this is the must-watch chart in my mind, and it has so many global macro implications if it gives out. So this is probably the single big and most important chart to watch in my opinion.
But I really do want to highlight further is if we go to page 4, when we look at the dollar index, it really feels like the dollar's been doing nothing. But really, once you leave the euro and you go and start looking at the rest of the currencies around the world, and particularly when you move into the emerging market currencies, You can see just how incredibly weak all those currencies have been relative to the dollar, whether you go to Mexico, Brazil, Argentina. I have the Russian ruble here. You have the South African rand and the Turkish lira, all just so incredibly weak. And that just continues to support that there is a fundamental US dollar bull market underway, and it's being disguised by the fact that the euro has been pinned, which makes the dollar index look like it's far more range-bound. But I actually think the US dollar is in full bull And it's just a matter of time before the euro gives out and succumbs to that predominant trend.
Erik Townsend: Patrick, let's move on to page 5. One of my favorite charts, of course, is gold. And boy, look at that breakout we've seen just in the last couple of days.
Patrick Ceresna: Oh, for sure. And you were talking about it, and this is the big question, right? When everybody is so convinced gold is going higher, usually whenever you have that kind of a strong sentiment, usually it means that the trade is crowded and it backfills. And so that storyline makes sense. But, you know, when you really look at the conditions around the world and the size of the gold market, is it possible that it just keeps, you know, punching higher and making fresh new highs? I mean, we're right now only $100 or $200 away from those 2011 highs. It will be really interesting whether or not gold makes the next push higher first before that much-awaited consolidation kicks in.
Erik Townsend: Well, and that's something I've been thinking about a lot is maybe that's the next move is up to 1,922, I think was the 2011. That's from memory. So, don't hate me if I got it wrong, folks. We get back to the 2011 high, and that's where we have a significant technical correction, maybe back down to 1,500 or 1,400 or something from there.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: The problems with this, you know, look, that you couldn't ask for better long-term fundamentals. You know that the politicians are gonna debase fiat currency. You know they're gonna keep on printing money to deal with the coronavirus crisis. And the next thing after the coronavirus crisis is gonna be universal basic income and the various social programs that some parts of the political economy would like to see in place. There's got so many reasons to be bullish, but the problem is everybody knows that. And what propels a bull market higher is when something causes people to make new purchases, and a lot of them. What could be the policy impetus, Patrick, that causes everybody to say, okay, this situation, it's more bullish than we thought, we gotta double down on our gold bets right here at this price? I mean, look at what the Fed has already done, Patrick.
Literally unlimited monetary policy accommodation to the tune of half a trillion dollars a week, or at least it feels that way. And you know, for a while we were going a couple trillion dollars a week in new fiscal spending bills that Congress is talking about pushing through. You know that they're going to debase the value of paper money, and it's got to be good for gold. But how do you top all of that? How do you come up with the next? It's not like there's a next news report that makes the case even more compelling. It's already priced in, I think. That's what got us up here. So, what happens, Patrick, if the Fed actually were to show some restraint and maybe moderate the amount of policy accommodation? And what if we stop having $2 trillion spending announcements from the government every week or two?
Then maybe we get, you know, the setup. So, we've come We've come an awfully long ways. We're overdue for a technical correction. I still feel like it has to come at some point, but boy, this chart still looks awfully strong. This descending triangle, if it had resolved to the downside, was the setup for maybe a really significant correction, and looks like it's not happening. We're resolving to the upside instead.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know, the one thing I'll add to that though is, I mean, you took a very American approach to that, which is like looking at what the Fed itself is doing, and the US dollar obviously is the world reserve currency. But the whole world is in an incredibly deep recession, and there's going to be a lot of currency debasement in in almost every country in the world. And so, what you know, even if there might be a catalyst that may not have that gold demand from the U.S., you have to still think that that the the safe haven element of gold will be incredibly popular, especially in a lot of those other cross currencies.
Patrick Ceresna: Anyway.
Let's move on to page 6 where I just wanted to touch on uranium. We don't talk uranium too often, and rightfully so. Uranium's been stuck in a bear market for many, many years. And what is interesting is one of the reasons behind that has been because there was an oversupply and they needed to work that through, that oversupply uranium that has caused it to trade below its actual production costs.
And so what this COVID has done though is that it actually shut down a number of mines. And now the catalyst for that supply to be worked off is actually there. And so we saw a pretty bullish breakout in uranium and it'll be really interesting to see whether the bulls can not only hold this or whether this actually is the beginning of a new bull market in uranium. So it's certainly something we're watching.
Erik Townsend: And folks, don't forget, Patrick does webinars with charts like this almost every single day. You can get a free trial. And all that information is on page 7 to sign up for Patrick's trading advisory service.
Patrick Ceresna: Now, Erik, before we wrap up the show though, why don't you give us a quick update on what's going on with the COVID-19?
Erik Townsend: You know, I don't have that much new to add this week as I continue to learn and read more about this. There's no, you know, huge earth-shaking headline or anything, but I just see more and more evidence that all piles up to me to say this is going to take longer than markets are discounting. I don't mean the economy is going to stay shut down, but the expectations so many people have about a V-shaped recovery and we're back to normal, like pre-virus normal, you know, 3 or 4 months from now, I just don't see it happening. There's no good reason to assume that there's going to be a vaccine for this. And there's so many different variations and mutations of the virus already that if we did have a vaccine, it might not cover all the different versions of it. It could take many years before we get completely back to normal. And of course, we're gonna restart the economy, we're gonna get as close to normal as we can, but it remains to be seen how much of a drag this creates.
And I, I really love to, to get Stan Druckenmiller on the program to go into more detail on what causes him to say that maybe this central bank-enabled credit bubble bubble is finally going to pop and this would be the catalyst to do it. That would really change everything and we could be looking at an outright depression. So I don't think it's nearly as simple as V-shaped recovery. And folks, we're going to leave it there for today's show. This episode was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at TopTradersUnplugged.com.
For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit MacroVoices.com/SponsorInfo. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as as well as, of course, our post-game chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, this week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the charts we just discussed in the post-game. There's also a link of the David Tepper interview where he discusses that this is the 2nd most overvalued stock market he has ever seen, as well as a link to an ECB article on negative interest rates and the transmission of monetary So, you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So, that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. And for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distribution.
If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases. You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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Lakshman Achuthan — founder of the Economic Cycles Research Institute, ECRI (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 218 was recorded on May 7th, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers worldwide, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing, helping investors overcome behavioral biases.
Economic cycles guru Lakshman Achuthan, founder of the Economic Cycle Research Institute, ECRI, will join me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll discuss what economic cycles teach us about recessions, which are driven by exogenous shock events, and what we might expect the recovery from the COVID-19 recession to look like. We'll also discuss longer-term cycles, including the shift from secular deflation to secular inflation or stagflation, and the outlook for US-China relations after the crisis.
Then be sure to stay tuned for our post-game segment when we'll take another deep dive into the crude oil market and discuss the epic reversal in WTI time spreads, what it means for both on-land and floating storage, as well as the price outlook for next week's options expiration.
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, listeners, we'll have a detailed update of the COVID-19 coronavirus crisis in our postgame segment after the feature interview. Now, Erik, let's dive into that S&P 500. No sooner did we finish recording last week did that Friday the S&P dive to the downside, and it's been more or less all week retracing some of that. We're about 2,876 on the, the SPOOs futures right now. What's, uh, what's your take on all of this?
Erik Townsend: Well, I think the really important signal is we only spent one day or so above that 2,930 Fibonacci retracement level. That's a 61.8% retrace. That's what causes me to say I think this is a bear market rally. I think that 61.8 fib was the top. We actually traded intraday quite a few points above that, but ended up, I think, only one close over that level. It's been all downhill since. Now we're bouncing now. I shouldn't say it's all downhill, but we're still staying below 2,900. If we saw a daily close above 2,930, that would make me think, okay, maybe there's still one last hurrah. We're going to get that of 3,000 before this is over. But right now my base case is it's probably over and done with. In some ways I kind of regret not shorting it when I had the chance. I really do think it's a bear market rally. But, and you know, we had Charlie McElligott this week.
You know, Charlie usually is a very, very good analyst, but usually all of his calls are really about what's going on with flow, you know, in the next 24 hours. He's a very short-term, what's happening right now in the market kind of guy. He's making a longer-term call. That he's saying he thinks that the outlook for the rest of the summer is down for the S&P, not up. So I do think that we've probably already seen the top of the bear market rally. If not, maybe there's one more push up to 3,000, but I doubt that. The reason that I didn't trade it again is just because, first of all, I've had, you know, my focus has been on the oil market and I'm spending all of my time there. I don't really have time for this. But also because I just see that the Fed has very clearly shown its hands. They want to bail out financial markets. They want to rescue the stock market.
It's an election year. President Trump doesn't want to see the stock market go down. He's going to assert every bit of pressure that he can. So, you know, betting on a collapse of the S&P, I, in any normal market, I would say we got to see new lows below 2,174. That was the bear market rally. The bottom is still yet to come. I'm not going to make that call in this market just because I see too much intervention risk from the federal government. Just, you know, look at what they did with junk bonds and so forth. So that's my take, but, you know, we could be wrong. We'll see what happens.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the dollar index, which is pivoting off the 100 handle up and down, but it really— the dollar's done nothing wrong but nothing right. I mean, it's just chopping around here. Do you still think this resolves itself to the upside?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as we've said for the last several weeks, we're in this consolidation pattern between 99 and 101. We need to see a break out of that range before we have any clear signal. You can certainly make the argument that we've now Have we seen a triple bottom with, I guess it was March 30th approximately, April 14th, 15th in there somewhere, and then just this last week, those tests of 99 or even down to 98.50 on the first one?
Was that a triple bottom? Is it all uphill from here? Really, the big tests for the bull case, first we gotta get through 101 on a daily closing basis. We've been consolidating for well over a month now and haven't done it. So until we get over 101, I don't think there's any real signal in this market. Once we do see If we see that, then the big test is $104. If we can see a closing print over $104, then I really think the move higher is on. For now, we're consolidating sideways. We'll wait and see what the market tells us.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, you warned me off the air that you had so much to say about crude oil this week that we would take up most of the postgame segment. But how about giving our listeners just a quick executive summary for now, and then we'll continue the conversation in the postgame?
Erik Townsend: Patrick, let's start with inventory. The crude oil build nationally was 4.6 million barrels. That pales— I mean, normally that would be a That's a big build, but compared to the last several weeks, that just pales in magnitude. A little bit misleading there because normally we don't see any action on the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, which is the government's piggy bank for crude oil. There was a 1.7 million barrel build on the SPR. So if you add the SPR and the non-SPR numbers together, you get 6.3 instead of 4.6. That's still much smaller than the 15 million barrel build that we saw 2 or 3 weeks ago. Cushing, Oklahoma, meanwhile, building 2.1 million barrels. In normal times, that would be considered a big build, but it's a very small build compared to the 5 million-plus that we were seeing a few weeks ago. And I just saw today on Thursday that Genscape reported, as of this week— they do some look-ahead reporting using infrared cameras to survey the tank farms in Cushing, Oklahoma— it looks like we may see the drawdown that I've been predicting on Cushing inventories coming in next week's report.
Needless to say, there's a big question of what this means. On the face of it, it seems to suggest that the storage crisis is over. It's all getting better. There's another way to interpret this. We talked about that last week. It's going to really take a fair amount of time to get into the nuances of all of what this could mean. Finishing the inventory report, gasoline was the only drawdown, 3.2 million barrels there. Distillates, though, building 9.5 million barrels. U.S. production ticking down a couple hundred thousand barrels to 11. 1.9 million barrels. From everything I'm hearing, the rate of shut-ins is faster than that. I suspect it ticked down more than that and that that's a high estimate. The big question, though, Patrick, is, okay, how do we interpret this data? Certainly the front month price has been rallying, surprising a lot of people, getting all the way up to $27 or almost $27 earlier today.
The short executive summary is I think there's a good argument that today may have been the top of a rally and that we may be headed back down. But it depends on some fairly nuanced considerations that are going to take the whole postgame. So let's save the rest of the conversation for after the feature interview.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, let's move on to gold because everything looked even this morning like it was just more of the same and flat. But in the last couple hours, right before we started recording, there was a pretty clear surge higher, almost $40 up to about the $1,727 on the futures. What's your take on all this? Do you think we're going to finally break out?
Erik Townsend: Well, it's depressing, frankly. You know, as a gold bull, which I definitely am extremely bullish on gold long-term, you know, what we gold bulls should wish for is a major technical correction so that we can buy some more gold on the cheap. And until today, it looked like maybe we were gonna see what arguably is either a wedge or a descending triangle pattern, maybe had a chance of resolving to the downside and starting a correction lower. I was excited to maybe buy some cheap gold. Cheaper gold to add to my existing fairly sizable position. Unfortunately, we saw today's move looks like an upside resolution to that descending triangle pattern. Then the big test will be to see if we get to new cycle highs above $1,788, which was the recent high that we saw, what was it, back in the beginning of April sometime or the middle of April. So it remains to be seen what happens.
Clearly, you wanna own gold. The fundamentals couldn't be better. I don't think here, now is the time to be using leverage to really, really, you know, load up the truck, so to speak. I'm waiting for some kind of significant technical correction before adding leverage to my existing long position, which is already substantial. So, I'm hoping for lower prices. And of course, the fundamentals are so strong, it seems like it's not cooperating with me right now. We'll see what happens.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yield, 'cause we got a little bit of a pop in yields on that heavy issuance that happened the other day. And yet here we, We find ourselves once again with the yields pressing back down. We're trading at a spot 6.2% right now at the time of recording. What's your take on all this?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as I've said for the last several weeks, I don't really have a short-term view on where rates are headed. What I'm trying to focus on is asking our feature interview guests to comment on the transformation that I'm convinced is in process. We've had this just secular trend because of deflation toward lower and lower Treasury yields, as we discussed last week with Dr. Lacy Hunt.
Someday, somehow, I'm convinced we're going to get to an inflationary or stagflationary macro backdrop. How do we get there? And what is it going to mean for Treasury yields along the way? I'm really thinking about that big picture and trying to form that worldview. I'll ask Lakshman Achuthan that question as we get into today's feature interview.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, this week's feature interview guest is ECRI founder Lakshman Achuthan. Why did we invite Lak back as this week's guest?
Erik Townsend: Well, Lak is Mr. Cycles, and it occurred to me, okay, you know, how do you even think about which cycles to look at? You know, recession cycles, economic cycles, pandemic cycles. I gotta believe that there's some insight. So, I wanted to get Mr. Cycles himself back to kind of comment on this. And I also really wanted to ask him, from a cycles perspective, about this question of the secular trend shift that I'm convinced is coming. I just don't know when, from deflation to inflation. And what it's going to mean for the economy. So, uh, super guy, really looking forward to this interview.
Erik Townsend: This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. In recent weeks, we've been reminded of the fragility of world financial markets and how quickly sentiment can shift from risk-on to risk-off. Once again, the mantra of buy the dip and the determination of central banks will be put to the test But as Chris Cole recently told us, the best approach to investing in the long run is very different from what's worked best in recent decades.
To help MacroVoices listeners navigate an uncertain future, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen host of the Top Traders Unplugged podcast, has created a guide to the best investment books of all time. You can get a free copy at toptradersunplugged.com. And be sure to listen to my full-length interview with Niels Kaastrup-Larsen on trend following.
The download link is in your Research Roundup email. Check out TopTradersUnplugged.com today. You'll be glad you did.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Lak is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Lakshman Achuthan, founder of the Economic Cycle Research Institute. Lak has prepared a terrific slide deck to accompany today's interview. I encourage you to download it. You'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. Now, if you don't have a Research Roundup email, that means you haven't yet registered a free account at MacroVoices.com. Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, look for the There's a red button that says, Looking for the Downloads, just above Lak's picture on the homepage. Lak, it's great to have you back on the show.
Needless to say, you are Mr. Economic Cycles. Your whole career has focused on economic cycles. I'm at a loss here as to even where to start, because how does a cycles guy look at the current situation? Do you look at the virus cycle of what happened in the 1918 Spanish flu, or do you look at this in terms of what we know about economic cycles affecting recessions? which we're clearly in now, or some other way? How do you even approach this?
Lakshman Achuthan: Well, thank you for having me, Erik. And, uh, it's an amazing cycle to be experiencing here from a research point of view. It's certainly a brutal recession and cycle to be experiencing as a, as a person and, you know, citizen of the world here. Look, it's, it's not one or the other. It is a combination of things, looking at it through a cyclical lens, looking at it through, in this case, a virus lens. There have been other shocks over the centuries that have interacted with cycles. You know, up front, it's, it's important, I think, to understand some of our foundational kind of approach to cycles at ECRI.
And I'm going to put words in the consensus's view for a minute and just say, you know, there, there are a lot of observers out there who, when a recession hits, say, ah, you know, it was not really foreseeable because there was this, you know, shock, an unpredictable shock that occurred, in this case, the virus.
And that's what causes cycles. And what we found over, as you were alluding to, you know, my entire career, but really, you know, my mentors' and my mentors' mentors' careers of looking at cycles over a century of of looking at US cycles and even international cycles is that recessions come out of, you know, an endogenous and inherent cycle that occurs inside of a free market-oriented economy combining with a shock.
And the shock doesn't necessarily have to be really big. It can be a relatively small shock at the right time, at a time of vulnerability. in the economic cycle. And then there can be times when you're less vulnerable, but there's a huge shock that is also recessionary. So it's really the combination of what's going on in the economic cycle and the timing of when these shocks are hitting. Are they hitting at times when there is some vulnerability? Now, in the current case, we literally flicked a switch and said, we're shutting down. The economy. So you, you can, by edict, create a recession. You can flick a switch and say, okay, everybody stop, you're not allowed to do anything.
And as a result, activity is going to collapse and you will have a recession. Now, the trick— the problem, the issue at hand, and we'll get into this, is that by flicking that switch back up, it doesn't necessarily mean, okay, here's a recovery. Or a sustainable recovery that's that's going to, as in as in past recoveries from recessions, kind of be something that can really persist in a healthier way. And so I think we look both at what's going on in the endogenous business cycle that we see in free market oriented economies everywhere, and how is that interacting with shocks? And in this case, you know, it's it's obviously one for the history books. This is a doozy. You've heard all of the descriptions of it being. record-breaking on so many different levels, and that is all true.
Erik Townsend: Let's go ahead and take a look at your slide deck. You talk about the 3 Ds referring to how you think about the dimensions, if you will, of recessions. Why don't we get into that discussion?
Lakshman Achuthan: Yeah. So, is it a recession? Is it a bad recession? Is it a depression? What does it all mean? And really, a recession is a contraction. When the level of activity is falling, measured by output, income, employment, and sales. Big, very broad aggregate measures of economic activity. This is a brutal recession, but in one respect, actually, it may not be kind of as bad as feared. And to understand why I could, I could kind of have it both ways there for a moment, You need to really understand how a recession's severity is measured.
And we look at something called the 3 Ds, as in dog: the depth of the recession, the diffusion of the recession, and the duration of the recession. Now, in terms of depth, this recession is extraordinarily deep. You know, well over 30 million people have filed for jobless claims. You've got You're kind of blowing out the jobs that were lost over 2 years during the Great Recession, just for some comparison.
And it's far from over. We're going to see some kind of jaw-dropping job losses in the upcoming jobs report. And without a doubt, this is a very deep recession. The GDP is going to plunge in Q2. Who knows exactly how far? These are going to be big numbers.
But a recession is not really— it's not really just a statistic. It's a vicious cycle with declines in one of these measures like output triggering the job losses, triggering or pushing down incomes, and therefore pulling down sales, which then feeds back into even weaker output. And so it's the cascading declines that are integral to the second D of how you measure the severity of a recession, and that's diffusion.
How is it spreading across the economy? Like, pretty much like wildfire during a recession, and it cascades from industry to industry and from even region to region in the country. There's really no stone that gets left untouched there. And so in terms of diffusion, also, this recession is very severe. It's hard to find pockets of the economy that are unaffected.
But on, on the 3rd D, duration, this recession could be among the shortest on record. And, and here's why. With, with economic activity plunging so deeply, even a slow or partial opening up of the economy can lift activity off of these extreme lows. So if a gradual opening up of the economy begins soon, It's plausible that the recession would technically end by summertime.
And if so, this recession would have lasted around half a year. And that's like, if we look to the last recession, the last recession, the Great Recession, was a year and a half long. So it would just be some 1/3 of that in terms of duration. So that's kind of what we're experiencing right now in terms of the technical measures of recession.
Erik Townsend: Okay, I just want to push back a little bit on the duration. I, I see a technical argument that if you go deep enough, any recovery could technically qualify as pulling you out of that condition of recession, but it doesn't get you back to where you were when you started.
And it seems to me that That there's a long way to go to get back to where we were pre-crisis. So, if we say that the duration of the technical recession condition, when the formal definition of recession of consecutive quarters and of GDP growth and so forth, it's over because we went from just scary, horrific, bad GDP to only modestly horrific, bad GDP, Well, okay, it increased, and so therefore we're out of the recession technically, but we're still in bad shape. So are there other cycles or other analogs that we should look to for where things got so bad that even the recovery felt worse than the average recession does?
Lakshman Achuthan: Sure, you don't even have to look that far back. I mean, you might look at '01 to '03, the early part of this century, and the recovery out of that recession was pretty wobbly for an extended period of time. So I would just say you don't even have to push back. I'm not going to argue with you on this point at all. Just because the recession is relatively brief, because there was an expansion off of the very, very low readings, in no way am I saying that we're going back to anything near where we were in short order.
Erik Townsend: Okay.
Lakshman Achuthan: When that vicious cycle of output pushing down jobs, pushing down income, pushing down sales runs its course and it begins to— the key is, you know, can it begin a virtuous cycle where some pop in demand increases production, employment, incomes, and therefore further demand growth. That is a critical question about under what conditions can that happen going forward.
And as I was saying earlier, you can't just flip a switch and make that occur, right? We can have states and perhaps much of the country say, oh, okay, it's okay to go outside and it's okay to go around and start kind of reclaiming your lives. But it's only when the virtuous cycle takes hold that we're going to see some sort of more persistent recovery or expansion. That's an open question. That's where the leading indexes really come into play. I mean, you can, you know, said another way, you can force a recession, you can mandate one, which is what happened.
But you cannot force a recovery. Now, every analyst out there is focused on the epidemiology, on when effective therapeutics will become widely available, and when different governors and mayors are going to allow schools and businesses to open up. But the beginning and the end of this recession are not symmetric. It's not flipping a switch. It's like— I was trying to think of different analogies, and this is going to be a little tortured, But I was just thinking of cars because I've been at home with my car.
Now, if you drive home, you switch off the engine, and you leave the car in the driveway through a bitterly cold winter. I got sick. I didn't want to go outside. I just left it there. And I couldn't get out of the house for a lot of weeks. So it's just sitting there. You don't want to do that with your car, but sometimes that might happen. Now, I have an older car, and it'll have an iced-up carburetor. Maybe the water in the fuel lines has, has, you know, maybe has gotten in the fuel lines and frozen up. You know, the oil is sticky, the battery's drained, all this stuff.
It's not that I'm not going to be able to drive that car again. I will. I'll fix it up. I'll work on it. But I have no misconception that it's just going to start right up. And I'm going to buzz off. without doing anything. I know it's going to take some time and some work and some thoughtful work. And, and, you know, if I, if I think about the economy now, when will we really be able to get some traction to the upside?
As we were saying earlier, it's, it's not imminent. It's not happening right, right away. Even if everybody goes outside tomorrow, technically the recession may shortly end, But it doesn't mean we're back to normal. This is where the good leading indexes come in. If they can put together a pronounced, a pervasive, a persistent rise, then that signals that things will be ready to really start turning. We're not there today.
Erik Townsend: I want to come back to your earlier point about exogenous shock factors and how they play in, because as you pointed out, A lot of times, the recessions—and I would say the biggest and most important recessions—even the 1929, the beginning of the Great Depression—there was really no exogenous shock there. That was an overcooked economy that was just too heated up, and it was time for gravity to set in. I would argue that the same thing is really true of 2008. We had a whole lot of just pent-up. up overpriced financial assets. The subprime debacle and what happened in housing was kind of the— you could think of it as a shock, but it was really part of the process. It was part of the overvalued financial asset. It wasn't some war that started or some external thing. Now, what seems ironic to me, Lak, is if I think about, okay, so where is there an analog to the current situation where there was a major exogenous event?
Lakshman Achuthan: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: Where all of a sudden everything changed because of something that had nothing to do with the financial system that nobody anticipated was coming? Well, World War II comes to mind, but ironically, in a lot of ways, World War II ended the Great Depression. So how do we make sense of, you know, clearly this particular crisis is an exogenous shock event. It's about the virus. It's not about It's not about whether or not commercial paper was overvalued before it started. It's about the fact that we had to shut the whole economy down.
What do we learn from other cycles that tells us how this might be different from other recessions?
Lakshman Achuthan: So, well, I'm thinking there's a— I'm jumping around in history now over the past century, but certainly, you know, the Depression, as you said, overcooked, a financially related shock to, I would say, combines with the endogenous cyclical forces. Okay, the— what the leading indexes are trying to pick up, which is much broader than what's going on in the markets. And of course, in the Great Recession, also, you know, those— some of those financial failures and things we were talking about coming at a time when there was vulnerability, cyclical window of vulnerability. So it's the combination of the two that give you the recession. When Pearl Harbor, you know, that's like kind of the big shock, right, out of left field. When that occurs, the leading indexes were actually ramping up.
So the window of vulnerability isn't there. And to your point, it helps drag us out of that earlier depressionary situation.
In 1990, you know, Saddam invades Kuwait. It's not the end of the world for any, you know, the US or anything, right? We get a, we get a spike, a little spike in oil prices. but that ends up being a recessionary event. And so here, actually, going into the coronavirus pandemic, the cyclical indexes were starting to turn up. They weren't running away, but they were starting to turn up. And you even see some of the PMI data at the beginning of the year following suit. And starting to firm a little bit, and then it gets walloped by, you know, the biggest shock that we've been all living through with the virus and the mandated kind of recessions through the shutdown.
Now, it's kind of interesting though, because, you know, I don't know if I would go as far as to say that this is a black swan event. You know, I was, I was listening the other day to Taleb, Nassim Taleb, you know, who coined the term, right? Black swan, as far as I know. And Then, you know, he, he cautions not to, you know, just, just use that term as a cliché for any bad thing that surprises us.
You know, from— you've heard all the stories of various people, including him and Navarro in the White House and others saying, hey, you know, this is Bill Gates, everybody's saying that, you know, these are— this is a real, real, real issue here. We got to get in front of it. I think Taleb phrased it as, you know, you should kill it in the egg. You know, we got to jump on this, but it didn't happen.
When I look separately from all of that, from all the viral analysis, back at ECRI's research, our leading indexes turned down. They started to weaken in January. Okay. And that's around the time that Navarro was privately talking inside the administration about the risk. And Taleb was, was saying what he was saying, and Gates was saying what he was saying, all from different vantage points. Okay, totally different measures of vulnerability or of threats or of risk.
And so it's complicated, right? We've got to, by definition, watch out for things that are going to surprise us. And we also have to have I think we don't have to, but I think it's a good idea to have some sort of framework, some sort of way of getting your bearings. And, you know, everybody— I'm not dissing any other approach to getting your bearings, but I think on this kind of directional analysis of where free market activity is going, you know, I'm quite sold on a cyclical framework.
I've always thought, you know, I really minimally want to know which way to look. I'll worry about magnitude second, and then that's not really the strength of the cyclical indicators.
But which direction should I be looking? Even though it sounds crazy, and I'm not pushing back on your original objection that while technically the recession could end this summer, we're not getting back to normal soon, I still know the direction I'm starting to look. Look, I don't think it's gonna be a big V for all of the reasons everybody's been talking about. I really need to see where the leading indexes are going to be heading to see how durable the recovery is going to be. And much of it may depend on the epidemiology of what happens here.
Erik Townsend: Lak, talk to us about how you see this playing out from here. I know you've written about a so-called bullwhip effect that comes into this, but in general, what should we expect in terms of a roadmap of what cycles teach us about what to expect from here to an eventual recovery?
Lakshman Achuthan: Yeah, great question. That's, that's where we're spending all of our time. We certainly are watching the high-frequency leading indicators, and some of them, maybe if you squint, are trying to find a bottom here. The weekly leading index has kind of been bouncing at a very low reading. But not at all plunging the way it was earlier. Some of our global sensitive industrial material price measures, so we, we look at things that are very early in the production chain, and those again have obviously been crushed, but they're starting, they seem to be starting to try and bottom.
So when we look at those types of high-frequency data and possible bottomings in that data, we really have to look at what's going on globally. It's much bigger than the US. And here, one of the dominant factors, especially in larger cyclical moves, is what we call the bullwhip effect, where the farther away you are from the end consumer, the larger the amplitude of your cycle.
And so this means like, you know, so if someone in New York City is, is buying something just, you know, on, on the street, they're the end consumer, but it could ripple all the way back to some early input commodity in an emerging market where a small cycle in New York is a massive cycle in the emerging market.
This is originally just to, to give credit to the origins of this concept. It's a colleague of my mentor, Geoffrey Moore, who was a woman named Ruth Mack, and in the 1950s wrote a paper about the shoe leather and hide sequence. And so, you know, shoes being the kind of front-end consumer, you go to buy a shoe, leather is kind of that intermediate input, And hides is the very early commodity, and often with kind of a relatively fixed supply, right? Because there's so much— in this case, hides are produced, you know, they're byproduct of meat production. But you could imagine semiconductors or oil, right? You have this big investment in the production, and you're going to produce, and the prices swing massively as a result. When the bullwhip gets into effect.
So what we've seen isn't a modest downshift in consumer demand. We've seen a collapse in the current cycle, and that's amplified up the supply chain. And even more, like, the supplier to the supplier is just getting, you know, I feel sorry, almost feel sorry for these guys because they're just getting crushed. For example, China, despite signs of a modest domestic rebound, The collapse globally in end consumer demand, right, as a result of the virus is boomeranging back on the Chinese economy now because it's reverberating right up the supply chain. So they can restart and say, oh, we got some backorders and we're going to, you know, start to fill those and whatnot. But they are going to have this tsunami of like collapse in demand hit them, and that's starting to happen now.
And so you see their exporters are already seeing the orders nosedive very recently, and the worker layoffs and all that is cranking up. So this global recession is— China is one example. I think commodity prices are another great example.
The production, as I suggested, tends to be relatively inelastic. And so when the demand is collapsing, the prices are just Like the moves there are just incredible. We saw oil, for example, right? This was— I mean, that was about as big a collapse as you could see. It starts off in a fight between Russia and Saudi Arabia, you know, and then their storage capacity. But at its root, the collapse in the price is really about a massive bullwhip effect, which is just crushing it. Now, we track these.
Oil prices, other exchange-traded prices, and they, as you know, got crushed. And then we also track these non-exchange-traded inputs, and those have also— they, they kind of hung in a little longer than the exchange-traded commodities, but then they also really collapsed. And just recently, they're just starting to maybe find a floor.
So this may be the kind of trough in the bullwhip effect, but the numbers are just going to be really dramatic for early exporters like China and some of the other Asian economies and commodity-driven economies. And currently, that's just crushing— that'll really knock the air out of inflation. And other things for the time being.
Now, at some point, and this again is where the leading indexes come in, the bullwhip will flick the other way. It works both ways. Okay. And this is another reason why I don't want to belittle necessarily the technical end of the recession, even though we are nowhere near recovered. And we'll be— just because the recession ends doesn't— you're going to have Millions of people unemployed.
There's— it's not going to be a good economy, but these directional shifts can support a flick of the bullwhip the other way. And so we have to keep an eye out for that with the leading indexes.
Erik Townsend: Lak, last time we had you on the show, one of the things we talked about was the Japanification of the US economy and, and really more so the monetary system. system and low bond yields and lots and lots of quantitative easing and so forth. Now, in recent months, a trend that I've seen with a lot of our expert guests on this program is where it used to be just, you know, people would laugh you out of the room if you even mentioned secular inflation. What they're saying now is it's not quite time yet. You know, they're saying, hey, we've still got a deflationary backdrop, but, you know, you're right, it's on the horizon. It's coming. We're going to get to the With all of this fiscal spending and all of the monetary intervention that's occurred, eventually it all has to become inflationary. And I'd say probably the consensus among our guests is, first of all, they don't know. But if they have to guess, they think maybe it's about 3 years off before we get a major shift out of deflation into inflation or stagflation.
What do economic cycles and the study of cycles teach us us that might help us to navigate that path as we figure out where we are on this voyage towards eventually getting out of deflation?
Lakshman Achuthan: Huge question. Huge question. You know, you know, they always talk about the bond, the bond investors being the smart guys. You know, they certainly— ECRI, over decades, we have a lot of fixed income and global fixed income managers use cycles. And the equity guys can get caught up in the stories, right? Right now, it's all the tech stocks, and you've got to chase those, and so on and so forth. And those are really good stories. I understand them.
But this is a huge question. We've been talking about the decline in trend growth for over a decade. It was in the summer of '08 that we started talking about this, way before Larry Summers and all that discussion a few years later. And there's structural problems that are holding down growth, and it relates to demographics and productivity growth and on, on an aggregate scale.
And those things haven't gone anywhere. And so prior to this recession, you saw what seemed like unthinkable amounts of growth and debt, public and private. it in order to get, you know, what was kind of like okay growth in the economy. I think the growth in debt— this is pre-crisis, pre-COVID crisis— the growth in debt of like the US, Europe, China, Japan was 10 times larger than the growth in the economy.
So it gives you an idea of like, you know, where the growth in the economy was coming from. And the US was the least dirty in that group for much of that time. But we were kind of doing the same thing, going with this debt expansion in various policy ways or corporate debt or whatever in order to pursue growth. And under the condition of low productivity growth and low demographic growth, that's our structural challenge. How do we have growth with those facts on the ground? And we were getting it, and the rest of the world is getting it through debt growth. Now, now you come into this brutal recession, US and globally, and boy, oh boy, there's been a lot of debt growth. So as everybody is saying, hey, this can't last. At some point, this is going to cause some inflation in terms of, you know, currency terms inflation, right? And Maybe it's a few years out there. I think that's a reasonable, sober thing to say.
I wouldn't disagree with that.
But I know a couple of things from cycles. One is that cycles in inflation are totally distinct and different than cycles in growth. And this is— it sounds easy to say that, but my gosh, central banks globally are set up differently. Than what I just said. And, you know, it was only for a brief period in the, in the 1990s when the US Fed actually acted that way, where they recognized the difference between cycles and inflation and growth.
Now, if we fast forward a couple of decades to the middle of 2016, our leading indicators of inflation— okay, they're separate from our leading indicators of growth. So most people don't even think about the world this way. But we're tracking a separate set of cycles in inflation. And globally, our leading indicators of inflation directionally turned up. And if you recall back then, inflation expectations that summer were on the floor.
And then we had this inflation trade that occurs subsequently, following that inflation cycle upturn. Now, it was not a big upturn. It was just a directional turn. Okay? And the direction, it was a big deal because everybody had been looking the other way. It wasn't big in terms of magnitude of inflation.
And now, in the current cycle, we're still watching the inflation indicators. They're all falling. There's no inflation imminent. The one— everybody listening has heard everything about it from every economist, but I'll try to boil it down to what I think is the one truism in economics, which is that recession kills inflation.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Lakshman Achuthan: And so I think you can kind of bank on that here. But what about a few quarters from now, or a few years from now, as other guests have opined? That's where these leading indicators of inflation come in.
If they turn up— and I'm not going to predict the predictors— but if they turn up, then you have to deal with directionally higher inflation. Structurally higher inflation? May be more difficult to come by, but unless you're investing for decades, that may not be the call. Everybody has to perform in the next quarter or 2 or 3. On that, that's much more of a cyclical timeframe.
If there's a cyclical upturn inside of a secular disinflation, you still have to deal with it and maneuver for it. I think that with the global recession that you have, you certainly have continued kind of low inflation for the time being. That's not over.
Erik Townsend: I'd like to move on to a final topic, which is, I think, one of the biggest, longest-term cycles that's known in economic research is the East-West power cycle, which, as I understand it, runs about every 500 years. Now, a view that I've held for more than a decade is that the US and China were in the early stages of a Cold War that I think is gonna go to the same proportions as the US-Soviet Cold War. And, you know, I think that this crisis could very easily be the catalyst to ratchet things up quite a bit. So far in my coverage of the coronavirus crisis, I have avoided all of the conspiracy theories and ideas that it's a bioweapon and so forth. I just don't wanna talk about it 'cause I can't prove it.
Lakshman Achuthan: Right.
Erik Townsend: Any of that.
Just this last week, I saw the first, what I consider to be really credible evidence that this was lab-made. No evidence that it's a weapon, but that this was lab-made and very, very likely an accidental leak out of the Wuhan Institute of Virology. Ironically, probably because they were doing research that was bought and paid for by Americans. But it looks like it probably did come out of a laboratory And boy, what a hotbed of finger-pointing. I mean, if the US is going to say, look, it's all China's fault, China's going to say, you hired us to do this research, it's all your fault. Where does this go? And what do cycles teach us about escalation in major Cold War types of conflicts between nations? Is this the kind of catalyst that could really ratchet things up?
Lakshman Achuthan: Well, I mean, it certainly moves the ball down the playing field a little quicker than you might have expected. I don't know if we're at the end zone just yet, but on this road to Japanification, for example, which isn't even about necessarily China directly, we've accomplished in a few months this year in 2020 what would otherwise may have taken us a handful of years or more.
In terms of the debt growth and some of the other things that have occurred to the economy in terms of the downside damage. So things have certainly accelerated. And when the economies, when our economy and other economies, China's economy, become more precarious, there's all kinds of political pressures that are going to pop up.
I'm going to get my timing is— I've kind of lost track of time during this, during being sequestered here. But it was roughly a year ago, I would say, that Vice President Pence gave a very important, I thought, very clear speech on China and the US attitude, you know, our— not our attitude, the near term, the midterm, and the longer term kind of issues that as a superpower, the US has with China rising as a superpower.
And None of that is going away, and it probably, as you're saying, gets accelerated during this time of great flux. Everybody's untethered, so those kind of things can accelerate quickly in that kind of environment. I don't know the details of the origins or the facts. I think it's hard about the virus and where they came from, but one of the other books I've been starting to look through is Bob Shiller's Narrative Economics.
So it may not— the actual, whatever, what actually literally happened may be less important compared to the narrative that takes hold here. And that's going to take hold in the context of the geopolitical tug of war that's going on.
A couple of years ago, we did a report which, which I'll give to you so listeners can, can look at it, about the century-long kind of flow of wealth east and west. And so the west, the rise of the west, you know, really comes with industrialization, you know, the Industrial Revolution in Europe, and then colonialism. These are 2 huge things that where the west can, you know, really dominated the world. I think it's— I think it's in the middle of the last century, like in the '50s or so, The West is dominating the entire globe, and the US is most of the West, right, at that point, and are the majority. We're the really big player.
Ever since then, it's been kind of slowly swinging back the other way until the last couple of decades where that's accelerated. We're still the biggest. The West is still bigger, but The kind of swing of the pendulum back has accelerated a bit further when you talk about the kind of the century's view of this.
And, you know, so that does get a little exciting, right? When you're a global superpower, as the US is, you're the military dominator of the world, yet this is still happening. Largest market, most productive market, all of those things. Yet, the pendulum is still, just by dint of, for lack of a better word, physics, kind of swinging back a bit.
Erik Townsend: How do you even look at something like this? It seems to me there's a conundrum here, which is you'd think, okay, let's look at economic cycles history and what it teaches us about cold wars and major rifts between nations and so forth. But all the history on that stuff goes back to a time period before globalization. So, when you had the US and the Soviet Union not being friends with one another, neither one was dependent on the other for most of its export business. But now with China, it's a completely different story. And I don't think there is a historic precedent for this situation.
What do you do in that case?
Lakshman Achuthan: You literally just hit on a report that we're doing right now, which is, you know, Look, stock prices are related to cycles. There is a relationship. You can't literally time stock prices on it, but they're related to them. And stock prices will typically bottom in the vicinity of a business cycle trough, especially— this is especially true in the United States. What's interesting is when you look internationally, let's say UK, Germany, France, China, Japan, Japan, any of these big countries.
Now, when you look there, that's not actually the rule.
And the reason is because we're so interdependent. Global investors have bought a lot of the US. I mean, they're invested here. I mean, there's nothing innocuous, there's nothing insidious about it. They, they want to invest in what's a good bet. And they're buying US companies, right? As shareholders. And what happens is you end up seeing international equity markets have a very tight relationship. They're tethered to the US market, which is tethered to the US economy.
So as you're suggesting, we're— it's harder to say us and them because we're interinvested with each other quite a bit. And when you look at, at markets abroad, it's really about the domestic economy is maybe 50% of the equation, of the risk equation on equities. And the other 50% is what's going on with the US.
That, that's where that risk equation gets really fuzzy, that you cannot divorce yourself from the other country that easily. And you see that even happening now in in some of the issues that Vice President Pence brought up about the relationship between the US and China near-term, the short-term stuff, the trade stuff that we're doing, right?
Even right there, making some shifts just because of the interdependence, it becomes, you know, it's not straightforward, right? We've all been talking about this for a few years now. So to be continued for sure. But I think ultimately, There's an aspect of us all being in the same boat.
Erik Townsend: Lak, before we close, I know that ECRI publishes some indices which are very widely followed, extremely popular with analysts. Tell us a little bit about what you guys do at businesscycle.com, what people can find on the website, and particularly the indices that you publish.
Lakshman Achuthan: Yeah, sure, sure thing. So, yeah, businesscycle.com is, is where everything is presented. And we freely have been releasing something called the Weekly Leading Index. My mentor, Geoffrey Moore, created the original Leading Index. And this is half a century ago. And in the '80s, developed something called— we distributed it through Businessweek magazine back then, was a really big deal. And it was the Businessweek Leading Index. And then we took it private and we just give it away to everybody on our website.
And it's a very prompt leading index of US economic cycles. And as I mentioned during the interview, it looks like it's trying to bottom here. And it's, it's so prompt that every Friday we have it through the previous week. So this Friday, we'll have it through, you know, it'll be through the end of April, and you get a really quick read on what the cyclical drivers of the economy are objectively Right? Because who knows, the market goes up, the market goes down. Do you believe it?
You know, what was it? These are a lot of non-market-related indicators also in there. So you have kind of a one-armed economist, you know, instead of saying on the one hand, on the other hand, it's just, it is what it is. It's, it's either going down or going up, and looks like it stopped going down. So we want to keep a really close eye on it right here.
Erik Townsend: Well, Lak, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air. Some We'll be back next week with of more of your the conversation with questions Professor Steve Keen. may air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview with Lak. You know, the part that resonated with me, which is my whole argument all along, everyone's so getting so excited about the fact that they're going to reopen the economy. I mean, we had a hard shutoff of the economy. It's impossible for the numbers not to start to improve once they start reopening things.
How long does it take for us to even get remotely close to where the economy was even just 3 months ago before this whole thing started? And, you know, his analogy of trying to start up a stalled engine is really the way I look at it. It's like it will eventually start up again, but I think everyone's getting their hopes up in terms of how fast a recovery can come about. What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: I agree exactly with what you said, Patrick. And when we get to the COVID-19 pandemic update later in this segment, I'll have more to say about the reasons I don't think that we're going to see a V-shaped recovery and why this could take a real long time before things are actually back to normal. I particularly was looking forward to getting Lak's perspective on the secular shift to inflation and how it plays out. It's just such an important question. And I'll continue with our other guests in future interviews to focus on that same topic. Thank you, Jeffrey.
But I want to move on now, Patrick, to our post-game chartbook.
Erik Townsend: Listeners, you'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, that means you haven't registered your free account yet at MacroVoices.com. Just go to MacroVoices.com, look for the red button on the homepage that says looking for the downloads. Patrick, here on page 2 of the post-game chartbook, I see you've got a chart of the June crude oil contract. My favorite chart. What's on your mind?
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, all I just wanted to show was on that June contract, uh, the, the recovery that we've seen off of that $5 printed low. I can't even use the continuous contract because it's got that -40 print on it, and it's been quite a bit of a recovery. Certainly interesting to see your thoughts as to what happens next here. So I wanted to start by asking you though to clarify something you've said many times. that contango in the futures market is a proxy for, and therefore a measure of, the demand for storage in Cushing, Oklahoma. Now, contango refers to a difference in price where the latter delivery month is priced higher than the near delivery month. What does that have to do with the demand for storage?
Erik Townsend: Well, let's take a look at page 3, which is showing you at a particular moment in time— this is as of yesterday's close on May 6th— each one of those little yellow dots is showing you the price of each separate contract. So the bottom dot is the June contract, the next dot up is the July contract, August, September, October, and so forth, all the way out to 2029. The crude oil futures literally trade 10 years worth of future prices. We're really only looking at the front of the curve there. That difference in price, well, what does that have to do with storage?
The easiest way to understand this is put yourself in the shoes of someone who owns physical crude oil that's in a tank in Cushing, Oklahoma, and their lease on that tank space is running out next month. They can't keep the oil there because they don't have storage after some time, say a few weeks from now. What are they going to do? Well, they've got to call somebody and try to buy some more storage space. They also have another option, though, that's available to What they could do is they could sell the June delivery contract, that's the bottom dot, and buy back, let's say for sake of argument, the December contract, which is about $4 higher right now in price.
That would basically allow them to take the oil that they have in storage. They would be essentially selling it and then buying it back later. But they would pay a fixed price that's guaranteed. They can lock in that price.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: Of $4, they're going to get their oil back, but now they've got 4 months to find someplace else to store it. So effectively, what they did by selling their oil and at the same time buying it back for later delivery was they secured an indirect form of storage for that oil for the next 4 months.
Now, that's not the way that people who need to store oil actually conduct their affairs. They're much more likely to call a broker who who handles these storage tanks and leases and so forth and just directly rent some space from somebody who's got it. But because it's possible to do it that way, it creates an arbitrage where essentially the contango in the front of the WTI crude oil futures curve is a measure of the cost of storage. Because one of the options for the way you could achieve storage of oil is selling your oil and buying it back. And the contango is effectively your storage cost. So that's what storage and contango have to do with one another.
And the general rule of thumb is for the first 6 months or so of the WTI term structure— that's this chart on page 3— the first 6 dots or so, what the primary thing is that's going to be affecting the distance, vertical space between those dots, is the demand for storage. That's the primary thing that determines that spacing. And the reason we got into a super-duper deep super contango where there was, you know, $5 of space between the dots last month is because we literally were running completely and totally out of storage. Those dots are now much closer together than they were last month. That, at least on the surface, seems to be an indication that there's not nearly as much demand for storage as there was a month ago. Once you go past the first 6 dots or so, the rest of the curve really is more of a reflection of longer-term expectations in the market for the balance between supply and demand.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, well, that covers the concept of what contango and backwardation means on any given day, but here's my problem with the chart on page 3. It shows us all the different prices for all the different contracts as they were at one moment in time, As of yesterday's close, in this case, as of May 6th. But there was no actual time series in these charts. It doesn't show how this phenomenon of contango has been evolving throughout the entire crisis or over the past few months.
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, that's exactly the reason that I very, very seldom use this form of chart. I wanted to start with this chart because this format is basically the industry standard. It's what everybody uses. And the way that The way most people would show a change in term structure is on the same chart. They'd have one, you know, yellow line of dots like we see here. And then in another color, they would plot the term structure from a different date, from a different snapshot in time, and say, okay, you know, the yellow line is yesterday, and the green line is 2 weeks ago, and the red line is a month ago. And we look at the difference in shape, and maybe we can draw some conclusions from that.
Even so, to me at least, this chart is just not a very effective way of thinking about what's going on. Because if I look, let's say, at the, the bottom of page 3, look at those dots. The first dot to the second dot to the third dot. Well, is the, the first dot farther from the second dot than the second dot is from the third dot? Or is that space between the third and the second dot bigger than the space of the first and I can't tell. It's too hard just from looking at that chart.
So I use my own form of chart, and that's on page 4. This particular format is kind of my own design. I haven't seen anybody else really think about term structure using this kind of chart. But what I'm doing is simply plotting each of those 1-month time spreads, the difference between each of those individual dots, and I'm plotting that as a time series. So the white line here that you see is the difference between the June and the July contract. The green line above it is the difference between the July and the August contract. The orange line above that is the difference between the August and September contract. The yellow one is September to October, and so on and so forth. So by looking at it this way, what I can see is both the relative size of each of those 1-month spreads I can see how they're trending and where there's a difference in trend.
If you look at, say, going back to the beginning of April, you see a very distinct phenomenon here where there's a general breakdown in the time spreads moving lower. But for the most part, the orange one, which is August-September, and the green one, which is July-August, they're kind of moving pretty much in the same direction, following the same signal. Signals. But the white one, which is June-July, is moving on a completely different trajectory. It's falling at a much steeper pace. So you can see a lot more, and you can intuit more from this chart, at least in my opinion, in terms of what's happening.
Now, I should mention also that the particular chart that I have here is only showing the actively trading spreads, starting with the June to July spread. The, the one before that, which was the May-June The reason I had to take that off the chart is it literally, as it went into expiration, just utterly collapsed all the way. You know, this— the Y scale here only goes down to -$8 at the very bottom right. That May-June spread went all the way to -$60 at one point just before it expired. So it wouldn't even fit on the chart here, Patrick.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, well, this chart really drives the story home, but it seems to be completely at odds with a lot of what's been discussed here and predicted here on MacroVoices. For weeks and weeks, we've been discussing all the reasons why we would run out of crude oil storage and why it would cause these time spreads to drop like a rock. And we can clearly see that's exactly what was happening right up until April 21st when the pattern bottoms. But since then, it's been an uphill ride for these time spreads. And the look of things, we've retraced almost all the way back to those mid-March levels. Now, Erik, please help me understand here. If anything, it seems like the chart is showing it's pretty clear that the storage crisis is done and over with and having ended back on April 21st, and that there's no longer a shortage of crude oil storage in Cushing, Oklahoma. Or maybe am I reading something wrong?
What conclusions are you drawing from all of this?
Erik Townsend: Well, you're not reading the chart wrong. The chart is exactly telling you that. It's basically saying, hey, the storage crisis is over, baby. The contango is coming out of the market. Seems like something changed and everything is better now. And it is entirely plausible that that is an accurate explanation.
I put out the feelers last week for our listeners in the physical crude oil market. I got several emails from people saying, hey, the, the pace of shut-ins that's happened ever since that May contract debacle with the negative prices, that freaked everybody out. All the people that were on the fence, not really sure what to do, they went ahead and made their decisions to shut in. So we really are seeing en masse shut-ins of production that is dramatically reducing that demand for storage. So it is possible, I emphasize possible, that this could be it. It could be that, you know, the price signal worked, it freaked everybody out, it caused the producers to shut in, and we no longer have a major contention for storage space in Cushing, Oklahoma, which certainly is what this chart appears to be telling us.
Patrick Ceresna: Hold on. You just explained last week that you thought smaller inventory builds in both Cushing and nationally were being misinterpreted, and that seems very relevant to this discussion. Now, please explain again and give us an update on whether you still think that's what's going on here.
Erik Townsend: Well, what I predicted 2 weeks before it happened, back when we were getting 15 million barrels of national And 5 million barrels of Cushing builds. I said, I think what's happening, and I think what's coming, is going to be a much smaller Cushing build, maybe even a Cushing drawdown. And everybody's going to assume it means, okay, there's no more demand for storage. The storage crisis is behind us. In fact, it could mean that. It's possible that that's exactly what it does mean. But it's also possible That the reason, you know, think about a glass of water. If something is already full, you can't add more to it. If Cushing is as full as it can get, and there's no room to put any more oil in because there's nobody who's willing to lease any spare storage capacity at any price, well then the size of the builds have to get much smaller or even go to zero because there's no room to add any more.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: It doesn't mean that there's no demand. It just means that there's no room to add any more. Now, Patrick, my first thought was that phenomenon I predicted is in play. What we're seeing is smaller Cushing builds. The reason for the smaller Cushing builds is probably because there's no space left at all and oil cannot be added. It has to go into much more expensive floating storage in instead, and the market's taking it the wrong way, and that has caused the beginning of a short squeeze because perhaps the, the most crowded trade that there is in the oil market has been short time spreads. Lots and lots of big traders, short time spreads in size. They've had to start covering. It's caused a short covering rally or a short squeeze where everybody's being forced out out, and I thought maybe that's based on a false signal. Well, the way you would validate that is to look at the tanker charter rates.
If tanker charter rates are going through the roof, well, that means that, yeah, it's exactly what I thought. The reason for the smaller Cushing builds is because it all has to go into floating storage. It doesn't fit into Cushing, and the market's got the wrong signal.
So let's go ahead and take a look at page 5, which is showing spot tanker rates in the VLCC market, the very large crude carrier market. And I went and looked at this chart thinking, if this is going to a new high, that really confirms my thesis. Well, guess what? Not only is it not going to a new high, it's crashing back to levels not seen since February. And I thought, oh boy, if we're seeing the tanker market also reflecting a sudden drop in demand. Maybe that means that we really and truly are past that peak in storage and we don't have demand for storage anymore. It was one of our listeners who pointed out to me on Twitter, he said, wait a minute, Erik, you're looking at the demand for spot storage of tankers. That's where the OPEC guys that are delivering oil from point A to point B. That's where they buy their tankers.
But the tanker trade, the contango trade, where you're storing oil by chartering a tanker for 6 or 12 months to just sit at anchor and hang on to the oil and come back and deliver it later, that's a different market. That's the time charter market. That's a different chart, and that one is on page 6. So all of a sudden we see on page 6, wait a minute, that number's coming down. Well, first of all, why did the number on page 5 come down?
The reason it came down is because OPEC's production cuts went into effect May 1st. That means OPEC countries are using less of those delivery tankers to deliver oil. Those prices are coming down. Well, if those prices are coming down, that means there's more tankers in the ocean that are available to be hired for something. It only makes sense that that has to cause the time charter market to come down too. Did it come down just as much?
Or not quite as much? Well, it really— if you look at page 6 here, it didn't come down nearly as much.
So I'm kind of on the fence here, Patrick. I, I think there is still room for the interpretation that what has happened here is there's been a short squeeze in time spreads that has pushed both the time spreads and the flat month price higher. It's being driven by this perception That we don't really have a storage problem anymore, that the demand for floating storage is collapsing, which if you looked at the first chart on page 5 showing tanker rates, you'd come to that conclusion. If you look at the page 6 chart though, which I want to thank that listener for pointing this out to me, it really tells a very different story. So, I think the jury is still out here. There's definitely room to conclude that what's going on is We've seen a short squeeze in both front month price and in time spreads. May have topped today, just as I look at the chart as we're speaking on Thursday afternoon.
It looks like a reversal may be upon us in both the flat price of the June contract and in time spreads. But hey, this is, you know, we're at the point in this crisis.
In the beginning, I was super high conviction. I'm like, folks, I know exactly what's going to happen. I'm sure of it. Well, we're at the hard part now where it's, you know, I see a couple of scenarios. I think you could interpret this either way. But my base case, if I have to say what I think is most likely, I think this thing's overdone. I think at least part of this has been a short squeeze. Maybe we do have less demand. We're past the peak for demand and storage because there's been so many shut-ins of production. Very, very possible. We've got lots Lots of evidence to corroborate that that is going on. But is the demand for storage really almost gone completely away as the chart on page 4 seems to imply? No, I don't think so. I think what's happened is some of it's gone away.
It started a short squeeze. That short squeeze has had to play out, may have topped out today, and it remains to be seen, Patrick, how this ultimately plays out.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, it remains to be seen how this all plays out here, but what are the signposts? What are we looking for on how this all gets resolved?
Erik Townsend: Well, for that, we need to go back to page 4 in the slide deck. Now, you mentioned earlier, you said that it looks like the storage crisis appears from this chart to have ended on the 21st of April. Actually, if you look a little more closely at the graph on page 4, you'll see that it's the June-July contract, the white line, that bottoms on the 21st of April. But really, all the other later spreads The green one is July-August and the orange is August-September and so forth. They all bottomed on the 28th, not the 21st. So what's special about the 21st? That's the question you have to ask. Why did the June-July spread go so far down on the 21st? And furthermore, look at how steep it declined into the 21st. It was really only in those last few days from the 16th of April to the 21st.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: 21st that it just took an absolute nosedive. I mean, it was on a downward trajectory before, but it was kind of in line with, with what the spreads above it were doing.
And then on the 16th, it just took an outright nosedive. Now, this chart doesn't even do justice to how big of a nosedive that was, Patrick, because intraday on the 21st, this spread actually traded all the way down to minus $12. It would be well off the bottom of the scale here.
Patrick Ceresna: Wow.
Erik Townsend: This chart is only showing closing prices on the end of each day, so it just shows you -710 or so, which is where that spread closed on the 21st. But it was in absolute freefall. What's so special about those dates, the 16th of April and the 21st of April? It's no coincidence, Patrick. The 16th of April was options expiration for the May contract, the one that came before this one.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: And the 21st was the last trading day for the May contract. So what happened is when— and we don't have it on this particular chart— but the May-June spread, it didn't just dive down to -12, it dove all the way down between the 16th and the 21st. It dove all the way down to -60.
So why did that happen? The answer is, you know, you can play lots of games with sentiment and maybe gaming the inventory numbers a little bit. It's been suggested that some of the big players may have been leasing storage in Cushing and intentionally leaving it empty to make sure that Cushing never hit the actual full mark as far as the EIA reporting was concerned, trying to kind of confuse the market a little bit and muster some positive sentiment.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: That might not actually have been warranted by the true underlying conditions. But the thing is, when you get to the contract going into expiry, from options expiration to the actual final trading date, that's when the fat lady sings, so to speak. That's when you find out whether or not there's an imbalance between the number of physical shorts that are standing for delivery, that are going to actually deliver oil, as opposed to rolling their paper contracts forward, versus the number of physical longs, people who are able to actually receive delivery, as opposed to paper traders who have to roll out of that position.
That's when the fireworks really start, and that's when you can't really hide reality from the market.
So the answer is, I don't know. It could be that the storage crisis really is is mostly behind us. I'm very, very skeptical of that. I find it very hard to believe. If I'm right, it would be into options expiration, which is next Thursday, the 14th of May, would be when the fireworks start. And by the 18th or 19th of May— the 19th, Tuesday, is the last trade date for the June contract. The 18th, Monday, is called the penultimate day, which is a great big Latin word that means the second to last Why they, they use that fancy word, I don't know, but that's what they call it. The second-to-last trading day is usually where everybody has to get out of the market because the last day is really only for the physical traders to finalize their transactions. So by the end of the 18th, we're gonna know one way or the other. If on the 18th we see basically the backwardation on the June-July spread, which on this chart is showing $1.24.
Let's say it's still less than $2 as of Monday the 18th. Okay, look folks, I guess I was a little bit late on the call. The storage crisis, it's behind us. It's getting better. It's time to start thinking about how you play the upside of the oil market from here.
I think it's more likely that we're gonna see some more downside before we get to the 18th, maybe a lot more downside.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: But really, we don't find out until we get past OPEX, which is next Thursday.
Patrick Ceresna: And needless to say, we'll have another update for our listeners on next week's MacroVoices, which we'll be recording just a few minutes after the pit close on the OPEX day. Until then, it sounds like the message is to watch for a possible downside reversal, and maybe a big one, on both time spreads and the front month price. Is that the gist of it?
Erik Townsend: Exactly. And again, I am hearing feedback from some of our listeners in the physical market saying, hey, the rate of shut-ins just scary. It could be that this is real. The demand for storage has abated significantly because a whole bunch of people were forced to shut in. It could be as simple as that.
I have a really hard time believing that the storage crisis is over already, despite what these charts are telling us. And, you know, we'll find out. Certainly by the end of the month, that will be it.
In the interest of full disclosure, I just want to mention I have exited most of my time spread shorts last Thursday and Friday, as I described on last week's podcast, even though I didn't think the move made sense. I thought it was set to continue. I was right about that. I was fortunate to get out of the way. I did put some of those time spread shorts back on today, thinking maybe this is the top today of a short squeeze, but that's a much smaller position, much less leverage than I was using before. Because I'm really not sure of it this time, where I was pretty darn sure the last time around. So we'll see what happens.
Overall, though, I don't know if it's time yet for us to start thinking about buying the bottom of this market and, you know, how to play the recovery from here. Maybe there's one more push down, but, you know, if it's one more push down, pretty soon, if we haven't already seen the bottom, we're going to get to a bottom, and it's going to be time to look at how You buy the bottom of this market, and I don't think it's with USO or, or any of the other ETF products, which are very vulnerable to the contango at the front end of the curve. The, the way to play that is with time spreads further out on the back end of the curve. Let's save that conversation until we get there, until we think that we're actually past that point. It could be as early as next week's episode.
We'll see.
Patrick Ceresna: So, Erik, let's move on and get an update from you on what's going on with the COVID-19.
Erik Townsend: What's Well, Patrick, until now I have very consciously and intentionally avoided any mention or discussion of the conspiracy theories. You know, it was a bioweapon engineered in order to intentionally take out humanity, blah blah blah. You know, there's just every imaginable conspiracy theory on the internet. I think those are, you know, things that should be investigated. We should ask every possible question. But until now, I hadn't seen any compelling evidence to support any of these ideas, and I didn't want to touch them because without compelling scientific evidence, I don't think it's useful to speculate in wild conjecture about what somebody's motive might have been for a bioweapon or what have you. And I want to be clear, I still have not seen any evidence that suggests that this is a bioweapon that was engineered to be a bioweapon. Again, I think that kind of thing should be investigated just in case, but I still have not seen any evidence that that's what's going on.
What I did see for the first time this week, and we've got some videos linked in your Research Roundup email, was Chris Martenson did a piece, and it really does appear that the Wuhan Institute of Virology was doing research on what's called gain-of-function, which means intentionally taking viruses out of animals and trying to see if you can monkey with their RNA and get them so that they will be capable of infecting humans. Now, I know it sounds like that would be a weapon thing to be researching. There are valid reasons that they do this kind of research just to research, you know, how viruses spread and so forth. It's called gain-of-function testing, and it's something that apparently was going on with bat viruses.
Now, here's the crazy part. You've heard a lot of reports in the media saying, look, leading scientists, experts in this field, have all weighed in saying there's no evidence whatsoever that this thing was created in a laboratory. It's nonsense. Don't even pay attention to this. It's all crazy talk. The scientists, the experts have weighed in.
What Chris Martenson's done is really looked in detail at this, and he's realized, look, there is this idea called gain-of-function research where they intentionally try to get these animal viruses modified in a way that they could infect humans so they can basically test what could go wrong. Not only did the Wuhan Institute of Virology get contracted to do exactly that kind of research on bat coronaviruses, the, the kind of virus that's in play and do gain-of-function testing to see if they can infect humans or be made to infect humans. But apparently they were funded to do that work by— bought and paid for— American science on, as far as I can see, American government grants. So they were doing this research, and furthermore, the people who sponsored that research, the people whose name is on the grant application, to get the check from the US government to pay the Wuhan Institute of Virology to do this kind of research on bat coronaviruses are the same scientists that have been quoted in the media as saying there's no evidence whatsoever that this thing could have possibly been manmade.
So there's a lot of conflicts of interest here. Now, I don't claim to know that, that Chris Martenson is right about all of this, but But there's a particular video that he did. The first video that we have linked kind of gives the backstory of this. He didn't know the information in the second video when he produced the first video.
The second video from a few days later is where Martenson finds out that there is a genetically inserted sequence of RNA in the SARS-CoV-2 virus that does not exist in any of the adjacent members of the family tree of this virus. There's a whole video to explain this whole thing. I don't want to get into all of the details in the podcast. The point is, it's the first time that I've seen really compelling evidence, not of a weapon, but apparently of gain-of-function research, trying to take bat viruses that only infect bats, get them so that they can infect humans intentionally for the purpose of doing research and testing. And it looks like that leaked and probably is the source of the virus.
Okay. Source of this thing. He makes a very compelling case about why there's one specific question which nobody in the press has asked yet, and so he's encouraging them to ask it, which is how did this specific genetic insert get into the RNA signature of this virus if it was not from genetic editing that went on in a laboratory? Please explain how else it could be possible based on on where the SARS-CoV-2 sits in the genetic tree and the fact that none of its adjacent branches of the tree have any signs of this particular signature. And there's another video that we don't have linked because it's even a day later where he's found more information that it appears that there's some evidence that one of the reference cases of a different virus— it's a little bit dodgy as to why there's no before January 20th, 2020, for the existence of one of the things that they're saying might have been the natural source of this.
It almost looks like somebody made up another virus to compare the SARS-CoV-2 virus to. I don't know if he's right, but this is the first time I've seen compelling enough evidence that it really appears to me that there's a strong case, not only that this was created in— and I don't want to mean— I don't want to say that the virus was engineered out of nothing. It looks like it was a bat virus that infects other bats that was modified intentionally through gain-of-function research funded by the United States in order to make it so it could infect humans. It looks like that may be where this virus came from.
Now, what are the implications of that if it's true in terms of US-China relations? The US is going to blame China. It's all their fault for sloppy, you know, they let this thing out. Maybe China would say, well, the US, you know, hired us to do their dirty work. Why did they want to do this research in the first place?
I have no idea where this could go, but it just seems to me like it is a can of worms in terms of where this could take us.
There's also more evidence coming out this week that to me just, it paints a more compelling picture that we're not headed for a simple scenario of a V-shaped recovery until there's a vaccine which solves the problem and it's all forgotten and gone with. First of all, there's very strong evidence of mutation of this virus into multiple strains. And what that means is you could potentially have gotten one strain, you develop the antibodies so that you're immune to getting that strain again, but there's other strains around. Maybe you could get another strain that you're not immune to. And so the fact that you've already had it doesn't really give you any protective immunity from the other strains that are in circulation. That means the whole concept of herd immunity as being sort of the solution that solves the problem eventually might be much, much farther off than we originally thought because you'd have to develop herd immunity to all of the different strains that are in circulation, which is a very different story.
Now the other thing is earlier in the coronavirus crisis evolution, it seemed like fortunately younger people, particularly children, were almost immune. They would contract the virus, they would be spreaders of the virus. A lot of schoolchildren gave the virus to their parents, it seems, but the kids never really got sick. They didn't have any serious symptoms. They just spread it around.
Now what we're seeing is big outbreaks, first in London and now in New York City, and the doctors are questioning, okay, is this a mutation of the coronavirus that we know and have been dealing with for the last few months, and somehow suddenly now it does develop serious symptoms in children because it's a different mutation? Or could it be an entirely new pathogen? We don't even know that, but something's going on where all of a sudden kids are being affected. And of And of course, if kids are susceptible, that changes the practicality of restarting school. If you can't restart school, it's hard for parents to go back to work because if they don't have daycare arrangements, it just has a ripple effect on the ability to restart the overall economy. So there's lots of reasons.
The other thing I mentioned in one of the podcasts, I said there's never been a successful coronavirus vaccine. It was pointed out to me by a listener that that's wrong. There has been a successful coronavirus vaccine for camels, but never one for humans. So, you know, there's never been a successful coronavirus vaccine. Yeah, we got a lot more smarter people working on it this time. It certainly is the focus of the entire medical community's efforts. Probably there's a better chance of getting one this time, but it's not a done deal that there's going to be a vaccine. And if there is a vaccine, vaccine, it's not a done deal that it's a vaccine for all of the different strains that are out there. It might be that we have a vaccine that only protects against, you know, half of the strains that are in circulation.
So I think there's a very real chance, Patrick, that we continue for a period of several years. I don't mean in lockdown, but, you know, we restart the economy partially and people who are most at risk, elderly and so forth have to stay at home for an extended period of time, and we continue to have some degree of social distancing where maybe, you know, big sporting events and stadiums full of people and everything doesn't become practical again for many years to come. So I don't think there's any reason to assume that there's a V-shaped recovery, and I don't think there's any reason to assume this is going to be easy. Obviously, we're going to make progress. Hopefully, the worst of this is behind this, but it doesn't mean that we're just a few months away from forgetting it and moving on.
I think there's a lot of risk. And, you know, the other thing we haven't even talked about, there's bioterrorism risk at some point. The bad guys are going to think about how to use this stuff to hurt us. And if you think about the things that have happened with suicide bombers in the past, they had to get through the metal detectors with their bombs and their weapons and so forth. If your weapon is, you're a martyr and you're willing And if you're willing to give your own life for your cause, and your weapon is your own body, you infect yourself with a deadly virus, as long as you can personally get to a political rally where you can shake hands and give people hugs and, and, and do whatever, you can do a lot of damage, and there's no way to detect that. The bad guys are thinking about this stuff already. You know that's going to be part of the future. So the consequences of this are really significant.
We do have 3 Chris Martenson videos linked in your Research Roundup. First one is the background on why it might be lab-made. The second one is kind of the smoking gun evidence about this genetic insert. The science is over my head, but it seems like he makes a pretty darn compelling case that we need to answer this question of where did this specific insert come from if not from a laboratory. And none of the people who have opined that supposedly, oh, there's no evidence that it's lab-made. Nobody's been able to answer that question or has even been asked to answer that question yet. There's another video that talks about multiple strains of COVID-19 and why there may be more than just one vaccine would be able to protect us from.
Erik Townsend: You can decide for yourself whether or not his arguments are credible, but I think it's worth watching the videos. And Patrick, we're gonna need to leave it there.
This episode was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at TopTradersUnplugged.com/MacroGuide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit MacroVoices.com/SponsorInfo. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as well as, of course, our postgame chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: In this week's Research Roundup, you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the supporting articles for Lak's presentation and the charts we discussed in the postgame. There's also an interesting article from Nouriel Roubini titled The White Swans of 2020, as well as a link to the latest Jeffrey Snider installment of Eurodollar University 6 titled Shocking Fragility. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com. Or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow us on our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.
You can also follow Erik directly on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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Lacy Hunt — Hoisington Asset Management Chief Economist (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 217 was recorded on April 30th, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers all over the world, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing, helping investors overcome behavioral biases. We've got I've got another terrific episode on deck for you this week. Hoisington Investment Management Chief Economist Dr. Lacy Hunt joins me for what has to be his best MacroVoices interview yet. We'll discuss why Dr. Hunt thinks deflation will be the name of the game in the immediate future and what it would take to cause him to change his deflationary views. We'll also discuss the critical question of whether the zero bound is really a boundary or if it's just another number along the way toward negative rates.
Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment when Patrick and I will have an extended conversation over charts about what we believe is the end of a bear market rally in the stock market. But we'll consider both sides of that argument. Is the top finally in, or are we headed back above 3,000?
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now listeners, we have a detailed update of the COVID-19 crisis in our postgame segment after the feature interview. Now Erik, let's dive right into the S&P 500. We got a little bit of a pop on the Fed, and then it's giving it all back. What's your take on all of this?
Erik Townsend: Well, I've been saying for weeks and weeks and weeks that I think it's a bear market rally, and my target for shorting it, if I was going to short it, would be the 61.8% Fibonacci retrace level, which is 2,930 I tweeted yesterday, okay folks, we hit it right here, right now. This is where I would short if I was going to short. And I think when I clicked the tweet button, the market was at about 2,952.
So that would have been my entry had I shorted it. I decided to pass on it. Several reasons. One is just that, you know, the stock market's been awfully erratic through this whole crisis, and my crude oil trades have been extremely predictable, doing exactly— well, today was an exception, but aside from the last couple of days, the oil market's been doing exactly what I expected, and I'm just kind of sticking to what I'm best at. I also think that we do have intervention risk here. You know, we already saw the Fed say that they could bail out HYG, junk bonds, bonds, and if I was going to trade it, I'd want to do it with puts rather than outright futures shorts. And, you know, the puts are expensive with the VIX still up where it is. So I decided to pass on trading it, but if I were going to trade it, I think the time to enter the short was yesterday. Maybe we got one more push up to 3,000 or above just to take out the stops up there, but it's hard for me to see it going a whole lot farther than that.
Let's save the rest for the postgame segment, though, because we're going to get into some charts and talk about the pro and con arguments for why this could or could not be a bull market rally, or maybe we're headed back to all-time highs.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to that dollar index because we are certainly backing off from the 100 handle, and we're down to about 99 right now on the dollar index. What's your take on the dollar here?
Erik Townsend: Yeah, we're definitely backing off, but it's still a consolidation range. You know, the range we've been in is 99 to 101. We're at the bottom of that range this week. We were at the top of it last week. It's not until we break out below 99 on a closing basis or above 101 that we actually get a signal from it. So for now, just in a consolidation. As I've said before, the Fed seemingly being so quick to be ready to intervene in just about everything weakens my bullish conviction a little bit, makes me mostly think there's room for more downside in the near term. But I think this ultimately is going to resolve dollar positive. This, this crisis is causing so much trouble all over the world. I think there's going to be a lot of flight capital moving into dollar assets.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil, 'cause we used to be able to track a continuous chart to just get a pulse on what's going on in crude. But now it's all about the time spreads and the rolls and which, you know, at least 4 front-month contracts on the term structure, just how they're all developing. What's your take on how this is all playing out?
Erik Townsend: Well, I wanna thank Jim Bianco because I wouldn't have been able to do the crude oil segment here in less than an hour. There's just so much to talk about. Jim Bianco and I did a great podcast on Sunday evening, kind of impromptu. And so, I strongly encourage people who've not listened to it, if you're interested in crude oil, we've got some really interesting ideas there about why there might be kind of a perfect storm setup for— I guess it's not a black swan if you can predict it. So, it's a white swan, it's a gray swan. I don't know what color swan it is, but we think there could be some real fireworks in the crude oil market ahead if our theory proves correct. that producers are going to be using the futures market to essentially take care of the problem that they don't have any storage by making storage somebody else's issue.
Now, I should point out, because we got a lot of criticism on Twitter and so forth, Jim and I certainly understand that the producers don't directly sell futures in the futures market. They would need to work with their bankers and other intermediaries to do that. But the basic thesis is we think that there could be a lot of selling, which is motivated by producers trying to deliver oil into the futures market. So, there could be stealth short positions where there's a higher percentage of short interest that intends physical delivery than anybody expects, and you don't find out until the contract's about to expire. So, we went into great detail on that subject. Then, what's changed since then, since we published that interview on Monday morning, there's been this whole rally this week. Big move up in crude oil prices. Frankly, it feels to me like this is the market badly misinterpreting the inventory data. Now, Patrick, I'm always circumspect, you know, when it feels to me like, okay, I'm smarter than the market.
I see what they should see and they're missing it. They're all a bunch of dummies. I try to be very, very careful not to get too cocky because, you know, sometimes it turns out the market's got it right and I'm the one who was missing the boat. So I definitely invite— I know we have many listeners who are professionals in the physical crude oil markets. Please tell me if you guys think I'm getting this wrong. But what happened this week was first API and then EIA confirmed smaller builds on inventory than we've seen in the last several weeks. Nationally, it was a 9 million barrel build, which by historical norms is still huge, but it's not 15 like we had last week. Cushing, Oklahoma, which is a critical number because that's where the WTI futures contract is settled, building 3.6 million barrels. Again, by historical norms, it's a very large build, but it's not the 5 million plus that we've been seeing in recent weeks.
Gasoline, a drawdown of 3.7 million barrels. Distillates building 5.1 million barrels. Now, what the market is interpreting here, or appears to be interpreting, is, okay, it's not as bad as we thought. That, that string of really big builds on inventory that was 5 million barrels a week going into Cushing. We were so afraid it was going to get filled up. Turns out it's not going to get filled up. The builds are not as big. It must be slowing down. Everything's getting better.
And I'm just pulling my hair out. I can't believe anybody is stupid enough to interpret it that way, but that's the way the press is reporting it and that's the way the market seems to be trading it. Look, just make this simple. Imagine You've got an empty water glass that you're filling with a pitcher. When it's half full, you can tip that pitcher and really put water in at a rapid rate, and the rapid rate of fill tells you that you're going to very quickly reach the top. Well, what happens when it's full? You can't add any more. What is the measurement of how much can be added in a given week? Zero, because it's already full. I think what's going on, Patrick, is people are looking at the published working capacity figures for the Cushing tank storage farm, and they're saying, wait a minute, we're not at that number yet, and the rate of increase is going down, so maybe we're not really going to hit the number after all.
I think that is badly flawed logic. The way I interpret this, and by the way, I did predict this a couple of weeks ago and tweeted about it, is—
Patrick Ceresna: Oh, really?
Erik Townsend: By next week, I predict we'll have a very small Cushing build, maybe even a small Cushing draw. What does it mean? It means there's no room to add any more oil into Cushing. Now, the number is still going to be less than the theoretical working capacity. It has to be that way because they always have to leave a couple of tanks empty to facilitate blending operations and various other logistical requirements. So there's no reason that anybody ever should have thought it was going to get to that theoretical working capacity. I think we've gotten to the point where Cushing is as full as it can possibly get. And the reason that we have a smaller build this week, and I expect an even smaller build next week, is because there's no room to add any more. But the market is interpreting these smaller builds as a bullish signal. Oh, we're not really running out of room after all.
Look, if we weren't running out of room after all, we wouldn't have all these guys still putting together new floating storage deals, leasing tanker ships, and going through all of the much higher expense of storing oil at sea. The next thing that seems to have helped this rally is Mnuchin's comment last night saying that the U.S. government is going to make available several hundred million barrels of storage and make it available to the commercial oil industry. Well, that would be just brilliant if the U.S. government had several hundred million barrels of storage capacity, which they don't. That statement should have been interpreted exactly like this statement: we're going to ship at least 1 million COVID-19 test kits by the end of this week. Remember that one? How did that work out? Same principle here. It's government nonsense. So there's in reality about 75 million barrels of spare capacity in the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Furthermore, it would take many weeks because of the limited pipelines and so forth that provide access to it.
It would take many weeks to fill it. So yes, I think it is going to come into play at some point that we fill up the rest of the SPR. If not government buying the oil, then the oil companies leasing that storage space. But it's not several hundred million barrels. Some people have speculated, well, maybe what they're talking about is lifting the Jones Act, which would allow non-U.S.-flagged vessels to move oil from U.S. to other U.S. ports. If we were talking about needing to get finished products from Houston to New York Harbor or something, that would definitely make a big difference. But when you talk about these tanker storage trades, Patrick, the way those work is they're putting oil on a ship. If that ship is not a Jones Act vessel, if it's a foreign-flagged ship, It's not allowed to go to a different point in the United States, but it is allowed to go back to the exact same terminal that it picked the oil up from.
So you don't have to use Jones Act ships for these tanker trades as long as they go back to the same place that they came from. So I'm not really sure why that would be relevant. But between the inventory number and Mnuchin saying this, we're seeing not only the flat price, which might be, you know, retail speculative activity, but we saw a major, major rally in the last couple of days.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: In the time spreads. Now, the time spreads are really important. Usually, they send a purer signal because it's professional traders that are trading them. And a lot of times, the noise that you see in the front-month flat price kind of gets faded out. The time spreads are being traded by people who are smarter, usually. Well, the thing is, the time spreads are through the roof. I think probably that what I think is a misinterpretation of the inventory data got a rally going and it turned into a short squeeze. One of the most crowded trades that there is in this market is being short time spreads.
So if the misinterpretation, which is what I think it is, of the inventory data led to a rally in the time spreads, maybe it became a self-reinforcing short-covering rally, short squeeze. That's all I can come up with because it doesn't make That doesn't make sense to me based on what the actual news is. I think we should be interpreting this in a way that would send the time spreads in exactly the opposite direction, which is, holy cow, we're completely out of space. We're seeing smaller builds in Cushing. That means there's no room for there to be bigger builds in Cushing. That's not the way the market's interpreting it. Physical oil market professionals listening, I know there's a bunch of you. If I'm missing something, please email me, info@macrovoices.com. I'd love to hear from you if you think I'm missing the boat.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: But it seems to me that the market's misinterpreting this signal. I think the smaller builds mean that we're already out of space and Cushing is as full as it can get.
There's also a theory that there are some big players that are intentionally leaving some of the tanks empty in Cushing because they don't want to allow that EIA report to ever report Cushing as being full because they know the impact that that would have on price. I have no way of verifying that, but certainly it would be consistent with what we're seeing in terms of Cushing apparently running out of space, even though the actual number is still well below the theoretical working capacity. There's also maybe part of what's affecting this market, Patrick, is margin bias, I'm calling it. The CME Group has dramatically increased margins across the board on crude oil futures, and they've particularly focused on the front-month contract. It's now $10,000 margin, which when you think about it, you know, everybody talks about how much leverage there is in the futures market. At $10 a barrel, which is not today's price, but it was just a few days ago, that means that there really is no leverage.
The margin requirement of $10,000 is the full price of those 1,000 barrels at $10 a barrel. So they've really hiked the margins super high on the June contract, but not so much on the further contracts. And I think that that is causing a lot of speculators, a lot of people who were short June, are thinking, well, you know, I really like June, it's a place I want to be short, but boy, it's so much cheaper in terms of margin to be trading on July. As far as the time spreads are concerned, you know, on one hand I want to say, okay, this must have been a short squeeze, hopefully it's over. Now's the time to back up the leverage truck, double down on those short time spreads, because I think they got to go the other way before this is over. The thing is, Patrick, my own prediction is next week we'll probably have an even smaller Cushing build.
Patrick Ceresna: Oh, really?
Erik Townsend: If the market misinterpreted that signal this week and they think it's bullish, they'll probably misinterpret it again next week. So I'm not adding to my short positions here. I'm kind of waiting this out. I want to see what next week brings. I'm not sure that this short squeeze is over yet in time spreads, but I do predict that the time spreads will reverse direction eventually, and they've got a lot lower to go before this whole COVID-19 crisis is over.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to gold. We've obviously been bumping our heads along overhead resistance. Coming off the last, uh, last week or two has seen gold pull back. We're now just under $1,700. Are you still structurally bullish gold here? What's, what's in store in your mind?
Erik Townsend: Well, long term, I couldn't possibly be more bullish. I mean, over the next decade, I couldn't be more bullish. Here's the problem: it's too easy. Everybody can see that the fundamentals are so incredibly strong for gold because of all of the money printing and debasement of fiat currency, the, the actions of the Federal Reserve. It's so clear, everybody gets it. That means for the most part people are already all in. And you know, Patrick, that means there's always risk of a technical correction if you get too many people that have already expressed their long position.
Everybody's already all in. There's no money to propel the price higher. Now I'm not saying that's the case because frankly I've been wrong quite a few times thinking That we had to have a technical correction. And boy, these incredibly strong fundamentals just kept carrying us higher. My point is simply realize, okay, we're gonna get into more detail in the postgame segment, but you and I both think that the bear market rally in the stock market is over and has topped out, or is close to topping out if it hasn't yet.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Well, one of the things that I've said could pull gold down would be a crash in the stock market. So, just realize, if you're going to be long gold here, be ready to ride out some turbulence. I think that the long-term fundamentals couldn't possibly be better, but you don't want to be getting into gold here if you're going to get spooked out and sell if it goes back below $1,600. I still think that $1,350 is a possibility, probably less likely than I thought a few months ago, but it's still very possible, and it does seem like everybody's all in. You know, we got up here to $1,700 quite a few weeks ago, We haven't seen that next push higher, so maybe we're about to have a correction. We'll see what happens.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yields. I know we're gonna have Dr. Lacy Hunt on, which is gonna give us some amazing insights, but we have the Treasury yield trading around 0.63% right now on the yield. What's your take? I mean, it's been stuck down here for a while.
Erik Townsend: Yeah, I really don't have any view short-term on Treasury yields. I think that now that we're flirting with the zero bound, it's kind of beyond my pay grade. What I'm trying to do is just ask as many of our feature interview guests as I can to comment on some of the secular issues. You know, the biggest enemy of the bond market is inflation. Seems like many of our guests agree some form of inflation is coming, but they also agree it's not coming anytime soon. So do we need to be worried about Treasury yields anticipating inflation expectations, or not until the inflation really happens? I'm not sure. Let's ask Dr. Lacy Hunt what he thinks. He's got a very deflationary view. Let's see what he thinks about where Treasury yields are here. And particularly, you know, what about this zero boundary thing? Can we really get negative 10-year yields?
Let's ask Dr. Hunt. He's definitely far more qualified than I am to comment.
Patrick Ceresna: So like you were saying, this week's featured interview guest is Hoisington Investment Management Chief Economist, Dr. Lacy Hunt. Now, why did we invite Dr. Hunt back to the show this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, I've really been looking forward to this one. And the reason is Lacy Hunt has just been brilliantly right and consistently right for a long time. And his argument has been, look, with the national debt and private debt for that matter, with so much debt in the system, we just can't support high interest rates. Treasury yields can only drift lower. Bond prices can only move higher. He's been making that same argument with the same fundamental basis for it for years. And he's been remarkably right. And he's been recognized as one of the most successful bond guys in the market. The thing is, a lot of his theory is very long-term. And it's like, well, we have to keep on moving lower and lower. Well, what happens when you get to zero? Is zero a barrier? Or is it just another number on the way to negative? And what happens if you look at what the Fed's doing now?
Doesn't that eventually have to be inflationary? Is that an view that the market won't be able to digest? What does it all mean? These are all things that I knew someday we would get to that would really put major challenges to Dr. Hunt's longstanding views. And he has adapted some of his views, as you'll hear in this interview. So I just wanted to find out, you know, what does he think about the zero boundary? What does he think about inflation risk and so forth? It's a fascinating interview.
Erik Townsend: I think you're really going to enjoy it.
This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by toptradersunplugged.com. In recent weeks, we've been reminded of the fragility of world financial markets and how quickly sentiment can shift from risk-on to risk-off. Once again, the mantra of buy the dip and the determination of central banks will be put to the test. But as Chris Cole recently told us, the best approach to investing in the long run is very different from what's worked best in recent decades. To help MacroVoices listeners navigate an uncertain future, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen, host of the Top Traders Unplugged podcast, has created a guide to the best investment books of all time. You can get a free copy at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide.
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Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with Dr. Lacy Hunt is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now, with this week's special guest, Here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Dr. Lacy Hunt, chief economist for Hoisington Investment Management Company. Dr. Hunt, I'm so looking forward to this interview. I've been thinking about you for weeks and weeks as we're navigating this very interesting time in markets. You've been just fantastically prescient and fantastically right. We've interviewed you several times over the last few years. You've always stuck to essentially the same core thesis, and it has proven correct. for all of this time. I strongly encourage any listeners, any newer listeners who didn't hear those prior interviews, to listen to those past interviews. Just type Lacy Hunt into the search box at MacroVoices.com, and you'll see the previous interviews. Dr. Hunt, for those newer listeners, please just briefly restate the core thesis of your view on interest rates and why we are where we are today.
Lacy Hunt: Well, we, we closed 2019 in very vulnerable condition, both domestically and globally. The United States and the world suffering from a massive debt overhang. Core discretionary spending had only risen by 1% annual rate since August of last year. There was no increase in capital spending last year. The global economy was even much weaker.
Germany, Italy, Japan, a number of other countries around the globe were either in recessions or quasi-recessions. Perhaps the best indicator is the— what happened to the volume of world trade last year. This is a very critical indicator. Typically, world trade grows about 5% per annum, or about double the rate of increase in GDP.
Last year, world trade volume declined by half a percent. That's only the third decline since since 1980. Another two were in the deep recessions of 1982 and 2009. So we came into the to 2020 in a very weak condition, and then we had the coronavirus, and we're now experiencing. A recession that has all the looks of being the worst one since 1945.
Assuming the virus is contained in time for a resumption of normal activities by the end of the year, there will be some recovery in GDP, but in the 4th quarter, perhaps, perhaps in the 2nd half of the 3rd quarter, But even, even under that assumption, we're going to close 2020 with a massive output gap. In fact, an unprecedented output gap.
And given the frailties of the economy, the inability to achieve much growth, we're going to stagger out of the recession. And it's going to take us 6 to 7 years, maybe even longer. to restore the output gap to where it was at the end of last year. And so this recession is actually going to produce deflation, and the net result is that we're going to press the interest rates down to the zero bound, and they're going to be stuck there for a considerable period of time.
That's sort of a thumbnail sketch of my current views.
Erik Townsend: I wanna pick up on the last part of what you said, because you've been just remarkably accurate for as long as I've been interviewing you and saying, look, you know, some people were saying Treasury rates would never go below 3% and then 2% and then 1%. You've been very consistent saying, hey, they're going lower because of this debt overhang. The fundamentals are just too strong. Well, now we're at that zero bound. So to what extent is the zero lower limit really a limit? And to what extent is it just a number along the way to negative interest rates?
Lacy Hunt: Well, there is a constraint on the zero bound, and it's the overnight rate that the Fed has control over. As long as the Fed holds the federal funds rate at zero or slightly positive, which is what we currently are witnessing, then the rest of the curve will just pile into the zero bound. The curve will be very, very flat.
And it will remain mired there. Now, the issue of whether the Federal Reserve could take the overnight rate is, is in doubt. I'm somewhat familiar with the Federal Reserve Acts. I studied them as a graduate student. Monetary economics was one of my fields, and I've stayed abreast of the, of the laws and the Federal Reserve system as an economist in the early part of my career, back in the days when William McChesney Martin and Arthur Burns was chairman of the Fed.
And it's my view that it's not clear that the Fed has the authority to take the overnight rate into negative territory. And if you look at the statements that past chairman— past and current chairmen of the Fed have made, It's clear that there's a split opinion there. Chairman Bernanke thinks that the Fed does have that capability.
Janet Yellen and the current Chairman Powell do not believe the Fed has the authority. It's clearly a murky area. It might be possible for the Fed to claim the, uh, that there is a servicing cost for the deposits that the banks have at the Fed. Of course, these are electronic deposits, but they could perhaps claim that they need to allocate their overhead to these electronic deposits and charge the banks a servicing fee of 25 or 50 basis points.
The banks would probably contest that. I don't know how the courts would rule personally. That's a legal issue. The reason they would contest it is, first of all, the banks are not in good shape. And their capital position is going to be considerably eroded by the events, and they would have to pay that safekeeping fee or servicing fee to the Fed.
And so it's, it's not, it's not clear, but let's say that the Fed was able to take the, the federal funds rate to negative territory. Then I think you would see a good portion of the curve. Also into negative territory. And, and the main motivating factor here is the, is the key determinant of the, of the long Treasury yields, which is the Fisher equation, uh, pillar of macroeconomics, which says that the, the longer-term bond yields are equal to the real rate plus expected inflation.
The real rate has been dropping now for 20 years as growth has underperformed. It will continue to go lower. And since we're going into deflation, the inflationary expectations will also move lower. And so we're, we're going to experience a pileup along the— along or close to the zero bound, and we'll pierce the zero bound if the Federal Reserve is able to and decides that they're willing to engage in a dogfight with the bankers. over their ability to, to do that.
Erik Townsend: In our past interviews, we had significantly positive interest rates. You made a very strong and persuasive argument that they would be moving lower, and that led to a conclusion that duration risk was the trade. So a lot of people benefited from price appreciation in longer-dated Treasury securities as a result of following your advice. Now, it sounds like now we're not really saying the trend is to move to substantially lower rates. You're saying it's go to zero and stay there. So is that probably not an argument for duration risk? What do you do as an investor in this environment?
Lacy Hunt: Well, that's a very good question. So the long Treasuries are around the 1.25% level, fluctuating quite violently from day to day. I think that— I think we're going to go to something like a deflation rate of about 2%. Let me explain that. The 3 worst recessions of the post-war period reduced the inflation rate by about 430 basis points, but we're starting with an inflation rate of 1.7%.
So we're going to go into a deflation, mild deflation. And so the tendency will be to keep pressing the longer rates down. And of course, they're going to be interfering with the structural restraint of the Fed action there with regard to the overnight rate. But if we were to go down to 50 basis points from here in the long bond over the next several years, then that would be a capital gain in excess of 20%.
Plus you get the coupon. And in a deflationary environment, there's another kicker. If you invest a dollar today and the inflation rate falls 2%, then you're going to get paid back at the end of the year in purchasing power dollars that are worth $1.02.
Now, the Treasury rates will decline somewhat further, but in deflation, the critical private borrowing rates are probably not going to decline. In deflation, you'll see decline in wages, something we haven't experienced for a long time. The risk premium on mortgages and corporate bonds will go up, and so the Treasury yields are going to outperform the so-called spread product. The spread product will not do well. This is what happened in Japan in the last 30 years. This is what happened in the Great Depression.
It's very, very difficult for borrowers to maintain profitability and sustain margins when you have even a mild degree of deflation, such as we're looking at.
Erik Townsend: Now, Dr. Hunt, you've just made an excellent argument for deflation. I agree with you. I think the coronavirus recession is gonna last longer than some people are seemingly assuming. But at the same time, the government reaction to it has been just unprecedented, both monetary and fiscal stimulus. To the tune of literally, you know, it seems like for a while there, it was every week, it was another $2 trillion stimulus bill being contemplated. You know, a couple trillion here, a couple trillion there. Before you know it, you're talking about real money. At some point, does all of this government reaction overcome or change that deflation and create a stagflation? Or how do you see the results of the government's reaction to this affecting your thesis?
Lacy Hunt: Remember, debt is an increase in current spending in exchange for a decline in future spending, unless you generate an income stream to repay the principal and interest. And we're borrowing astronomical sums, but the funds are going to maintain daily living needs, allow people to put food on the table, pay their rent. A humane activity, politically popular. But it will not generate an income stream to repay principal and interest. And one of the key points that, that I've made for a long time is that when you, when you use the economy's production function, what the debt is doing is it's triggering diminishing returns.
And the production function GDP is determined by technology interacting with the 3 factors of production. Land, labor, and capital. And the production function states that if you begin to overuse one of the factors of production, let's say borrowed capital, initially the GDP will rise, but continue to make overuse of that same factor of production, the GDP levels out, and further overuse leads to a decline in GDP.
In other words, the The overuse of debt triggers a nonlinear reaction— up GDP first, flat, then down. And when the growth rate falls, then that pulls the inflation rate lower. This is what explains clearly what's been happening. At the end of last year, government debt was 107% of GDP, which was an all-time record.
The 3 bills that have just recently passed, The Family First Act, the CARES Act, and then the bill just passed yesterday that provides an additional $400 billion for the Payroll Protection Plan add about 16% or account for about 16% of GDP based on last year's GDP. But of course, the GDP is declining. And in addition to that, the Social Security payments are going up, the unemployment compensation payments likewise, and income tax collections are going down, both corporate and personal.
And so the government debt-to-GDP ratio within— by the end of the year, early next year, is going to be somewhere around 125% to 130%.
Now let me explain how diminishing returns is working. There's a large number of econometric studies that indicate that when government debt reaches about 50% of GDP, there is a deleterious effect on GDP. And when it goes to 60%, the effect is more intense. There's a greater loss in growth against trend at 70%. At 90% debt to GDP, an economy loses about a third of its growth rate against trend.
But we're going into territory that we've never been before. But diminishing returns are at work.
And so the programs, while they're popular and certainly understandable from a human standpoint, they're going to weigh the economy down. And the net result is that it's going to produce very poor economic growth going forward, and that's going to drive the inflation rate lower, not higher. This is, this is The path that Japan has taken in the last 30 years.
Government debt-to-GDP rate has risen from 60% to 225%, and it's been combined with all types of monetary policy manipulations as well. And the Japanese economy has become progressively weaker, and that's the path that we're following. So this is really not stimulus. It gets us by. Helps people out, probably necessary, absolutely necessary, but it's going to retard growth for a very, very long period of time.
Erik Townsend: Let's talk a little more about the effects of national debt overhang. You just talked about Japan some. Something I've been perplexed by for as long as I've been interviewing you, you know, you've made this very, very clear argument and it's been proven right time and time again, which is, look, The, the problem here is we got too much debt, and as a result of having too much debt, interest rates have to stay super low because there's just no way for the system to service the debt at any higher interest rate. That makes logical sense. But, you know, at some point, when you get to a point where a borrower is insolvent, normally what happens is interest rates or yields go up dramatically because Because the market realizes it's mathematically impossible for that borrower to ever service the debt. So I have to believe if instead of talking about $25 trillion of national debt, if we were talking about $500 trillion of national debt at our current GDP, the market would conclude, okay, Treasury paper is worthless because there's no way to service it, and yields would go up.
So is there some threshold or event? How do you know when you get to the point—
Lacy Hunt: No, there's no threshold. In other words, you're going to continue to press down the right-hand side of the elliptical relationship that is the law of diminishing returns. More is not more, it's less, and economic activity will become progressively weaker.
And let me just make a couple of points here. One of the most important concepts in economics is the circular flow. which says that what we produce equals what we spend equals what we earn. Everyone accepts that. But out of the circular flow, there are certain platinum-solid propositions that hold.
And one of them is that physical investment must equal saving out of income. And saving out of income has, has 3 components: private, government, and foreign. Okay. So As we closed 2019, net national saving as a percent of net national income was just 2%. Historically, we've run 6.5%. Now, that 2% was comprised of private saving of 8.4% and government dissaving of 6.4%.
But the government dissaving— We're going to run a deficit in excess of $4 trillion versus a little bit more than a trillion last year. And so as a consequence, net national saving is going to go to -12% or -14%. Now, the private saving rate will probably go up. People will, I think, will conclude that they cannot operate as tightly as they have in the past, that they need to have rainy day funds.
We'll see some increase in the private saving rate, but we're going to have a net national dissaving of somewhere between 10% and 15%, which means there can be no physical investment. There are no resources. And without physical investment, you cannot increase GDP. You cannot increase the standard of living.
The debt will just make you weaker and weaker and weaker.
And one of the problems is that as Europe, the United States, China, Japan have pursued these debt policies over the last 30 years, One of the other elements in the production function has deteriorated, and that's the demographics. Last year, worldwide population growth was the slowest in about 3 quarters of a century at about 1.2%.
In the United States last year, population growth was 0.48, which ironically was the lowest since 1918. The year of the Spanish flu. But in Europe, population growth was only 0.2. Population was, we'll call it zero in China. It actually declined slightly. And in Japan, the decline was even greater.
But of course, this year the demographics are going to deteriorate further.
So when you look at the production function, because of the debt overhang, when we closed 2019, Public and private non-financial debt was— for every dollar of new public and private debt was generating only 40 cents of GDP growth. In Europe, it was in the high 30s. In China, it was in the low 30s.
In Japan, it was in the mid-20 cents range. By within 12 months, more or less, the United States number is going to be 25 cents. down from 40, but there are going to be even greater collapses in Europe, Japan, and China. The Chinese have undertaken a $5 trillion program this year, massive, and they're subject to diminishing returns. Everyone has a production function. It doesn't matter whether you're command and control or not.
You overuse that factor of production, you're dealing with a nonlinear relationship, and a lot of folks don't want to deal with that. They think that this is accounting. It's not. Economics is not accounting. And so we, we know 2 of the elements of the production function. The marginal revenue product of the debt is declining, is at low levels, and it's going lower.
And the demographics are at low levels and they're going lower. And so when we come out of this, there will be a pent-up demand recovery, but the major economies of the world are going to be very hard-pressed to generate even a 1% real growth rate in per capita terms.
And so the production function doesn't work for us, and the lack of saving to fund investment does not work for us.
And ironically, there have been some pretty smart minds over the years that have, have looked at the indebtedness problem. One of the first was by the great David Hume, writing in 1752. My professor, Ingrid Rima, said that the Enlightenment could not have occurred without David Hume. Adam Smith, who was mentored by Hume, said that he was the greatest intellect of the age. And Smith knew Voltaire, he knew Ben Franklin, and Hume was the greatest. Like Hume, in his Treatise on Human Nature, discussed the physics topic of time and space, to which Einstein attributed the inspiration for the theory of relativity.
In 1752, Hume wrote a paper called Of Public Finance, which I recommend you read. You can get it on the internet easily. It's only about 20 pages. It's not in modern English, but it's very, very understandable. And he looks at these cases that were available up until the time of 1752. He looks at at Mesopotamia and Rome and a number of lesser cases that have long since been forgotten.
And this is what he says. He says, when a state has mortgaged all of its future revenues, the state by necessity lapses into tranquility, languor, and impotence.
And today we know that it triggers diminishing returns and an insufficiency of saving to generate physical investment. So there's no level, in my opinion. And if the politicians pursue the idea that if $2 trillion doesn't work, we should try $4 trillion, and if $4 trillion doesn't work, we should try $8 trillion or $10 trillion or $12 trillion, then they're working in a linear world and they're trying to ignore the reality that we have nonlinear relationships coming through the production function.
More is not more. It is less, Erik.
Erik Townsend: I think that you are absolutely brilliant, Dr. Hunt, and I think that your reference to Hume is brilliant as well. The thing is, the politicians don't listen to the brilliant economists like yourself. They listen to whoever gives them something they can tell the voters that they want to hear. And it seems to me that at the moment, it seems like the resistance that existed toward modern monetary theory and simply monetizing a lot of government spending. That resistance, even from the political right, seems to be waning in this coronavirus crisis. We've gotten to the point— was it Nixon who said we're all Keynesians now? It seems like in this coronavirus crisis, we're all— not you and I, but the politicians certainly are all MMT-ers now.
Lacy Hunt: Well, we haven't adopted MMT yet. There are advocates who are raising their voice louder. We haven't done it. The Federal Reserve Act is very explicit. The writers of not only the 1913 Act, but the more critical legislation that was passed during the '30s, wanted to give the Federal Reserve broad powers to make loans and provide liquidity, but they did not give the Federal Reserve the ability to spend.
Today, when the Fed buys government and agency and other securities, When that transaction clears, the net result is that the sellers of the government debt give up a maturity of securities that have an average life of about 7 years. And at the end of the transaction, the banks then their holdings of overnight deposits at the Federal Reserve go up. In other words, it's just a reduction in in the average maturity of the government debt held by the private sector.
Now, the banks can make use of the reserves, and many people assume that they will, but that assumption is not valid because the banks, to make it— take advantage of the reserves, have to have the capital to put at risk, and they have to be able to make an assessment that they will cover the risk premium.
In other words, the likelihood of default. And the banks are very weakened. And moreover, this flat yield curve will further undermine the profitability of the banks. And moreover, not only do the banks have to find making loans attractive, the borrowers have to also be willing to put their capital at risk.
And they have to be able to make a calculation that the funds can be profitably used, which will be increasingly difficult if we go even into a mild deflationary environment.
Now, I would recommend that you listen to the webinar that Chairman Powell gave there in early April when they took the latest round of measures to facilitate on a lending basis various components of the fixed income market. And Powell made it very clear that the Federal Reserve has the authority to lend, but it does not have the power to spend.
Now, for them to do that, the Federal Reserve Act will have to be rewritten. Now, that could be done, and perhaps we will go in that direction.
And it's important to note that the Bank of England just recently this month has crossed the Rubicon. Or if they haven't crossed the Rubicon, they've certainly waded into the Rubicon. And the Bank of England made a direct advance to the British Treasury of approximately half a trillion dollars.
Now, they said it was temporary, and we certainly hope that it is, but the United States Federal Reserve does not have that authority, and it would require a change in the— the key writer of the revision to the Federal Reserve Act was a Virginia politician by the name of Carter Glass, and you may know that name.
He was also author of the Glass-Steagall Act, And he went to the 2 leading monetary theorists of the time, Irving Fisher of Yale and Charles Whittlesey of the Wharton School. And he said, how do we construct the Federal Reserve Act so that the Fed has liquidity powers, but not the power to spend? We don't want the Federal Reserve to turn the country into a banana republic.
And if you give the Federal Reserve that ability, then the inflation rate would take off. But unfortunately, what would happen is inflation rate would rise very rapidly and Gresham's Law would be triggered. The bad money chases out the good money. People would not want to hold paper assets.
They will try to convert their paper assets into commodities that either can be consumed or can be traded for other commodities that they might need. You'll force a return to barter, and in that case we would make everybody's lives miserable. In other words, you if to to go down the road of giving the Federal Reserve the ability to spend, you would basically destroy the system by trying to save the system.
Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, you make excellent points, but I want to push back just a little bit because the Federal Reserve Act is very very clear in that it says that the Federal Reserve can only buy. debt securities, which are backed by the US government, agency securities. And very recently, they literally reinterpreted that to say, well, if we put this little special purpose vehicle in between and pretend that the Treasury is a party to this transaction, we can call junk bonds, literally junk bonds, the ETF full of junk bonds, sort of kind of a government security, and we'll use the Federal Reserve to literally bail out the junk bond market, which has happened.
So it seems to me like we're in a political climate where, I don't know what you want to call it, a loose interpretation of the Federal Reserve Act by regulators is being tolerated. Nobody's questioning that in court now. So, you know, isn't it true that they are effectively spending money to bail out the junk bond market and just kind of pretending that junk bonds are government bonds because they created this little special purpose vehicle mechanism, which to me seems like they're just trying to undermine the intention of the law.
Lacy Hunt: Well, they're providing liquidity financing to debt that has already been issued. They're not providing additional funds for new debt. Now, the fact of the matter that they're stretching the Federal Reserve law does not change the fact that this does not constitute money printing, but there is a major economic effect. The firms that are seeking the Fed's help are doing so because they weren't prepared for the shock to the system.
The corporate sector was massively overindebted. In fact, it was more overindebted at the end of last year than at any time in our history. And one of the reasons that they were so overindebted is that corporate profits, as we closed 2019, were basically unchanged from 2012 and down slightly from the peak in 2014. And those are after profits, which were benefited from a significant corporate tax cut.
And so the effect of helping these folks out over the near term It maintains their viability, but there's an economic offset. It means that scarce capital is absorbed to sustain zombie corporations, the term that's been used, or failing corporations. And this increases the malallocation of capital.
And in the final analysis, as I told you, to have physical investment, the Fed's role is irrelevant. You have to have saving out of income, and we don't have saving out of income.
We're going to have net negative saving. So the Fed's action is basically a standing-in-place motion. And the way that you will be able to verify this is that we will see massive declines in the velocity of money. The presumption that if the Fed is able to increase the money supply, that it will have important influences on economic activity and, and on the inflation rate.
But GDP is determined by money and velocity. Now, velocity is a very, very complex variable. There are a lot of things at work there, but the most important of which is the marginal revenue product of the debt. And as the marginal revenue product of the debt has come down since the late 1990s, The velocity of money has declined.
And at the end of last year, velocity was about 1.42, down from almost 2.2 in 1997, almost a straight line down. There were some— there were a few bouts upward. And when the data comes in for the first quarter, I think velocity will drop down to 1.32, and then we'll have another massive decline in the second quarter.
For the velocity of money to rise, the increase in the money that the Fed manages to engineer in the short run will only be viable if it generates an income stream to repay principal and interest. And this kind of lending will not do that on the grounds that I've just explained, and the velocity of money will fall.
And that will usher in weaker growth in economic activity in the midst of high money supply growth. And the inflation rate will also go into negative territory in spite of it.
Erik Townsend: Let's talk more about how this plays out over the next several years, because it seems to me the coronavirus crisis is clearly going to lead to lots and lots of accommodation, both monetary policy and fiscal policy. spending, and so forth. Now, a lot of the critics have said they think that that's going to lead to runaway inflation. You're making a very good argument for why it will not lead to runaway inflation, because of the stronger dynamics that are in place. If you're right, I would say that that just gives more ammunition to the people who want to do much more of that— what you've described as counterproductive stimulus, stimulus that's not really stimulus.
Lacy Hunt: Right.
Erik Townsend: It seems to me that even though you and I agree it's a bad idea, what we're really talking about is a setup here, which is going to give the proponents of those policies ammunition. Look, it didn't lead to runaway inflation.
We should just keep doing more of it. We should, you know, provide much more, more, more, more, more, more. Would you agree that the politics are kind of set up that way? And if the more, more, more, more, more happens, what happens?
Lacy Hunt: The politics are set up that way. But unless the— I mean, the increasing in the debt will not itself produce better growth than inflation. If we give the Fed the ability to spend, which they do not have that authority now, that will generate inflation, but it will not generate growth, and it will make everyone's lives miserable.
And it is possible that we'll go in that direction. Not saying that we won't. But I'm telling you this, hyperinflation is going to make 99% of us terribly miserable. It will be a far worse outcome than mild deflation. There is no government lever that can solve this problem.
Now, we have some outstanding research that's been done on the matter by McKinsey Global Institute, which is the think tank of McKinsey and Associates. And it's a 2010 paper. And they looked at 24 advanced economies for the time in the period from 1900 through 2008 that became extremely overindebted. And they measured the buildup of debt to the panic year or multiple panic years, and then the ultimate solution. And they found in all 24 of these cases, that the indebtedness problem had to be solved by an extended period of austerity.
And they defined austerity as a significant rise in the saving rate. In other words, if you think of indebtedness as living beyond one's means, we have to— to solve an indebtedness problem, you have to live within one's means. Now, that's a very unappealing solution. And so in that regard, you're right.
Because people do not like the alternative, and that that does raise the risk. And you're correct to say so: that we change the Federal Reserve Act and we let the Federal Reserve print money. That's a real risk, and it's a risk that I am extremely cognizant of. But let me tell you this: we're going to make everyone extremely miserable in very short order.
There are numerous cases of this. This was tried by Chiang Kai-shek in the 1930s, Germany in the 1920s. This was tried by Yugoslavia and Hungary at the end of World War II. There was a famous Bolivian case in the 20th century, and basically, it was the path that was taken by the Bourbons of France and the Romans and the Mesopotamians.
They built up huge debts, which they could not service. And so take the Bourbon case, which is perhaps the most well-documented. They took on a great deal of debt to finance the French and Indian Wars, which was really a world war. It was all in Europe. It was called the Seven Years' War.
Then they financed the American Revolution. Cost the French more for us to win the American Revolution It cost them more for us to win than it cost us. And then they went into high living and so forth. And so what was the solution of the Bourbons? Well, to issue a worthless metallic coin.
And eventually the inflation became extreme. And so going to money printing is an avenue, and it may be seized upon. But the result is social rupture and the collapse of the financial system. People will not want to hold financial assets. The whole world will be turned upside down, Erik.
And in other words, at that point in time, we'll make the United States the equivalent of a banana republic.
Erik Townsend: Okay. Let's talk in more precise detail about how we get there, because I think we're in agreement, first of all, that lots and lots of fiscal spending, so-called stimulus is not a good idea. But we also agree that the setup is for governments to do much more of it.
Lacy Hunt: Well, let me, let me just interject something there. The first-round effects may appear to be appealing. I mean, wanting to bail people out in a time of crisis, people get a check, they think that's good. The, the problem is in economics is that there are the unseen effects, the second, third, and fourth-round effects.
And I don't like to use the term good or bad, but there's a little exercise that folks can do. If you graph government debt to GDP on one axis and the long bond yield on the other axis, and you do that for the United States, what you'll see is that there is an inverse relationship, that as the government debt levels go higher, the bond yields decline.
And the logic here is that you are triggering the law of diminishing returns and you're reducing saving to weaker and weaker levels that precludes physical investment. And by the way, if you do that exercise for Europe, for Japan, and now China, you'll see that the inverse relationships hold.
And so what we're talking about is understanding the economics. And the economics suggest that if we pursue this policy, we're going to get weaker growth and lower inflation and a prolonged period of low interest rates. Unless, of course, the central bank, Federal Reserve, is allowed to print money. And in that case, we will not improve the growth rate one iota.
In fact, the growth rate will probably even get worse because we will have experienced a severe decline in productivity. In extremely high inflation, people do not hold financial assets. They spend time converting the financial assets as quickly as possible into commodities. And then they trade those commodities with other people who have things that they want. In other words, you have to have double coincidence of wants, which is extremely inefficient.
And so productivity will fall, and the economy will lapse into an even deeper morass than it is now. So the money printing is an absolutely horrendous option. It may be used though, and if it does, you'll see a change in my forecast. Absolutely.
Erik Townsend: I want to make sure I understand where that distinction is, because what we've said so far is there's a setup for there to be a whole bunch more fiscal stimulus spending, infrastructure spending, whatever. You've made a very good argument that It feels good in the beginning, but in the end, it's not really stimulative. It just drags the economy further down, but it's deflationary in the way that it does that. It sounds like the key event, because as you said, hyperinflation is the really big risk. That's the one that there's no way you can fight it. The only way it sounds like you would see us getting to hyperinflation would be if they changed the Federal Reserve Act and allowed the Fed to spend money rather than just buying assets.
Lacy Hunt: That is correct. That is the key. You understand your macroeconomics. That is the critical key. Could I just go back to something? Okay. So let's just look at some fiscal actions that people are really familiar with. We had a $2 trillion stimulus in 2009 of shovel-ready projects. It was said that that was going to lead to accelerating growth and inflation and higher interest rates and a decline in the dollar.
And that was a very, very popular view. And moreover, the Fed was engaged in quantitative easing at the same time.
What we saw is maybe a couple of quarters of improved economic growth, and then the higher debt weighed on economic activity. In 2018, there was an important tax cut. It was a $3 trillion tax cut over 10 years financed with debt. Debt. In January of 2018, this law took effect, but by the end of January, there was also a bipartisan— I use that word bipartisan— increase in spending that added basically another $3 trillion in debt.
So you had the tax side and the spending side. So what happened? We experienced about one quarter of accelerating Maybe one and a half quarters, and then the growth rate turned down. There is a very fleeting transitory benefit, but the benefit fades very, very quickly. And and so these new programs that we're taking on right now, they they won't even be visible in my opinion. They'll be helpful, and they'll help us get us get us through.
They will help people that are in bad shape for a variety of reasons, but there is not going to be any income generation to repay the principal and interest. And so the economy is going to be much, much weaker as a result of these extremely politically popular and humane actions.
I'll just make one other point with you. In Hume's paper, he made a recommendation that the best fiscal policy is the one that always runs surpluses. And his argument was that you run surpluses so that when you have a national emergency— and he was mainly thinking about a war or some type of natural disaster— that you have the ready resources to handle the problem.
And as a matter of fact, Adam Smith in The Wealth of Nations followed Hume's advice. And generally speaking, the United States followed that policy until Keynesian economics took over. And if you think about the advice that Hume gave, this genius of a man, this towering figure, that's how successful people behave.
You don't run on the margin. You have a rainy-day fund. You're prepared for an emergency so that you do not have to rely on debt, which makes you weaker.
Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, you gave me a passing grade on macroeconomics, so I'm going to try my luck with reflexivity in politics. It seems to me that what you're saying here is right now, for humanitarian reasons, we've got to move forward with this stimulus, which is going to feel good to a lot of people. The people who oppose it are saying, but the risk is inflation. And what you're saying is they're going to be proven wrong on that. To my thinking, that just gives more ammunition to the people who want to get us eventually to change the Federal Reserve Act to allow the Fed to just literally print money and spend it.
So it seems to me like we're in a vicious cycle that takes us maybe by the 2024 presidential election when they're saying, okay, it's time to just let the Fed print money. And because, you know, we can't keep raising taxes when, you know, there's no way to serve all of this crazy debt that we have, the Fed's got to print money. And anybody who tries to express a voice of reason is going to get shut down and told, look, you people have been complaining about inflation for 25 years. Saying it was going to happen ever since we did the first round of quantitative easing back in 2009.
You've been wrong consistently. It's time to let the Fed print money. And that's where the event happens that eventually leads us to a hyperinflationary outcome and really bad consequences. How'd I do?
Lacy Hunt: You did very well. I will say that. I'll just make one—
Erik Townsend: I don't think it's very well. I think it's very bad.
Lacy Hunt: I think it's horrible. No, you did very well. No, you— no, it's not bad. Your explanation was excellent. The outcome is bad. For the Federal Reserve Act to be revised, the Federal Reserve will basically have to lead that role, in my opinion. In other words, the Federal Reserve would have to go to the Congress and the president and say that we need to, quote, modernize or whatever wonderful term you want to use.
Based upon the webinar that Chairman Powell gave this month, I would say that Powell would not lead that.
Now, his term will expire and we'll get a new Federal Reserve chairman. But one of the risks here is if you open the Federal Reserve Act up for revision, then we're going to have to deal with a myriad of alternatives ideas that people have, and some of them are really strange.
And so opening up the Federal Reserve Act for revision would open a whole can of worms, unknown can of worms. And where you go once that started is anybody's guess. It could be in the direction of money printing, and that's certainly a possibility that we have to be aware of. But I think the Federal Reserve area has to take the role and the leadership in pushing the change through. And I, I don't see the Powell Fed doing that.
I think he's aware of what the risks are. That would be my reading. I may be wrong on that, but that's my reading.
Erik Townsend: What happens when Stephanie Kelton is the Fed chair?
Lacy Hunt: Well, I'm not going to go there, but other Federal Reserve chairmen— I'm only just telling you that I don't think I think the Powell Fed would, would want to do that.
Erik Townsend: Dr. Hunt, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview. Listeners, throughout this interview, Dr. Hunt has referenced several different written works, some of which are 100 years old. Our production staff has assembled links to as many of these as we could find and inserted them into your Research Roundup email. So I encourage everyone to check your Research Roundup email And you'll find links to all of the various different writings that were discussed in today's episode. Again, thanks so much, Dr. Hunt. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, it was so great to have Dr. Lacy Hunt back on the show. You know, there's so much fearmongering about Project Zimbabwe out on the markets, and really what it comes down to is that in order for us to see that kind of massive hyperinflation driven by monetary policy, there actually has to be a change in the Federal Reserve Act. It simply isn't enough the way it is written. And like Dr. Lacy Hunt was saying, it's not out of the realm of impossibility that they rewrite the act. But the thing is, anyone who's assuming that this is imminent is probably holding their breath unnecessarily. What's your take on all of that? What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: Well, what I'm really trying to do, Patrick, in the last few weeks is to ask all of our top macro and particularly the fixed income guys, how does this whole story play out? We've got a very strong deflationary macro backdrop. But we've also got policy actions that a lot of people think are eventually inflationary. You know, what's the roadmap look like? How do we get from here to there? So we heard David Rosenberg last week saying he thinks that stagflation is where you get to, but not for 3 years, and it's deflationary until then. We had Dr. Pippa Malmgren on All-Stars tell us she thinks inflation is coming much sooner than a lot of these other guests think. So I'm just trying to assimilate a lot of different worldviews and kind of plug them all together and make sense of them.
And I think Dr. Lacy Hunt basically said, look, his view, and I disagree with him slightly, is it has to stay deflationary because given the Federal Reserve Act, it really can't be anything else. Now, the reason I disagree is, look, they've pretty much ignored the law when it came to the junk bond market.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: They say they're willing to bail out junk bonds, even by using some kind of special purpose vehicle to pretend that junk bonds are somehow agency bonds. It seems that the government is very willing to work around the intention of its own laws. So it feels to me like the political environment is very ready to bend the rules. So I don't really worry too much about what the Federal Reserve Act says, but I do agree with him that it's got to be deflationary for a while until you really get to the point where you're not just talking about it, you're not just doing stimulus to buy bonds, but you're actually using the Fed's ability. And, you know, what he said is you'd have to change the rules so the Fed is allowed to spend money rather than just buy assets. I would say you have to get to the point where we're actually bending the rules Enough to go ahead and do that.
And, you know, they can play all kinds of games. You just do a lot of government spending, you issue new bonds, you let private holders hold them for a couple of weeks before the Fed buys them, and you've worked around the intention of the Federal Reserve Act, and you're supposedly not monetizing government spending, although effectively that's really what you're doing.
So, I think it's a question of when we actually see implementation of spending spending programs that pump money into the real economy that we need to watch and see what happens in terms of price inflation and wage inflation and so forth. I think stagflation is definitely the highest candidate for what we eventually get to. I just wonder about the path of how we get there. So I'm just trying to assimilate a worldview out of the feedback that we get from all of our guests. And I thought Dr. Hunt kind of rounded out the picture with some of the other people that we've talked to. I'll look for asking some of the same questions of other guests in coming weeks.
Erik Townsend: But what I want to do for the rest of today's Postgame, Patrick, is dive into the Postgame Chartbook that you prepared. And let's have a longer conversation than we had time for in the Market Wrap about this bear market rally. At least that's what you and I think it is. But there's a lot of people who are saying, no, no, no, it's over, baby. We, you know, We've passed peak infections, we're reopening the economy, this thing is ending, the market is anticipating a move back to all-time highs because the, the bad news, the worst of it, is behind us. Let's examine both sides of this argument. Listeners, you'll find the download link for the chartbook that is going to facilitate this conversation in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, it means you're not registered yet at MacroVoices.com.
Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, look for the red button that says looking for the downloads. Patrick, let's go ahead and dive in on page 2 here. You're showing kind of an analog of the S&P 500 to what typical bear markets look like. Give us the story here.
Patrick Ceresna: Well, actually, this isn't a typical one. I specifically overlaid what happened in 2008, and particularly deeper into the bear market when the Lehman event occurred. And then how the rest of the market played out afterwards. And and so far, the market is overshooting what certainly played out in 2008. And what I just wanted to do was take a moment to just go and actually then look back and let's analyze some of the past major bear markets and look at what bear market rallies look like in them. And I thought that that would be a great journey to go on. And so. What I did was I snagged a chart on page 3 of the 1929 bear market. The initial drop in 1929 saw close to a 50% wipeout in a span of 2 months, including a 3-week period that saw a very similar drop the way we had, about 30 to 35% in like 2, 3 weeks. It was just a nasty and very ugly drop. That happened in that October period.
But then after hitting a short-term low into the first quarter of 1930, we saw a 5-month bear market rally. Now this one did muster up a 50% retrace. Our current bear market rally, I'm still convinced it is, it has only been, is only like 1 or 2 months into that bounce. And it's already surpassed more than 50% and 61% on the short term. But back then anyway, it was a 5-month prolonged period where the market just crawled higher and higher and higher going until it reached about 50% of a retracement. Even though it took 5 months to really play out, it didn't change the inevitable, which is that the market then turned around and began selling.
And so I wanted to move on and go to page 4, where we've had Ray Dalio and others try to compare this far more to like a 1937 period than a 1929 period. And so I wanted to see how that one played out. And that was, you know, less than a decade later from the 1929 crash. And we can again see a period where the S&P 500 wiped out about 50%.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Patrick Ceresna: of its value in just months in a very rapid crash.
But subsequently, after, in the early part of 1938, when it established a short-term low, we saw a meaningful rally. It was about a 61.8% retracement, but a meaningful rally. It was like 50, 60% off of the lows. But again, it lasted something like 200-some-odd days. I mean, it was again a 6, 7-month bear market rally. That rebounded. But yet over several years afterwards, even though it was a lot of sideways price action, it did inevitably make lower lows in what is the typical fashion of a bear market, which is, is that it's just— it's not a screaming rally higher, it just rallies back towards the highs and fades again and over and over again in that kind of a distribution cycle. The last one I wanted to touch on, which was a slightly different one was the 1974 bear market drop. And in 1974, the part that makes this slightly different is that the initial drop from 1973 to the middle of 1973 was very mild.
We only saw like a 20% drop in the markets. And so the bear market rally that ensued on the other side simply didn't have that much to retrace from because the big sell-off didn't really kick in. And then, but it was once that bear market rally was over, that one took about 2 to 3 months of rallying and then it resumed.
And so the most important takeaway I think that I want to suggest there, Erik, is like these bear market rallies, they can take 2 to 5 months, 2 to 6 months. There's nothing saying that this has to be over 1 or 2 months after the bounce and that we should somehow already be dumping to the downside and next wave. These things can drag on. Like, what if this bear market rally lasts until June, July, and just kind of keeps crawling and muddling along here? And it's just everyone that's waiting for it to crash is burning theta as their put options are decaying. And then you turn around and you have all the bulls trying to go long, but the market can't get any traction to the upside. I, I really think it's going to play out a little differently than everyone is expecting because everyone thinks it's all going to happen right away, right?
Erik Townsend: Well, I see this a little differently. It seems to me like you're looking for analogs to past events, past bear markets, and certainly that's a useful exercise to understand a range of possibilities. I think we're in completely unprecedented times, though. There's never been a time in history when we had this kind of monetary policy intervention participation in equity markets. So the way that I look at this is, if we're going to have normal market forces play out, clearly this should be a bear market rally. We hit the 61.8% Fibonacci retrace, which is a key level for bear market retracements. You know, that's kind of the number where the bear market rally ought to be done by there. And furthermore, Patrick, we hit it on the day of a Fed announcement, which oftentimes you get a blow-off, and that's kind of like the the turning point in the market, the sell-the-news event, so to speak. And we got above 2,930 which was that key Fibonacci level.
We traded there during the day, but we closed below it. So you never had a closing print above the 61.8% Fibonacci, which if there had been a closing print there, it would have been a signal that maybe there's further to go. But you did have a chance to sell it all the way up at at 2,960-something. So it so far feels like it's following all of the right recipe to be a bear market rally. And now we go down to new lows over the next several months. We get down to a number lower than 2,174, which was the low print so far on S&P futures. The thing is, Patrick, you know, I think I've made some pretty good arguments fundamentally over the years on MacroVoices when I've said, look, I think this market is way overvalued. I think it should go down, but I don't think it's going to go down because we've got so much intervention from the government. I think they're going to fuel the rally continuing.
And that's proven right. As much as I think I did make good bearish arguments on the fundamentals, the market kept on going higher. And I think we have a very, very bearish set of fundamentals right now. But I just don't know whether or not, you know, Fed money printing power is going to outweigh market fundamentals. It's really hard for me to decide. And the reason that I decided not to short this, even though I do think the most probable answer is this is the top of a bear market rally, is because it's so hard to say whether or not the Fed is going to print money to rescue the stock market. They can't print storage tanks. To rescue the super contango in the oil market, although today we had a big countertrend rally in those time spreads. So, you know, I just look at other markets as being a safer way to express this, but I think that's the question really is, will this unprecedented era of monetary stimulus intervention overwhelm the fundamentals?
And it seems like it's hard because the fundamentals are pretty darn bearish, But you never know.
Patrick Ceresna: Right. And so what I wanted to do on page 6, for instance, you were saying that Pippa was suggesting that inflation would come a lot sooner, even though Dr. Lacy Hunt and David Rosenberg think that deflationary pressures are still the dominant force on the short term. But what I wanted to just kind of reflect upon is what are periods where inflation or massive of monetary stimulus or asset purchases, how did stock markets behave that way? Because there's a lot of people that just assume it's a given that if the Fed prints a whole bunch of money and buys assets, that somehow that in itself is almost a certain guarantee that the stock market's going higher. And while it is definitely possible, and I don't want to say that it's not, When you think back and look at different scenarios, like on page 6, I have the period from 1965 through 1981 where inflation ran very hot in the US. The US was just coming off the gold standard.
So just entering a period where money was decoupled from gold, inflation was running pretty hot. And yet the Dow Jones for pretty much 15+ years, could not make a higher high throughout that entire period. But more importantly, on a real purchasing power basis, you saw almost a 90% wipeout of the value of the Dow Jones on a real basis. And it was a very ugly time.
Skipping ahead very quickly to page 9, I just want to stay on this theme. I wanted to jump to Japanese Nikkei. A lot of people then reference the fact, well, look, when Shinzo Abe started Abenomics back in 2013, the Japanese Nikkei went roaring higher, did over 100% advance in a couple years just with this huge massive advance. And there's no denying that that was in fact what the Nikkei did. But there was an interesting circumstance there because no other central bank bank in the world at that time has actively adopted such a currency-destructive monetary policy like Japan did at the time.
And when you go to page 10, you can see that while the Nikkei had that huge rally from 2013 through 2015-16, uh, into— sorry, into 2015— you also, though, it came on the back of the US dollar rallying materially against the yen. I mean, we saw the yen lose 40% of its value. And so in the— one of the huge precipitating drivers, the tailwinds behind the Nikkei, was a huge devaluation of their currency. And while the rest of the world had very stable currency structure, the Japanese yen was devalued very aggressively, and that contributed massively to that And so I asked the question, and maybe you can give me your opinion on that. I mean, I sort of am thinking that, well, yeah, maybe that scenario can happen where the Fed just starts printing a lot of money and buying up tons of assets. But if the US dollar is not materially in a bear market and being driven much lower relative to others, I mean, without that tailwind, I mean, is that— can it do it alone on that?
I personally think we would need a US dollar bear market market really well underway for equities to be inflating higher. What's your take on that?
Erik Townsend: I don't know, Patrick. It seems to me that we've got unprecedented amounts of both fiscal and monetary stimulus, and the conversation is shifting. The political and policy narrative is shifting from what used to be entirely an asset purchase kind of discussion, which If they were going to do more of the old style of QE, and that's all they were going to do, that would be, I think, very much supportive of higher stock prices. But it seems like now the narrative is shifting to much more of a broader-based MMT, you know, support the Main Street economy as opposed to just the financial economy. So I think that there's a lot of moving parts here, and I really don't have any firm predictions. That's the reason I've preferred to trade the oil market instead of the stock market is I know they can't print storage tanks, but they can print more money and they can get that money into the hands either of the people, hardworking people that need it, or into the hands of bankers that buy stocks with it.
It remains to be seen how this plays out from here.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Patrick Ceresna: So what I also wanted to though touch on is a lot of people are worked up by this idea that the Fed is saying that they're gonna buy junk bonds and all of these other assets in order to, to continue to support the market and, and provide the stability that was really needed during that crisis.
But the interesting part was that there, there are 2 central banks in the world that did very large asset purchases over the last decade— Japan and Europe. And what I have is, well, we already showed that Japan chart, but when we look at that Euro Stoxx 50 and it kind of asks the question. I mean, if very large asset purchases by their respective central banks was that bullish, why have we not seen very bullish charts? I'm sure a lot of our listeners are thinking it's because a lot of it's been routed from Europe to other places in the world to be invested elsewhere, like in the U.S. markets or something like that. And it does make sense. But I mean, I just don't know whether it's easy to just make the assumption that just because these asset purchases are being made and this capital is being actually made available for reinvestment, there still has to be a risk taker that has to reallocate that liquidity back into risk assets.
I mean, is that a certainty? I don't think so.
Erik Townsend: Well, I think you hit the nail on the head a minute ago, Patrick. I think that as the ECB was going through all of their stimulus that weakened the euro, a lot of people saw the double opportunity to both diversify out of their own market, get into a stronger currency. So by investing in US stocks, you're in a dollar-denominated asset, which means you get the pickup on the foreign exchange benefit of the dollar appreciating, plus the stronger US stock market. And I think those foreign capital flows are a big part of the reason that the S&P chart looks so much different from the Euro Stoxx 50 chart that you have here on page 11. So I do think that that has played a really big role in it. What are we going to see going forward? Is it going to be a competition between the central banks as to who can print more money and what are they going to do with it and how's the policy going to evolve?
I think it's a moving target and I think we're in uncharted territory.
Patrick Ceresna: But even just to continue that, what What if the monetary policy that the Fed is implementing ultimately does become US dollar bearish? I know we've had Luke Gromen and all these others that are on there that are suggesting that inevitably that may happen. What if that reverses the money flow? What if the money flow is not coming into US equity because the currency tailwind is now a headwind? It's really one of those really interesting puzzle pieces that we have the privilege on MacroVoices for the next year or two to actually be trying to put that puzzle together as we get the new information coming in. Nonetheless, I wanted to go and just quickly end this chart book and just looking at both page 7 and 8. The 7 shows the bear market rally that's showing on the Dow Jones Industrial versus that of the S&P, which we typically show.
But what I wanted to really touch on on page 8 was the fact that now where is this bear market rally been driven from? And what this chart shows is that the market cap of the 5 largest companies in the S&P 500— so only 5 of 500 companies, so 495 companies excluded— now these 5 companies make up 20% of the market cap of the S&P. And obviously the rallies in the Apples, Googles, Amazons, the Microsofts, these stocks have truly been the ones that allowed this bear market rally to be as meaningful as it has. Because if you leave those 5 companies, I mean, you can add the recent advance in Tesla and Netflix to the mix. So let's say you say outside of those kind of 7 companies, you really have not seen any meaningful rallies in most of them.
And so if you're just looking at the S&P 500 on the surface, you're not getting a good pulse on what is really happening under the hood. You're just looking at the surface. And while certainly these 5 companies have been just ripping to the upside, I mean, does that mean that it's not a bear market just because Amazon is benefiting from all of this and doing this huge rally? I don't know. I just— to me, there's more to this. than, than just looking at the, the price of the S&P. And I'm still convinced it's a bear market rally. So that's where I'm standing anyway.
Erik Townsend: Well, I'm convinced it's a bear market rally too. The question is just whether the Fed can overcome gravity and cause the, the what should happen next not to happen. And I do feel like we're in unprecedented times. And listeners should be sure to check page 12 if you want to grab a free trial of Patrick's service, Big Picture Trading. You can get a dose of Patrick's perspective almost every single day, not just once a week on MacroVoices.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, before we wrap up, I always like to get a quick update on what's going on with the COVID-19. So how are things developing?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, as I've said before, we do have great news, which is that phase that we were in where it was just an exponential acceleration, it was getting worse and worse That's behind us now, which is great. I hear a lot of people saying, well, now that new infections are on the decline, and I'm like, wait a minute, look at the data. It definitely— new infections have leveled off. We're on a plateau here. And just knowing a little bit about the way these things work, a decline should be expected. That was the logical thing that would come next. But we've been, you know, kind of cruising along at about 25,000 new infections per day in the United States.
Right. United States. And I wonder, frankly, I'm not an epidemiologist, I'm not expert at this, but I wonder if we've really flattened the curve enough and if opening the economy, which I think we have to do, you know, the economy, it's very clear that there have been impacts of keeping the economy closed which have caused loss of life in other ways. Suicide rates are up, people are in economic devastation, you know, we got to get the economy reopened.
But I think there's a very good, very strong chance of a second wave. And I'm not saying that means that we shouldn't reopen the economy. I'm just saying we've got to face the fact that we haven't actually seen a decline, a meaningful decline in new cases. We've seen a plateauing. We're already going to open the economy because we pretty much have to. It seems logical to me to think that it won't take very long at all before the next wave comes and we're back up to 30,000+ new infections per day. Again, this is not my field. Maybe I don't know what I'm talking about, but I think people are a little bit too complacent with how easily we can just reopen the economy without causing another wave. A lot of reaction— it seems like part of what pushed the stock market up yesterday to that above the 2,930 level, which I've been saying is is the key level to watch, was Dr.
Fauci talking about remdesivir, Gilead's drug, having a huge amount of promise. Chris Martenson did a little bit of a takedown on that, and he went through what Fauci said and what the clinical trials have actually revealed for remdesivir. Really, you know, it's funny, the press is all over remdesivir, rah, rah, rah, and chloroquine.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: Boo, boo, boo, Trump said it, so it can't be good. And, you know, frankly, from what Martenson says, really, the, the evidence is just as good for chloroquine plus zinc, as long as you give it early enough in the period, as remdesivir. So it's not really clear to me that there's any reason to think remdesivir is going to change the game in a material way.
So I feel like we're at the sell the news moment in the virus. And what I mean by that is, okay, we're reopening the economy. We're kind of ringing the bell saying it's time to reopen the economy. The guidelines have been issued. States are starting to reopen their beaches and reopen stores and so forth. It's the time when everybody says, okay, it's over, and they breathe a big sigh of relief. I don't think it's any coincidence that that's happening at the same time that we just hit what you and I think on a technical chart Looks like the top of a bear market rally. I think this is that sell-the-news moment. Now, I'm not saying that we haven't gotten past the worst of the crisis, but everybody's acting like, okay, it's ending now. It's not ending. It's going to be a long, long time before life is back to pre-crisis normal. We're at the point where that really difficult first wave is behind us, and now there's still a lot of challenges ahead.
And I don't think people are really looking at it that way.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: Anyway, big question on my mind, what I'm gonna be watching. I can make an argument that says, okay, what's gonna happen next is the following. Everybody's been cooped up in their house. They're sick of it. They're gonna say, okay, finally the restrictions have been lifted. Let's go on a vacation. Let's get on a plane. Let's go to a resort. Let's live our lives to the fullest because this crisis has taught us you never know what could go wrong. So baby, we're gonna go out. We're gonna travel. We're gonna party. We're gonna have fun. Because we can again.
The other side of it is people were really shaken by this and they feel like, boy, you know, okay, the airlines are flying again, but, you know, I'm not really interested in taking that risk. I think I'd rather skip going away from, you know, to another city on a vacation. I'd rather just have a staycation at home. Huge difference in the economic impact of those 2 scenarios in terms of how the economic recovery occurs.
Occurs. Which one's going to happen? Frankly, I have no clue. But my opinion is these things tend to be— it's like any fad in society. They're self-reinforcing. If what everybody around you seems to be doing is celebrating it's time to go travel again, you're probably going to do that too. If everybody else is scared to travel again, you're probably going to fall into that same thing. So I think it's going to be very interesting to see what the trend is in society as to whether people want to rush back to spending money traveling and doing things and being active and getting out in the world, or if people don't really want to go to the World Series because they're concerned about the risk associated with it and so forth. So we'll see what happens.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, we got an email from Matt Barrie, our good friend at Freelancer.com. What's that all about?
Erik Townsend: Matt's a super guy. He's the founder of Freelancer.com. He came to our MacroVoices live events. He's got the record for farthest farthest traveled to get to a MacroVoices live event. Matt has a really interesting customer base because Freelancer deals with people literally all over the world with businesses that hire freelancers to do all sorts of things. So he put a survey together about how businesses all over the world are responding to the COVID-19 crisis, whether they feel that there's one country that was at fault for this or they don't, whether they feel that their government has done a good job or a bad job and so forth. Fascinating, fascinating survey results. So let's try to get that full survey. I think it was just released to the public in the last 24 hours or so. Let's get it into the Research Roundup, Patrick, so that our listeners can peruse it. I went through it. He's got terrific graphs and charts.
I think you'll find it very definitely worth your while.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah, the business survey thing at the end there was pretty interesting just to see the impact and how long they, people think it will take for the recovery to come in. It's, uh, really worth the read.
Erik Townsend: And Patrick, we're going to need to leave it there. This episode was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at TopTradersUnplugged.com/MacroGuide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit MacroVoices.com/Sponsorship. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as well as, of course, our post-game chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the charts that we discussed in the post-game. There's also a link to an article by Jeffrey Snider titled, Can You Quota the World into Recovery? As well as a great Chris Somers interview discussing his days back at Greenlight Capital. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. That does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, Send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRR hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.
You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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David Rosenberg — former Merrill Lynch chief economist and the author of the infamous Breakfast With Dave newsletter (as introduced on the show)
Announcer: This is MacroVoices with hedge fund manager Erik Townsend, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 216 was recorded on April 23rd, 2020. I'm Erik Townsend. This episode of MacroVoices is dedicated to healthcare workers all over the world, the true heroes of the COVID-19 pandemic crisis, and is brought to you by TopTradersUnplugged.com, a podcast dedicated to quant and rules-based investing, helping investors overcome behavioral biases.
We've got a terrific episode lined up for you this week. We'll start with economist David Rosenberg joining me as this week's feature interview guest. We'll cover the stock market outlook, bond yields, and inflation versus stagflation outlook, plus a whole lot more. Now, most of you know Dave as the former Merrill Lynch chief economist and the author of the infamous Breakfast With Dave newsletter. But Rosie launched his own research firm this year, parting ways with the private wealth management firm that he was previously associated with. So we'll get the inside scoop on what led Dave to branch out on his own, and of course I'll hit him up for a free trial of his new product offerings just for MacroVoices listeners. Then be sure to stay tuned for our postgame segment when we'll take a deep dive into the crude oil market. We'll discuss the May WTI contract dipping all the way down to minus $40 briefly, what it means, and perhaps more importantly, what it doesn't mean and what we can expect in coming months.
Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Now, listeners, we'll have a detailed update on the COVID-19 coronavirus in our postgame segment after the feature interview. Now, Erik, let's just jump right into the S&P 500. We continue to muddle around 2,800 here for almost a week. What do you think? Is this still a bear market rally in your mind?
Erik Townsend: I still think it's a bear market rally. Top might be in. Maybe we still got room to go. You know, I've been eyeing the 61.8 Fib retrace, which is 2,930. As I've said before, I probably won't trade it though, and the primary reason is just having watched what happened with the Fed bailing out the junk bond market. As far as I'm concerned, that was both illegal and immoral. They shouldn't have done it. But what's to stop them from bailing out the stock market if it starts to go down? I mean, they're not supposed to do that either, but it didn't stop them on junk bonds. Why would it stop them on stocks? If I was going to play this market, I'd want to play it the safe way, which is with options. Well, the VIX is still kind of expensive, so options are expensive. So it, to me, it's not not really as appealing of a short as it was the last time around.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the dollar index. And the DXY is above 100. The euro is toying with breaking 108 on the downside. Is the dollar breakout still a part of your narrative?
Erik Townsend: Well, we're consolidating along here. Yes, we're above 100, but we're still below 101, which would be the next test just to get a higher high in this, what I think is going to be an uptrend here. Really, it's 104, which is the key level we need to take out in order to really prove my thesis. But again, my conviction is waning here simply because I think all of the bad stuff going on in the world definitely should be dollar positive. And there is a US dollar shortage. But I mean, just look at what the Fed is doing with all of this intervention and even more perhaps still coming. At some point, it's got to be dollar bearish. So that weakens my bullish conviction a little bit. As I weigh all of the different evidence, I still lean toward an upward outcome for the dollar. But my conviction's not as strong as it was a few months ago.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to crude oil because right now we're trading at $16.97, but that number does not tell the story at all, does it? What happened this week, Erik?
Erik Townsend: Well, to tell the full story is going to take more time than we've got in the market wrap. So very briefly, in case anyone missed it, the May WTI contract actually traded at minus $40 at one point briefly on Monday afternoon. Now, to give a quick overview of what that means and doesn't mean, it It doesn't really quite mean what it sounds like it means. We didn't really have the price of oil that refiners are paying for their oil, you know, go negative. What we had was a squeeze in a contract where some really foolish people got on the wrong side of a trade and they got taken advantage of. It really only affected a few thousand contracts at the end of the day on the second-to-last day of trading in that contract. The whole story is actually a very interesting story, and it probably has a lot of insight to give us for what may still lie ahead as we navigate this crisis of storage, which is really a bare storage capacity story, is what this is all about.
That full story is going to take our entire postgame segment, or most of our postgame segment. So I'm going to leave it there and just finish up with inventory and the market wrap, and we'll get the rest in the postgame segment. Crude oil building 15 million barrels. That was pretty much expected. Cushing, Oklahoma building 4.8 million barrels. Now, Cushing's been building 5 million barrels approximately per week for the last several weeks. I think there's maybe a chance of a surprise coming there. We'll talk about that again in the postgame segment. Gasoline building 1 million barrels, distillates building 7.9 million barrels. US production ticked down another 100,000 barrels to 12.2 million barrels. Let's save the rest of the crude oil conversation for the postgame segment, Patrick, because it's a doozy.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to gold 'cause it's slowly crawling back to $1,750 on the upside. Just feels like every time it sells, someone comes in and scoops it up and brings it right back toward the highs. Do you think we break out in a big way still?
Erik Townsend: Well, I mentioned my concern last week that there was an ascending wedge pattern that appeared to be resolving to the downside. It did resolve to the downside, resulting in a pullback in price, but that pullback in price was not very deep, only down to about $1,660 Or so. And now, as you say, we're back up almost to $1,750 as we're recording on Thursday afternoon.
The thing is, we did break down from that wedge pattern. I'd really like to see a closing print above the previous cycle high, which was $1,780-something. I'd like to see that just to sort of finalize my conclusion that the dip is over and, and we're headed higher from here. The fundamentals couldn't be better. The place where I think you could get a significant pullback in gold would be if the stock market really crashes in a big way. For the moment, that's not happening yet, so I'm not too worried about gold. If we get into a big stock market move, I think it could drag gold lower with it. If that happens, it's a buying opportunity in gold. Long-term, couldn't be more bullish on gold.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, well, let's move on to the 10-year Treasury yields, which are still more or less hovering around spot 6.1% right now. And do you think with it— it doesn't seem to be able to get off of that level. I mean, are we still going lower?
Erik Townsend: Well, as I've mentioned in the last couple of weeks, Patrick, I really don't know short-term where we're going. The way I'm looking at this Treasury market is, okay, there's been a really, really strong argument. Lacy Hunt probably has made it better than anyone else, that in this environment of too much debt and a deflationary backdrop and so forth, bond prices just have to go higher, bond yields have to go lower. You get to the question of, okay, but what happens when you get to the zero bound on the US 10-year Treasury? Is that really a lower limit or is it just another number on the way to negative yields? And I think the other really big aspect of this is, okay, I'm convinced and I'm really getting a consensus now. You'll hear this from David Rosenberg in today's interview. Kind of finding that some of the smartest people that I talk to— I had a phone call this week with our good friend Harley Bassman, the Convexity Maven.
I think all the smartest guys see the same thing I do, which is this trend of central bank accommodation is only going to get stronger from here. It eventually has to lead to a shift to secular inflation or stagflation, but that doesn't happen overnight. So the smartest guys in the room all seem to be saying, yeah, that's where we're headed, but it's maybe 2 to 3 years out. So, okay, if the worst thing that can happen to the Treasury bond market is inflation, and we think inflation is still at least 2 to 3 years out, does that mean it's time to get worried about rates backing up in the bond market now, or is it just something to keep in mind for 2 to 3 years out. I'd love to ask Dr. Lacy Hunt that question. For now, I'm just trying to ask all of our guests on the show exactly what they think. I don't really have a firm view myself.
I'm trying to rely on our guests and I'm learning along with our listeners, Patrick.
Patrick Ceresna: All right. Well, this week's feature interview guest is Rosenberg Research founder, David Rosenberg. Now, why did we invite Rosie back to the show this week?
Erik Townsend: Well, needless to say, he's an iconic guy in the industry. I think this The Breakfast With Dave newsletter is probably the longest-running daily newsletter in professional finance, and everybody loves it. It's— you get on the train from Westchester County into New York City, and half the finance guys on the train are reading Breakfast With Dave on their iPads on the way to work. So he's a super important guy. He's also a guy who's been right a lot about this kind of big macro move that we're seeing, and I wanted to get his perspective now that we're into the throes of this crisis.
Patrick Ceresna: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: But also, he recently announced he left the private wealth management firm that he was with and branched out to launch his own firm. So I wanted to find out what that's about, what led him to do that, and what we can expect from him in the future. So it— we've just been a little bit overdue to get Rosie back on the show, and it was a really great interview.
I really enjoyed it.
Erik Townsend: This episode of MacroVoices was made possible by TopTradersUnplugged.com. In recent weeks, we've been reminded of the fragility of world financial markets and how quickly sentiment can shift from risk-on to risk-off. Once again, the mantra of buy the dip and the determination of central banks will be put to the test. But as Chris Cole recently told us, the best approach to investing in the long run is very different from what's worked best in recent decades. To help MacroVoices listeners navigate an uncertain future, Niels Kaastrup-Larsen host of the Top Traders Unplugged podcast, has created a guide to the best investment books of all time. You can get a free copy at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide.
And be sure to listen to my full-length interview with Niels Kaastrup-Larsen on trend following. The download link is in your Research Roundup email. Check out toptradersunplugged.com today. You'll be glad you did.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik's interview with David Rosenberg is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's hedge fund manager Erik Townsend.
Erik Townsend: Joining me now is David Rosenberg, founder and president of Rosenberg Research. Now, most of you know Dave as the famous author of the Breakfast With Dave newsletter, he's actually branched out and got some really exciting new products and services that he's starting to explore in his own new firm. So we're gonna talk about that at the end of the interview. But David, obviously, we gotta start with, wow, these are amazing times that we're in. I gotta tell you, I am just dumbfounded. It seems like maybe a little bit of common sense in the last couple of days has hit the stock market. But until then, it seemed like most people thought, okay, it's all over now. We're past peak infections. It's time for new all-time highs in the stock market.
Um, I think it's crazy, but, but what do you see here? What's the big picture? Is this really ending, or is it only just beginning?
David Rosenberg: Well, look, I think that when you're taking a look at the extreme daily moves that we're seeing in the stock market, uh, it is completely characteristic of a fundamental bear market, not the onset of a new bull market. I mean, we've had just in the past, uh, 20 sessions, uh, 18 of those the Dow moved in either direction by at least 200 points.
It's almost like we become numb. Like today, if the Dow moves 400 points up or down, it's completely ho-hum. But these are dramatic daily swings. It's showing a market that is completely confused and I think caught in this tug of war between— I wouldn't say a V-shaped recovery— really caught between knowing that we have a very deep and sharp recession on our hands But also the Fed coming in and doing what no other Fed has done before.
I mean, Jay Powell has made a mockery out of, out of Ben Bernanke, that's for sure, and taken on this role not just as a liquidity backstop, but going into corporate credit, CMBS, municipal bonds, and now into high-yield ETFs.
And so the Fed is basically telling investors We are going to put a pervasive floor under the situation. Now, I'm not saying that the Fed can stop a bear market in its tracks, but what the Fed can do is send a message that it is going to eliminate tail risk.
And I think that is what caused, you know, this big, what I'd say, counter-trend rally off the lows was a big part of that was the Fed. And the shock and awe of that is over, and now we're heading back into a period where investors are realizing the deep recession that's staring us in the face and the very low likelihood that we get much of a recovery. It's really that tug-of-war, deep recession, unknown extent of recovery, and on the other side of that is this ongoing, incredible support that the Fed is trying to provide financial risk assets.
Erik Townsend: It's amazing, David. The very first thing, the first public statement that I remember Jay Powell making after he took office was to very authoritatively exclaim, look, folks, The Fed is not in the business of bailing out asset markets, so get that through your head. Well, I guess he didn't mean it or something. I think you've perfectly summarized what's going on. And then the big question it leaves me with is, okay, if we were talking about, you know, old normal reality, we've been through recessions before. Financial history teaches us a lot about what to expect. You would expect the stock market to have only just begun a bear market and much lower numbers, new lows still to come.
But wait a minute, as you just said, the Fed seems to be in the business of doing what they said they were not gonna do, which is bailing out asset markets. They've already done what I think was both immoral and illegal in bailing out the junk bond market through the ETF. Who's to say that stocks are not next? And I do think that's illegal, but it was illegal to bail out HYG. They did that. So what do you make of this? Do we apply the logic that eventually the fundamentals win out? Or is this more of a case of, hey, you know, you wouldn't want to short the stock market no matter how bad you think the recession is going to be because the Fed's probably going to, you know, put a floor under it?
David Rosenberg: Well, I guess that— I mean, I'm not going to jump at Jay Powell's defense. I think that this was something that started, you know, more than 30 years ago, which is the extent of the powerful relationship now between the financial economy and the real economy, or at least that's the perception at the Fed, whose models continue to believe in the wealth effect on spending.
That's essentially where they've taken their cue. I'm not going to sit here and say that the Fed can stop a bear market in its tracks, and I don't think they'll be successful doing that. I think that what they're trying to do here is provide some semblance of confidence that tail risks are not going to be tolerated.
Well, can the Fed come in and buy equities? Well, they probably, they probably can, and they might, depending on how bad this gets. I mean, after all, high yield in the capital structure resides right next to the equity market. Whoever thought that they would actually move from their traditional role as liquidity backstop towards being the savior of, of insolvency? But I think what it comes down to, and this is why I'll cut him some slack, is that this was man-made to some extent. Look, there's no doubt that we went into this. People say that there was no imbalances in the economy. Well, we went into this with balance sheets completely dilapidated, especially in the corporate sector, but there are wide swaths, even in the household sector, of debt excesses that should have been controlled. We always talk about this after the fact.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
David Rosenberg: I think that there's this collective guilt. I mean, look what's happening in Congress right now. For the first time, the Republicans and Democrats are fighting over how much more to add to any specific package, like the PPP. You've got the president on board, you've got the Democrats, Republicans, all fighting over how much bigger can we make this next fiscal assistance package. Now, I say assistance, because this isn't like FDR, where we're going to have the New Deal to try and put idle people back to work. What's happened here is that people have been told to stay home and not go to work. So I think there's this palpable sense of guilt at the government level, and that includes the Fed, that we made this decision here to tell people you can't work anymore, you got to stay home.
And so I think that, uh, you know, the risk is that they may be going way overboard here, whether it's on fiscal policy or certainly whether it's on Fed policy. But I think that there's this concern As I said, this collective guilt that we actually told people— this is actually— it wasn't even the virus. You can't even say that the virus, the coronavirus, caused this recession. It was the government's reaction that caused the recession. They could have done a whole bunch of things, but we went into basically national lockdown mode, and anything that's considered nonessential, which is 70% of the economy, just basically shut down. So I guess it's with that mindset that as a public official, which Jay Powell is. You know, the Fed is a construct of the Congress, and so that's why they're going into a realm that they've never done before, specifically because of the nature of this pernicious economic and financial downturn that was really caused by government decisions to begin with.
Erik Townsend: Let's talk more about the extent of the government response, because something I've said before, and it sounds like we're in agreement on, is, you know, the coronavirus is a really big deal, but I think that But the bigger risk is the government reaction to it. And, you know, when you start spending $2 trillion a week in fiscal stimulus, literally for a few weeks there, and an unlimited amount of monetary stimulus, it seems to me like maybe this is the long-awaited catalyst that finally forces a secular shift to a secular inflationary rather than deflationary backdrop. Am I on the right track there? And if so, So, is that something that plays out in the next 6 months or the next 6 years, or how does it work?
David Rosenberg: Well, let's first address what you said initially, which is about the gargantuan fiscal stimulus, which is— it is actually truly unprecedented. But we're in a situation now where you got some of these Wall Street economic houses calling for 40% down in second-quarter GDP at an annual rate. Without much of a recovery, which we're not going to get, we'll get some. We could be on the precipice here of GDP being down close to 10% for the entire year, which is almost what you had back in 1930, '31. When you're talking about, so far, the stimulus, which seems incredible, I mean, it's been well over $2 trillion just on the fiscal side, which is about 10% of GDP. Basically, covers the hole that the recession has created. So that's all the government has tried to do here is just fill a leaky boat.
That's why it's not really traditional stimulus. It's just basically to keep households and businesses intact. They may have a lot more to do, and then you've got to weigh in the fact that a lot of companies are going to be focused on 2 precious words called working capital, and households will be building on their savings rates. So A lot of this money coming into the system to the private sector, a lot of that's not going to get spent in GDP. A good chunk is going to get saved. It's not even clear that the stimulus or the assistance the government's providing is going to be enough to fill that economic hole. We have to keep that in some perspective.
In terms of the very near term, look, there's no doubt that this is initially, and I mean for the next 1 or 2 years, this is going to be a deflationary shock. of intense proportions, and it will be a deflationary shock that will linger on for the next, I'd say, 1, 2, or 3 years. We're going to be left most likely with double-digit unemployment for an extended period of time. There will be tremendous excess capacity in the business sector, and so deflation, if you have a 1 to 3-year view, is what we're going to be left with. If you're going beyond 3 years, I completely agree with you. I think there's going to be a time we have to basically not extrapolate what's happening now, you know, beyond, say, 3, 4, 5 years into the future. I think that'd be a mistake. I think you're quite right that what's going to happen here is that at some point, demand will stabilize.
We're not going to normalize. Nothing's going back to normal unless maybe we get a vaccine, and maybe that in the next few years, that's going to happen, or we'll have the herd immunity and we'll just all burn through it.
At some point, what's going to happen is that the supply side is going to overtake the demand side. Demand will stabilize, but the supply side is what is going to get crunched really hard here. We're talking about the implications that this is going to have on capital investment, the implications it's going to have on productivity and labor productivity. When you consider the future, we'll be wearing masks, there will still be some form of social distancing at work, taking people's temperatures as they go into the office or another workplace, This is all detrimental to productivity.
That alone is inflationary from a supply-side standpoint. And then you layer on what everything is going to mean in the future from a globalization standpoint, that supply chains will become more localized. The concept of just-in-time inventories, which was a great cost killer, is going to have to be reevaluated.
And I see a future now where some of these trends were already starting with these trade conflicts. In the past 18 months, but we're going to see a world that's going to be completely different. The trend towards populism, nationalism, isolationism, and protectionism, and dare I say socialism, is going to most likely, if you actually read the history books, is going to be on an accelerating trend. That means that the world is going to be shrinking in a lot of respects from a supply-side standpoint.
That is going to be cost-push inflationary at a time when demand is no longer imploding. When I look at where the aggregate supply, aggregate demand curves are going to be looking like beyond, say, 3 years, you're 100% right. We will come out of this. I would say, actually, wouldn't call it inflation. I'm going to call it a return to stagflation.
I think if you have more than a 3-year horizon, that has to be on your mind right now.
Erik Townsend: Let's talk a little bit more about how this plays out, because I agree with you. What we've got a setup for now with the coronavirus and the impact it has on the economy and everything, it's all very deflationary. But, you know, it's— the cat's out of the bag. We know that the central banks, not just the Fed, but around the world, are going to just go crazy conjuring more money out of thin air. And I predict if you look back at this podcast 5 years from now, people would laugh and say, listen to these guys. They're acting like single-digit trillions is a big deal in a policy announcement.
You know, it'll probably be bigger than that by then. But the thing is, at some point it has to be—
David Rosenberg: I mean, if—
Erik Townsend: I guess it depends on your definitions. If you don't wanna call it inflationary, let's say it has to debase the value of fiat currency. So is gold the big winner?
Erik Townsend: I mean, how do we navigate this period of we know something different's coming, but it starts with deflation, but it doesn't stay deflation forever?
David Rosenberg: Yeah.
Erik Townsend: What is the investment strategy that gets you through this storm?
David Rosenberg: Well, I think that you'd want to own the areas of the market that are classic inflation hedges. Again, you know, we're going past the next 1, 2, 3 years of deflationary pressure, you know, so I think gold would fit in very well, precious metals in general, commodities. I would say, you know, real estate, especially farmland, in my opinion, especially when you consider coming out of this situation realizing the impact this has had on, on the food supply chain.
So farmland, real estate, commodities, precious metals, TIPS. I think that, you know, consumer staples will be a good place to be, probably healthcare. You can actually concoct a portfolio that will be a great hedge against that. Inflationary future, the one thing that will happen is that the last thing you'll want to be in is going to be cash because that will erode in real terms. But yeah, I would tend to agree with you that gold would be— and notwithstanding the fact that gold has maybe not performed as well as us bulls on bullion would have liked to have seen, the reality big picture is that it's still up 11% year to date. So it's still been one of the better performing, obviously, asset classes so far in 2020. But I do think that gold, precious metals in general, will be good places to be in this environment.
Erik Townsend: And so it sounds like you're not concerned. Obviously, the next 2 or 3 years you think is going to be a big deflationary shock. In normal times when they're not printing trillions of dollars a week, I would say that's a good time to get out of gold. I think we probably agree that that it's a good time to stay in gold right now. Maybe we'll get a sell-off, but most likely the money printing will outweigh whatever downward deflationary pressure exists. Are we on the same page?
David Rosenberg: Well, look, I still think that, you know, gold is an effective hedge even in a deflationary environment, because when you're in a deflationary environment with private sector debts as high as they are, it creates a destabilizing cycle of defaults. and delinquencies. Now, 100% true that the Fed has provided a backstop for these fallen angels post-March 22nd, but I've got news for you.
The Fed is not going to be bailing everybody out. We are going to be seeing delinquencies and defaults, and there will be recurring rounds of instability.
So gold is not just an inflation hedge. I mean, that's what everybody thinks, and they're right, but gold is also a hedge against recurring rounds of instability. So I would still say that there's going to be different facets of gold, different characteristics that you still want to have a good chunk of it in your portfolio. Of course, a good chunk is very personal. It is all contingent on what your comfort level is historically. Some people would be happy with 20% gold, some people happy with 5% gold, always benchmarked against what's your comfort zone and how much of it have you owned historically.
But, you know, we talked about a lot of other things ahead of going into the stagflation, which is the growing global instability we're going to be seeing coming out of this.
So I always say that outside of inflation, you value gold at 1 divided by T, where T is trust, or perhaps the inverse of uncertainty. And the future is very uncertain. And what makes gold so alluring is not just because it is this shiny, malleable metal that goes back thousands of years. It's that it's about the only thing whose production function is stable at about 1% per year. That's the one thing that you can take to the bank is the gold production function. Now, maybe we can't predict what the demand of India or China or what the Russian Central Bank is going to be doing.
Maybe you've got these central banks like Russia being massively negatively impacted on its balance of payments because of what's happening with oil, so they sell gold to cover their debt service payments. To me, that's all just very temporary and is a buying opportunity. But gold at its heart has a stable production function.
And in a world where the production of money, where the production of almost everything has so many question marks in front of it, that you want to own gold just for the stability aspect of
Erik Townsend: Let's talk about bond yields next.
Erik Townsend: If we're expecting deflation for the next 2 or 3 years, the normal argument would be, okay, duration risk still makes lots of sense. Let's expect lower Treasury yields. But as we get to the zero bound on the US 10-year, you know, is that just another number on the way to negative yields, or is there really a zero lower limit there that we have to rethink the strategy on bond yields?
David Rosenberg: Well, Well, nothing, nothing, mathematically, says that the 10-year Treasury note yields can't go negative, any more than you would say, theoretically or practically, that we couldn't have negative 10-year yields in Japan or in wide swaths of Europe. And so nothing stops, really, if we go into a deflationary experience, if we go into an experience where the term premium starts to price a Fed policy that shifts to negative interest rates.
Remember that the Fed no longer just talks about— they don't talk about the zero bound anymore, they talk about the lower bound. You've had other central banks, by the way, talking more openly about negative interest rates. I'm not saying that's what the Fed's going to do, but all that has to happen is that the bond market starts to price that in, in the context of a deflationary environment and a huge savings glut in the private sector.
That you can't rule out. The 10-year note going below zero. There's nothing magical about it. It all depends on the constituents of what makes up a nominal yield, the real rate, inflation expectations, and the term premium. Can you go negative? Yes, you can. Are there other opportunities there right now in the fixed income marketplace to focus on where you probably have to take on a little more risk, but to get some yield? I'd say that I say this in the context of that you still want to have Treasuries in your portfolio, much like you want to have gold in your portfolio. At least you'll get some positive yield right now. It's not much, but I would say the municipal bond market, we're not going to get through this situation. We are not going to get through a recession if state and local governments are not made whole. They are a huge chunk of GDP outside of the consumer. The biggest chunk.
The Fed's already told you we're going to backstop this group. I'd hazard to say that the federal government would come to the aid of any state and local government that was on the precipice thereof of financial difficulty.
I'd say that the muni market looks relatively attractive to me. I'd say within the corporate credit market, would I be buying high yield? No. Would I be buying CCC distressed credit? No. But there are parts of the investment-grade universe, whether it's, uh, I'd say single-A high credit, or I would say, uh, BBB high credit, that you can formulate a strategy in the corporate market, pick up some yield in areas where you have some confidence where Default risk is low, even in a recessionary environment. I'd say that there are some pockets outside of Treasuries in the fixed income space that are worth looking at right now.
Erik Townsend: What does all of this mean for emerging markets? Obviously, some of them are going to get hit harder because they don't have the medical resources that developed nations have. What's the fallout after or during the rest of the coronavirus crisis going to mean for emerging market equities?
David Rosenberg: Well, there's so many correlations here that you have to run, and understanding that the emerging markets space is like talking about healthcare. Are you talking about hospital services, biotech, pharma? The emerging markets space is also very heterogeneous. You certainly don't want to be long any emerging market country right now that, for example, is a big oil exporter. I don't think you'd be really fawning over, say, Indonesia right now. Right. So I think that that's got a bulk large energy exposure. I think that countries that ended up not spending as much blowing their brains out on solving the coronavirus, you know, deserve a look.
There are countries that actually got ahead of this very quickly that ultimately won't have to expend as much fiscal and future taxpayer resources to fund the largesse. So you could be looking at places like Taiwan or Korea. Or Singapore. Notwithstanding the fact that Singapore has had another wave, the amount of money that a lot of these countries are spending to deal with the situation is far less as a share of GDP than it is in the United States.
I'd say that there are some parts of emerging Asia that are attractive, both their equity market and their fixed income market. I just named a few. Latin America is a little more dicey just because of the exposure either to oil or to commodities, which will be part of the near-term deflationary environment that we're in. So I can't say that I'm overly bullish on Latin America. Maybe there's parts of Asia that look interesting.
The big wildcard is going to be, you know, what happens to global supply chains that benefited not just China, but also a good chunk of emerging Asia. That's really the unknown as to the extent to which global supply chains that generated manufacturing capacity in a lot of these emerging markets end up coming back. into the confines of the US economy. That's, again, a really big unknown.
So the emerging markets right now, I'd say more like the capital markets in general, you've got to be extremely selective.
Erik Townsend: A lot of people have speculated that once the crisis is over, there's going to be newfound hostility and tension between the US and China. A lot of Americans feel like China withheld critical information that could have allowed other countries to get through the crisis much more easily. Now, regardless of whether or not that's actually true, the perception exists, and it potentially leads to more tension between these 2 superpowers. What are the implications of that economically if there is a breakdown between US and China from a trade relations standpoint?
David Rosenberg: Right. Well, look, I think that in the US, this distrust with China is one of the few things the Republicans and the Democrats can agree on, you know, outside of, uh, how much more money can we spend, uh, to put a floor under the economy. China is certainly something that they both agree on. And it's not just the US, it's really the world.
The world is going to view China with an even more skeptical lens, and I'm being charitable when I say that, than it did previously. So it's going to make any future trade deals with China that much more difficult. And it's going to, I think, impart what I said earlier, generally speaking, which is a world economy that is going to grow further apart than grow closer together. When you consider that, you know, it's, you know, think of the world economy today, it's really, it's the US and it's China. And so what I think happens here is that we have relations that'll be, that were already frayed, that will become more separated over time, and that'll have other geopolitical implications as well.
It will force China maybe into other alliances, but their problem is going to be that other countries are going to view China much the same way that the US does. So then the question becomes, after China joining WTO almost 2 decades ago— and there's a lot of people around that are in the financial business that have only known what the world is like in a bi-powerful world when you have China and you have the United States. And now we have a situation in the past 20 years where China grew more into the global economic sphere, and now it's going to end up potentially becoming less part of that global economic sphere. So you can almost view this as the start, and maybe it was starting with these trade frictions anyway, Maybe this just reinforces something that was just starting post-Trump presidency, which is an economic Cold War, and not just between China and the United States, but now between China and the rest of the world.
By the way, one other reason why gold will fit in well, or gold stocks, physical gold, because of the hedge against what will also be a potential of global political instability coming out of this in the future.
Erik Townsend: I want to shift gears now and give our listeners the inside story on the launch of Rosenberg Research. Most of our listeners know you, David, as the Breakfast With Dave guy. And certainly for anyone who's not familiar, Breakfast With Dave is probably the most well-respected daily newsletter that has existed in the industry for decades now. You've been through, I think, 3 or 4 different jobs. It seems like any firm that can get you on their team, if they can be the, the host of Breakfast With Dave, it's always worth it to them because Because your letter is just so highly respected. Seems like you kind of had a pretty cushy job, first with the position of being Chief Economist at Merrill and then moving on to Gluskin Sheff in the private wealth management area. You just went and took on a whole bunch of extra work launching Rosenberg Research, so you must have some big ambitions. What's going on?
What led to this? What's driving you to kind of launch your own firm and go to the next level with your work?
David Rosenberg: Well, you know, the the benefit of the previous ten years at my former employer was that I was able to market my research to outside clients, and I had over two thousand clients in forty different countries around the world, split evenly pretty well between individual investors and institutions. And I just decided in the past year. That maybe it was time just to hang up my own shingle, not have to be part of the pitching product in an either buy-side shop or sell-side shop, really just concentrate on unbiased research that will produce short ideas and long ideas and not just always having to have a bullish bias, which I found actually being on the buy side so long, I managed to see all the research coming from all my competitors on Wall Street and Bay Street.
And I'm not going to say that, that anybody is necessarily biased, but the reality is that when you work for an employer, when you work for another shop, especially a shop that is in the business of selling financial products, there is some pressure to toe the party line. And so I decided, not that I And this is something I always resisted, by the way, but I just want to spend 100% of my time not pitching product, and I want to spend 100% of my time building a team, which I've done, and formulating research that's going to be helpful to clients in the financial services industry, investors, to connect the dots between the economy and the markets and come up with a coherent and cogent financial plan.
And so that's what I want to spend all my time doing. And so that's why I endeavored on this, was so that I can call the shots, I can direct the traffic, but I also can spend 100% of my time 24/7 with me and my team producing the research that I think is most important.
Erik Townsend: Now, back in the day, the research in question was really the Breakfast With Dave newsletter, but it's grown to more than that now. So what are you offering through Rosenberg Research beyond the Breakfast With Dave newsletter?
David Rosenberg: Right. Well, the Breakfast With Dave newsletter was what people on the outside always saw. I mean, there was a tremendous amount of other work, you know, that I'd be doing, spending time with salespeople, with traders, with portfolio managers internally. And so the company I worked for over the years were invariably my primary client, and that makes perfect sense. And now my primary clients are my subscribers.
So I can provide just a a much larger set of products and services now. It's not just Breakfast With Dave. Breakfast With Dave was what always the outside world saw. They didn't see what I was doing day to day inside the walls of the company I was working for. It was a lot more than that.
And what I do outside of Breakfast With Dave is one of the services that my clients can get. And it involves conversations over the phone. It involves podcasts. It involves doing special reports. We've done probably 4 special reports already on the coronavirus and the implications near-term, medium-term, long-term on how to invest. So special projects, the Breakfast With Dave, when something in the middle of the day— could be any time, it could be the Fed does something, it could be that the Treasury does something— I write about it and I send it off to my clients right away. I didn't do that before. I would do that internally. Yeah. But I didn't do it externally. Now I do that externally.
And of course, you know, um, I mentioned podcasts, but a lot of what I do, like I'm doing with you right now, is verbal interaction. And I didn't do a lot of that back in my previous incarnations, but I do that now. So if you go on the website rosenbergresearch.com, you'll see all the different products and services that are being offered, but it transcends just Breakfast With Dave. Breakfast With Dave is still what I would call is the Big Mac, but there's a lot of other side dishes that I'm offering right now alongside that.
Erik Townsend: David, let's stay focused on the Big Mac, or Breakfast With Dave, just for one more minute, because with your previous employer, it was possible for people to get a 1-week trial of that. We were able to negotiate for MacroVoices listeners to get a full-month free trial to Breakfast With Dave. How about extending that offer again and giving our MacroVoices listeners a chance to get a 1-month
David Rosenberg: Absolutely. 1-month trial. And by the way, not just for Breakfast With Dave. You can have a 1-month trial for everything that I do in a given month. And so that, uh, I do an Early Morning With Dave, which is the first thoughts in my head when I get up in the morning. It's a few pages of just my random thoughts. And then Breakfast With Dave comes out shortly thereafter. But you'll also, if you come on, you'll get my podcast, you'll get, uh, you'll get maybe special reports, could be in a specific country. You mentioned emerging markets. We did a whole report on emerging markets a few weeks ago. Go. See, this is the sort of stuff I was not doing previously. So you can actually come on, get a 1-month trial of the whole smorgasbord, and, uh, would love to get as many people signed up as possible because the operative goal here from my lens is to, is to have influence and be impactful and helpful for people that have to, uh, actually put money to work in the markets.
I'm actually here to help guide you and limit the prospect of making a mistake, but also doing what I've done over the course of my 35-year career, which is always looking around the bend. It's all about mitigating your risk. So that's the mindset that I have, and I would love to have as many people as possible come on the website and, and for a full month look at the whole product of services that are being offered.
Erik Townsend: Listeners, you can sign up for that free 1-month trial, which I highly recommend, at rosenbergresearch.com. I also I also strongly recommend following David on Twitter. That's @EconGuyRosie, all one big word, E-C-O-N-G-U-Y-R-O-S-I-E, on Twitter. Patrick Ceresna and I will be back as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.
Announcer: MacroVoices is a listener-driven podcast. MacroVoices is a listener-driven program. Please email requests for specific future interview guests to requests@macrovoices.com. You can email questions for the program to mailbag@macrovoices.com, and we'll answer them on the air from time to time in our mailbag segment. We also welcome your suggestions for how we can improve the program. Now back to your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.
Patrick Ceresna: Erik, what a great interview with Dave. I always like his perspective on it. I've always had a slight bearish stance to everything, and I always find his way of looking at things just echoes mine. What did you take away from the interview?
Erik Townsend: Well, Patrick, what I really enjoyed most was Dave's perspective on inflation, stagflation, where we're headed. Listeners heard this interview. They didn't hear my phone call with Harley Bassman this week. Harley echoed a lot of the same sentiments that Dave did. And basically my conclusion is, look, probably the biggest thing that will happen in our entire careers in finance will be the secular shift from a deflationary backdrop to some flavor of inflation, whether that be outright inflation or stagflation or, you know, something new. I'm not sure. And it seems like all the smartest guys in the room agree. Yeah, that's coming. But that shit doesn't happen overnight. That probably takes a few years to get through the current cycle and to get to all of that money printing. It's a lag effect. It doesn't immediately cause inflation when you start printing money like crazy. It takes a while for that to actually flow into the economy and for the velocity of money to start to pick up.
So the question in my mind now is, okay, what's the roadmap from here forward in this macro environment as we We, over the next several years, I'm not sure when, make a transition from the current environment to some flavor of inflation, probably stagflation. And I'm going to keep asking all of the smartest guys that we interview on MacroVoices and try to assimilate a better worldview myself from our guests. But Patrick, I want to move on now to your chartbook. Listeners, you'll find the download link in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, that means you haven't registered yet at MacroVoices.com.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: No problem. Just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, look for the red button next to David Rosenberg's picture that says looking for the downloads. Patrick, page 2 here, we're looking at the S&P. Looks like your chart shows the same thing I'm thinking, which is bear market rally. Is it done yet? What do you think?
Patrick Ceresna: Well, first of all, where this entire chart book is all going to be focused on oil crash 2020. That's epic. But I just love this analog because to me, we put it on a month ago and we've been just more or less pasting the existing chart as it's going on top of what we drew was the analog of how 2008-2009 happened in the post-Lehman part of the drop. And so we had a bear market bounce, and this 2,800 level more or less is about a 50% retracement of the crash. And this continues to be the single biggest question that we have to figure out, is that— is this all this little bear market bounce is going to muster up? And if it is, how does the next phase of a, of a downdraft look? And it continues to I continue to be in a position that believe that it's, it's a bear market rally. I continue to think we're going down, but it may take a little bit longer than a lot of times.
I wouldn't be surprised if we go another week or 2 of it just kind of dropping and popping and dropping and popping and fake out a number of times, and then everyone kind of loses their conviction to want to be short, and then, then it'll break. That's my intuition anyway. But let's, uh, let's move on though, because on page 3 I have The May contract, and I'm
Patrick Ceresna: showing an hourly chart here from April 16th to the 21st showing that drop. And I can't think of a better person to take us through the play-by-play on what the hell happened here. So what happened?
Erik Townsend: Well, let's talk about both what happened and what didn't happen. First, what you're seeing here on page 3 is the May delivery contract for West Texas Intermediate crude oil. And the day before the last trading day, dropping all the way down to minus $40 just a few minutes before the close. If you caught my All-Stars interview with Louis Vincent Gave, this was happening in real time as we were recording, and Louis and I kind of talked through the play-by-play as oil was crashing to negative numbers as it was happening.
The important thing to realize here is this is not the real price of oil. By the time this happened, we were in the final hours, if you will, of that expiring May contract. All of the volume had moved over to the June contract at that point. So the prices that refineries are paying for oil in order to make gasoline that you buy at the gas station and put in your car, that never went negative. Those prices stayed up around $20 all day long. What happened was a squeeze because some really, really incompetent people did some really, really dumb things on the last few days of trading.
Now, to understand this, we're going to need to really take a deep dive into how the futures market works because there's a lot of emphasis on that last day of trading. Well, this contract expires on the 21st of April. Well, it's true that it expires on the 21st of April, but really the more important date to understand is not the 21st of April but the 16th of April, which is the options expiration day. Now it's known as OPEX day because it's when options expire, options, put and call options on crude oil contracts. But it's also the day that the exchange imposes a position limit on everybody except for the physical traders in the marketplace. So it's important to understand most of the market, I'd say at least 80% of the oil market, I don't know the exact figure, are paper longs and shorts. In other words, people who are speculating or hedging for whatever reason on the price of oil.
Both the longs and the shorts are people who are buying or selling oil for the purpose of trading its price with other traders. They don't intend to physically accept delivery of that oil. Now, the futures market is used by the real live refineries and producers of oil to transact real live physical transactions, but those physical transactions are a very small part of the overall volume that exists most of the time. It's on OPEX day, 3 days before the last trading day of the contract, when the exchange imposes— and actually it was a full week before that— that the exchange recommends that paper longs and shorts roll their positions forward into the next contract. But they don't actually impose a position limit which restricts all traders except for the guys that are actually active in the physical market market, taking physical delivery of oil into a tank. Everybody except those guys is supposed to be under 3,000 contracts by 2:30 in the afternoon on the OPEX day which would be April 16th in this case.
Now, Patrick, to you and I, 3,000 contracts probably seems like a lot because every contract is 1,000 barrels of oil. So we're talking 3 million barrels of oil. That's a lot of money, although I guess if it goes negative, it's not a lot of In any case, for the big boys, the institutional guys, it's not a huge number. So everybody has to be out of their speculative trades by the end of OPEX day at 2:30. The only people that are supposed to stay in the market for any sizable position, bigger than 3,000 contracts, are the physical traders in the physical market. The phrase that they use is bona fide hedgers. They have to be designated by the exchange as a bona fide hedger in order to stay in the market with more than 3,000 contracts. after OPEX day.
Now, the way that any roll process works, you've got longs and you've got shorts. So the guys that are going to roll their position forward to the next contract, if you're the guy who's long, you're hoping that the contango, the, the price premium that you're losing by rolling to the next contract, is as small as possible. If you're the guy who's short, you want it to be as large as possible because you're capturing that as a profit. So there's kind of a game of chicken going back and forth with the longs and the shorts. Shorts or trying to figure out, okay, what's the ideal time for me to roll my position forward?
If you've got a storage crisis, which is headline news all over the world, you would think that even retail traders, and certainly any institutional trader, has got to be smart enough to understand that the last thing you want to be is long a contract that you don't have a tank to accept delivery on, because you could get squeezed out.
So the way this works is got paper longs, the guys who are long the market because, you know, they're speculating on hoping the price of oil goes up. They wanted to buy the low price and the contract was at a low price. They have to roll their position forward to the next monthly contract. What happens is they think— and this is the anatomy of a squeeze— they think the other guys in the market are paper shorts who also have to roll forward. And all of a sudden it turns out that the only shorts that are left, which are the only guys that can close that contract out for them, are physical shorts, guys in the physical market who actually have the oil to deliver. So the paper guys are saying, wait a minute, the deadline's coming up, I have to close this contract, I've got to get somebody that will roll me forward into the next month.
You know, you shouldn't charge me that big of a premium, guys, this is already at a record. The guys that have got the oil in the tank are like, hey, we can deliver. This game of chicken is stacked in our favor. We don't have to get out of our contract. We can stay in it and deliver the physical oil. We got more than we need. What happens is the guy who's in that long paper position, the price just gets forced down and down and down until he's forced to take a really lousy trade.
What happened in this case is when the number went negative, the problem was exacerbated because some of these paper longs were retail investors, and they were with Interactive Brokers, which normally has a fairly sophisticated computer system. IB's rules force everybody who is either long or short in a physical delivery contract to be out 2 days before the contract expires. That's their rule, but they don't actually force liquidate the contract until the morning of the day before the last day. So that would be Monday morning.
I think what happened is the price went negative on Monday morning before IB did those forced liquidations. Their computer got confused about the negative price, and they didn't force liquidate people there. They didn't realize how much they were losing, and those traders were unable to get out of their positions because the IB computer wasn't handling the negative prices correctly. And the shorts that had the ability to physically deliver saw their opportunity to just squeeze it. They said, you know, we want deeply negative prices in order to let these longs out of their positions.
Now, here's the amazing part, Patrick. Bank of China, uh, okay, that's institutional. You would think this is— people get paid to do this job for a living. You'd think they'd know something about it. How could they possibly have more than 3,000 contracts long? Well, what is their product? Their product is, is basically sort of like the USO ETF, but it's, it's in China.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: It's a fund that invests like a crude oil tracker fund. Wait a minute, it's sold to retail investors. That's not physical market. Well, Bank of China, once in some other transaction a few years ago, did something in the physical market. They've got a designation somehow with the exchange as a bona fide physical hedger. So they've got apparently quite a few thousand contracts long. Why? Because they've got this USO-like retail fund of oil contracts, and it didn't occur to them when front-page news is that there's a storage crisis across the entire industry, that staying long until way after the exchange requires all of the non-physical delivery people to get out of the market was somehow a good idea.
They waited until the very last day, and they waited until late in the day on the very last day. It was actually the day before the last day of trading, and they realized that they were stuck and they had to get out at negative prices.
So what happened is there was a squeeze. The shorts realized that they were holding all the cards, and they pushed the price deeply negative because a whole bunch of traders just couldn't get out of their positions any other way. What happened though was a few thousand contracts out of, you know, more than than half a million contracts that are normally active in the front month contract. Just a few thousand contracts traded at these deeply negative prices, and some people got just taken out on a stretcher. It doesn't mean that the price of oil really went negative in terms of the economic signal that that would normally have, or what it would mean to the economy for the price of oil to go negative. What it means is that a crazy situation happened in the May contract.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay, well then what happened next in the June contract the day after?
Erik Townsend: Well, that's where we get to— okay, this time it is an economic signal that's really important. The June contract on the following day, that's Tuesday of this week, traded all the way down to $6.50. Now how the heck could crude oil— it's not the phenomenon we just talked about of the expiring contract having a squeeze. It's actually the open trading on an open exchange of the current active front-month contract. And I think, what was it at the end of the day on Monday? It was still over $20, and by early afternoon on Tuesday, it was $6.50.
How is it possible that that could happen? Well, talk about crazy stuff that only happens in the oil market. One of the things that happened on Tuesday is I think that USO, the really big US It's actually an exchange-traded note, ETN, not ETF, although I always call it an ETF, even though I shouldn't. The USO fund, I think they got spooked by what happened on Monday. So even though they had already moved some of their exposure out of the front month, they decided to move a whole bunch more of their long exposure because they don't want to be part of that squeeze if it happens again.
They said, we're not waiting till the end of the month, we're getting the hell out. Furthermore, they were pretty sloppy about the way that they got out. So they moved the market massively by selling a huge number of June futures and buying July and August futures to replace them. So they rolled their long exposure forward from June to a combination of July and August. And they did it in a very sloppy way. They moved the needle, as the expression goes, considerably. And that's what got us all the way down to $6.
Once USO was done with their big sloppy roll, the market started to recover. We managed to get back up today to the 5-day moving average at about $17.50. But I still think that, you know, even though it was influenced by a crazy event with USO doing some, what I think was some reckless trading in the market, hey, it was happening at a time in the front-month active contract when there was plenty of price discovery liquidity on both sides of the market. And I think that's what's It wasn't a crazy squeeze situation, and we got down to $6.50. It says to me that there really is room to, to go back to zero prices. Now, I'll be very surprised if we get to another minus $40 event unless it's another one of these technical squeezes that just a few people got a few contracts stuck in a, in a place they should have never gotten themselves into. But could we get to the real-life price of Of crude oil, you know, goes down below $5 before June is out.
I think the door is open to that now.
We've had a little bit of a squeeze today in the gasoline market that I think was resolved this afternoon when Pemex, the Mexican national oil company, declared force majeure on gasoline deliveries. I don't fully understand the mechanics of that one because I had to get ready for today's podcast. That news just came out this afternoon.
Looks like maybe that short squeeze is over, so I'm not sure if we're going a whole lot higher here, but we're back up to a number that to me makes sense, you know, $16.81 on the June contract as we're recording Thursday afternoon. Okay, that's a low price, but it's kind of in line with what we've been expecting and what we've been seeing in recent weeks. Are we going back down below $6.50?
Well, you know, I, I do think it's possible, but it's not going to happen until the end of the month when that contract expiry is approaching, and we get potentially an imbalance of paper longs to more physical shorts. And once again, the physical shorts are not very accommodating in terms of their pricing, and the paper longs start to get squeezed again. So I think we could see lower prices, even below that $6.50, in the real market, not in the special case, which really only affected a few thousand contracts.
Patrick Ceresna: All right, Erik, let's move on to some of these charts. So on page 5, what we have is that contango in the oil market, the super contango. Like, this is history, Erik. Like, I never thought we would ever see negative oil prices. And here, like, this chart is— well, I snagged this one from April 20th showing that -40 price and showing how the term structure is sloped. On page 6, we have now the new term structure without removing that May contract. So why don't take us through what you're seeing on these charts.
Erik Townsend: Well, let's start with page 5. First of all, as you said, until this event, I'm pretty sure the all-time record for contango on the expiring contract was $8.79, set in December of 2008. And of course, that was during the great financial crisis, prices crumbling down to about $30, $32 on the front end, and there was a great big contango And really, it only got to about $5 or $6 during active trading. And it was on that last trading day when there's almost no liquidity left to the market that it collapsed to $8.79. And that was, you know, the all-time record.
And one of the things— and this is so frustrating for me because I was short the May to June time spread going into this event. And the way I had looked at it, Patrick, was, okay, I know the world record here is $8.79, and I think I'm really going to be aggressive on this trade.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: trade. I think we can hit it again. So I'm going to set my limit orders, first one at $8.79, and then I had $8.99, and I think $9.15 or something. I'm thinking we could go even past $8.79. And I was so proud of myself when those orders started filling on Sunday night, and I'm like, yes, I was right, a record!
And what happened is I ended up closing on— I thought it was going to take until the end of Monday to get out of those positions. I ended up closing all of my short time spreads on Sunday evening at around $9 and change is the spread between the May and June contract. And as you're showing here, by the end of the day, the spread was like $50.
Actually, it went, it went to $60 at one point a few minutes before the close. It was just insane. Louis Vincent Gave and I were on the phone at the time, and my spreadsheet, which calculates the, the value of my open positions in my account, account is going to these insane, insane numbers. That would be if I had held the position and not closed it. And of course, I had already closed it. So unfortunately, I did pretty well on the trade, but nowhere close to what it would have been.
Patrick Ceresna: You weren't greedy, Erik. You weren't greedy.
Erik Townsend: Yeah.
Patrick Ceresna: You know, like, I mean—
Erik Townsend: That business about hogs getting slaughtered, I should have taken the chance just this once on a few contracts, because hogs made out on this particular day, especially on the short side of this trade. But what we're seeing here is just a total record $50 difference between the May contract and the June contract. Only a few thousand contracts of open interest when this happened, and as I say, it was a squeeze. By the time the day was over and we got to the next day, you see on page 6 that contango had gone back down still to, I don't know, on the order of, you know, $5 or $6 But nothing close to where it had been. So that really big difference and the huge dislocation on May was an anomaly because of a trading event. But the fact that the June contract got down to $6.50 the next day is probably a bigger news event than the minus $40, although the news isn't covering it.
Patrick Ceresna: If I can ask, Erik, like, it's a lot of people, the big question to them, especially those people that are investing into like these tanker stocks and other things like that, how long can this market stay in this contango? Like, I know maybe not super contango, but stay in this thing. Like, how, how long is this glut going to be in there that this— the shape of the curve stays in this? I mean, could this be for months? Could it be for the whole year? Like, how, how long can this stay this way?
Erik Townsend: Well, that's the $64 trillion question, Patrick. And not only is everybody trying to figure it out, but I believe that there are probably people who are trying to game the system to create false impressions. In other words, suppose that you're the oil producers, okay, and the whole world is concluding that there is super contango, there's no storage whatsoever, and it's pushing prices to zero. Okay, you don't want the sentiment in the market to be pushing prices to zero. And what would really get them there is Cushing, Oklahoma filling up with storage. Here's a, you know, one of those conspiracy theories that might just turn into conspiracy fact. Act before it's over. An idea that's been circulating in the last few days is, hey, wait a minute, the value of keeping the price elevated to producers is much higher than the cost, as expensive as it is, of storage in Cushing. So if you were major oil producers, why wouldn't you lease storage space in Cushing, Oklahoma, and leave it empty on purpose, just to make sure that those EIA reports never show Cushing, Oklahoma filling up completely?
Because you know that the filling up completely is the event that would cause the market to really crash toward zero prices. I personally am convinced, Patrick, that all of the space in Cushing is gone. It's all been leased, and I think that it's spoken for either by people who are intending to leave it empty or by who have their own plans for it. But the idea of there being spare capacity where, hey, if the market has too much oil and we need to buy some space, we just have to, you know, increase the price and surely somebody will be willing to sell us some storage space. I think it's all gone. I think it's already gone, and I think that could take June prices down and it could widen the spread considerably. Now when you look here at page 6, it's kind of hard if— okay, if I look at the bottom spread, it's not as big as the next spread, but the next spread, the second one up to the third one up, which one is bigger?
It's kind of hard to see that for sure. And also with those, all those little yellow dots, which one of those is July? Which one is August? It's kind of hard to keep track of them. So this is the conventional chart. It's called a term structure chart, which most people use. What I prefer is to look at the individual prices of those 1-month spreads. So the difference between May and June, and the difference between June and July, and the difference between July and August plotted as separate lines on a chart. chart. I haven't seen really anybody else but me do it this way, but if you go to page 7, this is my chart that is showing everything, curiously, except for the May to June calendar spread, and I'll explain that in just a minute. First of all, all these letters here are just the exchange code, if you will. J is April, K is May, M is June, N is July, Q is August, U is September, V is October, X is November, and Z is December.
Who thinks that makes sense? Probably somebody ex-military with a mustache. I don't know, but that's just the way the exchange does it. What you're seeing here is normally when these spreads expire, as they reach their expiration date, minus 30 cents, you know, the contango of just 0.30, that's a typical, you know, pretty good expiration for the storage guys. They can make a profit with 30 cents of contango on their storage. tanks. What you see on the purple line, the one that says J-K0 on the left there, it really on its OPEX day only got— it was about 30 cents on OPEX day. By the end of OPEX day, it got down to about 40 cents, and then it was on the last trading day that it finally collapsed all the way down to $2.75, minus $2.75, which is $2.75 of That, if you just look at what's left of that on the chart, that was totally unprecedented. We haven't seen $2+ of contango on the chart in years and years.
Well, look what's happened since. We see the subsequent months. Now, the white line, MN, that's June to July. The green line, that's July to August. The orange line, that's August to September. The light yellow, the pale yellow, is September to October.
Patrick Ceresna: Okay.
Erik Townsend: October, and so forth. Well, as you look at this chart, you can see that after the expiring April-May spread— that's the purple one— kind of set the precedent, all of the other spreads kind of let go of their traditional norms and started trading into deeper and deeper contango. This is a prediction, Patrick, of where the market is headed. The more months that you have out on curve that are showing significant contango. Let's say more than, than 50 cents of contango would be considered atypical. Any month that is showing more than 50 cents, that means the market thinks we're still going to have a storage problem by the time it expires. And just looking at this, you can't really see all of them, but I recognize the color codes there.
It looks like to get to -49 cents, I see that on the March to April of 2021. So it's going all the way out till next spring that the market thinks there's going to be some degree of storage problem. Well, if what we can see here is first the April-May spread, and the next one we see is the white one, the June to July spread, why don't we see the one that everybody's talking about, which is May to June, the one that just expired? The answer is, when you display that one, it blows the scale of the chart up so much that it's crazy. So if you look at the Y scale on this chart, that's showing you the contango. A negative number means contango. A positive number, which is really not in play here, would be backwardation. So we see right now that the June-July spread is $5.41. That's kind of unprecedented because normally, even on the final day of trading, the all-time world record had been $8.79 until just last week.
Well, that Y scale is going all the way to $7.20, almost to $8. So we're almost at all-time records as far as how big the scale is. Now go to page 8. As soon as I activate the display of the KM spread— that's the May to June spread— it goes down to -$60 at one point on the 20th. So it just throws the— the rest of it is the same chart we were just looking at, but the scale has been compressed vertically so that you can't even see it anymore. So I had to show you 2 different versions of the same chart. Because it just didn't fit. But you can see that what happened is during that squeeze, this spread just went crazy. As I say, I was short that KM spread and I covered it minus $9, very proud of myself for closing that position at a record-wide contango, only to miss the move down to $60 from there.
If you listen to my interview with Louis Gave, you'll hear me just envying what could have been as I missed the end of that trade. Needless to say, where we're headed from here— let's go back now to page 7. You can see there's been a bounce today in this June-July spread. To me, it's just mean reversion. You can visually kind of draw a line between those peaks. I think this has played out, and I wouldn't be surprised if that rolls over again along with the front month price. And I won't be surprised if we get to even wider numbers. The chart you see on page 7 is only plotting end-of-day prices. So on June 21st, it's showing a number down there around $7.20 of contango. It actually traded at $11 of contango at one point during the height of USO rolling its position from June into July and August. I think that we're now seeing basically from that event a relief rally back up to its established downward trend line.
And I think by the end of the month, we'll probably be back down into that record territory of $8.79 or higher. The other months we're going to keep watching, but it looks to me like more and more months are indicating that the market thinks this storage situation or this storage problem is going to last for several months to come. The other thing that I think a lot of people are not factoring into their analysis, Patrick, is they're thinking, okay, but, but they're going to restart the economy, they're going to get things things going again. So surely, you know, all this oil is going to come back out of storage. What they're forgetting is there's 250 million barrels plus of floating storage. That's oil that's in tanker ships anchored somewhere off the coast of Houston. That's more expensive storage than the on-land storage. So before we start emptying out the on-land storage, we've got to unwind all those floating storage deals, the tanker And I don't think that's over yet.
They're still adding more tankers. People are chartering more tankers and storing more oil in them. So this situation is not over till it's over. Saudi Arabia is still sending more tankers full of oil. I just heard this afternoon, and I haven't verified this, so don't hold me to it if it turns out to be urban legend, folks, but I'm told that they're considering reversing the Seaway Pipeline again. The Seaway Pipeline back in the day used to go from here to here.
Patrick Ceresna: Right.
Erik Townsend: Houston up to Cushing, Oklahoma. I think it was around 2011 or 12 they reversed it to go from Cushing, Oklahoma down to the Gulf Coast. I heard that they're actually talking about the possibility of reversing the Seaway Pipeline again in order to take a full tanker load of oil in Houston and pump it up to Cushing. Why in the world would you be doing that right now when you've already got a storage crisis?
Who's trying to accomplish accomplish what outcome in the market by doing that trade? Who decided that it was a good time to buy a full tanker cargo of crude oil from Saudi Arabia and add it to the already overwhelmed storage tanks in the United States? And what was their motive for doing so? I don't know the answer, but I think there's a lot of stuff going on behind the scenes here, Patrick.
Erik Townsend: But Patrick, I have a question for you, which is, I know you're speaking at the Montreal Exchange Options Education Day. I think some of our listeners may be assuming that means if they want to go, they have to travel to Montreal. This is actually a virtual event, isn't it? What's the story? What do you need to do to participate, and where do you have to be in order to sign up?
Patrick Ceresna: The Montreal Exchange has always held the Options Education Days across Canada, and, well, this COVID-19 situation has forced them to bring it online. And so they're opening it up as an online event. It's running on Monday, April 27th, from 11:30 AM to 4:00 PM. That's completely free to register. I'm going to be speaking in there with a whole wave of other great guests, and it's a great event. And you can find the links not only in the Research Roundup email, but it's also on the last page of this chart book So anyone who wants to attend and just get a day of options education for free, make sure you join.
Patrick Ceresna: Anyway, Erik, before we do wrap up, we do have to— we missed one important thing, an update on the COVID-19 situation. And And like, what's going on here? Like, there's so much news coming from so many sources, I don't even know what to make of all of it.
Give us a summary here.
Erik Townsend: Well, let's start with the good news because there is some good news. It seems pretty clear now that we're past peak infections, at least for the first wave in the United States. My prediction had been that just as in Europe, they had to go to triage where they were actually turning people away and saying, sorry, you know, you need a ventilator to stay alive. There's no ventilators available. available. We're going to have to let you die.
That didn't happen in the United States. I was afraid that it was inevitable. I couldn't be happier than to admit to being proven wrong on that prediction. So, the good news is that we're doing a little better than I feared with how we contain. The bad news, though, is I think there's just a lot of people acting like, okay, so that means this thing's winding down, it's ending, we're going to just, you know, go back to work and forget about all this.
I really want to refer our listeners— we have it linked again in our Research Roundup email this week— an article called The Hammer and the Dance. And the metaphor is basically the first thing you got to do to deal with this situation is the hammer. That's the lockdown, social distancing. Tell everybody to stay home for several weeks, as we've just done, in order to get the situation under control. The second half of that, the reason it's called the dance, is because it's not easy from there. You don't just Okay, flip a light switch, turn everything back on, and it's back to normal. It's a balancing act or a dance that you have to go through to figure out, okay, how quickly can we safely restart the economy without bringing on too big of a second wave that potentially has, again, the threat of overwhelming the healthcare system? And it's a dance. I don't think most people, including the Trump administration, administration are really recognizing that that dance is, is going to be difficult and challenging to navigate.
We're not going to be able to start things up as quickly as economically we would like to without bringing on a crippling second wave. So I think that first of all, it's, it's not as easy as people are assuming. Second of all, a lot of the economic damage is already done. A lot of businesses have already failed. A lot of credit has already not been China has a very real second wave. They've got, you know, medical issues again going on in Hubei Province with an outbreak that is continuing. Singapore is having another wave of infections. And there's also been some concerning developments this week. One is there's more evidence now, mounting evidence, and there was already some before, that even for people who have recovered and who didn't really They didn't really have very bad cases. They had mild cases, they never had to go to the hospital, and they had this for a few weeks and they got over it and they're feeling better now.
They may have had permanent lung damage, which makes this much more dangerous in terms of its long-term cost to society than was previously understood. The other thing that I've just done a little more reading on this week, Patrick, although it's not really new. There's a perception which is correct, which is a vaccine is probably at least a year off because the time it takes it. Now, there's a lot of people talking about, oh, we— such and such a company is very close to a vaccine, they're ready to test it, they're gonna have it ready in 6 weeks. Well, what that means is they're ready to begin the clinical trial process, which usually takes a year, and not all of these vaccines make it through that process. A lot of times they figure out that it didn't work, or that it has side effects, or what have you. So as far as a vaccine being ready for mass consumption to immunize all of society, most people think it's unrealistic to expect that in less than a year.
The thing that nobody's really focusing on is, hey, wait a minute, this is a bigger challenge than you think. There's the old expression, Patrick, they can send a man to the moon, but they can't cure the common cold. Well, why can't they cure the common cold? Because it's a coronavirus. Actually, the common cold is a collection of 3 or 4 different coronavirus strains. The problem is that the coronaviruses, unlike influenza, which you can develop a vaccine for, coronaviruses are RNA viruses. And the science is way above my pay grade, but the essence of it is they mutate very easily. They're, they're harder to develop vaccines for. for, and there's never been a successful vaccine against any other coronavirus. Now, obviously, this is a really big deal. The very brightest medical minds in the world are all going to be focused on this. We're going to try really hard to come up with a vaccine, even if that is challenging.
But it's a really big challenge. We should not assume that there's going to be a vaccine against this in a year. Meanwhile, there was news just came out today, Remdesivir, which is Gilead Pharmaceuticals' drug that was originally designed for Ebola, had some very promising initial trials. It looks like after some more clinical trials, maybe it's not going as well as people originally hoped. Financial Times reported that today. I haven't read the full article, so I can't really say. There's also this idea that's getting a lot more popularity, and it's almost hard to tell if it's good news or bad news, Patrick. And that's the idea that, hey, it's starting to look like maybe a whole lot more people have had this thing already than we ever thought before, and that means that the actual case fatality rate is probably a much lower percentage. In other words, this is a much more contagious virus than anybody imagined.
It's already circulated through more of the population than we previously thought, and that means that even though there's lots of deaths, those deaths are a percentage of a much larger number, which means the percentage is a smaller number. And maybe that means that we're a little bit closer to herd immunity, where, where we wouldn't have to be worried about a pandemic outbreak because society develops herd immunity to the virus. Okay, first of all, one of the major studies was from Stanford University, got a huge amount of press. Chris Martenson did a terrific video that's on his Peak Prosperity YouTube channel debunking it and just showing what utter junk science that study was. It seems like the authors were What they did is they took a study process which would only be valid or meaningful as surveillance testing, in other words, against a random sampling of society, and they went to Facebook groups full of people who believe that they have COVID-19, and they advertised and said, we need volunteers.
Obviously, there's a selection bias. You get a bunch of people who have symptoms and think that they're positive. that volunteered to be tested because it's the only way they could get a test was to volunteer for this clinical trial. So it doesn't appear to be a legitimate sampling of society as a whole. It has a very strong selection bias. Another study out of LA— Martenson hasn't done a video on that one yet— Mario Cuomo, the governor of New York, said today that antibody testing appears to indicate that as much as 21% of New York City residents residents who were tested in the test study may be antibody positive, which would suggest, you know, huge progress toward herd immunity. Now, having watched Martenson's video, not on whatever Cuomo is talking about, but on the Stanford study, I'm very skeptical. Okay, it's 21% of what group was antibody positive? Was there a selection bias where people who believed that they were COVID-19 positive volunteered to participate in this group, which is what went wrong at Stanford.
So I think it requires a close inspection. I haven't looked at the details. It only came out just a few minutes before we started recording today's podcast. So I don't know, but I think that one bears close inspection. Bottom line, we need to get to the bottom of this. What we really need is broad-based surveillance antibody testing for all of society so we can figure out just how pervasive this thing is, how many people already have it and how close to herd immunity we really are. We don't know that because we're not testing, we're not testing adequately enough, and we really, really need to put more priority on widespread application of antibody tests as soon as possible. They say they're doing it, they've just been slow to actually act. Bottom line, Patrick, this thing ain't over till it's over. I don't think we have our heads around the full scope of this crisis yet, and just because the first wave met Hopefully, you know, we're in the final innings here.
That doesn't mean the overall World Series is over. It's just the first game in what could be a string of several games before the situation is finally done. In closing, I just can't say it enough times. Let's all support our healthcare workers. These are the true heroes of this crisis. Wherever you live, please thank the healthcare workers in your community for all of their terrific service.
Erik Townsend: Thank you, Patrick.
Patrick Ceresna: Service.
Erik Townsend: This episode was made possible by toptradersunplugged.com. Remember to get the ultimate guide to the best investing books ever written at toptradersunplugged.com/macroguide. For information on sponsoring MacroVoices, please visit macrovoices.com/sponsorinfo. Listeners, be sure to register a free account at MacroVoices.com. The benefit to you is you'll receive our Research Roundup email, which provides you with all of the best free content that we could find on the internet each week, including downloads associated with our guest appearances, as well as, of course, our postgame chartbooks. Patrick, tell them what they missed in this week's Research Roundup.
Patrick Ceresna: This week you're going to find the transcript for today's interview, as well as a link to the charts we just discussed in the postgame. There's also a link to an article from Seth Levine titled COVID-19 Catalyst for an Easy Game Against Passive Investing, and a great Paul Singer article titled Perspectives. So you'll find this and so much more in this week's Research Roundup. So that does it for this week's episode. We appreciate all the feedback and support we get from our listeners, and we're always looking for suggestions on how we can make the program even better. Now, for those of our listeners that write or blog about the markets and would like to share that content with our listeners, send us an Send us an email at researchroundup@macrovoices.com or tag it with the #MVRRT hashtag on Twitter, and we'll include it in our weekly distributions. If you have not already, follow our main Twitter account @MacroVoices for all the most recent updates and releases.
You can also follow Erik on Twitter @ErikSTownsend and myself @PatrickCeresna. On behalf of Erik Townsend and myself, thank you for listening, and we'll see you all next week.
Erik Townsend: Thank you.
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