Michael Howell — founder of CrossBorder Capital and the publisher of the Capital Wars Substack (as introduced on the show)

Cold open and episode introduction

Michael Howell: This everything bubble will inevitably come to an end. And you are starting to see signs that liquidity is rolling over. And therefore, we've got to accept the fact that after every bubble comes a bust.

Erik Townsend: That was Michael Howell. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 545 was produced on August 13th, 2026. Michael and I will discuss the 65-month global liquidity cycle, where we stand in that cycle currently, and what comes next. Michael agrees with my view that gold has probably bottomed and is likely to rally from here. So we'll also discuss precious metals, inflation, and where Fed policy is headed longer term.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive into this interview.

Erik Townsend: You probably know Michael as the founder of CrossBorder Capital and the publisher of the Capital Wars Substack. There's also another business there, which is Global Liquidity Indices that we're going to talk quite a bit about. Michael, it's great to get you back on the show. It's been 6 months or so. Let's dive right into the slide deck that you prepared. Listeners, you'll find the slide deck linked in your Research Roundup email. If you don't have a Research Roundup email, just go to our homepage, MacroVoices.com, click the red button above Michael's picture that says looking for the downloads.

Let's go ahead and dive right into it. Talk about the liquidity cycle and so forth. Where do you want to start?

Global liquidity cycle has peaked

Michael Howell: First, Erik, thanks for the invitation. It's always a great pleasure to be on your podcast. I think the best thing to start with is the global liquidity picture. That's the lens that we look at markets through. Global liquidity is the key driver of asset markets. Money drives markets basically, and that's really our thesis. And so what we do is we monitor the flow of money through world financial markets. And in the slide deck, there's a chart there which shows the global liquidity cycle. We focus in this particular slide on the advanced economies for reasons that will be probably apparent later that China is doing something very different. But essentially what that's saying is the liquidity cycle has peaked. And by that we mean that the growth rate of liquidity is falling. The absolute level of liquidity in dollar terms is still elevated, but it's the growth rate which is really critical for asset pricing. And that's rolling over. And I think the thing to bring out of that is, or 2 things to bring out of that.

One is that this is a regular 5 to 6 year cycle. As you can see, all those that have got the slide deck will be able to see it's a very regular cycle. The cycle bottomed in late 2022 and it peaked at the end of 2025, and it's now starting to come off quite noticeably.

The second point to note is that the reason that that liquidity cycle is coming down is not really because central banks are tightening yet. That is a story that is unfolding and yet to come. It's much more because the real economies are strong and they are dragging liquidity out and effectively crowding out the financial sector increasingly. And it really comes down to a very simple point that all money that is anywhere must be somewhere. And effectively, if it's in the real economy, it's not in financial markets and vice versa. We've had the blaze of performance from asset markets, And now it's the turn of the real economy. It's as simple as that.

Erik Townsend: Now, if I'm reading this global liquidity cycle chart on page 3 correctly, it looks like not only has liquidity already peaked, but looks like we're more than halfway through the down cycle and maybe almost getting closer to the next rebound cycle, at least in terms of the Y-axis, but on the X-axis, we're not there yet. How do you reconcile that? Are we close to a bottom or are we far from a bottom? I could interpret it either way.

Michael Howell: You're right. The way that I would see it is that the liquidity cycle per se is unlikely to bottom within the next 6 months. It's much more likely to be a 2027 event. And if I had to venture a time, I would say sometime around the middle to later in 2027, that would be the normal timeline. It's possible that things could concertina and we make it an earlier rebound, but I think that's unlikely. And not least because the big monetary authorities, I mean, namely the Federal Reserve, is still a long way from aggressively tightening. But I think that that is upcoming. I think the Fed is going to have to do something much more explicit, and we may know that before the end of the month after the Jackson Hole speech.

Warsh versus the markets: rates and the Fed

Erik Townsend: Well, I actually thought that the title of your slide deck might be more telling than the slides themselves. You say Warsh versus the markets. Kind of feels to me like that's really the theme that we've been handed here is a president who who's absolutely passionate about getting a Fed chair installed who's going to do nothing but cut.

And I think we got a guy who might be inclined to do something different. So is this an impossible setup? I mean, how should we think about what comes next in Kevin Warsh kind of finding his relationship with Donald Trump, so to speak?

Michael Howell: Well, I think it's going to be a pretty unhappy relationship if that's what Trump is expecting, and probably is. I mean, the fact is that Central banks don't control interest rates. They may think they do, but the market controls interest rates, and it's the long end which drives the short end, not vice versa as the textbooks tell us. And the plain fact is that if bond yields are rising, which they clearly are, and I would argue that that rise in bond yields, which is a global phenomenon with the exception of China, is all about strong nominal GDP growth. That's what tends to drive the underlying level of interest rates. That's why they're moving up, and that is putting a lot of pressure on the front end of the term structure. And the plain fact is that the Federal Reserve can't resist that very easily. I mean, it can do various tricks, and they've already used up a lot of those tricks. But to keep the repo markets liquid after pushing so much funding into the front end of the market will mean rapid monetary growth or an expanding Fed balance sheet.

Those are presumably now ruled out. So barring some clever tricks from Scott Bessent, which could mean that a lot of the deficit is being funded at the margin by more and more bills, we're due higher interest rates. That must be coming, or higher policy interest rates. That has to come.

Erik Townsend: Michael, it seems like all indications are that rates are headed higher, but at the same time, we have a president who is absolutely passionate about wanting to see lower rates. And I'm not sure that he understands whether the dog wags the tail or the tail wags the dog. So what should we expect here?

Michael Howell: Well, I think it's going to resolve by rates are going to have to go up. I mean, that's what the markets are saying. If you look at what's happening at the front end of the curve in the US, the 2-year Treasury note, which has always been a fantastic predictor of policy rates, is elevated. It's already broken through SOFR rates. It's suggesting that we're heading for higher policy rates in the next few months. And in fact, the market is already discounting that. You know, that's clear. But we are probably treading a path which to my estimation looks remarkably like late 2021, early 2022. And that was a period of some considerable unhappiness for investors. And you've got to recall through that period, the S&P dropped 25% and Bitcoin dropped 75%. Now, some of that drop in crypto is already in the bag, but you get the idea here that markets, asset markets, risk asset markets don't like central banks that are tightening. And this is, I think, inevitable given the backdrop for the economy.

And my view is the economy is a lot stronger, a lot more robust than many people would envision.

The everything bubble and collateral-driven liquidity

Erik Townsend: Michael, let's move on to page 4, the history of asset bubbles. When's the next one? What should we be buying or selling in order to profit from it?

Michael Howell: Well, I think the fact is we're already seeing the asset bubble. This is the everything bubble that has been fueled by, again, more liquidity. And I think that one of the interesting points is to try and understand how the liquidity mechanism works. And it's something which is sort of running. It may have been originally triggered by central bank easing, but it's running now out of their control. And the problem is that the financial system creates liquidity endogenously because after an initial liquidity shock, which may come from the central banks, asset prices rise, collateral levels increase, We live in a financing system now where collateral is the mainstay or the backstop for all credit and all loans. Something like 80% of all lending now in the world economy is collateral-based. So if collateral values rise, you've got more ability to borrow and then more liquidity goes in the system. And this is why you see this recurring sequence of liquidity booms and busts.

Now, history shows, and this is what The slide deck is indicating that every previous bubble that we've shown there has had as a root cause a big expansion in liquidity. And it's no surprise that we are getting in again. Even if you drill down into the bubbles that we've seen in some of the emerging Asian markets like Korea, you've got to accept the fact that Korean liquidity has been skyrocketing higher. And this is just the reality of how markets work. This everything bubble will inevitably come to an end. And you are starting to see signs that liquidity is rolling over. And therefore we've got to accept the fact that after every bubble comes a bust.

China bifurcation and internal yuan devaluation

Erik Townsend: You mentioned a few minutes ago that China seemed to be an exception to the rule in terms of what was happening with global liquidity cycles and so forth. This is a message, Michael, I've been getting from several of our recent guests kind of saying China's in a special category all of its own. And that worries me because it feels like we're seeing a bifurcation of the economy where China's kind of branching off. And frankly, it makes me fear that we're headed toward a war scenario and that we're seeing the financial markets essentially anticipate that there will be a forced bifurcation of those economies by military circumstances. Am I crazy to think that?

Michael Howell: No, I don't think you're crazy to think that. I think that's the way that the world's evolving. And I think that you can see certainly in the liquidity data signs that China is definitely out of step and may be moving almost exactly oppositely to where the US is. Now, the legacy that China has had is that it's been struggling to try and maintain the value of the yuan for several years against what has been a strong dollar. And what they have done is they've basically maintained a very tight liquidity policy through much of that period. That tight liquidity reinforced the debt problem in China. It created debt deflation. The backdrop that we are now seeing in the Chinese economy is lackluster growth, very, very weak inflation, if not disinflation or deflation. And we're seeing the debt burdens grow. And if you look at the Chinese government bond market, it's the only bond market where yields are dropping.

And yields are down at 1.7%, which is a great contrast to everywhere else. Now that backdrop, it needs to be resolved. The Chinese economy can't stomach debt for much longer, this degree of debt, and they basically have to devalue debt domestically. In other words, that means devaluing the yuan within the Chinese economy. Now I stress the internal nature of that devaluation. China has capital controls, as you know, It has large forex reserves and it has compliant state banks, and they can probably manage, if you like, a bifurcated exchange rate regime, maintaining a stable yuan-US dollar externally while trying to devalue the yuan internally. And my reckoning has been that is all about, well, that is the story of why gold is going up and going down. The cycle in gold is all about Chinese devaluation. China is embarking on, I think, a significant liquidity expansion. It will need its economy to grow. That economic growth will further fuel world economic activity, and it will boost commodity prices globally.

And I think that's the regime we're in. I think one needs to understand the differences in these cycles. So what you're seeing is strong growth in Western economies, as we know already, that is fueling commodity markets. They've had a tremendous run over the last 12 months, but there's probably still more to go. And now we're getting a further stimulus likely coming through from China. And I think the increase in the gold price, particularly in the last 10 days, is indicating the fact that China is turning on the money taps again.

Gold and PBOC liquidity

Erik Townsend: This change in the direction of gold in the last 10 days has definitely caught my attention. Feels to me like the correction is over, the new move higher is on. Do you agree with that? And if not, why not?

Michael Howell: 100%. There's a chart that you can see in the pack, or if those are the listeners who have got the pack, if you go on to slide 21, there is a chart there which looks at PBOC liquidity and the gold bullion price. Now, what I've tried to indicate in that chart is that the 2 series are very closely correlated. In other words, the rise in the gold market, and in particular, the breakaway of gold from its normal axis of real interest rates, which was a very clear feature in early 2022, was not anything about Russia or whatever the excuse was. It was much, much more about the fact that PBOC, the People's Bank, started to turn on the liquidity tap quite aggressively. And if you look at the chart, you'll see there's actually quite a compelling correlation, both going up when liquidity is expanding, And then more recently when liquidity has come down with a bump.

Now it may now be being restored once more, but I think that gyration is very important. Now for those that are more, or maybe those that are less persuaded by this chart, there is another one which looks at changes on the following slide, which is shown in terms of weekly changes. And there's actually even, I think even a stronger case for saying that there is a connection between these 2 data series. And as the People's Bank started to increase liquidity, we signaled that the gold market was likely to rebound, and it looks like it has.

And very interestingly, if you look at the yuan gold price, in other words, the gold price denominated in Chinese yuan, it's bottomed exactly on its trend line at about 27,000 yuan. And that's the thing to look at, not the dollar gold price, because China and the Shanghai Gold Exchange is now the marginal pricer of gold worldwide, eclipsing COMEX in London. And that's where we need to look. It's Asian demand that's fueling gold, not Western demand. And we need to understand the People's Bank. Now, there is a chart which I've got a little bit earlier, I think it's slide 19, which looks in a lot more detail at what is going on. Now, this is an interesting conjecture. I'm not saying I've got any insight here, but it's purely proof by association. And this is looking at a daily print of the People's Bank's balance sheet, which we've constructed by looking at their open market operations and various other liquidity injections.

And what that chart on slide 19 shows is that the People's Bank, after a long expansion of liquidity, effectively turned the money taps off on March 2nd, And you saw liquidity declining quite noticeably. That money tap was turned on almost exactly to the day that the MOU was signed. Regardless of whether it was a fragile MOU or not, that seemed to be a turning point. And ever since that date, Chinese liquidity has expanded again. And with that, the gold market has gained more traction. And I think that this is the beginning of a further and maybe longer stimulus from China. Because they need it. Believe me, the economy needs some stimulus.

Gold, Hormuz risk and crypto as monetary hedges

Erik Townsend: Let's go a little deeper on this because I know a lot of our listeners will be tempted to get back into this gold market on the long side and speculate on higher prices. But it seems to me, as you said, China has been the key to all of this.

And it seems to me that what's going on right now is maybe things are getting better, but maybe not. And I think that there's plenty of room for a re-escalation of the Hormuz conflict as we realize that maybe President Trump didn't have this negotiated quite as well as he thought he did.

If the Hormuz conflict heats up again, does that potentially kill the gold rally and put us into lower lows, or has something changed that's going to be, I'll say, immune to those politics that would cause us to want to get long gold in size?

Michael Howell: I think the way that I would express it, Erik, is to say this, is that The gold price is going up now because of China's historic debts and the liquidity injection that we've seen from the People's Bank is all about trying to devalue the yuan internally. And that is what's driving gold up. And as we know, crypto, one of the other obvious monetary hedges, is illegal in China. So any buying of protection against liquidity expansion or money printing really is gold. And we know that Chinese retail have a huge, huge appetite for the gold market. So, what I would say is that the course of gold follows what happens from the People's Bank. So, the first thing one needs to look at is what the People's Bank is doing in terms of its liquidity injections into markets. If they fade off again, and let's never say never, but if they do fade off again, then the gold market is going to be challenged.

If they keep running, which I suspect they probably will, then gold continues to get a bid.

Now, I think that it's important to draw a distinction between gold and precious metals, which are the obvious monetary hedge for many, but particularly for Asians. They tend to like those instruments, that traditional monetary hedging, and crypto, which has really been the monetary hedge of choice of maybe many people in the West or particularly younger generations in the West. Now, crypto is much more attuned to global liquidity and particularly Federal Reserve liquidity than it is PBOC liquidity. By definition, the PBOC shouldn't have any effect on crypto. And the evidence suggests that it doesn't really have much effect, but it's really global liquidity and Fed liquidity, which really matters. Now, if we are correct and we are seeing this fading off of global liquidity and the Federal Reserve under pressure, to tighten, then it's no great surprise that crypto is under a cloud and gold has been outperforming. And that's really the story we think is likely to continue in the longer term.

Both assets are going to go up, but I think we've got to be, you know, we've got to acknowledge the cycles here, and those cycles are moving very differently.

Liquidity versus the real economy and asset allocation

Erik Townsend: Michael, I pulled you out of order a little bit there because I was very curious to get your thoughts on gold. Let's go back to where we left off on the slide deck at page 6. Tell me what's going on with the world global liquidity cycle. What causes the cycle to go down? And how much further does it have to go?

Michael Howell: Okay. Well, the slide that you refer to, which is on page 6, is looking at the difference between global liquidity, which if you recall is basically money which is flowing through world financial markets, and what's happening in the real economy. So let's think of those as 2 very distinct spheres of liquidity. The orange line on the chart is looking at our Global Liquidity Index, which is measuring the financial uses of liquidity. And the black line is the world business cycle, which I've basically calculated by looking at all the major headline business surveys worldwide, the Japanese Tankan, the ISM in the US, the IFO in Germany, et cetera, the INSEE in France, weighted them by GDP and put together an index of the world business cycle. Now, if you look at that chart, you'll see that those 2 cycles are moving completely asynchronously. In other words, what you see is when there is a trough in global liquidity, there is a peak in the world economy, and similarly vice versa.

And it comes back to the point I made earlier on, that is all money that is anywhere must be somewhere. And if it's in the real economy, it's not in financial markets, and similarly vice versa. Now, what that chart indicates is that the turning point, the inflection downwards in global liquidity coincides with an upward move in the world business cycle that was occurring from around late 2025, but it looks like it's accelerated recently. You know, vis evidence, look at the latest jump in the US ISM or the Philly Fed surveys or whatever. Those are clearly indicating some strong pickup in world economic activity, and that is draining markets of liquidity. Now, that would suggest that we are late in the investment cycle.

The investment cycle, as the name suggests, is a cycle. It goes up and goes down. And the fact is that liquidity is falling. It's got further to fall. And we were only probably, let's say, 60% of the way through a fall, a likely fall in liquidity. But bear in mind, this is a rate of change and not a level. Momentum, as I keep saying, is very important to asset pricing. But if you take a look a little bit further, maybe in the presentation, and if we take a look at slide 16, we try and put this into context. into an asset allocation framework. Now, what that diagram, schematic diagram on slide 16 tells us is that the liquidity cycle is very distinct, maybe not surprisingly, from the economic cycle. One morphs into the other. So the liquidity cycle leads the economic cycle.

Liquidity will spill over probably through wealth effects, et cetera, into a stronger real economy. And you can see on the chart that the lead time is probably somewhere around about 15, 18 months lead time between a liquidity peak and a real economy peak. So it would suggest that the real economy worldwide is still going to be expanding well into 2027, maybe early 2028, and that will be further boosting commodity demand. And what this is really saying as well is that We're really in that spot between the peak of liquidity and the peak of the real economy, which is basically telling us 2 things. One is that, as I just said, commodity markets look good, but in terms of financial assets, you ought to be moving more defensively. And that is an environment where bond yields tend to rise, where defensive stocks increasingly outperform.

And that's really where we're positioned.

Erik Townsend: And I noticed on page 16, you've got a 60-month periodicity on the sine wave here. I thought it was 65 on the earlier chart.

Michael Howell: I think it is, but that's broadly trying to— I think that comes into the category of being approximately right rather than approximately right and precisely wrong. But it's about those sort of levels. I wouldn't put too much credence on that. 60 months is just, we're just saying about around 5 to 6 years.

Erik Townsend: Tell me about the asset allocation cycle on page 17.

Michael Howell: Yeah, the asset allocation cycle really just derives from that. It just embellishes that rather further. And what it says is that if you look at that asset allocation cycle, we tend to think, as the right-hand side says, in terms of sort of broad regimes. So we think of calm or speculation or turbulence or rebound.

As the name suggests, turbulence is not a great place to be. Speculation gives you a flavor of where we are right now, which is saying that you can make returns, but volatility is going to be high. So the quality of those returns is poor. And I think it's no great surprise that a lot of asset managers are actually down this year despite the fact that the big indexes are up. And that's showing what a struggle it's been.

And then if you go to the earlier phase of calm, which is when the cycle is above average and expanding, that's when equity markets generally do well. And you just want to hold beta through that phase. And equities generally perform and everything kind of goes up. And that's clearly the phase we've been in for quite some time over the last 2 years. But that phase has already come to an end. One's got to be a lot more selective now. The commodity markets, as I've foreshadowed, really, they tend to be dominant around the peak of the cycle, and that's pretty much where we are.

The other thing to say is that you would typically expect to see in the downswing of a liquidity cycle, a bear flattening in yield curves. And that's certainly what we've had. Worldwide, right up until the last FOMC presser where it seemed to be that the yield curve in the US started to steepen. But I think that was really a reflection of the policy mix or the policy statements that really came out of the FOMC, particularly with Chair Warsh emphasizing the fact that, A, he wanted markets to do tightening for him. In other words, bond yields went up. And secondly, he was going to maintain liquidity. at the front end of the curve, emphasizing the ample bank reserve regime. And that is a recipe for a steepening curve. Now, clearly, he's fighting the markets in this because the markets want to flatten the curve, but we'll see how far he gets.

And that's why we entitled this Chair Warsh versus the Markets.

Erik Townsend: Obviously, the $64 million question is knowing when we're at the moment where you shift from turbulence to rebound mode. What are the signs to watch for?

Michael Howell: Well, I think the signs we tend to look at, I mean, we look at a range of factors, but one of those would be what the actual liquidity data is telling us. Are you getting an inflection at all?

The second thing we'd begin to look at is what sort of stocks are performing in different phases of the cycle. We'd add to that what the yield curves are doing. So you'd expect after an inflection, almost immediately after an inflection, that you would begin to get a bull steepening in yield curves. And that's another factor to watch out for. And at that stage, you would also expect to see some serious damage. In other words, falls in prices in commodity markets. They won't come out of this very well. Now, there may be compelling arguments to say that the trend in commodities is now a lot higher because of the background of competition with China and Arguably capital wars between the major powers. That may well be a strong underlying trend, but we must recognize the cycle as well because cycles are clearly very important to investment and often they can spoil the party. But generally, those are the sort of things we'd be looking at.

And I would say we're a long, long way from that point yet.

China's debasement, gold and the commodity cycle

Erik Townsend: Page 18 begins a series of slides titled, Has China's Great Debasement Ended? I'm quite curious. Has it ended? And talk us through this.

Michael Howell: Well, this is the point about gold, Erik. This is really saying that China needs to expand liquidity. It's got a huge debt problem. It's trying to, if you like, have its cake and eat it in the sense that normally if you expand liquidity, your currency will fold. As I've argued, that if China can basically keep that liquidity expansion internally to China, It can devalue domestic debt.

In other words, to raise the level of prices and wages in China relative to the value of nominal debt. If they succeed at doing that, they will manage to erode their debt problem or progressively erode their debt problem, but it will come at the cost of a devaluation, which will be expressed in a much, much higher gold price. Now, if you assume, and we are assuming this, that they can maintain the level of the yuan-US dollar cross, then that means that gold prices in US dollar terms are going to skyrocket as well. And I would think that would be pretty close to the top of my list of conviction trades, certainly over the medium term.

That's what I think is going to happen. Gold just simply has to go up, not just because, as I hinted or said earlier on, that it's all about China's historic debts that is driving gold now, but it's the West's future debts. In other words, the likely huge expansion in debt-to-GDP ratios right across the advanced world as aging demographics, you know the story as well as me, defense spending, government procurement, all these elements basically drive spending. And we are taxed out. They need to take on more debt, and that is likely to be the result. And as a result of that, more and more of that debt will be monetized. And the gold price will go up. So you've got many, many reasons why gold looks an attractive, very attractive asset right now.

But as I said earlier on, I think that it's not just gold, it's commodity markets that are worth looking at. What we've been seeing so far this year is a very clear outperformance of industrial metals against gold. You see the normal commodity cycle unfolding in front of us where it's gold and precious metals that kick the thing off. Industrial Metals then come through, then foodstuffs, and then energy tends to be towards the back end of the cycle. And I think it's energy, which is a really interesting play right now because so, so many people argue with great conviction that oil prices are probably even now too high and they're going to come down. I just don't buy it. I think oil prices are going to go up significantly. I'm very invested in energy stocks because I think this is a great area to be in.

Erik Townsend: I want to come back to energy in just a minute, but before we leave gold, let's just talk about what happens next. We've seen a 30% correction on gold. Do you think we've got a setup now for a big rally into year end where we get back to new all-time highs, or is it going to be a slower slog than that? What do you think?

Michael Howell: I wouldn't want to bet on new all-time highs by year end, but I think that the trend is in place. There's a chart in the pack that I alluded to earlier on, on slide 20, which looks at the gold price in Chinese yuan, which in my view is the better metric to watch. Because China is driving this price now.

And if you look at that chart, what I've put on there are various price levels that I have historically assumed that the Chinese were targeting, rightly or wrongly, but they seem to match up. And the trend line has basically held. And that trend line, as I suggested, at 27,000 is exactly where the gold price in yuan bounced off. It seems to be climbing higher. If you look at the pace of that trend, it would seem unlikely by year end that you would break out to new all-time highs, but I would figure we might even get close.

So I think that's something to watch. And I think the other thing which would reinforce that story is whether silver is outperforming gold. And another confirmation sign that I tend to look at is whether silver, which is a high beta play, is rising faster than the gold price. And if that's the case, that would suggest that sentiment is coming back into the precious metals.

Erik Townsend: And what are those indicators showing you right now?

Michael Howell: Well, I think they're hinting we may be near a turn. It looks as if silver, but we're only talking about a matter of a few trading days, but it looks as if silver is starting to claw its way back and beginning to outperform. And that would, if you like, reinforce this thesis. But like everything else in investing, I mean, you've got to look at many, many indicators and try and join the dots. And sometimes those dots join up quite well and sometimes they don't. At the moment they're joining up.

Oil outlook and the gold-oil ratio

Erik Townsend: Let's move back to your comments about energy prices and talk about where they're headed next. I agree with you, but I'll play devil's advocate and just say, okay, there's a lot of people who think that we've basically had the Strait of Hormuz closed. As soon as we get this situation under control, what's going to happen is you've had the UAE leave OPEC with the intention of basically producing as fast as they can. A lot of people think that oil prices will basically crash as everybody starts producing again, just as soon as we resolve this Strait of Hormuz crisis. That's not my view at all, but that's the view that competes with yours. So what do you have to say to that?

Michael Howell: Yeah, I think the starting point is to say what is to come back to fundamentals and try and argue what drives commodity markets. And in my view, and this is probably a very simple view, but I tend to hold there are 2 moving parts, Erik. One of those is the currency of denomination. So let's say that's the dollar.

And the other is some real exchange ratio that tells us a lot about the relative extraction costs of maybe 2 metals or 2 commodities. Now, if you take gold and oil, on page 15, there's a chart which shows the gold-oil ratio. Now, what I've done there is I've done 2 things. One of those is to draw that red line, which is the gold oil ratio on the right scale in log terms. So there's a little bit of mathematical manipulation, but I've done that so I could compress the gold oil ratio and fit it into the long-term liquidity cycle, which you can see overlaid on that chart, the sine wave that actually was extracted from an earlier chart looking at how global liquidity moved.

That, as I said, is a 5 to 6 year cycle. Now, you probably don't need to squint too much at the chart or go too much bot-eyed to work out or to see that those cycles pretty much overlap. And in other words, that as the global liquidity cycle rises, the gold-oil ratio also rises. And as the global liquidity cycle drops, so the gold-oil ratio falls. Now, What's the mechanism there? Well, the 2 things that I would argue are that number one, you tend to find that as liquidity increases, it fuels precious metals. They're an obvious monetary inflation hedge. And so the gold price tends to go up with the beginning of the liquidity cycle. Then as you start to see liquidity faltering, the faltering in liquidity, which causes the inflection, is all about money being shipped into the real economy.

So that downswing is largely explained by the fact that the real economies are strong and therefore commodity demand is picking up and therefore the oil market tends to be very buoyant. So in the upswing, the gold-oil ratio is pushed up by rising gold, and in the downswing, it's pulled back by rising oil.

And if you look at those cycles, it's been very regular. Now, If you then do a statistical analysis of the data on the red line, the gold oil ratio, it is shown to be strongly mean reverting, and there is very limited evidence of any trend in that data. There's a mild uptrend, but nothing which is too— over the long term since 1970, at least, there's nothing which is particularly compelling. Now, we saw in the COVID crisis exactly the same development of the gold oil ratio spiking. And then within 2 or 3 years, it actually mean reverted again.

And I would argue that we're looking at the same setup once more. Now, if you believe, and this is where one has to hold onto one's chair a little bit, but if you believe that the gold market is underpinned at $4,000 an ounce, maybe it's higher, who knows? But let's assume it's $4,000 an ounce and we take the long-run average gold-oil ratio historically, which has been around about 20 times. In other words, the ratio of an ounce of gold to a barrel of oil is about 20 times. And you divide that ratio into the gold price, what you find as a result is a $200 a barrel oil price. Now, that may be way, way off the scale, and I fully accept that. But I think let's just play around with the numbers.

We're just triangulating here. So it's not really a projection, it's just saying, what if? So if you believe that that gold oil ratio is stable and history is very much on the side because this is a real exchange ratio based on relative extraction costs of those 2 minerals, then you've got to say that, well, if it's not 20 times, maybe it's 30 times, maybe we accept that. And then you still get an oil price of $135 a barrel. So substantially above where we are now.

So all I'm doing is triangulating and saying, what if? And recognizing the fact that gold is probably going up, at least on my estimation, and the gold-oil ratio has shown very long-run stability.

Bond yields, nominal GDP and Treasury bill funding

Erik Townsend: You've made a very persuasive argument in favor of higher oil prices and also in favor of higher bond yields. I agree with you on both scores, and I think that those are self-reinforcing. You get higher oil prices, it tends to be inflation-inducing that results in higher bond yields and so forth. So it all makes sense to me.

Hang on a second, Michael. If we get to substantially higher bond yields, we're going to bankrupt the US government's ability to service its debt. What happens then?

Michael Howell: Well, I think equally, yes. I mean, these are tricky moments because the other thing to throw into that, Erik, is that if oil prices do jump, that's normally been an ending feature of bull markets. So what we're saying here is that you've got rising bond yields, not good, You've got rising, potentially rising energy prices, not good. And therefore one ought to be scaling back beta exposure within equities and risk asset markets. And that's pretty much where we are now. If you sort of come back to the mechanics of what's driving the bond markets and where we are going to end up, I'd suggest you take a look at a chart I put on slide 25, which is looking at the drivers of the US bond market. Now, what that is illustrating is in black, the black line there is showing the 4-year moving average of NGDP, which means nominal GDP. So that's the real bit plus the inflationary element on top. And this is a 4-year rolling average of that growth rate.

Now, what I've put on top of that 4-year moving average is the 10-year bond, 10-year US Treasury bond risk adjusted. So I've just taken off an estimate of term premium on that for those that are sort of wonkishly inclined, but it's really telling us the underlying level of interest rates over that 10-year period.

And you'll see those 2 lines really match very closely. And the only period they didn't was actually the beginning of the period where you saw the Treasury Fed, or up until the point where you've got the Treasury-Fed Accord, where after World War II controls and yield curve manipulation, the Treasury was basically— sorry, the Fed was allowed by the Treasury to set monetary policy more independently. And then you see the bond market and nominal GDP aligning more correctly through this period. What we're seeing now is a period whereby nominal GDP, the growth rate is accelerating. I would argue it's somewhere between a 6 to 8% range.

I think the huge fiscal spending in the US, the AI boom, and the effects of deglobalization on CapEx and inventory build are driving nominal GDP higher. That means both higher inflation and stronger activity growth, but that is pulling up bond yields. And you can see from the extrapolation that it's not impossible to see The 10-year bond testing 6% yields in the not too distant future. So that's clearly going to be a constraint. How does the Treasury get around that?

I think it's a difficult one, and this is a problem that I wouldn't like to have, but it basically means that if they want to fund, they may have to go to the front end of the curve. We've got a situation where right now 22% of outstanding debt In the US, federal debt is Treasury bills. So it's very short-dated government paper that may go up. It could go up. The Treasury have indicated that they originally indicated they had a preference for a range of between 15% and 20%. That's now been exceeded and it may go up to levels that we last saw in the early 2000s, which were nearer 30%.

That would be significant to the markets if they did that. It would be really bad for the dollar in my estimation, and it would cause the gold market to shoot up. Never say never. Scott Bessent has clearly come out against that policy in the past. The fact is that when push comes to shove, that's the policy he has been employing over the last couple of years.

So he's been following the Janet Yellen line of funding through the bill market. And that almost behooves the Federal Reserve to keep liquidity at the front end of the curve ample, which is what they say they want to do.

Japan, the yen and monetization

Erik Townsend: Michael, let's tie the Japanese yen into this. It seems like the yen has been a factor in quite a few of these trades. What's controlling what here? Is it tail wagging the dog or is the dog wagging the tail here?

Michael Howell: Well, I think again, if you look at what's happening in Japan is that bond yields are rising after a period of yield suppression. The Japanese are stepping back and letting the long end of the market to reprice properly. If you take a look at a slide on page 28, it basically shows what's happening to the 10-year JGB bond, which is the orange line, is catching up with nominal GDP growth in Japan. And the shaded area of that chart is where they had basically a yield suppression policy, which was the yield curve control or QQE policies as well.

Now, what you can see is that underlying economic growth in Japan, nominal GDP is over 4%, and that would suggest the long bond there, or the 10-year JGB rather, should be there closer to 4% than 3%. And clearly it's climbing. Now, the Japanese authorities are trying to hold that down by keeping short-term interest rates low. They're reluctant to raise rates. This is a story that we could equally put to Fed Chair Warsh. Again, if he doesn't raise interest rates, what are the consequences? And the consequences are a yen sell-off. And that yen sell-off is going to keep going until they decide that they're going to tighten monetary conditions. And this is the problem that we have, is that if you don't address these problems and you keep funding at the short end, This is basically monetization writ large.

Banks buying government debt, whichever stripe, be it bills or bonds or notes, is monetization. And the huge issuance of debt in all these economies is being sucked up by the banks and they're effectively printing money. And this monetization is causing currency turmoil, and certainly in the case of the yen. And what they need to do is to raise rates, but they aren't doing that. And that's a lesson for the US. This is what could go wrong.

Fed outlook: the rate-hike call

Erik Townsend: Michael, final question. Speaking of the US and what could go wrong, where do we stand in the Fed's, in the US Federal Reserve's hiking cycle? And what should we expect as the next policy decision? Is it a Fed hike or a cut?

Michael Howell: Well, my view is 100% that it's going to be a rate hike. I mean, if you take a look at slide 30, which starts to delve into what's happening in the in the US markets. What we chart there is SOFR overnight rates, which is the black line. That's the nearest thing to Fed policy rates, Fed funds. It's really the rate that is the main financing rate in the repo markets, the overnight rate. And the orange line is the 2-year Treasury note yield, which has always been a particularly good predictor of what's going to happen to policy rates.

I ran this data through AI for what it's worth, and I said, how accurate is the 2-year note as a predictor of policy rates? And the answer that came back from the AI model was it's correct 85% of the time. So, and that's on the upside and the downside. So what this is indicating is that rates are going to go up. And if you take a look at the following chart, what that shows is SOFR rates That spread of SOFR less 2-year yields for this cycle in orange and for the 2020-23 cycle in black.

As I recall, if you go back to the end of '21 on that chart and look at what is happening, that big drop in the black line signals a tightening of monetary conditions in the US. And that was a big sell-off between January and October of 2022. And we're Maybe not going as fast down that cliff edge, but we're certainly starting to move. We're hovering over it, and that's clearly the threat. And if you put that everything together, the slide on page 33 is then looking at Fed tightening cycles.

And what we've done is to look at the existing cycle, and this is looking at everything, throwing everything into the mix, looking at our liquidity data, for what the Fed is doing, what the Fed balance sheet's doing, et cetera. That's the broken dotted line, and that is following a path that looks remarkably similar to the average cycle over the 1985-2025 period shown in orange. And if that is true, we've got at least another 6 months of intensified tightening by the Federal Reserve to go before there is any hint of an inflection.

Where to follow Michael Howell's work

Erik Townsend: Well, Michael, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview, but before I let you go, please tell our listeners what you do at Global Liquidity Indices, what services are on offer there, and where people can follow your work.

Michael Howell: Great. Thanks, Erik. Yeah, GLI Indexes is basically the company which is supplying data. We produce indexes and data on liquidity worldwide. We cover 90 countries. We have recently expanded that into a daily nowcast of liquidity for all of those countries. If you think liquidity is important, that we have the data to show it or to prove it, and that's what GLI Indexes does. The other hat we wear is Capital Wars Substack That is a regular report or series of regular reports. We write about 3 reports every week on providing data and narrative about what's happening in markets.

Trade of the Week: GLD bull call spread

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Michael. Now it's time for Patrick Ceresna and Massil Beguenane to join for our MacroVoices Market Desk segment, which begins with Patrick turning Michael Howell's market outlook into a risk-defined trade. Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. So for this week's Trade of the Week, I want to focus on gold. Now, Michael clearly remains structurally bullish gold, but tactically he thinks the correction may be approaching an inflection. So when I'm thinking about a trade construction, I had to think about timeframes. In this case, my focus is on the interim tactical opportunity, looking for the next leg higher. So what I love about this opportunity when using using options on gold is that gold has a steep right-tail skew. That means calls are relatively expensive the farther you go out on the strikes. That lets us sell the expensive upside volatility to subsidize the call we're buying. Better payoff structure than simply buying the call outright. And that's why today I want to put this on as a traditional bull call spread. So our trade thesis is that gold will continue recovering for the next 2 months, and particularly I want to target that April high on the GLD near $450.

I also want to make sure I give it enough time by looking at an option that's about 2 months out into the future. So let's look at the trade mechanics. The GLD, which is the SPDR Gold Shares ETF, is trading around $405 at the time of this recording.

Now, I want to focus on that October 16th, 2026 expiration, which gives us about 65 days in the trade. Now I wanted to buy a $410 strike call option, which is about $5 higher than where we're currently trading, which costs around $15. Now I want to then subsidize the cost of that call by selling that $450 strike call, which is currently bid $4.50.

That gives us a net debit cost of about $10.50 on a $40-wide spread. So just again, to put that into simple terms, we're risking about $10 to make about $30 if we are right.

That's very close to a 3-to-1 payoff. Now, the max payoff, of course, is if the GLD in the next 2 months is able to make it up to the $450 strike. But what I love about this trade is it has a very defined downside, the premium which we paid for the spread. So with the fact that the GLD has already rallied close to $40, $50, there's all sorts of downside volatility that can happen, retesting lows, and this gives us that defined structure. So we're using that rich right-tail volatility in our favor, that defined risk, and being capital efficient. So for tactical traders looking to participate in Michael Howell's bullish Gold follow-through. The skew lets us build a defined risk structure with almost 3-to-1 upside. That's where's the trade.

Erik Townsend: Patrick analyzes and trades the markets every day over at Big Picture Trading. MacroVoices listeners can sign up for a free 2-week trial at BigPictureTrading.com. Now back to Patrick and Massil.

S&P 500, Nasdaq and COT equity positioning

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, I love it, Patrick. I mean, what's cool about gold is that it's still just starting out this move, so there's a lot of room to run on the upside even in the short term here. But let's turn to the equity markets here. What are we watching?

Patrick Ceresna: Let's dive into this S&P 500 because last week we had that explosive move to the upside that cleared the S&P 500 to a fresh all-time high. What is impressive about the last week is that the bulls have been more or less able to maintain that elevated level, which is price acceptance.

Normally, if that kind of an explosive liquidity event was not sustainable, we would've seen very deep mean reversion sending us back to, let's say, 7,500 on the S&P. And that's simply not happening. We're literally bouncing along 52-week highs. And so right now, the market structure is surprisingly bullish, and the bulls are 100% in the driver's seat on the short-term trend. That means if there was any short-term catalyst that breaks this to a fresh new high out of this 1-week trade range, we could even see 8,000 within a week or two on the upside.

So during this summer doldrums, the bull trend is the path of least resistance. Now, I want to make one note about where it would turn bearish, and this is where I think that the bulls actually have their edge because it would take a substantial decline in the tune of about 400 S&P points to start doing the technical price damage that would potentially trigger systematic selling and potentially reverse the trend. In other words, the bulls can easily absorb a 200 S&P point pullback. It'd be bought on dip and just be an opportunity to trade that upside. So right now, the bulls have a lot working in their favor. Now, that could quickly change in September, but right now, that's where we're at.

Massil Beguenane: And the positioning data does back it up. Quick reminder for listeners, this COT report does reflect positioning as Tuesday, August 4th. So anything after that, you'll have to wait for tomorrow's release to see this week's changes. But on equities, the data that stands out the most is that the Nasdaq is still lagging. You can obviously see that in the chart, but the Dow and the S&P, fresh new highs, but the tech-heavy Nasdaq just hasn't joined. I mean, look at the positioning data. The SPX speculators is sitting at the 96th percentile of positioning on the 1-year basis, while the Dow is even more extreme at 99th percentile. But the Nasdaq still near zero. Now, if you go to the market deep dive, you'll see that the Nasdaq positioning went short another 25,000 contracts, and that took them net short 35,000 contracts. What's cool about this is that it's all new shorts coming into the market, not positioning that changed of, you know, current positioning.

When you compare that to the SPY, they're only down 9,000 contract shorts, and the Dow is even positive at 6,000 contracts long. So we're pretty net-net on those 2 assets. So to me, the real question is, do the semis and even the tech as a whole finally come back and participate in this rally? I mean, what do you think about that, Patrick?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, the observation I would make there is a lot of that short positioning in the Nasdaq could very well be a long-short pairing against people that are way overextended on semiconductor and Mag Seven exposures. Now, what is interesting is that bullish impulse that we did see at the end of July that drove this rally, was very well led by the hyperscalers and these Mag Sevens ripping to the upside. But what is notable here is the lack of participation in this rally in the semiconductor space. Now, certainly they were huge leaders on the upside, and they are clearly where money is rotating out of at this stage. Overall, if the S&P is heading to 8,000 on the upside, it is going to need the Mag Sevens participating. And so watching whether or not they able to be bought on dip here and continue to press is going to be huge in terms

US dollar and yen intervention

Patrick Ceresna: of whether or not the S&P has the fuel to get to that 8,000 round number.

All right, now I want to move on and talk about this US dollar. Now, over the last 2 weeks, the US dollar has been mean reverting its prior bullish trend. Now, overall, we actually are structurally still in a bull trend on the dollar. Now, one of the biggest drivers of why this move happened was the big yen intervention in Japan. And that drove that US dollar-yen to drop from the 164 handle all the way down to 155. And that really was this burst. But now what we've seen is the US dollar-yen has now 50% retraced. We're basically rallied back about half of that huge intervention. loss. And so we're now actually at a really interesting inflection point. If the US dollar is going to continue to weaken, we should see the yen once again rally here and the US dollar to break down against this. And as well, we should see that correspondingly shown on the EUR/USD chart.

And so I think that it won't take more than a week or two to find out whether or not the US dollar is meaningfully reversed or whether this will be one big buy on dip.

Massil Beguenane: And you're totally right, Patrick. The whole story is in the yen pair because we saw extreme positioning on the short side in the yen for the better part of 2, 3, 4 years even. And that yen intervention forced a bunch of those short sellers out of the market. I mean, a 118,000-contract move in just one week on the long side. That's not only the biggest weekly change across all markets on the COT report, but it represented 25% of open interest that shifted just like that. That's 1 in 4 traders being forced out of their position, and that obviously explained the violent move that we saw just 2 weeks ago after the intervention. Now, even with that huge move, yen positioning is actually still net short, so more short covering is still possible. So I'm super excited to see what's going to happen over the next few weeks.

Crude oil

Massil Beguenane: Now let's move on to crude oil.

Patrick Ceresna: Interestingly, crude oil has actually been quiet here over the last few days. We've really settled in around that 50-day moving average, and really we have not seen any big explosive move. Clearly, the situation in the Middle East continues to be fragile, and certainly, you know, there's big debates as to who's really in control and how much oil is actually flowing through the strait. One thing I would generally conclude is that things are clearly not back to normal, and the oil markets continue to be stressed. That to me implies that there's lots of room for the fair value of oil to be at an elevated level.

I think that as we beat this $80 level. There's a very reasonable chance that we're going to stay in the $80-plus area with lots of room if on a headline-driven scenario where we could make it back to the $90 level where we were just trading a couple weeks ago. And so generally, I think oil has room to strengthen, and I don't really see the scenario where oil heads back to the June low near $65.

Gold breakout and silver positioning

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, positioning has largely stayed the same here on crude oil, whether you look at the WTI or the Brent. But I want to talk about gold because we've seen a big move in precious metals this past week. What do you see here?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, a lot of people are very excited about this breakout, a 10% move in gold very quickly. Clearly, we already talked about it during the Where's the Trade, but what I'm certainly going to be watching here on gold is how do the traders behave when we inevitably have a little bit of profit taking.

If this was a meaningful turn in the bull trend in gold, we should see all dips being bought, moving averages defended, and generally the price action remaining structurally accumulative. Overall, it was a very strong breakout, the first real sustained period above the 50-day moving average since late April's bounce. And so it'll be very interesting to see whether this is in fact the inflection point for the potential beginning of a new gold run.

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, on the positioning side, gold moved to neutral territory, but silver remains under-owned. Like here, large speculators are near the 0th percentile on the positioning for the last 12 months. So if this is a turn in precious metals as a whole, we're still in the first inning of this move. Now, listeners, if you want to see what I'm seeing, don't forget to visit COTSignal.com so you can start following the data along with us. Now, Patrick, is there any other markets that were super interesting this week?

Uranium and the URA rally

Patrick Ceresna: Well, listen, we got to quickly touch on uranium. Now, for the last 3 months, uranium has been completely dead. On the futures side, we were trading basically between the $85 to $87 level, flatlining. And for the first time in 3, 4 months, we're actually seeing the uranium market upticking. And what's particularly interesting is that when all the mining stocks came to life a few weeks ago, the uranium stocks turned up during that time.

In the URA, which represents the basket of uranium producers, we had almost a 25% trough-to-peak rally here over the last 2 weeks.

This has allowed the uranium stocks to reclaim their 50-day moving average and potentially have turned the trend. Now, one week like this does not make a new trend, but it is the first time we've seen some positive price action since early second quarter. So we're going to definitely be watching whether this is that key turning point for a new accumulation

Bonds, Fed path and rate-hike odds

Patrick Ceresna: cycle to begin. Now, Mass, while we've gotten most of the major assets out of the way, what else caught your attention on the COT reports?

Massil Beguenane: For sure. I mean, look at what's happening on the bond side. I mean, look at the 2-year and the 10-year. When you look at the 1-year range, The 2-year's sitting at the 100th percentile of positioning, but when you go to the middle end of the curve to the 10-year, we're seeing it at the 0th percentile of the range, just the complete opposite. So you've basically got 2 very different stories depending on where you look at the yield curve. What's your read on that?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, it's clearly just all about central banks because the 2-year note is very closely linked to the Fed path and whether or not Warsh is going to be raising interest rates. It's very interesting. We had just a weak jobs data, and now an inflation number that came in in line. What's interesting is when you look at Fed funds futures, clearly the idea of a September rate hike is slowly being walked back. We were at a greater than a 50-50 chance that Warsh was going to raise here in September, and now there's almost a two-thirds probability that they're not going to move at all.

What makes this particularly interesting is that there's only 3 Fed meetings this year left. And if they don't move in September, then the October meeting is literally within one week of the election. So there would need to be some very clearly sharp data for the Fed to feel like they're going to move into a political election. And therefore, all that would be left would be a potential Christmas rate hike.

Even though the current Fed funds futures are giving the most probable outcome that there's going to be one full rate hike this year, If they don't move here in September, I think that a lot of STIR traders are going to start walking back that the Fed may even move at all.

And so this makes it super interesting because the 2-year note, like you were highlighting, has had substantial short covering as a lot of the gross shorts are closing, as many feel that the Fed is much closer to the end of this hawkish cycle, or at least it's starting to be priced that way. But that's not what we're seeing on the long bond. The 30-year yield is almost at 5.25% and continuing to press highs as the long bond continues to just have a vicious downtrend. And the shorts continue to pile in on pressing that long bond. It'd be very interesting to see whether or not we get a bull steepening, but clearly the way traders are positioning at the front of the curve

Wheat, Black Sea risk and grains

Patrick Ceresna: versus at the back, is dynamically different.

All right, and Mass, let's wrap up with just touching on the positioning pulse. What else caught your attention in those COT reports?

Massil Beguenane: All right, the market that I'm watching this week is wheat because there's a pretty interesting setup building here. Now, I want you to look at the market deep dive on wheat on COTSignal.com, and that's the first chart on the top right, right? When you're looking at contracts, you would've seen that large speculators went from basically flat to about 15,000 contracts net short in just one week. But the part that I really care about is how we got there. We saw roughly 11,000 fresh new shorts come into this market. So this isn't just people getting out of longs. You've actually got new money coming in and betting that wheat goes lower. But here's where the timing matters. As I said earlier, the COT data only captures positioning as of last week from Tuesday, August 4th.

So all of these new shorts were put on before this latest escalation in the Black Sea. And for anybody that doesn't know, just 2 days ago, ago, we had reports of attacks on major Russian grain infrastructure, and Russia right now controls 22% of global wheat exports. So if you start disrupting Russian exports, that can become a global wheat problem pretty quickly, comparable to the lead-up to the 2022 Russia-Ukraine war. Just yesterday, we saw the price react to the news, which helped wheat futures hold its 50-day moving average and is also bouncing right off the Fib zone.

Now, the way that I'm looking at this is that you got traders getting more bearish on wheat at the exact same time that the risk to physical supply is going up. So if the Black Sea situation gets worse, those same traders who just sold wheat may suddenly have to buy it back. Now, I'll be keeping a close eye on this market myself. If you want to follow positioning behind it, it's all on COTSignal.com. It's free and it's updated every single Friday.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, you know what's also interesting is that that same type of a chart pattern is there on the soybeans and on corn. And so the entire ag space is It's certainly looking like it's setting up for some sort of food shortages and potential bullish price action. It's certainly something I want to keep watching. All right, well, so that's where we're going to wrap things up, and that's this week's Trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. See you next week.

Outro and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: And a reminder, as a MacroVoices listener, you're entitled to a 2-week free trial of Big Picture Trading, where you can watch Patrick analyze and trade the markets live every single day. at BigPictureTrading.com. No credit card is required to sign up and there's nothing to cancel. I'm Erik Townsend and this is MacroVoices. We'll see you next week.

MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.

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Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Viktor Shvets — No affiliation given in the intro; Viktor Shvets says at w7512 he is global strategist at Macquarie Capital (Erik says 'Macquarie Investments' at w7467) (as introduced on the show)

Viktor Shvets: We're living in a disinflationary world. I think Kevin Warsh and I think Scott Bessent are absolutely correct that disinflation is a dominant longer-term trend.

Erik Townsend: That was Viktor Shvets. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 544 was produced August 6th, 2026. In this episode, Viktor Shvets and I will discuss everything from Hormuz to inflation signals to precious metals to the K-shaped economy.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

The Fed under Warsh and Supreme Court independence

Erik Townsend: Viktor, it's great to get you back on the show. It's been too long, almost a couple of years, I think. The last time I had you on was in 2024. My question to you then was whether central banks had become too political. Now, since then, the president has installed his own personal Fed chair, so I think we got the answer to that question. But I still want to come back to it and get your perspective. From a 2026 perspective, how do you assess the new Fed, I'll call it, the Fed under Warsh's leadership? And I would go so far as to say that it's really the Fed under Warsh's leadership with maybe Bessent tag-teaming a little bit and participating in some of that policy setting.

Viktor Shvets: You're absolutely right, Erik, and it's great to be on your show. I think the first thing one has to recognize that compared to 2024, There has been a dramatic shift in the way US Supreme Court is thinking of, or is basically laying the law on a very simple concept of executive responsibility. In other words, back in 2024, there was an argument that US Constitution basically vests all the executive power in the president, and therefore 100 years of evolution of the United States whereby there was independent bureaucracy, independent institutions. Institutions, all of that is unconstitutional. So in 2024, there was a question mark whether that is going to transpire. In 2026, that question mark is gone. Effectively, US Supreme Court emasculated pretty much all federal institutions, but they did make an exception for the Federal Reserve.

And it was not intellectually systematic. It was not intellectually rigorous. Because there is really no argument why Federal Reserve should be independent, but Securities and Exchange Commission or EPA or many others should not be. So you can't justify it intellectually.

But what did happen is that US Supreme Court did carve out a niche for Federal Reserve. That basically means that Federal Reserve remains the only independent institution in the United States. Now, the second point is, of course, the Federal Reserve does not exist in a vacuum. It is part of society, it is part of the legal framework. And so the question is the extent to which it is being politicized. My view and the way I look at Kevin Warsh, he's not an inflationary hawk or a dove. He's really a politician. Now, that basically means that whatever he discusses, have to be interpreted very carefully. For example, many things he wants to do are actually things that most people will support.

The only problem is that they're not viable and not realistic.

A classic example is to reduce the degree of communication. Now, it's a laudable task, but nevertheless, what it means is a higher volatility and emergence of shadow chairs, That is still going to drive conversation. The less you communicate, the more other people will communicate. The other thing he was highlighting is that it would be a good idea to return risk to the market. Again, I think it's a very laudable task, but it cannot be done. There are other propositions such as reducing and altering the shape and the footprint of Federal Reserve. Again, a laudable task, but it cannot be done. So to me, a lot of the things that Kevin Warsh is discussing, very few people will disagree. And ultimately, it might not be a bad idea to do, but none of them, as I said, is relevant. If you wanted to debate the role of the monetary policy, the role of Federal Reserve, the role of financialization, we should have done this debate back in the '80s and '90s.

Today, that train left the station. Long ago.

So the way I look at Federal Reserve, is it still independent? Yes. US Supreme Court makes sure it is. Is it politicized? To some extent, all institutions are politicized. Does Kevin Warsh have different ideas? The answer is yes. But as I said a second ago, I think a lot of those ideas are not very practical. And I think what's going to happen over time is that they will fail the test.

Now, the next point after that is to say, if you look at the Federal Reserve, does a chair have a dominant voice? It depends on the chair. Certainly Greenspan was incredibly dominant. You find Bernanke was not dominant, but he did have a degree of respect and following within the Federal Reserve. You find, I think, Jerome Powell over time also acquired some of that degree of respect. So when you think of an untested chair like Kevin Warsh, does he have a degree of following within Federal Reserve, a degree of respect? Probably not yet. Can he acquire that? Yes, over time, that's conceivable.

In the meantime, he's only one voice out of 19, and at any given point in time, 12 of the votes.

So the interesting thing I find about Federal Reserve, today is that there are some good news and bad news. But one of the potentially bad news is that the Federal Reserve no longer speaks with one voice, that there is a high degree of dissent. There is a high degree of— even look at dot plots, for example. There is a massive spread in the dots. What the governors think is a neutral rate for the United States is, what are the appropriate policy rates.

So whenever you have that degree of confusion, whenever you start setting up committees to review things the way Kevin Warsh have done, you're injecting extra uncertainty. Now, it's okay if there is no crisis, if there is no emergency, but if you suddenly find an emergency 3 months from now, 6, 9 months from now, you do need to have a strong chair to drive the Federal Reserve in the right direction and that the rest of Federal Reserve infrastructure, because remember, it's a very large organization, essentially moves in line with what the chair wants to do. So it'll be very interesting in the next 6, 12 months how it evolves.

Disinflation, transient inflation and neutral rates

Erik Townsend: Let's talk about inflation. The last time I had you on, you described a pendulum swing back and forth between inflation and disinflation. But you were really leaning at that point toward disinflation. I believe this year you've made a stagflation call, which seems a little bit out of character for you. Have you had a change in thinking or how should we interpret this?

Viktor Shvets: No, I didn't have a change of thinking at all. In a sense, what I've been discussing for the last several years, actually since COVID is that we're living in a disinflationary world. I think Kevin Warsh and I think Scott Bessent are absolutely correct that disinflation is a dominant longer-term trend. The way Elon Musk discussed it is when he argued that young people should not be saving for pensions, what he basically meant that everything longer-term will be equal to zero. Everything will decline to zero. Every human, every part of the labor force will be worth zero. Every product, will find a zero marginal cost curve hitting them at some point in time or the other. And so that technologically driven disinflation is still going to be a very strong backdrop. But what is happening is that we're creating inflationary spikes. So in other words, the backdrop is disinflationary, but we're creating spikes. Where do they come from?

They come from our reaction to whatever happens to us. Things like COVID, things like Russia-Ukraine war, Iran war, things like chaotic trade or immigration policies. All of that creates inflationary spikes. But if we stop doing those things, if we just stop wrecking things, disinflation will take over.

Think of it this way. Let's assume Kamala Harris is the president today. Now, I think what would've happened is there would still be more protectionary measures introduced, Remember, Biden never took away the tariffs to begin with. I think there will be, but they will not be as extreme or as violent as what we have experienced. I think immigration, Biden was already clamping down on the borders in 2024, but I don't think it would've been as extreme.

And at the same time, it's not completely clear to me that there would've been a war in Iran. Now, think of falling inflation during Biden administration. On a 3-month moving average, they were already close to 2% anyway. If he did not create the waves of inflation through trade, immigration, and geopolitics, the chances are inflation today will be closer to 2% or less. But that's not the way it transpired. And the change in the regime to Trump administration, in my view, created waves of inflation. Now, if you just step back and stop creating those waves, disinflation will take over. And that comes back to the question of interest rates.

Is Stephen Miran correct that real neutral rates are close to zero in the United States, which means if you add inflationary breakeven rates, put your policy rates at about 2.5%? Or are the dot plots correct, which are showing closer to 1%, maybe even higher, 1.5% real neutral rates, which means if you add inflationary breakeven rates, you're looking at 3.5%, 4%, which is exactly where Federal Reserve is today. Now, what's the difference between Stephen Miran and the dots? The big difference to me is that a lot of the risks in our system have been expelled outside of economic and capital market cycles and have been expelled outside the system. Where does the risk come from? Polarization, politics, geopolitics, climate, healthcare, technology. Now, the chances or the capability of Federal Reserve or any central bank assessing those factors, understanding their timing, and understanding the impact is close to zero. And that is why you can actually take both views as being correct, that the neutral rates are zero or the neutral rates in real terms are 1%, 1.5%, or even more.

And so that's your volatility, that's your whiplashes that I was discussing last time, that as we create those waves, Inflation picks up, but then as soon as we stop doing it, disinflation takes control.

Now, the next question Kevin Warsh will have to address is that what I describe is a transient inflation. So COVID was a transient inflation. Iran war, unless we do another war, will prove to be transient. The tariffs that were put in in 2025, unless we do more of that as we go forward, will also become transient. But if you create too many transient inflationary periods, it becomes part of the natural operation of how people and businesses think about the business. So suddenly for them, it's no longer transient, it's permanent, even though it is transient, but for them it's permanent. Now, if it does become permanent, then you are in a position that businesses will be raising prices simply because they think, other businesses will also do the same. People will start unionizing and raising wages because they think other people are also going to do. So that's your risk with a transient overlap on top of the other transient, and in the minds of people or investors or businesses becoming permanent.

So that's a question mark that they would need to address. What is transient and what is permanent?

How do you know whether transient transited, so to speak, into permanent. There are 2 ways of looking at it. One is consumer and business surveys. Now, those surveys do not really show any degree of unanchoring of expectations, whether expectations of wages or NFIB, for example, expectation of price increases over the next 3 months. There is absolutely no evidence that it is currently unanchored. The other way to look at it is inflationary breakeven rates, as well as zero-coupon inflationary swaps. Those two give you slightly different answers. And at one point in time, at the beginning of Iran War and through Iran War, really 1 and 2-year swaps really got unanchored. They were looking at 3, 5% inflation. But 5 by 5, 5 years by 5 years, so 10 years, remain anchored. Today, 1 and 2 years normalized. They are currently below 2%.

And 5 by 5 and 10 didn't really move. They remained broadly at 2.2 to 2.4%. So to me, I think from a Federal Reserve point of view, this transient versus permanent inflation, your signs will be when consumer and business pricing expectations change, And/or where capital markets decide to reprice inflationary expectations going forward. So to briefly answer your question, no, I haven't changed. I still think we're in a disinflationary world, but we do have back and forth of inflation created through our fiscal, monetary policy, and military means.

Iran war as Vietnam; Russia-Ukraine as Korea

Erik Townsend: In 2024, you said that war-style or Cold War-style conflicts are economically manageable. Unless they displace global supply and demand curves. Well, I'm guessing that the Strait of Hormuz closure is going to satisfy your definition of—

Viktor Shvets: It does.

Erik Townsend: Dislocating those things. So I want to revisit that now. Did the Iran war crisis, obviously it crosses that threshold. So talks are now resuming. Oil was down, what, I don't know, more than 10% in the last couple of days. Where do you see this headed?

Viktor Shvets: Well, the way I look at it, it's like blind leading the blind in a sense. I stopped watching whether oil prices are up or down. Nobody has any ideas and nobody has any visibility. When the war started, my view essentially was that bombardment, military action, aerial attacks will fail.

The aerial attacks never succeed. In fact, they bring countries together, even though people might intensely dislike the regime they're living under. Whenever somebody bombs you, almost inevitably it pulls people together and it actually strengthens those nations rather than reducing their power. That was my first point to say that if that's all United States is going to do and Israel is going to do, it is going to fail.

Number 2, Iran is not Venezuela. It's not Panama. It's an ancient civilization, which by the way, defeated and killed 3 Roman emperors in their own time. We're not dealing with countries that have a relatively recent history that don't really have culture to speak of. We're dealing with a very different place. Incredibly complex society, incredibly complex geography, a huge country, over millions of square kilometers. So we're dealing with very different stuff. My point number 3 were lessons of Russia-Ukraine war. I'm not sure, I don't remember where we discussed it last time, but my view on Russia-Ukraine are similar to the views of Iran.

And so one of the things I've been highlighting is the changes in military tactics, that modern technology drastically levels the playing field between sophisticated armies and unsophisticated armies. between large countries and smaller countries. And so my argument was that there is no way out of this conflict, that there will be decapitation of leadership is not going to work. Regime change is not going to work unless you put boots on the ground and actually do occupation of significant parts of Iran and try to change regime. Otherwise, regime will stay and probably will become much more extreme than what it was before those attacks.

My next point was to say is that Strait of Hormuz is clearly the choke point, but Iran has many other choke points that they can actually use. And that's what you saw in the last week and a half with Houthis in Yemen, an entrance into Red Sea.

Also remember, As Ukraine showed, you can demolish all the infrastructure, you can demolish army, you can demolish navy, you can do all of that. All of that can be replaced these days incredibly fast. And that's how you use technology, how you use facilities.

So my view, and I compared Iran War to Vietnam in a sense, number one, there was no clear objectives. Number two, there was no clear way of getting out of this. Number 3, there is no definition of victory. You have one side, which is United States, with objectives that shifts almost on a daily or weekly basis. You have another side, which is Iran, which has a very systematic set of objectives they're trying to achieve, which is not dissimilar with Vietnam. US had shifting objectives all the way through, but Viet Cong and North Vietnam had a very a strong sense of what they're actually trying to do. And so my argument has been like Vietnam War, it has no solution. It will go on for a long period of time.

And regularly there will be hiccups, regularly there will be closures, regularly there will be flareups. But my feeling was all the way through that it's going to take time. And both United States and Iran will regularly be overplaying their weak hand in this particular game.

Unlike, say, Russia-Ukraine war, which I viewed much more like a Korean War, uh, and what I meant by Korean War, it was very brutal but relatively short war. And the same with Ukraine, uh, what Ukrainians want, Russia can never accept, and what Russians want, Ukrainians will never concede. And that's a recipe for a brutal But the one which ultimately will count, the DMZ, ultimately, and I hope within a year, maybe even less, it would lead to separation of forces. Ukraine will become part of European Union. It will be integrated and will reshape Europeans' agriculture, manufacturing, defense sectors, IT sectors, and could actually even become a version of South Korea. over time. But Russia is probably now morphing into a milder version of North Korea as we go forward. So to me, both of those conflicts will go on. One will be long without conclusive outcomes.

The other one, I hope, even though it's been very brutal in the last 4 and a bit years, I think it will conclude in due course.

Why gold fell during the Iran war

Erik Townsend: You've said in the past that gold was essentially the insurance premium on expected destruction. But then we've seen gold correct more than 25% during a war. It seems like during this Iran conflict, gold didn't quite behave the way a lot of people expected it to. What happened there? Why were the usual relationships not in place? What drove this kind of reverse behavior of gold?

Viktor Shvets: 2 things. One is interest rates, and the other thing is that people decided, or investors decided, that because gold is not really a transportable good in any form or shape, they've decided that even though the war was started by the United States, even though there is no clear sign how United States will exit that particular conflict, that it's still USD and Treasuries are the pools with the greatest degree of liquidity as a protective device. But I think it's temporary. Because at the end of the day, to me, gold remains the ultimate safety asset in a case of an absolute destruction, so to speak, where monetary systems melt down, where you have a situation where reset social and political systems, where you have multiple wars. I still think gold is the answer, not Bitcoin or digital assets. They might just fade away. from our psyche. But gold is an asset I'm still saying will have a premium, but it doesn't always behave, as I said earlier, the way you expect it.

And people shifted much more back into USD.

Polarization and the political horseshoe

Erik Townsend: You said in 2024 that people were not yet mad enough, that the electorates were not yet mad enough to empower at the extremes through elections, and that that was keeping economic policy converging. A couple years later, I think we've seen a pretty significant escalation on that front. So how do you read that situation now?

Viktor Shvets: The interesting thing to look at is V-Dem database, which is a Varieties of Democracy database. It's run out of Sweden. It has a database going all the way to early 1900s. And the way they assess polarization, how polarized societies are, is how people, groups of people, parties in democracy relate to each other. Can they talk to each other? Can they exchange views? Can they pass legislation through parliament? Can they form coalitions in some form?

And mathematically, they designed it as scores between -4, which is very benign, everything is absolutely fine, to +4, when you basically have a civil war. And traditionally developed countries and developed economies like Europe, Canada, US, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, places like that, they traditionally have a negative number, -1, -2.

More developing countries and emerging markets traditionally have a positive number like 1 or 2. Now, if you're saying 2 years ago, for example, or 3 years ago, because in '24 we would've had '23 numbers, US was looking much more polarized than it did before, but it wasn't really strongly in a positive territory.

So if you go back to late 1990s, for example, or mid-1990s, US was always more polarized than other developed countries, but the score was about -1. In other developed countries like Canada, it would've been -1.5, -2. In Europe, it would've been -1.5, -2. US was more polarized, but not dramatically. By 2023, US already gone into positive number, and other countries were becoming more polarized, but not extreme. If you think of the latest numbers coming out for '25, '26, US is +2.3.

That's the highest and the fastest polarization in the history of the database that you have seen. Now, other countries also becoming more polarized, Especially UK, Germany, France, Central and Eastern Europe like Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, some of the emerging markets, Turkey at 3.4, it's almost heading to the highest possible level. India have become more polarized. Some countries, however, escaping some of that. Australia, New Zealand, for example, have not really got polarized that much. Polarization in Japan is still much more limited. Polarization in Canada, much more limited than it is in the United States.

So what we've seen in this 2 to 3 years is that polarization escalated. And so what you can argue in response to what I've said, in some countries, people are already mad enough, and maybe they could become even more mad as we go forward. Because remember, when people become mad, they're no longer rational. Because they are suffering. They're suffering because of inflation, because they don't see the future, because of inequalities, inequities, lack of progression. They're suffering and they don't believe the system answers their questions.

That's why when we discussed last time, I compared to Europe in the 1930s when people become very polarized and they've gone into 2 extremes, either communism or fascism. But the interesting thing, of course, between left and right is that they're very similar. They share very similar philosophy. That's why a lot of things Bernie Sanders in the US or Donald Trump says, or Mamdani our mayor in New York, says, and Trump are very similar. Both of them are in favor of eliminating student debt. Both of them in favor of tariffs. Both of them in favor of either taking stakes in companies or creating wealth funds to take the stake and share the rewards on a more broader basis within society. Both of them want to suppress pharmaceutical prices. Both want to direct capital. In other words, try to facilitate capital flows in a direction that the government believes is appropriate. All of this is so far away from Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan, it's not even funny.

I mean, it's massively far away, but the left and right have a lot of similar views. In economic area. Where they differ is in social area. Right tends to be xenophobic, they tend to be more racist, they tend to be more exclusionary, us versus them. They tend to be socially more conservative, while the left is the opposite of that. And so there are differences in social areas, but in terms of underlying economic policies, This is the famous horseshoe, why communists and fascists quite often got along, because in many aspects, they do not trust free markets.

They believe that the government should be the primary driver. They believe that they know the best what needs to be done. It's almost like religious cults in some ways. And in every case, they are in favor of greater government. Not smaller government, not in terms of ownership of assets, but in terms of direction.

This is what we need to do.

And so when I look at it, I've been arguing that if midterms, for example, if Democrats take Congress or Senate, people say, well, will the United States return back to normal? No, it won't. It will not happen until Americans are less polarized. And the only way to achieve this lower polarization is either you have to blow things up, and that's the equivalent of civil and other wars, or you have to introduce specific policies, especially redistribution policies, both in terms of wealth and income, recognizing that humans are no longer as relevant input to production and everything else as humans used to be. In industrial revolution. Alternatively, you have to hope and pray that productivity increases will be so fast that you can actually fix all of these problems without paying. Now, I'm not a believer— longer term, I'm a great believer in productivity, but to me, that lies away at least 10 years out, not longer.

So if I'm not a believer that it's going to be sustainable rise in productivity in the next 5 to 10 years, Then the only other alternative is violence or redistribution. It's hard to see what else. So when I look at every country, whether it's UK, whether it's France, whether it's US, as I said, right has some similarities like anti-immigrant or whatever they are. Left doesn't have that. But in terms of economics, they're actually pretty similar.

AI as rolling bubbles

Erik Townsend: Let's move on to AI, which has become not just a thematic trend in the market, but almost the entire market. You've written in the past some about the difference between rolling bubbles and bursting bubbles. What did you mean by that and how does it relate to this AI story?

Viktor Shvets: The way I look at it, when people ask, is AI a bubble? I basically say, what is AI? Tell me. Is it data centers? Is it chips? Is it LLMs? Is it robotics? Is it automation? Is it 3D printing? Is it metaverse? Is it biotech? Is it quantum computing? What is AI?

And the answer, AI is everything. There is no difference between tech and non-tech. And increasingly, as we go forward over the next couple of years, those differences will disappear.

And so I prefer to say everything, as you, Erik, said, everything is AI. Except what you need to do is to look at a stack. It has different derivatives. The bottom of the derivative chain is usually commodities that you require. In order to create the new technology, especially if it's general purpose technology like AI.

Now, different GPTs require different commodities. For us, it's more energy. It is more copper, nickel, cobalt, rare earths, lithium, things like that. I'm not a great believer in commodities for a very simple reason. Human history tells you that we're very good at finding this stuff, but we're even better by using technology to optimize it.

So for example, today LLMs using less than 1/3 of the energy that we thought we need 3 years ago. Just wait another 4 years, it's going to be like 10% of energy. And by the time we get to quantum computing, a lot of data centers will become playgrounds for children because we just simply would not need it at that magnitude.

So the first derivative, are commodities needed? But this derivative has some choke points at irregular intervals. But it doesn't last terribly long. The second derivative are infrastructure that you need to build for that particular technology. Now, that has a longer lifespan. For us, it is data, it is chips, things like that. Now, again, have we already maxed out on that? The answer is no.

I don't believe so. There will be a declining rate of increase at which hyperscalers are investing. But other countries will be investing more, whether it's China, whether it's Europe, whether it's India. So overall, I'm not a buyer of the argument that infrastructure has already reached the peak. I don't believe that's true. In commodities, I think we have, but not in the infrastructure, at least in the next 2 to 3 years, if not longer.

But ultimately, we'll run out of that road as well. Now, as soon as we run out of road as well, you have to remember that there are businesses that need zeros. So if you think of software, LLMs have been eating software. Now gradually, LLMs are starting to cannibalize itself, not only through China, but also through its open-end systems. There are closed-weight systems and open-weight systems. I think the future clearly is open-end, which means that most of the open-weight, which means that for most LLMs, the value will be nowhere near the values that are being ascribed to it. So LLM is already starting to commoditize and starting to cannibalize. Eventually, as I said, we run out of infrastructure, but there are businesses that need zero to progress.

In other words, very low cost of infrastructure, very low cost of LLM gives them an opportunity to grow and prosper. Now, what are those businesses? Robotics, humanoid robotics, automation is one. Think of biotech, another one. Think of Facebook, Meta, changed the name too early, but now will be the time for metaverse. Think of 3D printing, started 10, 15 years ago, far too early, but now could be the time for 3D printing.

We can go on and think of further down the track within the next 5, 6, 7 years, quantum computing. Now that's going to completely unscramble almost everything we do. And that's what I call rolling bubbles. That there will be a bubble in commodities, there will be a bubble in infrastructure, and then there will be bubble in robotics, and then there will be bubble in other applications. In other words, every business, every industry will restructure themselves on the back of AI.

And therefore, there will be bubble in metal bashing, there will be bubble in, I don't know, barbershops and hairdressing, there will be a bubble in pharmaceutical companies. There will be a bubble in insurance companies. There will be a bubble in the banks. So that's what I call a sequence of bubbles. Now, what it basically means is that concentration of returns for shareholders will always stay high. So in other words, 10 stocks at most will deliver you 50% of performance maybe in some years. So something that investors are not very comfortable with is high concentration of returns, I think is going to endure. So the overall index might not change that much, but within this index, there will be very violent rotations from one bubble into next bubble and then into next bubble.

And if you as an investor identified the right theme you want to be investing in, it's like I run a portfolio called Replacement of Humans, so augmentation of humans. I run portfolio called Bullets and Prisons, saying basically we're going to fight wars. Or I run another portfolio, Opium of the People, We need to entertain people in various ways. You might identify the right theme, which has legs for 10, 20 years going forward, but you might be investing in the wrong end of the derivatives of that theme. And that is what's so discomforting for investors, that you need to be agile.

You should have no confidence in what you're doing, and you should always watch out for the new breakouts as they happen. And try to minimize your exposure to past winners that are being derated.

K-shaped economy, marginal utility and social risk

Erik Townsend: You've written and talked quite a bit about the K-shaped economy in the past. Let's tie that in with this AI race and everything that's going on, because it seems to me like we have a setup here where a whole lot of people are going to feel, whether they're correct or not, they're going to feel like AI basically sabotaged their prosperity. They don't have any career future. It's, you know, there's no point. And trying, entire generations are giving up on life because they figure that AI is going to take over. How does that societal change or that public opinion change potentially have a reflexive effect that could even be bigger than AI itself?

Viktor Shvets: In fact, it's not just could, it will. Part of the reason we have such erratic policies, part of the reason we have such a low degree of competency in what we do right now, part of the reason we're swinging from left to right is exactly that. Now, a lot of people say, but we don't have an apocalypse in jobs. That's missing the point.

There are 2 things to say. Number one, it's all about marginal utility, not average. You don't need to lose a job to feel that you're falling behind. You don't need to lose a job in order to be disappointed in your life. It's just your marginal utility and marginal rewards are decreasing. And that's what most of the younger generation feel right now. The other thing to remember is the technological and financial revolution.

The first steps of those revolutions usually involves transfer of value from labor to capital. It always has, it always done, and today it's exactly the same thing. So if you think of share of wages in the United States relative to GDI, We are now at the lowest point since 1947. Now, share of profit, we're at the highest level ever.

It's about 16%, 17% of national income, whereas traditionally Warren Buffett said anything more than 6% or 7% is too high. We more than doubled that level already. And if you think of wages, as I said, we're below 1947 levels. They'd never been That we're that low. So what you're seeing is now also transfer of value from labor to capital. Eventually, there is a transfer back and it works through productivity. But all I'm saying, there is this hiatus that sometimes lasts a decade or 2 where passions are incredibly high because people don't see the answer.

Think of it this way. If you are a young person and you say to yourself, I want to go from the bottom 25 percentile to the top 10, In the past, if you work hard and if you save, it could have taken you 20 years and you would've achieved it. Today, it's almost infinity. If you think of 0.1% of households in the United States, which is only 135,000 households, their average net worth is almost $200 million. That's average. And not only that, they control almost 15% of national wealth. If you go back to the 1980s, that number was 8%.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Viktor Shvets: Not 15. And it's not just the bottom feels it, it's anybody between 0.1 and 1. Their share is also falling. So what you have in a position now that A, a lot of younger people feel that their marginal utility is declining and their marginal usefulness is declining.

And at the same time, they feel no matter how hard they work, they won't be able to make it. And so that explains 2 or 3 things. It explains why the later millennials and Gen Z, anybody born after sort of 1985, why they're not becoming more conservative when they age.

The traditional demographic tells you that you start liberal and then as you age, you become more conservative. With this generation, it's the opposite. They're actually becoming even more liberal than what they were. when they were younger. And the reason it's happening, as I said, is that they don't see their way out. And so they're willing to take a gamble. And so number one, they're more gambling individuals anyway. So younger generation gamble more because that's the only way to get ahead.

Or they try to swing for extreme answers, sometimes transferring their loyalty to somebody like Donald Trump, then taking it away and putting an extreme left like You know, Mamdani or AOC or Bernie Sanders or Elizabeth Warren.

So to answer your question, remember we discussed how you can solve it? Violence, redistribution policies, or fast productivity. That's your 3 answers.

Erik Townsend: And do you think that the violence scenario is going to come into play now? We've certainly seen an escalation in recent months.

Viktor Shvets: Unfortunately, yes, because for a very simple reason, people are not ready for redistribution policies. People are not ready for things like universal basic income. People are not ready for changing social and welfare systems. So neither political systems nor individuals and people nor businesses are ready for any of this. And so the most obvious policies to apply in order to defund the extreme are not being implemented. The other set of policies you can introduce, and that's regulating AI and technology, and that basically saying, let's just develop it not just at a slower pace, but let's develop it in a way that it augments humans, not replaces humans.

Again, there are very few takers apart from academia and some places that actually agree with that. So to me, do we have answers outside of violence? Yes, we do. Unfortunately, we're not really embracing it. And it doesn't just apply to the United States. As I said, it applies to everywhere. You find level of violence is less in the countries that are less polarized.

So Australia started less polarized. Today it's less polarized. You don't have quite the same level. Japan started less polarized. Today it's less polarized. You have less. Other countries who already were polarized before, and become even more polarized like US or India, you do have a lot more of that occurring.

And I said, unless polarization have come down, we can't come back to something that we would regard as normal.

Erik Townsend: It seems to me that the big geopolitical or social political risk would really come into play if you had a large number of unemployed men that had nothing better to do with their time than have a riot, basically. So it seems to me that we need to watch unemployment rates carefully. Am I on the right track there? And how do the numbers look?

Viktor Shvets: To some extent, that's correct. Because when I talk about marginal decline, that's what kills you. Because your perception of yourself, how you value yourself, how you respect yourself depends on how other people look at you. If you know that you're no longer contributing anything much, and if you know that other people also know that you don't contribute much.

You don't feel very good about yourself, and you don't feel very good about your children because you understand that they're probably facing even harder time as they go forward. So the killer to me is not unemployment, but drip by drip, like a Chinese torture chamber, of declining marginal utility and usefulness and marginal rewards that are being placed on individuals. It's like, you know, the Karp from Palantir, he was quoted saying that average person might get a little bit more money as you go forward, but I will be, or anybody involved in AI is going to be 100,000 times richer.

That's a problem because that opens up the gap that no matter what you do, you will never be able to succeed. And that drives anger. But ultimately, you're correct. It has to translate into unemployment. I don't believe month-by-month figures mean anything. And besides, the way BLS is computing it is completely out of kilter.

I actually agree with that, with Scott Bessent and Kevin Warsh. It's out of kilter what the real life is. I think the situation is worse than what BLS is saying. In other words, we have a lot more gigs, we have a lot more multiple jobs where people are trying to find a way of getting ahead and in most cases failing.

China's strength and savings trap

Erik Townsend: Viktor, final question. Let's talk about China and China's role in the global economy. Something that really caught my attention is during this conflict with Iran, at least in my perception, China basically stepped in and said, hey, look, we've got plenty of assets, reserves, and procedure in place that we can easily manage this whole situation with Hormuz. And by cutting back on their imports and so forth, they completely changed the outcome of that crisis. To me, that really showed us China has more power than everybody understands. Am I reading that right? And where do you think things are headed?

Viktor Shvets: The answer is yes and no at the same time, which is unusual, but there are 2 answers. Answer number 1, is China much stronger than what people expect? The answer is yes. America already lost electrification stack completely. That includes not just EVs and batteries, but solar panels, wind, and everything else. So electrification stack is already lost to the United States and to Europe.

Now you're going to go beyond that because from electrification stack, you start building robotics and automation. That's only one more step forward. Again, China is already gaining control over that as well, not just electrification. Now, the third area where the US traditionally leads, which is science and technology, again, the US is relatively speaking falling behind. China is accelerating. And you can see it in LLMs. You can see it in the ability to try to bypass technology restrictions, particularly in chips.

So China is building the world and not deriving return on equity. That's why Chinese equity is not necessarily the best investment. Americans are delivering return on equities, but they're losing the world. And so the two are sort of incompatible. So that's your yes answer. China is much stronger. China is building a Sinosphere around their borders, including Russia, Central Asia, and many other places.

On the negative side, however, China is a prisoner of their very high national saving rates.

They've been running saving rates of 45% for more than 3 decades. Now, if you run saving rates at this level, that means you invest too much and you rely too much on exports. And so the problem is China misallocating capital at the fastest pace ever in human history. Now, US is not misallocating capital, but China is. Now, what it does, it pressurizes inflation. That's why China is the biggest disinflator on a global basis. But eventually, they will run out of room because China is investing every year $11 to $12 trillion.

That's almost triple GDP of Japan invested every single year. Eventually, planet Earth is going to be too small for China, for China's exports. So China has to change the economic model. They need to lower the national saving rates.

And the only way to do it is to increase consumption. The problem is it runs against 3 things. Number one, central control. In other words, China doesn't want to give up government and central control. Number 2, a very classical economist or Marxist view of productive forces, that consumption is not an independent variable, but arises out of your investment. And that's why they're investing as much as they do. And 3, geopolitical reasons. So those 3 reasons are precluding them from making adjustments. And I've been discussing it for well over 10 years now, actually even longer than that. And China still are not addressing this issue. So is China very strong, much stronger than people expected? The answer, absolutely. Is it also has a weak foundation in terms of capital allocation? Absolutely.

Closing: Macquarie and books

Erik Townsend: Well, Viktor, I can't thank you enough for another terrific interview, but before I let you go, please tell our listeners a little bit more about what you do at Macquarie Investments, what services are on offer there, and how people can follow your work.

Viktor Shvets: Thank you, Erik. I'm a global strategist at Macquarie Capital. We are a large investment bank. Uh, we're clearly very large in Asia and Australia, but we also have a very significant presence in the United States. Unless you're a client of Macquarie, you can't really follow my work, but I am reasonably active on social media. And so occasionally I do post things there. I'm also an author of 2 books where a lot of those issues have been discussed. One is The Twilight Before the Storm that we published in 2024, and the other one is The Great Rupture we published in 2020. Both of them discuss the role of societies. Economists, as well as technology and how financial— what I call Fujiwhara effect, the merger and reinforcement of 2 hurricanes, highly disruptive information age and a deep financialization, how it impacts societies, politics, economics, and markets.

Where's the trade: BOTZ with a protective put

Erik Townsend: Thanks, Viktor. Now it's time for Patrick Ceresna and Massil Beguenane. Patrick, where's the trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. The most interesting implication of Viktor's rolling bubble thesis is that the next AI trade may not be in the chip and infrastructure names that have already captured most of the capital. Robotics and automation could be the next destination. And unlike the market leaders, that group has gone through a substantial reset. For this week's trade, I want to express that through the Global X Robotics and Artificial Intelligence ETF, ticker BOTZ, B-O-T-Z.

The ETF went through a 3-month, 20% correction back towards its year lows. So much of the prior excess has already been cleared. That gives us an interesting asymmetry. We can establish exposure before the next momentum wave, but we need to respect the possibility that the entry is early. The simple version is to buy the underlying shares, which are currently trading around $37.50.

Now, to protect that initial entry, I'd pair the position with the August 37 protective put, which has 16 days till its expiration and costs about $0.60. Think of that put as a short-term insurance policy while the trade proves itself. If BOTZ turns higher, We retain the upside in the shares.

Alternatively, if this was a false breakout and the ETF breaks below 37, the put begins offsetting additional losses dollar for dollar during that window and gives you an exit strategy. So the goal is not to call the exact low. It is to establish early exposure to the next potential rolling bubble while limiting the damage if the first entry is premature and preserving capital for the second attempt. And that's where's the trade.

Erik Townsend: Patrick analyzes and trades the markets every day over at Big Picture Trading. MacroVoices listeners can sign up for a free 2-week trial at BigPictureTrading.com. Now back to Patrick and Massil.

Equities: record highs and SPX call volume

Massil Beguenane: Hey, that's an interesting setup, Patrick, and definitely one we'll be watching as it develops. Now, we had a pretty huge week across markets, so let's jump straight into equities. What's on your radar this week?

Patrick Ceresna: The big story in equities this week is that the market did not just grind back to all-time highs, it was effectively launched there. The setup coming into the week was that investors had spent months crowding into the AI enablers trade— semiconductors, memory, power, networking, infrastructure— while using the hyperscalers and mega-cap tech names as funding shorts. That trade had become over-owned. Then it reversed hard. The hyperscalers stopped being the drag on the index and started leading again, which was a critical step because the S&P 500 and NASDAQ were never going to make substantial new highs without those mega-cap weights participating.

But the more interesting point was what happened in options. SPX call option volume eclipsed 4 million contracts on Tuesday, easily the highest level ever recorded. The premiums were not priced for the size of the move. The rally blew through what the daily options market was implying, and once that happened, old upside calls that looked out of reach suddenly came back to life. Those calls picked up delta, forcing dealers and investors to chase the market higher. So this was not simply bullish investors buying stocks. It was a mechanical liquidity event higher. This was compounded by positive geopolitical headlines around the potential Iran ceasefire and reopening of the Strait of Hormuz.

It knocked crude oil lower, easing inflation pressure and calming rates volatility. Now, earnings played a key role in all of this, with strong earnings per share and revenue beats across the S&P 500. But particularly sharp reactions in some of the key Mag Seven beats. Now, looking at those technicals, the S&P 500 cut through all short-term upside targets like a hot knife through butter. So we need to turn to the NASDAQ 100, which still has key technical hurdles to beat at the 30,000 and 31,000 resistance levels.

COT: S&P 500 futures and the dollar

Massil Beguenane: Well, Patrick, I actually want to turn to the Commitment of Traders report here, which is the CFTC's weekly snapshot of futures market positioning. And just to remind everyone, This is the latest report that was released on Friday, July 31st, and reflects positioning held as of Tuesday, July 28th. I also think it's worth explaining what these reports actually are. The COT report isn't a crystal ball. It's really just a crowd map. It shows us where traders are committing their dollars and where positioning could become vulnerable if the market stops rewarding those same traders.

Now let's turn to the S&P 500 futures because large speculators are sitting at the 100th percentile on the 1-year positioning score. But it's only sitting at the 60th percentile relative to the 3-year score. So the market is definitely leaning on the bullish side, but it's not a market stuffed with speculative longs, which means that this breakout still has lots of room to attract additional buying.

Now, what about the dollar, Patrick? Are we seeing similar moves?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, the dollar index reversed sharply following the FOMC meeting, and that weakness was then accelerated by the yen intervention. We are now in the middle of a genuine dollar correction with prices testing a critical support zone that should determine whether this is simply a pullback within a broader breakout or the beginning of a larger trend reversal. The key level is the 99.5 level on the DXY. A clean break below that area would damage the technical structure, pull the dollar back into its prior 15-month trade range, and open the door for a much deeper correction. The dollar is sitting at an inflection point, and the next move should tell us whether this breakout remains intact or has failed.

Massil Beguenane: Well, what's interesting, Pat, is we keep seeing the dollar being crowded. Large speculators are sitting with a score of 91 over the 3-year measure, with net long exposure now equaling to 29.5% of open interest, which is quite significant historically speaking. Now, the raw data shows us that bulls added more than 2,000 contracts this week. So this was fresh bullish participation, not just short covering from previous traders. Now, as I said earlier, this COT report came out before the post-FOMC reversal. So let's watch for the changes in data this week. I feel like it'll be a lot more interesting. What about crude, Patrick? What's going on there?

Crude oil: truce hopes versus depleted inventories

Patrick Ceresna: Well, crude oil spent the week giving back much of its geopolitical premium as hopes for a sustainable peace deal agreement pushed prices back towards $75. At the time of this recording, but the bigger issue is that the physical damage has not disappeared with the headlines. Global inventories have been heavily depleted, and Saudi Aramco has warned that rebuilding them could take as long as 18 months. That creates a structural floor beneath the market, even if a truce holds. The question now is not whether a peace—the question is where oil ultimately settles once that geopolitical premium is removed. But the inventory deficit. it remains. The market is now searching for that new fair value.

Massil Beguenane: And we talked about this last week, and it's worth reinforcing this point because even after the recent 35% rally in crude oil this past month, large spec positioning remains at multi-year lows.

Gold breakout and positioning

Massil Beguenane: So the market is still bearishly tilted this market as we move into fresh negotiations on the war front. But let's just finish with gold here. What are we seeing in this precious metals market this week, Pat?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, gold delivered a decisive 4% breakout from its multi-month trade range, reclaiming both its 50-day moving average and its descending trend line. On its own, that would already be technically significant, but what gives it more greater weight is the breadth behind it. Silver, platinum, palladium, copper mining stocks, and even uranium equities all turned higher at roughly the same time. That kind of simultaneous strength across the metals and materials complex suggests that this is not simply an isolated short squeeze in gold, but a broader intermarket rotation into hard assets. The first real obstacle now comes near the $4,550 area where gold meets a key Fibonacci resistance zone.

A decisive break above that level would confirm genuine bullish follow-through and strengthen the case that a sustainable new trend has begun.

Massil Beguenane: I just love this gold market on the positioning side, Patrick, because right now large speculators are scoring 25 on the 1-year view. So we'd think that's actually pretty low tilting or bullishly tilted, but the raw book remains heavily net long with 47.3% of open interest remaining bullish. So that means that any bullish price action will be supported by strong positioning in the gold market, and these bulls are just not getting shaken out of here.

Now, listeners, if you want to see what I'm seeing, don't forget to visit cotsignal.com so you can start following the data right along with us.

Positioning pulse: yen intervention

Patrick Ceresna: Now, Massil, we've covered all 4 core markets. Now, for this week's positioning pulse, when you're looking across the broader COT landscape, what stands out for you the most?

Massil Beguenane: Well, Patrick, there's no other market that needs to be talked about this week outside the Japanese Yen, and the timing of the data is critical. A reminder to our listeners, this latest COT report was collecting data for positioning on July 28th, meaning it captured positioning immediately before the coordinated US-Japan intervention of the yen.

Now, going into that intervention, the short yen traded had become very one-sided. Large spec positioning was sitting at the 0 percentile on both the 1-year and 3-year scores. Now, nominal gross shorts had reached a record 264,000 contracts, while gross longs had fallen to a 1-year low.

More importantly, traders were still pressing the trade going into the intervention. Just in the week prior to it, large specs added nearly 5,000 new shorts while cutting more than 6,000 longs. So again, everybody was just leaning on one side. The important thing to understand is that the bearish crowd was not retreating. It was getting more committed at precisely the moment the authorities were preparing to move against them.

Then we all know what happened. The intervention came. The yen surged from 163 to 158 per dollar, blindsiding a speculative community positioned on the opposite side.

Now, the first move was ignited by officials buying, but the long-term question is whether it creates a second self-reinforcing move driven by the market itself. If the yen holds these gains going into next week, short sellers may be forced to cover, triggering stops, systematic trend reversals that produce even more yen buying. Now, this is what makes tomorrow's COT report release especially interesting. It'll capture the first positioning response following the intervention and show us whether large speculators have already materially reduced their shorts or whether much of that potential short-covering fuel remains in the market going into next week. Now, that's your positioning pulse for the week.

Patrick Ceresna: You're bang on with that. It's going to be super interesting to see whether those heaviest short sellers are going to be forced to reverse their positions. And it certainly can be a big driver. So watching that yen is gonna be the thing to watch. So that does it for this week's Trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. See you next week.

Outro and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: And a reminder, as a MacroVoices listener, you're entitled to a 2-week free trial of Big Picture Trading, where you can watch Patrick analyze and trade the markets live every single day at BigPictureTrading.com. No credit card is required to sign up, and there's nothing to cancel. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices. We'll see you next week. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice.

Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors. MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Jim Bianco — Not stated in the intro; Bianco describes his own firms at w8906 as Bianco Research (institutional research) and Bianco Advisors (fixed income total return index, WisdomTree ETF ticker WTBN) (as introduced on the show)

Cold open and episode intro

Jim Bianco: Bond traders can stop panicking when the Fed starts panicking. Well, the Fed didn't panic today, so bond traders panicked.

Erik Townsend: That was Jim Bianco. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices, the free weekly podcast targeting professional finance and sophisticated private investors. Episode 543 was produced on July 30th, 2026. Jim Bianco and I will discuss this week's FOMC meeting and how it led the 30-year Treasury note to a 19-year record high print of 5.20. We'll talk about the impact on bond and stock markets, the state of the economy, the Iran conflict, and artificial intelligence in this week's episode. And after the feature interview, Patrick's going to turn Jim Bianco's market outlook into a risk-defined trade.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. Let's dive straight into this interview.

FOMC reaction: dissents, Warsh and forward guidance

Erik Townsend: Jim, it's great to get you back on the show. We wanted to line you up for an FOMC week, and boy, they gave you plenty to talk about. There was no action at the meeting in theory, although there certainly is news out of the meeting. So give us some color on what happened, why it's significant.

Jim Bianco: Yeah, so you're right, the markets had a wild reaction to the Fed. Let me start with the bigger picture so everybody understands what's going on with this Fed. Trump has been bashing the Fed for 2 years, and the Fed has been very worried about their independence. And the way that they have resolved their problem with independence is the voters now are starting to act independently. I know I'm using the word independence a lot here.

And so that's why you're starting to see a lot of dissents.

And we had 3 dissents today that were in favor of hiking rates today. So, what's changed with the Fed that we're talking about raising rates when you could credibly say, what's changed with the data in the last 2 months? We didn't talk about it 2 months ago. We did at the June meeting. We didn't talk about it at the May meeting. Why are we all worked up about inflation now and raising rates now?

Because the voters have always been suppressed under the thumb of the Federal Reserve chairman. He tells them what he thinks. He tells them how they're going to vote. He tells them what they're going to say, and that's what they do. Now, the voters are allowed to act independently, and we're finding out that they are a lot more hawkish and probably were disposed to raising rates a lot sooner than this meeting. And so, we're starting to see that unfold. So, that's the first part that's going on with the independence.

The second part, Is Warsh doesn't believe in forward guidance. Again, if you're not familiar with the term, it just means the Fed signals what they're going to do. I agree with him that forward guidance has been problematic for the Fed for many years. Why is it problematic? Because it's always taken as a promise. Whenever the Fed says, you know, if the data continues this way, we'll cut rates or hike rates, the market just pencils in that it's a certainty. That's what they're going to do. And since market participants think it's a certainty, they tend to overspeculate and kind of get over their skis. And then we get instances like Silicon Valley Bank not hedging their interest rate exposure and causing a potential financial crisis, or the repo market blowing up in September '19, or other— what the Fed's fancy word is— moral hazards.

So, those are the 2 things that are changing about this Fed. So, when you walk into this press conference, the press conference was designed for a Fed that had forward guidance. That's where they're supposed to kind of give us clues as to what's coming next.

But Warsh doesn't believe it. So, he kind of non-answered every question and he didn't really offer a whole lot in the answers that he gave. And stylistically, my impression was he came off a little bit condescending to some of the reporters on some of the questions as well too. But that's just a stylistic thing that we'll have to get adjusted to. So, I think that the market is still stuck with the old thinking. We're going to watch the presser because the chairman's going to tell us what the Fed's going to do. Not ready to accept that he's only one of 12 voters.

And when he doesn't tell us what we're going to do, we're going to get very disappointed.

Now, last thing I'll say, what kind of kicked this all off in my opinion is if there was one thing that he talked about at the press conference that might have been problematic for the Fed was, let me back up and say, On July 13th, Chris Waller gave a speech, Fed Governor Chris Waller.

And in the speech, he had this line that a lot of people picked up on: sternly staring at inflation until it melts before our withering gaze is not an option. Okay. A little rhetorical flourish, but I kind of get it. He's absolutely right that if, if that they have to do more than just stare at it.

And then the problem was That when we got to Warsh, he said here in today's press conference, my own judgment is this is a period of watchful thinking.

Wow. That does sound like withering gaze is what he just said, that if we just kind of think about inflation and talk about inflation, it'll magically go away. And I think that the marketplace is of the opinion that no, You have to do more than just talk about it or think about it for it to go away. More obviously is raising rates. And since they didn't raise rates, there's an old adage that I've been using a lot lately that bond traders can stop panicking when the Fed starts panicking.

Well, the Fed didn't panic today, so bond traders panicked. And that's why we got the 30-year yield, to use one measure, at 5.2%, a 19-year high.

30-year yield at 19-year high, inflation and nominal GDP

Erik Townsend: Where are we headed? I mean, a 19-year high is pretty darn significant. Where are we headed in terms of long-term rates? And step back from this week's news and tell me about Jim's perspective on the longer term.

Jim Bianco: Let me go back to September of 2024, September 18th, 2024, to be exact. That was the day that the Fed cut 50 basis points and started the rate cut cycle. The 30-year yield on that day was 4.02%, just barely above 4%. And as I mentioned, it's at 5.20% today. So it's up 118 basis points during a period when the Fed was cutting rates by 150 basis points. The 30-year yield went up 118 basis points. Yes, that's very unusual. There's only one time in the last 60 years that we saw anything like that. The Fed cut by over 100 basis points and yields went up by a significant amount. And that was the early 1980s. But we also had 14% interest rates back then. So this, if you want to discount that for the high level of rates, this is really unprecedented.

Erik Townsend: Why?

Jim Bianco: Because I think the market has been trying to tell us it's worried about inflation. It's not panicked about inflation, but we've got an inflation problem. 64 months in a row we've been above 2%. We're above 3% now, right now with inflation. It's not coming down. You know, you can argue all you want about technology and deflation, but none of that is happening and none of that has been happening for over 5 years. And the marketplace is worried that if the Fed keeps rates too low and too stimulative on the economy, that it's just going to foster more inflation. And bond investors don't want any of that.

So bigger picture, I've been arguing that rates will continue to go higher until somebody deals with inflation. Now, the deal is somebody dealing with inflation is either A, the Fed panics a little bit and raises rates. They didn't do that right now. Or B, the market takes yields up high enough to do it for the Fed, that they will effectively snuff out any inflation expectations or inflation concerns that it has with higher yields. I don't think we're there yet right now.

So, this has been the hardest thing I've had to explain to people is if you are complaining about yields going up, And maybe people I'm referring to is the President of the United States. If you're complaining about yields going up, the thing that would stop that is the Federal Reserve raising rates and showing a little bit of panic and everybody calming down.

But you just replaced the Fed chairman and have bashed that institution for years because you don't want them to raise rates. Well, that's why we have a 19-year high in the 30-year yield. So, I think they're going to keep going up. Until we get to that point that the market can say, okay, we've done enough to not worry about inflation. Either market levels will have to do it or the Fed will have to change its policy.

Erik Townsend: Well, let's talk about what's actually going on in the state of the economy, because there's always the counterargument, Jim, that, well, no, it's not inflation. It's the economy is strengthening and we're seeing this backing up of long-term yields because it's a strong economy. It's all a good thing. It's not an inflation risk. Is there any Potential truth to that in this case?

Jim Bianco: Oh, there's total truth to that. I would argue to you, I'm a believer in nominal GDP as being the driver of interest rates. What that means is that why do some countries have 100% interest rates, others have negative interest rates, others have 5%? What is the overarching theme that says one versus the other? Well, the big one is what is your nominal growth? Your nominal growth is your inflation rate plus Your real growth, the 2 added together. Now, in a country like Venezuela, you might have well over 100% inflation, you have well over 100% interest rates. In a country like Japan 2 years ago, not now, but 2 years ago, you added together their inflation rate and their real growth and it was zero, and they had zero interest rates. So, if the economy is staying strong, and that's one half of nominal, and inflation is staying sticky, Nominal growth is going up.

What that means is that the fair value for interest rates is rising, so they should rise. Also, it means the fair value for the funds rate is rising. So, if the Fed wants to sit there like they have since December and not do anything, and the economy's doing okay, and nominal keeps rising, They're progressively getting easier because that fair value number is going higher. Now, of course, the fair value number is kind of a theoretical construct. There is no Bloomberg symbol you can go get the number to the 4th decimal or anything like that. It's a guess. But the guess is that the fair value is rising and the Fed is not following it higher. Maybe it's political reasons or maybe they don't believe it, but the fear the Fed is getting easier. And that, that is a problem in this type of environment.

Stocks, the inflation debate and economists' blind spot

Erik Townsend: Jim, the stock market didn't take much liking to this event from the Fed. Tell us a little bit about that and where it's headed. Today's red candle put us decisively below the 50-day moving average on the S&P for the first time in months.

Jim Bianco: Yeah, if you actually saw the intraday movements in the stock market, it was down this morning, then the Fed didn't move, it rallied back, above, back to green. And it looked like for a moment there we were going to have a decent day, and then it fell apart all over again with the rise in yields towards the end of the day.

I'm going to interpret that going back to my first comments. The Fed is independent. They vote independently. And a lot of these members have been suppressed hawks, and now they're allowing to show their hawkishness. And the Fed has to deal with the inflation problem, otherwise the bond market will deal with the inflation problem.

I don't think the stock market's gotten the memo. They still think it's only one guy, the Fed chairman, parse every syllable he says, he will tell the other 11 how they can vote, when they can go to the bathroom, and that's kind of the way the Fed works. Well, that's the way it used to work, but it doesn't work that way under Warsh anymore. And so I think the stock market is struggling to understand that dynamic right now.

That's why you saw that big whipsaw in the market today. And as it does understand that dynamic, it's going to have to come to grips with this idea that the discount rate, the cost of money, is going to go up and it's going to stay higher until we do something about this inflation problem that we have.

Might add too about the inflation problem. I've been real curious because when you read political polls, the political polls overwhelmingly say the number one issue in the country, bar none, is inflation, cost of living, affordability, whichever phrase you want to use for it. People are going to vote on that. The DSA, the Democratic Socialists of America, are screaming that the reason that they're rising to power is the cost of living and affordability and the anger that it's pushing into everybody. Okay, I understand that.

But then I listen to my economist friends and then they'll say, oh, the 1-year swaps rate or the 2-year breakeven rate, inflation is not a problem and it's well anchored and it's under control. We're about to have a political revolution in this country because of cost of living and affordability. And all the economists that I talk to are saying that there's nothing to see here, move along. So, there's a big cognitive dissonance between these 2 groups right now. And I'd probably put it more on the economists that keep talking about that there is no inflation problem. Again, let me be clear about the inflation problem. Whenever I say inflation problem, people automatically, I've said this to you before in these calls, people automatically run to Zimbabwe. Oh, you just said we're going to have a million percent inflation or Venezuela or something like that. No, If the world thinks that we're in a 2% inflation world, and Warsh said, our target is 2%, there is no perceived target of 3%, we want the inflation rate to be 2%.

Okay, it's not, and it hasn't been for over 5 years. And if you believe that, you better do something about it or the bond market will. And so, I think that they need to get back onto this idea that there's a bigger inflation problem out there than we think. Inflation problem meaning sticky at around 3 or 4, which pushes yields up, not necessarily that it's going to go to some kind of hyperinflationary level.

Erik Townsend: Now, I agree with you on this, Jim, but just because there's always the argument that someone might not, is there a side of this that you can interpret that says, okay, it's not 2%, it's more like 3 or 4? Is there some way that that's not an indication of Anything other than significant inflation?

Jim Bianco: Yeah. I mean, if once you start unanchoring inflation and once you start getting it to 3 or 4, and the perception is that the Fed, who is insistent that it's 2 is the target, and that the Trump administration is going to move heaven and earth, just like the Biden administration tried to before them to get the inflation rate down. and you can't, and it stays at 3 or 4%, then you run into a credibility problem.

And then you could wind up having people start to fear that it's going to get worse than that, and it could wind up spinning out of control. Right now, it still has some— there's still some credibility out there that we can get inflation back to those lower levels. But time's of the essence. You can't— we can't keep waiting and waiting and waiting for that to happen. We're either going to have to enact policies to make that happen or let the market do it for us.

Will the Fed hike? Vote counting at the FOMC

Erik Townsend: Jim, let's imagine that this Federal Reserve sees further indications that it ought to be hiking rates in order to battle that inflation that you're talking about. Do you think they'll do it or do you think they're afraid of— the President of the United States was making an expletive-laden Critique in another forum today, swearing at people on national television. Seems like upsetting him is probably not what Fed officials want to be doing right now.

Jim Bianco: I think they would, and I think they will. And I'll point out just for a benchmark, the probability that the Fed will raise rates in September went above 50% on June 17th, the day that the May CPI report was released. It was also the day he signed the MOU in Versailles too, but it was mainly the CPI that drove it up that day. And the probability of a rate hike in September has been above 50% ever since June 17th. By contrast, the July meeting we just finished the day we're recording never got above 50%.

It got to 40% earlier this week, but it never got above 50%. So the market is expecting a rate hike, at least now. Now check back in a week or 2 or 3 and that might change. How are you going to get that?

We had 3 dissenters today in favor of a rate hike. We had Beth Hammack of the Cleveland Fed, we had Lorie Logan of the Dallas Fed, we had Neel Kashkari of the Minneapolis Fed. I was shocked that there wasn't a 4th, and that would be, as I mentioned earlier, Chris Waller, Fed governor, who said that our withering gaze is not going to be enough to make inflation go down.

You know, if he was here with us, I'd say, Why didn't you follow through on that and vote to raise rates? I think he's a 4th member that in my mind is almost surely going to look to raise rates. After that, now we only need 3 more votes in order to get to— or 2 more. It's possible to get a 6-6 vote, but then the chairman gets to break the tie. But it depends on which side the chairman is on it. But 3 would do it. And you could see a number of people, Lisa Cook might be in that camp and some others, might be in that camp to raise rates.

So, what I'm arguing is the other thing I've been trying to tell people too, Fed watching is not a game of parsing the chairman's words, although we'll keep doing that because that's our muscle memory on Wall Street and that's all we know how to do. It's a vote tallying exercise. You're going to have to listen to all the voters and you're going to have to put them in the hike column or cut column and figure out which one is a majority. And that's what they're going to wind up doing. So yeah, I could see that. And it wouldn't be a stretch for me to say, maybe not now, but somewhere along the line we might see a chairman outvoted, that we might see 7 people vote to raise rates, but one of them would not be Kevin Warsh. That I'd put that at a less than 50% probability, but well above zero, which is where I would've put it under Powell or under Yellen or Bernanke.

It was, that was zero. But it's some non-zero number, but less than 50%. That's happened in the past. It happened to Marriner Eccles in 1939 and 1940. He got outvoted a couple of times by the committee, but it was a far different committee. It wasn't big type on the front page of the New York Times that the chairman got outvoted, but it has happened in the past. So I could see them raising rates and I could see them doing it without Warsh if they have to do it. Without Warsh. But at the end of the day, I would argue that he would probably vote to do it because if you listen to some of the comments he said, although, like I said, mostly tried to say nothing, it sounded like if you was listening to his comments, he was more hawkish than not, which bred a lot of questions people are asking him about, why didn't you vote to raise rates? You know, listen to what you're saying about inflation.

It sounds like you should be voting to raise rates. And that's when he said that comment about, you know, do some thinking about it, and that should hopefully be enough for it to go away.

Iran war: oil as independent variable, drone warfare

Erik Townsend: Meanwhile, we still have a military conflict going on in the Middle East. What do you make of the way things have evolved now? We've got this ongoing negotiation. It seems like, frankly, it's heated up again, and it seems like peace discussions are not really the center point for now. Where is this all headed, and how much longer can— how much time do we have before we run out of oil to play in this game?

Jim Bianco: Yeah. So, let me start with about what's going on in the Middle East, and I'll credit my friend Marko Papic over at Bank Credit Analyst for giving me the idea. And that is that we need to understand that oil is the independent variable, not the dependent variable. Now, that's fancy talk. What does that mean? Trump wakes up every day, he looks at the price of oil on his phone, and if it's $70, He's very hawkish and he wants to bomb everybody and he wants to call in the military, gas up the planes, and let's go.

If it hits $100, he then starts saying, Iran just called me and they want a deal really bad and we're going to stop and we're going to talk and everything else. So, in other words, people have always asked, why isn't the war driving the price of oil? And what I'm arguing Which I think is correct, is it's the price of oil that's driving the war. It's the other way around. So, we're in— the question then becomes, does it ever become a dependent variable? In other words, we last week were pushing $100 on Brent.

And what happened when we got to $100 on Brent, if you go back to last Friday, the president called off the airstrikes over the weekend. And they made up a lot of it. Oh, Iran called and they really, really want to make a deal. And he called off the airstrikes. And then Tuesday, Iran fired a bunch of missiles at American bases in Jordan. And as you pointed out, I was telling you this off camera, but on Fox News this morning, he said, I'm going to beat the effing S out of those guys. Basically, he's so mad at what Iran did. So, the question then becomes, because the price of oil today from yesterday's low was up almost 10% today.

The question then becomes, if we do trace back to $100 on oil and he does follow this pattern that we've seen where he starts, say, making noise that Iran called, they want a deal, we'll stop bombing them, hopefully we'll get a deal, does it become the dependent variable? And the question meaning, That no, at this point it stops working. Now the price just keeps going up and up even if you stop because inventories are too low, the ships aren't moving fast enough, the demand for oil is not slowing down enough to meet the constricted supply. And so it then becomes dependent that the strait is not open. Even if you say that they want a deal, that's not going to work anymore. That's where I think the real risk comes in. And once you cross over that and become the dependent variable, then it's out of control because then at that point, Trump could wake up in the morning, he could look at the price of oil, and he can't do anything about it.

But right now, he believes that he can, and actually evidence suggests that he has been able to do it. So, I think we're at the highest point ever of it flipping over to becoming that dependent variable. The inventories are down. We have no cushion anymore. And demand is still up. As we were talking about with the economy's doing okay, there's really no signs of slowing demand from around the world on oil. Yes, China could maybe restrict some of its imports for a while, but they can't do that forever. And so I think the risk is really high that it runs into that dependent variable. And the last thing I'd point out about the war is the elephant in the room is We can't open the strait.

And I've talked to you about this as well too.

And I've said the modern war in the 21st century is very different than the 20th century. 21st century war is about cheap, expendable, iterative unmanned systems like drones, whether they're ground drones, sea drones, or air drones. They don't cost much. You have thousands of them. And iterative means That you're, as somebody finds a way to defeat your drone, you just go to version 1.2 and 1.3 and 1.4 almost every other week in order to try and outsmart them with those versions. And what makes that work is the mass quantity of them. There's way more of them than we have of Patriot missiles or THAAD missiles to shoot down their drones. They've got more of them than we do. Even if our ability to shoot them down is 100%, We still don't have enough of them. And so, we can't get the strait open. It's a stalemate and it causes the cost to go up and then oil becomes the dependent variable.

The last thing I point out to you before we shake our head and go, boy, did Trump mess this up, and there's an argument to be made with that, so did Putin in Ukraine. And I'll quote University of Chicago Professor Robert Pape, who I think has been making some compelling arguments.

China better be taking lessons because if China thinks that they can attack Taiwan, they could lose. How could China possibly lose? Because there are ports, Chinese ports, that are 10, 15-minute drone flights away from Taiwan to mainland China. They can't win. They can't push them off the island. They could make the economic cost of them trying to attack Taiwan So prohibitively expensive that even though they might have their soldiers in Taiwan, they might even be the installed government in Taiwan, the cost that they will pay won't be worth it at the end of the day.

So, this is what 21st century war is about. 20th century war was big exquisite systems like aircraft carriers and fighter jets and bombers and cruise missiles. Those have a purpose in the 21st century, but that purpose is narrowing. What do you do with them? Less and less. And the fear is what Trump— when Trump gets angry, he keeps talking about, we're going to bomb bridges and we're going to bomb power plants.

And the quip about 20th century weapons like cruise missiles and F-35s is all they're good for is creating war crimes and human rights violations. But you're not going to stop the Iranians from keeping the strait closed, or at least driving the cost up of using the strait so much it effectively gets closed. If you want to bomb their bridges and power plants, you've just created war crimes and human rights violations, and you still haven't solved the problem because we don't have the right tools yet. Hopefully we've learned our lesson. Hopefully Europe has learned this lesson. Russia's learned it in a hard way. China's probably paying attention. So yeah, you could say, you shake your head and say, Trump really screwed this up. And I wouldn't disagree, but somebody was gonna do this somewhere down the line. And it's not that we screwed it up, it's really, do we know we did? And what are we doing to rectify the situation?

And hopefully we are moving as fast as we can and that this window where we're vulnerable in 21st century war only lasts a couple years before we get beyond it.

Cheap drones and a changed balance of power

Erik Townsend: Jim, this is a topic that I don't think we're talking enough about. It seems like the big lesson that we learned here was not just what you said, but also we thought or we assumed that the United States beating Iran was going to be easy. Well, it turned out not to be easy, and it seems like we are learning that, as you said a few minutes ago, the nature of warfare has changed. You have gigantic, super expensive, previously thought to be Undefeatable military assets like an aircraft carrier battle group, and then somebody figures out, well, if we have a large enough number of really cheap, inexpensive drones, we can beat that thing. Have we just kind of hit a moment in history where we're realizing that the balance of power isn't what we thought it was? And if so, what are the economic consequences of that?

Jim Bianco: Yeah, I think we are hitting that moment now that we're starting to realize that's the problem that we have. The problem is you see it on social media all the time, right? And you hear it from a number of people that the president, I'll pick on him because he's an easy target, he refers to them as paper airplanes or toys. He's right, they are.

An individual drone might not do a lot of damage and an individual drone might be easy to shoot down, but when hundreds of them come at you and they just never stop, that's when the problem Starts to occur. And why can they do hundreds of them? Because they only cost a few thousand dollars each. You don't need a gazillion dollars to build an air force of all of these drones in order to do it. And so I hear that in that there's this dismissiveness, and I won't just throw Trump under the bus. Armin Papperger, who is the CEO of Rheinmetall— Rheinmetall is the biggest defense contractor in Europe— referred to these drones dismissively in an Atlantic article. As made with 3D printers by a bunch of housewives in Ukraine.

He's right. Ukraine can't make them in a traditional factory because Russia would bomb it. So they've decentralized it so that they're made from house to house. You make your part, send it to your neighbor, they make their part, and you just keep moving it down the line. And it's impossible for Russia to know how do you get rid of this supply chain when it's decentralized like that.

So yeah, it is a bunch of housewives with 3D printers next to the refrigerator. Making these parts, and they're defeating the Russian army with this. And so, we really need to understand that it is that way. And you hear a lot of people also talking about, well, we've got these great bombers and we've got these aircraft carriers and these cruise missiles and they can blow stuff up. As Trump said today on Fox, we're going to beat the effing S out of them. Yeah, because we've got the kind of tool that can beat the effing S out of somebody. But that doesn't stop a decentralized, highly iterative warfare style.

Like I said, all it really does is create a war crime at the end of the day because you've attacked the civilian population, but you haven't stopped anything in terms of them having the ability to open the straits.

So, I think they get it at this point. The problem is the bureaucracy of moving along to try and fix it. Papperger at Rheinmetall is in the business of making tanks and airplanes and big expensive multi-billion dollar systems on 10-year contracts. He doesn't want to hear that the world wants to move to cheap iterative parts drones, most of which are made with commercial parts to keep the prices down low. So you're not even making military grade, you're actually using commercial parts because that's a threat to his business. And so that's going to be the thing is whether or not the bureaucracy is going to allow us to change Before it's too late.

AI: transformation, funding and the coming bubble

Erik Townsend: I want to move on to artificial intelligence, a subject that I've really been looking forward to talking to you about, Jim. It seems to me that we've reached a point where AI is a fire that we cannot put out, and it's because of the military argument. We can't let our enemy get something that would give it an advantage that we can't tolerate them having.

So we can't give up on this. We can't stop. We can't decide that AI's not the fad anymore. It has to continue. But at the same time, I see the spending and the CapEx just looking unsustainable to me. Are we headed for some kind of, well, it does have to continue, but it's going to crash along the way anyhow? If you think about it, that's kind of what happened with the internet boom. We had the dot-com boom. The people who thought the internet was going to be a really big deal were not getting it wrong. They just got a little bit ahead of themselves.

Jim Bianco: Let me start bigger picture here. The AI is the most transformative technology of the last 100 years. I've used the example that it is going to transform this country like nothing else has been since the railroads. And the railroads were hugely transformative. It used to take you 4 months to go from St. Louis to California in a covered wagon. And then when we got the railroads, it took 5 days. And that really changed everything about the very nature of our country when we got the railroads. AI's going to do that too. Why? Because most of us in the digital world of 2026, we spend our day— let me explain the day that most of us have. My day, your day, everybody's day. I spend my day in front of a screen and I have all these different software products open. They don't talk to each other and I'm the glue that makes everything work. I'm taking stuff out of here, out of an email, putting it into a spreadsheet. transposing it into a spreadsheet to put it into a PowerPoint presentation and then making a PDF and then sending it to somebody.

And I'm doing all of this stuff and it's very time-consuming and it's very expensive. Now, maybe if I don't do it, I'm paying a lot of assistants a lot of money to do it for me as well. The promise of AI, if you want me to put it bluntly, is you won't need your keyboard anymore. You'll have a contacts window and you'll just tell it to just do it for you. And look through my emails, which ones do I need to answer? Tell me about which ones are important and which ones aren't. That's it. You won't have to open out Outlook and search through them, all your unread emails or anything. It'll be very, very straightforward. Imagine like you had an assistant. So, I do believe that this is a hugely transformative technology.

Where are we going to get the money to pay for all of this AI buildout? 2 places. First of all, most of the estimates I've seen are that about 2% of the workforce is using AI in a productive capacity. We got 98% to go. 100% of the workforce uses a computer.

And what AI is going to be is the way you're going to use your computer in the future. So, we're eventually going to have to go to 100%. If you want to continue to be old school and use Microsoft Office and Outlook and PDFs and everything else, Then you're going to be old school. You're going to be looked at like that old guy from 20 years ago that was still sending faxes when email became very important.

So, there's a lot more growth that's going to come from it. Where's the money going to come from it? The average corporate computer spends, and I'm talking about corporate computer now, spends more in software in a year than the cost of that computer. If you think about security software, customer relations monitors, productivity tools like Microsoft Office or Word or Outlook and the like. You add it all up. And if you are in the financial sector, which a lot of us are, you might have a Bloomberg or a FactSet or an S&P Global subscription, and those aren't cheap. You're spending more in a year on software than the cost of your computer. If a lot of that gets diverted to, but AI can do a lot of this stuff, I don't need a lot of this software, which is why we had the SaaS-pocalypse, all the software stocks getting crushed.

Then that's where the money could come from. Is there an example in the past? Yes, your phone. Why do you pay $1,100 for an iPhone when you very rarely make a phone call on it? Because an iPhone is about 18 products all rolled up into one. It's a camera, it's a video recorder, it's a tape machine, it's a flashlight, it's a GPS machine, it's a communication device. You don't have to buy those other 17 products anymore, especially a camera and a video recorder. You do it with one purchase of a mobile phone, an iPhone or an Android phone, and therefore it's very cost-effective. And that's where the money came from to make Apple again now the most valuable company in the world, if over $5 trillion.

So we're going to divert a lot of our spending to it. That's where the optimistic part comes from. That's why Larry Page said in late 2024, I would rather Google go bankrupt than lose the AI race. Meaning all the Google products that we love, Search, Maps, Sheets, Documents, and the like, we're not going to be using those in the future. We're going to be using AI to do all that. And it better be, according to Google, it better be Gemini, their AI, or Gemini better have a place in it. Otherwise, their business is just going to get eaten away from them.

So, that's the optimistic argument of where it's going to come from. Now, where does it run into trouble? Every technology, every single one of them always ends in a bubble. This one will be no different. I would argue though, as we understand it today, we are not in that bubble yet. We're building the bubble. We're creating the bubble. We're not ready to pop the bubble. Why do I say that? Because every metric I read is compute, is at a deficit. We don't have enough of it. We only have 2% of the public or the population using this stuff, and you're going to need a lot more compute. That's why we're building data centers like crazy, and that's why we've got this whole political fight about data centers. I'll say to my friends, if you're not sure about this, in 2 to 5 years, you won't be using a keyboard. You'll still have one, just like you had a fax machine, And you'll barely use it because you won't need to.

You'll just talk to your computer and just tell it what you want and it'll give you the output that you need. You won't need to bang away at your keyboard for 35 minutes to do something. It'll take 2 minutes by just asking your computer to do it for you. And that's still coming. Now, eventually we'll get to that overcapacity point where we built too much.

The example I've used in the past is Global Crossing. Global Crossing was the fiber optic company that was laying fiber optic cable around the world. Because in the late 1990s and early 2000s, we perceived the demand for the internet as being infinite, and there was no amount of cable that they could lay that was too much.

And right now, by the estimates that I've seen, by 2001, Global Crossing laid more fiber optic cable than humanity will ever need to use. But investors were still throwing money at it to this just insane overcapacity. We'll probably do that with With AI, now the one caveat I would give you is: Does that mean we got to build another 10,000 data centers before we get to that overcapacity? Maybe, or maybe coming out of China, or maybe coming out of the labs here, we find a technological way to say the data centers that we have now can do 10, 20, 30x more compute with the same footprint. in the same number of chips than we're currently using. And that creates the massive overcapacity. That's why when things like Kimi K3 come outta China or DeepSeek from last year, everybody gets very nervous because they think, oh man, we just flipped over into massive overcapacity because of a technological advance.

I don't think we're there yet. So I'm fairly bullish on the AI sector. And the reason I say fairly bullish is I think it's going to go up. I think if you're going to invest in it, it's going to be a wild ride. It's been a wild ride. It will continue to be a wild ride. But you also have to remember it's going to end in a bubble and that's going to be very dangerous. Maybe that bubble is 3 or 4 years down the road, or maybe it's 3 or 4 weeks down the road. That's going to be the trick in trying to play this game. But this is just the way all technologies work right now. But I don't think it's too early. And I think that if you're skeptical of what I'm saying, I would humbly suggest you're not fully realizing the power that a lot of these large language models and these harnesses that you can use with these large language models and just what you're capable of doing by just asking a question and getting an answer.

And by the way, when I say asking a question and getting an answer, create me a spreadsheet with this. Create the chart that does this, make that line blue, and then send it to Erik on an email. That's it. I'm done. I'll go walk the dog, my computer grind away, do it, and send you the email. I don't have to open 8 programs and spend 45 minutes doing all of that work.

AI, energy and the US-China race

Erik Townsend: It seems to me, Jim, like this AI thing ultimately has to come down to energy. Who's got enough energy to, once you deal with the CapEx problem to build those data centers. You still got to actually power the data centers somehow. As you said, maybe there's some magic technological breakthrough that hasn't happened yet that somehow allows the data centers to run on less energy than they've required in the past. So all of a sudden, the data center that used to require a gigawatt now only requires a few megawatts. But I haven't read anything about any breakthroughs like that. Have you? And if not, what do you think about the seemingly unavoidable conclusion that whoever wins on the energy race side is going to win this AI race?

Jim Bianco: Yeah, I think you're right. I mean, keep in mind, as you pointed out, the way we measure data centers is in energy, right? A gigawatt. That's the metric we use. to measure these data centers. And so a lot of the compute constraint I was talking about is an energy constraint.

And the disadvantage that we have in the United States over China is that we are at an energy deficit for these data centers. They're not. They have the ability to scale data centers with energy. Now, the advantage that we have is people don't trust China. And what I mean by that, why does China put out these open weight models? Why does China basically create a Kimi K3 and just give it away? Here it is, you could download it, you could run it on your own server. Yeah, you need some serious hardware to run it, but if you're a big corporation or a bank or an insurance company, you've got that hardware to run it and you can have it on your software. Yeah, you could search it for bugs or anything. There's not going to be any bugs in it, but you You could model it yourself, and then it doesn't cost you anything in token usage to run queries on it.

Why do they do that? 2 reasons they do that.

One, they want to be disruptive, I think, in terms of the AI race. And 2, if they were to bring online a bunch of data centers and they were to say, hey, for $20 a month, you could sign up and use our model like you do with ChatGPT or with Claude, I think a lot of people would be very resistant to say, I'm not going to do that with China. I don't trust them.

So, that's why they have to wind up giving it away at any great degree. But you're right, energy is that measure. We don't have enough of it and China does. And when we try and alleviate that problem, we run into all kinds of problems because when data centers are built, Everybody comes to them and says, well, my electricity bill's going to go up.

And they say, no, well, we'll build a gas turbine power generator right next to the data center to power the data center. And everybody looks and goes, well, that's going to take 5 years of EPA and state reviews to even allow you to do something like that. So yeah, we are constraining ourselves with this. And the fear is that if we wind up Losing this race, it could be very detrimental. The computer is the central nexus of all business.

And what makes it work for us is we are the dominant player with the computer, whether it's the hardware, the software, or anything else associated with it. If we lose an important part of that to China, then we are at their whims and their beck and call. And that context window that you depend on doing your job with, you might need permission from China to use it, and we don't want to be down that road.

Erik Townsend: You say that as if it's a future tense, but I mean, haven't we already kind of lost some edge to China? I mean, if I look at China's new models that they're introducing, it seems like they're making an awful lot of progress awfully quickly. And it also seems that progress is aimed and targeted toward saying, look, we can do things that these other bigger companies are not doing, and we can do it with an open-source model that allows anybody to run it anywhere. Kind of hard to beat that.

Jim Bianco: Yeah, it is. But I would say that is a concern. But let's remember, when did Anthropic first develop Mythos, which is now Fable 5? February. It was February. And then they decided that it was the doomsday machine. And then they sat on it for a few months. And then if you remember, they gave it to a bunch of select corporate customers to play around with it, including the Treasury and the Fed. And then they rolled it out, then they banned it for 3 weeks, and then they rolled it out with a bunch of guardrails on it as well too.

So I still think we're 6 months ahead. We're just not allowing ourselves that when we make a breakthrough to immediately capitalize on it. But even if you accept that, in 6 months or in a year, the Chinese will be where we are right now, and we have to be ahead of them. And the problem you're going to face with that is that in 6 months or a year, if they've got a free version of the full-blown Mythos model for 95% of customers or 95% of corporate users, that's good enough. I mean, I'm not trying to cure cancer. I'm not trying to fly the I'm not trying to fly the Falcon 9 into outer space or doing something really, really complicated like that that requires severe, you know, major horsepower.

I'm just trying to get my life organized, get my inbox organized, getting my answers to my customers and everything. That model might be good enough. And if the answer is, well, I'll just use the Chinese version of it, then they might still win this race at the end of the day. And so that is a real risk. It absolutely is a risk.

Social backlash to AI and the fracking analogy

Erik Townsend: I think we're coming to a social conversation about AI, which is probably going to lead us toward, I don't know if it's universal basic income or what, but I think that the people who are complaining about AI stealing their jobs are going to expect some kind of, you know, AI has to pay a tax in order to right this wrong. I disagree with all of that. I don't think there's a wrong to be righted there, but I think that's the sentiment that we're dealing with. How do you see that resolving?

Jim Bianco: I was listening, I read a piece by Joe Nocera on The Free Press yesterday, and he made an excellent point that he said, if you look at the complaints that everybody has about AI, power usage, dirty water, noise, pollution, all that other stuff, these are exactly the same arguments they were making 15 years ago about fracking.

It's almost like they took the fracking playbook and they just applied it to AI. And the thing about AI is even Nocera said, look, for every one of those complaints that you have, there is a solution. If you're complaining about groundwater usage, they recycle the water. They have a certain amount of water they use for cooling and they just keep recycling it. They don't use any of your groundwater. If you're worried about your electric bill, they'll bring their own power. If you're worried about pollution, there's not really a whole lot of pollution with them.

If you're worried about noise or blightness, they'll put them in out-of-the-way places. And oh, by the way, they're more than happy to pay really nice real estate taxes to your county or your city in order for you to fund your schools and your fire departments and your police departments as well too. So I think at the end of the day, A lot of this pushback is once we start to understand it, once we start to see the need for it, it'll become like the fracking argument. We tried to ban fracking in Pennsylvania, just like New York State is trying to ban data centers right now.

We went down that road, but where are we right now with fracking? We're the number one producer of oil in the world right now, and it's largely done because of fracking. We kind of worked through a lot of those issues with fracking and we found a happy medium between the public's concerns and what the industry needed. And I think we could do the same with data centers as well too.

Erik Townsend: Well, Jim, I can't thank you enough for a terrific interview as always. Before I let you go though, please tell our listeners a little bit more about what you do at Bianco Research, what services are on offer there, and how people can follow your work.

Jim Bianco: So we have 2 businesses. We have our institutional research business, biancoresearch.com. Find out more about us there or on the socials at Bianco Research on Twitter, X, on YouTube. My name, Jim Bianco, on LinkedIn. And our second business is we manage a fixed income total return index under the website Bianco Advisors. And there's an ETF that tracks our index with our partners at WisdomTree under the ticker symbol WTBN.

Where's the Trade: TLT bear put spread

Erik Townsend: And now it's time for Patrick, Where's the Trade?

Patrick Ceresna: Thanks, Erik. Jim Bianco's core warning was that inflation remains too persistent for the bond market to relax, and that either the Fed tightens further or long-term yields do the tightening for it. As the old bond market saying goes, bond investors can stop panicking when the Fed starts panicking. Jim's point is that the Fed still has not shown enough concern to give the long end an all clear. The cleanest way I'd express that view is through the iShares 20-Year Treasury Bond ETF, symbol TLT, trading around $82.55.

This trade can be used in 2 ways. For investors who believe yields are headed higher, it is a defined-risk bearish position designed to profit from another decline in the long-duration bonds. At the same time, for investors who already own TLT or other long-duration Treasury exposure, it can serve as a short-term protective overlay to reduce portfolio losses if bonds sell off further. What makes this setup interesting is that the implied volatility on long-duration Treasuries remains relatively inexpensive. The Fed announcement lifted volatility by roughly 2 points, but it is still on the lower end of its year-to-date range. So the goal is to use that relatively cheap optionality to create asymmetric downside exposure without committing substantial capital.

The structure is the bear put spread. You buy downside protection near the current market price, then sell a lower strike put to reduce the cost. If you are bearish, the spread pays off as TLT falls. If you already own bonds, those same profits help offset losses in the underlying position. It does not eliminate all downside risk, but it creates a defined protection band at a known cost. Now, using the August 21st, 2026 expiration, 22 days out, I'd buy the $82 put for $0.80 and sell the $80 put for $0.30.

That creates a $2-wide bear put spread for a $0.50 net debit. The maximum profit is $1.50, giving you a 3-to-1 payoff if TLT finishes at or below $80 by expiration. And that's how we accomplish the goal, a capital-efficient bearish trade for investors expecting higher yields or a low-cost protective spread for investors looking to hedge existing long bond exposure. And that's where's the trade.

Erik Townsend: Patrick analyzes and trades the markets every day over at Big Picture Trading. MacroVoices listeners can sign up for a free 2-week trial at BigPictureTrading.com. Now back to Patrick and Massil

Trading Desk: equities, CTA selling and COT positioning

Massil Beguenane: Before we get into the major asset classes, Patrick, Jim said something about the long bond that lines up almost perfectly with what I'm seeing in this week's positioning data. So first on equities, Patrick, what are you watching?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, Mass, the week began with optimism that the pause in hostilities could reopen the path toward an Iranian agreement, briefly pulling oil lower and supporting equities. That optimism quickly collapsed as Iran resumed missile attacks and the United States retaliated, sending oil sharply higher and putting renewed inflation pressure back into the market. So, equities entered the FOMC already vulnerable, trading near 1-month lows as the global AI and semiconductor trade continued to unwind, led by an extraordinary rout in South Korea. That South Korean KOSPI was down over 40% in just over a month, and the The SOX semiconductor index in the US down almost 25% over the same timeframe. So then we got the FOMC meeting yesterday where the Fed then delivered a hawkish hold. 3 policymakers preferred an immediate hike, but Warsh provided little forward guidance, leaving the market with tighter financial conditions and greater policy uncertainty in what many are calling the biggest non-cut surprise in decades.

In the aftermath, the decisive stress came from the bond market. The 30-year Treasury yield broke to approximately 524 basis points. It's the highest level since 2007, tightening the valuation pressure on equities, having the S&P 500 break to a fresh 1-month low. Mag Seven earnings last night Reinforced the market's growing sensitivity around AI spending. Microsoft was rewarded for delivering credible growth and cash flow, while Meta fell sharply as rising costs and capital expenditures overshadowed its revenue growth. This will put all the focus on Apple and Amazon that report after today's closing bell. So, the technical breakdown was not caused by one headline, But from a perfect storm of disappointments.

But what compounds this is that we've now walked right to the edge of the systematic selling cliff with the S&P 500 beginning to trip the short-term CTA triggers near 7,455.

These strategies are not making a discretionary call on fundamentals. They are responding mechanically to price, and Goldman estimates that they could sell roughly $31 billion globally in a downtape over the next week, rising to as much as $184 billion over the next month if the decline continues through additional trend-level triggers.

That does not guarantee a major market break because the medium and long-term signals remain positive, but it does mean the bulls are now fighting an additional headwind. Every move lower risks creating forced selling that adds fuel to the decline.

Massil Beguenane: And Patrick, I want to show you what's happening in the data here. So I'm looking at the Commitment of Traders report, which is the CFTC's weekly snapshot of futures markets positioning. And I'm looking at the latest report here, which was released on Friday, July 24th, and reflects positions held as of Tuesday, July 21st. So remember, this is a positioning snapshot rather than real time. Now, what happened in the market here in the past week? The S&P was down 2% and the NASDAQ at 4.5%. Now, looking at the COTSignal.com data charts, that's under the market deep dive, large speculators are now only net short 21,000 contracts. But let's actually break that down and see what it means. So I want to go back to that June peace deal gap higher that we saw in markets because we saw here that gross shorts collapsed from roughly 460,000 contracts to 272,000, while gross long positions remained broadly unchanged right around 250,000 contracts.

So, in other words, the recent rally that we saw here since the June peace deal was driven primarily by short covering rather than aggressive new buying. But the important thing to know about what's happening today is that while equities are breaking key technical levels, like we're seeing the S&P here breaking its 50-day moving average, a sustained decline lower would force systematic funds to start selling and speculators to potentially rebuild their short positioning. Now let's turn to the dollar. What's going on here?

Trading Desk: US dollar after the FOMC

Patrick Ceresna: Well, the US dollar entered the FOMC pressing against its 52-week highs and threatening a significant bullish breakout. That advance had been supported by rising oil prices, renewed inflation concerns, and expectations for tighter Fed policy. Instead, the Fed held rates steady and failed to validate the market's hawkish expectations, triggering a sharp reversal in the dollar and front-end Treasury yields. Technically, the dollar has backed away from resistance, but has not yet suffered enough damage to invalidate the broader bullish structure. The next few sessions are critical. A recovery back toward the highs would suggest that this was merely a post-FOMC positioning flush.

On the other end of that, continued weakness would indicate the meeting has interrupted the advance and opened the door for a deeper mean reversion, correcting back to retracement zones under the $100 handle.

Massil Beguenane: All right, nothing new on the dollar week over week, Patrick. I mean, technically speaking, we're seeing the dollar breaking above a key 15-month trading range, but the positioning still confirms that large speculators remain at 1-year highs.

Trading Desk: crude oil and speculator positioning

Massil Beguenane: All right, now let's turn to crude, Patrick. Lots of volatility here. What's happening over the last week?

Patrick Ceresna: When talking crude oil, it has become again the geopolitical headline market. The failed diplomatic pause and renewed US-Iran attacks have put the Strait of Hormuz and roughly 20% of the global oil flows back at risk, causing the markets to rapidly rebuild the disruption premium. That risk is colliding with an increasingly thin physical buffer.

US crude inventories fell 7.2 million barrels last week to roughly 6% below their seasonal average, while the SPR continues to be drawn down. With inventories tight and refineries running near capacity, any supply interruption now has an outsized impact on price.

Technically, July delivered an extraordinary 40% advance from trough to peak before the hopes of diplomatic progress triggered a sharp correction back towards $80 a level. When those negotiations failed, buyers immediately returned and crude oil resumed its advance, suggesting the pullback was corrective rather than a breakdown in the trend. Now, oil is back above its key moving averages. Dips continue to attract demand, and the broader bullish structure remains intact. The key technical question is whether this marks the beginning of the next impulse higher, one capable of carrying crude toward that psychologically important $100 level. For now, the market has room to extend. The test is whether momentum follows through or another administration headline interrupts that advance.

Massil Beguenane: All right, Patrick, I'm actually excited to take a deeper dive on crude oil here because of the divergence we're seeing in positioning. I mean, look at this. I invite everyone to look at the market deep dive section of the COTSignal.com page, and that's on the WTI. And just like you said, crude advanced 40% in just 3 to 4 weeks. And the net positioning graph shows large speculators' shorts near a 5-year extreme around 228,000 contracts, while gross longs have fallen from around 380,000 to just over 300,000 today. Isn't that crazy? I mean, look, price is rising without shorts meaningfully capitulating. Or the longs even aggressively joining the move higher. And that's why I think oil still has fuel to run for another leg higher as shorts will be forced to cover and longs begin rebuilding exposure. Now let's just watch what happens over the next few weeks.

On gold now, Patrick, what are you seeing?

Trading Desk: gold range and positioning

Patrick Ceresna: Gold has spent the past month consolidating between roughly $4,000 support and $4,200 resistance, with neither the bulls nor the bears able to force a decisive resolution. The principal headwinds remain a firm US dollar and rising real yields, which increase the opportunity cost of holding a non-yielding asset such as gold. Gold rallied following the FOMC as the dollar initially weakened, but the move has not yet broken the broader trade range. What is notable is gold's resilience despite 10-year real yields reaching their highest level since late 2023. The metal continues to defend the $4,000 level. That suggests substantial Macro pressure has already been absorbed. The Middle East creates a 2-sided influence. Geopolitical instability supports safe haven demand, but the higher oil prices also threaten renewed inflation, initial Fed tightening, and still higher real yields, which would work against gold.

Technically, $4,000 is now the critical dividing line. If bulls continue to defend it and gold can clear $4,200, That would suggest that the market has absorbed the dollar and yield headwinds and is beginning a new advance. Conversely, a decisive breakdown below $4,000 would complete a downside measured move down towards the $3,700 to $3,600 level, a further decline of another $300 to $400.

Point being that there is no clear technical breakout to yet suggest a new trend move, but we'll be watching this closely.

Massil Beguenane: Now, look at this, Patrick. Gold has gone down 26% from its Feb highs. That's almost $1,500. Yet neither gross longs nor gross shorts have changed materially. We flatlined on positioning all year. Now, the question is what kind of move in gold we will need to see, to see those large speculators meaningfully reposition. And most importantly, which side breaks first here? Now, listeners, if you want to see what I'm seeing, don't forget to visit COTSignal.com so you can start following the data along with us.

COT Signal Positioning Pulse: the long bond

Patrick Ceresna: All right, it's time for the COT Signal Positioning Pulse. Mass, at the top, you were teasing with something that you were watching. What's on your mind here, bud?

Massil Beguenane: Well, you know, Patrick, Jim made a critical point earlier in the show, which is that in a persistently inflationary world, the long bond doesn't need rate cuts. It needs the Fed to restore its inflation-fighting credibility. Now, if investors believe the Fed is behind the curve, easier policy actually pushes long yields higher. Effectively, the market demands more compensation for inflation and duration risk.

And we just watched this happening live yesterday. The Fed talked tough at the Fed meeting. You know, there was 3 dissents for a rate hike, and the 30-year still hit 5.2%.

That's the highest yield we've seen since 2007. So, it's definitely not something to ignore. Now, here's what positioning adds to Jim's story. Large speculators have pushed shorts roughly 187 contracts net That may not seem like a lot, but that's near the bottom of the last 5 years range. So, we're definitely on an extreme there.

And the bearish bond thesis isn't just a consensus view anymore. It's fully expressed in actual positioning with real money. So, here's the one thing to watch. The day bonds stop falling on bad news, whether it's a hot inflation print or it's an ugly auction or it's a hawkish Fed speech, and listeners will definitely want to follow that September Fed meeting closely for that.

If you start to see the long bond refusing to make new lows, that's when I would expect a short-covering reversal in the long end. Until then, if you want to track all this by yourself, go to cotsignal.com's webpage. The first graph under the market deep dive will show you when that short covering starts week over week. That's it for the positioning calls for the week. Back to you, Patrick.

Patrick Ceresna: That does it for this week's Trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane We'll see you next week.

Sign-off and disclaimer

Erik Townsend: And a reminder, as a MacroVoices listener, you're entitled to a 2-week free trial of Big Picture Trading, where you can watch Patrick analyze and trade the markets live every single day at BigPictureTrading.com. No credit card is required to sign up, and there's nothing to cancel. I'm Erik Townsend, and this is MacroVoices. We'll see you next week. MacroVoices is presented for informational and entertainment purposes only. The information presented on MacroVoices should not be construed as investment advice. Always consult a licensed investment professional before making investment decisions. The views and opinions expressed on MacroVoices are those of the participants and do not necessarily reflect those of the show's hosts or sponsors.

MacroVoices, its producers, sponsors, and hosts shall not be liable for losses resulting from investment decisions based on information or viewpoints presented on MacroVoices.

MacroVoices transcripts are machine-transcribed, then corrected and edited by AI under MacroVoices' editorial rules: names, terms and figures are checked against the audio where the text is uncertain, and this free transcript is the corrected verbatim text: it keeps what each speaker said, including fillers, repeats and false starts (the subscriber edition is the edited reading copy). Nothing is added; every edit is logged against the verbatim transcript, which MacroVoices keeps. Timestamps refer to the published audio. Errors are still possible — where it matters, listen. Nothing on MacroVoices is investment advice: the views expressed are the participants' own, and MacroVoices, its hosts and producers accept no liability for decisions made on the basis of this material.

Subscribers get the formatted edition of this episode as PDF and HTML — the research-note outline with every market call flagged, the contents with links into the text, the guest's earlier MacroVoices appearances and related episodes, the edited transcript and the glossary — and the one-page Episode Brief. Open the subscriber edition.

Luke Gromen — Forest for the Trees founder (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Episode preview and Trading Desk teaser

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 542 was produced on July 23rd, 2026. I'm Erik Townsend. Forest for the Trees founder Luke Gromen returns as this week's feature interview guest. Luke and I will revisit how the Strait of Hormuz stayed closed for more months than almost anyone thought possible, but also why the price response that both Luke and I expected from the crude oil market didn't materialize, along with what comes next as the conflict reescalates. We'll also cover precious metals, inflation, monetary policy, and much more. Then stay tuned for our new and improved MacroVoices Trading Desk, where Patrick and Massil will deliver a fast-paced market wrap featuring Patrick's Trade of the Week, fresh positioning insights from the Commitments of Traders reports, and a concise breakdown of the key markets you need to watch.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. The S&P 500 spent the week pulling back from its highs and consolidating ahead of the heart of earnings season, with several of the Mag Seven set to report and potentially determine the next leg for the broader market. Crude oil, meanwhile, continues its powerful advance, rising roughly another 1,300 basis points week over week and trading near $88.43 at the time of this recording. We'll take a closer look at those moves and the key charts and positioning signals after the interview on the MacroVoices trading desk. Now, this week's feature interview guest is Forest for the Trees founder Luke Gromen. Erik and Luke discuss how the Iran conflict, China's energy strategy, fiscal expansion, and mounting pressure on global bond markets may accelerate the shift towards financial repression, gold, and a more fragmented monetary system.

Erik's interview with Luke Gromen is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Iran war and Hormuz: what Gromen got right and wrong

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's your host,

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Forest for the Trees founder, Luke Gromen. Luke, it's great to get you back on the show. Last time we had you on, the Iran crisis was just starting. You and I got ridiculed for talking about even the possibility that it could last as long as until July. Everybody said, no, it's going to be 2 or 3 weeks.

The crazy thing is it was your call that it could go as long as July. You got that exactly right, but I don't think you were expecting the price to be where it was when we got to— Wait a minute. beginning of July. Oh no, now it is. I have to take stock of what minute it is that we're recording in because it'll all be different by the time our listeners hear this. So what's happened the way we thought it was going to happen? What's happened the way we didn't think it was going to happen? And where do you see it headed from here?

Luke Gromen: Thanks for having me back on. Of course, we wrote a mea culpa of sorts to clients probably 2 or 3 weeks ago where we said, look, we had high conviction that The Iran war was going to last much longer than consensus thought. That's absolutely happened. We had high conviction that Hormuz would still be closed in May and probably in June and possibly on July 4th. And as we sit here today, July 21st, it's closed again.

That's worked. And where we got it wrong was really twofold.

Number one, the price, obviously. If you would've told me, hey, Hormuz is still going to be closed, I would've thought equity indices would be lower. I would've thought inflation higher, and I would've thought oil higher. And I think part and parcel to the oil side of that has been the reaction of China, which a lot of other folks got wrong as well in terms of their reaction, which is to say in the first half of '26 alone, they shifted 1.4 million barrels a day of demand for oil to EVs.

They reduced demand overall for, by 3 to 4 million barrels a day. That has to be in part a rundown of their SPR reserves. And that's really an astonishing thing that you're able to take oil demand down by that much. And yet it was conventional wisdom that China would be worst hurt or one of the worst hurt by what was going on. And yet China's exports to the world were up 27%. Year over year in May.

China's corporate profits year to date up 19, 20%.

They have weathered it much better than I, or I think anyone else would have thought. And that kind of brings us to where we are today, which is sort of, you know, as of a week and a half ago, as we used to say, I don't know if you ever played streetball, whether you're playing football or hockey, whatever, you know, car goes by, game off, car leaves the street, game back on, right? We're game back on from a much worse starting point or much more challenging starting point than we were when we originally said game on. So that's kind of where I see things as they stand today.

China's geopolitical leverage: EVs, solar, yuan swap lines

Erik Townsend: Luke, let's talk a little bit more about China because I think the big surprise here was what we just learned about how much power China has on the geopolitical stage in the world. And how much its energy reserves really give it leverage to flex that power. I mean, we saw China basically intervene to stop what could have been a really huge price dislocation. China said, no, we're not going to let that happen. Whether they did that as a promise, quid pro quo of some kind to President Trump, or if they just did it to save the economy so that their exports wouldn't get clobbered, I'm not sure. But one way or another, China just showed us that they have more power than anybody understood.

Luke Gromen: Oh, absolutely. This was always a pain contest when you go back to when this started, and consensus was that China was going to be hit first. My view was that the Treasury market would get hit first, and I think that ended up playing out correctly. We can see, you know, the MOVE Treasury Volatility Index hit near dysfunctional levels on March 27th, and literally within 12 hours of each other, early the next week, equity volatility and bond volatility peaked and fell precipitously, which is very, very odd. You wouldn't expect that with MOVE hitting 120. You'd expect volatility in bonds and equities to continue rising and feeding back off each other. So I think there was some intervention by Treasury or Fed or somebody else.

So the Treasury market did show its vulnerability before the Chinese.

But to your point, the Chinese showed they could have taken pain for a lot longer. Certainly well beyond when the treasury market would dysfunction, number one. But number two, they showed the geopolitical power. We can cut our oil imports 3 to 4 million barrels a day, which is an astonishing number, and still grow.

And when you really look at some of the components of growth, yeah, they were shorting themselves oil to prevent a much bigger market an oil supply catastrophe throughout Southeast Asia and across the Global South. Let's not kid ourselves, the Global South would've suffered far more than the Treasury market and probably faster.

So the Chinese, whether they intended to do it or not, created some real good political goodwill amongst potential trading partners. The other thing that they demonstrated that I think is still not really well understood or appreciated in the West is they just showed a whole bunch of potential customers Hey, watch what we can do. We, by using our solar panels, our EV setups, our EVs, our battery array setups, which, oh, by the way, China dominates the production of globally, you can shift your oil consumption down meaningfully and begin to isolate yourself or hedge yourself from the oil policy and the foreign policy of the United States. So, Let us sell you a bunch of solar panels. Let us sell you a bunch of EVs. Let us sell you a bunch of lithium-ion battery arrays.

Let us sell you the know-how to set it all up. You can then reduce your oil demand. You can reduce your demand for dollars as a result, since oil is still mostly priced in dollars. And oh, by the way, since China has large yuan swap lines set up with basically every country in the world except for the United States, the swap lines are already there. Pay us in yuan or pay us however you like.

But I think absolutely when you look at it through that lens, the Chinese demonstrated an ability to take pain much more than the West. And that doesn't even get into some of what we've seen in terms of the rundown of Western weapons stores, The ongoing rare earth drama where the US is still squawking that China isn't sending enough, or in some cases any, to the US that we need for weapons and other industrial goods, et cetera. So yeah, I, as we sit here on July 21st, I think objectively China demonstrated that it has a lot more geopolitical flexibility vis-à-vis oil and commodities than was appreciated 5 months ago.

China's long game: bond stress, Hamiltonian economics, gold settlement

Erik Townsend: Let's talk about where energy prices go from here, because I can make the argument that, boy, we're just getting started. We're finally seeing the rubber meet the road in Iran. This is only beginning. It's all uphill from here. But then I can make the opposite argument and say, wait a minute, China just pulled off a miracle with basically containing oil prices.

Whether they did that as a favor to Trump or not isn't clear, but they might be persuaded to do it as a favor to Trump. He needs that favor right now in a big way before the elections. So it seems to me like, why wouldn't they just continue draining SPRs and doing everything to manipulate the price of energy temporarily lower? That game won't last forever, but it'll last until the elections.

Luke Gromen: Yeah, I think it's a distinct possibility. I'm not convinced that China wants to do Trump any favors. I think they want to do Trump just enough favors so that he hangs himself on his own petard, which is to say, if I'm China, I keep oil prices low enough for there to not be a crisis, high enough to keep inflation rising while simultaneously selling everyone on every side of every conflict the weapons they need because China's really the only person that can do that. And that includes the United States because that will keep Chinese economic growth going robustly.

And then I just let the bond markets do what they're going to do because if I keep oil prices from a real crisis, but I keep inflation elevated and I keep the disruptions that these conflicts and the inflationary impulse of these conflicts going, look around the world what's happening to global bond markets. Every bond market in the world, US straining on the upside, Japan straining on the upside, Europe straining on the upside, UK straining on the upside.

The only bond market— Korea straining on the upside. The only bond market in the world that's not straining on the upside is China.

And so China's long-term goal for going on 20 years has been to change the global currency system towards one that better suits China and most of the rest of the world, including a big part of the United States, by the way. They've been very clear about that since 2009, which is when they wrote, we want to move to a non-credit-based currency with a neutral settlement asset. They've repeated that over and over. They've said, we don't want the yuan to replace the dollar. We want gold to replace the Treasury bond as neutral reserve asset. We want to internationalize the yuan, which means we want to buy oil and gas in yuan, and we're going to use gold settlement to do that. They've been very clear for 15 years, 16 years on this.

And so if that is their strategic goal, they can achieve that simply by stringing, by doing just enough to keep oil prices low enough to not create a severe crisis, high enough to create inflation in the US and the world, keep these conflicts going so that they can keep selling components and weapons to everybody. They can keep selling lots of EV batteries, solar panels to everybody, gaining clout there. And in the meantime, that's going to generate enough inflation that it's going to create a bond market crisis in the US, in Japan, in Europe. I don't know where it starts in the UK. I don't know where it starts first, but it doesn't matter because once one goes, they're all going to go.

And once they all go, then we're right back to the same moment we've seen replay 6 or 7 times since 2020 or late '19, which is, does Warsh want to save the bond market or does he want to save the dollar? Does Bessent want to save the bond market or save the dollar?

And again, this isn't necessarily a negative for the US. You had Bessent come out 4 weeks ago and give a speech in New York where he said the US is moving to Hamiltonian economics. He, in case anybody missed that or thought he was mistaken, he wrote an op-ed saying Trump's economic plan is based on Hamiltonian economics.

That echoes something US Trade Representative Greer said back at Davos in January, right before we started all this silliness in Iran, where he said the US is shifting to a Hamiltonian economic plan.

And what is a Hamiltonian economic plan? It is high tariffs, neutral reserve asset that floats in all currencies. And so to me, if I'm China, this is going great. This is moving me where I want my strategic to be because the ultimate strategic victory is the ability to buy oil and gas and other commodities in their own currency, settle in gold that floats in all currencies.

And now the US, Bessent and Greer are on board with it. Vance is on board with it based on comments he made last year and earlier this year at Davos. Trump is on board with it. He said he wants us to go back to 1870 to 1913 when we had high tariffs and taxed foreigners to pay for our people. Which is again, a version of a Hamiltonian economic system. So I think that's where this is all ultimately going.

Now, that's sort of the strategic of it, but life is what happens while you're busy making other plans. Everyone has a plan till they get punched in the mouth. Choose your metaphor or your statement on it. When you're in wars, stuff happens and things don't go according to plan. So let's see. But I think I think China will be happy to just keep this thing going.

Erik Townsend: China will be happy to keep this thing going in the sense of prolonging the crisis and extending it?

Luke Gromen: The longer the US stays at war, the better it is for them. And people might think that's a controversial statement, but let's go back in time. Let's look at the relative power of the United States and China in 2003 when we invaded Iraq. Compare that now to 2020. Compare that now to 2026.

Who won and who lost by us going to war for 23 years? It wasn't America, it was China. Why would China want us to stop being at war? It's the best thing for them.

China's next moves: rare earths, helium ban, Chinese AI

Erik Townsend: Okay. If that's what's best for them, then where do you think they're going to take this next? What's their next policy move?

Luke Gromen: You've seen a couple things that I think hint at what the next policy move is, which is number one, you've seen continued constriction of rare earth volumes. You've had numerous articles out, complaints that the Chinese are not abiding by what they've agreed to in the trade agreements, which is exactly what you'd expect if they want this thing to last longer.

And I don't think it's a bad policy on their part. I would— I think Americans that expect the Chinese to sell the US the weapons to point at the Chinese need to think a little harder.

But there was this interesting article last week highlighting that the Chinese had implemented helium export bans last week, which I thought was a really, really interesting signpost because first thing I did is I called up the price of helium and the price of helium's on the floor. Like it's, they're giving the stuff away. So why would they need to export bans? Okay.

That's number one. Number 2 is who's the biggest producers of helium worldwide? Number one's the United States of America. Number 2's Qatar. And what's number 3?

What's helium used for? It's used— the most important thing as it relates to our economy today is it's used in semiconductor chip production. So you have the Chinese come out and say, we're going to ban the export of helium. Why would they do that? Price is on the floor. US is the biggest producer. Qatar's the biggest producer, and we need it for semiconductors. China thinks Qatar's going back offline again, number one. And number 2, China thinks the US might curtail how much helium we'll send them. Well, why would China think Those things. And there's only one thing that sort of checks all those boxes, which is the war's going to last longer than expected, and the Americans are going to be honked off about something and weaponize helium against the Chinese.

So I looked at that as a really big sort of puzzle piece around all of this, that the Chinese think it's going to continue to go a lot longer and that they're making preparations for that and for helium to be weaponized against them.

Perhaps even as part and parcel to what we've seen in the last week, which is, holy cow, Chinese AI is suddenly starting to threaten to disintermediate US AI models at the frontier, which is something that nobody thought possible. Which again, to me, the first time, fool me once, shame on you. Fool me twice, shame on me. How about fool me 6 or 7 times? How many times have we heard, hey, The Chinese, they're cheaper, but they'll never be better. And then it's like, oh, they're cheaper and better. Like I've heard that 6, 8, 10, 15 times in my, over my last 25 years of my career. And here once again, we have that going on that where, oh, they're just cheaper, but they're not as good. Oh, they're about as good. Oh, they're better and they're cheaper. And that's a moment we're reaching in AI.

And so maybe it's, maybe the helium ban has nothing to do with the war. Maybe it's everything to do with the Americans are getting desperate and need to find another way to slow the Chinese down and are saying, They'll probably cut helium exports to us to try to slow down our chip production.

Maybe that's it.

But all of it speaks to a conflict that is going to continue to go on, that is going to continue to add to global inflation because there'll be tit-for-tat restrictions of supplies, et cetera, in both directions and around the world. And then, you know, go back to square one. Whose bond markets are getting hurt by this? Not the Chinese bond market.

Erik Townsend: So China basically sits back, allows the US to stay at war while China quietly builds out even more AI capability, more dominance with respect to AI and so forth. And they continue to build out more power dominance, more energy dominance at the same time, which will support that AI agenda down the road.

They basically just Sitting back and smartly watching the US damage itself and quietly getting ahead.

Luke Gromen: Yeah, there was a dear friend of mine who sent me Kishore Mahbubani, and he gave a speech last week or 2 weeks prior. This is a guy, very serious, very high degree of gravitas, saying that the West is sleepwalking. into its downfall. And one of the things he said was just fascinating. He said, where is your reflection about how many people you have killed around the world over the last 30 years?

And the whole point is, is like, you guys are 4% of population. The rest of the world is a lot bigger than you, and we're moving on. And so yeah, I think that's exactly what China's doing, which is just, you know, When you've got a dog that won't stop chasing cars, let it catch the car and then see what it wants to do.

I mean, the one thing I hear, I've heard from multiple different relationships in and around China is essentially like, what is it with you Americans in the Middle East? Why do you keep doing this to yourselves? Like, what are you doing? And they're happy. Like, okay, well, if you want to do that again, great. It didn't work for you the last 23 years. Maybe it'll work for you this time.

I think it's exactly what they're doing. This is what I would do.

Outcome: yield curve control, defense borrowing, Bessent and Trump

Erik Townsend: So where do you think this is all headed? What is the outcome for China and for the US?

Luke Gromen: I think the ultimate outcome is that it's going to force the West into either some form of implicit or explicit yield curve control to control their bond markets. Because when you look at what the West is doing, not only is war always inflationary, it's always inflationary, always. There's never been a deflationary war ever in history.

So war's going to last longer than expected. Supply chain interruptions are going to last longer than expected. Sell bonds. And people all over the world, by the way, are selling bonds.

But in the last month, Trump got everybody together in NATO and what have you, and there appears to be a coordinated effort. And I say that because in 3 weeks' time, the US, the UK, the Koreans, and the Japanese all seem to come to the same idea simultaneously, which is— and the Germans, excuse me, as well. They all came to the same idea, which is, hey, we need growth, we need supply chains. Let's all borrow money and build our defense base.

So historically, the Japanese have been creditors of the United States. The Germans have been creditors of the world, right? They're running surpluses. The Koreans to a lesser extent. And so now you've got 3 big creditors structurally in the global economy over the last 50 years now turning borrowers to build their Basically engage in what I would call defense stimmies, right?

Do we go back to 2021? It was consumer stimmies. US, UK, Germany, Korea, Japan, all doing defense stimmies. We're all borrowing money and we are going to build, we're going to build out our defense. Okay. On some level that makes some sense, but into supply chain breaks, into war, into rundown of inventories, into issues in the oil market that are getting more pre— more obvious by the day when you look at various crack spreads and refining spreads, This week, for example, your buyers of bonds are turning borrowers, sellers of bonds, Germany, Japan, Korea, and building this stuff out's going to be inflationary because you're not going to use China for any of it. And China's the biggest industrial base in the world.

And so it all says sell bonds, sell bonds, sell bonds. And that suggests rates are going to keep going up until something is triggered. And something, it could be Japan, it could be UK, it could be Germany, it could be US, I don't know. But then someone's going to need, you know, once one starts into yield curve control of some description, they're all going to need to.

And you'll get all those currencies weakening. They should all weaken together against the yuan and against gold. But if they all weaken together, then maybe they all could look around at each other and they all fall at the same rate. Nobody really looks like their currency's getting weaker, but inflation in all these countries will be going bonkers on the upside. Their equity markets will be going bonkers on the upside in their local currency terms. Their equity markets will be falling in gold terms because gold will really be going on the upside. I think Bitcoin would do really well in that case. So I think that's where this is all heading.

The $64,000 question to me is A, when? And B, does Warsh decide he wants to be Mr. Tough Guy and pretend that he can fight inflation by hiking rates first? And that could be the catalyst for sort of the downside and rates running. higher and forcing all this. I don't know.

Erik Townsend: Do you think Trump and Bessent have a master plan for how they're going to get out of this or how they're going to get through this conflict that's coherent and makes sense now?

Luke Gromen: I don't know. I've heard that bad news does not get reported to Trump. I've heard this from multiple different people that don't know each other. And I've worked for organizations where the CEO doesn't like to get told bad news, and so he doesn't. And Those aren't good organizations. Those are companies that don't do well.

You know, I think Bessent is extremely bright. I think on some level he doesn't have ultimate decision. I think Trump does, even on stuff as it relates to the economy.

And I have seen multiple instances where Bessent has said things that he either knows to be false or should know they're false. For example, when he was on with Tucker Carlson in April of 2025 and he told Tucker Carlson with a straight face that we as the debtor nation have all the leverage, not the Chinese.

Within 2 months, he was eating his words, which was very obvious at the time. So was that bravado? Was that just dogma since he really does not like China and has not liked China for a long time? I don't know.

I've seen him see— there are other examples in oil markets where when he said he was going to lower oil prices down to $50, $60, and he was going to grow production by 3 million barrels a day of equivalent as part of his Three Arrows plan. And I know for a fact that he had oil analysts telling him that was impossible, and he told those oil analysts, I don't believe you. And yet here we are a year and a half later, and guess what?

That part of the Three Arrows, actually the whole Three Arrows are all right in the toilet, but that part of the Three Arrows is right in the toilet.

On some level, I think they have a North Star they are aiming for, which is this Hamiltonian economics that we discussed earlier that Bessent talked about 4 weeks ago, that Greer talked about again this week with the New York Times, back in January in Davos. Vance referred to it as the, I think he called it the stupid rules-based global order or the stupid that hollowed out our industrial base, something along those lines. And Trump, of course, talked about how America was richest and best from 1870 to 1913 when we were taxing foreigners via tariffs to pay for our citizens as opposed to taxing our citizens to pay for foreigners. That's almost the direct quote from Trump.

All of those things, I think, point to a goal of we would like to change the structure of the global monetary system, higher tariffs, Neutral reserve assets. So probably settling in gold. And oh, by the way, in the last 10 months, 8 of those 10 months, gold has been the US's number one export, bigger than pharmaceutical preparations, bigger than jet engines, bigger than oil. 2 months that it wasn't, it was oil and it was pharmaceutical preparations.

I think they have a strategic plan on that front. Tactically, I think they're just messing it up as they go. This Iran thing is just a disaster in terms of trying to achieve that. It is not working out for them the way they thought. And I think they don't know what to do. And I think they are— I think Trump in particular doesn't want to hear that. There was even a Washington Post article this week where the military's trying to tell him, we don't have the weapons to keep this thing going. He don't want to hear it.

I think there is a strategic plan sort of as a North Star, but sort of the tactics they're using to get there, what's the plan with that? I don't see how the tactics are necessarily working in favor of the strategic plan.

Oil price outlook: too hard to call, own gold

Erik Townsend: How do you come to a view on energy prices in this environment? Because I mean, it's so easy to say, well, gee, you and I both thought that if it went on this long, we'd be at $150 prices. We didn't get anywhere close to that. Actually, we went above that briefly for some local markets, but We haven't stayed sustained above that level. I'm not sure that we're not still headed there, and I can't decide. It's very clear that China can step in at any time they want to and kind of calm things down. I'm not sure that China would want to do Trump any favors coming into the election. And if that's the case, if they decide to throw this in the other direction between now and the election, I could easily see $200 oil prices. So I can go either direction. I can make an argument for 50 or for 200.

Luke Gromen: Exactly. And look, the thing I'll say too about Bessent, where I think he's particularly shown his brilliance, has been how he's managed oil prices. I mean, you know, as a trader with the volatility that oil was showing March, but especially April, where one headline and you're down 20%, you can't carry positions into weekends like that. And so basically he enforced the degrossing of leverage completely out of the oil market because people just could not afford that kind of risk, right? You make, even on a small bet, you can ruin your year if you're at all levered.

And so I think that the way the oil market was managed in April in particular, even into May, shows how much Bessent knows markets without a doubt. But ultimately, as you know, It comes down to the physical molecules.

And so here we are basically in the same position we were on March 1st, except now we're coming up on August 1st. You know, a lot of these SPRs, et cetera, are to some degree run down. You know, one of the happy outcomes was you had a lot of oil volume that was shifted over to the Red Sea, right? And now you have engaged or activated the Houthis who are Perhaps as of a couple days ago, interrupting those, that diversion in terms of that route, which was reducing the net drawdown of supplies caused by the blockade in Hormuz.

You've got the Chinese, which is exactly, they have proven they can make a significant impact in terms of effective supplies. Will they? What are their motivations? All of those things I think are important swing factor on its own.

Put all together, it's a huge puzzle to try to sort of put together on oil. And I look at it and go, for me, it's too hard. Just buy gold. I just look and go, you know what? Too hard. I'll just own gold. And I think gold's going to do well over time on less volatility and at least keep up with oil over time in all of this. We had a compression of the gold to oil ratio, but ultimately I Gold's going way higher relative to oil. So that's how I've thought about it for my own money and for clients as well.

But overall, I think oil's going to stay at levels that are good prices for US oil producers and for global oil producers.

Gold turning: war-on, rates up, oil up, gold up

Erik Townsend: So where are the other trades then? You mentioned that one of them was in buying gold. So it sounds like you think the turbulence is over in the gold market, or you Waiting it out.

Luke Gromen: So far, war equals, you know, war hot equals gold down and war off equals gold up. And I think that's about to reverse. I think it may have already reversed. Let's see. You know, this week has been very interesting. War on, rates up, oil up, gold up. That's different versus the past 5 months.

And it makes perfect sense, right? Because ultimately the longer this goes on, the better it is for gold.

We can go back to the Iraq War, right? 2003, oil's, or excuse me, gold is, I don't know, $300, $350 an ounce. By 2008, it's $1,000. And that was from a starting point of the US was running surpluses, right? I mean, the thing that's sort of been lost in all this with the war is like, we can't afford this. We were having fiscal problems before this, and there's nothing more inflationary and disruptive than war.

And so there comes a point, you know, yes, in the short run there's reserve selling and there of gold and that's knocked prices down, blah, blah, blah.

But ultimately, the longer this goes on, the better it is for gold in no small part because we've seen the Chinese be able to sort of be like, eh, we have an alternative system. The CIPS volumes yuan trade volumes on the CIPS, China International Payment System, they hit an all-time record in May. Huge number, like $2 trillion in the month.

Dollars, not yuan, like 14 trillion yuan. So the longer this war goes on, the more everybody makes other arrangements. And there's only one other arrangement. It's yuan and you net settle any surpluses in gold, which means you start having more world trade diverted to yuan and diverted into gold settlement, which is really, really good for gold. And so I, that's why I look at that and go, okay, The longer this goes on, it's good. Gold's going to start to get bid and people are going to be confused. Now, is it? I think it might've started this week. Let's see if it continues. I don't want to play 5-minute macro as one of my dear friends says, but it was interesting to me so far this week we've seen rates up, oil up, gold up.

Other trades: US electrical infrastructure, Japanese industrials

Erik Townsend: Well, Luke, it'll be interesting to see if those trends continue. What other trends and what other trades are you looking at?

Luke Gromen: I still really like US electrical infrastructure equities. We're seeing very clearly the bottlenecks around power, and the Chinese are able to sort of brute force a lot of stuff because they've spent the last 20 years subsidizing power generation. And when we've been subsidizing $8 trillion in wars in Iraq and Afghanistan that did nothing.

And so we're behind the 8-ball. The United States has barely added any electrical capacity In 20 years. It's just starting to tick back up.

So I'm involved in a couple, in one of my biggest positions, an electrical infrastructure private equity deal. They basically, they make metal that goes into that infrastructure. They bend and shape and sell, right? So they're generation agnostic, gas generation, coal generation, nuke generation, hydro, it doesn't matter. They'll sell into those things and they are seeing They are seeing lead times, just open field running for years, years and years, much more than what the public companies are willing to admit. Because look, if you're a public company, there's no upside to you saying, hey, we think our revenues are going to double over the next 5 years. They will never say that.

But those are the types of things, not specifically, but those are the types of things I'm hearing from this private company. Like, oh yeah, our big public companies are, are, could not be more excited. They've got 3 to 5 years of really good open field running. So I think electrical infrastructure equities are in a really good place, things like the PAVE ETF, the GRID ETF. If you look at the components of those things, that'll give you some idea of the types of companies I'm talking about.

Look, I think Japanese equities, they've done really well within that though. The industrials haven't done as well as some of the headline stuff around AI. And the reality is that the US is not going to be able to reshore without Japan. If you want to build something these days, you're going to have to have Japan build it for you or China build it for you. And China's not going to be the one to build it for us for obvious reasons. Korea can help on the margins. Germany maybe can help on the margins, maybe. But if it's not going to be that, and America just, we waited too long to do this. We don't have the ability to make stuff without just crazy inflation. And so the Japanese have a major role to play. And I think that is, I don't think that's a total shock to anybody listening, but I think that is still Pretty early days. So I think Japanese industrial equities also do very well.

So those are a couple things that I think are of interest in terms of how I'm seeing the world at the moment.

Semiconductors and the Chinese AI moment

Erik Townsend: And what about the semiconductor rally and all the strength that we've seen there? Is it too much too fast? Is it set to continue?

Luke Gromen: What do you think?

Erik Townsend: I don't know.

Luke Gromen: Gun to my head, it's probably been too much too fast simply As a result of this trade war and what we're seeing in AI, which is to say what the Chinese have rolled out on AI, this isn't going to stop. You know, I've seen this movie. I've been in the Rust Belt my whole career. I remember this vividly for US industrials, and it was like, well, yeah, the Chinese are cheaper, but their quality's terrible. And, you know, so they're never going to take us. And then it became, well, their quality's getting better, but we're still better. We still do the high end, the frontier stuff. And then it was, oh God, they're cheaper and they're better. We're screwed.

This week we've had sort of a, oh God, they're better and they're cheaper moment.

You know, the tech guys and the finance guys, they really have no idea what's coming for them on this because they never had to deal with it. For 40 years, US tech was dominant. The last time US tech had real competition was probably in the mid-'80s to late '80s from the Japanese.

And so there's never been this moment where tech guys have had any, how do you adjust the multiples of what you're paying for some of these, you know, AI models?

And then the other thing within that I would flag is there was this great Substack in early July by somebody who writes as Groundbreaker. So you Google Groundbreaker Substack and he put up this mind-blowing Substack on AI where he says, look, these are not tech companies. These are real estate companies.

And when real estate has a problem, it's not because demand falls. Demand almost never falls in real estate. It's when the second derivative of growth slows and you can't refinance your debt because the second derivative of the asset value falls. And that is happening right now in AI. And that was before the Chinese— this thing was published 3 weeks before the Chinese, the Kimi performance thing. That's weighed on these names in the last week or two. So my point here is that people should read this Substack. Oh my God, it blew my mind.

As it relates to the semis, my view is if US AI has a problem, semis are going to get dragged down alongside it. And that's probably an opportunity to add to them because I don't necessarily think that's the right thing, but I think that's what would happen longer term.

We've seen this over and over. The US has weaponized semiconductors against China. They did it in 2022 with Biden. At the time, people were saying, oh, this is the death of Chinese tech, death of Chinese semiconductors. They're never gonna be able to compete in AI, which again was totally frigging wrong.

But now that you've showed that to the Chinese, they're never gonna go. They're gonna work until they create something that creates a hedge for them. And this week there's, there was something out just today that the Chinese Z.ai have some giant 1 gigawatt data center that's running entirely on Chinese semiconductors. No Nvidia.

Erik Townsend: Now.

Luke Gromen: What's the performance? What's the energy efficient? Who knows? I don't know. To me, that just says that a day is coming where this sort of AI moment for China, which we saw in the Rust Belt 20 years ago of, hey, it's cheaper, but it's worse to, oh God, it's cheaper and it's better.

Something like that's coming for semis in, and again, is it 1 year? Probably not. Is it 2 years? Probably not. 5 years? Probably within 5 years. And then you can go, okay, well, what multiple do I want to put on semis if Chinese are going to do to that like they've done to everything else.

But so for me, I look and go near-term, I think chips get dragged down with AI, but on that risk, but ultimately I think they probably end up higher ultimately.

Erik Townsend: Seems to me that long-term China has the energy advantage, they have the strategic commitment to AI, and they're not backing down. So I just worry that we get to a point where it's just, it's actually, it's cheaper and it's better and it's from China. And they've dominated the market. And all of the sudden you potentially get to all of these big US AI companies. I don't know if they go to zero value, but it's kind of like, wait a minute, if China's got it better and it's cheaper and they've already nailed it, why are we continuing this?

The rest of the world's view of China and the dollar

Luke Gromen: When you look at this throughout the rest of the world's eyes, right? The US-China is a very divisive subject, understandably so. Rest of the world, China's rating higher than the US is in a lot of different places. There's an article in the FT about it again today.

All cultures are different, and the issues we have with China are not issues a lot of other places have with China. Some places have other issues with China. We always hear, well, China's authoritarian and they've killed all these people, and it's true.

And think what Kishore Mahbubani said. When are you, America and the West more broadly, When are you going to reflect on how many people you've killed? You just kind of— nobody's got a higher body count than America in the last 30 years. And I say that not because I hate America, but simply as I look at this as an objective analyst and go, I don't think the rest of the world is going to have the hangups of using Chinese equipment that will better their lives the way a lot of American analysts and investors think they will, that the rest of the world will have those hangups.

Because American analysts and investors tend to completely smooth over all the bad stuff America's been doing abroad over the last 25 years. And the Chinese, Larry Summers said, look, when the Americans come, we get a lecture. When the Chinese come, we get an airport. That's a former Treasury Secretary of the United States said that in 2018 or 2023. So that's still holding true. And now the deal sounds pretty good. Hey, the Americans are there disrupting your oil and gas flows and your fertilizer flows and your people might starve and you might have a dollar shortage and your economy might collapse.

That's what the Americans are doing. Here's what the Chinese are doing. Hey, we've already got you on a yuan swap line. We'll make you as many solar panels as you want. We'll give— we'll sell you as many EVs as you want. They're dirt cheap and we will sell you as many battery arrays as you want. And so guess what? In Asia right now, solar is generating more electricity than gas. Think about that. That just crossed over. I just saw that the other day.

And so that's where I think this is all going to go, which is it just, America needs to pivot into like basically building ourselves out, fixing what we messed up. And then once we fix that, we're going to have really good products to offer people and compete on that basis versus like, we're behind, let's just dump the whole frigging chessboard. And, you know, woo-hoo, we're going to win because of the dollar. Because we're not, we're not going to win because of the dollar. Because I can't eat the dollar. The dollar doesn't generate electricity for me. You know what generates electricity for me? Chinese solar panels. I can't drive the dollar. You know what I can drive? I can drive a Chinese BYD.

You know, well, I can't because my country won't let it in. But most of the world, like I was just over in London and Scotland, there are BYDs all over the place. There's other Chinese car brands all over the place because it turns out People like having cheap transportation. Who knew?

Erik Townsend: BYDs are good vehicles too.

Luke Gromen: They're absolutely—

Erik Townsend: the first time I got in one, I was expecting it to be just the lowest-end quality thing, and it's not. It's actually a good quality product.

Luke Gromen: That's what I hear.

Erik Townsend: Yeah.

Luke Gromen: I mean, that's the ones I saw over there were nice and people raved about 'em. American strategy appears to be, we're going to turn over the chessboard and try to squeeze you with the dollar until you comply. And the more they squeeze, Look, you can see it showing up in yuan payment volumes. You can see it showing up in Chinese export volumes. You can see it showing up in Asian EV or Asian solar panel electricity generation. It's not working.

So at some point, American leadership needs to maybe think a little bit about changing the strategy, or they can keep trying what they've been trying for 25 years. It's going so star-spangled awesome. Maybe just keep doing that. China was nothing 25 years ago when we invaded Iraq, and now look. fight Iran for another, you know, however long. It's folly to think we'll end up ahead of China following the same strategy we used in Iraq. What are we doing?

Forest for the Trees services and hand-off to Trading Desk

Erik Townsend: Well, Luke, on that note, I can't thank you enough again for a terrific interview. But before I let you go, please tell our listeners a little bit more about what they can expect to find at fftt-llc.com, Forest for the Trees-llc.com. And what services are on offer there?

Luke Gromen: I appreciate that. Yeah, we aggregate large amounts of publicly available data trying to identify developing economic bottlenecks. We're basically trying to see where excess returns will accrue because in— I've been doing this over 30 years now, which is frightening to say. And in my experience, sectors that are set to benefit from economic bottlenecks earn excess returns and those that get hurt by it don't. And that's what we try to identify. And we've got different products available. for both institutional and mass market investors. So check that out. And if you're interested in more, you can also find me on X, of course, @LukeGromen.

Erik Townsend: And be sure to stay tuned for our new MacroVoices Market Desk segment. Patrick and Massil are coming up next. Patrick, where's the trade?

Trade of the Week: GLD risk corridor

Patrick Ceresna: Welcome to the MacroVoices Trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. Let's dive straight into the trade of the week. Patrick, what do we got?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, Luke's tactical observation was that gold had started rising along oil and interest rates during renewed geopolitical political escalation. That matters because it may signal that the market is moving beyond short-term liquidation and beginning to price the longer-term consequences of war spending, fiscal expansion, and eventual financial repression. At the same time, gold has already endured a major reset. From peak to trough, the correction has lasted roughly 6 months and erased almost 30% of the prior advance. A substantial amount of the excess has already been cleared, but the short-term trend has not yet decisively turned bullish.

So the objective is to establish long exposure without pretending we can identify the exact low. So for this week's Trade of the Week, I want to own the GLD at around $376, but wrap the position in a short-term risk corridor through the September 18th expiration. Think of the structure in 2 parts. First, I'm buying downside protection that begins at $370 and remains effective down to $350.

That me a $20 band where the hedges offset further losses in the shares dollar for dollar. Second, I'm helping finance that protection by agreeing to cap my upside at $415, which is roughly 10% above the current price.

After combining all 3 option legs, the total cost of the outlay is just $1.75 per share, or $175 for every 100 shares of the GLD. So the payoff is straightforward. Over the next 60 days, I remain fully exposed to the upside to the $415 strike while the hedge meaningfully dampens the drawdown towards $350 in case there's still some short-term summer volatility.

The objective is to confidently start leaning into gold positioning after this 30% correction, knowing you cheaply reduced the volatility of one more corrective leg lower during the fragile early stages of this trade.

Massil Beguenane: I love it, Patrick. You know, I was looking at the latest Commitment of Traders report from the CFTC, and the positioning definitely backs you up here. Gold speculators are near the bottom of their 1-year positioning range, meaning there's room for that upside to $415. But there hasn't been a broad washout in positioning, which is why that protection at $370 is so valuable. It can serve as cheap insurance on a trend that's still fragile.

Equities: Mag Seven earnings, CTA flip points, S&P positioning

Massil Beguenane: All right, now let's get into the markets, Patrick. What are you seeing this week?

Patrick Ceresna: So the current market backdrop is in this environment where we have a re-escalation of the war in Iran. Oil is responding higher, bond markets are weakening, but so far the equity markets are not responding to those headlines. Right now, the focal point continues to appear to be all driven by earnings and the potential turn here in the semiconductors. So what is it that I think is the most important thing to watch? Well, right now we've continued to see some top being formed in the KOSPI, but the semiconductors have worked their way for several weeks now off of their highs.

We now just entered into the earnings season where Mag Sevens are reporting. We just got a report from Google and Tesla, and each of them are at least at this point indicating a lower open. And so the question really becomes, what is going to drive the markets higher if we see that the Mag Sevens and the semiconductors can't do the heavy lifting? While we have see the breadth of the market widen, it may not be enough. And with the markets having traded sideways for a prolonged period, all of those CTAs and systematic traders, their flip points are slowly rising, almost like a trailing stop loss.

If we see at this stage even a 150 or 200 S&P point drop, it would put us into a sell trigger area where suddenly the flows will pivot and a lot of of forced systematic trading strategies will actually be active sellers. Now, we haven't seen those triggers hit yet, but the market right now is quite vulnerable. And at least the hope that the Mag Sevens were going to give some bullish tailwind has not started to emerge yet. We obviously have some really big numbers coming out next week, and it's going to, I think, set the tone for whether or not we're going to have a summer market correction or not.

The key level to definitely watch is going to be the 7,400 level. We want to see whether the bulls can immediately buy dips when those risky areas are reached. Otherwise, any sustained price action down there could really start to create that feedback mechanism of selling, which could spur a correction down to 7,000. Let's see how it plays out.

Massil Beguenane: You know, it's interesting you say that because the story on flows this week is all about who just joined the Large specs, they've been crowded long on the S&P and the Dow for weeks now, but now small specs are piling in too. And that was the biggest jump in positioning on the board, almost 30 points on each of the index in just one week. That puts small speculators in their top decile positioning from the last 12 months. Both groups now are sitting at 90 on their 1-year positioning score. And here's what that tells you. The bullish positioning isn't just holding, it's broadening. Large specs, small specs, everyone leaning the exact same way. And when there's crowding this clear, it can exacerbate downside volatility if a sell catalyst ever changes the narrative, just like you mentioned. All right, let's turn to the dollar, Pat.

Dollar and cross-currencies, COT positioning

Massil Beguenane: Lots of interesting things happening in the cross-currency pairs.

What do you see?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, Mass, I want to start with just looking at this US dollar. We have a flagging formation that was basically forming above the 50-day moving average for a month now, and we're seeing early signs that the US dollar may attempt to bull breakout here. Definitely the key level to watch is the 101.50 level. If we see a decisive kick higher in the dollar index, that could really get going a new bull advance. We've already broken out of that 15-month trade range. An entire month we've spent consolidating above that range, which is quite technically bullish, and looking for bull continuation on the dollars there.

But what's interesting is, is that it's the euro that remains so decisively weak. Any breakdown here, below 114 on a sustained basis. Could see us visiting the 112 or 111 level in just the next few weeks. And not only that, but the US dollar yen is shockingly strong. The US dollar has now broken out of a 2, 3-week trade range on the upside as we've now hit the 163 handle on the upside of that US dollar yen. We're seeing pretty much strength in the US dollar against almost all cross-currencies, asking the question as to whether this is being driven by some sort of US dollar funding stresses.

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, and you can see that in the large specs too. They're still pinned at the very top of the range. They didn't add, they didn't sell, they barely moved a single contract all week. And across the major pairs is the mirror image. The euro, the yen, the pound, just like you said, all sitting in extreme short positioning. But here's the one that jumped off my the Canadian dollar. Speculators are now short almost half the entire market, 48% of open interest, the most abandoned trade on the entire Commitment of Traders report this week. All right, Pat, the craziest market's definitely been in crude.

Crude oil: re-escalation rally and positioning

Massil Beguenane: What's happening this week?

Patrick Ceresna: Listen, this is where almost all of the major action has been. Not only did we have that June massacre that had forced flows washed out on the downside, But we have had an extraordinary reversal as the re-escalation of the war has gone full throttle. Obviously, both straits are in play, as we heard from Anas last week. And right now, off of the lows, we've already seen a 35% advance in crude oil in just 3 weeks.

We are back to this $90 handle where we were trading at back in the early part of June, and this recovery has now decisively broken back above the 50-day moving average, catching a lot of traders off guard on this one.

As fast as this was a washout of long positioning, suddenly it's turned into a full-on short squeeze to the upside. What's really interesting here at the same time is that Brent oil has made a full recovery almost back to the $100 level on the upside. And the interesting part to me is that oil volatility has not spiked with all of this. Now, back in March, we saw implied volatilities on crude oil futures up in the 120% range. That collapsed down to 40% throughout the June massacre, and we're only back up to about the 65% level, nowhere near the type of volatility we were seeing in the previous crazy bull advances of oil.

That makes it pretty interesting because a lot of option strategies can still be built around oil here. We still continue to have a very fat right-tail skew developing in there. And when you look at a lot of the subproducts, gasoline, diesel continue to rip to fresh highs. Crack spreads remain very high in terms of refining rates. Even the 3-2-1 crack spread continues to blow out. What is clear is the re-escalation of this war has caught a lot of traders off guard. Now, the bigger question for me is that where is the fair value of oil?

Clearly, it did not belong down at $70, but does oil on the short term belong back at $120? Are we now going to see crude oil settle into more of a trade range in a much higher elevated fair value zone, let's say between $90 and $100? A lot of this has to be revealed. On the short term, it's very hard to press the long trade unless now putting on some sort of gamma to create some optionality because with this magnitude of a move, the volatility here in both directions can be gut-wrenching.

Massil Beguenane: You know, Patrick, last Friday's COT report, which is for positioning that took place on July 14th, the WTI data actually surprised me. WTI has actually been ripping higher and you'd expect speculators to be chasing it, right? But they actually did the opposite. As of the latest report, large speculators actually sold into the rally, cutting another 13,000 contracts, and their positioning score, it's down to just 12 points.

Think about that. Price surging and the specs are leaving, which means this move is running on fundamentals. So the market keeps tightening and there's still a whole crowd on the sidelines that hasn't even bought in yet.

Precious metals: gold downtrend and sticky positioning

Massil Beguenane: Now, speaking of safe havens, Patrick, What are the precious metals doing?

Patrick Ceresna: Well, it's interesting. We obviously talked about the trade on gold here. There is a primary downtrend on gold that has been in place for 6 months. And while we've definitely had this week a little bit of a pop to try to recover off that $4,000 handle that's been acting like a support, one thing that we're going to be watching into next week is whether or not the bulls can actually sustain a short-term breakout. Every time we've seen these kind of 2, 3-day breakouts, they almost immediately fade and are under pressure of selling. Will we see that pattern repeat itself, or will we start to see bottoming formations developing here? As of this moment, there is no new bull trend that can be identified.

So we're going to see whether or not bottoming formations start to develop here. The one thing that I do want to observe is that if this current rally that started over the last few days fails and we trade back to the 4,000 level, is a technical weakness sign that could open the window to a break to lower lows, which could usher in that retest of the $3,800 level. So there is again some short-term pressure. That's why we wanted to hedge up some of the risks associated with picking the bottom here. But we definitely are $1,600 off the highs, and we're just looking at here where gold will finally settle in and start to form bottoming formations.

Massil Beguenane: You know, gold's positioning is actually telling a fascinating story here. Think about what this market just A 6-month correction, 30% off the highs. That kind of drop usually breaks people, you know, it shakes them out. But look at the data here in the COT report. Large speculators, they're still holding almost half of that entire market. Small speculators, they didn't sell a single contract. Their positioning is basically unchanged through the whole correction. Nobody left. That is some real sticky positioning we're seeing here.

Positioning Pulse: copper's crowded-trade lesson

Patrick Ceresna: The main question that is left to answer is whether that conviction becomes fuel going Okay, Massil, let's take a deeper dive into these Commitment of Traders reports and go into some of the other really interesting things going on. What did you pick up in the COT reports that you want to talk about?

Massil Beguenane: Yeah, in this week's Positioning Pulse, I want to focus on copper, and this one's really a lesson because copper just showed us something every trader should understand about positioning data. Here's the story. Back in May, copper was a crowded trade. Large specs hit 100 on the COT signal holding nearly 29% of the entire market on that net positioning over open interest basis. And that's pretty extreme even on a 5-year view. Now, most people see a reading like that and think crowded means sell, but that's not how this works.

An extreme is a condition, not a signal, because there are 2 ways a crowded trade resolves. One, the price can crack and the crowd gets flushed out in a correction, or 2, the market simply digests it through time. And copper this time chose time. Over 6 weeks of sideways action, specs quietly trimmed 14,000 contracts, and the score still cooled from 100 back down to 75, right back inside that normal range. But price never really broke down, and that's because the physical world kept buying it. Chinese inventories were falling, import premiums rising, metal leaving the warehouses, and that's the lesson.

Positioning tells you who's in the boat, but price and fundamentals tells you whether that boat is actually in trouble. So now copper enters this breakout attempt with a reset score and room to rebuild.

Now watch this upcoming Friday's report. If speculators return gradually while price holds, that's a healthy fuel. If price climbs while positioning stays calm, well, that's even better. And the best part, you can track all of that yourself on every market it every single week at COTSignal.com. That's C-O-T-S-I-G-N-A-L.com. So that's your Positioning Pulse for the week.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, great insights on copper. Let's see how it plays out into next week.

Massil Beguenane: That does it for this week's episode. Thank you very much for listening and see you next week.

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Anas Alhajji — oil market expert (as introduced on the show)

Announcer: This is MacroVoices, the free weekly financial podcast targeting professional finance, high net worth individuals, family offices, and other sophisticated investors. MacroVoices is all about the brightest minds in the world of finance and macroeconomics telling it like it is, bullish or bearish, no holds barred. Now, here are your hosts, Erik Townsend and Patrick Ceresna.

Episode preview and market teaser

Erik Townsend: MacroVoices episode 541 was produced on July 16th, 2026. I'm Erik Townsend. Dr. Anas Alhajji is back for what will be his most complete interview to date on the Hormuz crisis and how it evolved. We'll start with an update on the week's news and then step back and review how we got into this conflict and why Anas still believes that it was the goal of the United States to close Hormuz initially.

I intentionally let this interview run long, so make the Popcorn and sit back for an extended-length interview with Dr. Anas Alhajji on how the Strait of Hormuz crisis came to be. Then stay tuned for our new and improved MacroVoices Trading Desk, where Patrick and Massil will deliver a fast-paced market wrap featuring Patrick's Trade of the Week, fresh positioning insights from the Commitments of Traders reports, and a concise breakdown of the key markets you need to watch.

Patrick Ceresna: And I'm Patrick Ceresna. The S&P 500 spent the week consolidating near its 52-week highs, but has yet to break above the June peak. which continues to act as near-term overhead resistance. Crude oil delivered another major advance, gaining nearly $9 or roughly 1,280 basis points week over week as it moved up to test its 50-day moving average. Meanwhile, gold remains notably weak near its June and July lows, raising the question of whether another leg lower is about to begin. We'll discuss this and more. After the interview. This week's feature interview guest is oil market expert Anas Alhajji. Erik and Anas discuss the outlook for crude oil and refined products, why the real bottleneck may be in refining rather than the raw oil supply, and how geopolitics, energy security, LNG, and AI-driven power demand are reshaping the global energy markets. Erik's interview with Anas Alhajji is coming up as MacroVoices continues right here at MacroVoices.com.

Announcer: And now with this week's special guest, here's your host, Erik Townsend.

Bab el-Mandeb: the next chokepoint after Hormuz

Erik Townsend: Joining me now is Energy Outlook Advisors founder, Dr. Anas Alhajji. Anas, it's great to have you back. Needless to say, this has been a huge week of escalation in the Iran conflict. You have a note out this week though to your subscribers saying, hey, pay attention here because you need to focus your eye on where the ball is. And it's not so much Hormuz, it's actually Strait of Bab el-Mandeb that we need to watch next. So give us the update on what's going on and tell us particularly about your writings this week as to why Bab el-Mandeb requires as much attention as Hormuz does.

Anas Alhajji: Thank you for having me on the show again. The main point here is the market has already priced kind of a closure of Hormuz for a longer period. And the surprise to the market was not the kind of the breaking of the MOU or the end of the MOU. The surprise to the market was how fast basically Trump basically agreed to the MOU and how fast he signed it. And how fast the amount of oil that was stranded basically left the Hormuz Strait. So we got over 120 million barrels out of the Hormuz Strait. So that was really the surprise to the market, not the end of the MOU.

So what happened is the Iranian regime is not unified. It's not one unit. So we have the Iranian regime, we have the negotiators, But we do have the hardliners of the IRGC, the Revolutionary Guard, and those are not part of the government, but they are very well trained and they are well equipped in terms of various weapons, etc.

And those guys benefited greatly from the sanctions and benefited greatly from what's been going on for a long time. And we should point out that Iran's oil production increased substantially to the extent that the production in 2025 is the highest in like 20-something years. And in February, Iran's oil exports were the highest since 2017. So those guys been making a lot of money despite the sanctions and despite everything else. They control the economy and they benefit from the prestige, the control, and the money. And we are talking about billions and billions of dollars.

And it seems that the Trump administration underestimated their power and their will. And the reason why those guys do not want to negotiate, because if everything goes back to normal and all the money goes to the Iranian people and to the government, They lose everything. They lose the control, they lose the money, they lose the prestige.

So they are behaving like a drug cartel. They are literally willing to fight. You know, drug cartels are willing to fight. They fight. And they are willing to fight for the money and for the, uh, whatever they have. And that's what we've seen. So they kept attacking ships and other countries.

Erik Townsend: Hmm.

Anas Alhajji: In an effort to derail the negotiations, and it is clearly now that they succeeded in doing so, or they succeeded in controlling the Iranian regime or part of the Iranian regime, or controlling the negotiators, etc. And as a reaction to that, we've seen President Trump basically canceling the MOU and returning back the. the blockade.

But we have to remember that yes, prices went up by about $12 to $15 as a result of that, and that is normal for such events to happen. But we did not see prices going up to $100, $120 simply because the market long ago, before signing the MOU, already assumed that this is going to drag on for a long time. Even after the elections.

But what the real story for the oil bulls is really Bab-el-Mandeb, because this was the biggest surprise of all the events that we've seen. The end of the MOU, all the issues that we've seen in terms of attacks on ships, that was just part of the game.

But what was the surprise is the attack by the Houthis on the Saudi airport in the city of Abha, which kind of ended the agreement that the Saudis had with the Houthis. And that was the biggest problem that we see right now, that it seems that those IRGC extremists were able to control either the Houthis or some of the Houthis And they decided to defy the ban on airlines over Yemen, and they literally took a plane full of people to Sana'a Airport, which led to the Saudis basically making an attack to prevent the plane from landing.

And then the Houthis basically replied by attacking Saudi Arabia. Why this is important? Because the Saudis reached an agreement with the Houthis where the Saudis basically will support in one way or the other the economy of the city and support the people of Sana'a while the Houthis basically will stop attacking Saudi Arabia.

And it held very well. And when people were talking about Bab el-Mandeb early in March, I said at that time, don't worry about Bab el-Mandeb because the agreement is holding very well. And all of a sudden in recent days with the attacks basically showed that it may not be.

And as a result, we might see attacks on ships in the Bab-el-Mandeb. Bab-el-Mandeb, for those who do not know, it is the southern door of the Red Sea. So about 6 million barrels of oil basically passes through Bab-el-Mandeb. Mostly Russian and Saudi oil. And we've already seen some Houthi leaders threatening to close Bab el-Mandeb. We've seen some IRGC leaders threatening to close Bab el-Mandeb.

And can they close Bab el-Mandeb? No, Iran cannot close the Hormuz Strait and cannot close the Bab el-Mandeb, but they can cause enough trouble to raise prices, oil prices significantly, and raise insurance. And the fear is not the Houthis blocking Bab el-Mandeb. The fear is that few guys basically launching an attack on couple of oil tankers, and as a result, the insurance companies of Europe, mostly UK, will literally cancel the insurance, especially the war insurance the same way they did with Hormuz.

And if they do that, then Saudi Arabia in particular cannot send its oil through the Hormuz Strait because of lack of insurance. Putin will be a big winner here because he is sending massive amount of oil to India and China, and that oil is mostly sent on sanctioned tankers that do not qualify for the Western insurance anyway. So they are insured by Russia, China, India, others. So if the Houthis act or do something for Bab el-Mandeb, then we will lose more than 4 million barrels a day of Saudi crude as a result. It is the same crude that's been diverted from the Gulf because of Hormuz. Through the east-west pipelines.

And losing that basically will force prices way above $100.

It seems right now we do have 2 comments on this. The first one is, if this is going to happen and the Houthis attack ships, the expected reaction from this, from called the Arab coalition, which is led by Saudi Arabia, is going to be severe, is going to be extremely significant, and the impact is going to be severe on the Houthis. At the same time, we expect the United States to participate in that, which means that the issues with Bab-el-Mandeb will not last long, but it'll be poisoned forever, just like the Hormuz Strait.

And therefore insurance basically will be higher for longer as a result, even if Bab el-Mandeb is open a few days after those attacks.

The other thing is, given the severity of the issues, and the Saudis do not want the Houthis to attack Saudi cities, et cetera. And of course, the Houthis are, the problem is they are not only attacking military sites, they are attacking civilian sites. So they are attacking the airport. A person was killed in the airport, a civilian airport. They don't want that. So the probability of going back to the agreement is very high.

So while we are concerned about Bab el-Mandeb, the first comment on that is that it will not last long, but prices will go up anyway and costs will go up anyway. And if the Saudis and the Houthis go back to the agreement, Then the danger basically is way less than the first case.

Erik Townsend: Okay. So to summarize, the update from Dr. Anas is we have things heating up in the Middle East. The thing to watch right now is the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. It would be a skirmish there or a closing of that strait, even just a temporary one. If it has the effect of spooking the insurance companies, that's enough to close the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb, which is the southern entrance to the Red Sea. In other words, the other side of Arabia from where the Persian Gulf exists.

That could be closed off too. That would be the next friction point. That's your update. That's probably what a lot of the audience came for, but I want to expand this interview, Anas, and really go broader to a story that I think hasn't been told for really as long as this conflict is going on. So I want to set the Wayback Machine now to a year ago.

Anas Alhajji: Okay.

Why Alhajji predicted a US-engineered Hormuz closure

Erik Townsend: Summer of 2025, June, July.

You predicted, or you wrote in your Energy Outlook Advisors newsletter a year ago, that's more than 6 months before the Iran conflict even broke out. You said, okay, I'm declaring, Anas is declaring that a message was just delivered to China. And the message that was delivered to China fully a year ago was China, brace yourself for a closure of the Strait of Hormuz, but not by Iran. Actually, you thought it would be the United States that would bring about that closure. So why did you predict that a full year ago, 6 months before the conflict even started?

Anas Alhajji: There were several reasons for that, and those who are interested, they can go back to these writings because they have a lot of details. We don't have time to go over all of them. But one thing was clear at that time, that we've seen many reports in prestigious media outlets talking about Iran closing the Hormuz Strait.

And we've seen some reporting about Iranians basically talking about closing the Hormuz Strait. And I followed up with these things and I found out that one of the stories, basically when they talked about Iranian official, that official was It was a city council meeting in a small city, and that is not even, you cannot see it even on the map, who was angry because of the 12-day war last year.

And he took the mic basically, and in front of the camera, and he was asking his government to close the Hormuz Strait. Somehow that video got out and the Western media took it as an Iranian official basically calling to close the Hormuz Strait. He was, in a sense, by strategic standards, he was no one.

He was just a city council member of a small city somewhere that you cannot see on the map. And there was another quote by someone who is unknown, but there was the same name for a guy who was working for the government and he retired. And then we've seen several articles appearing on the issue And if you study those articles, you find out that they have the same talking points.

And that's where the issue is. Who has an interest basically in hiring a PR firm basically to publish those articles with the same talking points all over, whether in Europe or the United States?

So it seems that China was reading all of this. And by the way, the Chinese literally have a massive team of all languages, who knows all languages, et cetera. They read everything. And just to show you that how significant this is, they literally read my Arabic articles that are published in the Middle East. And I got invited basically to speak on topics that I wrote in Arabic, I did not write in English.

So the Chinese basically were reading and probably collecting information, et cetera. So they got the message that the Hormuz Strait is going to be closed. And they started building up oil inventories, natural gas inventories, and coal and everything else expecting something is going to happen. And if you recall, Erik, from previous shows that I always made the statement, what are the Chinese up to?

What do they know that we don't know? Because that was really the big question, why they are doing all of this. Later on, of course, it was being confirmed that the Hormuz Strait was closed. And the way it was closed basically was, in a sense, there were 2 surprises the way it's closed.

But here I would like to point out that on previous shows and in previous places, I mentioned several times over the years that Iran cannot close the Hormuz Strait. And I still stand by that. And I do have enough evidence to prove it, that Iranians could not close the Hormuz Strait. They can cause problems, but they cannot close the strait.

Erik Townsend: But your view is that the US closed the strait because the US had the desire for China to be, to essentially see that the US could do that. Correct.

Anas Alhajji: Correct.

Erik Townsend: But once it was closed, the Iranians do seem to have the ability to keep it closed. So they're preventing the—

Anas Alhajji: Not even that, basically. I wrote kind of a story kind of for fun. Just imagine the way the Iranians basically acted, that just like a gangster goes to the mall after it closed after 10 PM, with his gun and he stood in front of the door and he turned on YouTube or TikTok and he was broadcasting and saying, look, no one can walk to the mall right now. I am here. I'm not going to allow anyone to walk to the mall.

But that's after the mall closed. And then a police car comes in. The couple of policemen look at him, say, what are you doing here? He said, well, I'm guarding the mall. I'm not allowing anyone to go in. And the policeman said, well, just continue doing so. We are going to have dinner and come back.

So the Iranians basically claimed that they closed the Hormuz Strait after the insurance companies closed it.

But I would like to emphasize the point that, yes, I did say Iran cannot close the Hormuz Strait. And I still stand by the point that they did not close the Hormuz Strait. The US closed the Hormuz Strait. And the idea that I said Hormuz Strait will never be closed, I did not say that. So I just want to clarify that point. I never said that this strait will never be closed. I said that Iran cannot close the strait, but the United States will close the strait. And I strongly believe that is exactly what happened. But there were 2 surprises here. The first surprise was the how quick it happened, because we were talking about the next two three years, and it happened in months.

So that was a big surprise.

And the second surprise is the way it happened, because the Hormuz Strait was closed without any military action. And this is a very important point to realize that. The reason why shipping stopped, simply because insurance companies canceled the war coverage.

And the story goes like this, that the EU instituted laws to prevent the solvency of the insurance companies. So solvency in Europe basically is equivalent to bankruptcy in the United States. And the reason why, because Europe been experiencing many floods and natural events in recent years. And to prevent the bankruptcy of these companies, the EU instituted laws and a formula where those companies have to keep cash on hand or semi-cash to handle whatever crisis at hand.

So immediately, if there is a crisis based on that formula, they have to transfer money And they have it in cash or near cash, so they won't go bankrupt. And as they have done for the last 45 years, we had 3 wars and massive number of attacks on ships in the region, and we have the war in June. So what insurance companies did, they raised the premiums and they had the cash to cover.

But all of a sudden, the US Navy attacked a Navy boat that has 200 Iranians, and they killed about 85 soldiers. And you might expect that this happened at Hormuz or near Hormuz or the Gulf of Oman. It did not. It happened near Sri Lanka. And as a result, the EU basically told the companies, look, now you have to expand coverage to cover the whole Indian Ocean. And insurance companies said, there's no way, we cannot cover all these ships throughout this period. So we are going to take advantage of the law and we are going to cancel all policies as stated in the law within 7 days.

And as you know, if there is a ship loading at Basra Port in Iraq, it'll take more than 7 days to load and get out of the Gulf. So they cannot get out quickly. So this 7-day law basically locked up Most of the tankers in the area without even a military action.

So the surprise, the first surprise was how quickly this happened. And the second surprise was how smartly they've done it.

I'm not talking about a conspiracy between the Trump administration and the insurance companies. No, I'm talking about how the insurance industry been used to close the Hormuz Strait as a result of that. And yes, insurance companies later on basically returned the coverage, or some of them returned the coverage, but at a very high rate. And the ships did not move.

A case in point here, even after the MOU was signed and insurance rates went down and ships start leaving the strait, there were 9 Indian tankers India couldn't get out. And the question is why? Why India did not take advantage of those 3 weeks and get those tankers out?

So the bottom line here is we have— the United States basically did this. So the question is why? And for those interested in this, there are all kinds of writings, whether on Twitter or on my Substack, to explain why.

Erik Townsend: Okay, well, let's take this a step at a time because I want to start with your high-level view here is you hold the non-consensus view that the Strait of Hormuz was intentionally closed by the United States for the purpose of, I'll call it statecraft with China, basically showing China that the US is going to be dominant in energy and AI. Is that the reason that this was done? So why don't we start with why they did this and step through your whole thesis as to why this has occurred in the way that it has. So why did the US want to send this signal to China? What was the signal to China? How did that come about?

Anas Alhajji: If you go back to the first Trump administration, you'll see that the administration was highlighting the point that we are going for energy independence. And President Trump basically was after this idea, energy independence. And the criticism, of course, at that time was, no, we still import oil, we still do this, et cetera. But the whole idea of increasing US power in the energy sector was about energy independence.

Then years later, Trump comes back to the White House and we have a new administration, and all of a sudden the talk is not about energy independence. The talk is about energy dominance. And it did not stop at that. It started talking about dominance in the world through energy, And AI, and when you talk about AI, of course, you are talking about the manufacturing of semiconductors, etc., which is outside the United States. And most of that where the United States gets its semiconductors and computer chips is from Asia, and that's literally Taiwan and South Korea.

And of course, we know about the competition with China. In this regard, so the administration highlighted those two points of dominance through energy and AI.

Here's the problem: you cannot have AI without energy. So all of a sudden, this energy dominance becomes the dominant theme of the administration, and how to be energy dominant? You need to control energy markets, and how you control energy markets—that takes us. Back to LNG first, when the United States basically started in 2014 thinking about how to reduce or eliminate Europe's dependence on Russian gas. And we started building the LNG plants and sending LNG to Europe. And Trump in his first term was the marketer-in-chief of LNG. Every time he goes to Europe or he has some discussion with any European leader, he was talking about LNG. He was asking them to buy US LNG.

Then we have change in administration and Biden came to office. And Biden is on the extreme left, but it's about climate change, anti-fossil fuel. And all of a sudden Biden continued Trump's job. Biden was a marketer-in-chief of LNG. Despite the fact that at the, toward the end of his administration, He had this ban on future LNG, et cetera. But throughout his administration, basically was marketing LNG.

And we've seen what happened to Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2, and then to the Ukrainian gas pipeline that used to take the Russian gas to Europe. So the elements for energy dominance basically were very clear. You need the US basically to supply this energy to others.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Anas Alhajji: And if you go back into the literature, to the literature in the last 50 years, and what you find, one thing that is clear for every university professor and every expert in the field, they will tell you, if you control the energy flow of any country, you control the destiny of that country.

And we have a lot of evidence from around the world to prove this point. So this energy dominance basically came with the idea that We need to be dominant, and that dominance means we need to cut off the supplies of others and we will supply it.

And in terms of AI, and again, I want to go back to that second point I mentioned when I said that the way they closed the Hormuz Strait was a very smart way. This was another smart way of doing it because you cannot make computer chips and semiconductors Without helium.

And 75% of the helium going to South Korea and Taiwan is coming from Qatar. And it just happened that at the beginning of the war, the plant that makes the LNG and helium in Qatar was destroyed. Among all the plants, all the factories, all the refineries in the Gulf, in all those countries, that particular plant that produces the helium.

Erik Townsend: Wow.

Anas Alhajji: was hit and destroyed.

So now Asia is without helium. They have storage, but if this crisis is going to continue, of course that storage is going to run out. They can do recycle, but that recycling cannot continue forever. And what happened, aside from the fact that the cost went up, of course helium is not a major cost to the industry, but if there is no helium, you cannot produce.

Erik Townsend: Right.

Anas Alhajji: the semiconductors. So this is part of the story and all of what we've seen before that. We've seen the industry moving back to the United States. We've seen Secretary Bessent basically declaring just about a month ago that this industry is coming back to the United States, which is one of the objectives.

And at the same time, one of the, all the emphasis on that AI and the investment, et cetera. Just to give you an idea how important this is, just the Taiwan investment in Arizona, $150 billion. That is more than the oil revenues of Kuwait and Iraq for a year.

So we're talking about a massive amount of money that's been transferred to the United States in the form of investment to make the semiconductors. And then to make the semiconductors, basically this is an energy-intensive industry. So oil prices went up, natural gas prices went up, LNG prices went up, electricity prices went up. Everything for the Asians basically went up.

And I know we are going to go back to this point later on, but people must realize that oil prices went up substantially in Asia. Those who are fixated with WTI and Brent, they are missing the point. Brent is not the price in Asia. It's for Europe. WTI is the price for the United States or North America. But in Europe, it was Dubai and Oman. It was the medium sour crude. And prices of medium sour crude went up above $170 with some reports basically talking about some shipments being sold for $200 or close to $200.

So for the AI industry in Asia, Got hit really hard by higher energy costs on one hand and no helium on the other. At the same time, we go back to that LNG war that we've been talking about. All of a sudden, Qatar couldn't export LNG and all the plans by Qatar in the future, all the expansion they were planning, which will compete directly with the United States, is gone right now. It's been delayed and could be delayed for years.

So the strategic objectives of the United States in this case about energy dominance and AI dominance already been achieved. And that was really the reason. And I will end this answer with this statement here. If assume that Iran closed the Hormuz Strait, what they've done. They hurt China, they hurt Asia, who are their customers and supporters, and they benefited the United States. Does that make sense?

And the point that I'm making here is you can either look at the war with Iran as a war that is intended for Iran and its nuclear program, and then you can analyze it that way, or you can look at Iran's war. Within this context that I'm going to present right now, think about it within what happened in Venezuela, the Panama Canal, the trade wars, the sanctions, the tariffs, Russia, China, Greenland.

It's a if you put it within that context, you get a completely different view of what's going on at Hormuz than anything else.

IRGC hardliners, the MOU collapse and what comes next

Erik Townsend: Okay, Anas. So to summarize the big picture, you think that what's happened here is that we were told a story when this Iran conflict originally broke out that was about how it was supposedly entirely because of Iran having nuclear weapons or being about to get nuclear weapons and so forth. You're saying that you don't think that's the real reason that the US started the conflict with Iran. You think the real reason is US has an agenda to show China, look, We're big men on campus when it comes to AI and energy dominance. You better not mess with us because we are in control of the whole world here. If that was the agenda, I would say that maybe it's been a little bit suboptimal in terms of execution. I'm not sure that the US has really shown China and the rest of the world that we're completely in charge of everything. So did it not go quite the way they wanted?

And where does that leave the US now in terms of achieving the objective that you're describing the US as having?

Anas Alhajji: Before I answer this question, I would like to mention 2 points. The first point is, for those who are interested in this, they can go back and read the National Security Strategy that's been released by the Trump administration in November, which outlines most of the points that I mentioned.

And they also talk about, there was a statement that's a very striking statement, About keeping Strait of Hormuz open. And the Strait of Hormuz never been closed. They always talk about freedom of navigation. Why this time they are talking about keeping the Strait of Hormuz open before 3 months before they closed it? But the idea here is whatever these strategies are, this comes from the deep state.

It does not come directly from the Trump administration, which means that Even if we have a different administration, we would have seen similar approaches anyway because this is a United States government or deep state basically action.

But the execution basically went bad. And there are several reasons for that. One of them is we heard in the media that, for example, Netanyahu convinced Trump to go and attack Iran because of Netanyahu. It could be exactly the opposite. That Netanyahu, through his information, realized what's going on and he jumped on the wagon. So it's exactly the opposite of what the story we've been told.

And the problem is they did not— they achieved their objectives. Now they want the Hormuz Strait open, but that's where the bad execution happened. Because when they wanted to be opened, after they trained the Iranians on all the secrets of closing Hormuz Strait and all the statements and everything else. And the Iranians woke up in the morning to realize they have a crown jewel they need to keep and something they've been bragging about.

The IRGC, those extreme elements, basically the uncontrollable elements that we don't know much about, basically are the problem. So the Trump administration does not have a problem with the negotiators. or the regime behind the negotiators. They have a problem with the extreme elements of the IRGC, which was not part of the plan, and there was no plan on how to counter them.

And that's where everything went wrong.

Erik Townsend: Okay. So the US intentionally closed the strait thinking the US would be able to intentionally unclose the strait. But the factions within the IRGC who've seen an opportunity here to just use this as way to take bribes and tolls in the strait and so forth. They're saying, wait a minute, we don't want to give up that opportunity to play this. They're not allowing the strait to be reopened even though the US wants it open again. That's essentially the pickle that we've gotten into.

Anas Alhajji: And in addition, basically they think they can literally, just like a drug cartel, they can extract things from the other side. So they wanted more than just little things. They wanted something larger, way larger than what's being negotiated. And they want this to last longer. So they don't want it just to end next month and that's it. Those guys are in for the long term. And that's why they are using it right now.

And again, that was not part of the plan. And that's why the Trump administration is struggling with them.

Erik Townsend: Okay. So the Trump administration intentionally closed the Strait of Hormuz expecting to be able to easily open it. Now we can't open it because certain factions of the IRGC are not cooperating. Where does that leave us now? And this didn't go the way they planned it, obviously. So does the end of the MOU and the return of the blockade that President Trump just put back in place, does that signal a return now to a full-scale conflict between the US and the IRGC until they get to the bottom of who really has the ability to reopen this strait? Is that what happens next or where are we in this story?

Anas Alhajji: The question here is what is the default after the failure of the MOU? And those who believe oil prices will increase significantly, they believe that there is only one default and that's full-scale war. And whenever we talk about war here, I would like to explain that sometimes we use it casually, Really, if we want to talk about war, we talk about what happened in March and April. That was the real war. And whatever we see or we've seen in recent weeks after the MOU basically are some sort kind of skirmishes and battles, et cetera, but it's not the full-scale war that we've seen. So when we talk about war, we have really to define what we are talking about in this case. So The question here is, what is the default after the failure of the MOU?

And if you look at that, we see many scenarios. And the full-scale war basically is one of those scenarios, but the probability of going back to full-scale war is very small.

What we might see is exactly what we've seen recently, that the IRGC will attack and then the United States will retaliate. Et cetera. Some people being critical of me when I said the attacks by the Trump administration will happen on the weekend, and now they are not on the weekend, and they are taking that as a sign that there is something wrong and oil prices should go up. What they are missing here is the fact that there was a red line and being crossed, and the red line was the attack on LNG carrier.

That was. red line, not only for the Trump administration, for everyone. And that's why the Trump administration was quick to respond within hours to attack those guys who attacked the ship.

So they are not attacking the regime, they are attacking the IRGC elements who are causing those problems. And they've been attacking them for a while, by the way. So the issue was that they knew that those guys will continue attacking LNG ships. And they want to stop that, and we've seen that stopped. So no more attacks on LNG carriers. What we are going to see basically is the most likely scenario. Of course, there are many scenarios here, but the most likely scenario is that what we've seen in recent days will continue, and the United States will be after the extreme elements of the IRGC. So they will be watching where the attacks coming from. where the weapons are coming from, where the drones are coming from, and they will be attacking them until they either eliminate them or weaken them substantially. So the negotiating team basically can have enough power in Iran to represent Iran and act on the promises they made.

Erik Townsend: Do you think the US is negotiating in good faith with an Iranian negotiating team that's also negotiating in good faith, but neither side is able to bring about a resolution because there are IRGC factions which don't represent the elected government in Iran, which are out of control right now. And until they're under control, basically everything's a wild card. Is that essentially the situation?

Anas Alhajji: Absolutely correct. And here, a message to the audience that the Iranian government and the negotiators have no choice but to make statements against the Trump administration. They have no choice because they have a population, they need to look like they are powerful enough, and they have those IRGC elements that they want to show that they are standing with them because the last thing they want is a civil war within Iran. So they have to make those statements. And for the Trump administration, including President Trump, they have to make outrageous statements for domestic consumption within the United States. So we should not be fooled by those statements and conclude, oh, we are going to go back to a full war and therefore oil prices will go to $150 as a result, simply because most of those statements are intended for domestic consumption.

Oil price outlook and China's demand response

Erik Townsend: Okay, well, let's take a look at the situation now because you correctly predicted first the initial increase in oil prices, but then you were very quick to get ahead of the permabulls and say, wait a minute, guys, the situation has evolved to the point where you accurately predicted that prices would fall substantially, which they did all the way down to $67 or so.

When they started to get down there, you also said they had gone too far and were overdue to correct. So you've been perfectly nailing the price calls, but frankly, I'm left with my head spinning at this point. We've got the US wanting the strait reopened, but they can't get it reopened because they've got the problem that you just described with the, you know, there's out-of-control IRGC people that are keeping the strait closed.

You just described a new risk in the Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb. So which way are prices going from here? Are we back to a forecast of higher prices, or do we still think that the permabulls are overlooking things and there's reason for lower prices, or is it? Both or what? I'm lost here.

Anas Alhajji: It is really both. And when it comes to Bab el-Mandeb in particular, we have to wait. It's very hard to make a judgment on that because the Saudis are really good at negotiations and they've proven this. So they might end up bringing the Houthis to the table and ending that Bab el-Mandeb issue. So what remains for Bab el-Mandeb, the risk basically is not the Houthis as a regime, causing problems. It's some elements of the Houthis who are influenced by those extreme elements of the IRGC acting up in Bab el-Mandeb.

And that's where the problem is.

And here I would like to emphasize a point that people do not know. This extreme element of the IRGC that is probably gaining control right now in Tehran is really an international organization, just like a big drug cartel throughout, let's say, South America or something. And that's what makes it different from others in Iran.

So they have this international organization, so they have access to Yemen, they have access to Lebanon, they have access to Iraq, and they have all those groups. They are armed groups in those countries. In fact, they have even presence in Mexico, Venezuela, Argentina. So their influence extends internationally. So in a sense, they can wreak havoc on the world because of this connection.

So what happened is, let's go back and look at the events in March when the war started and the Hormuz Strait was closed by the insurance companies. And then Iran claimed that it closed the Hormuz Strait. Oil prices increased substantially. And medium sour crude, especially when we talk about DME Oman exceeded $170.

What strikes me until today, we have analysts who are not even aware of the fact that oil prices exceeded $170, and that is a big problem. Later on when prices declined, they stayed around $155 for a while, and people continued to talk about Oh, Brent is $105 and WTI is $98. It does not represent the facts, et cetera. They are not, they have nothing to do with the actual market. These are futures while the actual market was somewhere else. And this is natural in such events.

So when oil prices exceeded $170, do you think Chinese refiners are going to import oil at that price? No way. Do you think Bangladesh, one of the poorest countries in the world, is going to import oil? No way. So China, basically the Chinese decided to reduce their imports. They reduced their imports by about 6 million barrels a day.

And that led to that demand decline that reduced prices from the 90s to the 70s. But this behavior basically is consistent what they've been doing for the last 10 years and consistent with what we've been talking about all along. Remember, even when we had the MacroVoices energy program, we've been talking about it at that time, how Chinese basically buy low and sell high. And when they sell high, basically they reduce their imports. So this behavior is not strange. The only thing now is the amount is too large. 6 million is a lot.

And people thought, oh well, since their demand declined and global oil demand declined, Then they must be using their inventories. But that is not the case at all. The inventories used by the Chinese is only about 50 million barrels so far. It's not a big deal. And there are many reasons why the Chinese were able to reduce their imports without reducing their inventories significantly.

And I'm going to go over a few of them quickly.

China, as you recall from the beginning of the show when we talked about China knew that the Hormuz Strait will be closed and they started building up inventories. Well, what happened is when oil prices went above $170, they stopped building up inventories. And therefore, the imports that was intended to build up the inventories is no longer there. And that's between 800 to 1 million barrels a day.

So part of the 6 million basically is that amount. And the second one is when we talk about inventories and you see all those charts on Twitter and various places, those are onshore inventories that are the visible inventory onshore that we can see from satellites. But what the Chinese did is they have massive amount of floating storage And the way the customs basically work is kind of very fluid situation where they can use floating storage and will not appear in the customs data until later on. So we estimate the use of floating storage about 1.5 million. So that's 2.5 million are gone from that 6 million.

And then the other thing that analysts missed was the domestic increase in production. China basically was trying to increase its domestic production, oil, gas, coal, and everything else. And they were extremely successful, especially in natural gas, but they were able to increase their production. And that came at the expense of imports.

And then they banned exports of petroleum products, which means that if a refiner was importing let's say 200,000 barrels or exporting 200,000 barrels of petroleum products, then he does not need the crude to produce it. And therefore that declined too. And that was about 1 million barrels too.

So that led to that decline in imports. So we have all those reasons basically that contributed to this decline. And then we have a decline in consumption.

And we got the confirmation this morning, by the way. For the economic growth in China, that's the official number. Economic growth in China in the second quarter of 2026 is the lowest since the '90s. So even if you believe their numbers, basically, then oil demand declined. This is aside from the decline because of electric vehicles and everything else. So they have a decline in consumption that contributed to the decline in imports, but that amount is small. But the idea here is we have this decline, major decline in global demand because of those high oil prices.

And that's what the permabulls basically missed. And that's why when I was talking about the decline in prices, this was part of the story. You add it to the fact that Saudi Arabia and UAE were able to divert oil through the pipelines. You add the amount released from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve, you add what we lost in terms of demand decline from around the world, we end up with almost a balanced market.

And therefore, this idea of $75 to $80, $85, basically, dollars a barrel for Brent basically matches that balanced market. But of course, it is temporarily because we don't know what's going to happen next. And that's where the big issues are. What's going to happen next?

Erik Townsend: Okay. But the way that you've described this, the US intentionally brought about the initial closure of the Strait of Hormuz with the intention of kind of showing China who's in charge. We're the top dogs here. We're in charge of energy and AI. Seems to me that didn't go very well, Anas, because what we actually showed them was actually That China could do an incredibly good job of rebalancing the market in response to all of these events, cutting off their own exports, which actually showed some teeth to the West in the sense that China was able to cover all of its own needs, maybe cutting off some other consumers of Chinese exports of finished products.

It doesn't seem like the US goal of putting China in its place and showing China who the top dog was went very well for the US. Am I reading that wrong? And where does that leave us?

Anas Alhajji: No, you are absolutely right. That is the case because the idea here is we have 2 chess players and both of them are good and each one can guess what the other one will do aside from the fact they can spy on each other. So if you go back and look at the last couple of years, especially since Trump came to office, and you look at the behavior of China with the trade wars, It seems they were always ahead of the game, and evidence abounds in this case because it is very clear they know, either by direct communication or spying, they know these things. So if you look at what happened in Venezuela, for example, they were ahead of the game. If you look at the trade wars, you look at LNG, you look at the tariffs, they were ahead of the game. They stopped importing from the United States simply because they were ahead of the game.

It is very clear that's the case. Here is the problem. All of this is absolutely correct only for a limited time, which means that if the Hormuz Strait issues continue and the United States has the stomach to keep the Hormuz Strait closed like this for an extended period of time and can handle the world criticism because the whole world economy is going to collapse, China will be the biggest loser. If this is going to last for long, because the Chinese cannot continue these policies for a very, very long time. So they can be affected. So the Chinese policies are very effective in the short term, probably a little bit to the medium term, but that's it.

After that, what are the choices? That's why we've seen China basically realizing this. So the emphasis in China on solar and wind and hydro and nuclear was designed exactly for this. This has nothing to do with climate change. This is, this was designed because of this. And the reason why, I'm going to go back to 2019 because I heard this.

In 2019, Chinese officials basically were convinced that there will be either a war or sanctions against China. And they were convinced that Malacca Strait will be closed. So China basically is preparing for the Malacca Strait to be closed. And it just happened now that the Hormuz Strait was closed, but they are aware of the issue. But the question is, can they handle this? If let's say if this continued until next year, June next year, what will happen in China? I don't think that the Chinese can handle this for a very long time.

US-China signalling, negotiations and regime-collapse risk

Erik Townsend: Do you think the reason that President Trump keeps saying time is on our side with respect to negotiating with the Iranians is because really he thinks we need to be taking our time with the Chinese, that that's the real negotiation?

Anas Alhajji: I don't know, but China is on our side basically in a couple of issues. And the Chinese already said this publicly, that they want the flow of oil and gas to be Free of any intervention in the strait, whether from the United States or Iran. And they don't want any tools or any obstructions in the area. And Trump understood it as they are on our side because they already declared those two.

Erik Townsend: Okay. So the mess that we've made, China wants to help us get out of. The US wants out of the mess. The solution is to make a deal with the Iranians who want to negotiate. You're saying that you think the team of Iranians that have been put in the position of being the negotiators do want to bring about a peace deal and put this whole story behind us, but it is the rebel factions of the IRGC who benefit more from the bribes and the security tactics of keeping the strait open and collecting tolls and so forth. Those are the people that are standing in the way right now. So what happens next? Because on one hand, you've described reasons why you correctly predicted prices would come down, but now you're saying Strait of Bab-el-Mandeb could come into the fray if the Houthis want to escalate again.

So which way does this go next?

Anas Alhajji: It is one option for the United States is clear that they will cooperate with the Iranians indirectly where they can get more information about those extreme elements and attack them and attack their positions until they diminish their power and literally help the negotiating team basically to gain more power in Iran. And the reason why they want to do this, because some people are saying, well, let's change the regime completely and get them out.

This is what you don't want to get. Because one issue that you need to be aware of, that a collapse of the regime in Iran is literally the worst outcome you get. And no one in the whole region wants a collapse of the regime. Even the United States basically does not want a collapse of the regime. They want to replace it, yes, but they don't want a collapse because a collapse is a disaster for everyone, especially Pakistan.

You talk about the Gulf countries, Western Europe. Look, Ukraine basically is not all of it is at war. Yes, certain areas in Ukraine being hit by Russia all the time, but look at the number of Ukrainian refugees in Europe. We did not see that in Iran, by the way.

But imagine if we have a collapse of the regime and all of a sudden we have the revenge killing and the revenge of everything, we are going to see massive exodus of millions of people. And they are not going to settle in Iraq. They are not going to settle in the Gulf. They are not going to settle in Turkey or Pakistan. They are going to go all the way to Western Europe, and therefore Western Europe does not want that.

At the same time, Turkey does not want the Kurds to be independent, and Pakistan does not want the Baloch, which is an ethnic group there, to be independent. They've been fighting the government of Pakistan for years. So no one has an interest in a collapse of the regime, and therefore the only choice for the United States is to support the negotiating team against the extreme elements.

Refining bottleneck, SPR versus commercial inventories, demand destruction

Erik Townsend: Okay. So I want to make sure that we get to all of the expected outcomes from this, because one of the things that you've also started saying recently is, look, everybody's focused on crude oil prices, up, down, up, down. What's going to happen next? We really should be focusing on the refined products because you've made the point that really it's refining capacity, which is the thing that is in most dire extreme shortage. Not so much the crude oil to supply it.

What did you mean and what should we be focused on in terms of refining capacity and which countries are most important in this equation?

Anas Alhajji: Yeah, the biggest criticism to the idea of energy dominance, that whoever crafted this policy, they focused on upstream and they forgot the downstream. So for the Trump administration or for whoever came up with the idea in the deep state or the CIA or whoever done this, They really forgot about this. You need to expand US refining capacity substantially if you want to use energy dominance in the coming years and coming decades in the world. So we need to see more refineries and we need to see an expansion of existing refineries.

So that's number one. But one of the issues that's been missed by analysts is the following. They've been saying, look, Global oil inventories declined substantially, which is true, and therefore oil prices should go up. Here they mixed apples and oranges and they misunderstood what's been going on. Most of the decrease was in strategic petroleum reserves, not in commercial inventories.

And the impact here is different because when commercial inventories decline, Oil prices go up. But when the Strategic Petroleum Reserve declines, prices go down. Why? Because they are intended for that. The government holds them for emergencies. So when you have shortages and higher prices, you release those amounts to quell prices and reduce them. So these are 2 different things. These are apples and oranges.

So most of the decrease in global oil inventories was in strategic petroleum reserves.

And they kept telling us global oil inventories declined this much. That is a lie. That is not correct. And the reason why, because most of that decline was only in 2 countries, United States and Japan. And for the decline in Japan was for one reason. And the decline in the United States was completely For a different reason.

And if you look at the small decline in commercial inventories, they were only in 2 countries, the United States and China. So we cannot even say there were a global decline in inventories. It wasn't. And until today, it is not. We do have plenty of crude in this case.

So let's go over Japan and United States here. So to explain this point. Japan basically got stuck because they had to use their own strategic petroleum reserves and withdraw massive amount.

As a result, of course, they need to reduce their imports. But until today, their imports did not recover and their inventories did not recover. While if you look at India, for example, India at the beginning, its imports declined, Its inventories declined because they had to withdraw some from their inventories to compensate.

But later on, they were able to increase their imports to pre-war levels and they replenished their inventories and their inventories now are the highest since COVID So why India was able to do that, but Japan was not able to do that? The reason why, because the Japanese yen collapsed.

And in April, the price of oil in Japanese yen was the highest in history, literally the highest in history. So the Japanese companies have no choice basically but to go and use the Strategic Petroleum Reserve that's been bought at very low prices historically until prices go down or they have a solution.

But one thing is clear here when we talk about the Strategic Petroleum Reserves and refilling the Strategic Petroleum Reserves. People are saying, well, now they have to refill and therefore prices will go up. Japan is not going to refill as long as the yen is low, because even by today's prices, the price is too high for Japan.

So they are not going to refill until the Japanese yen goes up and goes up enough So oil looks cheap within Japan.

For the United States, there were 2 issues here. The first issue is the United States realized that we do have a problem with petroleum products and realized that we have shortages of oil. At the same time, we have that energy dominance idea. So they needed to release massive amount of oil. By the way, the daily release is the highest on record.

So they need to release that amount and allow it to be exported to other countries.

And at the same time, historically speaking, Trump was telling Zelenskyy not to hit the Russian export facilities of crude. And then that issue basically was dropped. And Zelenskyy basically was sending all those drones, hitting all the Russian targets to the extent that Russia's exports of petroleum products declined substantially at a time where we need them.

So logically, the Trump administration should be asking Zelenskyy to slow down, but that was not the case. And one of the ironies is that all of a sudden, because of the Russian refineries being closed, that the United States is exporting petroleum products to countries That never received American products before for the first time in history.

So they are taking customers from Russia the same way they took Europe from Russian gas, exactly the same thing. So you want to talk about energy dominance? It is right there. However, for the United States, basically when we talk about refill, because the bulls basically are saying that once we start refilling the SPR, oil prices will go up.

Yes, it is bullish in a sense that it'll support prices and it'll create a floor. But what they are missing is we have asymmetry between the releases and the injection. For example, we released at certain days, we released 1.9 million barrels a day. We did that, but we cannot refill that amount because technically speaking, At the current situation, we cannot inject more than 400,000 barrels a day.

So we cannot return this amount by— at the same rate that we released it. And that's why when you talk about 400,000 barrels a day, it's not a big deal in terms of prices. Yes, it supports prices, it creates a floor, but it's not going to raise prices substantially.

We've seen this before.

At the same time, people have to realize an important fact that the releases, which is about so far is about 99 million barrels that we released. So we still have about 73 million barrels to release. Those releases are loans. They are not sales. And this is very important to the balances of the market.

Why? Because when companies borrowed the oil at $120, it was extremely attractive for them to borrow because they need to return this oil later on with some interest in kind. So for example, if ExxonMobil borrowed, let's say, 10 million barrels, they have to return them 12 million barrels later on.

This is just an example. So they have to return the interest in kind. But think about what happened here.

They borrowed the oil at $120 and later on when they return it, they'll return it when oil is $60 or $70 or $80. So even with the interest, the oil companies basically, and the traders are making hundreds of millions of dollars of the taxpayer money, of the taxpayer-supported SPR as a result of this game.

So the idea here is when they refill, They are not going to refill at a higher price. They are going to refill at a lower price. So those who are expecting prices will go up, companies are not going to play the game that way because it's a loan, it's not a purchase.

So these are some of the reasons. So even if you look at China, for example, China have not released any oil from its strategic petroleum reserves. The decline in China, about 50 million, came from the refining part. Right. Simply because the government allowed them to export some recently. So they started using the oil that bought cheaply before.

The Chinese are not going to refill their inventories, and we have data for the last 10 years to prove this point, unless prices are below $70. So the perma bulls basically have no case when it comes to refilling the SPR. Yes, the SPR filling is bullish and it supports prices.

It creates a floor, but the idea that prices will increase significantly, it's not going to happen. It's just illogical based on the points that I just mentioned.

As for the products, the shortages really were in the products, not in crude, because I mentioned that most of the decline was SPR and most of that is in the United States and Japan. Et cetera. But most of the decreases were in the products because we as a human, we use petroleum products. We don't use crude oil.

And that's why if you look at the United States and various countries, we see a major decline in the inventories of petroleum products.

For the United States in particular, the permabulls basically are saying that once we reach the tank bottom, In the products, especially diesel and gasoline. We are not going to reach it in jet fuel, by the way, because the airlines have to run no matter what. So they always keep enough jet fuel. But when it comes to gasoline and diesel, companies still have businesses to run. But their idea is if we go to tank bottom, then gasoline and diesel prices will go through the roof.

And therefore crude prices will go up and WTI will go up substantially. This is nonsense. And the reason why, because if you look at today's numbers, refineries right now, some refineries are running above 100% of their capacity. And on average for the US refining sector, we are running at 96%, 97%.

So when refineries are running at almost full capacity, even if there is massive demand for gasoline and diesel, If you cannot process the crude, then you are not going to demand the crude. And if you don't demand the crude, there is no reason for its prices to go up.

Erik Townsend: It seems to me, Anas, like we have a setup here for what could be that really big price escalation moment that everybody predicted in crude oil could still happen in finished products because we really do have a problem there. But the thing is, no matter how big of a problem it is, even if diesel fuel is $300 a barrel at some point, it doesn't change the fact that we've still got plenty of crude oil waiting to be refined.

Anas Alhajji: That is absolutely the case. So we might end up with higher gasoline prices, higher diesel prices. Of course, if you look at jet fuel, for example, in Europe, prices already hit record high. So we have the inflation, of course, we see it all over the place. We are still waiting for the 2nd quarter data to come out from around the world to see what's been going on. But the fact is you are absolutely right that the problem is in products. Prices will go up and might go up even higher, but we will see demand destruction. We will see a demand decline.

By the way, this is for the audience. Demand decline means this can be recovered over time. Demand destruction cannot be recovered. And that demand destruction, when you see, for example, a change in production lines, when you see people basically getting rid of their SUVs that run on gasoline and buy electric vehicles, for example, that is demand destruction. But everything else is demand decline and can recover later on.

Erik Townsend: So let me run this scenario past you. What if we saw a complete upset and unexpected outcome here where the permabulls who had the idea that we were headed toward this major price dislocation that was going to result in a price-driven demand decline event that would destroy a whole bunch of demand. What if that really does still have to happen, but it happens in diesel and gasoline prices, and all the while crude oil is hovering around a comfortable level because There wasn't enough refining capacity to consume all the crude that is available. The problem is in the finished products. And the problem is that because we have delayed the operation of all of our refining capacity, we can't catch up with that now. Is that a realistic risk scenario here?

Anas Alhajji: The issue here is when the crisis started, I was one of those bulls who said oil prices will go up. substantially and we might get even to $250. I was one of those guys at the beginning, but we already got it. Even in our research, basically in our reports, we published that demand destruction starts at $160 and we've seen that.

So the idea here is whatever the permabulls basically were looking for, it already happened and it already passed them. And they still look at Brent and WTI and they think it should happen here. It happened, but it happened In the different price in a different area. But it happened and it passed. And now the damage, we are dealing with the damage of it.

So it's very hard to see this happening again unless we see the Bab-el-Mandeb or any other waterway such as the ones in Asia or in Turkey or others basically are closed. Other than that, there is no reason to be extremely bullish. on oil prices. There is no case. The damage already been done. The damage to demand already been done. Countries are reacting. People are reacting. We see a change in behavior. So we are seeing those changes.

And the question is, what will happen once we use all the oil in the Strategic Petroleum Reserves?

SPR drawdown limits and the global diesel crisis

Erik Townsend: Well, how much is left? Before we even get to what happens when we use it all, tell me about the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve.

Anas Alhajji: Yeah, this is exactly the point. Both of us are going in the same direction.

Erik Townsend: How much can we really take out of what's supposedly left there?

Anas Alhajji: Well, we've seen people basically talking about, oh, we have a technical limit. We cannot go below 250. This is a lie. It's not a technical limit. It's a legal limit. So we have something from the Congress that's been specified long time ago that we cannot go below 252 million barrels.

So here is the issue. We already released about 99 and we still have about 73. So if we want to release the 73, we are going to go below the legal limit. But if you look at the language, the legal language, the Congress says that the president in case of emergency can go below the 250. So basically President Trump can literally say we are in emergency and we have to go below 250.

So that's number one. So we can go below 250 without any problems. The technical limits are way, way lower than that. It's just that experts do not agree on what are the technical limits. We don't know. No one knows exactly where the technical limits are, but at least it is very clear based on what is out there. We can go with an additional 100 million barrels above the 172 without any problems with the technical limits.

And those who are talking about a collapse of those caverns, they need to study geology because those caverns have been there for millions of years. And the government chose them because they've been there for millions of years. And some of them basically think that we took that oil out of the caverns and there is nothing but air. That is not correct. It's filled literally with water instead of oil to maintain the integrity of those caverns. So yes, there could be some technical issues, et cetera, but not as big as those guys are saying.

On the other side, the United States is part of the International Energy Agency. To be a member of the International Energy Agency, you have to maintain 90 million barrels in Strategic Petroleum Reserves of oil, of net imports. So oil here means it's not necessarily to be crude, could be anything. It could be gasoline, diesel, anything. In fact, most of the SPR in Europe is really petroleum products. It's not crude.

So the condition for the IEA is to have 90 days of your net imports, and the United States is a net exporter. And therefore the IEA rules do not apply to the United States.

So between the legal and technical conditions and between the IEA conditions, the United States can literally drain all inventories in the United States down to the technical limits without any problems.

Erik Townsend: Okay. It seems to me like there's a major policy and public sentiment issue here because crazy me, I would like to think that people would come to their senses and say, gee, maybe with everything the world has been through in 6 months. Draining our Strategic Petroleum Reserves down to the point where we barely have anything left is not too smart. Therefore, a very high priority of society should be refilling the Strategic Petroleum Reserve all the way up to 780 million barrels or whatever its capacity is supposed to be as quickly as we possibly can.

That's just me though. I suspect there's probably a larger number of people who are saying, well, why don't we just keep draining it all the way into the election so we can get the price of gasoline down even more.

Anas Alhajji: Couple of things here. First of all, the Republicans in the '90s wanted to close the Department of Energy and sell the SPR. So for those who remember that, or people can Google it and go back and see what Newt Gingrich and others at that time, they literally wanted to shut down the— Rick Perry, basically the Secretary of Energy during the Trump, the first Trump administration, was one of them who wanted to shut down the Department of Energy And sell the SPR. Trump himself in 2017 wanted to sell half of the SPR, which a dream of Trump in 2017 is happening right now, selling half of the SPR.

So these things been there. And the question is, do we really need that SPR to be at 700 or even 400, et cetera?

When we established the SPR, we were a net importer. We were expected to increase imports to the extent that our US imports could be, instead of being 6 million right now, could be around 20 million. But now it's exactly the opposite. We are a net exporter. That shale revolution basically changed everything. So that's the first point. The second point is the problem we have.

You can look at shale literally as the SPR because we can produce oil quickly from shale. Here's the problem, crude quality. What we need for diesel basically is medium sour crude. What we produce from shale is light sweet crude. So we can produce a lot of gasoline from it, but we cannot produce a lot of diesel.

So while we can depend on shale to support us in case if we drain the SPR, we have a serious problem with crude quality. And that's why If you look at the diesel crisis, you asked me earlier about refining and petroleum products. If you look at the diesel crisis worldwide, that's where the Strategic Petroleum Reserves basically work their magic.

Because without the US Strategic Petroleum Reserve releases, diesel prices in the United States probably would be in the range of $12 a gallon.

And if you look at the diesel crisis worldwide, it's a true crisis. And the crisis basically went like this. We have 3 major refineries in the Gulf, one in Kuwait, one in Saudi Arabia, and one in United Arab Emirates. All their exports of diesel, jet fuel, and everything else being shut down because I'm talking about the exports.

So their exports being shut down. So we lost all of that. And as a result of this, of course, we have a total panic in the global market. And because of that panic, we ended up with the following situation. Countries like China, India, South Korea, and others, basically, they were afraid they will have shortages. So what they've done, they limited the exports of petroleum products. So China shut it down completely.

India imposed very heavy taxation that reduced the exports. And South Korea adopted a different system where they said, okay, you meet this limit, anything above this limit, you are free to export. But the idea here is these rules of because of the panic exacerbated the situation. So in a sense, we have direct impact of losing the diesel from the Hormuz Strait or the Hormuz crisis, and then we have the indirect impact when those countries panicked and they decided to stop exporting diesel.

And because diesel prices were going through the roof, we ended up with hoarding.

We ended up with traders basically playing the game. And at the same time, we ended up with tankers carrying diesel being sold and exchanged hands several times. So if a diesel tanker basically going from India to South Africa, halfway it was sold to Singapore and then it's been redirected halfway, it's been sold to China. It's being redirected, and then halfway it's being sold to Japan and being redirected. We ended up with more ships on water at that time carrying the diesel and little diesel coming to the shores, and that exacerbated the situation.

What made the situation worse for diesel is that we need that medium sour crude to produce that diesel. And what we lost out of Hormuz? Most of the crude that we lost out of Hormuz is medium sour. So even those who have the refining capacity in Asia, they couldn't refine the diesel because they couldn't get the medium sour crude.

So what the Trump administration did, released massive amount of medium sour crude from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. So for those who are anti-releases must realize the tremendous impact and value that the releases basically resulted in, not only in the United States but worldwide, because we released this massive amount of medium sour crude. We sold some of it to the international market, and US refiners basically reduced their imports of medium sour crude. So they left more medium sour crude for the rest of the world to deal with.

And they refined more diesel and exported the diesel to the rest of the world.

That's how we were able to increase our diesel exports to the highest on record. So the idea here, the bottom line here is those massive releases of SPR, especially of the medium sour crude, saved the world. And the question is, even if financially it does not make sense, But what is the strategic value?

And what is the value when you start looking at economic growth, when you start looking at inflation, you look at employment, et cetera? What is the value of not having diesel at $12 a gallon?

Post-Hormuz world: pipelines, OPEC+ reform and strategic reserves

Erik Townsend: Anas, let's move on to the post-Hormuz world, what we can expect when we eventually get this Hormuz situation under control. Will Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries develop alternatives in order to eliminate dependency on the Strait of Hormuz? possible for them to come up with a plan B so they don't need to export through the Strait of Hormuz? And if so, what are those alternatives? What role would OPEC play in that scenario? For that matter, what's the future of OPEC? Does it have a future after the UAE left?

Anas Alhajji: Couple of things here. The first one is when, if you look at the situation 50 years ago and you look at pipelines or creating canals or others, et cetera, These were very smart ideas, but the technology in the last 15 years changed, and you can see it in Ukraine and Russia right now with those drones. You can go to the heart of Russia basically and bomb anything accurately.

So from a security point of view, having more pipelines to the West or through Syria or Israel or any other country does not make sense at all because everything can be bombed right now.

And by the way, the suggestion to take pipelines through Syria and Israel basically does not make sense simply because the market for the Gulf is in Asia, is not in Europe, it's not in the United States. So it does not make sense basically to build those pipelines. Iraq can build a pipeline through Syria for a small amount, probably 500,000 barrels a day, just to take it to Europe, but that's it. But we cannot talk about millions of barrels.

But the idea here is having more pipelines does not solve the problem.

Those who want to build pipelines, they have to do it the Emirati way, the UAE way. What that means, you have to make economic and financial sense out of them, not a security sense. And if security comes on top of that, you are a winner. But if you want to build them only for security, they don't make any sense at all. Right now, but for the UAE in particular, because of its geographic location and because of the plans to build those pipelines to Fujairah, they make perfect economic sense.

So if they can obtain security above, that's great. And the reason why, because if you look at the map, you have only straight pipeline going south from Abu Dhabi to Fujairah, and that oil basically just goes in one direction.

Compare that to a VLCC going from Fujairah around that big triangle, kind of looks like a peninsula, around it to Abu Dhabi area basically to load the oil. The savings from not letting those ships going through the Hormuz Strait in terms of distance, in terms of cost of fuel, in terms of daily rent, in terms of Wages for employees, etc. Those pipelines saves a lot of money, a lot of money. So they make economic sense. If they can obtain security above, that's perfect.

But for others who wants to do it just for security, it does not make sense right now because technology changed at all.

Three weeks ago, I wrote an article, and in that article basically I explained what OPEC Plus. Should do and the changes that are needed simply because the world after Hormuz is completely different from the world before Hormuz. And OPEC+ have to adjust to this new world. And the 3 major proposals I made, the first one is change the bylaws of the group. And instead of focusing on production, they have to focus on Exports, because you can measure that more precisely than production.

And at the same time, the second point is to focus on all liquids, not only on crude, because the demand side is all liquids, not only crude.

And the third point is the most important, is for them together as a group, OPEC+, to work with the consuming countries. To build massive strategic petroleum reserves. And I went country by country basically in the research work basically to show how it works. And the objective is to avoid any choke points, not only Hormuz, and to avoid any waterway. So you don't want the Turkish waterways, you don't want the Danish waterways, you don't want the Panama Canal, you don't want the areas south of Argentina, for example. You don't want any of that. You want to choose locations where you have the market without any obstructions at all. So they can build this massive storage there.

So in case of Hormuz or Bab-el-Mandeb or Malacca or anything basically is closed, we don't only have the oil, those countries can maintain their revenues and they can survive.

Because if you look at what's been happening right now in Iraq, basically Iraq is on the verge of bankruptcy right now. But if they have this massive storage out there, they don't have to go bankrupt. So the main solution is really building those massive strategic petroleum reserves. And the cost of that is a fraction of the cost of pipelines, is a fraction of the cost of canals.

At the same time, the strategic alliances they are going to build with the countries where they are building them becomes extremely important.

So you can expand OPEC+. For example, you can go to India and India really wants to increase its strategic petroleum reserves, but they don't have the money. So what do you do? Allow OPEC+ to come in, build 200 million Strategic Petroleum Reserve or 300 million or even more in India.

So if the Hormuz Strait and Bab-el-Mandeb are closed, India will have enough oil. It has a big refining sector so it can refine the products. At the same time, India becomes an oil exporter when Saudi Arabia and others cannot export the oil. And all of a sudden India becomes part of OPEC+. Because they are exporting the oil after the changes in bylaws from being a producer to being an exporter. So strategic alliances, basically an interdependence between the producers and consumers, increase substantially.

And if you want to look at the main lesson out of Hormuz, we need that cooperation. The idea is we look at producers as the enemy or the consumers as the enemy. Must end because that was one of the biggest lessons out of Hormuz.

As for OPEC basically, or OPEC+, for a country to leave, it is not in the interest of the UAE, for example, for prices to collapse. So they are going to act in a very responsible way no matter what to avoid that. And they want to avoid a price war under any circumstances. So the impact is limited. So OPEC+ will be intact no matter what, but they have to meet the new challenges after Hormuz.

And I believe I provided some solutions for them.

The ghost of Hormuz

Erik Townsend: Anas, you've said that the ghost of Hormuz will remain with us forever. What do you mean by that specifically? And why do you think that the risk of this shadow of Hormuz will persist indefinitely?

Anas Alhajji: Sure. So the problem is when this war started, And whether you talk about President Trump or you talk about Netanyahu or you talk about deep state or whoever, whatever you want to talk about, no one was paying attention to closure of Hormuz Strait and what it means to the world.

And because of the massive publicity of Hormuz Strait, even children right now know what Hormuz Strait is. That was not the case in January. A lot of people, even university professors, They don't know where Hormuz Strait is. But now everyone knows what Hormuz Strait is.

So what happened is, let's say we are going to end up with a deal and a very firm, good, in the words of Trump, beautiful deal. Anyone who is going to get mad from the IRGC at their government, they are going to go to Hormuz Strait and cause problems.

Whether they're going to issue a tweet, a fiery speech, or actually fire at a ship a year from now, three years from now, twenty years from now, etc. This is going to happen. Any terrorist group or militia in the region who wants attention, they know they get the attention by going to Hormuz.

In fact, anyone in the United States or Norway or Brazil or anywhere else who is trading oil. Or trading oil stocks. They can, if they have very large following on social media or on YouTube, if they go and buy, let's say, 10,000 contracts, and then they literally make up a story and say a ship was attacked at Hormuz just 5 minutes ago, oil prices go up by $3.

They sell their contracts, they make the money, and then say, sorry, that was not confirmed. So anyway, anyone can play the news. So what we did here is we created a monster that no one can slay, period. So whether group of Iranians or group of anyone in the region or traders or young people who wants to play the stock market or the oil trading, et cetera, anyone can play this market right now.

With social media and the impact of social media, They just made the impact of Hormuz way larger. We've seen what it is, and the market becomes extremely responsive to these things. And that's why the ghost of Hormuz basically will stay with us forever, even if we reached a final resolution to the crisis.

Investment conclusions: LNG, coal and national-security energy policy

Erik Townsend: Anas, let's bring this whole thing together now. What investment recommendations would you make for both institutional and retail investors out of this whole conversation?

Anas Alhajji: A couple of things are very clear right now, Erik. The first one is how countries are going to react to the Hormuz crisis because the impact is tremendous. The impact is huge. And people realize that the short-term behavior of China that we talked about earlier basically proved that China basically was the least affected.

And therefore, countries and governments are going to adopt the Chinese model. What is the Chinese model? Is linking energy sources to national security. And once you do that, you can do a lot of things, and even in democratic countries. So what's going to happen right now is because under the name of national security, you can pass many things to promote your domestic energy sources. So when it comes to climate change policies, for example, All the policies that failed because you don't have money or the Congress did not allocate enough money or the parliament did not allocate enough money, or you have massive opposition because of the massive amount of subsidies, et cetera. Now you can come in and say, look, it's a national security issue.

And we've seen those national security arguments for protection and trade agreements, et cetera, for the last 100 years or so. So we are going to see it now on a larger scale than ever, where everything is going to be packaged under national security. And therefore they can declare emergency, they can declare many things, and they can literally focus on those energy sources. So what we are going to see is companies benefiting from all those subsidies that the governments are going to allocate because of national security. So that's one part of the business. But 2 things are clear as a result of this. The first one is the winner among all energy sources is natural gas and LNG. So investing in LNG, basically, especially LNG names, especially the United States names, is a big one. So the LNG is going to be a very big winner out of this, not only because of the Hormuz crisis, but also because of the demand for power, for electricity, coming from data centers and AI.

So you combine Hormuz with data centers and AI, and you can see the massive demand as a result of this. And who are the winners? The first winner basically is natural gas and LNG. It's mostly LNG. I am very big on LNG names. The other one is coal. And the reason why coal becomes very attractive here, not only because it's cheap, it is a domestic source in most of the consuming countries. That been affected by Hormuz.

And we got to compare where coal was heading versus where it's going to be. And you can see that coal basically, coal companies basically are going to do extremely well because linking those sources to energy security is going to benefit all the sources, not only solar and wind, they are going to benefit natural gas, even oil and coal. And by the way, when you talk about oil, We don't have that much generation coming out of oil. About only 4% of global oil demand basically is used in power generation. But this morning we have very big news out of France that oil use in power generation increased substantially because wind stopped because of the heat. And this is the important point people have to realize that the weather is hot simply because you don't have wind. And if you don't have wind, You don't have power generation from wind.

But that's part of the story. The other story is the water in the rivers basically heated up and it's not suitable for the nuclear plants. So they have to shut some of them down. And as a result, now they are burning oil. We've seen that during the very high expensive LNG because the Northeast of the United States import LNG. It's one of the ironies, by the way, we are the largest exporter of LNG in the world. But because of the Jones Act, historically we had to import to Boston, basically we have to import LNG.

The utilities couldn't import the LNG because it was too expensive. And what was the replacement? Oil. So we are going to see those sources basically back in the play as a result of this. The bottom line here is LNG and coal are going to be the winners of this combination of Hormuz

Erik Townsend: Well, Anas, I can't thank you enough as always for a terrific interview. Before I let you go, please tell our listeners a little bit more about what you do at Energy Outlook Advisors, what services are on offer there, and how people can follow your work.

Anas Alhajji: Yes. So most of the work I do, I do a lot of research and I have a team to work with me too. And what I do is mostly I give speeches to board members and companies, investors, et cetera. whether in person or through Zoom. So that one. The other one is we do have 2 publications, both of them on Substack, the Energy Outlook Advisors newsletter that is intended for institutional investors. And we do have the Daily Energy Report that is intended for everyone, even individuals. It's only like $1.30 a day or something like this. So it's not a big deal. So we have the Daily Energy Report. They can find that either by searching Google or going to my Twitter account. I put a lot of things on Twitter and I do have a subscription, very cheap subscription on Twitter for those who wants to get some information, not the full picture, but it is there.

But the best way to communicate with me is either through the website or through the Twitter account.

Erik Townsend: And listeners, be sure to stay tuned for our new MacroVoices Market Desk segment where Patrick and Massil will take this apart. And look for Patrick, Where's the Trade?

Trading Desk: Cheniere Energy Trade of the Week

Patrick Ceresna: Welcome to the MacroVoices Trading Desk. I'm Patrick Ceresna.

Massil Beguenane: And I'm Massil Beguenane. Let's drive straight into the trade of the week, Patrick. Anas laid out a pretty compelling case. Energy security, geopolitics, and exploding power demand are all colliding, and US LNG sits right where they meet. How would you play that?

Patrick Ceresna: One of Anas's strongest conclusions was that natural gas, and especially US LNG infrastructure, stands to benefit as countries prioritize secure energy supply. While AI and data centers drive another leg higher in electricity demand. For this week's Trade of the Week, I want to express the theme through Cheniere Energy, symbol LNG, one of the cleanest US-listed ways to participate in that structural buildout. From a technical perspective, the timing is starting to look interesting. At the start of the year, Cheniere rallied roughly 60% into late March and then spent the next 3 months in a 25% correction lower. Now through July, the stock rallied, reclaimed its 50-day moving average, and broke above the descending trend line from the March peak, suggesting that a correction may have already run its course and a new bullish phase may be starting.

With LNG closing at $255.83, the cleanest expression is to simply buy the underlying shares. But because this is still early in the breakout, I want to add a short-term protective put to make sure the entry holds. The technical failure point sits at $240. So I'm looking at buying the $240 strike to put for $4.55, giving us 36 days of protection. The hedge costs roughly 1.8% of the stock price and creates a defined floor beneath the position during the fragile early stage of the breakout. So this is a straightforward way to stay long Anas's energy security thesis while limiting the damage if the technical reversal fails.

Massil Beguenane: All right, let's dive into equities.

S&P 500, KOSPI and speculative positioning

Patrick Ceresna: So diving into these equities, fundamentally, the market remains caught in a tug of war. There's renewed Middle Eastern escalation and rising oil prices are reviving these inflation concerns, but those risks are being offset with the momentum of this AI boom in semiconductors, the resilient corporate earnings, and the expectations for supportive monetary policy. Technically, the S&P 500 is still very clearly in a bull trend. Higher highs, higher lows, all dips are being bought. And it's pressing to 52-week highs even though not yet broken those June highs. So clearly the bulls are in the driver's seat and maintaining this trend. The bigger question is, can they follow through? There's been a momentum loss in the last few weeks that has basically the S&P 500 in an uptrend but with no genuine momentum. So the bigger puzzle to solve here is this a part of a broader topping formation and we entered some distribution cycle where overhead resistance is established us, there's plenty of supply of stock up there.

I think a lot of that has to be answered by what happens in some of the key AI sectors. Now, the first thing I want to specifically talk about is the Kospi. Now, the Kospi has been directly correlating to the semiconductor index. And what we've seen is now several weeks from which the semiconductors have been trading off of their highs. The difference here is that the SMH and the semiconductors have more or less held the 50-day moving average, and we have not seen that decisive break breakdown yet, and that's the puzzle to solve. Because if the semiconductors break with the Kospi on the downside, and the question becomes what part of the leadership and sector rotation can maintain the momentum on the upside of the S&P. Now, certainly the financials had positive earnings this week, which is driving at least some bullish tailwind in there. But definitely the puzzle to solve going into next week is whether the selling pressure Breaks down this market cap weighted index as some of these big behemoths may begin some bigger selling.

On a final note, the technical level in my mind to watch is actually about 200 S&P points lower on the S&P 500, somewhere just below 7,400. That's going to be an area where a lot of the CTA sell triggers have been slowly crawling up to. And the thing to definitely watch is can the bulls keep the price action away from systematic sell triggers? in order to maintain the prevailing bull trend, or will we see some sort of prevailing weakness that adds systematic selling as a factor into the summer price action?

Massil Beguenane: Well, Patrick, large speculators' positioning in the S&P futures has surged from 16 to 94, and that just happened in a single month. That's systematic money aggressively chasing this rally, not conviction that was built over time. And guess what? But that distinction sets up the fork in the road. If the index breaks to new highs, that positioning gets reinforced and the chase can keep feeding itself. But sitting in the top decile of positioning in the past year, the same trait cuts the other way. If the market rolls over and starts triggering CTA sell signals, positioning that was built in a month can unwind fast. Not in months, in days. Now let's move on to the next asset here. What about the dollar? Are we seeing similar moves?

Dollar index, euro and Canadian dollar positioning

Patrick Ceresna: Well, when looking at the dollar index, we continue to spend the last 2, 3 weeks in a backfilling consolidation, and we've now approached the 50-day moving average. And more importantly, where all the previous highs were of the 15-month trade range that was bullishly broken out, this is actually a very important technical crossroad. We saw a huge US dollar bull breakout, and this entire consolidation now is still staying above the previous trade range. This is a very typical place for buy-on-dip traders to defend. And if we see the dollar bullishly advance off this level, particularly reclaiming north of 101.50 on the upside on the dollar index, that could reopen an upside move that could see the dollar index heading to the 103 level on the upside. Bottom line, the bulls are still in control of this dollar trend, and we haven't seen any technical reversal points that suggest otherwise.

Massil Beguenane: While here we're seeing large specs positioning in both the euro and the Canadian dollar just keeps weakening. Both are now sitting at zero on the COT Signal's 1-year positioning score, but the 5-year window tells you those 2 zeros just aren't the same. The euro has only slipped modestly net short as a percentage of open interest, while the Canadian dollar is already deeply net short, and both are still sinking towards the bottom of their 5-year ranges. So the abandonment is real, but it may not be the end.

Now let's move on to crude, Patrick. What do you see there?

Crude oil technicals and WTI positioning

Patrick Ceresna: Well, Mass, when looking at the crude oil chart, and just as we heard from Anas and Erik during the interview, there was a re-escalation of the military conflict, which has certainly put a risk premium back into oil. We were in an incredibly oversold condition trading down below $70 2 weeks ago. We've now seen a retrace of the June decline now approaching a 50-day moving average and the 50% retracement of that June decline.

This is now unwinding the oversold state of oil, and this is where we're going to really start getting a technical tell on how the price action is going to develop. If we see the pattern that old dips are being bought and generally accumulation is still coming in, that leaves the window open for oil to trade back to $85, $90 a barrel, which would still be below the major consolidation throughout March and April and May, but certainly room for oil to at least come to a mid fair value zone that is somewhere in between the highs of the second quarter versus those lows that were established here just 2 weeks ago.

Massil Beguenane: Well, Patrick, large speculator positioning in WTI has dropped to just 19 on the 1-year score, and net long exposure is back down near where it sat before the Iranian war even started. Think about what that means. Nearly everything speculators added during the call for has now been washed out, which means the market spent the last month unpricing a war that never actually ended. Now that we know the war is re-escalating again, how is gold reacting to all this?

Gold and silver

Patrick Ceresna: When looking at gold, there's a lot of reasons to be long-term bullish gold, but over the last few months, the price action still remains decisively distributive. All rallies are failing. The selling pressure is still dominant. Now, we've established over the last 3, 4 weeks a baseline around the $4,000 level. which is a key round number. And it'll be very interesting going into next week whether the bulls can hold the line there because a break of $4,000 could see short-term corrections head down to $3,800 or even as low as $3,600 for one last quick washout on the downside of gold. Now, I want to stress that while we're obviously recognizing this prevailing downtrend remaining dominant, I want to stress that I think that the asymmetry is already skewing towards the bulls. We're We're already $1,600 off of the highs, and we are talking about whether or not there's a couple hundred more dollars of volatility to go. Overall, the asymmetry of being long has been reset, but the bull trend is just not your friend yet.

And so I think over the course of the summer, it's going to be about recognizing when we've transitioned from this distribution cycle and sell cycle to a more constructive technical backdrop, which suggesting that gold may begin a new rally. It's clearly not here yet, and it's something that we're going to keep talking about every single week here on the show.

Massil Beguenane: Well, Patrick, the clearest contrast in the metals is how much more aggressively silver has been washed out than gold, and it shows up across all 3 trader groups. Both speculative groups in silver are scoring near the bottom of their 1-year ranges, and commercials are only lightly hedged. And when the hedgers ease off, it tells you they see less froth left to protect against. Interestingly enough, gold shows a different picture. The gauge reads neutral, but large speculators are still heavily net long at 52% of open interest. So silver's been through the storm. Gold is still holding its umbrella.

Coffee: positioning pulse from the COT data

Patrick Ceresna: All right, Massil, when looking beyond these 4 major asset classes that we've just discussed, when looking at these Commitments of Traders reports, are there any futures or commodities that you think are worth talking about?

Massil Beguenane: What's on your mind Let's jump right into it, into a market we've not talked about, and that is coffee. I want to touch on this because it is a textbook example of fundamentals forcing an entire market to reposition. Now, coffee spent roughly 8 months in a brutal bear market, falling about 44% from its October peak. By the time it bottomed, the trade had been completely abandoned. Large and small speculators were both sitting at their 1-year positioning lows with real short positions On, not just reduce longs. And here's the tell on the other side: commercial hedgers have gone unusually exposed, barely hedging at all. When the producers themselves stop paying for protection, they're telling you something: there's nothing to protect against. Everyone who could give up already has. Severe weather and harvest delays in Brazil, renewed El Niño concerns, and extremely thin global inventories suddenly challenge expectations for a record crop. With very little inventory available to absorb another supply disrupt. Coffee surged roughly 30%, including a historic 15% one-day rally.

The COT data show how that repricing forced everyone to pivot. Large speculators moved from a positioning score of 0 to 51 in just one month, the largest increase we've seen across all assets. But because price rose while open interest declined, the first stage appears to have been driven much more by bears covering shorts than by new bulls building positions. Now, small specs also arrived a little later as their positioning jumped by 40 points in just one week. Meanwhile, commercials used the rally to rebuild hedges, moving from 0 to 52 on that positioning. Now here's the opportunity. Large specs are net long only about 15% of their total open interest compared to their historical peak, which is usually around 40%. So professional positioning has recovered. But it is not crowded by any means. Now here's what confirmation looks like from here. There's 3 things moving together: price making new highs, open interest expanding underneath it, and large specs doing the adding.

Now if that happens, coffee may be transitioning from a short covering rally into a more durable bull market. The fundamentals created the turn. The positioning tells us the market may still have room to run. And that's your positioning pulse for the week. To get access to all this data, visit cotsignal.com.

Patrick Ceresna: That's C-O-T-S-I-G-N-A-L.com.

Massil Beguenane: All right, back to you, Patrick.

Patrick Ceresna: Well, thanks for bringing that up. I'm definitely going to keep a close eye on the coffee trade going into next week. Now, listeners, reminder that you'll find this week's Trade of the Week chartbook and the supporting links in this week's Research Roundup or on the homepage of MacroVoices.com. That does it for this week's edition of the MacroVoices Trading Desk. Have a good trading day, everyone.

Massil Beguenane: Have a great trading day, everyone.

Anas Alhajji: Have a great trading day, everyone.

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